

Summary of the round tables under workstream 2 ADP 2, part 2 Bonn, Germany, 4–13 June 2013

Note by the Co-Chairs

25 July 2013

I. Introduction

1. At the second part of its second session, held in Bonn, Germany, from 4 to 13 June 2013, the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) convened workshops and continued its round tables on workstream 1 addressing matters related to paragraphs 2–6 of decision 1/CP.17 (regarding a process to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties (hereinafter referred to as the 2015 agreement)) and on workstream 2 on matters related to paragraphs 7 and 8 of the same decision (regarding pre-2020 ambition).¹

2. One workshop and two round tables under workstream 2 were convened during the second part of the second session. In addition, briefings were organized to inform the ADP on on-going work in various bodies and arrangements of relevance to the work under both workstream 1 and workstream 2.² The objective of the workshop organized under workstream 2 was to address the pre-2020 ambition through energy transformation, in particular including scaling up renewable energy, enhancing energy efficiency and the consideration of carbon capture and storage (CCS). The discussion held during the workshop is captured in the summary report on the workshop.³

3. The objective of the round tables was to focus on how the ADP can build a practical approach to increasing pre-2020 ambition and enhance climate finance, technology and capacity building enablement and support. This note summarizes the discussions of the round tables and is structured according to the main themes that Parties discussed, rather than following in chronological order of interventions. In order to focus the discussions the round table meetings were structured in the following way:

- Building a practical approach to increasing pre-2020 ambition: round table meetings held on 5 June, 8 June and 10 June 2013;
- Enhancing finance, technology and capacity building enablement and support: round table meeting held on 8 June.

4. At the beginning of the round table meetings, some Parties were invited to make short and focused interventions exploring and elaborating on specific proposals and ideas, in order to start off the discussions. Recognizing that the various topics are interlinked and overlapping, the Co-Chairs clarified at the outset that the themes were not meant to limit the discussions in any way, but rather to give structure and focus and to allow the Parties to prepare accordingly.

¹ The summaries of the previous round tables organized under workstream 2 in 2012 and 2013 can be found <http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp_rt_workstream2_26092012.pdf>, <<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/adp1/eng/7infsum.pdf>> and <<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/adp2/eng/6infsum.pdf>>.

² Information on the briefings is available at <<http://unfccc.int/7695>>.

³ The summary of the workshop is available at <http://unfccc.int/meetings/bonn_jun_2013/workshop/7645.php>.

II. Increasing the ambition of emission reduction pledges

5. Parties widely recognized that the pre-2020 ambition could be enhanced by increasing the ambition of emission reduction pledges and actions. It was also recognized that such an increase must be guided by the objective and principles of the Convention and should be treated as a matter of urgency. Developing country Parties maintained that, consistent with these principles, developed countries should continue taking the lead by implementing their mitigation commitments, enhancing their national actions and providing financial support to developing countries to, in turn, facilitate their enhanced action. Some developing country Parties cautioned against a potential shift in responsibilities from developed to developing countries and called for enhancing the ambition, specifically, of developed country Parties' pledges. These Parties also noted that the discussion on ambition of pledges should be framed along the lines of the provisions of the Bali Action Plan (decision 1/CP.13). A number of Parties stressed that addressing the climate change challenge should become the collective responsibility of all, with each Party contributing a fair share to common efforts.

6. Parties discussed options and ways for Parties to both increase by 2020 the ambition of existing emission reduction pledges that were put forward by developed and developing countries following the Cancun Agreements and come up with new and more ambitious pledges. With regard to existing emission reduction pledges, some Parties suggested critically assessing the conditions associated with a number of pledges; moving to the upper range of pledges; and broadening the scope of these pledges. With regard to possible new pledges, it was suggested that Parties should be invited to put forward new and more ambitious emission reduction pledges, thus increasing the number of Parties taking on such pledges and increasing the ambition of those pledges. It was also suggested that identifying the barriers that prevent Parties from making such pledges and considering the ways to remove those barriers should be discussed.

7. Many Parties reiterated the importance of encouraging Parties included in Annex I to the Convention (Annex I Parties) that have agreed to take on quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments (QELRCs) under the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol to increase the ambition of their targets in 2014 at the latest through the ambition mechanism referred to in decision 1/CMP.8, paragraphs 7–11. In this context, some Parties mentioned that the possible outcomes of the review of the ambition under the Kyoto Protocol in 2014 should be discussed at the high-level summit in September 2014 called for by the United Nations Secretary-General.

8. With ratification by at least three quarters of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol required to make the QELRCs for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol legally binding, many Parties urged to promptly ratify the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol (decision 1/CMP.8). In addition, Annex I Parties that are not Parties to the Kyoto Protocol were strongly encouraged to undertake comparable emission reductions under the Convention.

9. Parties were further encouraged to continue the process of clarifying their emission reduction pledges by 2020 under the Convention and to seek ways of increasing the ambition of these pledges. The measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) system established by decisions 1/CP.16 and 2/CP.17 in relation to the review and assessment of emission reduction pledges under the Convention was considered essential to provide confidence and to contribute to trust building among Parties. The MRV system was seen as part of the arrangements incentivizing Parties to increase the ambition of their pre-2020 pledges; those arrangements will serve as a foundation of the 2015 agreement.

III. The emissions gap and mitigation potential for further action

10. An assessment of the emissions gap was presented by Dr. Joseph Alcamo (United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)) in a presentation entitled "Bridging the emissions gap", which was based on the findings of three recent UNEP reports on the emissions gap. In his presentation, Dr. Alcamo focused on the gap between the projected emission level associated with the full implementation of the 2020 emission reduction pledges and the emission level consistent with the 2 °C goal, and discussed ways to bridge this gap. According to the latest report, the

emissions gap is estimated to range between 8 and 13 Gt carbon dioxide equivalent (CO₂ eq) in 2020 and potential emission reductions associated with the existing emission reduction pledges by 2020 are not sufficient to bridge the gap. Based on bottom-up sectorial studies, UNEP identified the total technical mitigation potential, estimated as 17+/-3 Gt CO₂ eq per year in 2020, as sufficient to bridge the gap. The key question is, therefore, how to enhance the ambition of the existing emission reduction pledges and actions. In his presentation, Dr. Alcamo highlighted examples of best practices of policy actions in areas with high mitigation potential, such as transport, buildings, and forestry and reducing deforestation. If scaled up and successfully replicated, such best practices of policy actions could contribute to bridging the gap.

11. Dr. Alcamo cautioned against locking in emission-intensive technologies, structures and processes, as well as against losing time and opportunities to effectively address climate change by relying on a number of current inefficient technologies. He mentioned that in order to meet the 2 °C goal, global emissions should peak before 2020 and decrease by approximately 25 per cent and more than 50 per cent below 2010 levels by 2030 and 2050, respectively. In conclusion, he stressed that the gap can be narrowed if Parties make more ambitious pledges by 2020, adopt strict rules for complying with emission reduction pledges and scale up mitigation policies and actions that deliver co-benefits and address national priorities, all while reducing emissions.

12. Following the presentation, participants asked questions on a broad range of topics, including estimates of mitigation potential, examples of mitigation actions, the methodology used to assess the emissions gap, ways to shift consumption patterns, potential adaptation requirements related to different emission pathways, and the roles of the multiple stakeholders in increasing mitigation ambition. In his responses, Dr. Alcamo highlighted that the policies, measures are available to address untapped mitigation potential, for example, in buildings, cities, appliances, public lighting systems, urban transport, agriculture, etc., and that the mitigation impact could be maximised if national climate change policies address sustainable development priorities in an integrated way. He clarified that the approach used by the UNEP Emissions Gap Report that was based on various emission drivers, scenarios, trajectories and policy impacts in estimating the gap. In addressing the question on adaptation, he mentioned that the economic costs of adaptation and negative climate change impacts are growing and that the need for adaptation cannot be ignored. He recognised a critical role of the private sector and decision makers in implementation of mitigation actions.

13. During the discussion, a Party made a presentation on the findings of a study estimating the emissions gap in 2020.⁴ According to this study, the emissions gap is caused by the effect of the total aggregated cumulative emissions of Annex I Parties and not necessarily due to a lack of pre-2020 mitigation ambition by all Parties. The full implementation of emission reduction pledges by Annex I Parties by 2020 would significantly narrow the pre-2020 emissions gap. According to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, emission reductions by 2020 by Annex I Parties would range between 25 per cent and 40 per cent below 1990 levels. It was mentioned that the emissions gap assessment is uncertain due to data uncertainties, various assumptions used and dependency on scenarios based on multiple emission pathways. The study's conclusion highlighted that the emissions gap could be closed by Annex I Parties through their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, and through comparable commitments under the Convention by Annex I Parties that are not Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.

14. A number of Parties proposed an in-depth look at the emissions data used and the conclusions reached by the study taking into consideration the total historical emissions (including total emissions with and without land use, land-use change and forestry) by all Parties by 2020, shares of developed and developing countries in global total emissions and the long-term emission growth trends. A proposal was made to examine mitigation ambition in 2020 and beyond as well as the future emission pathways and mitigation impact of existing policies and measures after 2020. Many Parties deemed that addressing the emissions gap and undertaking emission reduction efforts is common responsibility and stressed that ways to close the emissions gap, looking at the past and future emission patterns,

⁴ The presentation is available at < http://unfccc4.meta-fusion.com/kongresse/sb38/pdf/closing_the_gap_in_the_WS2_context_China.pdf.>

should be identified. A global approach to addressing the shift of emissions to some countries as a result of emission reductions in other countries should be based on further scientific studies and the lessons learned from the past emission trend assessments.

IV. Increasing ambition through mitigation action at the national level

15. Many Parties highlighted that the pre-2020 ambition should be considered in a comprehensive manner, taking into account four pillars mentioned in paragraph 5 of decision 1/CP.17, namely: mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, capacity-building, and transparency of action and support. Many developing country Parties emphasized that pre-2020 mitigation and adaptation actions are equally important for the facilitation of enhanced ambition and should receive adequate political attention and support.

16. Some Parties highlighted the need for further action to reach the 2 °C goal, which could include economy-wide structural changes to shift to low-emission development and to address consumption patterns and wasteful lifestyles while simultaneously taking into account the interests of the public and private sector. It was also noted that national action should be aligned with the sustainable development goals and the outcomes of the Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, which was held in June 2012.

17. With respect to action in specific sectors, some developing country Parties emphasized the importance of the national circumstances of countries with economies that are highly dependent on the level of production in those sectors and the distributional impacts of policies, particularly the impacts on the livelihoods of vulnerable groups. More specifically, these Parties highlighted the importance of applying the provisions of the Convention to economies that are highly dependent on income generated from fossil fuels. Some other Parties said that similarly the concerns of countries whose economies are highly dependent on consumption of fossil fuels also need to be looked at. In addition, some Parties raised concerns over unilateral measures undertaken by some developed countries that may affect the economies of other Parties.

18. The climate change challenge demands the adoption of a large number of well-informed and carefully designed policies that should allow countries to move towards a low-carbon development pathway, fit national green and resilient development strategies and contribute to the promotion of environmentally friendly economic growth. In this context, Parties highlighted the benefit of information exchange via the examples of efforts taken at all levels across various thematic areas with mitigation potential.

19. Parties engaged proactively in sharing information on the implementation of actions addressing mitigation ambition at the national level, the barriers to further actions and the ways Parties overcome these barriers based on their experience and lessons learned. Some developed country Parties shared information on domestic and multilateral actions, highlighting the long-term policy, institutional and regulatory frameworks put in place to implement the 2020 commitments in relation to mitigation ambition and the provision of support.

20. Developing country Parties highlighted the importance of the provision of secure and predictable finance for the implementation of national actions by these countries. The existing nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) prepared by many developing countries could be used as a framework to draw further financial support. Many Parties shared examples of implementing a broad variety of actions under national energy and climate change policy frameworks, including policies aimed at the promotion of green technologies in domestic and international contexts; the introduction of mechanisms to leverage private funding and catalyse public investment; the creation of enabling environments for climate-friendly action; the avoidance of carbon leakage from developed to developing countries; and the establishment of public-private partnerships to enhance the implementation and delivery of national action. The involvement of various stakeholder groups in the implementation of national policies was highlighted by a few Parties, including the involvement of local communities, youth and women in climate action on the ground.

V. Catalysing action at the international level

21. Parties discussed the role of international efforts in catalysing action at the national level. In this context, it was highlighted by many developing country Parties that the international cooperative initiatives (ICIs) should not impose any additional commitments on developing countries, but should follow the principles of the Convention and respect national circumstances. A few Parties expressed caution over potential double counting of emission reductions achieved as a result of national actions and ICIs, proposing that all mitigation effects be reflected in the national greenhouse gas inventories.

22. The ICIs mentioned by Parties included those which address short-lived climate pollutants, hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) emissions, low-emission development strategies, reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD-plus)⁵, action by city administrations, energy efficiency in the buildings sector under the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate and other initiatives. Some Parties suggested that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) could contribute to increasing the visibility of such initiatives and could engage in information exchange with various cooperative initiatives covering the thematic areas with high mitigation potential in order to better understand their role in closing the emissions gap.

23. With regard to the reduction of HFC emissions, a group of Parties proposed discussing ways to address the production and consumption of HFCs, which are the main source of HFC emissions, under the framework of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer in a way that can complement Party efforts to address these emissions under the UNFCCC process. This proposal was underpinned by the following considerations: (i) the significant growth over the past 20 years of HFC emissions was a result of the phase-out of ozone-depleting substances that are controlled by the Montreal Protocol and the use of HFCs as their substitute; (ii) HFCs have a high global warming potential (GWP) value; (iii) there are gases with a low GWP value that can be used as alternatives to HFCs when replacing ozone-depleting substances controlled by the Montreal Protocol; and (iv) national abatement policies in developing countries could be financed through the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol.

24. Some Parties argued that the consideration of HFC emissions should continue under the UNFCCC process given that: (i) HFCs are not ozone-depleting substances; (ii) the availability and use of technologies dealing with the alternatives to HFCs with high global warming potential values when replacing ozone-depleting substances is limited in developing countries; (iii) the Montreal Protocol does not follow the same principles as the UNFCCC; and (iv) controlling the production and consumption of HFCs through the Montreal Protocol may result in additional binding targets on the phasing-down of their production and consumption by developing countries.

VI. The role of enablement and support in facilitating an increase in ambition

25. The role of enablement and support was recognized as a critical factor in the facilitation of enhanced action by developing countries prior to 2020. In particular, increase in support was deemed essential for developing countries to come forward with additional NAMAs and pledges as well as to ensure the full implementation of the existing NAMAs and pledges by developing countries. To that end, developing country Parties called for urgent action towards achieving a goal of mobilizing USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries.

26. The immediate operationalization and capitalization of the Green Climate Fund was seen by many Parties as an important step forward towards contributing to the provision of much-needed financial resources for developing

⁵ Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries.

countries. In this regard, several Parties expressed their deep concern over the low level of capitalization of the Green Climate Fund and low predictability of obtaining secure climate finance.

27. Some Parties proposed to discuss the options and ways to encourage enhanced financial flows; to motivate the private sector to invest in climate-friendly technologies; to address investment risk, through risk sharing and risk reduction; and to mobilize additional public investments. The important role of carbon markets was mentioned in attracting private-sector finance and catalysing cost-effective mitigation action. Some Parties suggested that climate-friendly development assistance and investment on an adequate scale could be encouraged through development institutions, bilateral funding programmes and mechanisms providing technical assistance to developing countries.

28. In a broader and longer-term context, Parties discussed the shift in investment patterns and flows that is essential to ensure the transformation of the economy and, in particular, energy, towards less carbon-intensive pathways. Such a shift would require enhancing the enabling environment and relevant adjustments in policy frameworks, changing institutional structures and capacity requirements and introducing policy incentives in line with the sustainable development priorities. The issue of redirecting investment flows from 'brown' to 'green' sectors of the economy, both domestically and internationally, was raised in this context.

29. The importance of technology development, transfer and deployment was highlighted by many Parties, and the two components of the Technology Mechanism, the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), were mentioned as elements instrumental for the further facilitation of this process. Many Parties also emphasized the need to have synergy and close collaboration between the TEC, CTCN and the Green Climate Fund. It was mentioned that many developing countries have identified their technology needs through the technology needs assessments and that they now require financial support to implement concrete projects identified through the assessments. Some developing countries noted that one of the barriers that should be addressed to enhance the development, transfer and deployment of technology is the intellectual property rights (IPRs), and a possible solution proposed was for the Green Climate Fund to have a funding window addressing this issue.

VII. Next steps under workstream 2 in advancing the workplan on enhancing mitigation ambition

30. It was widely acknowledged that the considerations of enhancing mitigation ambition under workstream 2 are fundamental for progress in the negotiations on the 2015 agreement. In this context, Parties discussed the next steps to be taken under workstream 2 in the near term by the nineteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) and beyond in the lead-up to 2015.

31. A group of Parties made a concrete proposal on process in the lead-up to COP 19, to be held in Warsaw, Poland, in November 2013.⁶ The thematic focus of the proposal was the ways to promote renewable energy, energy efficiency and CCS. The steps proposed included the following: (i) submissions by Parties on the mitigation benefits of actions, initiatives and options to enhance mitigation ambition; (ii) a request to the secretariat to prepare the second version of the technical paper on the mitigation benefits of action, initiatives and options; (iii) the organization of pre-session technical workshops on the three focused areas mentioned above; and (iv) the organization of the in-session high-level ministerial round table on enhancing mitigation ambition.

32. Most Parties engaged in discussions on this proposal and provided their suggestions with regard to the scope of the proposal, the topics for technical discussions and the proposals for a COP decision in Warsaw. Some developing country Parties proposed widening the scope of the proposal by considering all four pillars of paragraph 5 of decision 1/CP 17. In particular, it was proposed that the following issues be reflected in the proposal: (i) to broaden the mitigation thematic areas and gases considered under workstream 2; (ii) to add the consideration of

⁶ The presentation is available at <http://unfccc4.meta-fusion.com/kongresse/sb38/pdf/AOSIS_WS2_Next_Steps_10-June_RT.pdf>

adaptation and the provision and transparency of support; and (iii) to focus the discussion on enhanced affordable, scalable and effective actions.

33. In addition to the three topics proposed by a group of Parties, namely, renewable energy, energy efficiency and CCS, several other topics were proposed for discussion at the technical workshops on pre-2020 ambition including:

- International transport;
- Phasing out the use of high GWP HFC emissions;
- Agriculture;
- Reducing emissions from forest degradation and deforestation, and financial and technological support;
- Waste management;
- The role of the cities and effect of growing urbanisation;
- Ways to bridge the emissions gaps and the role of national mitigation action and international cooperative initiatives;
- The role of institutions established under the Convention in enhancing access to support.

34. A suggestion was made to focus the discussion at COP 19 on the ways to close the emissions gap by 2020 by enhancing the ambition of pledges, action and support in line with the principles of the Convention and the global goal of limiting the average temperature increase to 2 °C. Developing country Parties stressed that the work under workstream 2 should be guided by the objective and principles of the Convention and that ambition should be increased through the implementation of the Convention and the outcomes of the Bali Action Plan.

35. To reflect the outcome of the discussion under workstream 2 on the workplan on enhancing mitigation ambition, a number of Parties proposed that a decision be prepared to be adopted at COP 19 covering the following elements:

- An invitation, as a matter of urgency: to Annex I Parties that are Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, to increase their QELRCs; to Annex I Parties that are not Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, to make emission reduction pledges under the Convention comparable to pledges under the Kyoto Protocol; and to all Parties, to make new and more ambitious emission reduction pledges; and to scale up existing emission reduction pledges taken under the Convention;
- A call for developed countries to define clear emission reduction pathways consistent with the 2 °C goal up to 2020;
- Setting up a timeline and deliverables to enhance the ambition of action prior to 2020. This could include action on preventing the increase in HFC emissions;
- A call for the operationalization and capitalization of the Green Climate Fund and preparation of a financial road map to achieve the 2020 commitments on support as a way to enhance the ambition of support.

36. While many Parties acknowledged that the round table discussions were a useful way of sharing technical information and exchanging experiences, success stories and best practices, they also acknowledged that technical discussions alone were not sufficient to enhance mitigation ambition. To that end, political engagement was deemed necessary to add impetus to the discussions and catalyse action at all levels. Many Parties supported the idea of organizing high-level political engagement on raising mitigation ambition at a ministerial-level meeting convened at COP 19 and announcing 2014 as the Year of Ambition. It was also suggested that a ministerial meeting could be

convened to specifically focus on energy efficiency and renewable energy sources, and the role of support, with the participation of ministers of finance.

37. As to the actions to be taken beyond COP 19 in the lead-up to 2015, many Parties considered it essential for a clear direction to be set by COP19 for the work to be carried out by the ADP in 2014, including work on finding the best ways to link the technical work by the ADP on enhancing mitigation ambition and the political processes within and beyond the UNFCCC.

38. On the technical work to be done by the ADP, in addition to the on-going activities, Parties proposed to move to a more formal mode of work and a contact group was proposed as one of the options. In case of workstream 2 the contact group would discuss concrete proposals to catalyse action and enhance ambition. On political processes, the engagement of world leaders during 2014 was mentioned, with specific reference to discussions on how to increase the level of pre-2020 ambition, including through mitigation action in the areas with high potential.

39. Some Parties referred to the first version of the technical paper on the mitigation benefits of actions, initiatives and options to enhance mitigation ambition, compiling information provided in submissions by Parties and observer organizations.⁷ The technical paper provided information relevant for the discussions under workstream 2 and contributed to enhancing Parties' understanding of various elements of pre-2020 ambition.⁸

⁷ Technical paper on mitigation benefits of actions, initiatives and options to enhance mitigation ambition (FCCC/TP/2013/4).

⁸ In this regard, the ADP requested the secretariat to prepare a second version of the technical paper, which Parties may wish to consider once it becomes available. See FCCC/ADP/2013/2, paragraph 36 (a).