I. Progress, developments and important context[1]

1. *Strongly reaffirms* commitment to multilateralism and to the principles and provisions of the Convention and the Paris Agreement, as the central framework for collective climate action, recalling that the Paris Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances, resolves to remain united in the pursuit of efforts to achieve the purpose and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement;

2. *Commends* the 163 Parties that, as at 9 November 2026, had communicated their new nationally determined contributions for the next policy cycle of the Paris Agreement and *urges* Parties that have not yet communicated a new nationally determined contribution to do so as soon as possible, demonstrating progression and highest possible ambition;

3. *Commends* the 80 Parties that have communicated long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies and *urges* Parties that have not yet done so to communicate such strategies as soon as possible;

4. *Recognizes* the 2026 synthesis report on nationally determined contributions, including its finding of positive uptake of the outcomes of the first global stocktake in nationally determined contributions;

5. *Welcomes* the 2026 synthesis report of the first biennial transparency reports, and *recognizes* that the enhanced transparency framework under the Paris Agreement is in full implementation;

6. *Encourages* Parties that have not yet submitted their first biennial transparency report to do so as soon as possible, taking into consideration paragraph 4 of decision 18/CMA.1;

7. *Invites* all Parties to submit on time their biennial transparency reports due on 31 December 2026, and *underlines* the need for enhanced, predictable and timely support for developing country Parties to prepare their biennial transparency reports and strengthen their national transparency systems. recalling the resources available for transparency;

8. *Commends* the Parties that have submitted national adaptation plans, policies and sectoral strategies, and calls upon Parties that have not yet done so to do so;

9. *Acknowledges* that, while progress has been made in adaptation planning, further efforts are needed to translate adaptation priorities into action on the ground;

10. *Encourages* enhanced support for the implementation of national adaptation plans, and *urges* Parties to implement the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience and to mainstream climate change adaptation into all relevant national plans and strategies, taking into account national circumstances and priorities;

[1] The present document is being issued without formal editing.

11. *Acknowledges* that the Paris Agreement is working and that the global transition towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development is irreversible, and that significant collective progress towards the Paris Agreement temperature goal has been made, from an expected global temperature increase of more than 4 °C according to some projections prior to the adoption of the Agreement to an increase of around 2.6 °C based on the full implementation of national climate plans;

12. *Welcomes* with appreciation that the goal by developed country Parties to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year to address the needs in developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation was surpassed in 2022, 2023 and 2024 by a growing margin. In the context of this goal, *acknowledges* progress on meaningful mitigation action and transparency on implementation, while noting that further efforts are needed to address the remaining gap in both agreed mitigation action and transparency on implementation.

13. *Welcomes* the rapid establishment and operationalization of the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage, the ongoing progress made by its Board to establish the Barbados Implementation Modalities and the progress achieved in the implementation of the Santiago network and by the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism, and *stresses* the importance of enhancing the collaboration, coordination, complementarity and coherence across loss and damage instruments;

14. *Acknowledges* the historical responsibility of developed country Parties for climate change and their obligations to demonstrate leadership through their climate action and the delivery of their climate finance obligations, *notes* with deep concern the pre-2020 gaps in both mitigation ambition and implementation by developed country Parties, and *recognizes* that the present situation is linked to historical emissions and the lack of delivery on the commitments by developed countries, particularly in mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation;

15. *Recognizes* that capabilities and responsibility for action and support are evolving, and *welcomes* that, as capability grows, more actors can contribute more strongly to global climate action on mitigation, adaptation and finance, on a voluntary basis;

16. *Expresses* concern that the carbon budget consistent with achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal is now limited and being rapidly depleted, *acknowledges* that historical cumulative net carbon dioxide emissions of developed country Parties already account for about four fifths of the total carbon budget for a 50 per cent probability of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C, *notes* that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change had earlier indicated that developed countries must reduce emissions by 25 to 40 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020, which was not achieved, and *recognizes* that shortfalls in mitigation ambition in developed country Parties were followed by decreasing climate finance provision and increasing adaptation impacts and costs;

17. *Decides* to convene a high-level ministerial roundtable on the experience and lessons learned from the pre-2020 mitigation implementation and ambition gaps in conjunction with each session of the Conference of the Parties, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, starting in 2027.

II. Impacts, challenges and opportunities

18. *Expresses* deep concern for scientific findings on 1.5°C overshoot and that global efforts remain insufficient to keep 1.5°C within reach;

19. *Reaffirms* resolve to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C, to limit both the magnitude and duration of any temperature overshoot, and to close adaptation gaps;

20. *Recognises* that the magnitude and duration of any overshoot will be determined by the pace and scale of global action on mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation and that the likelihood of overshoot underlines the urgency of climate action to achieve deep, rapid and sustained emissions reductions and to build resilience to current and future risks.

21. *Recognises* that 1.5°C overshoot and every increment of warming beyond 1.5°C will increase the frequency and intensity of loss and damage and result in increasingly adverse, and in some cases irreversible, impacts and risks to human and natural systems.

22. *Resolves* to return global warming to below 1.5 °C as early as possible within this century.

23. *Urges* Parties, while implementing their NDCs, to strive to overachieve their targets, in light of national circumstances;

24. *Requests* Parties to revisit and strengthen their NDCs and accelerate their implementation, as necessary to align with the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement, in advance of the second global stocktake, recognizing the ability of developing country Parties to do so depends on the provision of adequate, predictable and accessible means of implementation by developed country Parties;

25. *Recognizes* that developed countries should take the lead, including the call to achieve net zero emissions by 2030 and net-negative emissions by 2040;

26. *Recognises* that ongoing geopolitical tensions are placing multilateralism under strain even as the urgency of climate action continues to intensify, and *acknowledges* that such tensions have contributed to heightened uncertainty and volatility in global energy markets and fossil fuel supply chains, with implications for energy security, access and affordability, as well as broader economic and social impacts;

27. *Expresses* deep concern that global peak warming is projected to exceed 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, *recognizes* that every increment of warming increases climate risks and impacts, including irreversible losses, the risk of crossing climate tipping points and increasingly constrained adaptation options, and *reaffirms* the resolve to pursue efforts to limit warming to 1.5 °C, underscoring the urgency of accelerating action to minimize both the magnitude and duration of any temperature overshoot and to return global warming to below 1.5 °C as soon as possible;

28. *Notes* with deep concern that the adverse impacts of climate change are increasing in frequency and severity, with far-reaching consequences for people, livelihoods and ecosystems, including oceans, mountains and the cryosphere, and *further expresses* concern over the potential of the ongoing El Niño event, compounded by long-term climate change, to exacerbate extreme weather events, including droughts, floods and extreme heat, with disproportionate impacts on particularly vulnerable developing countries, including Small Island Developing States;

29. *Recognizes* that climate change is already harming human health, including physical and mental health, through climate-sensitive diseases such as malaria, dengue and cholera, heat stress, maternal health, food and nutrition insecurity and damage to health facilities during extreme events, with these impacts falling hardest on the most vulnerable developing

countries, and *underlines* the need to strengthen the climate resilience of health systems, including through the integration of health in national adaptation plans and nationally climate plans and of climate information and early warning systems into public health protection;

30. *Recognizes* that temperature overshoot will further increase adaptation needs and climate risks, constrain the availability and effectiveness of adaptation options, and increase losses and damages, particularly in vulnerable developing countries, and *emphasizes* the importance of a comprehensive response to overshoot across mitigation, adaptation and averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage, underscoring the urgency of closing adaptation gaps, strengthening adaptive capacities and climate resilience, and enhancing action and support to enable countries and communities to better prepare for, adapt to, respond to and recover from adverse climate impacts;

31. *Recognizes* the particular vulnerability of mountain regions and glacier-dependent communities to the adverse effects of climate change, and *decides* to establish a dedicated work programme on mountains and climate change to strengthen scientific understanding, adaptation action, resilience-building and support for mountainous and glacier-dependent communities and requests the SBTA to recommend a draft decision on this matter for consideration by the COP at its X session; *also decides* to include a standing agenda item on matters related to mountains and climate change under the COP, supported by a high-level dialogue to be convened at COP32 under the guidance of the COP Presidency;

32. *Welcomes* the Mountains and Climate Change Dialogues to be convened at SB66 and SB68 and recognizes their contribution to elevating scientific understanding and awareness of the impacts of climate change on mountain ecosystems, glacier-dependent communities; *encourages* the continuation of these dialogues and the convening of a regular high-level dialogue under the COP Presidency to facilitate the exchange of knowledge, experiences and best practices, strengthen cooperation on adaptation and resilience-building, and ensure that the perspectives and priorities of mountain countries, Indigenous Peoples, and local communities continue to inform climate action under the Convention and the Paris Agreement.

33. *Notes with concern* the persistent gaps in mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage and in the provision of means of implementation, particularly finance, technology transfer and capacity-building, including the gap between climate finance flows and needs, *recognizes* the urgency of enhancing action and support in relation to adaptation, means of implementation and mitigation to address the gaps in the implementation of the Paris Agreement as a whole, and *also recognizes* that enhanced support for developing country Parties will allow for higher ambition in their actions;

34. *Expresses* deep concern on the decline in annual contributions to the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and Global Environment Facility and *calls on* developed country Parties to urgently scale up their contributions.

35. *Welcomes* the GEF-9 replenishment to ensure substantial scale-up of climate finance, underline the importance of an ambitious 3rd GCF-replenishment and encourage the GCF to actively reach out to new contributors;

36. *Notes* with deep concern the findings of the United Nations Environment Programme's Adaptation Gap Report 2026, which estimates adaptation finance needs in developing countries at approximately USD 305 billion annually by 2035, compared with international public adaptation finance of USD 28 to 32 billion in 2024, only USD 1 billion more than the previous year; *also notes* that even tripling adaptation finance by 2035 would represent no more than 29 per cent of estimated needs, and recalls Article 7, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement in relation to the resultant increase in adaptation costs in the context of overshoot;

37. *Emphasizes the importance of* tpromoting the economic and social benefits and opportunities of climate action, including economic growth, affordability, job and income creation, entrepreneurship and innovation, improved energy access and security, and improved public health and quality of life, inter alia through integrated climate and clean-air action;

38. *Recognizes* the significant drop in the cost and the maturing of renewable energy technologies since the adoption of the Paris Agreement and current global challenges around energy security and dependency, and the role of the energy transition in improving competitiveness, innovation, access and affordability;

39. *Acknowledges* the opportunities available to pursue sustainable economic diversification and low-emission development pathways, including through emerging technologies and industries, consistent with national priorities and circumstances, and *further recognizes* the transition towards renewable and low carbon energy sources and energy efficiency as essential to ensuring energy security, affordability and availability for all while strengthening energy system resilience;

40. *Decides* to establish a work programme on understanding the science on 1.5C so as to return below 1.5C by the end of the century, including a focus on understanding scientific evidence on limiting the magnitude and duration of overshoot as well as on responding to the impacts of exceeding 1.5C and considering the complementarity between equity, science and sustainable development, and *requests* the SBI and Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) to recommend a draft decision on this matter for consideration and adoption by the CMA at its ninth session;

41. *Decides* the work programme will consider the work of the IPCC, consist of an annual dialogue held at the first SBs session of each year and an annual synthesis report of each dialogue, and that the annual reports will be considered by the CMA at each session;

42. *Requests* the SBSTA to dedicate its next research dialogue to the science of overshoot and the return to below 1.5 °C;

43. *Recognizes* that systematic observation underpins early warning, climate services and the assessment of collective progress through the Global Stocktake, and expresses concern regarding threats to the continuity and sustainability of long- term observational records and networks, both in situ and satellite, of the Earth system and the declining support available to sustain them, including support for the Global Climate Observing System (GCOS) and for the Global Ocean Observing System (GOOS) and encourages support for closing observation gaps in developing countries, including through the Systematic Observations Financing Facility;

44. *Recognizes* the contribution of the reports of the United Nations Environment Programme on the emissions gap, limiting overshoot, sea-level rise and the cryosphere;

45. *Recognizes* the critical importance of science and information integrity as essential to climate action, underlines the need to protect those on the frontlines defending information integrity and calls on all actors to continue working together to promote information integrity at the international, regional, national and local levels.

III. Accelerating implementation

A. Concrete solutions

46. *Underlines* that the mitigation and adaptation efforts referred to in this section are global efforts to which Parties are called upon to contribute in a nationally determined manner, taking into account the Paris Agreement and their different national circumstances, starting points, development priorities, pathways and approaches, recognizing that pathways vary and that Parties have the right to determine their own policy choices, and that these global efforts do not establish specific targets or obligations for individual Parties;

47. *Recognizes* that end-to-end multi-hazard early warning systems are among the most effective solutions for saving lives, reducing loss and damage and strengthening adaptation and resilience, highlights the need for strengthening and expanding deployment of end-to-end multi-hazard early warning systems linked to early action;

48. *Recalling* the call of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to ensure universal coverage of early warning systems for all people on Earth by 2027 and recognizing the contribution of the Early Warnings for All initiative towards achieving this goal, affirms the commitment to deliver on the Early Warnings for All initiative and the 2027 target for universal coverage, including in all least developed countries and small island developing States, and calls for scaled-up international cooperation and support for developing countries, including finance, technology transfer, technical assistance and capacity-building, to strengthen national and local capacities for climate risk monitoring, forecasting, early warning dissemination, preparedness and anticipatory action and to integrate climate information and early warning systems into public health protection, disaster risk reduction and adaptation planning;

49. *Calls* for accelerating, in line with national circumstances, the transition towards clean, secure, affordable, accessible and resilient energy systems, including through the accelerated development, deployment and diffusion of renewable energy and other zero- and low-carbon energy technologies, energy efficiency, the accelerated expansion, modernization and resilience of electricity grids, transmission and distribution networks, interconnection, storage and flexible power systems, sufficient investment and enhanced access to adequate, affordable and predictable financing, particularly for developing economies, and universal access to clean, reliable, affordable and sustainable energy and clean cooking, including in Africa;

50. *Calls* on Parties to contribute, in a nationally determined manner, taking into account the Paris Agreement and their different national circumstances, pathways and approaches, to global efforts to increase the share of electricity in total final energy consumption to 35 per cent by 2035, recognizing the significant benefits to emission reductions, energy security, energy efficiency, economic development and energy access, particularly when combined with efforts to triple renewable energy capacity globally and double the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030, and alongside storage, system flexibility and modern and resilient grids; calls for accelerating the clean energy transition through increased clean electrification; and underlines that its benefits are realized through universal access to clean and affordable energy and on means of implementation for developing country Parties noting that electrification can provide co-benefits regardless of the electricity mix and should be complemented by other decarbonization strategies especially in hard-to-abate sectors;

51. *Recognizes* that rapid and substantial reductions in anthropogenic methane and other non-carbon-dioxide emissions provide significant opportunities to slow the rate of global warming in the near term and to limiting peak warming and the duration of overshoot,

alongside accelerated action to reduce all greenhouse gas emissions, and calls on Parties to accelerate action to reduce such emissions, building on paragraph 28(f) of decision 1/CMA.5, through practical and cost-effective solutions, recognizing that mitigation pathways, opportunities and implementation approaches vary across sources, sectors and taking into account different national circumstances and development priorities;

52. *Encourages* the accelerated implementation of proven and cost-effective measures to reduce methane emissions, in particular from fugitive processes, through strengthened measurement, reporting and verification, the rapid detection and repair of leaks and the elimination of routine flaring and venting, and best efforts to achieve near-zero upstream methane intensity levels, as well as the capture of methane from waste and calls for enhanced international cooperation, technical assistance and support for developing countries in this regard;

53. *Expresses* deep concern about the impacts of climate change on the ocean, livelihoods and biodiversity, including through ocean warming and sea level rise, and recognizes the important contribution of sustainable ocean-based climate action and solutions to strengthening adaptation and resilience and advancing mitigation efforts towards the achievement of the goals of the Paris Agreement, while delivering benefits for communities and biodiversity;

54. *Further encourages* Parties, as appropriate and in accordance with national circumstances, to strengthen and accelerate the implementation of sustainable ocean-based action in their national climate goals and plans, including, but not limited to, NDCs and NAPs, in a nationally determined manner recognizing the urgent need to enhance means of implementation and support, in a timely, adequate and predictable manner, to achieve the implementation of ocean-based climate action, especially for those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant capacity constraints including through enhanced access to data and technologies, capacity-building to support enabling policy and regulatory frameworks, funding and investment, improved access to finance and tracking of ocean–climate financial flows;

55. *Encourages* locally led and ecosystem-based adaptation and integrated adaptation programmes that combine sustainable land management, ecosystem restoration, drought resilience and climate-resilient livelihoods, supported by adequate finance, technology transfer and capacity-building, from developed countries to developing countries, taking into account national circumstances and priorities;

56. *Recalling* decision 1/CMA.5, recognizes nature-based solutions and ecosystem-based approaches as essential climate solutions that can contribute simultaneously to mitigation, adaptation and resilience, including through the conservation, protection, restoration and sustainable management of forests and other natural ecosystems;

57. *Emphasizes* that forests play a critical role as carbon sinks and reservoirs, support biodiversity, food security, and help communities adapt to climate impacts, and encourages enhanced efforts to halt and reverse deforestation and forest degradation by 2030, and in this regard;

58. *Recalls* decision 1/CMA.5, paragraph 28(e), and recognizes that carbon dioxide removal will be required to return warming to below 1.5 °C but must complement, and not substitute for or delay, deep emission reductions, and stresses that its deployment should ensure environmental safeguards, and respect the rights of Indigenous Peoples, and local communities;

59. *Welcomes* efforts that contribute to urgently and rapidly scaling up the development, *dissemination* and deployment of Carbon Capture Utilization and Storage and Carbon Dioxide Removal technologies;

60. *Calls on* Parties to contribute to, taking into account the Paris Agreement and their different national circumstances, pathways and approaches, global efforts to accelerate Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage to at least 500 MtCO2 reflecting current policies by 2035, and to work towards 1.3 to 2.5 Gt CO2 per year by 2035 and encourages all actors, including industry, to scale up research and development and deliver on committed projects, recognizing the role of carbon, capture, utilisation and storage, particularly in hard to abate sectors;

61. *Recognizes* the importance of resource efficiency, sustainable consumption and production, waste reduction and circular economy approaches as important elements of climate action, in accordance with national circumstances and priorities;

62. *Welcomes* the report of the "Belém Mission to 1.5", produced by the *Presidencies* of the sixth, seventh and eighth sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement pursuant to paragraph 42 of decision 1/CMA.7, and encourages Parties and non-Party stakeholders to consider its recommendations, as appropriate and in the light of national circumstances, and calls on the COP30, COP31 and COP32 Presidencies, to [develop, in an open, inclusive and Party-driven manner, an implementation plan giving effect to the recommendations contained in the report, and to report on progress at the ninth session of the CMA][continue the Belém Mission to 1.5 over the following two years, as an input to the second global stocktake and the preparation of the next round of nationally determined contributions];

63. *Encourages* Parties, non-party stakeholders, and relevant works programmes and constituted bodies under or serving the Paris Agreement within their respective mandates, to consider its findings of the report referred to in the preceding paragraph as an actionable toolbox to advance implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions and National Adaptation Plans, as appropriate and in the light of national circumstances, including as an input to GST-2 and in the next round of preparation of nationally determined contributions;

64. *Calls* for the full and expeditious implementation of the outcome of the first global stocktake, as set out in decision 1/CMA.5, in its entirety, encompassing mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation;

65. *Reaffirms* paragraph 28 of decision 1/CMA.5, and *urges* Parties to accelerate its implementation, including transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems in a just, orderly and equitable manner; *emphasizes* the importance of phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that do not address energy poverty or just transitions, as soon as possible, building on the first global stocktake;

66. *Calls* for accelerated action to phase out fossil fuels, including through the immediate transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems.

B. Enabling action, including through means of implementation

67. *Recognizes* that the ability of developing country Parties to enhance ambition and implement nationally determined contributions, including conditional targets, depends on adequate, predictable and accessible means of implementation provided by developed country Parties, including finance, technology and capacity-building; *requests* Parties to

revisit and strengthen their nationally determined contributions and accelerate implementation, as necessary to align with the Paris Agreement's temperature goal in advance of the second global stocktake, and calls for support and partnerships to enable conditional contributions;

68. *Expresses* concern that shortfalls in mitigation ambition in developed country Parties have been followed by decreasing climate finance provision and increasing adaptation impacts and costs and *stresses* the urgent need for scaled-up provision and mobilization of adequate, predictable, public, grant-based and highly concessional finance for adaptation in developing country Parties, especially LDCs and SIDS and others with significant capacity constraints;

69. *Recognizes* the importance of grants and other non-debt-inducing instruments for small island developing states as the primary modality for adaptation activities that do not generate revenues;

70. *Recognizes* the barriers developing country Parties face in accessing climate finance and underscores the need to remove barriers and address disenablers faced by developing country Parties in financing climate action, including high costs of capital, limited fiscal space, unsustainable debt levels, high transaction costs and conditionalities for accessing climate finance, and by scaling up grant-based, highly concessional and non-debt-creating instruments, debt pause clauses in loan agreements, taking into account debt burdens and the inequity of debt-financed adaptation;

71. *Emphasizes* that effective implementation of the new collective quantified goal on climate finance requires addressing systemic access barriers and the capacity constraints faced by developing country Parties, particularly least developed countries and small island developing States;

72. *Recalls* paragraph 18 of decision 1/CMA.3 and *also recalls* paragraph 53 of decision 1/CMA.7 on efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 in the context of decision 1/CMA.6, including paragraph 16 thereof; *urges* full and timely implementation of those commitments and *calls* for adequate and predictable resources for the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, the Adaptation Fund and the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage;

73. *Decides* that tripling finance for adaptation should reach at least USD$120 billion and requests developed country Parties to urgently increase their collective provision of adaptation finance to developing country Parties, and provide a roadmap, including enhanced clarity on the trajectory by which to increase their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing country Parties;

74. *Requests* the Standing Committee on Finance to identify the baseline for the tripling of adaptation finance by developed country Parties by 2035 on the basis of Oxfam's methodology for tracking grant-equivalent climate finance and to report the baseline for consideration and adoption by Parties at the thirty-second session of the Conference of the Parties and the ninth session of the conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement; and *decides* to develop, under the climate finance work programme referred to in paragraph 54 of decision 1/CMA.7, a time-bound implementation pathway for tripling adaptation finance by 2035 for consideration at CMA 9, with a clear baseline, milestones and arrangements for monitoring, reporting and reviewing progress, contributing to a balance between mitigation and adaptation finance within the goal of at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035;

75. *Requests* the Standing Committee on Finance in its report on the NCQG to recommend common methodologies for tracking adaptation finance flows, drawing on existing biennial transparency reports and common tabular formats;

76. *Recognizes* improved, efficient and equitable access to climate finance as essential to implementation, including the NCQG, and *acknowledges* progress by multilateral development banks and climate funds;

77. *Encourages* enhanced readiness support, institutional capacity-building and technical assistance for developing country Parties to strengthen national financial institutions, including national and public development banks and other entities seeking direct access to climate finance, and *invites* the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, funds serving the Paris Agreement and multilateral development banks, upon request and in a country-driven manner, to support funded project preparation and capacity-building without conditionalities and without prejudice to the obligations of developed country Parties under Article 9 of the Paris Agreement;

78. *Requests* the secretariat, in collaboration with Parties that provide bilateral climate finance, multilateral development banks, and the multilateral climate funds, including the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, the Adaptation Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund, to organize a series of annual workshops from 2027 to 2030 to facilitate the exchange of views, efforts and progress made and next steps in implementing paragraphs 22 to 24 of decision 1/CMA.6 on enhancing access to climate finance, and *also requests* the Secretariat to prepare technical reports on these workshops for consideration as inputs to the biennial report by the SCF on implementation of decision 1/ CMA 6 and as inputs to the Special Assessment of Access to Climate Finance established in paragraph 34 of decision 1/ CMA 6;

79. *Urges* developed country Parties, and the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, the Adaptation Fund and the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage, and *invites* multilateral development banks and other international financial institutions, to: operationalize simplified, harmonized and expedited approval and disbursement procedures, and publish the time taken from submission to approval and from approval to first disbursement; prioritize enhanced direct access for national, subnational and regional institutions, including through mutual recognition of accreditation across funds; establish dedicated minimum allocation floors for small island developing States and least developed countries; provide readiness and project preparation support that extends beyond the preparation of strategies and pipelines to support implementation; reduce co-financing requirements and transaction costs; and deliver support predominantly through grant-based and non-debt-creating instruments that reflect country-driven priorities;

80. *Invites* the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, the Adaptation Fund and the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage to include in their annual reports information on the measures taken to improve access for small island developing States and least developed countries, and on the time taken from submission to approval and disbursement;

81. *Encourages* country-led programming and the meaningful and accessible engagement of vulnerable communities and groups, including the use of funding modalities and delivery mechanisms which enable a greater share of climate finance to reach the local level;

82. *Encourages also* the use of anticipatory financing, multilayered disaster risk financing instruments, regional risk pooling, pre-arranged finance and insurance, and investing in adaptive, inclusive, accessible and shock-responsive social protection systems;

83. *Reaffirms* paragraph 16 of decision 1/CMA.6 and *decides* to define at its ninth session a pathway to at least triple annual outflows from the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, the Adaptation Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund based on 2022 levels by 2030 at the latest, including indicative annual milestones; and *calls* upon developed country Parties to announce ambitious pledges by the end of 2027 to the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage, the Global Environment Facility, the Special Climate Change Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Adaptation Fund and in line with the decision to triple climate fund outflows from 2022 levels by 2030, as contained in decision 1/CMA.6;

84. *Notes* that requests under the Barbados Implementation Modalities total approximately USD 2.8 billion against allocations of approximately USD 342 million, that only 50 per cent of USD 822 million in FRLD pledges has reportedly been converted into contributions, and that the Santiago Network and WIM ExCom remain under-resourced and *welcomes* the rapid establishment and operationalization of the FRLD, and ongoing progress made by the Board to establish the BIM;

85. *Recognizes* the role of regional mechanisms, such as the Pacific Resilience Facility, which was designed by and for small island developing States, and calls for their capitalization;

86. *Acknowledges* the Convention's role in setting the framework for equitable and just international cooperation on climate change responsive to the needs of developing countries by reflecting historical responsibility through legally binding financial obligations on Annex II Parties, and the importance of an open and supportive international economic system;

87. *Reaffirms* that developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention and *calls* on developed countries to fulfill their commitments without backtracking and to provide adequate, accessible, and predictable finance, that responds to the needs and priorities of developing countries;

88. *Recalls* the decision to establish a two-year work programme on climate finance, including on Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement in the context of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement as a whole;

89. *Reaffirms* decision 1/CMA.6 on the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance as the principal multilateral framework for the mobilization and provision of international climate finance, and *emphasizes* full implementation and follow-through on the goal;

90. *Welcomes* the report ‘Implementing the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T’ and *calls* on Parties to continue efforts on the implementation of the Roadmap and to monitor progress on its implementation;

91. *Requests* the Standing Committee on Finance to launch work on finalizing a common approach for reporting climate finance from developed country Parties through the Enhanced Transparency Framework building on previous Standing Committee on Finance reports on the matter and present options for the consideration and adoption of Parties at the thirty-second session of the Conference of the Parties and the ninth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;

92. *Requests* the Standing Committee on Finance to prepare by COP32 (2027) a preliminary report on implementation of the New Collective Quantified Goal as an input for

the second Global Stocktake in 2028, and to report by COP32 on progress towards the COP26 commitment to double adaptation finance from 2019 levels by 2025.

93. *Requests* the Standing Committee on Finance, as part of its efforts to prepare its biennial report on collective progress towards the NCQG as per paragraph 30 of decision 1/CMA.6, to consider developing a methodology for assessing access to climate finance and to provide information on regional challenges in accessing climate finance, particularly those faced by LDCs and SIDS, including disaggregated information by region, as appropriate.

94. *Reaffirms* Article 2, paragraph 1(c), as a long-term goal of the Paris Agreement; *welcomes* accelerating global economic, technological and investment trends and their opportunities for climate-resilient development, and *recognizes* the importance of a robust, evolving and non-burdensome evidence base under the Veredas Dialogue to improve visibility of nationally determined action, implementation and priorities of Parties and non-Party stakeholders; *encourages* Parties to identify and report measures that help align financial flows with low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.

95. *Emphasizes* that an ambitious response to overshoot requires full implementation of Article 2, paragraph 1(c), in a nationally determined manner reflecting different national circumstances, complementary to and not a substitute for the provision and mobilization of financial support under Article 9; *recognizes* that these policies, actions and measures can enhance developing countries' capacity to attract and absorb climate finance, optimize the use of grant-based and concessional finance, and crowd in private investment.

96. *Recognizes* the three complementary dimensions for understanding and assessing progress towards the implementation of Article 2 paragraph 1(c), namely (i) the consistency of real-economy investment flows with low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development, (ii) the alignment of public fiscal activities, and (iii) the alignment of financial sector activities and capital allocation with these goals.

97. *Emphasizes* the importance of mobilizing public, private, bilateral, multilateral and alternative sources of climate finance for developing country Parties; *encourages* voluntary contributions by developing country Parties, including through South–South cooperation, and by other capable countries, as well as expanded private-sector funding, recognizing that the ability to provide support grows as capabilities evolve.

98. *Takes note of* the 21% increase in climate finance from multilateral development banks over the prior year in view of reaching their 2030 climate finance estimates announced at COP29, of delivering $120 billion per year to low- and middle-income economies and mobilizing a further $65 billion in private capital;

99. *Decides* to launch, under the guidance of the COP31 and COP32 Presidencies, in consultation with Parties, the “Antalya-to-Addis Ababa Roadmap on Adaptation and Resilience Finance”, aiming to identify predictable and scaled-up public sources of finance for adaptation and loss and damage, including through innovative sources, and mechanisms for access; and *requests* the Presidencies to produce a report summarizing the conclusions of the work for consideration by COP32 (2027);

100. *Requests* the Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to provide options for the process to operationalize the risk mitigation mechanism and global insurance mechanism for Parties consideration at the sixty-sixth session of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation with a view to recommending a draft decision for the consideration of Parties at the thirty-second session of the conference of the Parties;

101. *Calls* for strengthened technical and financial support for developing countries affected by severe land degradation and desertification;

102. *Encourages* Parties, in accordance with their national circumstances and priorities, to strengthen multilevel arrangements with subnational governments for the implementation of their nationally determined contributions and national adaptation plans, and *calls* for adequate means of implementation to support such efforts in developing country Parties;

C. International cooperation

103. *Underlining* the urgent need to address, in a comprehensive and synergetic manner, the interlinked global crises of climate change, biodiversity loss, desertification, and land and ocean degradation in the broader context of achieving sustainable development;

104. *Encourages* enhanced cooperation and synergies among the Convention, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, and with other multilateral environmental agreements, within their respective mandates and available resources, including through existing mechanisms such as the Joint Liaison Group and secretariats, respecting the distinct legal mandates, governance structures and financial mechanisms of each convention, and through coherence among relevant national planning, implementation and reporting processes, such as nationally determined contributions, national adaptation plans, national biodiversity strategies and action plans and land degradation neutrality targets, in accordance with national circumstances, with a view to reducing duplication, improving institutional coordination and facilitating access to financing for integrated projects;

105. *Acknowledging* that climate change is a common concern of humankind and that Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of Indigenous Peoples, and of people of African descent, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity;

106. *Recognizes* the leadership of Indigenous Peoples as stewards of nature and the important role of their knowledge, wisdom and values in effective action on climate change, including through the use of traditional knowledge and knowledge of indigenous peoples, where appropriate, *emphasizes* that climate action must respect, promote and fulfil the inherent and distinct rights of Indigenous Peoples, including their right to free, prior and informed consent, in accordance with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and *urges* Parties to actively involve Indigenous Peoples in the design and implementation of climate action, noting climate solutions must not come at the expense of the territories, practices, livelihoods, rights, and lives of these Indigenous Peoples.

107. *Stresses* that effective and sustainable climate action requires respecting, protecting and fulfilling human rights, gender equality, the full, equal and meaningful participation and leadership of women and girls in all their diversity, as well as an inclusive approach which takes into account intergenerational equity, including children and youth, calling for gender-responsive climate action and the mainstreaming gender equality across all negotiated outcomes and Action Agenda activities and *urges* Parties to advance the implementation of the Belém Gender Action Plan, adopted by decision 7/CP.30, through gender-responsive and gender-transformative policies and actions across all aspects of climate action while addressing structural inequalities;

108. *Recognizes* that children and youth are disproportionately affected by the impacts of climate change and are important actors in an effective response, *invites* Parties to strengthen

action and support to respond to the impacts of climate change on children as a primary consideration in national planning and implementation processes;

109. *Recognizes* the importance of advancing intergenerational equity and meaningful participation of children and youth in climate action and decision-making processes, and invites relevant work programmes and constituted bodies to integrate responses to impacts on children, youth in undertaking work within their existing mandates and in their activities and outputs;

110. *Encourages* Parties and relevant actors to strengthen climate and water resilient health, education, and sanitation systems and infrastructure, with a view to safeguarding children's access to essential services and reducing climate-related risks to health, learning outcomes and overall development;

111. *Calls* for just transition pathways that integrate developing countries into technology value chains, strengthen industrial capacity and value addition, and create decent employment, and for such pathways to be supported by finance and technology transfer; reflecting national circumstances and priorities; safeguarding the right to development; and addressing the social and economic impacts of response measures.

112. *Recognizes* that workers' rights, decent work and quality jobs are central to effective climate action. The transition to low-emission economies should protect the dignity of workers and their families, reflect the imperatives of a just workforce transition and nationally defined development priorities, and address the human and social costs of technological development, including often-invisible labour and exploitative working conditions throughout technological supply chains.

113. *Recognizes* the central role of the best available science and of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, whose assessment reports are the most robust and comprehensive assessment of climate science, for the effective implementation of the Convention and the Paris Agreement, highlighting the importance of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change for the global stocktake, and expresses appreciation and gratitude to those involved in preparing the reports of the Seventh Assessment Report for their contributions;

114. *Recognizes* the value of a full range of knowledge and participation in the IPCC, including contributions from Indigenous Peoples, people of African descent, local communities, non-English speaking regions, and developing countries, and allow sufficient time to prepare comprehensive and credible scientific assessments;

115. *Expresses* serious concern at the proliferation of unilateral climate-related trade-restrictive and regulatory measures with cross-border effect which transfer the economic burden of mitigation action to other Parties, especially developing country Parties, contrary to Article 3, paragraph 5, of the Convention and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and at their impacts on the market access, competitiveness, investment and industrialization of developing countries and on just transitions, and *requests* the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures and its Katowice Committee of Experts to assess, under its workplan, in a comprehensive, thorough and systematic manner, the social and economic cross-border impacts of such measures on developing country Parties, including on the accessibility and affordability of climate-related products and technologies, and to report thereon to the subsidiary bodies;

116. *Recognizes* that international trade can contribute to a supportive and open international economic system that promotes sustainable economic growth and development, supports climate action, and creates opportunities for value addition, diversification and participation in emerging low-emissions value chains and emphasizes the role of enhanced

international cooperation on finance, technology development and transfer, capacity-building and productive capacities in enabling nationally determined, development-centered transitions that reflect different national circumstances and national development priorities.

117. *Welcomes* the convening of the first dialogue on trade and climate change at the sixty-fourth sessions of the subsidiary bodies and encourages continued engagement at the next two dialogues and the related high-level event, recognizing that trade-related measures can have both positive and negative implications for climate action;

118. *Decides* that the dialogue established by decision 1/CMA.7, paragraph 57, will advance discussions towards developing common guiding principles for trade-related climate measures under the UNFCCC, such as non-discrimination, transparency and interoperability, taking into account Article 3.5 of the Convention, and shall, inter alia, identify modalities, including time-bound modalities, for the avoidance, minimization and elimination of unilateral climate-related trade-restrictive measures with detrimental impacts on developing country Parties;

119. *Calls* on developed country Parties to phase out unilateral climate-related and trade-restrictive measures and any other measures with negative spillover effects on international cooperation on climate change by the end of 2027;

120. *Welcomes* the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 23 July 2025, which clarifies the obligations of States in respect of climate change, and *notes* General Assembly resolution 80/263, underlining the importance of States implementing measures, in the context of the Paris Agreement and in the light of different national circumstances, pathways and approaches, to limit the increase in the global average temperature to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, without prejudice to the legal positions of States;

121. *Welcomes* the full operationalization of the Global Implementation Accelerator at its eighth session as a cooperative, facilitative and voluntary initiative to accelerate implementation across all actors to keep 1.5 °C within reach and supporting countries in implementing their nationally determined contributions and national adaptation plans, and *welcomes* the report of the Presidencies of the seventh and eighth sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;

122. *Underscores* the complementary roles of the negotiations and the Global Climate Action Agenda in accelerating implementation and *emphasizes* the voluntary nature of the Global Climate Action Agenda in scaling up and strengthening voluntary efforts, initiatives and coalitions and mobilizing non-Party stakeholders to accelerate implementation;

123. *Welcomes* the progress, leadership and work of the high-level champions in promoting activities under the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action on implementing voluntary efforts, initiatives and coalitions;

124. *Recognizes* the role of the Global Climate Action Agenda in supporting implementation and enhancing international cooperation and *further recognizes* progress across the six axes of the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action and its role in supporting implementation of the outcomes of the first global stocktake and encourages its continuity.

125. *Invites* Parties to appoint voluntary implementation focal points by informing the secretariat to receive regular relevant information on engagement with the climate high-level champions, Marrakech Partnership and the Global Climate Action Agenda.

126. *Welcomes* the launch of the COP31 Antalya Compact for Energy Efficient Buildings, developed by the COP31 Presidency with the support of the United Nations Environment Programme-hosted Global Alliance for Buildings and Construction secretariat, and its collective global ambition to reduce the operational energy intensity of the global building stock by at least 25 per cent by 2035, relative to 2020 levels;

127. *Welcomes* the launch of the second global stocktake as a comprehensive, facilitative, inclusive and Party-driven process and an integral part of the ambition cycle of the Paris Agreement, building on the outcomes of the first global stocktake and respecting the five-yearly cycle of the global stocktake, *underscores* the importance of the second global stocktake assessing collective progress, implementation gaps and enabling conditions across mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, and means of implementation and support, informed by equity and the best available science, and providing an effective response to overshoot, *underlines* that the second global stocktake should assess collective progress towards the global efforts referred to in paragraph 28 of decision 1/CMA.5 and calls for regular, consistent tracking of the global stocktake energy goals, so that shortfalls in delivery are identified while there is still time to correct them and encourages the incorporation of climate tipping points, transboundary climate risks and transformational adaptation into the technical assessment phase of the second global stocktake, and *requests* the secretariat, in consultation with the Presidency and relevant constituted bodies, to begin preparatory work in accordance with applicable modalities and guidance, and encourages the meaningful participation of non-Party stakeholders in the process, including through, but not limited to, the climate high-level champions and the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action;

128. *Invites* the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, while fully respecting its independence, to provide all three working group contributions to its Seventh Assessment Report and its Synthesis Report in time to inform the second global stocktake, and to continue to provide relevant and timely information for future global stocktakes;

129. *Requests* the co-facilitators of the Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue to develop a multi-year plan for the Dialogue, taking into account the ambition cycle of the Paris Agreement; to prepare for the technical assessment of the global stocktake.

130. *Further requests* the co-facilitators of the Dialogue to develop a synthesis report drawing on the outcomes of the Dialogue, on how Parties have consider ocean-based action in their national climate policies, as relevant, and in the implementation of these ocean-based actions, and on how relevant work programmes and constituted bodies under the UNFCCC have integrated and strengthened ocean-based action in their existing mandates and workplans as per the invitation in decision 1/CP.26;

131. *Recognizes* the importance of strengthening the ocean and climate change dialogue and of better integrating ocean-related considerations into existing work under the Convention and the Paris Agreement, *encourages* relevant work programmes and constituted bodies, further to paragraph 60 of decision 1/CP.26, to strengthen the integration of ocean-based climate action within their existing mandates and workplans and to report progress on relevant aspects through the ocean and climate change dialogue and in their inputs to the second global stocktake, without imposing additional reporting burdens on Parties.

132. *Invites* the co-facilitators of the ocean and climate change dialogue to develop a multi-year road map for the dialogues in 2027–2028 and, after considering the outputs of the second global stocktake, a multi-year road map for the dialogue covering the period 2029–2033, taking into account views submitted by Parties and non-Party stakeholders, to connect the outcomes of the dialogue across the workstreams under the Convention and the Paris Agreement, including the implications of temperature overshoot for ocean and coastal ecosystems, and make the reports of the dialogue from 2024 to 2028 available as an input to the technical assessment of the second global stocktake;

133. *Invites* Parties to include information on ocean-related mitigation and adaptation activities in their biennial transparency reports, taking into account national circumstances, and decides to establish a high-level ministerial dialogue on ocean–climate action;

134. *Recognizes* the important role and active engagement of non-Party stakeholders, particularly civil society, business, financial institutions, cities and subnational authorities, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, people of African descent, women, youth and children, and research institutions, in supporting Parties and contributing to the significant collective progress towards the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, in addressing and responding to climate change and enhancing ambition and implementation with a view to keeping 1.5 within reach, including progress through other relevant intergovernmental processes.

135. *Recognizes* the need to ensure meaningful and effective social dialogue, participation and action of all stakeholders, calling on all actors to work together to significantly accelerate and scale up climate action worldwide, as part of a global mobilization towards significantly enhancing international cooperation and implementation during this critical decade, through inclusive, multilevel, gender-responsive and cooperative action, including the meaningful participation of Indigenous Peoples, local communities, people of African descent, children and youth, older persons and persons with disabilities, and call for consideration of how to further enhance participation by the most vulnerable countries and communities, particularly from the least developed countries;

136. *Recognizes* the increasing complexity and breadth of the UNFCCC process and the need to maintain an inclusive, transparent, predictable, consensus based, Party-driven UNFCCC process that can effectively fulfill the objectives of the Convention and the Paris Agreement.

137. *Decides* to work towards strengthening the UNFCCC process to fulfil the objectives and goals of the Convention and the Paris Agreement and to launch, under the guidance of the Presidencies of the thirty-first, thirty-second and thirty-third sessions of the Conference of the Parties, in consultation with Parties and independent expert reviewers, as appropriate, high-level consultations on strengthening the UNFCCC process, its organization and its decision-making, aimed at making the process fully fit for purpose to support enhanced ambition and facilitate implementation, while preserving its transparency, inclusivity and Party-driven nature.

138. *Invites* Parties and non-Party stakeholders to submit their views on pathways to strengthen the UNFCCC process *and requests* the Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to organize a dialogue at the sixty-sixth session of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (June 2027) and to prepare a summary for consideration at COP32, with a view to adopting recommendations to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the process.

139. *Recognizes* the important role of voluntary cooperation under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, as a vehicle to promote international cooperation, in enabling higher ambition in mitigation and adaptation actions, promoting sustainable development and ensuring environmental integrity, and the potential of high-integrity international carbon markets to mobilize investment, accelerate emission reductions and contribute to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement, and *encourages* the secretariat and its regional collaboration centres to continue providing technical assistance and capacity-building support to developing country Parties to participate in cooperative approaches, the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, and non-market approaches.

140. *Welcomes* with appreciation the work and efforts of the Presidency of its seventh session towards a decisive transition to a focus on the implementation of the Paris Agreement,

through voluntary, facilitative, non-prescriptive initiatives to contribute to global efforts, in a nationally determined manner, taking into account the Paris Agreement and their different national circumstances, pathways and approaches, including the "COP30 Presidency Roadmap for Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels in Energy Systems, in a just, orderly and equitable manner, accelerating action in this critical decade, so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science", the "COP30 Presidency Roadmap on Enhancing Efforts Towards Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation by 2030", and the "Implementing the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T".

141. *Welcomes* the BRIDGE initiative of the Presidency of the thirty-first session of the Conference of the Parties;

142. *Recognizes* initiatives that foster inclusive dialogue on the ethical dimensions of the climate crisis and of the response to it, bringing the perspectives of people and communities closer to the multilateral process, as illustrated by the Global Ethical Stocktake launched by COP30 Presidency;

143. *Decides* to launch a process to consider the process for the third and further commitment periods of the Kyoto Protocol in accordance with Article 3, paragraph 9, of the Protocol, at the sixty-sixth session of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (June 2027) with a view to recommending a draft decision on the matter for consideration at the twenty-second session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (November 2027);

144. *Decides* that the first review and update, as appropriate, of the modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework for action and support contained in the annex to decision 18/CMA.1 will begin at the sixty-sixth session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (June 2027) and will be undertaken in a facilitative and non-prescriptive manner, with a view to improving clarity, consistency and coherence, and in a manner that respects the flexibility provided to developing country Parties that need it in the light of their capacities, and that the review of the information to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding and of features of nationally determined contributions will also begin at that session, invites Parties, non-Party stakeholders, transparency practitioners and experts to submit via the submission portal by 31 March 2027 their views on experience in reporting, technical expert review and facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress, as input to the review, and requests the secretariat to prepare [a summary report][a compilation and synthesis report] on the submissions, to be made available no later than three weeks prior to that session, for consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice at that session.