



缔约方会议

2022 年 11 月 6 日至 20 日在沙姆沙伊赫举行的缔约方会议第二十七届会议报告

增编

第二部分：缔约方会议第二十七届会议采取的行动

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第 13/CP.27 号决定

长期气候资金

缔约方会议，

回顾《公约》第四条和第十一条，

又回顾第 1/CP.16 号决定第 2、第 4 和第 97-101 段、第 1/CP.17 号决定、第 2/CP.17 号决定第 126-132 段，第 4/CP.18 号决定、第 3/CP.19 号决定、第 5/CP.20 号决定、第 1/CP.21 号决定、第 5/CP.21 号决定、第 7/CP.22 号决定、第 6/CP.23 号决定、第 3/CP.24 号决定、第 11/CP.25 号决定第 10 段、第 1/CP.26 号决定和第 4/CP.26 号决定，

1. 回顾发达国家缔约方根据第 1/CP.16 号决定，承诺在有意义的减缓行动和实施工作透明的背景下，实现到 2020 年每年共同筹集 1,000 亿美元的目标，以满足发展中国家缔约方的需要；
2. 又回顾根据第 1/CP.21 号决定第 53 段，发达国家重申将在有意义的减缓行动和实施工作透明的背景下，将现有的集体筹资目标持续到 2025 年；
3. 深为遗憾地注意到，发达国家缔约方在有意义的减缓行动和实施工作透明的背景下到 2020 年每年共同筹集 1,000 亿美元的目标没有实现，原因包括从私人来源筹集资金面临挑战，欢迎发达国家缔约方正在努力争取实现每年共同筹集 1,000 亿美元的目标；
4. 敦促发达国家缔约方紧急地充分实现每年筹集 1,000 亿美元的目标并一直持续到 2025 年，同时指出公共资金的重要作用；
5. 欢迎最近向适应基金(共计 2.116 亿美元)、最不发达国家基金(共计 7,060 万美元)、气候变化特别基金(共计 3,500 万美元)作出的认捐，欢迎全球环境基金第八次充资(总额 53 亿美元，与气候有关的资金目标不低于第八个充资期所有供资承诺的 80%)，敦促发达国家缔约方按时兑现认捐；
6. 欢迎比利时、德国、挪威、大韩民国、俄罗斯联邦、西班牙、瑞典政府和欧洲联盟为长期资金工作和与下文第 11 段提及的活动有关的工作作出捐款；
7. 重申发展中国家尤其是最不发达国家和小岛屿发展中国家需要赠款资源，特别是用于适应工作；
8. 又重申适应资金中相当一部分应通过资金机制经营实体、适应基金、最不发达国家基金和气候变化特别基金提供；
9. 强调需要进一步努力增加获得气候资金的机会，包括通过统一、简化和直接的获取程序；
10. 请缔约方继续加强扶持型环境和政策框架，以便利气候资金的筹集和有效利用¹；

¹ 见第 3/CP.19 号决定。

11. 重申秘书处将继续与资金机制的经营实体、联合国各机构以及双边、区域和其他多边渠道协作，探讨各种方法和手段，以协助发展中国家缔约方以国家驱动的方式评估自身需要和优先事项，包括技术和能力建设需要，并协助它们将气候资金需要转化为行动²；
12. 注意到资金问题常设委员会的第五次气候资金流量两年期评估和概览³；
13. 又注意到资金问题常设委员会关于在有意义的减缓行动和实施工作透明的背景下实现每年共同筹集 1,000 亿美元以满足发展中国家的需要这一目标方面所取得进展的技术报告及其中载列的量化和质化信息⁴；
14. 还注意到对每年从公共和私人、双边和多边等各种来源包括另类来源共同筹集 1,000 亿美元这一目标的进展情况有不同的估算，认识到在这方面缺乏一个通用的定义和核算方法；
15. 请资金问题常设委员会考虑到其他相关报告，编写两年期报告包括主要结论摘要，说明在有意义的减缓行动和实施工作透明的背景下每年共同筹集 1,000 亿美元以满足发展中国家需要这一目标方面取得的进展，供缔约方会议第二十九届会议(2024 年 11 月)、第三十一届会议(2026 年)和第三十三届会议(2028 年)审议，指出最后报告将在与资金问题常设委员会有关的事项范围内审议；
16. 又注意到资金问题常设委员会关于气候资金定义的工作报告⁵，以及缔约方和非缔约方利益相关方在气候资金总量核算和报告方面使用各种不同的气候资金定义带来的复杂性；
17. 还注意到资金问题常设委员会关于梳理与《巴黎协定》第二条第一款第(三)项有关的现有信息的报告，包括提及第九条之处⁶；
18. 欢迎缔约方会议第二十六届会议主席关于第四次气候资金问题两年期高级别部长级对话的说明⁷，特别是其中传达的关键信息；
19. 又欢迎第五次气候资金问题两年期高级别部长级对话就到 2020 年每年共同筹集 1,000 亿美元这一目标的进展和实现情况进行的讨论，期待看到缔约方会议主席为第二十八届会议(2023 年 11 月至 12 月)编写的摘要。

第 10 次全体会议
2022 年 11 月 20 日

² 第 6/CP.23 号决定，第 10 段。

³ 见 FCCC/CP/2022/8/Add.1-FCCC/PA/CMA/2022/7/Add.1 号文件。

⁴ FCCC/CP/2022/INF.2。

⁵ FCCC/CP/2022/8/Add.2-FCCC/PA/CMA/2022/7/Add.2。

⁶ FCCC/CP/2022/8/Add.4-FCCC/PA/CMA/2022/7/Add.4。

⁷ FCCC/CP/2022/2。

第 14/CP.27 号决定

与资金问题常设委员会有关的事项

缔约方会议，

回顾《公约》第四条和第十一条，

又回顾第 12/CP.2 号决定、第 12/CP.3 号决定、第 1/CP.16 号决定第 112 段、第 2/CP.17 号决定第 120-121 段，以及第 5/CP.18、第 5/CP.19、第 7/CP.19、第 6/CP.20、第 6/CP.21、第 8/CP.22、第 7/CP.23、第 8/CP.23、第 4/CP.24、第 11/CP.25、第 5/CP.26、第 5/CMA.2 号和第 10/CMA.3 号决定，

注意到第 14/CMA.4 决定，

1. 欢迎资金问题常设委员会 2022 年的报告；¹
2. 又欢迎资金问题常设委员会《第五次气候资金流动两年期评估和概览》，以及概要，并注意到附件一所载的建议；²
3. 注意到 2019-2020 年气候资金流量比 2017-2018 年高 12%，达到年均 8,030 亿美元，这是在建筑物能效、可持续交通和适应方面投资的推动下实现的；《公约》附件二所列缔约方在两年期报告中报告的 2019-2020 年公共财政支助的年平均价值(401 亿美元)比 2017-2018 年报告的年平均价值增加了 6%；多边开发银行平均每年向发展中国家和新兴经济体提供的气候资金³ (459 亿美元)自 2017-2018 年以来增加了 17%；《气候公约》各基金和多边气候基金分别承诺在 2019 年和 2020 年为气候融资项目提供 29 亿美元和 35 亿美元；
4. 关切地注意到，相对于发展中国家的总体需要，全球气候资金流量很小；
5. 又关切地注意到，尽管全球气候资金流量有明显增加趋势，但从其他资金流量、投资机会和成本的更广泛角度来看，这些资金流量仍然处于相对较低的水平；
6. 鼓励《公约》缔约方酌情考虑落实上文第 2 段所述建议；
7. 承认第五次两年期评估在信息的质量、透明度和颗粒度方面有所改进，同时认识到数据的局限性依然存在，特别是在私人气候资金，包括发达国家缔约方通过双边和多边渠道筹集的私人资金以及能源和运输以外部门的资金方面，并要求在第六次两年期评估中进一步开展这方面的工作，包括按区域分列的数据、从公共干预措施筹集的私人资金以及与避免、尽量减少和处理损失和损害有关的供资安排；

¹ FCCC/CP/2022/8-FCCC/PA/CMA/2022/7。

² 另载于 FCCC/CP/2022/8/Add.1-FCCC/PA/CMA/2022/7/Add.1 号文件。

³ 见资金问题常设委员会脚注 2。2022 年，《第五次气候资金流动两年期评估和概览》，波恩：《气候公约》。可查阅 <https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/resources/biennial-assessment-and-overview-of-climate-finance-flows>。

8. 强调必须报告在活动和国家两个层面提供、筹集、需要和收到的气候资金情况，并加强衡量和报告气候资金结果和影响的方法；
9. 注意到资金问题常设委员会关于气候资金定义的工作⁴表明，所使用的定义多种多样；
10. 又注意到缔约方和非缔约方利益相关方使用的气候资金定义的多样性在确保气候资金的清楚总量核算和报告方面带来的复杂性；
11. 请资金问题常设委员会编写一份报告，供缔约方会议第二十八届会议(2023年11月至12月)审议，报告应以委员会关于气候资金定义的工作为基础，说明可在《气候公约》进程中考虑的正在使用的气候资金定义的分组类型，目的包括酌情更新委员会对气候资金的操作性定义，以及支持缔约方的国家报告工作，并请缔约方和外部利益相关方在2023年4月30日之前通过提交材料门户网站⁵进一步提交有关材料；
12. 注意到资金问题常设委员会编写的报告，说明在有意义的减缓行动和实施工作透明的背景下，在实现每年共同筹集1,000亿美元的目标以满足发展中国家缔约方的需要方面，取得了哪些进展；⁶
13. 关切地注意到缔约方会议没有利用资金问题常设委员会编写的资金机制经营实体指导意见草案，⁷在这方面，请委员会改进其编写资金机制经营实体指导意见草案的工作方式；
14. 表示衷心感谢澳大利亚政府为确保资金问题常设委员会关于为基于自然的解决办法提供资金的论坛第二期会议取得成功所提供的支持，赞赏地注意到论坛的高级别摘要，⁸但不影响其他多边进程，并欢迎论坛对土著人民和知识的具体关注；
15. 又欢迎将为公正转型提供资金作为资金问题常设委员会2023年论坛的议题；
16. 表示赞赏澳大利亚和德国政府及欧盟委员会提供捐款，支持资金问题常设委员会的工作；
17. 核可资金问题常设委员会2023年工作计划，⁹并强调委员会应将2023年工作的重点放在其当前任务上；
18. 欢迎资金问题常设委员会努力在其工作计划范围内继续加强与利益相关方的接触，包括与《气候公约》组成机构、私营实体和《气候公约》以外的其他实体的接触，并鼓励委员会在2023年继续这种努力；

⁴ 见 FCCC/CP/2022/8/Add.2–FCCC/PA/CMA/2022/7/Add.2 号文件。

⁵ <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx>.

⁶ FCCC/CP/2022/INF.2。

⁷ FCCC/CP/2022/8/Add.5–FCCC/PA/CMA/2022/7/Add.5。

⁸ FCCC/CP/2022/8/Add.6–FCCC/PA/CMA/2022/7/Add.6。

⁹ FCCC/CP/2022/8–FCCC/PA/CMA/2022/7, 附件二。

19. 还鼓励资金问题常设委员会继续加大努力，确保在执行工作计划时顾及性别平等，并请缔约方在提名委员会成员时考虑到性别平衡和地域代表性；
20. 鼓励资金问题常设委员会采取进一步措施，在今后的报告中准确、充分和公平地反映缔约方的意见，并确保以体现其多样性的平衡方式提出这些意见；
21. 请资金问题常设委员会向缔约方会议第二十八届会议报告其 2023 年工作计划的执行进展情况；
22. 又请资金问题常设委员会考虑缔约方会议其他相关决定对其提出的指导意见。

Annex*

Summary and recommendations of the fifth Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows

[English only]

I. Context and mandates

1. The fifth BA conducted by the SCF¹ provides an updated overview of climate finance flows up until 2020, highlighting the trends therein, and an assessment of the implications of these flows for international efforts to address climate change. The fifth BA includes:

(a) Information on recent developments in methodologies related to the tracking of climate finance at the international and domestic level, the operational definitions of climate finance in use and the indicators for measuring the impacts of climate finance, as well as emerging methodologies that support tracking the consistency of finance flows (see also the box below);

(b) An overview of climate finance flows from developed to developing countries, and available information on domestic climate finance, cooperation among developing countries² and other climate-related finance flows that constitute global climate finance;

(c) An assessment of the key features of climate finance flows, including their composition and purpose; an exploration of the effectiveness, accessibility and magnitude (in the context of broader flows) of climate finance flows; and insights into country ownership and alignment of climate finance flows with the needs and priorities of beneficiaries.

2. Since the first BA was conducted in 2014, the preparation of BAs has been guided by mandates from the COP and the CMA to the SCF.³ The fifth BA comprises this summary, prepared by the SCF, and a technical report prepared by experts under the guidance of the SCF drawing on information and data from a range of sources. The report was subject to extensive stakeholder input and expert review, but remains a product of the external experts.

Challenges and limitations in collecting and aggregating data on climate finance

The challenges and limitations outlined below need to be taken into consideration when deriving conclusions and policy implications from the fifth BA:

(a) The fifth BA covers 2019–2020, a period during which the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic may have affected the provision, mobilization and reporting of climate finance flows;

* For the list of abbreviations and acronyms, see document FCCC/CP/2022/8/Add.1–FCCC/PA/CMA/2022/7/Add.1.

¹ The SCF assists the COP in exercising its functions with respect to the Financial Mechanism, including in terms of measurement, reporting and verification of support provided to developing country Parties through activities such as the BA. The SCF also serves the Paris Agreement, in line with its functions and responsibilities established under the COP (as per decision 1/CP.21, para. 63), including through the BA.

² For the purpose of the overview of climate finance in the BA, various data sources are used to illustrate flows from developed to developing countries, without prejudice to the meaning of those terms in the context of the Convention and the Paris Agreement, including but not limited to flows from Annex I Parties and Annex II Parties to non-Annex I Parties and MDBs; flows from OECD members to non-members; flows from OECD Development Assistance Committee members to countries eligible for OECD Development Assistance Committee official development assistance; and other relevant classifications.

³ Decisions 2/CP.17, para. 121(f), 1/CP.18, para. 71, 5/CP.18, para. 11, 3/CP.19, para. 11, 4/CP.24, paras. 4, 5 and 10, and 11/CP.25, paras. 9–10; and decision 5/CMA.2, paras. 9–10.

(b) In compiling the estimates of climate finance flows, efforts were made to ensure they are based on activities that are in line with the operational definition of climate finance adopted in the first BA in 2014 and to avoid double counting. Challenges were encountered in aggregating and analysing information from diverse sources with varying degrees of transparency;

(c) In 2019, COP 25 changed the due date for submission of the fifth biennial reports of Annex I Parties (including Annex II Parties), which were to include information on climate finance provided to non-Annex I Parties in 2019–2020, to no later than 31 December 2022.⁴ Therefore, during preparation of the fifth BA, the SCF invited Annex II Parties to provide preliminary data on climate finance provided and mobilized for 2019 and 2020. These preliminary data may be subject to change once fifth biennial reports are submitted by Parties by the end of 2022;

(d) In the area of global climate finance, challenges remain in filling data gaps, particularly on private finance for adaptation activities and for mitigation activities in the AFOLU, the waste and the water and sanitation sectors. Methodologies for calculating climate finance based on total cost or incremental cost produce different estimates by activity. This potentially leads to limitations regarding the completeness of data and any interpretation of the relative shares of global climate finance going to different themes or sectors. Energy efficiency estimates do not include data broken down by public or private actor financial instrument, or at country level. Some data sources, such as those for renewable energy, provide activity-level data but may make country- and technology-level assumptions on finance flows to fill data gaps. In compiling data from various sources to aggregate global climate finance flows, approaches that ensure the avoidance of potential overlaps in coverage are taken;

(e) Regarding domestic climate finance, although more countries are developing climate finance reporting systems, time lags in implementation mean data are underreported for 2019–2020. Amounts in relation to public expenditure may refer to ex ante budget allocations or ex post actual expenditures. Furthermore, the climate relevance of activities reported may refer to weighted criteria per activity or to positive activity lists;

(f) Data on international climate finance flows are compiled using various methodologies and have varying interpretations. Flows from developed to developing countries – covering finance provided, mobilized and received – include a mix of data based on disbursements to projects and recipients in the given year or on financial commitments made in the reporting year to activities that may be implemented over several years. Information on South–South cooperation in climate finance flows remains relatively underreported. The classification of data such as by geographical region or by granularity is not uniform across data sources. **As for previous BAs, for the fifth BA, no aggregation of data from different sources for finance flows from developed countries to developing countries was carried out owing to these challenges and limitations.**

The SCF will continue to contribute, through its activities, to the progressive improvement of the measurement, reporting and verification of climate finance in future BAs, to help address these challenges and limitations.

II. Key findings

A. Methodological issues related to transparency of climate finance

3. **New reporting tables will improve the information on climate finance submitted by Parties.** CMA 3 adopted new tables for reporting by Parties under the Paris Agreement on climate finance provided to and mobilized for developing countries and climate finance

⁴ Decision 6/CP.25, para. 3.

needed and received by developing countries. The new tables will be used for reporting from the end of 2024 in biennial transparency reports. A number of improvements will facilitate enhancing the granularity of data reported on climate finance (including sectoral and subsectoral data) and on whether the financial support also contributes to capacity-building or technology transfer, and will provide an option to report on grant-equivalent amounts of climate finance provided and mobilized. In addition, CMA 3 requested the secretariat to establish an interactive web portal to facilitate the availability of information on climate finance reported by Parties.⁵

4. **The coverage and granularity of reporting on climate finance received by non-Annex I Parties is improving.** The proportion of BURs that include information on finance received rose from approximately 60 per cent in 2014 to over 97 per cent in 2021. A total of 70 Parties have provided quantitative information on climate finance received at the project or activity level in tabular format. More Parties are reporting details on financial instruments and implementing entities and on whether finance received is for mitigation or adaptation. Information that is reported the least includes that related to the use, impacts and results of climate finance. Limited capacities and resources to track climate finance received can pose challenges for non-Annex I Parties in reporting this information, and a lack of reporting on the year an activity received climate finance can make it difficult to compile and aggregate data.

5. **Systems to track domestic public climate finance are growing in both developed and developing countries.** Twenty-four jurisdictions have established tracking systems for national budgets, with a further 24 countries having methodologies for tracking climate-relevant budgets in development. Building on previous work carried out as part of the climate public expenditure and institutional reviews of the United Nations Development Programme, many countries are developing guidance on green budgeting frameworks that include climate-relevant activities. Domestic public expenditures on climate change in 2019–2020 amounted to an estimated total of USD 134.2 billion (see chap. II.B below).

6. **Renewable energy, CCU/S, electrified transport, energy efficiency of buildings, and water management and supply are the most common mitigation activities listed across international, regional and national taxonomies or classifications.** An analysis of 12 classification lists or taxonomies related to climate change mitigation activities, including those of MDBs and of regional and national jurisdictions, revealed that mitigation activities that appear most commonly (in more than 75 per cent of lists) are renewable energy, electrified transport, energy efficiency of buildings, water management and supply, and abatement technologies (e.g. carbon dioxide capture and use or storage). Different eligibility criteria are in use for common activities relating to agriculture, waste, transport infrastructure and power generation (the latter including geothermal power, hydropower, bioenergy and efficiency improvements). Less common activities (in 25–75 per cent of lists) include gas-fired power generation, waste-to-energy processes, sustainable logging, and information and communication technology infrastructure. Of the uncommon activities (less than 25 per cent of lists), notable are nuclear power generation, aviation and mining. Of the 12 taxonomies of countries and institutions reviewed, 10 make use of exclusion lists across mitigation sectors. For adaptation, most taxonomies refer to process-based screening methods rather than an activity list owing to adaptation activities being specific to a given local environment or context. The evaluation baseline for adaptation screening processes is typically based on environmental and climate risk and vulnerability assessments or national, regional or global resilience and biodiversity standards and codes. In addition, 7 of the 12 analysed taxonomies apply the ‘do no significant harm’ principle (to other environmental objectives) when assessing the eligibility of activities.

7. **Climate finance providers are advancing more indicators and metrics to measure what climate finance is achieving on the ground.** Multilateral climate funds (including the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism), multilateral institutions and national development finance institutions are in the process of developing or have already developed frameworks for measuring outputs, outcomes and impacts of climate finance interventions,

⁵ Decision 5/CMA.3.

with the granularity of indicators and metrics increasing. Multilateral climate funds, in their results management frameworks, capture information on 141 indicators, 48 of which are core indicators, and most multilateral institutions, as well as bilateral contributors, use a similar set of mitigation and adaptation indicators. Common indicators identified for mitigation are greenhouse gas emissions reduced (in t CO₂ eq) and sector-specific metrics for the energy, transport and land-use sectors. For adaptation, common indicators in use are the number of beneficiaries; the hectares of land protected; and the number of policies, projects, plans, systems or assets that foster climate resilience. An ongoing challenge is defining and reporting on outcome and impact indicators that enable the long-term or indirect effects of climate finance interventions (e.g. job creation or the increased climate resilience of beneficiaries) to be captured as opposed to measuring direct project outputs (e.g. number of beneficiaries or number of early warning systems installed). Methodologies for outcome measurement are at earlier stages of development by climate finance providers than those for output measurement.


8. **Increasing efforts are being made to enhance the transparency and comparability of approaches for tracking consistency with low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways.** Methodological developments in this area, particularly from the private financial sector and supervisory authorities, are in a dynamic growth phase. The aim of these initiatives and efforts is to offer discussion of and guidance on appropriate choices of emission pathways and scenarios, emission metrics and measures, geographical and sector coverage, the role of carbon offsets, the formulation and implementation of transition plans and governance frameworks, and aggregate Paris Agreement alignment indicators. In the financial sector, a focus of current approaches on decarbonization and net zero targets, rather than on fostering climate change adaptation and resilience, continues to be observed. Since the fourth BA, initiatives that seek to increase the transparency and understanding of approaches for tracking consistency have emerged – notable among these are the United Nations High-Level Expert Group on the Net-Zero Emissions Commitments of Non-State Entities and the Expert Peer Review Group under the Race to Zero campaign. In addition, various private and public sector reports that assess approaches to alignment with the Paris Agreement continue to be published (see SCF documents on work under this area for further information).⁶

B. Overview of climate finance flows in 2019–2020

9. **Global climate finance flows were 12 per cent higher in 2019–2020 than in 2017–2018, reaching an annual average of USD 803 billion, with the trend being driven by an increasing number of mitigation actions in buildings and infrastructure and in sustainable transport, as well as by growth in adaptation finance.** The growth in finance flows in 2019–2020 was largely driven by increased investment in the energy efficiency of buildings (USD 34 billion increase), sustainable transport (USD 28 billion increase) and adaptation finance (USD 20 billion increase). While overall investment in clean energy systems remained stable, public energy investment increased its share of total finance flows. Adaptation finance increased by 65 per cent, from an annual average of USD 30 billion in 2017–2018 to USD 49 billion in 2019–2020, driven mainly by financing from bilateral and multilateral development finance institutions. Figure 1 provides a breakdown, by sector, of global climate finance flows in 2017–2020 and figure 2 provides an overview of global climate finance and finance flows from developed to developing countries in 2019–2020.

⁶ FCCC/CP/2022/8/Add.3–FCCC/PA/CMA/2022/7/Add.3 and FCCC/CP/2022/8/Add.4–FCCC/PA/CMA/2022/7/Add.4.


Figure 1
Global climate finance flows in 2017–2020 by sector
 (Billions of United States dollars)



10. The continued decline in renewable energy technology costs in 2019–2020 compared with those in 2017–2018 meant that renewable energy investments, despite the economic slowdown caused by the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic, remained close to the record high in 2017. Technology cost decreases in 2019–2020 compared with 2018 for onshore wind (13 per cent), offshore wind (9 per cent) and solar photovoltaic (7 per cent) emphasized how greater impacts are now achieved for each new dollar invested. Aggregate investments in new renewable energy generation projects made up the largest segment of global climate finance. The declining costs of renewable energy alongside the maintenance of high levels of investment indicates that the overall deployment of renewable energy technologies has increased in real terms.

11. **Government pandemic recovery packages included up to USD 513 billion of spending allocated to green or climate-related measures (21 per cent of the total USD 2.5 trillion) up until the end of 2020.** Approximately 76 per cent (USD 392 billion) of climate-related recovery spending was announced by developed countries and the remainder by developing countries, particularly those in Asia. Data from climate budget tagging systems and other sources indicated domestic public climate finance amounted to USD 134 billion per year in 2019–2020, half of which was in 21 developing countries and the other half in 6 developed countries or jurisdictions.

Figure 2
Climate finance flows in 2019–2020
 (Billions of United States dollars, annualized)



		2019	2020	Sources of data and relevant section
Global total flows	Renewable energy		325.1	Section 2.2.3 CPI 2022 based on multiple sources
		Public	108.2	
		Private	216.9	
	Sustainable transport		175.2	Section 2.2.4 IEA 2021b, CPI 2022 based on multiple sources
		Public	112.1	
		Private	63.1	
	Buildings and infrastructure		160.0	Section 2.2.5 IEA 2021b, CPI 2022 based on multiple sources
		Public	26.0	
		Private	134.0	
	Industry		45.0	Section 2.2.6 IEA 2021b, CPI 2022 based on multiple sources
		Public	9.0	
		Private	36.0	
Other sectors - mitigation ^a		32.2	Section 2.2.7 and 2.2.8 CPI 2022 based on multiple sources	
Adaptation public finance		42.4	Section 2.2.9 CPI 2022 based on multiple sources	
Both mitigation and adaptation		15.3	CPI 2022, based on multiple sources	
Domestic climate-related public investment		134.2	Section 2.3 Country level reporting, BURs, CPEIRs, various government reports, CPI	
Flows to non-Annex I Parties	UNFCCC funds	2.2	2.9	Section 2.5.2 Fund financial reports, CFU
	Multilateral climate funds (including UNFCCC)	2.9	3.5	
	Climate-specific finance through bilateral, regional and other channels	31.9	31.4	Section 2.5.1 Preliminary data from Annex II Parties, subject to change
	MDB climate finance attributed to developed countries ^b	30.5	33.2	Section 2.5.2 OECD 2022a
	Mobilized private climate finance through multilateral channels	8.6	8.0	Section 2.5.4 OECD 2022a
	Mobilized private climate finance through bilateral, regional institutions ^c	5.8	5.1	
Other private finance projects ^d	7.3	9.6	Section 2.5.4 CPI 2022 based on multiple sources	

Notes: (1) Figure note (a): other mitigation investments include industry, waste and wastewater, information and communications technology and other cross-sectoral investments; (2) Figure note (b): includes investments from amounts listed by sector above that are discounted when calculating the global aggregate to avoid double counting; (3) Figure note (c): flows are from developed to developing countries, see section 2.5.2 of the technical report of the fifth BA for further information; (4) Figure note (c): estimates include private finance mobilized through public interventions by developed countries; (5) Figure note (d): this includes private finance in addition to finance mobilized through bilateral and multilateral channels and institutions.

12. Public climate finance flows from developed to developing countries increased by between 6 and 17 per cent, depending on the source, in 2019–2020 compared with 2017–2018. Preliminary data from Annex II Parties on climate-specific finance provided for 2019–2020 showed that it increased by 6 per cent from 2017–2018 to USD 40.1 billion per

year on average. Most of the climate-specific finance (79 per cent) was channelled through bilateral, regional and other channels, with the remainder consisting of contributions or inflows to multilateral climate funds and multilateral financial institutions.

13. Mitigation finance constituted the largest share of climate-specific financial support through bilateral, regional and other channels, at 57 per cent (USD 17.9 billion). However, the share of adaptation finance continued to increase – from 20 per cent (USD 6.4 billion) in 2017–2018 to 28 per cent (USD 8.9 billion) in 2019–2020 – as it grew at a higher rate than mitigation finance. In 2019–2020, adaptation finance through bilateral, regional and other channels grew 40 per cent while mitigation finance decreased by 13 per cent. The share of cross-cutting finance, which serves both mitigation and adaptation purposes, stagnated at 14–15 per cent (USD 4.4 billion and USD 4.7 billion) in 2017–2018 and 2019–2020, respectively.

14. UNFCCC funds and multilateral climate funds approved a combined USD 2.9 billion and USD 3.5 billion for climate change projects in 2019 and 2020 respectively. The annual average for 2019–2020 (USD 3.2 billion) represents an increase of 21 per cent compared with the annual average for 2017–2018, attributable primarily to increases in project approvals by the GEF Council, the GCF Board and the Clean Technology Fund. In terms of inflows, the GEF raised USD 5.3 billion from 29 contributors under the GEF-8 replenishment in 2022 for the programming period 2022–2026, an increase of more than 30 per cent compared with the amount raised under GEF-7. Under GEF-8, USD 852 million was allocated to the climate change focal area for mitigation, an increase of 6 per cent compared with the amount allocated under GEF-7. The Adaptation Fund registered USD 356 million in new pledges from 16 donors at COP 26, which is more than triple the amount it raised in 2020 (USD 116 million).

15. MDBs provided USD 46 billion and USD 45 billion in climate finance to developing and emerging economies in 2019 and 2020 respectively. The annual average of USD 45.9 billion in 2019–2020 represents a 17 per cent increase compared with the 2017–2018 amount. The attribution of these flows from developed to developing countries is calculated at USD 29.3–30.5 billion in 2019 and USD 28.2–33.2 billion in 2020.

16. Data on private climate finance flows to developing countries remain challenging to compile and assess. There is a methodological difference between measuring private finance for climate action in general and measuring climate finance mobilized through public interventions. With existing methodologies and approaches, tracking private finance mobilized by technical assistance or policy interventions is difficult. Further, data sources often do not specify whether private funds are sourced from private sector entities in developed or developing countries and whether these funds are received by public or private sector entities from developed or developing countries. OECD estimates that private climate finance mobilized by developed countries through bilateral and multilateral channels amounted to USD 14.4 billion and USD 13.1 billion in 2019 and 2020 respectively. The annual average of USD 13.8 billion represents a 6 per cent decrease compared with the annual average of USD 14.6 billion in 2017–2018.

17. The increase in submissions of BURs from non-Annex I Parties resulted in a greater amount of information on finance being available for the fifth BA than for previous BAs. However, time lags in data availability for reporting made it difficult to compile updated, complete information on finance received in 2019–2020. Of the 79 Parties that had submitted BURs as at 30 June 2022, 28 included some information on climate finance received in 2019 or 2020 in their reports. In total, USD 10.0 billion was reported as received for projects starting in 2019 and USD 1.6 billion for projects starting in 2020. Approximately 81 per cent of the 2019 amount was specified as coming from bilateral institutions in developed countries or multilateral institutions and 15 per cent from institutions based in developing countries; the origin of the finance was unspecified for the remaining amount.

18. **Trends in South–South climate finance flows varied depending on the source of finance.** Finance commitments from International Development Finance Club members based in non-OECD countries to projects in other non-OECD countries amounted to USD 1.7 billion and USD 2.2 billion in 2019 and 2020 respectively, which represented a substantial decrease from the USD 4.1 billion committed in 2018. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank continued to increase finance flows, and

MDB-attributed financing from non-Annex II Parties increased from around USD 9.1 billion in 2017–2018 to an annual average of USD 11.0 billion in 2019–2020. Investments in renewable energy and sustainable transport projects decreased from an annual average of USD 3.2 billion in 2017–2018 to USD 2.6 billion in 2019–2020. Overall, the availability of data on and the coverage of climate finance flows between developing countries remain limited.

C. Assessment of climate finance flows


19. **The collective goal of jointly mobilizing USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation action and transparency on implementation was not fully met in 2020.**⁷

20. **More public finance flows from developed to developing countries are for mitigation than for adaptation, yet adaptation finance has grown significantly through bilateral channels and MDBs.** In 2019–2020, on average, mitigation had a 57 per cent share (USD 17.9 billion) of bilateral climate finance, a 37 per cent share (USD 1.2 billion) of multilateral climate fund climate finance and a 62 per cent share (USD 23.6 billion) of MDB climate finance, while adaptation had corresponding shares of 28, 19 and 36 per cent (USD 9.0 billion, USD 605 million and USD 13.8 billion respectively). Since 2017–2018, adaptation finance from bilateral channels has grown by 39 per cent (USD 2.5 billion) and from MDBs by 48 per cent (USD 6 billion), while adaptation finance from multilateral climate funds has remained constant. The share of public climate finance flows contributing to both adaptation and mitigation from multilateral climate funds rose to 35 per cent (USD 1.1 billion) in 2019–2020 from 27 per cent (USD 785 million) in 2017–2018. When assessing the balance of finance between mitigation and adaptation, it is worth considering different approaches to measuring climate finance flows and considering whether data are adjusted by the financial instrument providing the resources. Information on face-value financial volume can be complemented with information on grant-based equivalent financial volume (as is done by the GCF to assess its mitigation and adaptation split). The number of interventions and information on how different institutions allocate finance can also help inform discussions on balance.

21. **Public adaptation finance is predominantly delivered through grants while public mitigation finance predominantly takes the form of loans.** In 2019–2020, grants accounted for 57 and 99 per cent (USD 8.5 billion and USD 1.2 billion) of the face value of bilateral adaptation finance and of adaptation finance from multilateral climate funds respectively, compared with 64 and 95 per cent (USD 5.9 billion and USD 1.1 billion) respectively in 2017–2018. In 2019–2020, 15 per cent of adaptation finance flowing through the MDBs was grant-based (USD 2.1 billion) (see figure 3). Mitigation finance remains less grant-based in nature, with 31 per cent of bilateral flows (USD 4.6 billion), 30 per cent of multilateral climate fund approvals (USD 865 million) and less than 5 per cent of MDB investments (USD 1.1 billion) taking the form of grants.

⁷ For more information see document FCCC/CP/2022/8–FCCC/PA/CMA/2022/7.

Figure 3
Public climate finance flows from developed to developing countries in 2019–2020, by theme, source and financial instrument



Source: Analysis of OECD Development Assistance Committee Creditor Reporting System statistics and Climate Funds Update.


22. **Reflecting their geographical and population sizes, Asia and Africa are the regions receiving the largest total amounts of public climate finance.** Asia received the most climate finance for adaptation and mitigation projects and programmes from bilateral channels, multilateral climate funds and MDBs, with an average of 36 per cent of the total climate finance provided. Asia was followed by Africa (average of 27 per cent) and Latin America and the Caribbean (average of 16 per cent). The remainder was shared among developing countries of Eastern and Southern Europe and Oceania.⁸ On a per capita basis, the less populous developing country regions Oceania and Eastern and Southern Europe received the largest amounts of climate finance (USD 5.1–49.5 and USD 1.0–84.2 respectively), followed by Latin America and the Caribbean (USD 0.8–10.7), Africa (USD 0.6–8.4) and Asia (USD 0.2–4.0). These data do not, however, consider differing costs for climate change solutions in different regions, adjust for purchasing power or address the relative scale of climate vulnerabilities or emission reduction potential.

23. **Support provided to the LDCs and SIDS as a proportion of overall public climate finance flows remained relatively stable compared with previous years.** In 2019–2020, funding provided to the LDCs accounted for 25 per cent of bilateral flows, 26 per cent of approvals from multilateral climate funds and 20 per cent of MDB climate finance. While bilateral channels and MDBs increased their adaptation finance commitments to the LDCs from 2017–2018 to 2019–2020, multilateral climate funds decreased their adaptation finance while doubling their mitigation finance from 2017–2018 to 2019–2020.

⁸ The fifth BA, for the first time, presented a geographical breakdown of public bilateral sources, multilateral climate funds and MDBs with a unified regional classification in accordance with the standard country or area codes for statistical use (M49) of the United Nations Statistics Division. Only non-Annex I Parties were included in the country grouping analysis.

24. In 2019–2020, funding provided to the SIDS accounted for 3 per cent of bilateral flows, 7 per cent of approvals from multilateral climate funds and 2 per cent of MDB climate finance. International public climate finance flows to SIDS are predominantly adaptation focused. Grant finance plays a strong role in SIDS, ranging from 43 to 89 per cent across the channels analysed. The LDCs and SIDS have specific vulnerabilities and needs, which are partially reflected in the climate finance provided to them on a per capita basis. Per capita climate finance reached USD 3.6–16.9 for SIDS and USD 0.8–9.4 for the LDCs in 2019–2020 (see figure 4).

Figure 4
Geographical distribution of climate finance by volume and on a per capita basis in 2019–2020



25. **Between 2016 and 2020, private climate finance mobilized by developed countries for developing countries through bilateral and multilateral channels totalled USD 66.8 billion.** Of this amount, 86 per cent was mobilized for mitigation actions, particularly in the energy sector (53 per cent of total mobilized finance in the five-year period). Private finance mobilized for adaptation actions targeted industry, mining and construction. Private climate finance was mobilized through number of mechanisms, dominated by direct investment in companies and special purpose vehicles, which together accounted for 44 per cent of the total. MDBs mobilized 57 per cent of total estimated private climate finance, followed by bilateral providers and multilateral climate funds. SIDS and the LDCs received 1 and 8 per cent respectively of total private finance mobilized.

26. **Accreditation to multilateral climate funds increased by 36 per cent in 2019–2020, driven by a rising number of national and regional institutions being accredited; however, while national and regional accredited entities now account for more than half of all accredited entities, they accounted for only 10 per cent of financial outflows in 2019–2020.** Climate finance readiness and project preparation initiatives play a key role in facilitating access to climate finance. The number of partners through which developing countries can access multilateral climate funds continues to grow rapidly, driven by GCF accreditation. Efforts are under way to enhance access beyond national and regional entities, by supporting access at the local level.

27. **Interest in country platforms that facilitate country ownership of climate finance flows and their alignment with national priorities is emerging.** Country ownership is a fundamental factor in the delivery of effective finance but is also a broad concept encompassing active stakeholder engagement, links between climate policies and economic growth and development policies, and national spending and tracking systems for climate finance. Recent studies drawing on experience from development cooperation suggest that to be successful in stimulating climate action, country platforms need to secure and maintain political will, coordinate public finance from multiple channels and harness private investment. Also important is that country platforms are tailored to country needs and priorities.

28. **Reported expected and actual results from climate finance providers indicate an increase in portfolio-level emission reductions and number of beneficiaries reached.** Multilateral climate funds reported a combined 96.3 Mt CO₂ eq emission reductions achieved and 54.8 million beneficiaries reached through their interventions. Expected results from the portfolios of approved or currently implemented projects are orders of magnitude higher, for example, 1,980 Mt CO₂ eq emission reductions and 588 million direct and indirect beneficiaries in the GCF portfolio alone. While multilateral climate funds are increasing their transparency and reporting under their results frameworks more regularly, they face persistent challenges in impact measurement, namely, that direct project output indicators are easier to define than outcome indicators and that reporting on actual results is largely dependent on the reporting capacity of implementing entities. MDBs present mitigation and adaptation outcomes to varying degrees against their results and impact frameworks, often for their entire portfolios rather than on climate-specific support, while bilateral contributors have differing approaches to impact reporting. In general, it takes at least several years before being able to report on outcomes and impacts of approved and implemented projects supported by climate finance, and this time lag poses challenges for comprehensive portfolio impact reporting.


29. **The way in which gender issues are addressed under the governance and operational frameworks of the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism and multilateral climate funds has improved.** However, the development of systems for monitoring and reporting on gender-related outcomes at the project and portfolio level is still in progress, as is the building of capacity of the operating entities to implement gender-responsive policies. This suggests work remains to be done on strengthening gender mainstreaming efforts and the availability of gender-disaggregated and other gender-related data to evaluate outcomes.

30. **Global climate finance flows are small relative to the overall needs of developing countries.** Global climate finance in 2019–2020 was estimated to be USD 803 billion. This amount is 31–32 per cent of the annual investment needed for the global temperature rise to follow a well below 2 °C or a 1.5 °C pathway. This level of climate finance is also below what one would expect in the light of the investment opportunities identified and the cost of failure to meet climate stabilization targets.

31. More can be done to ensure that finance flows are consistent with climate change objectives. Such efforts include the reform of fiscal policies, financial policies and regulations and the integration and management of climate risk for financial decision-making processes by private actors and the financial sector, with care taken in all circumstances to manage a just and equitable transition for all.

32. Given the scale and speed of effort needed to align finance flows with low-emission, climate-resilient development pathways, it is critical to consider climate finance flows within the context of broader finance flows (see figure 5). A sole focus on positive climate finance flows will be insufficient to meet the overarching purpose and goals of the Paris Agreement. This does not mean that broader finance flows must all have explicit beneficial climate outcomes, but it does mean that they must integrate climate risks into decision-making and avoid increasing the likelihood of negative climate outcomes.

Figure 5
Global climate finance in the context of broader finance flows, opportunities and costs



Notes: (1) Data points are provided to place climate finance in context and do not represent an aggregate or systematic view; (2) All flows are global and annual averages for 2019–2020 unless otherwise stated; (3) The representation of stocks that overlap is not necessarily reflective of real-world overlaps. The flows are not representative of all flows contributing to the stocks; (4) Climate finance flows are those represented in section B of the summary and recommendations and chapter 2 of the fifth BA technical report; (5) For data sources, see chapter 3 of the fifth BA technical report.

33. Across the key areas of climate finance identified through the recommendations arising from previous BAs, the findings of the fifth BA reveal both progress and continuing challenges, as presented in the table below.

Following up on recommendations from previous BAs: progress and challenges

<i>Area of recommendation^a</i>	<i>Progress</i>	<i>Challenges</i>
Improve transparency of reporting of climate finance provided and received (a), (b), (c), (d)	Improved reporting tables agreed for implementation in 2024 Increasing number of developing countries reporting on climate finance received	Limited capacities and resources to track climate finance received and report on the impacts and outcomes of climate finance
Improve data coverage, granularity and tracking of flows from all sources, including developing country Parties, international financial institutions and private finance data providers (e), (f), (g), (h)	Increasing data coverage for financing of electric vehicles, climate finance mobilized and domestic climate finance reporting	Scarcity of data on energy efficiency, the AFOLU sector, buildings, industrial sectors and adaptation, in particular from the private sector, as well as on South–South cooperation
Align climate finance with national needs, plans, climate change frameworks and priorities, enhancing country ownership (j), (l), (p)	Significantly increased number of direct access entities and national implementing entities and other accredited entities of multilateral climate funds Growing number of national investment plans and strategies to target climate finance Publication of needs determination report	Finance flows channelled through regional and national entities remain low Lack of support for local-level access beyond national or regional entities Methodological, capacity and data limitations in development of project pipelines
Balance funding for mitigation and adaptation (l)	Increase in adaptation finance of 39 and 48 per cent through bilateral channels and MDBs respectively since 2017–2018 Achievement by GCF of a 50:50 balance in mitigation and adaptation on a grant-equivalent basis Most adaptation finance from bilateral channels and multilateral climate funds now in the form of grant finance	Difficulties in costing adaptation needs to inform assessments of balance Different accounting approaches applied for mitigation and adaptation finance to inform assessment of balance
Encourage the uptake of available resources to strengthen institutional capacities for programming climate action and tracking climate finance (k), (l)	21 dedicated access, readiness and project preparation support modalities offered by multilateral climate funds 48 identified national climate funds in countries that are not OECD members 48 jurisdictions with domestic climate finance tracking systems, and 35 taxonomies formulated by 30 jurisdictions and 5 international or national organizations	Different funding requirements of diverse climate finance actors Time lag in reporting from nascent domestic climate finance tracking
Improve tracking and reporting of the impacts of climate finance, including the incorporation of ‘climate proofing’ and climate resilience measures in line with new scientific information (n), (o)	Increased granularity of impact measurement frameworks (three multilateral climate funds have adopted revised frameworks since 2018) Wide availability of expected results reporting Initial development of transformational change indicators	Limited ex post results data in reporting chains Limited availability of climate finance specific portfolio-level impact reporting from MDBs and bilateral sources Trade-offs between results measurement comparability and context-specific impact measurement (including at the country, local and sectoral level)

<i>Area of recommendation^a</i>	<i>Progress</i>	<i>Challenges</i>
		Limited approaches for measuring transformational change
Improve tracking and reporting of gender-related aspects of climate finance (m)	Gender mainstreaming in governance and operational frameworks of climate finance contributors (all multilateral climate funds with revised frameworks or policies since 2018)	Limited implementing capacities and availability of gender-disaggregated data on outcomes and impacts
Update data sets and information relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement (i), (q)	Global proliferation of private and public sector actor approaches for aligning finance flows	Lack of data on implementation of Paris alignment approaches and on common standards in approaches to prevent greenwashing – this complicates evaluation of approaches

^a Letters in parentheses denote the relevant recommendation from para. 51 of the summary and recommendations of the third (2018) BA (available at <https://unfccc.int/BA-2018>). No recommendations were included in the fourth (2020) BA.

III. Recommendations

34. The SCF invites the COP and the CMA to consider the recommendations presented in chapter III.A–C below. The three sets of recommendations relate to chapter II.A–C above.

A. Methodological issues related to climate finance flows

35. Recommendations on methodological issues related to climate finance flows are as follows:

(a) *Encourage* Parties to report on climate finance provided, mobilized, needed and received in the new common tabular format for their first biennial transparency report to the highest level of granularity possible, taking into account the flexibility for those countries that need it in the light of their capacities, in accordance with the modalities, procedures and guidelines of the enhanced transparency framework under the Paris Agreement, in particular to report annual activity-level data;

(b) *Encourage* Parties to adopt or follow green- and climate-budgeting approaches and improve or establish climate finance tracking systems at the domestic level to inform their implementation of nationally determined contributions and adaptation communications;

(c) *Encourage* climate finance providers and recipients to report climate finance provided, mobilized, needed and received at both the activity- and the country-level;

(d) *Encourage* climate finance and data providers to further improve the data and the methodologies necessary for tracking private finance mobilized by developed countries, and others in a position to do so, through technical assistance, policy support and other public interventions for climate action in developing countries;

(e) *Encourage* Parties and climate finance providers to enhance their methodologies for measuring and reporting on climate finance results and impacts;

(f) *Encourage* Parties and climate finance providers to enhance their reporting on the qualitative aspects of climate finance, including policies, approaches and other factors related to strong enabling environments and delivering results;

(g) *Encourage* Parties, through the enhanced transparency framework and taking into account the work of the SCF on definitions of climate finance, to better track climate finance provided, mobilized, needed and received;

(h) *Encourage* climate finance providers and data aggregators, in keeping with social inclusion and the potential value of information and data from the informal private sector and from local and indigenous communities, as well as noting the usefulness of proxy data, to incorporate into their systems the tracking of climate finance flows and impacts relating to these stakeholders;

(i) *Encourage* climate finance providers to enhance their reporting on elements relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement, thus increasing the ability to advance work related to pathways for low-emission, climate-resilient development.

B. Overview of climate finance flows

36. Recommendations on the overview of climate finance flows are as follows:

(a) *Encourage* climate finance providers, including multilateral and other financial institutions, relevant non-financial institutions and data providers, when reporting on climate finance, to enhance the availability of granular, country-level data on finance for adaptation and resilience as well as on finance for mitigation in the AFOLU and the water and sanitation sectors;

(b) *Encourage* climate finance providers and recipients to further enhance the tracking of private climate finance, in particular for adaptation activities;

(c) *Invite* private sector associations and financial institutions to build on the progress made on ways to improve data on climate finance and to engage with the SCF, including through their participation in the forums of the SCF with a view to enhancing the quality of the BA.

C. Assessment of climate finance flows

37. Recommendations on the assessment of climate finance flows are as follows:

(a) *Encourage* climate finance providers to continue to enhance country ownership and consider policies to improve the balance between support for mitigation and adaptation at the global level, taking into account country-driven approaches and recipient country capacities and priorities;

(b) *Encourage* climate finance providers to enhance access and increase climate finance for the LDCs and SIDS;

(c) *Encourage* developed countries, other climate finance providers and recipients to continue to enhance access to climate finance, including by addressing the barriers to access arising from the complex architecture of multilateral climate funds, and to enhance country ownership through supporting modalities such as direct access entity and national implementing entity accreditation, readiness and project preparation facilities and subnational- and local-level access programmes;

(d) *Encourage* development finance institutions, in particular MDBs, to continue their essential role in helping developing countries to deliver on their nationally determined contributions by expanding climate investment through either expanding the availability of development assistance or boosting climate-related investment directly;

(e) *Encourage* developing countries to take advantage of available modalities and to advance in-country efforts to strengthen institutional capacities for climate change programming and for tracking its effectiveness and impacts;

(f) *Encourage* climate finance providers and recipients to improve the tracking and reporting of portfolio-level results in terms of the impacts and outcomes of climate finance and advance the development of indicators for measuring the outcomes of climate finance interventions;

(g) *Encourage* climate finance providers and recipients to improve the tracking, reporting and dissemination of best practices in relation to the gender-related aspects of climate finance, impacts of climate finance interventions and gender-responsive budgeting;

(h) *Request* the SCF, in preparing the sixth BA, to follow up on the recommendations made in this and previous BAs.

*10th plenary meeting
20 November 2022*

第 15/CP.27 号决定

对资金问题常设委员会职能进行第二次审查的职权范围

缔约方会议，

忆及第 6/CP.20 号、第 6/CP.21 号、第 8/CP.22 号、第 9/CP.22 号、第 8/CP.23 号、第 4/CP.24 号、第 11/CP.25 号、第 5/CP.26 号、第 5/CMA.2 号和第 10/CMA.3 号决定，

1. 通过附件所载对资金问题常设委员会职能进行第二次审查¹ 的职权范围；
2. 注意到资金问题常设委员会向《公约》缔约方会议和作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议提交的 2022 年报告²，特别是附件二；
3. 请资金问题常设委员会委员、缔约方、《公约》组成机构和外部利益相关方在 2023 年 4 月 30 日之前通过提交材料门户网站³ 提交关于根据附件所载职权范围对资金问题常设委员会职能进行第二次审查的意见，供附属履行机构第五十八届会议(2023 年 6 月)审议；
4. 请附属履行机构第五十八届会议根据职权范围，并考虑到上文第 3 段所述的提交材料，启动对资金问题常设委员会职能的第二次审查工作；
5. 又请附属履行机构第五十九届会议(2023 年 11 月至 12 月)完成对资金问题常设委员会职能的第二次审查工作，以期作为建议提出关于这一事项的决定草案，供《公约》缔约方会议第二十八届会议和作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议第五届会议(2023 年 11 月至 12 月)审议和通过；
6. 还请秘书处根据职权范围，考虑到附属履行机构第五十八届会议的审议情况和结论，以及上文第 3 段所述的提交材料，编写一份关于对资金问题常设委员会职能进行第二次审查的技术文件，供附属履行机构第五十九届会议审议；
7. 请作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议确认本决定，包括对资金常设委员会与《巴黎协定》相关的职能进行审查的职权范围；
8. 注意到关于对资金问题常设委员会职能进行审查的第 15/CMA.4 号决定。

¹ 根据第 11/CP.25 号决定，第 17 段。

² FCCC/CP/2022/8-FCCC/PA/CMA/2022/7。

³ <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx>。

附件

对资金问题常设委员会职能进行第二次审查的职权范围

一. 目标

1. 第二次审查的目标是审查资金问题常设委员会的职能，以期：
 - (a) 酌情加强资金问题常设委员会的工作；
 - (b) 确定提高效率和效力的机会；
 - (c) 向缔约方通报资金问题常设委员会现有活动和工作模式将在多大程度上有助于其按照第 1/CP.21 号决定第 63 段履行为《巴黎协定》服务的任务；
 - (d) 考虑到相互关联的审查进程，如对资金机制的审查。

二. 范围

2. 审查的范围将涵盖资金问题常设委员会在履行任务，协助《公约》缔约方会议并为《巴黎协定》服务以履行资金机制方面职能的过程中迄今取得的进展和吸取的经验教训。在此背景下，审查应：
 - (a) 基于资金问题常设委员会的现有任务和职能；
 - (b) 参考其他实体开展的气候资金方面的工作；
 - (c) 考虑到资金问题常设委员会执行工作的能力，审查资金问题常设委员会在执行工作方面是否存在差距，以及如何消除这些差距。
3. 审查应涉及以下要素：
 - (a) 评估资金问题常设委员会在多大程度上有效履行了相关决定所述四项核心职能和各项任务活动¹，并在这方面盘点资金问题常设委员会过去在具体产出方面及其利用方式方面取得的成就；
 - (b) 确定资金问题常设委员会现有职能重新调整和重新排定优先次序方面的潜在必要；
 - (c) 评估资金问题常设委员会的工作模式，包括委员的参与是否适合履行职能的目的；
 - (d) 产出质量；
 - (e) 与《公约》和《巴黎协定》组成机构的联系；
 - (f) 与有关外部利益相关方的关系。

¹ 根据第 2/CP.17 号决定。

三. 信息来源

4. 除其他外，审查应利用以下信息来源：

(a) 资金问题常设委员会委员、《公约》和《巴黎协定》缔约方、《公约》和《巴黎协定》组成机构以及参与资金问题常设委员会活动的外部利益相关方提交的材料；

(b) 资金问题常设委员会的年度报告；

(c) 《公约》缔约方会议和作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议关于资金问题常设委员会的相关决定；

(d) 资金问题常设委员会交付的产出；

(e) 资金问题常设委员会的自我评估报告及关于改善其效率和效力的建议；

(f) 本决定上文第 6 段所述秘书处将编写的技术文件。

四. 标准

5. 除其他外，审查应考虑到以下：

(a) 资金问题常设委员会履行职能的效力和效率；

(b) 其决策进程的透明度；

(c) 资金问题常设委员会的包容性和地域代表性；

(d) 利益相关方参与的程度和性质；

(e) 资金问题常设委员会产出的质量和附加值，包括《公约》缔约方会议、作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议和外部利益相关方对产出的看法，以及其建议如何为《公约》缔约方会议和作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议的工作提供参考和推动；

(f) 资金问题常设委员会产出的及时性。

第 10 次全体会议
2022 年 11 月 20 日

第 16/CP.27 号决定

绿色气候基金提交缔约方会议的报告和对绿色气候基金的指导意见

缔约方会议，

忆及第 3/CP.17 号决定附件，

1. 欢迎绿色气候基金提交缔约方会议第二十七届会议的报告及其增编¹，包括绿色气候基金董事会根据缔约方会议的指导意见而采取的行动的相关信息；

2. 又欢迎绿色气候基金正在努力为旨在实现国际社会所设目标的全球努力做出重大和具有雄心的贡献，以应对气候变化和适应其影响并推动实现《公约》目标，同时考虑到发展中国家的需要；

3. 还欢迎 2022 年在绿色气候基金下取得的进展，包括在董事会根据缔约方会议提供的指导意见所采取的行动方面取得的进展：

(a) 核准的供资提案数量增加，使董事会核准的资金总额达到 113 亿美元，可用于支助在 128 个发展中国家执行 209 个适应和减缓项目和方案；

(b) 获得董事会认证的实体数目增加，使获得认证的实体总数达到 114 个，其中 72 个为直接获取资金实体；

(c) 核准的国家适应计划和其他适应规划进程准备支持赠款增加，使核准的赠款总数达到 87 笔；

(d) 更新了简化审批程序，包括将绿色气候基金对每份提案的供资额增加至 2,500 万美元并实行了进一步简化；

(e) 通过了更新后的认证框架，其中包括实施了特定项目评估办法，作为机构认证进程的补充模式，以及通过了一项认证战略；

(f) 通过了多项关于指导意见的决定，这些指导意见涉及绿色气候基金提供支持以加强气候适应工作的愿景、方法和范围，还涉及用于证明减缓和适应活动影响潜力的原则；

(g) 通过了《私营部门战略》；

(h) 通过了尽量减少货币波动影响的政策；

(i) 综合成果管理框架开始运作；

(j) 土著人民咨询组开始运作；

(k) 绿色气候基金继续与适应委员会、气候技术中心和网络、最不发达国家专家组和技术执行委员会合作；

4. 请董事会确保其对项目适用的条件不违反已核准的政策和程序；

¹ FCCC/CP/2022/4 和 Add.1。

5. 欢迎基金为了制定《2024-2027 年绿色气候基金战略计划》而正在开展的工作；
6. 又欢迎启动绿色气候基金 2024 年 1 月 1 日至 2027 年 12 月 31 日第二次筹资，并回顾基金将收到《公约》发达国家缔约方的资金投入，并可接收各种其他公共和私人来源，包括替代来源的资金投入；²
7. 请董事会继续加强绿色气候基金与其他相关双边、区域和全球供资机制和机构的一致性和互补性，以更好地调集各类资金和技术能力；
8. 特别指出绿色气候基金必须在支持实施与发展中国家适应优先事项有关的行动方面发挥作用，并敦促董事会改善技术和能力建设支持，促进按照其核准的关于适应支持的指导意见，制定基于国家适应计划的各项项目和方案；³
9. 请董事会继续加强支持国家适应计划的制订和执行，使发展中国家能够采取有效的适应行动；
10. 欢迎董事会继续支持在准备和筹备支持方案下加强支持技术开发和转让以及能力建设，并鼓励董事会继续在这方面支持发展中国家；
11. 又鼓励董事会继续开展关于征集在发展中国家建立技术孵化器和加速器的提案的工作；
12. 请董事会继续按照更新后的认证框架和认证战略对直接获取资金实体进行认证，特别是国家和区域实体和机构，重点关注没有或只有很少几个经证实体的国家和地区；
13. 敦促董事会保持其随着时间的推移逐步核准的适应资金与减缓资金之间的平衡，并提供高水平的适应支持，同时强调第 7/CP.20 号决定第 12 段所述的适应需要；
14. 请董事会继续响应特别易受气候变化不利影响的发展中国家的需要；
15. 邀请董事会加强支持最不发达国家、小岛屿发展中国家和其他发展中国家制定项目管道和提案，并支持与其国家适应计划优先事项有关的适应行动；
16. 鼓励董事会继续通过政策方法和激励措施支持基于成果支付，促进加强发展中国家通过实施与减少毁林和森林退化造成的排放、保存森林碳储量、可持续管理森林和提高森林碳储量有关的活动对全球减缓努力做出贡献；⁴
17. 邀请董事会支持全面实施基金的《私营部门战略》，并在这方面支持基金与私营部门、特别是地方私营部门行为体和中小微企业接触，以大规模催化气候资金，促进技术创新和降低投资风险，包括向发展中国家的地方私营部门和初创企业提供早期融资和赠款融资；
18. 请董事会考虑在下一版性别政策中提高目标，并邀请董事会在现有指导意见的范围内考虑到加强的性别问题利马工作方案及其性别行动计划的执行情况；

² 《绿色气候基金管理文书》，第 29-30 段。

³ 按照第 1/CP.21 号决定，第 46 段。

⁴ 如第 1/CP.16 号决定第 70 段和第 1/CP.13 号决定第 1(b)(三)段所述。

19. 鼓励董事会考虑加强通过准备和筹备支持方案提供的支持，促进制定国家和国家以下各级与气候有关的性别战略，并考虑进一步强化绿色气候基金活动中性别平等方案的拟订工作，为此支持其中包含的各项政策和项目的实施；
20. 敦促董事会继续将土著人民和地方社区的利益、观点、知识和气候优先事项纳入其决策，包括通过其土著人民政策和土著人民咨询组的建议这样做，以及为此继续与地方社区和土著人民平台促进工作组和国际土著人民气候变化论坛等机构进行接触；
21. 邀请缔约方最晚在缔约方会议第二十八届会议(2023 年 11 月至 12 月)前 10 周，通过提交门户网站⁵，向秘书处提交关于对绿色气候基金的指导意见内容的意见和建议；
22. 请资金问题常设委员会在编写供《公约》缔约方会议第二十八届会议和作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议第五届会议(2023 年 11 月至 12 月)审议的对绿色气候基金的指导意见草案时，考虑到以上第 21 段所述提交材料；
23. 又请董事会在向缔约方会议提交的年度报告中列入资料，说明为执行本决定中提出的指导意见而采取的步骤；
24. 注意到第 16/CMA.4 号决定，并决定向绿色气候基金转交该决定第 2-7 段所载的作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议的指导意见。⁶

第 10 次全体会议
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⁵ <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx>.

⁶ 按照第 1/CP.21 号决定，第 61 段。

第 17/CP.27 号决定

全球环境基金提交缔约方会议的报告和对全球环境基金的指导意见

缔约方会议，

1. 欢迎全球环境基金向缔约方会议第二十七届会议提交的报告及增编，包括全球环境基金对缔约方会议提出的指导意见作出的回应；¹

2. 又欢迎全球环境基金在报告所述期间(2021 年 7 月 1 日至 2022 年 6 月 30 日)开展的工作，包括：

(a) 核准在全球环境基金信托基金、最不发达国家基金和气候变化特别基金之下批准的 86 个气候变化项目和方案；

(b) 继续将气候变化优先事项纳入其他重点领域和综合方案，预计由此可避免或固存 7,660 万吨二氧化碳当量；

(c) 继续执行关于绿色气候基金与全球环境基金互补性、一致性和协作性的长期愿景；²

(d) 在透明资源分配系统中设立一个竞争性资金窗口，占透明资源分配系统分配给该系统下五大受援国资源的 8%；

3. 还欢迎全球环境基金第八次充资结束，充资额达到 53 亿美元，同时注意到第八次充资中可用于气候变化重点领域方案编制的总体资源比第七次充资中的资源增加了 6%；

4. 欢迎全球环境基金在所有五个重点领域³ 采用综合方案编制办法，这应有助于最大限度地扩大其支助所带来的全球环境惠益；

5. 注意到全球环境基金理事会第 59 次会议通过了“私营部门参与战略”⁴，并在全球环境基金第八次充资期间更新了非赠款工具；鼓励全球环境基金在第八次充资期间加强努力，动员私营部门并与其合作；

6. 欢迎全球环境基金第八次充资在透明资源分配系统下增加了对小岛屿发展中国家和最不发达国家的资源分配，包括统一了小岛屿发展中国家和最不发达国家的最低限额，并将这些最低限额提高到 800 万美元；

7. 赞赏全球环境基金秘书处努力扩大分配给小岛屿发展中国家的适应资金，为此在气候变化特别基金下指定了一个专项窗口，支持小岛屿发展中国家的适应需要；鼓励根据全球环境基金《2022-2026 年最不发达国家基金和气候变化特别

¹ FCCC/CP/2022/5 和 Add.1 号文件。

² 全球环境基金理事会 GEF/C.60/08 号文件。

³ 全球环境基金信托基金工作方案下的五个重点领域是生物多样性、化学品和废物、气候变化、国际水域和土地退化。

⁴ 全球环境基金理事会 GEF/C.59/07/Rev.01 号文件。

基金适应气候变化方案编制战略》的要求，继续并增加对最不发达国家基金和气候变化特别基金的自愿捐款；⁵

8. 又鼓励全球环境基金在管理最不发达国家基金和气候变化特别基金时，支持发展中国家缔约方执行国家适应计划和其他国家适应规划进程；敦促发达国家缔约方增加对最不发达国家基金和气候变化特别基金的自愿捐款；

9. 鼓励全球环境基金在全球环境基金第八次充资期间努力执行《最不发达国家基金和气候变化特别基金适应气候变化方案编制战略》，以便有效援助发展中国家；

10. 请全球环境基金继续促进增强执行机构的多样性，利用各机构的相对优势，并考虑到受援国的优先事项；

11. 吁请全球环境基金在其任务范围内加大对执行加强的性别问题利马工作方案及其性别行动计划的支持；⁶

12. 鼓励全球环境基金秘书处作为建议提出进一步精简措施，以减少所有执行机构的交易费用，减少行政费用，并促进多边开发银行更多获得资金；

13. 请全球环境基金报告为实现在第八次充资进程中商定的提高小额赠款方案下对每个项目的供资上限所作的努力；

14. 欢迎全球环境基金承诺在其第八次充资中保持直接和间接气候共同效益的高水平；

15. 请全球环境基金进一步探讨各种方法，以支持发展中国家缔约方以国家驱动的方式评估需要和优先事项，包括技术和能力建设需要，并支持它们将气候资金需要转化为行动；

16. 敦促全球环境基金进一步加强对技术培训、技术开发和转让筹资以及能力建设活动的支持；

17. 鼓励全球环境基金继续与绿色气候基金合作，包括执行关于绿色气候基金与全球环境基金互补性、一致性和协作性的长期愿景；⁷

18. 请全球环境基金酌情确保有效妥善遵循其关于审议和审查供资建议书的政策和程序；

19. 请缔约方最晚在缔约方会议第二十八届会议(2023年11月至12月)前10周通过提交材料的门户网站⁸就对全球环境基金的指导意见的要点提交意见和建议；

20. 请资金问题常设委员会在编写供《公约》缔约方会议第二十八届会议和作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议第五届会议(2023年11月至12月)审议的对全球环境基金的指导意见草案时，考虑到上文第19段所述的提交材料；

⁵ 全球环境基金理事会 GEF/LDCF.SCCF/SM.03/01 号文件。

⁶ 第3/CP.25号决定。

⁷ 全球环境基金理事会 GEF/C.60/08 号文件。

⁸ <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx>.

21. 又请全球环境基金在向缔约方会议提交的年度报告中提供信息，说明为执行本决定中提出的指导意见而采取的举措；

22. 注意到第 17/CMA.4 号决定，决定向全球环境基金转交该决定第 2-10 段所载作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议提出的指导意见；⁹

第 10 次全体会议
2022 年 11 月 20 日

⁹ 按照第 1/CP.21 号决定，第 61 段。

第 18/CP.27 号决定

通过技术机制加强气候技术的开发和转让

缔约方会议，

忆及第 2/CP.17、第 1/CP.21、第 15/CP.22、第 21/CP.22、第 15/CP.23、第 12/CP.24、第 13/CP.24、第 14/CP.25 和第 9/CP.26 号决定，

1. 注意到技术执行委员会及气候技术中心和网络 2022 年联合年度报告¹ 以及这两个机构在促进技术机制的有效实施方面取得的进展；
2. 欢迎技术执行委员会与气候技术中心和网络在 2022 年的联合活动² 中开展协作，并请它们继续开展联合活动，加强系统性反馈的交流，以确保技术机制的一致性和协同作用，并确保其得到有效实施；
3. 赞赏地欢迎技术机制 2023-2027 年第一个联合工作方案³，制定该方案的目的是加强技术机制，以支持实现《公约》目标所需的转型变革；
4. 欢迎联合工作方案中所述的主要联合活动和共同工作领域：即技术路线图、数字化、国家创新系统、水—能源—粮食系统、能源系统、建筑物和基础设施、工商业以及技术需求评估；
5. 邀请技术执行委员会及气候技术中心和网络与《公约》之下和之外的机构、进程和倡议，包括私营部门的机构、进程和倡议一起，共同寻求合作伙伴关系和战略参与，以期促进执行联合工作方案下的所有活动；
6. 又请技术执行委员会和气候技术中心和网络加强与国家指定实体的系统接触，包括通过国家指定实体区域论坛，以扩大技术机制工作对实地政策和做法的覆盖面和影响；
7. 还请缔约方、技术执行委员会以及气候技术中心和网络探索向国家指定实体提供更好的技术和后勤支持的方式，包括通过与公共和私营部门合作；
8. 赞扬技术执行委员会和气候技术中心和网络继续努力将性别考虑纳入其工作的主流，并请技术执行委员会和气候技术中心和网络迅速完成气候技术领域女性专家和性别与气候变化领域女性和男性专家的两份全球名册；
9. 欢迎技术执行委员会及气候技术中心和网络与资金机制经营实体开展合作，并大力鼓励这两个机构继续开展这种合作，以期提高发展中国家编制项目建议书的能力，便利它们获得现有的技术开发和转让资金；
10. 承认技术执行委员会和气候技术中心和网络在联合工作方案下计划的关于孵化器和加速器的工作，并请这两个机构继续与发展中国家缔约方，特别是最不发

¹ FCCC/SB/2022/4。

² 见技术执行委员会及气候技术中心和网络 2022-2023 年联合活动表，可查阅 <https://unfccc.int/ttclear/tec>。

³ 可查阅 <https://unfccc.int/ttclear/tec/documents.html>。

达国家缔约方和小岛屿发展中国家合作，促进孵化器和加速器的使用，并支持制定纳入其用途的供资提案，以提交资金机制的经营实体；

11. 请技术执行委员会及气候技术中心和网络继续加强努力，监测和评估其工作的影响，包括确定新的方式，如通过更加切实有效的调查，邀请指定国家实体就技术机制工作的影响提供反馈；

12. 表示赞赏缔约方迄今为止为支持技术执行委员会及气候技术中心和网络的工作提供的自愿捐款，并鼓励通过资金和其他资源为技术执行委员会及气候技术中心和网络的工作提供更多的支持；

13. 注意到以上第 1 段所述联合年度报告没有说明技术执行委员会及气候技术中心和网络如何在开展工作时对缔约方的任务作出反应，并请这两个机构在其联合年度报告中列入这类信息；

14. 鼓励技术执行委员会秘书处及气候技术中心和网络秘书处密切合作，包括在资源调动方面密切合作，以确保联合工作方案得到切实执行；

一. 技术执行委员会 2022 年的活动和业绩

15. 请缔约方和相关利益相关方审议技术执行委员会关于 2022 年的相关关键信息和建议的执行情况，并请技术执行委员会及气候技术中心和网络审议直接向它们提出的建议；

16. 鼓励技术执行委员会继续努力，包括通过缔约方各自的指定国家实体、《气候公约》组成机构和其他相关利益相关方，提高其知名度和与缔约方的外联工作，并得到使其建议最大限度的采纳；

17. 关切地注意到技术执行委员会的组成尚未实现性别均衡；鼓励缔约方为技术执行委员会提名更多女性候选人，以实现委员会组成的性别平衡；

18. 忆及第 9/CP.26 号决定第 15 段，并决定技术执行委员会除现有成员外，还应包括一名来自《公约》附件一所列缔约方的成员，以及一名来自第 1/CP.16 号决定附录四第 1(b)段所指区域未代表的非《公约》附件一所列缔约方的成员；

二. 气候技术中心和网络 2022 年的活动和业绩

19. 赞赏地注意到为回应气候技术中心和网络第二次独立审查⁴ 而采取的行动，鼓励气候技术中心和网络继续执行其中的建议，并在下一份年度报告中报告执行情况；

20. 又鼓励气候技术中心和网络继续应请求向发展中国家，包括尚未得到气候技术中心和网络技术援助支持的发展中国家提供支持，包括为此动员私营部门实体和网络成员，以期建设和加强发展中国家的能力，以评估自身技术需求，制定和实施技术行动计划，扩大技术援助，并为实施减缓和适应行动获取可用资金；

⁴ 根据第 11/CP.26 号决定。

21. 欢迎在大韩民国松岛设立伙伴关系和联络处，并请气候技术中心和网络在年度报告中说明松岛伙伴关系和联络处运作的经验教训；
22. 关切地注意到，为执行技术机制履行任务筹措资金仍然是一项重大挑战，并鼓励加强对技术机制的支持；
23. 赞赏气候技术中心和网络努力调动各种资源，包括无偿和实物捐助，并请气候技术中心和网络最后确定并落实一项资源调动和伙伴关系战略，并在其年度报告中列入有关信息；
24. 赞赏地欢迎绿色气候基金理事会对联合国环境规划署作了重新认证，并将其提升为中等规模项目预算类别，以便向绿色气候基金提交供资提案；
25. 欢迎气候技术中心和网络正在开展的制定两个中型项目的工作，鼓励气候技术中心和网络在制定未来项目时考虑区域平衡，并在年度报告中报告绿色气候基金下的项目制定专项基金的使用情况。

第 9 次全体会议
2022 年 11 月 17 日

第 19/CP.27 号决定

巴黎能力建设委员会 2022 年年度技术进展报告

缔约方会议，

回顾第 2/CP.17 号、第 1/CP.21 号、第 2/CP.22 号、第 16/CP.22 号、第 16/CP.23 号、第 15/CP.24 号、第 8/CP.25 号和第 12/CP.26 号决定，

1. 欢迎巴黎能力建设委员会 2022 年年度技术进展报告¹，并注意到其中的建议²；
2. 请缔约方，并酌情请资金机制经营实体、《公约》组成机构、联合国组织、观察员和其他利益相关方，审议上文第 1 段所述各项建议，并根据各自的任务规定，酌情采取任何必要的行动；
3. 承认巴黎能力建设委员会在履行其任务方面取得的进展，即处理发展中国家缔约方在实施能力建设方面现有的和新出现的差距和需要，以及进一步加强能力建设工作，包括加强《公约》下能力建设活动的一致性和协调；
4. 又承认巴黎能力建设委员会在第 9/CP.25 号决定附件所列优先领域和活动的基础上执行其 2021-2024 年工作计划³方面取得的进展；
5. 欢迎巴黎能力建设委员会新的监测和评价框架，以及对其 2021 年 9 月至 2022 年 7 月期间工作计划活动的产出、成果、影响和成效进行监测和评价的结果；⁴
6. 又欢迎巴黎能力建设委员会在加强《公约》之下能力建设活动的一致性和协调方面所做的工作，包括与各组成机构和其他利益相关方在这方面的合作；
7. 还欢迎巴黎能力建设委员会通过巴黎能力建设委员会网络、《公约》和《巴黎协定》框架内能力建设非正式协调小组、能力建设德班论坛、能力建设中心和社交媒体宣传等途径，继续与缔约方和非缔约方利益相关方合作，开展气候行动能力建设，并处理跨领域问题，包括人权、性别平等敏感性、青年、气候赋权行动和土著人民的知识；
8. 注意到巴黎能力建设委员会将适应方面的能力建设支持作为 2023 年重点领域，着重解决与制定和执行国家适应计划有关的差距和需要；⁵
9. 注意到发展中国家在执行《公约》方面仍然存在能力差距和需要；

¹ FCCC/SBI/2022/14.

² FCCC/SBI/2022/14，第三章。

³ FCCC/SBI/2020/13，附件一。

⁴ FCCC/SBI/2022/14，附件一。

⁵ 见 FCCC/SBI/2022/14 号文件，第 14 段。

10. 请缔约方和相关机构酌情向巴黎能力建设委员会提供支持和资源，以便其按照第 1/CP.21 号决定确立的委员会目标执行其 2021-2024 年工作计划。

第 9 次全体会议
2022 年 11 月 17 日

第 20/CP.27 号决定

实施应对措施的影响问题论坛的报告

作为《京都议定书》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议，

回顾第 7/CP.24 号、第 3/CMP.14 号、第 7/CMA.1 号、第 4/CP.25 号、第 4/CMP.15 号、第 19/CP.26 号和第 7/CMP.16 号决定，

1. 欢迎实施应对措施的影响问题卡托维兹专家委员会 2019 年¹ 和 2021-2022 年年度报告²；
2. 注意到实施应对措施的影响问题论坛对影响问题卡托维兹委员会 2019 年和 2021-2022 年年度报告的审议结论；
3. 通过下文第一至第六节所载论坛提出的建议，涉及：
 - (a) 从分析和评估缔约方实施应对措施的积极和消极影响中获得的经验教训和最佳做法；
 - (b) 论坛及其影响问题卡托维兹委员会工作计划中的活动 2、3、4、5 和 11；³
4. 请缔约方、观察员组织和利益相关方酌情落实下文第一至第六节中的建议；
5. 请论坛及其影响问题卡托维兹委员会和秘书处酌情落实下文第一至第六节中的建议；
6. 赞赏影响问题卡托维兹委员会在支持实施应对措施的影响问题论坛的工作方面取得的进展；
7. 欢迎附属科学技术咨询机构主席和附属履行机构主席为与附属机构第五十六届会议同期举行的关于工作计划活动 3、4、9 和 11 的研讨会编写的非正式说明；
8. 赞赏关于实施工作计划活动 5 和 11 的技术会议，并感谢为论坛及其影响问题卡托维兹委员会的工作作出贡献的专家；
9. 又感谢安提瓜和巴布达政府、塞内加尔政府、国际劳工组织和联合国开发计划署提供了实物、财政、行政和实质性支持，为 2022 年 4 月 20 日至 22 日在安提瓜和巴布达圣约翰和 2022 年 9 月 21 日至 23 日在塞内加尔萨利举行的关于工作计划活动 3 的区域研讨会取得成功作出了贡献；
10. 注意到对论坛工作计划的中期审查无法在这些会议上完成，注意到关于中期审查的非正式说明⁴，并请论坛在附属机构第五十八届会议(2023 年 6 月)上继续进行中期审查；

¹ KCI/2019/2/4 号文件。

² FCCC/SB/2022/6 号文件。

³ 载于第 4/CP.25 号、第 4/CMP.15 号和第 4/CMA.2 号决定附件二。

⁴ 可查阅 <https://unfccc.int/documents/624251>。本说明的内容并不代表缔约方之间的一致意见。

11. 又请秘书处与相关组织和利益相关方合作，在附属机构第五十九届会议(2023年11月至12月)之前就工作计划活动3举办一次区域研讨会，以满足区域需要，肯定影响问题卡托维兹委员会已经开展的工作，并指出论坛可决定就活动3举办更多区域研讨会；

12. 请缔约方和观察员在2023年4月之前通过提交材料门户网站⁵提交意见和指导性问题，以便审查论坛的职能、工作方案和模式，⁶并请秘书处编写提交材料的摘要，作为审查讨论的基础，审查将从附属机构第五十八届会议开始，到第五十九届会议结束；

13. 注意到上文第3、第11和第12段所述有待秘书处开展的活动所涉估计预算问题；

14. 请秘书处在资金允许的情况下开展本决定所要求的行动；

一. 从分析和评估缔约方实施应对措施积极和消极影响中获得的经验教训和最佳做法

15. 鼓励缔约方考虑：

(a) 酌情与技术专家、从业人员和其他相关利益相关方协商，制定用于评估和分析实施应对措施的影响的方法和工具，包括建模工具；

(b) 建设开发和运用方法和工具的能力，特别是建设发展中国家缔约方的能力，以便为国家气候变化减缓和可持续发展优先事项和政策提供信息和支持；

(c) 开展更多的国家、区域和具体部门案例研究，涉及评估和分析实施应对措施的影响，以便缔约方之间交流经验；

二. 工作计划活动 2⁷

16. 鼓励缔约方投资于包容性和基于利益相关方参与的公正转型政策的早期规划；

17. 又鼓励经济发展水平很低的国家在进行经济多样化之前，优先考虑打好基础，并指出随着国家的发展，可以有多种多样化途径；

18. 请秘书处在注意到各国国情不同的同时，尽可能开展同行学习，以促进规划和实施有效的政策；

⁵ <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx>.

⁶ 第4/CP.25号、第4/CMP.15号和第4/CMA.2号决定附件二所载工作计划中的活动(e)。

⁷ 确定关于劳动力公正转型、创造体面工作和优质岗位以及经济多样化和转型的国家驱动战略和最佳做法，侧重于实施温室气体低排放政策和战略对实现可持续发展带来的挑战和机遇。

三. 工作计划活动 3⁸

19. 鼓励缔约方：

(a) 在选择用于评估实施应对措施的影响的工具或方法时，考虑是否具备国家层面的专业知识、培训、支持和咨询服务；

(b) 根据国家和国际标准(例如，联合国国民账户体系或环境经济核算体系)投资于数据收集；

(c) 建立能力建设伙伴关系和网络，以提高发展中国家的代表性，让更多发展中国家使用和开发影响评估工具和方法以评估实施应对措施的影响；

(d) 考虑采用定性和定量方法来评估实施应对措施的影响；

20. 请论坛及其影响问题卡托维兹委员会：

(a) 促进加强缔约方，特别是发展中国家缔约方的能力，以开发和使用影响评估方法和工具，自行评估和分析应对措施的影响，包括对体面工作和优质岗位的影响，以及对经济、社会和环境的影响、国内和跨境影响、积极和消极影响；这包括促进酌情开展案例研究，并组织有针对性的区域实践培训讲习班；

(b) 开发和维护一个用于选择工具和方法的网络用户界面，并酌情促进缔约方和利益相关方使用该界面；还可编制界面用户手册；

21. 又请秘书处视需要酌情定期更新适用于评估实施应对措施的影响的现有工具和方法数据库；

四. 工作计划活动 4⁹

22. 鼓励缔约方：

(a) 促进国际合作，以确定和分享成功实现经济多样化的国家的最佳做法和经验；

(b) 确定国际社会可促进所有缔约方可持续经济发展的国内和非国内障碍以及发展途径；

23. 请缔约方和专家优先开展和分享关于公正转型以及经济多样化和转型的案例研究，特别是关于发展中国家缔约方的案例研究，以便了解在规划和实施中面临的机遇和挑战；

24. 又请促进开发强有力的评估工具和方法，以反映实施应对措施的一系列多层次影响；

⁸ 与技术专家、从业人员和其他利益相关方协商，促进开发、强化、定制和使用工具和方法，对实施应对措施的影响进行建模和评估，包括确定和审查数据匮乏环境中的现有工具和方法。

⁹ 通过利益相关方的合作和投入，提高缔约方在评估和分析实施应对措施的影响方面的能力和了解，以促进经济多样化和变革以及公正转型。

25. 鼓励相关机构、金融机构和《气候公约》组成机构加强支持，处理与评估和分析实施减缓行动、政策和方案的影响有关的问题，包括国家自主贡献和长期低排放发展战略，以期处理不利影响和最大限度地利用机会；

26. 又鼓励相关机构强化和发展其现有的评估和分析培训框架和模块，以便于国家层面的培训方案以及开发影响评估工具和方法；

五. 工作计划活动 5¹⁰

27. 鼓励缔约方：

(a) 促进研究和开发方面的伙伴关系，包括确定风险和机会，以及让来自公共和私营部门的相关国家和国际利益相关方、民间社会、地方社区和土著人民、青年、工人以及新行业和新业务的研究和学术界参与同行学习；

(b) 促进国家间和国家内关于新行业和新业务的经验、最佳做法、研究成果和学习的交流，包括确定相关技能，充分利用现有知识和能力，以及通过有针对性的培训、重新装备、再培训和技能重塑来开发新技能；

(c) 探索新技术、碳捕获、利用和储存、氢和人工智能工具，以最大限度地发挥实施应对措施积极影响的积极影响，尽量减少消极影响；

(d) 在国家、区域或全球层面酌情制定碳捕获、运输、利用和储存以及氢气生产、基础设施和运输的监管框架，酌情探索实现设计和应用标准化的可能性，同时确保高安全标准；

(e) 消除碳捕获、利用和储存的障碍并加强政策支持，以推动创新和部署扩大规模，确保对拓展全球市场前沿至关重要的具体政策激励措施；

(f) 视需要就氢气生产周期温室气体排放量的计算方法进行合作，并为氢气的部署制定全面的、基于科学的术语和相关标准，以促进广泛采用氢气经济，同时也消除障碍；

28. 又鼓励各缔约方、观察员组织和其他相关利益相关方让包括中小企业在内的私营部门参与进来，以便于确定和交流经验和最佳做法，推动在新行业和新业务中创造体面工作和优质岗位；

29. 进一步鼓励缔约方和利益相关方促进合作，开展联合试点活动和方案，分享知识、经验教训和最佳做法，包括来自政府、工商界、研究和学术界、人工智能专家和民间社会团体的知识、经验教训和最佳做法；

30. 鼓励相关利益相关方开展经济和财务分析，包括评估投资和商业模式的多样化，以促进对氢气经济的投资，并开展科学评估，以了解用于可持续氢气生产的国家资源禀赋；

¹⁰ 提高缔约方和其他利益相关方的认识和了解，以评估实施应对措施可能产生的新行业和新业务的经济影响，以期最大限度地提高实施应对措施的积极影响，尽量减少消极影响。

六. 工作计划活动 11¹¹

31. 鼓励缔约方对应对措施的影响进行更深入的分析，量化应对措施的协同效益，对共同效益的来源和共同效益的受益者进行分类，以便为综合气候行动提供信息；

32. 请影响问题卡托维兹委员会加强缔约方特别是发展中国家缔约方的能力，以开发和使用针对具体国家的工具和方法，用于评估气候变化政策和行动的环境、社会和经济共同效益。

第 10 次全体会议
2022 年 11 月 20 日

¹¹ 利用现有最佳科学，包括利用现有工具和方法，促进、交流和分享关于评估气候变化政策和行动的环境、社会和经济共同效益的经验和最佳做法。

第 21/CP.27 号决定

对《公约》之下长期全球目标和实现该目标方面总体进展情况的第二次定期审评

缔约方会议，

忆及《公约》第二条至第三条，

又忆及，根据第 1/CP.16 号决定第 138 段，对《公约》之下长期全球目标和实现该目标方面总体进展情况的第二次定期审评应结合《公约》最终目标并根据《公约》的相关原则和规定进行，

还忆及第 1/CP.16 号决定第 138-139 段、第 1/CP.17 号决定第 6 段、第 2/CP.17 号决定第 157-167 段、第 1/CP.18 号决定第 79-91 段、第 10/CP.21 号决定、第 18/CP.23 号决定、第 5/CP.25 号决定和第 1/CP.26 号决定，

1. 欢迎关于对《公约》之下长期全球目标和实现该目标方面总体进展情况的第二次定期审评的有结构的专家对话(以下简称有结构的专家对话)所开展的工作，这些工作为完成第 2/CP.17 号决定第 164 段所述第二次定期审评的各个阶段作出了贡献；注意到相关综合报告¹，包括其中强调的 10 项关键信息，以及对话各次会议的概要报告；²
2. 表示赞赏和感谢参加有结构的专家对话的各方，特别是联合召集人；
3. 又表示赞赏和感谢为第二次定期审评提供的所有投入，包括政府间气候变化专门委员会、秘书处、《气候公约》组成机构和其他联合国机构和组织为有结构的专家对话提供的投入，以及关于 2020 年前实施和力度的 2020 年圆桌会议的报告；
4. 注意到第 1/CP.18 号决定第 86 至 89 段所述的有结构的专家对话的工作已经完成，并注意到对话涵盖了第 5/CP.25 号决定第 4(a-b)段所述的第二次定期审评的两个主题；
5. 重申第 10/CP.21 号决定第 4 段所述的长期全球目标，即把全球平均气温升幅控制在工业化前水平以上低于 2°C 之内，并努力将气温升幅限制在工业化前水平以上 1.5°C 之内(以下简称长期全球目标)，同时认识到这将大大减少气候变化的风险和影响；注意到对该目标的评估经历了几十年的时间；
6. 表示震惊和最严重关切的是，人类活动迄今已使全球平均气温比工业化前水平高出约 1.1°C，每个区域都已受到影响，而且这种影响将随着全球变暖的每一次加剧而加剧；
7. 回顾 1.5°C 的气温升幅与 2°C 相比，气候变化的影响将小得多³；确认将全球平均气温升幅控制在工业化前水平以上 1.5°C 之内，不超过该范围或略微超过一

¹ FCCC/SB/2022/3。

² 可查阅 <https://unfccc.int/topics/science/workstreams/periodic-review/SED>。

³ 第 1/CP.26 号决定，第 16 段。

点，将避免产生日益严重的气候变化影响，同时强调指出，每避免一次全球变暖的加剧，影响的严重性都将随之降低；

8. 重申为将全球变暖控制在 1.5°C 之内，必须快速、大幅和持续地减少全球温室气体排放，包括到 2030 年将全球二氧化碳排放量相比 2010 年减少 45%，并在本世纪中叶前后实现净零排放，以及大幅减少其他温室气体排放；⁴

9. 注意到自第一次定期审评(2013-2015 年)以来，信息和知识水平有了显著改善，但在第 5/CP.25 号决定第 4 段所述第二次定期审评范围所涉领域方面，仍然存在着重要的信息和知识差距；鼓励科学界弥补这些差距；

10. 注意到《政府间气候变化专门委员会第六次评估报告综合报告》预计将于 2023 年 3 月完成；请政府间气候变化专门委员会在附属科学技术咨询机构第五十八届会议(2023 年 6 月)上介绍报告中的结论；

11. 注意到通过立即、快速、大幅和持续地减少全球温室气体排放总量，仍然有可能实现长期全球目标，同时认识到在缓解、适应以及执行和支持手段方面存在挑战；

12. 又注意到现行政策和措施不足以实现长期全球目标，实现这一目标的机会之窗正在关闭；

13. 还注意到在有结构的专家对话期间就缔约方如何能够在重要系统和部门实现根本性变革提供了宝贵的信息；

14. 强调需要采取预防性、渐进性和变革性适应措施，解决造成脆弱性和风险增加的根本因素，包括缺乏应对气候变化的能力，并强调迄今为止大多数适应措施都是渐进性的，很少有证据表明适应措施具有变革性，并且仍然难以跟踪适应规划的进展情况；

15. 注意到，尽管在缓解、适应以及执行和支持手段方面取得了总体进展，但缔约方作为一个整体并未走上实现长期全球目标的轨道，一些缔约方 2020 年前的承诺及其随后的执行工作力度均不够；

16. 又注意到集体承诺的减排量与实现长期全球目标所需的减排量之间仍存在巨大差距，在支持《公约》所述的发展中国家缔约方特别是那些对气候变化不利影响特别脆弱的发展中国家缔约方的适应和执行手段方面也存在差距；

17. 承认为了转向并留在实现长期全球目标的道路上，缔约方必须在《公约》和《巴黎协定》之下加强努力，在 2030 年之前大幅减少累计排放量，同时认识到在资金、技术、经济、能力建设和体制方面的挑战，以及《公约》所述的发展中国家缔约方特别是那些对气候变化不利影响特别脆弱的发展中国家缔约方的具体需要和特殊情况；

18. 注意到虽然《气候公约》、其组成机构和其他实体在扩大资金、技术和能力建设支持方面已经取得了一些进展，但气候行动的这些推动因素与实现向低排放和气候韧性的迅速、公正和公平转型的紧迫性并不匹配，这种进展在规模和速度方面仍然存在重大差距；

⁴ 第 1/CP.26 号决定，第 17 段。

19. 确认自第一次定期审评以来气候资金有所增加，但仍不足以满足各项需要和优先事项；重申发达国家缔约方应继续履行在《公约》下的现有义务，提供增强的支持，包括通过财政资源、技术转让和能力建设提供支持，在减缓和适应这两方面协助发展中国家缔约方，并鼓励其他缔约方自愿提供或继续提供这种支持；
20. 注意到各缔约方在促进实现长期全球目标方面的责任、国情和能力各不相同，而气候变暖相关影响和风险分布不均，在这方面又注意到需要加强努力实现长期全球目标，同时考虑到力度、公平、公正的转型和现有的最佳科学知识；
21. 还注意到有结构的专家对话的产出可依照第 19/CMA.1 号决定第 37(c)段所述作为第一次全球盘点的投入，以及对《公约》和《巴黎协定》下其他相关进程的投入；
22. 决定根据第 5/CP.25 号决定第 8 段，在第二十九届会议(2024 年 11 月)上审议继续开展定期审评的问题；
23. 注意到第二次定期审评完成了第 1/CP.16 号、第 1/CP.17 号、第 2/CP.17 号、第 1/CP.18 号和第 5/CP.25 号决定所载的任务。

第 10 次全体会议
2022 年 11 月 20 日

第 22/CP.27 号决定

全球气候观测系统的实施

缔约方会议，

忆及《公约》第四条第 1 款(g-h)项和第五条，

又忆及第 8/CP.3、第 14/CP.4、第 5/CP.5、第 11/CP.9、第 5/CP.10、第 9/CP.15 和第 19/CP.22 号决定，

还忆及《巴黎协定》第七条，

注意到全球气候观测系统在满足《公约》所载气候观测和气候服务需求方面的重要作用，

又注意到报告和温室气体清单指南是根据《气候公约》和《巴黎协定》通过的，

认识到支持系统观测的能力建设的重要性和持续必要性，

1. 认识到强有力的地球观测系统和相关长期数据记录对于增进对全球气候系统及其变化的了解以及适应和减缓行动至关重要；
2. 欢迎《2022 年全球气候观测系统实施计划》¹ 和 2022 年全球气候观测系统基本气候变量要求，² 并鼓励缔约方和相关组织酌情努力，执行《2022 年全球气候观测系统实施计划》；
3. 强调需要填补系统观测空白，特别是在发展中国家，以及对海洋、山区、沙漠、极地区和冰冻圈的系统观测空白，以便更好地了解气候变化、与气候相关的风险和临界点以及适应限度，并确保更好地提供气候服务和预警系统；
4. 关切地注意到全球气候观测系统中的现有差距，并认识到需要加强系统观测界活动的协调，提高其能力，为减缓、适应和预警系统提供有用和可供采取行动的气候信息，以及有助于理解适应限度和极端事件归因的信息。

第 9 次全体会议
2022 年 11 月 17 日

¹ 见世界气象组织。2022 年。《2022 年全球气候观测系统实施计划》。日内瓦，世界气象组织，可查阅 https://library.wmo.int/doc_num.php?explnum_id=11317。

² 见世界气象组织。2022 年。《2022 年全球气候观测系统基本气候变量要求》。日内瓦，世界气象组织，可查阅 https://library.wmo.int/doc_num.php?explnum_id=11318。

第 23/CP.27 号决定

《格拉斯哥气候赋权行动工作方案》之下的行动计划

《公约》缔约方会议和作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议，

回顾《公约》第四条和第六条以及《巴黎协定》第十二条，

承认气候变化是人类共同关注的问题，缔约方在采取行动处理气候变化时，应当尊重、促进和考虑它们各自对人权、健康权、土著人民权利、当地社区权利、移徙者权利、儿童权利、残疾人权利、弱势人权利、发展权，以及性别平等、妇女赋权和代际公平等的义务，

回顾第 18/CP.26 号、第 17/CMA.1 号和第 22/CMA.3 号决定，

又回顾第 1/CP.26 号和第 1/CMA.3 号决定，其中敦促缔约方迅速开始实施《格拉斯哥气候赋权行动工作方案》，同时尊重、促进和考虑各自在人权以及性别平等和妇女赋权方面的义务；

1. 通过附件所载《格拉斯哥气候赋权行动工作方案》之下的四年期行动计划，该行动计划侧重于通过短期、明确和有时限的活动，在《格拉斯哥工作方案》各优先领域(政策一致性；协调行动；工具和支持；监测、评价和报告)的指引下，立即采取行动，同时以平衡的方式考虑到气候赋权行动的六个要素：¹
2. 认识到气候赋权行动的六个要素和《格拉斯哥工作方案》的优先领域具有相互关联性，对气候行动的实现和进展具有同等的相关性和重要性；
3. 强调应以包容、代际和促进性别平等的方式实施该行动计划；
4. 回顾曾在《格拉斯哥工作方案》之下：²
 - (a) 请缔约方和相关非缔约方利益相关方参与和支持《格拉斯哥工作方案》的实施，同时保持国家驱动的做法；
 - (b) 请多边和双边机构和组织，包括资金机制的经营实体，酌情为实施气候赋权行动的有关活动提供资金支持；
 - (c) 鼓励有条件的政府间组织和非政府组织为气候赋权行动的有关活动提供技术或资金支持；
 - (d) 请秘书处促进与其他组织、私营部门和捐助方的伙伴关系，以支持实施《格拉斯哥工作方案》；
5. 申明上文第 4 段所述任务也适用于行动计划；

¹ 教育、培训、公众认识、公众参与、公众获取信息和气候变化方面的国际合作。

² 第 18/CP.26 号决定，第 5、第 6、第 9 和第 10 段；以及第 22/CMA.3 号决定，第 5、第 6、第 9 和第 10 段。

6. 注意到秘书处关于《格拉斯哥工作方案》之下各项活动执行进展情况的年度概要报告；³
7. 请秘书处在《格拉斯哥工作方案》之下的每一份年度概要报告中纳入关于行动计划中所列材料、资源和结论的信息，例如关于活动 A.1、A.2、B.1、C.2、C.3 和 D.1 的执行进展情况的信息；
8. 请缔约方和非缔约方利益相关方在行动计划持续期间每年通过提交材料门户网站⁴ 向秘书处提交关于安排年度气候赋权行动对话的建议，如建议的发言人和指导性清单，以加强对话，满足缔约方和更广泛的气候赋权行动界的需要；
9. 注意到附件所述将由秘书处开展的活动所涉估计预算问题；
10. 请秘书处在资金允许的情况下开展本决定所要求的行动。

³ FCCC/SBI/2022/17.

⁴ <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx>.

附件

《格拉斯哥气候赋权行动方案》之下的行动计划

1. 《格拉斯哥工作方案》之下的本行动计划规定了《格拉斯哥工作方案》四个优先领域¹ (见表 1-4)² 的短期、明确和有时限的活动,旨在解决与实施气候赋权行动的六个要素³ 有关的差距和挑战,并为加速实施创造机会。
2. 请缔约方、秘书处、《气候公约》组成机构和相关组织酌情开展气候赋权行动计划所载的活动。
3. 将以平衡的方式推进气候赋权行动所有六个要素的实施。

优先领域

4. 各优先领域⁴ 的目标载于下文第 5 至第 8 段。

A. 政策一致性

5. 加强气候赋权行动之下工作的协调,认识到也在作为《气候公约》进程一部分的各工作流程之下、联合国系统的各个框架和进程之下以及国家层面的多个部门和战略中开展与气候赋权行动有关的活动。

B. 协调行动

6. 继续建立长期、战略性、可操作、多层次、多利益相关方和代际伙伴关系,以汇集各种专门技能、资源和知识,加速气候赋权行动的实施。

C. 工具和支持

7. 加强工具和支持的可得性,以建设能力,并提高缔约方、国家气候赋权行动联络人和非缔约方利益相关方对气候赋权行动的认识。

D. 监测、评价和报告

8. 根据缔约方的具体优先事项、需求和国情,加强对气候赋权行动所有六个要素在各个层面的实施情况的监测、评价和报告。

¹ 见第 18/CP.26 号决定,附件,第三章;以及第 22/CMA.3 号决定,附件,第三章。

² 表中使用的缩略语: COP = 缔约方会议, SB = 附属机构届会。

³ 见第 18/CP.26 号决定,附件,第四章;以及第 22/CMA.3 号决定,附件,第四章。

⁴ 根据第 18/CP.26 号决定附件第 6、第 9、第 11 和第 15 段;以及第 22/CMA.3 号决定附件第 6、第 9、第 11 和第 15 段。

表 1
优先领域 A: 政策一致性

活动	负责实体	时间表	交付成果/产出	实施层面
A.1 加强《气候公约》之下气候赋权行动工作的协调	秘书处	持续至 COP 31 (2026 年)	查明将气候赋权行动的六个要素纳入《气候公约》组成机构工作的良好做法，并在《格拉斯哥工作方案》之下的年度概要报告中报告有关情况	国际
	牵头方：秘书处 协助方：《气候公约》组成机构，包括地方社区和土著人民平台促进工作组、缔约方、相关组织	SB 62 (2025 年 6 月)	在气候赋权行动对话期间与《气候公约》组成机构和《气候公约》之下所有工作方案的代表举行一次联席会议，讨论如何加强人们了解儿童和青年以及土著人民在加速实施气候赋权行动和在其工作中促进代际知识共享方面的作用	国际
A.2 加强将气候赋权行动纳入国家气候政策、计划、战略和行动的制订和执行	秘书处	持续至 COP 31 (2026 年)	查明将气候赋权行动的各个要素纳入国家气候变化政策、计划、战略和行动方面的良好做法，包括在气候赋权行动框架内纳入《巴黎协定》序言部分第十一段—其中承认气候变化是人类共同关心的问题，缔约方在采取行动处理气候变化问题时，应当尊重、促进和考虑它们各自对人权、健康权、土著人民权利、当地社区权利、移徙者权利、儿童权利、残疾人权利、弱势人权利、发展权，以及性别平等、妇女赋权和代际公平等的义务—方面的好做法，并在《格拉斯哥工作方案》之下的年度概要报告中报告有关情况	国际
	秘书处	SB 62 (2025 年 6 月)	在 2025 年气候赋权行动对话期间举办一次互动研讨会，并在 COP 31(2026 年)之前在区域层面举办互动研讨会，讨论如何采用明确的包容、代际和促进性别平等的办法制定和执行国家气候变化政策、计划、战略和行动	国际、区域
	相关组织	持续至 COP 31 (2026 年)	促进自愿同行交流，以便为国家气候赋权行动联络人提供技术和实质性指导，使其能够根据国情参与相关的国家进程和政策，例如国家气候赋权行动战略	国际、区域

表 2
优先领域 B: 协调行动

活动	负责实体	时间表	交付成果/产出	实施层面
B.1 在气候赋权行动对话之前，通过线上和面对面的区域对话、研讨会和磋商会，加强区域合作，酌情利用区域合作中心和区域气候周等现有论坛，加强《格拉斯哥工作方案》在区域层面的执行，并以地方举措为基础加强地方气候赋权行动中心	牵头方：相关组织、缔约方 协助方：秘书处	持续至 COP 31 (2026 年)	酌情在气候赋权行动对话之前分享线上和面对面区域对话、研讨会和磋商会上产生的经验和良好做法 在气候赋权行动对话上介绍区域活动的成果，并在《格拉斯哥工作方案》之下的年度概要报告和《气候赋权行动通讯》中报告有关情况	区域
B.2 促进发展支持区域、国家和地方层面气候赋权行动有关活动的区域和地方网络和平台，鼓励青年、妇女、学术界、儿童、传统领袖和土著人民参与制定和执行气候赋权行动有关活动，并在这方面提供能力建设	牵头方：秘书处 协助方：缔约方、国家气候赋权行动联络人、相关组织	持续至 COP 31 (2026 年)	通过气候赋权行动对话、区域气候周和秘书处组织的非正式线上网络联系会等方式，加强国家气候赋权行动联络人就国家层面开展的气候赋权行动有关活动进行同行交流	国际、区域

表 3
优先领域 C: 工具和支持

活动	负责实体	时间表	交付成果/产出	实施层面
C.1 建设和加强国家气候赋权行动联络人的能力和技能	牵头方：秘书处 协助方：缔约方、国家气候赋权行动联络人、相关组织	持续至 COP 31 (2026 年)	为国家气候赋权行动联络人提供能力建设机会，包括在气候赋权行动对话和区域气候周上开展能力建设	国际、区域
C.2 切实吸收青年参与各个层面的气候行动并与他们接触，根据国情促进儿童、妇女、土著人民和残疾人等群体包容性地参与	相关组织、缔约方	持续至 COP 31 (2026 年)	为青年提供能力建设机会，侧重于决策以及根据国情在国家国际层面实施气候行动	国际、区域
	主导方：秘书处、相关组织 协助方：青年和青年组织	持续至 COP 31 (2026 年)	为青年提供在气候赋权行动对话和区域气候周上演讲的机会，以突出青年在气候行动中发挥的领导作用 允许青年参加为国家气候赋权行动联络人举办的网络联系会和能力建设研讨会	国际、区域
	牵头方：秘书处 协助方：相关组织	SB 60 (2024 年 6 月)	在《格拉斯哥工作方案》之下的年度概要报告中，对气候行动方面的儿童教育和赋权问题的现有指南和良好做法进行摸底和整理，同时特别考虑到性别平等和纳入残疾人	国际

活动	负责实体	时间表	交付成果/产出	实施层面
C.3 加强国家气候赋权行动联络人和非缔约方利益相关方(包括民间社会组织、青年领导的组织和包容青年的组织、社区组织、地方社区和土著人民的代表)的多层面行动	牵头方：秘书处 投入提供方：缔约方、相关组织、多边和双边金融机构	持续至 COP 31 (2026 年)	在《格拉斯哥工作方案》之下的年度概要报告中，报告为国家气候赋权行动联络人和非缔约方利益相关方(包括民间社会组织和社区组织的代表)参加气候赋权行动对话以及附属机构和缔约方会议届会等国际会议提供支持，包括资金支持的情况	国际
	牵头方：秘书处、相关组织、 多边和双边金融机构 协助方：国家气候赋权行动联络人、《气候公约》组成机构	SB 60 (2024 年 6 月)	组织一次专家会议，讨论如何在气候赋权行动对话上撰写有说服力的项目提案，以支持气候赋权行动有关活动的实施	国际

表 4

优先领域 D: 监测、评价和报告

活动	负责实体	时间表	交付成果/产出	实施层面
D.1 加强对气候赋权行动所有六个要素执行情况的监测、评价和报告	牵头方：秘书处 协助方：相关组织、研究界	持续至 COP 31 (2026 年)	汇编监测、评价和报告最佳做法和资源，并向缔约方提供此类信息，供其自愿报告气候赋权行动有关活动，并在《格拉斯哥工作方案》之下的年度概要报告中报告有关情况	国际
D.2 加强对根据国情何为气候赋权行动有关活动的优质和有效评价的理解	秘书处、缔约方、国家气候赋权行动联络人、相关组织、研究界	持续至 COP 31 (2026 年)	在各个层面与专家、国家气候赋权行动联络人、青年领袖和其他利益相关方组织互动研讨会，包括在 2023 年气候赋权行动对话上，以讨论如何评估实施气候赋权行动的有效性	国际、区域、国家
D.3 支持附属履行机构审议秘书处编写的《格拉斯哥工作方案》之下各项活动执行进展情况年度概要报告	秘书处	持续至 COP 31 (2026 年)	在缔约方会议各届会议之前举行信息通报会，介绍年度概要报告所报告的《格拉斯哥工作方案》之下各项活动执行进展情况	国际

第 9 次全体会议
2022 年 11 月 17 日