



缔约方会议

2021年10月31日至11月13日在格拉斯哥举行的缔约方会议第二十六届会议报告

增编

第二部分：缔约方会议第二十六届会议采取的行动

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## 第 1/CP.26 号决定

### 格拉斯哥气候协议

缔约方会议，

回顾第 1/CP.19、第 1/CP.20、第 1/CP.21、第 1/CP.22、第 1/CP.23、第 1/CP.24 和第 1/CP.25 号决定，

注意到第 1/CMP.16 和第 1/CMA.3 号决定，

确认在可持续发展和努力消除贫困方面多边主义和《公约》，包括其各项进程和原则的作用，以及开展国际合作处理气候变化及其影响的重要性，

承认 2019 冠状病毒病大流行具有破坏性影响，必须确保可持续、有韧性和包容的全球复苏，同时展现团结，特别是与发展中国家缔约方的团结，

确认 1994 年以来通过《气候公约》多边进程取得的重要进展，包括在《公约》、《京都议定书》和《巴黎协定》背景下取得的进展，

承认气候变化是人类共同关心的问题，缔约方在采取行动应对气候变化时，应尊重、促进和考虑各自对人权、健康权、土著人民权利、地方社区权利、移民权利、儿童权利、残疾人权利、弱势人群的权利、发展权，以及性别平等、妇女赋权和代际公平等的义务，

指出必须确保包括森林、海洋和冰冻圈在内的所有生态系统的完整性，并保护一些文化视之为地球母亲的生物多样性，又指出在采取行动应对气候变化时，“气候公正”概念对一些人意义重大，

表示赞赏参加格拉斯哥世界领导人峰会的国家元首和政府首脑宣布提高目标、加强行动，并承诺作出共同努力和与非缔约方利害关系方合作，以在 2030 年之前加快部门行动，

确认土著人民、地方社区和民间社会包括青年和儿童在处理和应对气候变化方面的重要作用，并重点指出迫切需要采取多层面的合作行动，

确认气候变化和生物多样性丧失这两个相互关联的全球危机，以及保护、养护和恢复自然和生态系统在提供适应和减缓气候变化的好处方面的关键作用，同时确保社会和环境保障，

## 一. 科学和紧迫性

1. 确认现有最佳科学对有效的气候行动和政策制定的重要性；
2. 欢迎政府间气候变化专门委员会第六次评估报告第一工作组报告<sup>1</sup>，以及世界气象组织近期的全球和区域气候状况报告，并请政府间气候变化专门委员会于 2022 年向附属科学技术咨询机构介绍其计划发布的报告；

<sup>1</sup> 政府间气候变化专门委员会。2021 年。《气候变化 2021: 自然科学基础。政府间气候变化专门委员会第六次评估报告第一工作组的报告》。V Masson-Delmotte、P Zhai、A Pirani 等人(编)。剑桥: 剑桥大学出版社。可查阅 <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/>。

3. 表示震惊和最严重关切的是，人类活动迄今已造成全球变暖约 1.1°C，并且每个区域都已受到影响；
4. 强调迫切需要在这关键的十年中加强与减缓、适应和资金有关的雄心和行动，以消除实现《公约》最终目标及其长期全球目标的各种当前努力与途径之间的差距；

## 二. 适应

5. 严重关切地注意到政府间气候变化专门委员会第六次评估报告第一工作组报告的各项结论，包括极端气候和天气情况及其对人和自然的不利影响将随着不断上升的气温的每一次再度升高而继续增加；
6. 强调迫切需要扩大行动和支持，包括资金、能力建设和技术转让，以根据现有最佳科学，提高适应能力、增强韧性和降低对气候变化的脆弱性，同时考虑到发展中国家缔约方的优先事项和需求；
7. 欢迎迄今已提交的国家适应计划，它们加强了对适应行动和优先事项的理解和执行；
8. 促请缔约方将适应行动进一步纳入地方、国家和区域规划；
9. 请政府间气候变化专门委员会向缔约方会议第二十七届会议(2022 年 11 月)介绍其第六次评估报告第二工作组报告的结论，包括与评估适应需求有关的结论，并吁请研究界进一步深化对气候变化的全球、区域和地方影响、应对办法和适应需求的理解；

## 三. 适应资金

10. 关切地注意到目前提供的用于适应行动的气候资金仍然不足以在发展中国家缔约方应对气候变化日益恶化的影响；
11. 促请发达国家缔约方紧急和显著地扩大用于适应行动的气候资金、技术转让和能力建设，以满足发展中国家缔约方的需求，作为全球努力的一部分，包括促进国家适应计划的制订和执行；
12. 确认适应资金必须充足和可预测，包括确认适应基金在为适应行动提供专门支持方面的价值；
13. 欢迎许多发达国家缔约方近期承诺提供更多的气候资金，用于满足发展中国家缔约方日益增长的需求，支持这些缔约方的适应行动，包括向适应基金和最不发达国家基金捐款，这与以往的努力相比有重大进步；
14. 吁请多边开发银行、其他金融机构和私营部门加强调动资金，使提供的资金达到实现气候计划、特别是开展适应行动所需的规模，并鼓励缔约方继续探索创新方法和工具，从私人来源调动适应资金；

## 四. 减缓

15. 重申把全球平均气温升幅控制在工业化前水平以上低于 2°C 之内的长期全球目标，并努力将气温升幅限制在工业化前水平以上 1.5°C 之内，同时确认这将会大为减少气候变化的风险和影响；
16. 确认 1.5°C 的气温升幅与 2°C 相比，气候变化的影响将小得多，并决心努力将气温升幅限制在 1.5°C 之内；
17. 确认为将全球变暖控制在 1.5°C 之内，必须快速、大幅和持续地减少全球温室气体排放，包括到 2030 年将全球二氧化碳排放量相比 2010 年减少 45%，并在本世纪中叶前后实现净零排放，以及大幅减少其他温室气体；
18. 又确认必须在这关键的十年中加快行动，这应基于现有最佳科学知识和公平，反映共同但有区别的责任和各自能力，并联系可持续发展和消除贫困的努力；
19. 请缔约方考虑采取进一步行动，到 2030 年减少包括甲烷在内的非二氧化碳温室气体排放
20. 吁请缔约方加快开发、部署和推广技术以及采取政策，向低排放能源系统转型，包括迅速扩大部署清洁发电和节能措施，包括加快努力逐步减少未加装减排设施的煤电和逐步停止低效化石燃料补贴，同时根据国情向最贫穷和最脆弱的人提供有针对性的支持并确认需要支持实现公正的转型；
21. 强调必须保护、养护和恢复自然和生态系统，包括森林和其他陆地和海洋生态系统，让它们发挥温室气体的汇和库的作用，并保护生物多样性和确保社会和环境保障，以实现《公约》的长期目标；

## 五. 用于减缓和适应的资金、技术转让和能力建设

22. 促请发达国家缔约方继续履行在《公约》下的现有义务，提供增强的支持，包括通过财政资源、技术转让和能力建设提供支持，在减缓和适应这两方面协助发展中国家缔约方，并鼓励其他缔约方自愿提供或继续提供这种支持；
23. 关切地注意到发展中国家缔约方的需求日益增长，特别是由于气候变化的影响不断加强以及 2019 冠状病毒病大流行加剧负债；
24. 欢迎资金问题常设委员会关于确定发展中国家缔约方与执行《公约》和《巴黎协定》相关需求的首份报告<sup>2</sup>，以及第四次(2020 年)气候资金流动两年期评估和概览<sup>3</sup>；
25. 强调需要调动所有来源的气候资金，以达到实现《巴黎协定》目标所需的水平，包括显著增加对发展中国家缔约方的支持，每年超过 1,000 亿美元；
26. 深为遗憾地注意到发达国家缔约方在有意义的减缓行动和实施透明度框架内到 2020 年每年集体调动 1,000 亿美元的目标尚未实现，并欢迎许多发达国家缔约方

<sup>2</sup> 见 FCCC/CP/2021/10/Add.2–FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/7/Add.2 号文件。

<sup>3</sup> 见 FCCC/CP/2021/10/Add.1–FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/7/Add.1 号文件。

增加的认捐额，以及《气候资金交付计划：实现 1,000 亿美元的目标》<sup>4</sup> 和其中所载的集体行动；

27. 促请发达国家缔约方紧急全面兑现 1,000 亿美元的目标且延续至 2025 年，并强调在履行承诺的过程中必须保持透明；

28. 促请资金机制的经营实体、多边开发银行和其他金融机构进一步扩大对气候行动的投资，并呼吁继续提升全球所有来源的气候资金的规模和有效性，包括赠款和其他高度优惠形式的资金；

29. 再次强调需要扩大财政资源，以考虑到那些特别易受气候变化不利影响的国家的需求，并在这方面鼓励相关多边机构考虑应如何将气候脆弱性反映在提供和调动优惠财政资源和包括特别提款权在内的其他形式支持的工作中；

30. 强调许多发展中国家缔约方在获取资金方面面临的挑战，并鼓励进一步努力增强获取资金的渠道，包括由资金机制经营实体付出努力；

31. 注意到就获取优惠形式气候资金的资格和能力问题提出的具体关切，并再次强调必须扩大财政资源，同时考虑到特别易受气候变化不利影响的发展中国家缔约方的需求；

32. 鼓励相关的财政支持提供方考虑如何能将对气候变化不利影响的脆弱性反映在提供和调动优惠财政资源的工作中，以及如何能够简化和增强获取资金的渠道；

33. 承认在能力建设方面取得的进展，特别是在加强旨在实施《公约》和《巴黎协定》的能力建设活动的连贯性和协调方面取得的进展；

34. 确认需要继续支持发展中国家缔约方查明和应对当前和新出现的能力建设差距和需求，并催化气候行动和解决办法予以应对；

35. 欢迎技术执行委员会及气候技术中心和网络 2020 年和 2021 年联合年度报告<sup>5</sup> 并请这两个机构加强协作；

36. 强调必须加强技术开发和转让方面的合作行动，以利实施减缓和适应行动，包括加快、鼓励和扶持创新，并强调必须为技术机制从各种来源调动可预测、可持续和充足的资金；

## 六. 损失和损害<sup>6</sup>

37. 承认气候变化已经造成并将越来越多地造成损失和损害，并且随着气温上升，极端气候和天气情况以及缓发事件的影响将成为愈发严重的社会、经济和环境威胁；

<sup>4</sup> 可查阅 <https://ukcop26.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Climate-Finance-Delivery-Plan-1.pdf>.

<sup>5</sup> FCCC/SB/2020/4 和 FCCC/SB/2021/5。

<sup>6</sup> 注意到与气候变化影响相关损失和损害华沙国际机制的治理有关的讨论未产生结果：这并不影响对这一事项的进一步审议。

38. 又承认地方、国家和区域各级广泛的利害关系方，包括土著人民和地方社区，在避免、尽量减轻和处理与气候变化不利影响相关的损失和损害方面发挥的重要作用；
39. 重申迫切需要酌情扩大行动和支持，包括资金、技术转让和能力建设，以便在特别易受气候变化不利影响的发展中国家缔约方实施避免、尽量减轻和处理与这些影响相关的损失和损害的各种方法；
40. 促请发达国家缔约方、资金机制的经营实体、联合国实体和政府间组织以及其他双边和多边机构，包括非政府组织和私人来源，提供增强的和额外的支持，用于开展活动，处理与气候变化不利影响相关的损失和损害；
41. 确认必须提供由需求驱动的技术援助，建设能力以实施避免、尽量减轻和处理与气候变化不利影响相关的损失和损害的各种方法；
42. 欢迎避免、尽量减轻和处理损失和损害问题圣地亚哥网络进一步投入运作，包括就其职能和进一步发展其体制安排的进程达成协议；
43. 核可第 1/CMA.3 号决定第 67-70 段和第 73-74 段；<sup>7</sup>
44. 承认必须采取协调一致的行动，以应对气候变化不利影响引发的大规模需求；
45. 决心加强发展中国家和发达国家、各基金、技术机构、民间社会和社区之间的伙伴关系，以更好地理解如何能够改进避免、尽量减轻和处理损失和损害的方法；

## 七. 执行

46. 忆及 2018 年、2019 年和 2020 年举行的缔约方和非缔约方利害关系方关于 2020 年之前的执行和目标的圆桌会议有助于突出和加强对缔约方在 2020 年之前的行动和支持方面的努力和面临的挑战的理解，以及对组成机构在这一时期的工作的理解；
47. 强烈促请所有尚未兑现《公约》下任何未兑现承诺的缔约方尽快兑现承诺；
48. 欢迎为释放部门行动的潜力以促进实现和执行国家目标而采取的行动，特别是在排放密集部门；
49. 确认需要根据《公约》第四条第 8 和第 10 款，考虑到经济最受应对措施不利影响的缔约方、特别是发展中国家缔约方的关切；
50. 又确认保护、养护和恢复生态系统以提供关键服务的重要性，包括作为温室气体的汇和库，减少易受气候变化影响的脆弱性，支持可持续生计，包括为土著人民和地方社区提供这种生计的作用；
51. 鼓励缔约方在国家和地方政策和规划决定中采取综合办法处理以上第 50 段所指问题；

<sup>7</sup> 注意到与气候变化影响相关损失和损害华沙国际机制的治理有关的讨论未产生结果：这并不影响对这一事项的进一步审议。

52. 确认需要确保促进可持续发展和消除贫困的公正过渡，以及创造体面工作和高质量的就业机会，包括通过使资金流动与实现低温室气体排放和具有气候抵御能力的发展的途径相一致，包括通过部署和转让技术，以及向发展中国家缔约方提供支持；

## 八. 协作

53. 确认必须在全社会所有行为体、所有部门和所有区域间就创新气候行动(包括技术进步)开展国际协作，以推动在实现《公约》的目的和《巴黎协定》的目标方面取得进展；

54. 忆及《公约》第三条第 5 款以及合作应对气候变化和支持可持续经济增长和发展的重要性；

55. 确认非缔约方利害关系方，包括民间社会、土著人民、地方社区、青年、儿童、地方和区域政府及其他利害关系方在推动实现《公约》的目的和《巴黎协定》的目标方面的重要作用；

56. 欢迎改进马拉喀什全球气候行动伙伴关系<sup>8</sup> 以增强力度，欢迎高级别倡导者的领导和行动，以及秘书处为支持问责和跟踪自愿倡议进展就非国家行为方气候行动区平台开展的工作；

57. 又欢迎关于区域气候周的高级别公报<sup>9</sup>，并鼓励继续举办区域气候周，以便缔约方和非缔约方利害关系方可在区域层面加强其可信和持久的气候变化应对措施；

58. 欢迎附属科学技术咨询机构主席关于审议如何加强适应和缓解行动的海洋与气候变化对话以及关于土地与气候变化适应相关事项之间关系的对话的非正式概要报告；

59. 请缔约方在关于以上第 58 段所指土地与气候变化适应相关事项之间关系的对话的报告第 75 段中，就如何在现有《气候公约》方案和活动下加强土地方面的气候行动提交意见，并请附属科学技术咨询机构主席就此编写一份非正式概要报告，提交缔约方会议第二十七届会议；

60. 请相关工作方案和《气候公约》之下的组成机构考虑如何在其现有任务和工作中纳入和加强基于海洋的行动，并酌情在现有报告进程中报告这些活动；

61. 还请附属科学技术咨询机构主席从附属科学技术咨询机构第五十六届会议(2022 年 6 月)开始举行年度对话，以加强基于海洋的行动，并就此编写一份非正式概要报告，提交缔约方会议下届会议；

62. 促请缔约方迅速开始实施关于气候赋权行动的格拉斯哥工作方案，同时尊重、促进和考虑各自在人权以及性别平等和妇女赋权方面的义务；

<sup>8</sup> 可查阅

<https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Improved%20Marrakech%20Partnership%202021-2025.pdf>.

<sup>9</sup> 可查阅 <https://unfccc.int/regional-climate-weeks/rcw-2021-cop26-communicue>.

63. 表示赞赏儿童和青年非政府组织群体于 2021 年 10 月在格拉斯哥举办的第十六届青年会议的成果，以及意大利于 2021 年 9 月在意大利米兰主办的“青年气候 2021: 驱动雄心”活动；
64. 促请缔约方和利害关系方确保青年代表有意义地参与多边、国家和地方决策进程，包括《公约》和《巴黎协定》之下的进程；
65. 请缔约方会议的未来主席在秘书处的支持下，与《气候公约》儿童和青年群体以及其他青年组织合作，为组织一次年度青年主导的气候论坛提供便利，以便缔约方和青年进行对话，从而为执行《气候赋权格拉斯哥工作方案》作出贡献；
66. 强调土著人民和地方社区的文化和知识在就气候变化采取有效行动方面的重要作用，并促请缔约方积极让土著人民和地方社区参与设计和实施气候行动，并参与 2022-2024 年执行地方社区和土著人民平台职能的第二个三年期工作计划；
67. 表示确认观察员组织，包括九个非政府组织群组，在分享自身知识方面发挥的重要作用，以及这些组织关于采取有力度的行动以实现《公约》目标的呼吁和为此与缔约方的协作；
68. 鼓励缔约方增加妇女在气候行动中的充分、有意义和平等参与，并确保实施工作和执行手段促进性别平等，这对提高力度和实现气候目标至关重要；
69. 呼吁缔约方加强执行强化的利马性别平等工作方案及其性别平等行动计划；<sup>10</sup>
70. 注意到本决定所述的有待秘书处开展的活动所涉估计预算问题；
71. 请秘书处在资金允许的情况下开展本决定所要求的行动。

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2021 年 11 月 13 日

<sup>10</sup> 见第 3/CP.25 号决定，附件。



## 第 2/CP.26 号决定

### 适应委员会的报告(2019 年、2020 年和 2021 年)

缔约方会议，

1. 欢迎适应委员会 2019 年、2020 年和 2021 年的工作，并注意到适应委员会 2019 年、2020 年和 2021 年的报告；<sup>1</sup>
2. 欢迎适应委员会为加强开展适应行动与支助提供的技术支持与指导，并强调均衡、明确、切合实际的建议对于适应委员会工作计划中所有工作流程活动的重要性；
3. 欢迎适应委员会 2022-2024 年弹性工作计划；<sup>2</sup>
4. 请适应委员会改善衡量委员会活动和出版物受众范围的工作，包括在弹性工作计划中纳入关于活动和出版物等提高认识、外联和信息共享工作的按性别和区域分列的数据的收集工作；
5. 请适应委员会恢复定期举办线下会议与活动，同时提供虚拟出席的选择，以确保包容性参与，包括观察员的参与，与此同时承认线上参与带来的挑战；
6. 请缔约方通过各自的《气候公约》国家联络点确定一个或多个适应联络点，以便改善缔约方、最不发达国家专家组以及关于气候变化影响、脆弱性和适应的内罗毕工作方案的伙伴机构等其他相关组织和方案伙伴之间的信息传播，包括关于缔约方制定和执行国家适应计划的努力的信息传播；
7. 回顾第 5/CP.22 号决定，该决定授权缔约方会议第二十七届会议审查适应委员会的进展、效力和业绩；
8. 按照第 11/CMA.1 号决定的规定，请作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议第四届会议(2022 年 11 月)参加上文第 7 段所述审查，因为审查与《巴黎协定》相关；
9. 欢迎就适应委员会的进展、效力和业绩提交资料<sup>3</sup> 的缔约方所作的努力，并注意到这些资料对于上文第 7 段所述审查的重要性；
10. 再次邀请<sup>4</sup> 缔约方不迟于缔约方会议第二十七届会议举行之前三个月通过提交材料门户网站就适应委员会的进展、效力和业绩以及审查进程提交意见，以便为审查进程提供参考；
11. 鼓励缔约方为成功和及时实施适应委员会 2022-2024 年弹性工作计划提供充分资源。

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<sup>1</sup> FCCC/SB/2019/3、FCCC/SB/2020/2 和 FCCC/SB/2021/6。

<sup>2</sup> FCCC/SB/2021/6，附件。

<sup>3</sup> <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx>。

<sup>4</sup> 见第 5/CP.22 号决定，第 12 段。

## 第 3/CP.26 号决定

### 国家适应计划

缔约方会议，

回顾第 1/CP.16 号、第 3/CP.17 号、第 5/CP.17 号、第 12/CP.18 号、第 18/CP.19 号、第 3/CP.20 号、第 1/CP.21 号、第 4/CP.21 号、第 6/CP.22 号、第 8/CP.24 号和第 7/CP.25 号决定，

又回顾国家适应计划制订和执行进程的目标是在发展中国家建设适应能力、加强韧性，从而降低对气候变化影响的脆弱性；确认国家适应计划制订和执行进程在推进实现全球适应目标方面的作用，

注意到最不发达国家专家组的开放式国家适应计划倡议具有在最不发达国家加快国家适应计划制订和执行工作的潜力，并请其他发展中国家参加这一倡议，

确认尽管有 2019 冠状病毒病大流行造成的限制以及疫情对国家适应计划制订和执行工作的影响，但适应委员会、最不发达国家专家组和秘书处继续向发展中国家缔约方提供关于国家适应计划制订和执行进程的支持，

1. 欢迎阿尔巴尼亚、亚美尼亚、柬埔寨、科威特、尼泊尔、秘鲁、南非、南苏丹、东帝汶和汤加在国家适应计划中心网<sup>1</sup>上提交其国家适应计划，使已提交的国家适应计划总数达到 30 项；

2. 请附属履行机构第六十届会议(2024 年 6 月)启动第 8/CP.24 号决定第 19 段所述的对国家适应计划制订和执行进程进展情况的评估，并就此事项提出建议，供《公约》缔约方会议第二十九届会议(2024 年 11 月)审议和通过；

3. 决定附属履行机构为启动上文第 2 段所述评估，必须采取以下行动和步骤：

(a) 请缔约方和有关组织在 2024 年 2 月 1 日之前向秘书处提交信息，说明各自在实现国家适应计划制订和执行进程各项目标方面的进展，以及说明自身的经验、最佳做法、所获教益、差距和需求，以及在国家适应计划制订和执行进程中所提供和得到的支持；

(b) 请缔约方以一份问卷调查<sup>2</sup>为指南，通过国家适应计划中心网不断提供信息；

(c) 请秘书处考虑到根据《公约》所提交国家报告中的信息、上文第 3(a-b)段中提到的信息、来自相关活动(包括国家适应计划展览)的信息以及其他相关来源的信息，编写一份综合报告，说明在实现国家适应计划制订和执行进程各项目标方面的进展，并说明经验、最佳做法、所获教益、差距和需求，以及所提供和得到的支持；

<sup>1</sup> <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NAPC/Pages/national-adaptation-plans.aspx>.

<sup>2</sup> <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NAPC/Pages/assessingprogress.aspx>.

(d) 请最不发达国家专家组与适应委员会协作，组织一次缔约方专家会议，审议上文第 3(c)段所述报告，以期提供国家适应计划制订和执行进程的进展情况概要；

(e) 请最不发达国家专家组与适应委员会协作并在秘书处的支持下，编写一份关于上文第 3(d)段所述会议的报告，供附属履行机构第六十届会议在评估国家适应计划制订和执行进程的进展情况时审议；

4. 又决定上文第 2 段所述评估应考虑到第 5/CP.17 号决定第 3 段所载的国家适应计划制订和执行进程的所有指导原则；

5. 请《公约》之下的组成机构和方案继续提供信息，介绍各自开展的与国家适应计划制订和执行进程相关的活动，作为国家适应计划年度进展报告的一部分。

第 10 次全体会议  
2021 年 11 月 11 日

## 第 4/CP.26 号决定

### 长期气候资金

缔约方会议，

回顾《公约》第四条和第十一条，

又回顾第 1/CP.16 号决定第 2、第 4 和第 97-101 段、第 1/CP.17 号决定、第 2/CP.17 号决定第 126-132 段，第 4/CP.18、第 3/CP.19、第 5/CP.20、第 1/CP.21、第 5/CP.21、第 7/CP.22、第 6/CP.23、第 3/CP.24 号决定，第 11/CP.25 号决定第 10 段和第 5/CMA.2 号决定第 10 段，

1. 回顾发达国家缔约方根据第 1/CP.16 号决定，承诺在有意义的减缓行动和实施工作透明的背景下，实现到 2020 年每年共同筹集 1,000 亿美元的目标，以满足发展中国家缔约方的需要；
2. 欢迎最近向适应基金(总计 3.56 亿美元)和最不发达国家基金(总计 6.053 亿美元)作出的认捐；
3. 注意到发达国家缔约方根据第 1/CP.16 号决定，继续努力在有意义的减缓行动和实施工作透明的背景下，实现到 2020 年每年共同筹集 1,000 亿美元的目标；
4. 严重关切地注意到发达国家缔约方在实现到 2020 年每年共同筹集 1,000 亿美元的目标方面存在差距，包括因为从私人来源筹集资金存在困难；
5. 注意到发达国家缔约方向发展中国家缔约方提供的气候资金有很大一部分是通过公共融资渠道获得，敦促发达国家缔约方继续扩大气候融资，以实现到 2020 年每年共同筹集 1,000 亿美元的目标；
6. 确认需要为发展中国家缔约方执行《公约》提供支持；
7. 回顾发达国家根据第 1/CP.21 号决定第 53 段重申，将在有意义的减缓行动和实施工作透明的背景下，将现有的集体筹资目标持续到 2025 年；
8. 赞赏地注意到资金问题常设委员会关于确定发展中国家缔约方在执行《公约》和《巴黎协定》方面的需求的第一份报告，<sup>1</sup> 以及第四次(2020 年)气候资金流量两年期评估和概览；<sup>2</sup>
9. 注意到近期关于增加气候资金的承诺，承认一些发达国家缔约方已将适应资金的提供增加了一倍，并请其他发达国家缔约方大幅增加适应资金的提供，包括酌情考虑将适应资金翻一番，以实现减缓和适应之间的平衡；
10. 欢迎缔约方在加强国内扶持环境以吸引气候资金方面取得的进展；请缔约方根据第 3/CP.19 号决定继续加强本国的扶持环境和政策框架，以促进筹集并有效部署气候资金；<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 见文件 FCCC/CP/2021/10/Add.2–FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/7/Add.2。

<sup>2</sup> 见文件 FCCC/CP/2021/10/Add.1–FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/7/Add.1。

<sup>3</sup> 见第 3/CP.24 号决定，第 7 段。

11. 强调有效和连贯的气候融资格局对于最大限度地获得气候资金以满足发展中国家缔约方的需要和优先事项至关重要；
12. 请资金问题常设委员会继续就气候资金的定义开展工作，同时考虑到缔约方就这一事项提交的材料，以期为缔约方会议第二十七届会议(2022 年 11 月)的审议提供投入；
13. 又请资金问题常设委员会进一步梳理与《巴黎协定》第二条第一款第(三)项有关的现有信息，包括提到第九条之处，以期提供投入，供缔约方会议第二十七届会议审议；
14. 注意到迄今为止收到的发达国家缔约方按照第 3/CP.19 号决定第 10 段提交的关于更新的 2014 至 2020 年扩大气候融资的战略和方针的两年期材料，并注意到这些材料的汇编和综合报告；<sup>4</sup>
15. 注意到 2019 年和 2020 年长期气候资金问题会期研讨会的概要报告，<sup>5</sup> 特别是缔约方会议第二十六届会议主席举办的关于筹集气候资金和扩大气候融资进展的讨论，请缔约方和相关机构考虑其中所载的关键信息；
16. 赞赏地注意到缔约方会议第二十四届会议主席关于第三次两年期气候资金问题高级别部长级对话的说明，<sup>6</sup> 特别是其中所载的关键信息；
17. 欢迎第四次气候资金问题高级别部长级对话的审议，期待缔约方会议主席编写概要；
18. 决定于 2027 年结束关于长期气候资金的持续讨论；
19. 请资金问题常设委员会结合《气候融资交付计划》<sup>7</sup> 和其他相关报告，在 2022 年编写一份报告，说明在有意义的减缓行动和实施工作透明的背景下，在实现每年共同筹集 1,000 亿美元的目标以满足发展中国家缔约方的需要方面，取得了哪些进展，供缔约方会议第二十七届会议审议，并在编写气候资金流量两年期评估和概览时继续为评估上述目标的实现情况做出贡献；
20. 决定在 2022、2024 和 2026 年召开两年一次的气候资金问题高级别部长级对话；请缔约方会议主席编写对话纪要报告，供来年的缔约方会议审议；
21. 请缔约方会议第二十七届会议主席在 2022 年组织气候资金问题高级别部长级对话，讨论在实现到 2020 年每年共同筹集 1,000 亿美元的目标方面取得的进展；
22. 重申秘书处将继续与资金机制的经营实体、联合国各机构以及双边、区域和其他多边渠道协作，探讨各种方法和手段，以协助发展中国家缔约方以国家驱动的方式评估需要和优先事项，包括技术和能力建设需要，并协助它们将气候资金需要转化为行动；<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> FCCC/CP/2019/INF.1.

<sup>5</sup> FCCC/CP/2019/4 和 FCCC/CP/2021/6。

<sup>6</sup> FCCC/CP/2019/7.

<sup>7</sup> 见 <https://ukcop26.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Climate-Finance-Delivery-Plan-1.pdf>.

<sup>8</sup> 见第 6/CP.23 号决定，第 10 段。

23. 注意到秘书处开展上文第 20 和 22 段所述活动涉及的概算问题；
24. 请秘书处在资金允许的情况下开展本决定所要求的行动。

第 12 次全体会议  
2021 年 11 月 13 日

## 第 5/CP.26 号决定

### 与资金问题常设委员会有关的事项

缔约方会议，

回顾《公约》第四条和第十一条，

又回顾第 12/CP.2 号决定、第 12/CP.3 号决定、第 1/CP.16 号决定第 112 段、第 2/CP.17 号决定第 120-121 段，以及第 5/CP.18、第 5/CP.19、第 7/CP.19、第 6/CP.20、第 6/CP.21、第 8/CP.22、第 7/CP.23、第 8/CP.23、第 4/CP.24、第 11/CP.25 和第 5/CMA.2 号决定，

注意到第 10/CMA.3 号决定，

1. 欢迎资金问题常设委员会 2020 年和 2021 年报告；<sup>1</sup>

#### 一. 第四次(2020 年)气候资金流量两年期评估和概览

2. 欢迎资金问题常设委员会第四次(2020 年)气候资金流量两年期评估和概览，<sup>2</sup> 特别是概要，<sup>3</sup> 赞同附件一所载的主要结论；
3. 注意到 2017-2018 年全球气候资金流量比 2015-2016 年高出 16%，年均达到 7,750 亿美元；《公约》附件二所列缔约方在两年期报告<sup>4</sup> 中报告的 2017-2018 年公共财政支助的年平均(487 亿美元)比 2015-2016 年报告的年平均增加了 2.7%；多边开发银行平均每年利用自有资源向发展中国家和新兴经济体提供的气候资金(366 亿美元)自 2015-2016 年以来增长了 50%；《气候公约》各基金和多边气候基金 2017 年和 2018 年分别批准了 22 亿美元和 31 亿美元的气候融资项目；
4. 欢迎第四次(2020 年)气候资金流量两年期评估和概览中的数据更加细化，鼓励发达国家缔约方和气候资金提供方以及多边机构和金融机构、私人资金提供方和其他相关机构继续提供关于减缓和适应融资的国家一级的细化数据；
5. 呼吁发达国家缔约方和其他气候资金提供方继续加强协调追踪和报告提供和筹集的气候资金的方法；
6. 承认没有多边商定的气候资金定义，注意到根据第 11/CP.25 号和第 5/CMA.2 号决定收到的材料，其中强调，一些缔约方提到了缺乏共同定义如何影响追踪和评估气候资金的能力，另一些缔约方则称单一的定义没有用，又注意到目前使用的操作性定义基本反映了对什么是减缓和适应资金的共同理解；

<sup>1</sup> FCCC/CP/2020/4-FCCC/PA/CMA/2020/3 和 FCCC/CP/2021/10-FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/7。

<sup>2</sup> 资金问题常设委员会。2021 年。《第四次(2020 年)气候资金流量两年期评估和概览》。波恩：《气候公约》。可查阅：  
[https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/54307\\_1%20-%20UNFCCC%20BA%202020%20-%20Report%20-%20V4.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/54307_1%20-%20UNFCCC%20BA%202020%20-%20Report%20-%20V4.pdf)。

<sup>3</sup> FCCC/CP/2021/10/Add.1-FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/7/Add.1.

<sup>4</sup> 截至 2020 年 10 月提交的报告。

7. 请资金问题常设委员会考虑到缔约方就这一事项提交的材料，继续就气候资金的定义开展工作，以期提供投入，供缔约方会议第二十七届会议(2022年11月)审议；
8. 请资金机制的经营实体和其他提供气候资金的机构审议资金问题常设委员会对气候资金的操作性定义，以确保提供的资金满足发展中国家缔约方的需要，同时遵守这些国家的现行政策；
9. 欢迎在第四次(2020年)气候资金流量两年期评估和概览中梳理与《巴黎协定》第二条第一款(c)项有关的信息，注意到该报告的主要结论，包括资产超过37万亿美元的银行和拥有6.6万亿美元资产的机构投资者承诺使其贷款和投资符合到2050年实现净零排放的目标；
10. 鼓励缔约方确保将公正的过渡融资纳入根据《巴黎协定》的目标开展气候行动的办法；

## 二. 关于确定发展中国家缔约方在执行《公约》和《巴黎协定》方面的需求的第一份报告

11. 欢迎资金问题常设委员会关于确定发展中国家缔约方在执行《公约》和《巴黎协定》方面的需求的第一份报告，<sup>5</sup>特别是内容提要，<sup>6</sup>赞同附件二所载的主要结论和建议；
12. 注意到153个缔约方的国家自主贡献中包含4,274项需求，其中1,782项需求(共来自78个国家)注明了费用，到2030年累计需要5.8-5.9万亿美元，虽然发展中国家缔约方提出的适应需求数目多于减缓需求，但确定的减缓费用却更高，这未必意味着减缓所需资金更多，而是说明可用来评估适应需求的数据、工具和能力不足；
13. 又注意到关于确定发展中国家缔约方在执行《公约》和《巴黎协定》方面的需求的第一份报告是第一份此类报告，一些重要领域需要进一步展开；
14. 还注意到，因可获得的信息有限，关于确定发展中国家缔约方在执行《公约》和《巴黎协定》方面的需求的第一份报告没有完全涵盖发展中国家和所有区域的需求和所需费用，确认资金和技术支持将提高发展中国家报告有关其需求的最新定性和定量信息和数据的能力；
15. 表示关切的是，关于确定发展中国家缔约方在执行《公约》和《巴黎协定》方面的需求的第一份报告没有关于小岛屿发展中国家的分类数据；
16. 强调在计算气候适应和增强抗御力项目的估计费用方面存在特殊挑战，因此计算避免、最大限度地减少和解决损失和损害的估计费用也存在挑战；

<sup>5</sup> 资金问题常设委员会。2021年。关于确定发展中国家缔约方在执行《公约》和《巴黎协定》方面的需求的第一份报告。波恩：《气候公约》。可查阅：<https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/workstreams/determination-of-the-needs-of-developing-country-parties/first-report-on-the-determination-of-the-needs-of-developing-country-parties-related-to-implementing>.

<sup>6</sup> FCCC/CP/2021/10/Add.2-FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/7/Add.2.



17. 鼓励发展中国家缔约方在计算成本和确定需求时，考虑对关于确定发展中国家缔约方在执行《公约》和《巴黎协定》方面的需求的第一份报告所提方法的意见；

18. 请资金机制的经营实体、联合国机构、多边和双边金融机构以及其他有关机构在帮助发展中国家缔约方确定需求和计算费用时，利用关于确定发展中国家缔约方在执行《公约》和《巴黎协定》方面的需求的第一份报告中所载的信息；

19. 请资金问题常设委员会在编写今后关于确定发展中国家缔约方在执行《公约》和《巴黎协定》方面的需求的报告时，继续为生成有关需求的数据和信息，与发展中国家缔约方和相关发展中国家利益攸关方接触；

### 三. 资金问题常设委员会的报告

20. 表示赞赏比利时、日本和挪威政府及欧洲联盟委员会提供捐款，支持资金问题常设委员会的工作；

21. 核可资金问题常设委员会 2022 年工作计划，<sup>7</sup> 强调资金问题常设委员会应根据当前任务规定开展 2022 年的工作；

22. 又核可第五次气候资金流量两年期评估和概览技术报告纲要，强调该报告将继续根据第 1/CP.16 号决定，在有意义的减缓行动和实施工作透明的背景下，继续为评估到 2020 年每年共同筹集 1,000 亿美元的目标的实现情况做出贡献；<sup>8</sup>

23. 注意到 2021 年 10 月 15 日和 16 日以混合形式举行的资金问题常设委员会“为基于自然的解决方案提供资金”论坛第一期会议高级别概要报告，请资金问题常设委员会在遵守 2019 年冠状病毒病大流行相关健康和安全要求的情况下，在 2022 年举办论坛第二期会议；

24. 注意到资金问题常设委员会未能提出对资金机制经营实体的指导意见草案，也未就第四次(2020 年)气候资金流量两年期评估和概览的建议达成一致，为此请委员会改进其工作方式；

25. 赞赏地注意到资金问题常设委员会按照其工作计划，努力加强与利益攸关方的接触；

26. 鼓励资金问题常设委员会继续加大努力，确保在执行工作计划时顾及性别平等；

27. 请资金问题常设委员会向缔约方会议第二十七届会议报告 2022 年工作计划的执行进展；

28. 又请资金问题常设委员会考虑缔约方会议其他相关决定对其提出的指导意见。

<sup>7</sup> FCCC/CP/2021/10-FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/7, 附件二。

<sup>8</sup> FCCC/CP/2021/10/Add.5-FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/7/Add.5.

**Annex I\*****Summary by the Standing Committee on Finance of the fourth (2020) Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows**

[English only]

**I. Context and mandates**

1. The SCF assists the COP in exercising its functions with respect to the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, including in terms of measurement, reporting and verification of support provided to developing country Parties, through activities such as the BA. The SCF also serves the Paris Agreement in line with its functions and responsibilities established under the COP, including the BA.<sup>1</sup>
2. Since the first BA in 2014, the preparation of subsequent BAs has been guided by mandates from the COP and the CMA to the SCF.<sup>2</sup>
3. **The fourth (2020) BA presents an updated overview and trends in climate finance flows up until 2018 and assesses their implications for international efforts to address climate change.** The fourth BA includes an overview of climate finance flows from developed to developing countries,<sup>3</sup> and available information on domestic climate finance, cooperation among developing countries and other climate-related flows that constitute global climate finance. It assesses the key features of climate finance flows, including their composition and purposes, and explores insights into their effectiveness, access to finance, country ownership, and alignment with the needs and priorities of beneficiaries, as well as their magnitude in the context of broader flows. In addition, it provides information on recent developments on methodological issues related to the tracking of climate finance at the international and domestic level, operational definitions of climate finance in use and new indicators for measuring the impact of climate finance.
4. **The fourth (2020) BA includes mapping of information relevant to the long-term goal outlined in Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement on making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low GHG emission and climate-resilient development.** The fourth BA provides the first mapping exercise, to be conducted every four years, to identify the latest actions and activities of different actors related to making finance flows consistent with low GHG emission and climate-resilient development pathways, including national Governments, development finance institutions, central banks and regulators, multilateral finance institutions, and climate funds, as well as private sector actors such as corporations, banks and investors. Information produced by United Nations entities and initiatives, and under other multilateral processes, as well as the perspective of civil society organizations and the academic community, was also explored. Emerging

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\* For a list of acronyms and abbreviations, see document FCCC/CP/2021/10/Add.1–FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/7/Add.1.

<sup>1</sup> Decisions 2/CP.17, para. 121(f); and 1/CP.21, para. 63.

<sup>2</sup> Decisions 1/CP.18, para. 71; 5/CP.18, para. 11; 3/CP.19, para. 11; 8/CP.22, annex, para. 37(f); 4/CP.24, paras. 4, 5, and 10; and 19/CMA.1, para. 36(d).

<sup>3</sup> For the purpose of the overview of climate finance in the BA, various data sources are used to illustrate flows from developed to developing countries, without prejudice to the meaning of those terms in the context of the Convention and the Paris Agreement, including but not limited to Annex II/Annex I Parties, non-Annex I Parties and MDBs; OECD members and non-OECD members; OECD DAC members and countries eligible for OECD DAC official development assistance; and other relevant classifications.

methodologies, indicators and data sets to support tracking the consistency of finance flows are also discussed in respective chapters of the technical report (see para. 5 below).

5. The fourth BA comprises this summary, prepared by the SCF, and a technical report, prepared by experts under the guidance of the SCF drawing on information and data from a range of sources. It was subject to extensive stakeholder input and expert review, but remains a product of the external experts.

## II. Challenges and limitations

6. The fourth BA provides an updated overview of climate finance flows in 2017–2018, along with data on trends in 2011–2016 compiled from previous BA reports where applicable. Due diligence has been undertaken to use the best information available from the most credible sources. In compiling estimates, efforts have been made to ensure that they are based on activities in line with the convergence of operational definitions of climate finance identified in the first BA and to avoid double counting by focusing on primary finance, which is finance for a new physical item or activity. Challenges were nevertheless encountered in collecting, aggregating and analysing information from diverse sources.

7. **Data uncertainty:** Most of the uncertainties associated with each source of data which have different underlying causes identified in the previous BAs persist, although there have been some improvements. Uncertainties relating to the data on domestic public investments result from the lack of geographical coverage and differences in the way tracking methods are applied, as well as significant changes in the methods used for estimating investment in energy efficiency and sustainable transport over time. Uncertainties also arise from the lack of transparency of data for determining private climate finance; the methods used for estimating adaptation finance; differences in the assumptions used in underlying formulas for attributing finance from MDBs to developed countries; the classification of sustainable or green finance; and the incomplete data on non-concessional finance flows.

8. **Data gaps:** Significant gaps in the coverage of sectors and sources of climate finance remain, particularly with regard to private investment, and adaptation and resilience. While estimates of incremental investment in energy efficiency have improved, understanding of the public and private sources of finance and the financial instruments used remains inadequate. For data on sustainable transport, efforts have been made to improve coverage of public and private investment in electric vehicles and charging infrastructure. However, high-quality data on private investments in sustainable agriculture, forestry and land use, water, waste, and adaptation and resilience are particularly lacking. Specifically, adaptation finance estimates, which are context-specific and incremental, are difficult to compare with mitigation finance estimates, and more work is needed on estimating climate-resilient investments.

9. In relation to mapping information relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement, the lack of a common interpretation of or guidelines on what information qualifies as relevant presents a challenge in adequately capturing the scope and depth of related action. For the fourth BA an actor-specific mapping approach was adopted, as opposed to focusing on particular financial instruments, asset classes, or categories of action, in order to capture what financial sector actors consider to be relevant information on activities to be consistent with or align with the goals of the Paris Agreement. Such mapping may be non-exhaustive and limited in terms of representation across geographic areas and sectors. It may also obscure the role of actors that work across multiple categories. Given that a significant amount of information considered relevant is to be derived from multiple-member initiatives and coalitions, due to potential benefits of network effects, focusing on these groups may limit the mapping of information from individual cases that may be considered best practice or leading examples. Furthermore, there is a limited track record and limited in-depth information related to implementing activities consistent with or that align with the Paris Agreement that might enable a thorough assessment of their effectiveness, and therefore their relevance, in achieving the goal outlined in Article 2, paragraph 1(c).

10. The limitations outlined above need to be taken into consideration when deriving conclusions and policy implications from the fourth BA. The SCF will continue to contribute,

through its activities, to the progressive improvement of the measurement, reporting and verification of climate finance in future BAs, to help address these challenges.

### III. Key findings

#### A. Methodological issues related to transparency of climate finance

11. **Improvements in the consistency of reporting on climate finance under the Convention are observed.** Progress regarding the consistency of climate finance reporting was observed in the BR4 common tabular format submissions from Annex II Parties and the provision of qualitative information in the documentation boxes of those tables or in the BRs. One improvement relates to the reporting by type of support, with Parties reporting only on mitigation, adaptation and cross-cutting categories, without including other types of support. Nevertheless, improvements in aggregating geographic or sector-based information remains limited owing to differences in the approaches used by Parties and the functionality of the reporting system to allow differences in reporting. Several Parties referred to ongoing work to resolve challenges related to reporting on private finance mobilized by public interventions.

12. Data coverage and granularity of reporting on climate finance received in the BURs of non-Annex I Parties has improved since the previous BA. Nineteen Parties have submitted a BUR for the first time since the previous BA, in addition to a further 27 Parties submitting second or third BURs. The proportion of BURs that include information on finance received rose from approximately 60 per cent in 2014 to over 90 per cent in 2019–2020. A total of 41 Parties have provided quantitative information on climate finance received at the project or activity level in tabular format. Many differences remain in the approaches Parties used for reporting, including time periods of reported data and information on types of support, sectors and financial instruments. Several Parties included additional information in their second and third BURs on whether a project is linked to capacity-building, technology development and transfer, or technical assistance.

13. **Availability of domestic public climate finance data is increasing, with more countries establishing climate budget tagging systems.** Notable improvements were observed in the tracking of domestic climate-related public or private finance flows, with the issuance of green sovereign bonds incentivizing the establishment of regular tracking systems in both developed and developing countries, building on previous work through CPEIRs. Thirteen countries have established tracking systems for national budgets, with a further five countries developing tracking methodologies. In total, estimates of domestic public expenditures on climate change in 2017–2018 amount to approximately USD 86.6 billion (see chap. III.B below).

14. **Operational definitions of climate finance in use generally reflect a common understanding of what is considered mitigation or adaptation finance, but differ on the details of sector-specific activities, certain financial instruments and approaches to public and private finance flows.** Operational definitions of climate finance in use have evolved over time. The MDB list of activities eligible for classification as mitigation finance includes charging stations for electric vehicles and hydrogen or biofuel fuelling since 2017 and resource efficiency in aquaculture since 2018, while OECD DAC integrated adjustments to adaptation finance eligibility criteria in 2016 to harmonize with a stepwise approach developed by MDBs.

15. The lists of climate mitigation activities developed by MDBs have served in part to inform green or climate-aligned taxonomies in recent years to support the development of the green bond market and/or regulatory efforts in the field of sustainable finance to combat greenwashing and promote the standardization of financial products. Approaches to defining mitigation and adaptation activities are broadly consistent across various international organizations and regulatory initiatives, although inclusion and exclusion lists and approaches to the criteria used to define such activities can vary.

16. Parties' submissions on operational definitions of climate finance in use highlighted a range of views on the need for, and on the form and scope of, a common definition of

climate finance. Some Parties noted that a single definition would not be useful, or should be broad enough to cater for the dynamic and evolving nature of climate finance due to a variety of factors, including NDCs and implementation of the enhanced transparency framework over time, ways of tracking progress related to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement, and changes in methodologies and definitions for mitigation and adaptation due to data availability or improvements in processes and knowledge.

17. Some Parties pointed to the use of a classification system or taxonomy rather than a single definition and referred to the development of taxonomies or classifications outside the UNFCCC process or within national sustainable finance frameworks.

18. Other Parties noted how the lack of a common definition affects the ability to track and assess the fulfilment of the obligations of Annex II Parties under the Convention and those of developed country Parties under the Paris Agreement. A common definition could support the preparation of the BA and the overall transparency and effectiveness of the UNFCCC process by highlighting the link between the level of action of developing countries and the level of support provided and, ultimately, the achievement of the objectives of the Convention and the Paris Agreement. In this context, two submissions included a proposal for an operational definition of climate finance, while other submissions included a proposal for an operational approach to achieving greater convergence among definitions over time, based either on common principles or responses to a common set of questions to provide granular information.

19. **More methodologies on measuring outcomes of financing for climate resilience have emerged in recent years.** Many multilateral institutions are in the process of developing or have already developed frameworks for measuring impacts, with an increasing focus on adaptation and resilience, such as the Resilience Rating System by the World Bank Group and the Climate Resilience Metrics Framework by MDBs and IDFC. Although approaches to measuring impacts of climate finance vary, most multilateral institutions, as well as bilateral contributors, use a similar set of mitigation and adaptation indicators.

20. **There are four common decision points identified in emerging methodologies and metrics in use for tracking consistency with low GHG emission and climate-resilient development pathways.** As with tracking climate finance, emerging methodologies relevant to tracking consistency with the long-term goal under Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement also need to overcome issues related to definitions, the scope or boundary of tracking, data availability and comparability.

21. Methods differ as to the type of finance flows, stocks and services tracked (primary or secondary markets) and the ways of measuring consistency (e.g. on the basis of GHG emissions, emissions intensity metrics or technology choices). However, the four common decision points are:

(a) Identifying a given pathway to low GHG emission and climate-resilient development against which the consistency of actions will be measured. Different pathways may be chosen relative to their consistency with low GHG emission development and mitigation goals, and to their consistency with climate-resilient development and adaptation or resilience goals. Pathways may result in compatible activity lists or performance metrics against which to measure action. In addition, the timescale used to measure consistency is important. This could be, for example, within 5 or 10 years, or by a given year, such as 2050;

(b) Reviewing the activities and actions to be tracked (e.g. investments, economic activities such as production and sales or purchasing of goods and services, policymaking, legislation and voluntary standards) that the stakeholder undertakes, which is relevant to whether the pathway will be achieved;


(c) Understanding which finance flows that go towards realizing the activities and actions should be tracked by the stakeholder;

(d) Identifying which key metrics to use to assess whether finance flows and related processes result in activities and actions that are consistent with the given pathway identified during the review.

## B. Overview of climate finance flows in 2017–2018

22. **Global climate finance flows were 16 per cent higher in 2017–2018 than in 2015–2016, reaching an annual average of USD 775 billion and achieving significantly higher results, particularly in renewable energies.** High-bound climate finance estimates increased from USD 692 billion in 2016 to USD 804 billion in 2017 and USD 746 billion in 2018, for an annual average of USD 775 billion in 2017–2018. The growth in 2017 was driven largely by an increase in new private investment in renewable energy as a result of decreasing technology costs, while the decline in 2018 was due primarily to a slowdown in wind and solar investment in major markets. Figure 1 provides a breakdown of global climate finance flows in 2015–2018 by sector, and figure 2 provides an overview of global climate finance and finance flows in 2017–2018 from developed to developing countries.

Figure 1  
**Global climate finance flows in 2015–2018**  
 (Billions of United States dollars)



23. **Continued decreases in renewable energy technology costs mean new investment goes further.** Renewable energy technology costs continued to decline in 2017–2018 compared with those in 2015–2016, with a 29 per cent decrease for solar photovoltaics, an 18 per cent decrease for offshore wind and a 10 per cent decrease for onshore wind, emphasizing how greater impacts are achieved for each new dollar of investment. In 2018, 100 per cent more renewable energy capacity was commissioned than in 2012 with only a 22 per cent increase in investment.

24. For the fourth BA, several new data sources have been used to track climate finance in areas that were not previously included, such as electric vehicle charging infrastructure, transport, water, waste and municipal investments. Where possible, the data have been integrated in the time series retroactively to allow for trend comparisons.


25. **Climate finance from developed to developing countries increased through various channels.** Total public financial support reported by Annex II Parties in their BRs submitted (as at October 2020) amounted to USD 45.4 billion in 2017 and USD 51.8 billion in 2018. The annual average (USD 48.7 billion) represents an increase of 2.7 per cent from the annual average reported for 2015–2016. Climate-specific financial support, which accounts for up to three fourths of the financial support reported in the BRs, increased by 13 per cent on a comparable basis to an annual average of USD 36.3 billion. Most climate-specific financial support was reported through bilateral, regional and other channels, with USD 28.1 billion in 2017 and USD 31.8 billion in 2018.

26. Mitigation finance constitutes the largest share of climate-specific financial support through bilateral channels at 64 per cent. However, the share of adaptation finance increased from 15 per cent in 2015–2016 to 21 per cent in 2017–2018 as it grew at a higher rate than mitigation finance.

27. UNFCCC funds and multilateral climate funds approved USD 2.2 billion and USD 3.1 billion for climate finance projects in 2017 and 2018, respectively. The annual average for 2017–2018 (USD 2.7 billion) represents an increase of approximately 39 per cent compared with those in 2015–2016, owing primarily to increases in project approvals by the

GCF Board and the GEF Council. In terms of inflows to the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, the seventh replenishment of the GEF resulted in USD 4.1 billion in pledges and USD 802 million allocated to the climate change focal area, compared with USD 4.4 billion in total pledges and USD 1.26 billion allocated to the climate change focal area in the sixth replenishment. The first replenishment of the GCF pledging conference in 2019 amounted to USD 9.8 billion, compared with USD 10.2 billion from the initial resource mobilization pledging conference in 2014.

Figure 2  
**Climate finance flows in 2017–2018**  
 (Billions of United States dollars, annualized)



		2017	2018	Sources of data and relevant section of technical report
Global total flows	Renewable energy	351.4	322.4	Section 2.2.2 CPI 2020 based on multiple sources
	Public	66.5	51.4	
	Private	284.9	271.0	
	Energy efficiency	229.9	234.6	Section 2.2.3 IEA Energy Efficiency Market Reports/CPI
	Public	35.7	32.3	
	Private (a)	194.2	202.3	
	Sustainable transport	160.5	120.5	Section 2.2.4 IEA World Energy Investment Reports/ CPI 2020 based on multiple sources
	Public	118.1	70.9	
Private	42.4	49.7		
Other sectors public finance – mitigation	37.4	34.4	Section 2.2.5 (see notes) CPI 2020 based on multiple sources	
Adaptation public finance	24.7	34.1	Section 2.2.6 CPI 2020 based on multiple sources	
Domestic climate-related public investment	86.7	86.7	Section 2.3 BURs, CPEIRs, I4CE, IDB, UNDP, various government reports	
Flows to non-Annex I Parties	UNFCCC funds	1.5	2.4	Section 2.5.2 Fund financial reports, CFU
	Multilateral climate funds (including UNFCCC)	2.2	3.1	
	Climate-specific finance through bilateral, regional and other channels	28.1	31.8	Section 2.5.1 Annex II Party BRs
	MDB climate finance attributed to developed countries (b)	24.1	25.8	Section 2.5.2 OECD 2020a
	Mobilized private climate finance through multilateral channels	10.8	10.8	Section 2.5.4 OECD 2020a
	Mobilized private climate finance through bilateral, regional institutions (c)	3.7	3.8	
	Other private finance projects	5.3	11.0	Section 2.5.4 CPI 2020 based on multiple sources

Notes: (1) Value discounts transport energy efficiency estimates by 8.5 per cent to account for overlap with electric vehicle estimates, same as in previous years. (2) From Annex II to non-Annex I Parties. Values derived from calculating attributed shares of Annex II Parties per MDB multiplied by the climate finance provided to non-Annex I Parties from MDBs’ own resources. (3) Estimates include private finance mobilized through public interventions from developed countries.



28. MDBs provided USD 34 billion and USD 42 billion in climate finance from their own resources to developing and emerging economies in 2017 and 2018, respectively. The annual average (USD 36.6 billion) represents a 50 per cent increase since 2015–2016. The attribution of these flows to developed countries is calculated at between USD 23.3 billion to USD 24.1 billion in 2017 and USD 25.8 billion to 28.0 billion in 2018.

29. The uncertainty of the data on the geographic sources and destinations of private finance flows to developing countries remains significant. OECD estimates that private climate finance mobilized by developed countries through bilateral and multilateral channels amounted to USD 14.5 billion in 2017 and USD 14.6 billion in 2018.

30. Information on the recipients of climate finance remains limited. The increase in BUR submissions from non-Annex I Parties has resulted in a greater amount of information on finance received than for previous BAs. However, time lags in data availability for reporting make it difficult to provide updated or complete information on finance received in 2017–2018. Of the 63 Parties that had submitted BURs as at December 2020, 28 included some information on climate finance received in 2017 or 2018. In total, USD 7.8 billion was reported as received for projects starting in 2017 and USD 2 billion for projects starting in 2018. A total of 23 Annex II Parties included information on recipients of finance at either the country or project level in their BR4s.

31. **South–South climate finance flows have increased, but data availability and coverage remain limited.** While data availability and coverage of climate finance flows between developing countries remain limited, it is a growing area of global climate finance flows. Several countries voluntarily report to standardized reporting systems such as OECD DAC. Up to 20 development finance institutions that are IDFC members are based in non-OECD countries, and MDBs led by developing countries such as the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank and the New Development Bank continue to increase finance flows. Estimates of South–South climate finance flows amounted to USD 17.8 billion to USD 18.0 billion in 2017 and USD 18.0 billion to USD 18.2 billion in 2018.

### C. Assessment of climate finance flows

32. Trends in public concessional climate finance, including bilateral flows, multilateral climate funds and funds from MDBs, point to increasing flows towards developing countries from multilateral sources, while bilateral climate finance flows have stagnated.

33. **Support for mitigation remains greater than support for adaptation.** Adaptation finance has remained at between 20 and 25 per cent of committed concessional finance across all sources (noting measurement differences), showing little movement since the previous BA (see the table below). However, the continued rise in public climate finance flows contributing towards both adaptation and mitigation complicates this assessment. The rise is most obvious in flows from multilateral climate funds and through bilateral channels. While the GCF allocates climate finance for projects in this cross-cutting category to adaptation or mitigation, not all institutions do so in their programming or reporting. This makes it more difficult to track progress in scaling up adaptation finance and ultimately achieving balance between finance for adaptation and mitigation objectives.

34. **Grants continue to be a key instrument for adaptation finance.** In 2017–2018 grants accounted for 64 and 94 per cent of the face value of bilateral adaptation finance reported to OECD and of adaptation finance from multilateral climate funds, respectively (see the table below). During the same period, 9 per cent of adaptation finance flowing through MDBs was grant-based. These figures indicate no change since 2015–2016. Mitigation finance remains less concessional in nature, with 30 per cent of bilateral flows, 29 per cent of multilateral climate fund approvals and 3 per cent of MDB investments taking the form of grants. These figures, however, may not fully capture the added value brought by combining different types of financial instruments, or technical assistance with capital flows, which can often lead to greater innovation or more sustainable implementation.

### Characteristics of international public climate finance flows in 2017–2018

	Annual average (USD billion)	Area of support				Financial instrument		
		Adaptation	Mitigation	REDD+ <sup>a</sup>	Cross-cutting	Grants	Concessional loans	Other
Multilateral climate funds <sup>b</sup>	2.7	20%	48%	5%	27%	53%	40%	8%
Bilateral climate finance <sup>c</sup>	29.9	21%	65%	–	15%	64%	36%	<1%
MDB climate finance <sup>d</sup>	39.2	25%	75%	–	–	5%	75%	20%

*Note:* All values based on approvals and commitments.

<sup>a</sup> In decision 1/CP.16, para. 70, the Conference of the Parties encouraged developing country Parties to contribute to mitigation actions in the forest sector by undertaking the following activities: reducing emissions from deforestation; reducing emissions from forest degradation; conservation of forest carbon stocks; sustainable management of forests; and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.

<sup>b</sup> Including: Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme, Adaptation Fund, Bio Carbon Fund, Clean Technology Fund, Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, Forest Investment Program, Global Climate Change Alliance, GCF, GEF Trust Fund, Least Developed Countries Fund, Partnership for Market Readiness, Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience, Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program, Special Climate Change Fund and United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries.

<sup>c</sup> Bilateral climate finance data are sourced from Annex II Parties' BRs (that further include regional and other channels) for the annual average and thematic split. The financial instrument data are taken from data from OECD DAC, referring only to concessional flows of climate-related development assistance reported by OECD DAC members. In section C of the summary and chap. III of the technical report, "bilateral finance" refers only to concessional flows of climate-related development assistance reported by OECD DAC members.

<sup>d</sup> The annual average and thematic split of MDBs includes their own resources only, while the financial instrument data include data from MDBs and from external resources, owing to the lack of data disaggregation.

35. With regard to the geographic distribution of public concessional climate finance, Asia remains the principal beneficiary region. In 2017–2018 the region received on average 30 per cent of funding commitments from bilateral flows, multilateral climate funds and MDBs. Sub-Saharan Africa received an average of 24 per cent of commitments across the sources in the same period, followed by Latin America and the Caribbean with 17 per cent and the remainder going to the Middle East and North Africa; Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe; the South Caucasus; and Central Asia.

36. The LDCs and SIDS are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. Article 9 of the Paris Agreement emphasizes the importance of the provision of scaled-up financial resources to these countries. In 2017–2018 funding committed to projects in the LDCs represented 22 per cent of bilateral flows and 24 per cent of finance approved through multilateral climate funds. Funding committed to SIDS represented 2 per cent of bilateral finance and 10 per cent of finance approved through multilateral climate funds. Of the finance provided to the LDCs and SIDS, the amount targeting adaptation fell slightly in 2017–2018, although the shares remained stable overall. MDBs channelled 11 per cent of their climate finance to the LDCs and 3 per cent to SIDS. As in previous years, adaptation finance as a share of all climate finance to these countries was significantly higher than that of the overall climate finance spending by MDBs.

37. **In 2017–2018, there continued to be a push to diversify modalities of access to climate finance.** In a 2019 survey of 105 respondents from 45 developing countries, 73 per cent identified finance from multilateral climate funds as the most challenging source of finance to access compared with private finance (62 per cent), MDBs and development finance institutions (30 per cent) and bilateral sources (17 per cent). Institutions in developing countries are increasingly able to meet fiduciary and environmental and social safeguards requirements for accessing funds. Data show a continued increase in the number of national implementing entities of multilateral climate funds as well as an increase in the accreditation of civil society and private entities, with both trends largely driven by the GCF. Significant shares of climate finance approvals from multilateral climate funds are programmed through multilateral accredited and implementing entities.

38. The management of climate finance, as well as the development and implementation of projects that it supports, necessarily entails costs. Often recovered through mechanisms such as administrative budgets and implementing agency fees, the degree of such costs varies across institutions by nature of their different approaches and delivery models. In 2017–2018, major multilateral climate funds spent USD 217 million on administration costs, while implementing entity fees amounted to USD 231 million. In general, the administration costs of climate finance management have tended to decrease over time. The alignment of administrative functions between funds (e.g. the GEF administration of the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund) can streamline management and disbursement mechanisms. This is essential in order to retain the trust that contributors and beneficiaries place in the funds. However, it must be balanced by the above-mentioned rise in implementing entities and associated costs.

39. The capacity of institutions to make strategic choices to use climate finance has long been recognized as important. Both the Adaptation Fund and the GCF have developed readiness programmes, supporting countries to plan for, access and deliver climate finance. Together these funds have approved over USD 285 million in readiness support. The GEF has instead incorporated capacity-building objectives into existing project funding through “enabling activities”. Reviews of these programmes have endorsed the use of readiness support to build all aspects of the capacity required to mobilize finance for climate action, rather than a focus on supporting access to multilateral climate funds.

40. **Ownership over the end use of climate finance flows remains a critical factor in its effectiveness.** The broad concept of ownership encompasses the consistency of climate finance with national priorities, the degree to which national systems are used for both spending and tracking, and the engagement of a wide range of stakeholders. Financial needs are being increasingly articulated, but to date lack sufficient comparability of methods, including for costs, time frames and assumptions, in order to make an accurate assessment of the alignment of climate finance provision with such needs. Ministries of finance and planning are strengthening their commitments to engage in climate change planning, with national-level institutions playing a greater role through domestic tracking, monitoring and verification of climate finance.

41. **Impact reporting systems and practices for climate finance are maturing.** Mechanisms for monitoring the impact of climate finance may be relevant for the implementation of the enhanced transparency framework. While the reporting of results is slowly improving under multilateral climate funds, MDBs do not include information on mitigation and adaptation outcomes in their joint reports and bilateral contributors have varied approaches to reporting on impacts. Emission reduction remains the primary impact metric for climate change mitigation, while adaptation impact continues to be measured primarily in terms of the number and type of people that benefit from projects. It remains difficult to accurately assess the quality of the impacts (i.e. outcomes) achieved, given that they are being presented in a multitude of formats and over varying timescales and are hard to verify.

42. **A number of decisions have strengthened the way in which gender issues are addressed in the UNFCCC process.** Gender-responsive public finance is likely to be more effective and efficient. Multilateral climate funds have been front runners in mainstreaming gender considerations in governance and operations. Those under the Financial Mechanism now have a mandate to include information on gender considerations in their annual reports to the COP. While advances are being made, there is scarce information on gender-responsive budgeting, suggesting that work remains to be done in integrating gender considerations on the ground.

43. **The drivers of climate finance flows can consist of both demand- and supply-side actions but may differ in terms of mitigation or adaptation objectives.** For mitigation finance, policy targets and support mechanisms have played a major role in driving climate finance flows, such as in the role of long-term fixed prices in supporting renewable energy deployment and more recently purchasing incentives for electric vehicles and bans on the sale of new combustion engine vehicles in the long term. Cross-cutting features of enabling environments, such as currency stability of exchange rates, stability of policies and

enforcement of contracts, particularly in driving finance towards sustainable land use, and maintenance of political will and support, have also proven to be significant drivers.

44. For adaptation finance, the role of national plans, standards and institutions takes on more importance in driving finance flows than may be the case in mitigation finance, owing to the importance of local, context-specific conditions. Building codes, design standards and disaster risk management guidelines play a role in furthering climate resilience within infrastructure and development investments. Furthermore, local and context-specific vulnerabilities require local-level data and information systems on risks to drive investment, particularly in agricultural adaptation activities.

45. **Although climate finance flows are increasing, they remain relatively small in the broader context of other finance flows, investment opportunities and costs.** Climate finance accounts for just a small proportion of overall finance flows, as shown in figure 3. The level of climate finance is considerably below what would be expected in view of the investment opportunities and needs that have been identified. However, although climate finance flows must obviously be scaled up, it is also important to ensure the consistency of finance flows as a whole (and of capital stock) with the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, specifically those set out in its Article 2.


46. **Financial flows and stocks in GHG-intensive activities remain concerningly high.** Fossil fuel investments amounted globally to USD 977 billion in 2017–2018, while fossil fuel subsidies amounted to USD 472 billion in 2018. Fossil fuel corporate capital expenditure at risk of becoming stranded amounted to USD 50 billion in 2018, while investments with deforestation risks amounted to USD 43.8 billion in 2017–2018, and net agriculture subsidies amounted to USD 619 billion per year on average from 2017 to 2019. Fixed assets in sectors linked to fossil fuel systems amounted to USD 32 trillion, real estate assets at risk in 2070 amounted to USD 35 trillion, and stranded assets worth USD 20 trillion are at risk out to 2050.

47. Given the scale and speed needed for the transformation to low GHG emission and climate-resilient development pathways, it is critical to consider climate finance flows within the context of broader finance flows. A sole focus on positive climate finance flows will be insufficient to meet the overarching objectives of the Paris Agreement. This does not mean that broader finance flows must all have explicit beneficial climate outcomes, but it does mean that they must integrate climate risks into decision-making and avoid increasing the likelihood of negative climate outcomes. Without this, the effectiveness of climate finance flows can be called into question or even negated.

#### **D. Mapping information relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement**

48. Article 2 of the Paris Agreement sets out three interlinked goals aimed at strengthening the global response to climate change in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty: (1) limiting the increase in global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels; (2) increasing the ability to adapt to and foster resilience against the adverse impacts of climate change; and (3) in Article 2, paragraph 1(c), making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development. Article 2 states that the Paris Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity, and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.

Figure 3  
Global climate finance in the context of broader finance flows, opportunities and costs




49. Although there is no dedicated process for responding to the goal set out in Article 2, paragraph 1(c), some Parties have articulated policies and measures in their long-term strategies or domestic policy frameworks that speak to the goal. Furthermore, both public and private sector institutions in the financial sector have articulated in their strategies efforts to align with the Paris Agreement and the goal in Article 2, paragraph 1(c). In the absence of a common vision among Parties on what information may be relevant, the aim of the mapping exercise was to capture how their actions meet the goal in Article 2, paragraph 1(c), and therefore what they consider relevant from their perspective, and it provided a number of key insights.

50. **Significant growth in relevant initiatives has been apparent since the Paris Agreement entered into force, particularly in coalitions fostering collective commitments on climate action.** Activities relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), in many

instances, are found in practices, coalitions and initiatives that predate the Paris Agreement. Policy and regulatory measures on green finance have been recorded since 1980, although there has been a marked increase in such measures since the adoption of the Paris Agreement (see figure 4). This historical context is relevant as it provides evidence that even prior to adoption of the Paris Agreement, actors were developing sustainability- and climate-related financial instruments and regulations which represent foundations for action relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), that is also integrated with national development goals. For example:

- (a) 34 of 103 stock exchanges have sustainable bond-listing processes;
- (b) Investors managing USD 90 trillion have signed on to the Principles for Responsible Investment;
- (c) 53 banks, representing over USD 37 trillion in assets, which represent one fourth of global banking assets, have pledged to align their lending and investment portfolios with net zero emissions by 2050, as part of the Net Zero Banking Alliance;
- (d) Over 40 institutional investors with USD 6.6 trillion in assets have pledged to align portfolios with net zero emissions by 2050, as part of the Net-Zero Asset Owner Alliance.

Figure 4  
**Number of green finance policy and regulatory measures, and growth of selected initiatives since the adoption of the Paris Agreement**



51. However, the Paris Agreement triggered a focusing of action whereby existing sustainability and climate-related finance initiatives sought to adopt objectives or activities that matched those of the Paris Agreement goals. At least 115 sustainability- or climate-related financial initiatives exist that claim to be either directly or indirectly associated with contributing to the goals of the Paris Agreement. The majority relate to promoting new

financial instruments that address funding needs for sustainable development and climate change. A smaller pool of approximately 31 initiatives are focused on greening financial systems – for example, the TCFD, the European Union High Level Expert Group on Sustainable Finance and the NGFS.

52. Many activities across the stakeholder mapping exercise that explicitly refer to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement and Article 2, paragraph 1(c), in particular are executed through collective initiatives and organizations. This highlights the importance of network effects, knowledge-sharing and common goal setting. In contrast, relatively few relevant actions by national Governments are framed in the context of Article 2, paragraph 1(c). Particularly in developing countries, the ability to access international climate finance in the context of Article 9 is mentioned, as is directing domestic finance flows towards achieving NDC goals.

53. **Assessing the real-economy impact and the risk of greenwashing remains a challenge.** Efforts relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), are widespread across all actors within the financial sector, with actions concentrated on defining their exposure to climate risks and the economic opportunities linked to climate response measures. However, achieving the goal in Article 2, paragraph 1(c), related to low GHG emission and climate-resilient development, set in the context of Article 2, depends on real-economy actions that reduce emissions in line with temperature goals and help to develop climate resilience. Many actors in the financial sector operate at a number of steps removed from real-economy activities, through stock or bond trading, portfolio allocations, or micro-prudential supervision, which has little direct effect on real-economy investment decisions relative to banks lending to projects, corporations approving capital expenditure plans or governments announcing support incentives. Therefore, measuring the effective role of financial actors in the context of Article 2, paragraph 1(c), is a notable topic of debate among initiatives, including which metrics are most important as indicators of success.

54. Several researchers highlight the absence of any independent critique of the motives and impacts of the numerous finance-related initiatives that have emerged since the adoption of the Paris Agreement. Such critical engagement will assist in assessing the real-economy contributions of these initiatives towards achieving consistency of finance flows and combating greenwashing in this context. Further, a plethora of initiatives offers the potential for incoherence and different levels of ambition in articulating how the goal in Article 2, paragraph 1(c), may be met.

55. The most recent initiatives include efforts of respective stakeholders to align with net zero emissions or 1.5 °C temperature rise pathways, with a focus on commitments for target setting and reporting, in contrast to earlier initiatives that focused on advocacy and high-level commitments.

56. **Trend towards activities with more stringent minimum requirements or mandatory regulations over voluntary activities.** Actors are largely adopting approaches in line with their institutional mandates, geographical reach and interpretation of how climate risks and opportunities affect and benefit their operations. To date, initiatives with the widest coverage and scope among financial actors are voluntary in nature, often with non-prescriptive commitments to principles. More recently, some initiatives include mandatory implementation requirements against common timelines. Furthermore, some Governments have already signalled that mandatory exclusions or obligations are being placed on institutions, although these remain limited in number and geographical scope.

57. **More work needed to promote inclusivity and geographical representation.** A number of initiatives relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), include representation from different regions and both developed and developing countries. For private finance actors, such representation is important, and it reveals how different relative starting points, capacity and skills gaps exist within coalitions that make common commitments. Further, although a significant number of initiatives were identified, many have yet to combine networks to achieve greater effect. Of the 115 partnerships identified of relevance to supporting the goals of the Paris Agreement, with up to 5,181 constituent members, the vast majority (75 per cent) are connected to only one partnership.

58. Inclusive and broad geographic representation is even more critical among relevant initiatives targeted at public finance actors, regulators and other country-focused actors such as financial centres. In these forums, it is important to reflect the perspectives of different regions, financial systems and country priorities in how common goals are articulated, particularly as the activities of these actors support and facilitate the achievement of the goal in Article 2, paragraph 1(c), as well as their country NDCs.

59. **Pursuing consistency requires consideration of how finance targeted at GHG-intensive activities can support pathways.** A focus on individual financing or investment decisions that are consistent with a pathway towards low GHG emission and climate-resilient development is not straightforward owing to the significant potential range of what pathways may be followed for achieving the broader goals in Article 2. The trend towards developing climate, green or sustainable finance taxonomies, as seen across multiple public actor initiatives, can support the identification of activities that are consistent with such pathways, but may risk excluding necessary investment in high-emission sectors or activities that can support the overall transition to such pathways. These may be in areas where activities that are consistent are not yet available at scale owing to technological innovation (e.g. steel and/or cement processes), where activities are needed to enable the transition (e.g. financing of mining activities, road building), or where financing is needed to wind down or responsibly manage the retiring of high-emission activities and transition communities away from their reliance (e.g. coal phase-out policies and subsidies).

60. Transition finance taxonomies and transition bonds are being developed for private finance actors to finance, for example, transitional activities in the context of financing just transitions, which implies projects that meet certain conditions, such as displacing more carbon-intensive options compared with industry norms; and enabling wider application or integration of less-carbon-intensive options.

61. **Further consideration of climate-resilient development pathways is necessary to complement existing approaches.** The mapped approaches include a strong focus on actions linked to achieving the goal in Article 2, paragraph 1(a), of the Paris Agreement, namely financing investments related to low GHG emissions, and to mitigating the physical and transition-related risks of shifting from high- to low-emission development trajectories. There appears to be limited evidence of the degree to which financial actors are aligning their investment mandates with climate resilience goals linked to Article 2, paragraph 1(b), of the Paris Agreement. There is a view that focusing on proper climate-related risk disclosure should result in better, more resilient investment and financing decisions as an end in and of itself, while other views have recognized the existing gaps in guidance and understanding on how to proactively engage on this element.

62. **Stakeholders may take action across a number of areas to support advancing efforts in relation to the goal in Article 2, paragraph 1(c).** These include:

(a) In public policy and finance, promoting opportunities to make sustainable recovery packages consistent with the goals of the Paris Agreement in the short term and setting in place financial policies and regulations for achieving net zero commitments in the long term;

(b) Ensuring that just transition financing is incorporated into approaches to align action with the goals of the Paris Agreement or into classifications of consistency with those goals, including in supporting vulnerable developing countries at risk of climate impacts in gaining access to capital to support their climate-resilient development, and in supporting the shift of trade flows away from economic activities that are inconsistent with those goals;

(c) Further clarifying the differences or complementarities between climate finance related to Article 9 of the Paris Agreement and the long-term goal under Article 2, paragraph 1(c).



## Annex II\*

### **Executive summary of the first report on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement**

[English only]

#### **I. Introduction**

1. The first NDR<sup>1</sup> provides an overview of qualitative and quantitative information based on available data and evidence from reports at the national, regional and global level. As such, the first NDR does not constitute an assessment of the needs of developing country Parties: the numbers of reported and costed needs are higher in the reports of some countries than of others. This does not imply that the latter have no or fewer needs; rather, this may be due to the lack of available data, tools and capacity for determining and costing needs.

#### **II. Context and mandate**

2. COP 24 requested the SCF to prepare, every four years, an NDR for consideration by the COP, starting at COP 26, and the CMA, starting at CMA 3. The COP also requested the SCF to collaborate, as appropriate, with the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, the subsidiary and constituted bodies, multilateral and bilateral channels, and observer organizations.<sup>2</sup>

3. COP 25 and CMA 2 encouraged the SCF to present, to the extent possible, disaggregated information in relation to, inter alia, mapping data availability and gaps by sector, assessing climate finance flows and presenting information on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement.<sup>3</sup> COP 25 and CMA 2 also encouraged the SCF, in implementing its strategic outreach plan, to build on existing efforts to reach out to developing country Parties and relevant developing country stakeholders when generating data and information for the determination of the needs of developing country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement.<sup>4</sup>

#### **III. Scope and approach**

##### **A. Scope**

4. The first NDR presents quantitative information (hereinafter referred to as costed needs) and qualitative information (hereinafter referred to as needs) on the needs of developing country Parties. Quantitative information was compiled from costed needs at the project level and those derived from economic modelling in reports at the national, regional

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\* For a list of acronyms and abbreviations, see document FCCC/CP/2021/10/Add.2–FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/7/Add.2.

<sup>1</sup> Available at <https://unfccc.int/documents/307595>.

<sup>2</sup> Decision 4/CP.24, paras. 13–14.

<sup>3</sup> Decisions 11/CP.25, para. 9; and 5/CMA.2, para. 9.

<sup>4</sup> Decisions 11/CP.25, para. 12; and 5/CMA.2, para. 12.

and global level and other sources. Qualitative information was derived from descriptions of planned activities, strategic directions, national priorities and action plans in the same sources.

5. To the extent possible and on the basis of the available information, the first NDR contains an analysis and presentation of the needs of developing country Parties by time frame, geographical region, thematic area, means of implementation, and sector and subsector (chap. 2). The report reflects information and data on needs as mentioned in the national, regional and global reports. The needs are dynamically changing and may depend on different factors, such as temperature scenarios, mitigation pathways and adaptive capacity, extreme weather events, adverse effects of trade and economic barriers, and social factors such as poverty.

6. Further, the first NDR illustrates processes and approaches for determining needs (chap. 3). It also maps out available tools and methodologies for determining and prioritizing needs, including sector-specific methodologies and tools, and advantages of and challenges in applying them (chap. 4). Finally, the report highlights opportunities, challenges and gaps in relation to determining needs (chap. 5).

7. The first NDR comprises an executive summary and a technical report. The executive summary was prepared by the SCF, whereas the technical report was prepared by experts under the guidance of the SCF but remains a product of the external experts. The technical report has benefited from extensive inputs from Parties and stakeholders.

## **B. Sources of information**

8. The first NDR has been compiled from reports prepared by developing country Parties, specifically those submitted to the UNFCCC, and reports developed by regional and global institutions. Such national reports include ACs, BURs, LEDS, NAPs, NAPAs, NCs, NDCs, TAPs and TNAs.

9. Further sources of information are the submissions received from Parties and non-Party stakeholders in response to the call for evidence issued by the SCF.<sup>5</sup>

## **C. Approach**

10. The technical work comprised a review of literature and sources of available information and data, and quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis, complemented by outreach activities. Data and information were systematically collected by the technical team under the guidance of the SCF co-facilitators for the first NDR.

11. The SCF periodically considered the outputs of the technical team and the input derived from regional meetings, and provided guidance on the development of the first NDR, including during conference calls and in-person meetings.

12. In preparing the first NDR, the technical team noted data inconsistencies, gaps and interpretation challenges, as referred to in paragraph 59 below. Efforts were made to overcome these challenges, such as identifying reporting overlaps on the basis of the reporting guidelines and avoiding double counting in aggregating and presenting the data.

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<sup>5</sup> See <https://unfccc.int/documents/231567>. The deadline of the call for evidence was extended to 30 October 2020, by which 34 submissions had been received. All submissions are available at <https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/workstreams/needs-report/repository-of-information-on-the-needs-of-developing-country-parties>.

## IV. Key findings

### A. Overview of the needs of developing country Parties

#### 1. Information and data from national reports

13. National reports submitted by developing country Parties as part of the UNFCCC process contain information on their needs related to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement. There are nine types of national report, which serve different purposes under the Convention and the Paris Agreement, with reported needs varying in terms of thematic and sectoral coverage, time frame and granularity of detail. In total, 563 documents were included in the analysis for the first NDR.<sup>6</sup>


14. Figure 1 provides an overview of the articulation of the needs of developing country Parties, including overall costed needs, across the nine types of national report submitted by developing country Parties to the UNFCCC.<sup>7</sup> The overall costed needs by type of report are based on the information on activities with associated costs included in the corresponding individual national reports. The needs included in national reports are identified using a top-down approach (i.e. needs that are typically estimated using economy-wide or sectoral modelling techniques) or a bottom-up approach (i.e. needs that are typically identified from a project pipeline). Developing country Parties periodically update their national reports submitted to the UNFCCC, reflecting changing circumstances and improvements in their data-collection processes and analysis. Therefore, data and information on needs may not be exhaustive as the needs are dynamically changing.

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<sup>6</sup> Only the most recent submissions to the UNFCCC were used in the analysis as Parties regularly update information on their needs to reflect changing circumstances. To avoid double counting where Parties may have provided the same information in different reports (e.g. BURs and NDCs), each type of report is treated separately, without aggregation across them.

<sup>7</sup> Needs are catalogued in the analysis at the most granular level at which information was provided (i.e. a project or activity expressed as a need by a developing country is counted as a single activity; if activity-level information was not provided, needs are counted at the sector level; if sector-level information was not provided, needs are counted at the thematic level, etc.). Depending on the nature of the report, it is possible that the priorities and programmes consist of multiple projects and action items. See chap. 1 of the first NDR for details on the scope of the quantitative and qualitative information collected from national reports.

Figure 1  
**Overview of articulation of needs, including costed needs, by type of national report submitted to the UNFCCC**



Note: Ranges of costs included where available.

**(a) Insights from quantitative data on needs**

15. The needs identified and articulated by developing country Parties across the nine types of national report encompass a wide range of financial, technology development and transfer, and capacity-building needs. The level of detail in the information provided varies in terms of the description of needs and their associated costs, if specified. While some Parties express costed needs for adaptation or mitigation purposes, other communicate needs at the activity or sector level.

16. As at 31 May 2021, NDCs from 153 Parties included 4,274 needs, with 1,782 costed needs identified across 78 NDCs, cumulatively amounting to USD 5.8–5.9 trillion up until 2030. Of this amount, USD 502 billion is identified as needs requiring international sources of finance and USD 112 billion as sourced from domestic finance. For 89 per cent of the costed needs, information was not provided on possible sources of finance. Among the national reports, NCs from 149 Parties present the highest number (6,990) of identified needs, of which 1,137 costed needs cumulatively amount to USD 8.8–8.9 trillion, with 5 per cent of the costed needs distributed across 45 NCs and 95 per cent in 1 NC. BURs from 62 Parties indicated 2,044 needs, of which 535 needs are costed, cumulatively amounting to USD 11.5 trillion, with 5 per cent distributed across 60 BURs and 95 per cent across 2 BURs, thereby representing the highest amount of costed needs identified across the nine types of national report. These figures should be viewed in the light of the size and nature of developing country Parties’ economies and the scale of climate impacts.

*(i) Thematic distribution of costed needs*

17. As shown in table 1, cumulatively, identified costed mitigation needs tend to be larger than costed adaptation needs across the reports that cover all thematic areas such as BURs, NCs and NDCs. The overall amount of costed adaptation needs is comparable to the overall amount of costed mitigation needs expressed in NCs (43 and 56–57 per cent, respectively). In the case of NDCs, the overall identified costed mitigation and adaptation needs (50 per

cent) are comparable to the amount of costed cross-cutting needs (50 per cent), noting that the costed needs expressed as cross-cutting are largely a reflection of one NDC. Although some developing countries provided information on costed needs for mitigation and adaptation by sector and subsector, this information was not provided across all reports. Therefore, it was not possible to provide a comprehensive and accurate overall amount of costed needs by sector and subsector in the first NDR.

Table 1

**Overview of sources of reported costed needs of developing countries by type of national report submitted to the UNFCCC**

Report	Costed needs (USD billion)				
	Total	Mitigation	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Other
AC	44.10 (100%)	–	44.10 (100%)	–	–
BUR	11 465.53–11 465.90 (100%)	5 286.94–5 287.31 (46%)	3 628.81 (32%)	2 550.01 (22%)	–
LEDS	1 707.15–1 707.35 (100%)	1 407.15–1 407.34 (82%)	300.00 (18%)	–	–
NAP	135.02–135.03 (100%)	–	135.02 (100%)	–	–
NAPA	10.05 (100%)	–	10.05 (100%)	–	–
NC	8 845.85–8 934.94 (100%)	5 019.30–5 033.83 (56–57%)	3 812.06–3 882.07 (43%)	2.23 (>0%)	12.25–16.81 (>0%)
NDC	5 817.48–5 888.56 (100%)	2 156.05–2 156.13 (37%)	764.24–835.24 (13–14%)	2 893.39 (49–50%)	3.81 (>0%)
TAP	40.74 (100%)	21.97 (54%)	18.76 (46%)	–	0.01 (>0%)
TNA	88.24–92.33 (100%)	30.33–34.33 (34–37%)	57.9–57.98 (63–68%)	0.01 (>0%)	–

Notes: (1) Ranges of costs included where available. (2) The percentages given are the percentages of the type of costed need for each report type.

18. Although developing country Parties identified more adaptation than mitigation needs, more costs were identified for the latter. This may not imply that mitigation needs are greater, but rather be due to lack of available data, tools and capacity for assessing adaptation needs (see the information on challenges and gaps in paras. 61–66 below).

19. Available information related to costed needs varies across regions (see table 2). African countries included 1,529 needs in their NDCs, of which 874 were costed, amounting to USD 2.5 trillion. NDCs of countries in the Asia-Pacific region included 1,677 needs, of which 630 needs were costed, cumulatively amounting to USD 3.2–3.3 trillion. Of the 771 needs expressed in the NDCs of countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region, 166 NDCs included costed needs, cumulatively amounting to USD 168.2–168.3 billion, of which almost 60 per cent was in one NDC. NDCs of developing countries from the Eastern European region included 282 needs, of which 112 were costed, cumulatively amounting to USD 9.36 billion.

(ii) *Regional distribution of costed needs*

Table 2

**Number and cost of needs expressed in nationally determined contributions by region**

Region	Number of expressed needs	Number of expressed needs with financial information (i.e. costed needs)	Costed needs based on available financial information (USD billion)
African States	1 529	874	2 459.56–2 460.56
Asia-Pacific States	1 677	630	3 180.39–3 250.39
Eastern European States	282	112	9.36

<i>Region</i>	<i>Number of expressed needs</i>	<i>Number of expressed needs with financial information (i.e. costed needs)</i>	<i>Costed needs based on available financial information (USD billion)</i>
Latin American and Caribbean States	771	166	168.18–168.26
Western European and other States	15	–	–

*Note:* Ranges of costs included where available.

20. Some Parties reported information on potential needs related to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage, either through specific adaptation activities that include objectives related to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage; referenced damage incurred owing to recent climate-related events such as droughts and severe weather; or modelled potential future impacts of climate on GDP or economic losses in a given year (e.g. 2030 or 2050). The information was also reported in the context of national circumstances, climate impacts and/or needs depending on the reporting Party.

21. As noted in paragraph 5 above, needs expressed in national reports are dynamically changing and, therefore, data and information thereon may not be exhaustive. While the number of needs and costed needs communicated in national reports is lower for some regions than others, this does not mean that those regions have no or fewer needs. Rather, this may be due to lack of available data, tools and capacity for determining and costing needs. Therefore, the number of needs and costed needs compiled from national reports available at the time of preparation of the first NDR should not be used to draw comparisons of the actual needs across regions.

(b) Insights from qualitative data on needs

Figure 2  
Needs expressed by developing countries in national reports by theme, region and means of implementation





Figure 3  
Needs expressed by developing countries in national reports by sector





*(i) Thematic distribution*

22. Overall, needs related to adaptation are mentioned more often than those related to mitigation in all report types except BURs and LEDCs, indicating greater attention to supporting developing countries' expressed adaptation needs. For example, as shown in figure 2, NDCs included 1,991 needs for adaptation and 1,956 for mitigation.

*(ii) Regional distribution*

23. When the number of expressed needs across the nine national report types is considered, developing country Parties in the Africa and Asia-Pacific regions identified comparable numbers of needs across the national reports with broad thematic and sectoral coverage such as BURs, NCs and NDCs, comparable with the Latin America and Caribbean region only in the case of BURs (see figure 2, section 2.2). Developing country Parties in the Asia-Pacific region used NAPs and TAPs to further specify adaptation needs, as more than half of the needs identified in NAPs and TAPs were from this region. Developing country Parties in the Latin America and Caribbean, and Eastern European regions expressed more needs in their NCs than in other national reports. Latin American and Caribbean Parties expressed a considerable number of adaptation needs in adaptation-specific national reports (e.g. ACs and NAPs) when compared with the overall number of needs expressed in their BURs and NDCs. Developing country Parties in the African region expressed more needs through TNAs compared with other regions, reporting 993 needs compared with the 642 needs identified by Parties in the Asia-Pacific region.

*(iii) Distribution by means of implementation*

24. Qualitative data show a significant prevalence of capacity-building and technology development and transfer needs, which may in part be due to the resources developing countries can access to support the identification of these needs. The number of capacity-building needs is higher than finance needs and technology development and transfer needs identified in the nine national report types except for TNAs (see figure 2, section 2.3). Capacity-building needs expressed across the national reports typically cover areas such as research, training and education, awareness-raising, institutional strengthening and coordination, and policy development.

*(iv) Sectoral and subsectoral distribution*

25. On the basis of the number of mitigation needs expressed across the nine national report types, energy is the lead sector for climate change mitigation actions, followed by land use and forestry, transport, agriculture, and waste and sanitation (see figure 3, section 3.1).

26. When considering mitigation needs by sector and subsector, the nine types of national report show that most needs in the **energy sector** relate to requests for support for the energy efficiency and renewable energy subsectors, albeit with some variation between them. In NDCs, needs for renewable energy development were identified almost twice as frequently as those for energy efficiency (399 and 261, respectively) but the total nominal value of energy efficiency projects was 1.5 times larger than that of renewable energy projects (USD 377.22 billion and USD 198.08 billion, respectively). In BURs and NCs, more needs related to renewable energy than to energy efficiency were identified. TNAs included a larger variation among energy subsectors, including the development of natural gas, the phasing-out of inefficient subsidies, the exploration of carbon capture and storage, and the development of the efficient use of coal.

27. The majority of expressed mitigation needs in the **land-use and forestry sector** represented a few densely forested countries, such as Bhutan, Brazil, the Congo, Costa Rica, Ghana, Guyana, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Suriname, the United Republic of Tanzania and Viet Nam. This sector covers key activities such as reforestation, forest fire prevention, social forestry development, sustainable forest management, development of sustainable supply chains for forest commodities, spatial planning forestry research and some land-use activities, such as management of livestock. Data in NCs and NDCs showed that, within this sector, needs related to reforestation are the largest needs expressed in financial terms.

28. On the basis of the number of adaptation-related needs expressed across the nine national report types, agriculture and water are the two lead sectors for climate change adaptation actions, followed by disaster prevention and preparedness, coastal zone management and health (see figure 3, section 3.2).

29. Adaptation needs in the **agriculture sector** cover a wide variety of land uses that overlap with other key sectors. Needs related to agroforestry and irrigation, for example, also touch on areas or land managed under the forestry and water sectors. Needs related to the agriculture sector relate to crop diversification, development of resistant crops, land and soil management, livestock management, and fisheries and aquaculture.

30. Adaptation needs in the **water sector** are dominated by the need for water distribution infrastructure, water harvesting and irrigation. Other types of need in this sector vary widely and cover water resource management, water storage and water sanitation. In NDCs, about 38 per cent of expressed needs in the water sector include financial information. Water distribution infrastructure, including wastewater treatment, was the largest need in financial terms across all types of report.

### (c) Other areas of needs

31. Developing country Parties also communicate other areas of needs that involve issues such as gender, indigenous peoples and vulnerable groups. However, across the nine national report types, less than 10 per cent of needed activities referred to gender or specific communities. Where these topics are included in national reports, information tends to relate to commitments, policies and/or strategies.

32. Some reports that expressed needs for policy development were linked to the SDGs and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda. In general, the implementation of climate actions is mainstreamed in SDG-related actions. However, a few reports expressed needs focusing on institution-building and policy development, aiming to link climate commitments with the SDGs; for example, Jordan's need to align its intended nationally determined contribution with the SDGs, and Morocco's needs (expressed in its NCs) to strengthen the National Institutional Framework of Climate Change through a regulatory system based on the Framework Law on the National Charter for Environment and Sustainable Development.

## 2. Information and data from reports by regional and global actors

33. Information and data on the needs of developing countries are also available from regional and global reports. For the mitigation needs of developing countries, these reports use a mix of climate economic modelling for scenarios of below 2 °C, ranging from USD 2.4 trillion to USD 4.7 trillion in annual energy-related investment needs globally;<sup>8</sup> investment opportunities based on stated national plans and targets including and beyond NDCs, ranging from USD 23.8–29.4 trillion for emerging markets from 2016 to 2030;<sup>9</sup> and investment estimates for achieving conditional NDC targets using carbon prices, for example USD 715


<sup>8</sup> See Collum DL, Zhou W, Bertram C, et al. 2018. Energy investment needs for fulfilling the Paris Agreement and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. *Nature Energy*. 3(7): pp.589–599. International Energy Agency. 2020. *World Energy Model Documentation*. Paris: IEA. Available at [https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/bc4936dc-73f1-47c3-8064-0784ae6f85a3/WEM\\_Documentation\\_WEO2020.pdf](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/bc4936dc-73f1-47c3-8064-0784ae6f85a3/WEM_Documentation_WEO2020.pdf); and International Renewable Energy Agency. 2020. *Global Renewables Outlook. Energy transformation 2050*. Abu Dhabi: International Renewable Energy Agency. Available at <https://www.irena.org/publications/2020/Apr/Global-Renewables-Outlook-2020>.

<sup>9</sup> International Finance Corporation. 2017. *Climate Investment Opportunities in South Asia. An IFC Analysis*. Washington, D.C.: International Finance Corporation. Available at [https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics\\_ext\\_content/ifc\\_external\\_corporate\\_site/climate+business/resources/final+climate+investment+opportunities+in+south+asia+-+an+ifc+analysis](https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/climate+business/resources/final+climate+investment+opportunities+in+south+asia+-+an+ifc+analysis).

billion in Africa<sup>10</sup> (see figure 4 for an example of energy investment needs identified by the International Renewable Energy Agency<sup>11</sup>).

Figure 4

**Shares of annual average clean energy investments in the International Renewable Energy Agency transforming energy scenario, by region, 2016–2050**



Source: International Renewable Energy Agency. 2019. *Transforming the energy system – and holding the line on rising global temperatures*. Abu Dhabi: International Renewable Energy Agency. Available at [www.irena.org/publications/2019/Sep/Transforming-the-energy-system](http://www.irena.org/publications/2019/Sep/Transforming-the-energy-system).

34. Reports based on energy–economy models note that developing country regions have the largest investment gaps compared with historical trends to achieving climate scenarios in line with the Paris Agreement. Three to fourfold increases of investment are necessary in both renewable energy and energy efficiency across many regions that include developing countries.

35. Regional and global reports also provide estimates related to adaptation and resilience. Costs based on bottom-up national and sector-based studies (ranging from USD 140 billion to USD 300 billion annually by 2030) measuring impacts to GDP (for example, ranging from USD 289.2 billion to USD 440.5 billion up to 2030 in Africa) and the incremental investment needed to upgrade or retrofit infrastructure stock (ranging from USD 11 billion to USD 670 billion in annual incremental costs) are most prevalent.


36. To make current and future infrastructure climate-resilient, annual costs as a percentage of GDP are at least double in countries with emerging market economies, low-income countries and small States compared with the costs in high-income countries, that is 1.1–1.49 per cent compared with 0.45 per cent. Investment needs expressed as a percentage of GDP for upgrading new infrastructure and coastal protection are proportionally greater in lower-income countries and small States, while retrofitting existing infrastructure is the major cost component in countries with emerging market economies. However, the reports also noted that specific knowledge on the degree of exposure of infrastructure to natural hazards, related to their location, intensity and level of risk, could affect the incremental cost

<sup>10</sup> African Development Bank. 2021. *Needs of African Countries Related to Implementing the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement*. Available at [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Needs%20Report\\_African%20countries\\_AfDB\\_FINAL.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Needs%20Report_African%20countries_AfDB_FINAL.pdf).

<sup>11</sup> For the purpose of the first NDR, various data sources were used to illustrate needs of developing country Parties, without prejudice to the meaning of this term in the context of the Convention and the Paris Agreement, including but not limited to Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention and other classifications used in regional and global reports.

of making infrastructure climate-resilient (e.g. 3 per cent of total investment as opposed to 8–45 per cent) (see figure 5).<sup>12</sup>

Figure 5  
**Public investment needs for resilience of physical infrastructure, by country grouping (gross domestic product weighted average)**



Source: International Monetary Fund. 2020. *Fiscal Monitor. Policies for the Recovery*. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.

37. The information and data generated from the national, regional and global reports cannot be compared with each other as the reports have different time frames, objectives and scopes. However, all of the reports may be viewed as complementary in offering different insights, granularity and processes and approaches for identifying needs.

## B. Processes and approaches for determination of needs of developing country Parties

### 1. National institutional arrangements

38. Developing country Parties have varied institutional arrangements for identifying climate change needs, which are described in most of their national reports submitted to the UNFCCC. Most countries have established specialized institutions within their ministries and departments whose mandate is to spearhead climate change actions. These institutions have various names such as climate change directorate, climate change unit, interministerial climate change coordination committee, climate change technical working group and climate research centre.

39. Good practice in ensuring buy-in and effective coordination of the needs identification process is the engagement of high-level decision-making government offices at the initial stage of the climate change needs identification process. In addition, the engagement of other stakeholders and the assignment of specific roles and responsibilities to participants representing various sectors and interest groups at both the national and subnational level was noted in the reports of the majority of developing countries.

40. Institutional arrangements for needs determination vary widely across countries. However, in most countries the ministry responsible for environmental affairs coordinates the process through a focal point or a committee.

41. The focal point leads the needs identification process and can adopt varying arrangements for stakeholder consultation. The stakeholder consultation process leads to determining the institutional arrangements for the needs identification process. Some of the most common institutional arrangements include focal point only, focal point with other ministries and an interministerial committee. Among these, the interministerial committee is the most inclusive and likely to provide more detailed information on needs across sectors.

<sup>12</sup> As footnote 11 above.

## 2. Needs identification process

42. The needs identification process of most countries starts with consultations between the lead ministry and the country's leadership. This ensures country ownership and top-level support in the needs identification process (see figure 6).

Figure 6

### Common steps adopted by countries' committees or units for identifying climate change needs



43. Stakeholder consultations are an integral part of the needs identification process. During the initial phase, background information is collected and assessments are carried out to help scope the needs. The stakeholders consulted are mainly from government line ministries, though in some instances they include non-governmental organizations and the private sector. Local communities are the least consulted stakeholders during the process.

44. In most of the national reports, the description of the needs identification process does not explicitly mention inclusivity aspects. Needs related to gender and local communities are captured in some reports emanating from those processes. However, where the needs identification process has projects and programmes as part of its output, gender and other inclusivity aspects of various stakeholders were mostly elaborated in the project or programme documents.

## 3. Processes and approaches used by other actors, namely multilateral climate funds, multilateral development banks and United Nations agencies

45. MDBs and United Nations agencies play a critical role in supporting developing countries in their needs identification process. In most cases, these agencies use experts during country-driven needs identification consultation forums to provide insights and share data that may help developing countries better identify and report their needs.

46. In other instances, MDBs and United Nations agencies provide financial and technical support for developing countries in the needs identification process. This support is used to carry out in-depth sectoral analysis to identify pathways within these sectors where considerable effort is needed and where greater impacts can be achieved. For countries that have benefited from this support for their second NDCs, their reports provide more granular information on needs, including by sector, compared with their first NDCs.

47. The multilateral climate funds established under the Convention, namely the GEF, including the special climate funds managed by the GEF (the Special Climate Change Fund and the Least Developed Countries Fund), the Green Climate Fund and the Adaptation Fund, also play a critical role in providing financial support for countries in facilitating their climate change needs identification process. This is particularly evident in the case of the Green Climate Fund and Adaptation Fund readiness support and the GEF Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency Trust Fund, which enable countries to identify and prioritize their climate change needs.

## **C. Methodologies and underlying assumptions used in determining the needs of developing country Parties**

### **1. Methodologies used at the national level by developing countries in national reports**

48. Developing country Parties identify adaptation and mitigation needs in preparing their national reports, following UNFCCC reporting guidelines and guidance and, in some cases, other methodologies adapted to their national context. The approaches taken vary depending on institutional and human capacities, cost, geography, time frame and data availability.

49. Although recent national reports include more information about methodologies used to determine adaptation needs, overall, there is still more information about the methodologies used to determine mitigation needs than for adaptation needs. The types of methodology applied vary. Most methodologies used to identify mitigation needs are quantitative, while a lower number of qualitative methodologies are used to identify adaptation needs. However, in recent reports, some countries have used methodologies to identify both mitigation and adaptation needs.

50. Countries in the Africa, Asia-Pacific, and Latin America and Caribbean regions present region-level information about methodologies applied to determine mitigation needs. Countries in the Africa and Asia-Pacific regions also present information about methodologies used to determine adaptation needs.

51. UNFCCC reporting guidelines and guidance, such as those provided for TNA preparation, have facilitated identification of needs for technology transfer and capacity-building related to mitigation and adaptation actions through methodologies such as the TNA methodology and the guidance for preparing a TAP.<sup>13</sup> However, the existing reporting guidelines and guidance do not include specific provisions on how to assess these needs at the local level. As such, countries assess their needs on the basis of methodologies developed for application at the national or international level.

52. Methodologies used by developing countries to determine mitigation needs include both top-down and bottom-up models for the energy and non-energy sectors. Bottom-up models are suited for studying options that have specific sectoral and technological implications. Top-down models are useful for studying broad macroeconomic and fiscal policies for mitigation, such as carbon or other environmental taxes. Methodologies applied to identify mitigation needs mainly focus on the cross-cutting, energy, greenhouse gas inventory preparation, waste, transport, agriculture, forestry, building and industry sectors.

53. Methodologies used by developing countries to determine adaptation needs mostly include vulnerability assessments that determine the levels of risk and vulnerability for each sector. These methodologies mainly focus on the agriculture, ecosystem and biodiversity, water and cross-cutting sectors.

### **2. Methodologies used at the regional and global level**

54. For international and regional reports, top-down methodologies have been developed and applied to identify finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity-building needs. Such reports have provided alternative methodologies to developing countries that have been adapted to national circumstances and contexts and used to determine national needs.

## **D. Challenges, opportunities and gaps in determining the needs of developing country Parties**

### **1. Opportunities**

55. There are several regional and global specialized institutions that can support countries in their needs identification process by providing expertise and data. Some of these

<sup>13</sup> Technology Executive Committee. 2020. *Enhancing implementation of the results of technology needs assessments*. Bonn: UNFCCC. Available at <https://unfccc.int/tclear/tec/brief13.html>.

institutions are United Nations agencies, to which countries have quick and easy access and which can be engaged with during the needs identification process to provide the required support.

56. A number of platforms have been established by various institutions, including United Nations agencies and MDBs. These platforms offer a good opportunity for developing countries to share their experience and good practices in the needs identification process. Most developing countries are already using these platforms to share their experience.

57. Several initiatives have been established that can help in the needs identification process. These initiatives include the establishment of emissions inventories, which provide some of the data and information that can facilitate the prioritization of sectors and activities as part of the country's climate change needs identification process.

## 2. Challenges

### (a) Challenges experienced in the preparation of the report

58. In compiling the needs of developing country Parties from the various sources, efforts were made by the technical team to overcome challenges such as identifying reporting overlaps so as to avoid double counting in aggregating and presenting the data.

59. Nevertheless, the following challenges were encountered in collecting, categorizing, aggregating and presenting the data on needs:

(a) **Data inconsistencies:** the classification of sectors and subsectors is not uniform across data sources, including in different sources of information and reports submitted by the same Party. This increases the risk of double counting, as cost estimates may be given in one report by sector and in another report by activity, so the same activity may be captured and hence accounted for under the costs by sector. Issues related to the definitions of needs also introduce inconsistencies because needs are referred to as qualitative needs, investment needs or costs;

(b) **Data gaps:** gaps in the coverage of information on costed needs by sector or subsector pose a significant challenge. These gaps are particularly evident for adaptation needs, which, compared with cost estimates for mitigation, remain limited. Significant data gaps related to capacity-building needs remain; these are predominantly characterized in qualitative terms. Further, information on methodologies used in producing and communicating information on needs in national reports is, in many cases, not included in the reports. In addition, methodological assumptions, which in most cases are not stated, may impact the interpretation of the data. The needs are dynamically changing and may depend on different factors such as temperature scenarios, mitigation pathways and adaptive capacity, extreme weather events, adverse effects of trade and economic barriers, and social factors such as poverty. Most reports, however, provide a snapshot of a Party's needs. It should also be noted that not all Parties have submitted reports;

(c) **Data interpretation:** when collecting, analysing and aggregating data and information on the needs of developing country Parties, best efforts have been made to ensure accuracy. When collecting and analysing the amounts of needs reported by developing country Parties in their national reports, different Parties apply their respective definitions and interpretations of needs. Needs may be reported as needs or activities needed to take climate action. Furthermore, costed needs may be determined in one national report but not in the subsequent report, without stating whether the same amounts of costed needs apply.

60. The following steps were undertaken to analyse, aggregate and present the data:

(a) Analysis of data gaps and identification of areas for improvement;

(b) Harmonization of data sets used for estimating the global total needs in order to minimize misalignment between information and data according to thematic areas, regions, sectors and time frames;

(c) Presentation of quantified data in ranges of estimates where possible, instead of aggregating the amounts, to avoid possible data overlaps;

(d) Use of case studies to highlight good practices and lessons learned in determining needs.

#### **(b) Challenges experienced by developing countries**

61. Institutional coordination was highlighted as a major challenge in the needs determination process. The coordination challenge affected needs identification between sectors and between levels of governance, namely the local and national level. Two of the identified drivers of limited coordination were the lack of specialized institutions within ministries with the mandate to spearhead climate change actions, and the involvement of ministries other than the environment ministry in climate change planning in the needs identification process.

62. While most countries have used methodologies to identify and report their needs both qualitatively and quantitatively, costing these needs has been a major challenge and therefore most of these needs do not have accompanying cost estimates. This challenge is particularly evident in deriving cost estimates for climate adaptation and enhancing resilience needs, and, in this context, deriving cost estimates for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage needs, since developing countries' adaptation actions cannot always be included in short-term projects, but rather require long-term interventions that are difficult to estimate in monetary terms.

### **3. Gaps**

63. Developing countries have taken significant steps to improve their needs determination process but capacity gaps within lead institutions continue to hinder progress. These capacity gaps vary widely across countries and include the lack of qualified personnel to spearhead the needs identification process and the lack of institutional-level capacity.

64. Limited availability of granular data at the sector and subsector level constitutes one of the major gaps identified by developing countries. As a result, many developing countries provide cost estimates for overall needs rather than disaggregated by theme or sector.

65. The lack of specialized national institutions to spearhead the means of implementation under the Convention, such as technology development and transfer, and capacity-building, limits the ability of some developing countries to track needs continuously and identify additional and emerging needs.

66. Limited detailed guidance on the structure and content of reports submitted to the UNFCCC resulted in needs with varying levels of detail across countries. Where such guidance was available, for instance for TNAs, the needs were identified at a higher level of detail compared with needs communicated in other national reports.

### **4. Insights into determining needs using available resources: country case studies and experience**

67. Country case studies have shown that the needs identification process provides an opportunity for countries to translate their needs into investment opportunities and climate actions, including by using existing support mechanisms to prioritize and cost identified needs and turn needs into project ideas for support. For example, through the TNA process, some countries identified technology support needs and submitted a request for technology assistance to formulate project ideas related to technology development and transfer.

68. Costing adaptation and mitigation needs for action is becoming a crucial area of work at the national level in order to better identify gaps where financial support is needed and ways to leverage public and private resources.

### **5. Co-benefits related to addressing the needs of developing country Parties, such as in relation to the Sustainable Development Goals, disaster risk reduction and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda**

69. For most countries, climate change needs are aligned with the targets set out in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. As the SDGs are ideally indivisible, all developing country Parties covered in this report are taking action to address SDG 13 that



relates to taking action to address climate change, and SDG 13 affects all the other SDGs. Overall, the needs identified by developing countries touch on all SDGs, with 75 per cent of NDCs having linkages to SDGs 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15 and 17.

70. In their national reports, some developing country Parties refer to the Addis Ababa Action Agenda provision for mobilizing and aligning local resources for climate action. This is particularly evident in countries that capture their climate action budgets under the national budgeting process.

## V. Recommendations

71. The SCF invites the COP and the CMA to consider the following recommendations:

(a) *Encourage* developing country Parties and climate finance providers, as well as multilateral and financial institutions, private finance data providers and other relevant institutions, to enhance the availability of granular, country-level data on needs related to the implementation of the Convention and the Paris Agreement with a view to addressing existing data gaps;

(b) *Encourage* developing country Parties to share best practices on determining needs, including regarding the institutional capacity conducive to determining needs;

(c) *Encourage* developing country Parties to provide, where possible, information on needs related to:

(i) Gender-responsive climate action and the needs of indigenous peoples and vulnerable groups;

(ii) Preparation of national reports to the UNFCCC, including reporting on the activities contained therein;

(iii) Addressing and mitigating risks, including physical and transitional risks;

(iv) Energy poverty as it relates to sustainable development;

(v) Methodologies employed in the determination of the needs in their national reports to the UNFCCC, including, in accordance with reporting guidelines and where available, quantified data on needs;

(d) *Request* the SCF, in preparing future NDRs, to present available data and information on needs related to the recommendations referred to in paragraph 71(c) above;

(e) *Invite* the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, United Nations agencies, multilateral and bilateral financial institutions and other relevant institutions to make use of the information contained in the first NDR when supporting developing country Parties in identifying and costing needs;

(f) *Invite* the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism to revise templates and guidance for developing countries when supporting their processes in identifying their needs with a view to enhancing availability of granular information on qualitative and quantitative needs;

(g) *Encourage* the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, United Nations agencies, multilateral and bilateral financial institutions and other relevant institutions to make available further information on methodologies related to determining and costing needs, especially for adaptation needs and incremental costs;

(h) *Encourage* developing country Parties to consider the insights on methodologies identified in the first NDR when costing and determining needs;

(i) *Encourage* developing country Parties to take advantage of available resources through the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, as well as other multilateral and bilateral actors, to strengthen institutional capacity for identifying and costing their needs in relation to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement;

(j) *Request* the SCF to engage with public and private financial institutions and to disseminate the findings of the first NDR;

(k) *Invite* UNFCCC constituted bodies, in particular the Paris Committee on Capacity-building and the Adaptation Committee, to consider the insights identified in the first NDR when implementing their respective workplans;

(l) *Encourage* Parties, multilateral and financial institutions, academia, methodology developers, research institutions and other relevant actors to continue to develop methodologies for the determination of adaptation and resilience enhancement needs and, in this context, needs related to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage;

(m) *Encourage* the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, United Nations agencies, multilateral and bilateral financial institutions and other relevant institutions to provide financial and technical support to developing countries for updating the reporting of their qualitative and quantitative information and data on needs to be considered in subsequent NDRs, as appropriate;

(n) *Encourage* all actors, when determining needs for implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement, to highlight linkages to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and application of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda.

*12<sup>th</sup> plenary meeting  
13 November 2021*

## 第 6/CP.26 号决定

### 绿色气候基金提交缔约方会议的报告和对绿色气候基金的指导

《公约》缔约方会议，

忆及第 3/CP.17 号决议，附件，

1. 欢迎绿色气候基金提交《公约》缔约方会议第二十六届会议的报告，<sup>1</sup> 包括绿色气候基金董事会(下称“董事会”)根据《公约》缔约方会议的指导意见采取的行动清单；

2. 又欢迎绿色气候基金继续努力，为实现国际社会设定的应对气候变化目标的全球努力做出重大和雄心勃勃的贡献；

3. 还欢迎绿色气候基金在 2020-2021 年取得的进展，其中包括在《公约》缔约方会议提供的指导下取得的进展：

(a) 核准的供资提案数量增加，使董事会核准的资金总额达到 100 亿美元，可用于支助在 127 个发展中国家执行 190 个适应和减缓项目和方案；

(b) 获得董事会认证的实体数目增加，使获得认证的实体总数达到 112 个，其中 72 个为直接获取资金实体；

(c) 核准绿色气候基金《2020-2023 年更新战略计划》、<sup>2</sup>《综合成果管理框架》和成果跟踪工具；

(d) 修改了绿色气候基金环境和社会政策，以重申致力于防止性剥削、性侵害和性骚扰；修改了行政补救和排除政策；以及旨在便利独立纠正机制委员会审议关于复议请求、申诉和投诉的报告的准则；

(e) 批准了绿色气候基金评价政策；

(f) 绿色气候基金、气候技术中心和网络及技术执行委员会之间继续开展协助；

(g) 绿色气候基金、适应委员会和最不发达国家专家组之间开展协作；

4. 欢迎绿色气候基金和全球环境基金之间关于互补性、一致性和协作的长期愿景，<sup>3</sup> 并请董事会加强与其他气候资金提供渠道的一致性和互补性，以期增强绿色气候基金工作的影响和有效性；

5. 鼓励绿色气候基金、气候技术中心和网络以及技术执行委员会通过持续的联合工作以及在活动上的协作，并在考虑到与性别平等主流化和观察员参与有关的因素的前提下，进一步进行协作和接触；

<sup>1</sup> FCCC/CP/2020/5 和 FCCC/CP/2021/8。

<sup>2</sup> 载于绿色气候基金 GCF/B.27/21 号文件，附件二。可查阅：  
<https://www.greenclimate.fund/document/gcf-b27-21>。

<sup>3</sup> 载于全球环境基金 GEF/C.60/08 号文件，附件一。可查阅：<https://www.thegef.org/council-meeting-documents/long-term-vision-complementarity-coherence-and-collaboration-between-green>。

6. 再次请董事会继续设法保持适应和减缓之间的资源分配平衡；
7. 鼓励董事会进一步澄清来自政府间气候变化专门委员会等机构的数据和信息以及传统、当地和土著知识和做法在评估概念说明、项目编制供资申请和供资提案方面的作用；
8. 还鼓励董事会通过主动让国家指定机构参与项目和方案周期的所有方面，加强国家掌控权和区域管理；
9. 注意到 2019 冠状病毒病大流行的特殊情况及其对董事会四年期更新工作计划的执行造成的重大影响，确认董事会在此期间所做的努力，并鼓励董事会继续提高其工作效率和有效性；
10. 注意到董事会继续努力按照现有投资成果框架和绿色气候基金的供资窗口和结构，包括通过项目筹备基金和准备和筹备支助方案，为与避免、尽量减少和处理发展中国家缔约方的损失和损害有关的活动提供资金；
11. 注意相当多的余下的政策缺口，包括更新认证框架，包括批准特定项目评估办法，更新简化批准程序，批准方案办法政策，补齐与投资框架有关的政策，处理与私营部门融资机制和战略有关的事项，以及董事会议事规则中尚未解决的事项等，<sup>4</sup> 并敦促董事会作为紧急事项优先弥补政策缺口，并探索扩大应对气候风险的金融工具的选择面，包括选择气候事件参数保险；
12. 注意到《公约》缔约方会议主席设法处理给予绿色气候基金及其官员特权与豁免的事项，并请董事会继续设法确保基金享有必要的特权与豁免；
13. 敦促董事会按照第 7/CP.21 号决定第 23-25 段的授权，及时完成与《公约》缔约方会议关于森林筹资和替代办法的指导和安排有关的工作；
14. 鼓励董事会继续将性别考虑纳入其活动，包括通过其性别政策和促进基金各机构的性别均衡；
15. 请董事会考虑如何增加当地非政府组织和私营部门组织求助于基金的机会；
16. 还请缔约方在《公约》缔约方会议第二十七届会议(2022 年 11 月)前 10 周，就向绿色气候基金提供指导的要点通过提交门户网站向秘书处提交意见和建议；<sup>5</sup>
17. 请资金问题常设委员会在编写供《公约》缔约方会议第二十七届会议和作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议第四届会议(2022 年 11 月)审议的对绿色气候基金的指导意见草案时，考虑到以上第 16 段所述提交材料；
18. 还请绿色气候基金董事会在提交《公约》缔约方会议的年度报告中列入资料，说明为执行本决定中提出的指导意见而采取的步骤；
19. 注意到第 11/CMA.3 号决定，并决定向绿色气候基金转交该决定第 2-8 段所载作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议的指导意见。<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> 可查阅：<https://www.greenclimate.fund/document/rules-procedure>.

<sup>5</sup> <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx>.

<sup>6</sup> 按照第 1/CP.21 号决定，第 61 段。

第 12 次全体会议  
2021 年 11 月 13 日

## 第 7/CP.26 号决定

### 全球环境基金提交缔约方会议的报告和对全球环境基金的指导

缔约方会议，

回顾第 11/CP.1 号决定第 1(c)段和第 13/CP.25 号决定，

注意到《建立重组后全球环境基金协议》<sup>1</sup> 第 9(b)段，

1. 欢迎全球环境基金向缔约方会议第二十六届会议提交的报告及增编，<sup>2</sup> 包括全球环境基金对缔约方会议提出的指导意见作出的回应；
2. 又欢迎全球环境基金在报告所述期间(2019 年 7 月 1 日至 2021 年 6 月 30 日)开展的工作，包括：
  - (a) 核准报告所述期间在全球环境基金信托基金、最不发达国家基金和气候变化特别基金之下批准的气候变化项目和方案；
  - (b) 将气候变化优先事项纳入其他重点领域，以此减少温室气体排放；
  - (c) 改善与绿色气候基金的协调；
  - (d) 通过私营部门参与战略；<sup>3</sup>
  - (e) 通过全球环境基金信托基金的可持续债券战略；<sup>4</sup>
3. 鼓励全球环境基金作为第八次充资进程的一部分，结合第 12/CMA.3 号决定第 6 段提到的报告要求，适当考虑如何增加分配给气候行动，包括气候变化重点领域和气候共同效益的资金，并在各重点领域之间采取协调一致的办法，优先考虑产生环境共同效益的项目；
4. 呼吁发达国家缔约方向全球环境基金捐款，为全球环境基金强有力的第八次充资做出贡献，以支持发展中国家执行《公约》，鼓励向全球环境基金第八次充资提供更多自愿捐款；
5. 注意到目前关于第八次充资进程的讨论，内容涉及透明资源分配系统下的分配政策，请全球环境基金在向发展中国家缔约方分配资源时适当考虑发展中国家缔约方的需要和优先事项；
6. 注意到全球环境基金正在开展工作，监测全球环境基金伙伴关系的集中度、地域和专题覆盖面，以及效力、效率和参与度，鼓励全球环境基金考虑如何促进发展中国家缔约方的更多国家实体和区域实体参与伙伴关系，包括通过酌情让它们担任执行机构；

<sup>1</sup> 全球环境基金。2019 年。《建立重组后全球环境基金协议》。华盛顿特区：全球环境基金。可查阅：<https://www.thegef.org/documents/instrument-establishment-restructured-gef>。

<sup>2</sup> FCCC/CP/2020/1 和 Add.1 以及 FCCC/CP/2021/9 和 Add.1。

<sup>3</sup> 见全球环境基金 GEF/C.59/07/Rev.01 号文件。可查阅：<https://www.thegef.org/documents>。

<sup>4</sup> 见全球环境基金 GEF/C.59/12 号文件。

7. 请全球环境基金考虑如何进一步加强国家机构和民间社会组织作为执行机构的作用，以便加强国家对全球环境基金资助项目和方案的掌控度，并防止实施机构同时担任执行机构；
8. 赞赏地欢迎发达国家缔约方向最不发达国家基金捐款 6.053 亿美元，鼓励向最不发达国家基金和气候变化特别基金提供更多自愿捐款，以支持适应行动和技术转让；
9. 请全球环境基金作为负责气候变化特别基金运作的《公约》资金机制经营实体，继续协助发展中国家缔约方高效地获取资源；
10. 呼吁全球环境基金继续改进其机构的治理框架，提高执行伙伴的问责标准；
11. 注意到全球环境基金第七次充资分配给非赠款工具的资金从第六次充资时的 1.1 亿美元增加到 1.36 亿美元，鼓励全球环境基金在讨论第八次充资下的非赠款工具时，继续考虑发展中国家的需要和优先事项，以及发展中国家的不同国情；
12. 请全球环境基金考虑更新关于性别平等的政策，将保护不受歧视纳入其中；
13. 确认全球环境基金在审查单个项目和方案时没有规定最低门槛和/或共同筹资或投资的具体类型或来源；<sup>5</sup>
14. 鼓励全球环境基金加大努力，在第八次充资过程中与私营部门接触并从私营部门筹集资源；
15. 注意到全球环境基金内部正在就第八次充资下的小额赠款方案进行讨论，请全球环境基金考虑提高对每个项目的供资上限，以便向社区和民间社会组织提供充分的资金和技术支持；
16. 敦促全球环境基金加大对地方利益攸关方合作项目的支持，继续为技术培训项目提供资金，并继续扩大南南合作以及与技术执行委员会及气候技术中心和网络的三方合作；
17. 欢迎关于绿色气候基金与全球环境基金互补性、一致性和协作性的长期愿景，<sup>6</sup> 请全球环境基金理事会加强与其他气候资金交付渠道的一致性和互补性，以期提高其工作的影响和效力；
18. 又请全球环境基金作为第八次充资进程的一部分，注意气候融资的需要和优先事项，包括关于确定发展中国家缔约方在执行《公约》和《巴黎协定》方面的需求的第一份报告、<sup>7</sup> 国家自主贡献、国家信息通报和国家适应计划，以及其他现有信息来源，包括气候资金流量两年期评估和概览及其他相关报告中提出的需要和优先事项；

<sup>5</sup> 全球环境基金 GEF/C.54/10/Rev.01 号文件，附件一，第 5 段。

<sup>6</sup> 载于全球环境基金 GEF/C.60/08 号文件，附件一。

<sup>7</sup> 资金问题常设委员会。2021 年。关于确定发展中国家缔约方在执行《公约》和《巴黎协定》方面的需求的第一份报告。波恩：《气候公约》。可查阅：<https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/workstreams/determination-of-the-needs-of-developing-country-parties/first-report-on-the-determination-of-the-needs-of-developing-country-parties-related-to-implementing>。

19. 请缔约方最晚在缔约方会议第二十七届会议(2022 年 11 月)前 10 周通过提交材料的门户网站<sup>8</sup> 就对全球环境基金的指导意见的要点提交意见和建议；
20. 请资金问题常设委员会在编写供《公约》缔约方会议第二十七届会议和作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议第四届会议(2022 年 11 月)审议的对全球环境基金的指导意见草案时，考虑到上文第 19 段所述的提交材料；
21. 又请全球环境基金在向缔约方会议提交的年度报告中提供信息，说明为执行本决定中提出的指导意见而采取的举措；
22. 注意到第 12/CMA.3 号决定，决定向全球环境基金转交该决定第 2-10 段所载作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议提出的指导意见；<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx>.

<sup>9</sup> 根据第 1/CP.21 号决定，第 61 段。



## 第 8/CP.26 号决定

### 关于《巴黎协定》第九条第 5 款所涉信息的两年期信息通报的汇编和综合及其会期研讨会概要报告

缔约方会议，

忆及《公约》第四条和第十一条，

又忆及第 12/CMA.1 号决定，

1. 欢迎秘书处就根据《巴黎协定》第九条第 5 款提交的首次两年期信息通报所载信息编写的汇编和综合<sup>1</sup>；
2. 又欢迎 2021 年 6 月 11 日举行的关于缔约方根据《巴黎协定》第九条第 5 款提供信息的两年期会期研讨会的概要报告<sup>2</sup>；
3. 注意到第 14/CMA.3 号决定。

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<sup>1</sup> FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/3.

<sup>2</sup> FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/5.

## 第 9/CP.26 号决定

### 通过技术机制加强气候技术开发和转让

缔约方会议，

回顾第 2/CP.17、第 1/CP.21、第 15/CP.22、第 21/CP.22、第 13/CP.23、第 15/CP.23、第 12/CP.24、第 13/CP.24 和第 14/CP.25 号决定，

1. 欢迎技术执行委员会及气候技术中心和网络 2020 年和 2021 年<sup>1</sup> 的联合年度报告，并赞扬这两个机构在持续的大流行中努力推进工作；
2. 欢迎技术执行委员会与气候技术中心和网络继续开展协作，并请这两个机构加强协作和相互提供反馈，以确保技术机制任务的协调一致、协同增效和有效执行，特别是通过探索编制一项联合方案；
3. 欢迎技术机制和资金机制之间的协作，并鼓励继续这种协作；
4. 注意到技术执行委员会及气候技术中心和网络在持续的大流行期间执行任务时面临的挑战，并欢迎这两个机构为应对这些挑战所作的努力；
5. 欢迎实施技术执行委员会及气候技术中心和网络的监测和评价系统，并请这两个机构继续报告其工作的成果和影响；
6. 又欢迎技术执行委员会及气候技术中心和网络努力利用《气候公约》群组的工作来增强技术机制下工作的影响；

#### 一. 技术执行委员会 2020 年-2021 年的活动和业绩

7. 赞赏技术执行委员会灵活适应新的工作方式，包括使用虚拟平台举行会议和活动，并与其成员、工作队、观察员和其他相关利害关系方进行建设性接触，从而推动在成功实施 2019-2022 年滚动工作计划中的活动方面取得进展；<sup>2</sup>
8. 请缔约方和相关利害关系方审议技术执行委员会基于 2020 年减缓问题技术专家会议的成果就前进方向和应采取的行动提出的建议；<sup>3</sup>
9. 又请缔约方和相关利害关系方考虑技术执行委员会 2020 年和 2021 年关于以下领域技术政策的关键信息和建议：技术需要评估；避免、尽量减少和处理沿海地区损失和损害的技术；国际合作研究、开发和示范；采取创新方法推动吸收现有的清洁技术解决方案；以及内生能力和技术；<sup>4</sup>
10. 赞赏地注意到技术执行委员会与其他组成机构和相关组织在执行其工作计划活动方面的协作；

<sup>1</sup> FCCC/SB/2020/4 和 FCCC/SB/2021/5 号文件。

<sup>2</sup> 可查阅 <https://unfccc.int/ttclear/tec>。

<sup>3</sup> 见 FCCC/SB/2020/4 号文件，附件三。

<sup>4</sup> 见文件 FCCC/SB/2020/4 和 FCCC/SB/2021/5。

11. 注意到私营部门的参与对于将研究、开发和示范成果转化为可在市场部署的气候技术至关重要，并欢迎技术执行委员会在这方面的活动；
12. 又欢迎在 2020 年和 2021 年成功举办技术日活动，<sup>5</sup> 以推广与气候智能型农业以及海洋和沿海适应有关的适应技术的创新方法，并鼓励技术执行委员会继续通过此类活动加强其工作的影响并触及目标受众；
13. 赞扬技术执行委员会努力将性别考虑纳入其工作中，包括采取结构化方法，努力确保性别平等问题协调人发挥积极作用，并在 2021 年所有活动中实现发言者的性别均衡；并期待委员会在这一问题上继续努力；
14. 鼓励技术执行委员会进一步增加关于外联和利害关系方参与的活动，以传播其政策和出版物，特别是面向目标受众；
15. 关切地注意到技术执行委员会的成员构成使某些缔约方无法充分参与其工作；

## 二. 气候技术中心和网络 2020-2021 年的活动和业绩

16. 欢迎气候技术中心和网络采取举措以适应持续的大流行带来的业务挑战，侧重于执行技术援助请求以及利用在线利害关系方参与和能力建设活动；
17. 赞赏气候技术中心和网络服务采用多国、区域和方案办法以精简气候技术中心和网络的业务，并期待继续采用这些办法；
18. 注意到气候技术中心和网络在 2020 年和 2021 年的活动、业绩和关键信息，包括面临的挑战和吸取的经验教训；
19. 欢迎气候技术中心和网络努力提高包容性，实施其性别平等行动计划并加强与妇女和性别平等、青年和土著人民组织的接触；
20. 赞赏地注意到气候技术中心和网络目前是绿色气候基金准备和筹备支持方案下技术准备支持的最大提供者，鼓励气候技术中心和网络继续通过准备和筹备支持方案开展合作，并通过项目准备基金扩大与绿色气候基金的接触；
21. 赞赏地欢迎在大韩民国松岛设立气候技术中心和网络伙伴关系和联络处，其工作重点主要是与绿色气候基金协作以及进行研发，并请气候技术中心和网络报告从中吸取的经验教训；
22. 赞赏地欢迎气候技术中心和网络与全球环境基金继续协作；
23. 欢迎气候技术中心和网络采取行动，让私营部门参与制定和执行其工作方案，包括通过中小企业提供技术援助和能力发展，并努力加强与私营部门和网络成员的接触；
24. 请气候技术中心和网络继续努力支持发展中国家编制和更新技术需要评估和技术行动计划，并应请求支持实施；
25. 又请气候技术中心和网络继续为加强发展中国家的国家指定实体的能力提供支持，使它们能够履行职责；

<sup>5</sup> 见 [https://unfccc.int/ttclear/events/2020/2020\\_event07](https://unfccc.int/ttclear/events/2020/2020_event07).

26. 鼓励发达国家的国家指定实体考虑如何参与气候技术中心和网络的努力；
27. 赞赏地注意到报告的关于公益捐助和实物捐助方面经验教训的信息，<sup>6</sup> 并鼓励气候技术中心和网络继续努力调动此类捐助；
28. 赞赏气候技术中心努力调动各种资源，<sup>7</sup> 包括来自多边开发银行、私营部门渠道、慈善组织、网络成员、联合国环境规划署和联合国其他机构的资源，以及对多捐助方信托基金的新捐款和多年期承诺，使气候技术中心和网络能够成功执行任务；并鼓励气候技术中心和网络继续作出这些努力；
29. 表示感谢缔约方迄今为支持气候技术中心和网络的工作而提供的资金捐助；
30. 认识到为气候技术中心和网络确保 2022 年可持续财政资源是一项挑战，并请气候技术中心和网络加强资源调动努力，以确保为有效执行其工作方案提供可持续资金；
31. 鼓励气候技术中心和网络参加一些活动，以提升其形象和知名度，扩大其外联范围以及增强其影响，以加强知识共享和对气候技术的采用。

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<sup>6</sup> 根据第 14/CP.25 号决定，第 22 段；另见 FCCC/SB/2020/4 号文件，附件五。

<sup>7</sup> 根据第 14/CP.25 号决定，第 26 段。

## 第 10/CP.26 号决定

### 审查气候技术中心和网络咨询委员会的组成

缔约方会议，

回顾关于气候技术中心和网络咨询委员会职能的第 2/CP.17 号决定附件七，

又回顾关于气候技术中心和网络咨询委员会组成的第 14/CP.18 号决定附件二，

依照第 14/CP.18 号决定附件二第 16 段，

1. 同意修订气候技术中心和网络咨询委员会的组成，如附件所载；
2. 指出对咨询委员会组成的修订应确保其有效运作。

## 附件

### 审查气候技术中心和网络咨询委员会的组成

1. 为实现公平和平衡的代表性，气候技术中心和网络咨询委员会应由以下人员组成：

(a) 18 名政府代表，《公约》附件一所列缔约方(附件一缔约方)和非《公约》附件一所列缔约方(非附件一缔约方)的代表各占一半，就非附件一缔约方而言，应确保公平地代表联合国各区域集团；

(b) 技术执行委员会主席和副主席，作为技术执行委员会的代表；

(c) 绿色气候基金理事会的一名联合主席或联合主席指定的一名理事，作为绿色气候基金的代表；

(d) 适应委员会主席或副主席，或主席和副主席指定的一名委员，作为适应委员会的代表；

(e) 资金问题常设委员会的一名联合主席或联合主席指定的一名委员，作为资金问题常设委员会的代表；

(f) 气候技术中心和网络主任，作为气候技术中心和网络的代表；

(g) 六名代表，由《气候公约》下列类别的观察员组织——环境非政府组织、工商业非政府组织、研究和独立非政府组织、青年非政府组织、土著人民组织、妇女和性别平等支持群体——各选出一名具备技术、金融或商业专长的代表，由气候技术中心东道组织在考虑地域平衡的基础上接受。

2. 咨询委员会将根据第一次会议制定的模式和程序，视具体的议程项目需要，邀请有关组成机构的代表和专家观察员出席会议。<sup>1</sup>

3. 由气候技术中心和网络主任担任咨询委员会秘书。

4. 政府代表由各自的集团或推选集团提名，经缔约方会议选举产生。鼓励国家集团或推选集团向咨询委员会提名政府代表，以期在适应和减缓技术的开发和转让方面实现专门知识的适当平衡，同时也要考虑到第 36/CP.7 和第 23/CP.18 号决定所述实现性别平衡的需要。

5. 咨询委员会的政府代表任期两年，最多连任两届。适用下列规则：

(a) 最初选举半数代表任期三年，半数代表任期两年；

(b) 此后，缔约方会议每年选举半数代表，任期两年；

(c) 代表任期到继任者选出为止。

6. 如咨询委员会的一名政府代表辞职或因其他原因无法完成指定任期或履行职能，考虑到离下届缔约方会议的时间长短，咨询委员会可决定任命来自同一推选集团的另一名代表接任该代表的余下任期，所作任命应算作一个任期。

<sup>1</sup> 见第 25/CP.19 号决定，附件一。

7. 上文第 1(b)段所指咨询委员会代表依据其任期任职。
8. 上文第 1(c-e)段所指咨询委员会代表依据其任期任职。
9. 上文第 1(g)段所指咨询委员会代表任期最多两年。<sup>2</sup>
10. 咨询委员会的决定仅由上文第 1(a-b)段所指咨询委员会代表经协商一致作出。这些代表将在咨询委员会的模式和程序中说明在尽一切努力都无法达成共识的情况下，将如何作出决定。
11. 咨询委员会每年从上文第 1(a)段所指代表中选举一名主席和一名副主席，任期一年，其中一人来自附件一缔约方，一人来自非附件一缔约方。主席和副主席职位每年由附件一缔约方代表和非附件一缔约方代表轮流担任。
12. 主席临时无法履行职务时，由副主席代行主席职务。如主席和副主席均未出席某次会议，则由咨询委员会从上文第 1(a)段所指代表中指定一人临时担任该次会议的主席。
13. 如主席或副主席无法完成任期，则由咨询委员会依据上文第 6 段，选举一人代为完成任期。
14. 除非咨询委员会另有决定，否则允许缔约方、秘书处和观察员组织以观察员身份出席咨询委员会会议。
15. 气候技术中心应为气候技术中心和网络咨询委员会的工作提供支助和便利。

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2021 年 11 月 12 日

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<sup>2</sup> 第 13/CP.24 号决定，第 16 段。

## 第 11/CP.26 号决定

### 第二次审查气候技术中心和网络

缔约方会议，

忆及第 1/CP.16、第 2/CP.17、第 1/CP.18、第 14/CP.18、第 14/CP.23 和第 12/CP.24 号决定，

1. 欢迎秘书处根据第 2/CP.17 号决定附件七第 20 段和第 14/CP.23 号决定第 10 段委托有关机构对气候技术中心和网络有效实施情况进行第二次独立审查的报告(下称“第二次独立审查”);<sup>1</sup>
2. 赞赏地欢迎秘书处组织对话会,<sup>2</sup> 审议第二次独立审查的成果;<sup>3</sup>
3. 还赞赏地欢迎各缔约方和相关组织在第二个审查周期对气候技术中心和网络活动给予的协助和支持;
4. 注意到上文第 1 段报告所载第二次独立审查关于气候技术中心和网络所提供的相关性、实效、效率、影响和可持续性的主要结论;<sup>4</sup>
5. 还注意到上文第 1 段报告所载气候技术中心和网络有效实施的主要成就和挑战;<sup>5</sup>
6. 又注意到气候技术中心和网络对转型变革的贡献预计将是可持续的, 将带来适应、缓解和社会经济的共同效益;
7. 欢迎气候技术中心为加强对技术援助请求的支持而在区域一级做出新的组织安排;
8. 还欢迎上文第 1 段报告所载联合国环境规划署管理层对第二次独立审查的回应;<sup>6</sup>
9. 决定将第 14/CP.18 号决定附件一所述缔约方会议与联合国环境规划署之间关于托管气候技术中心的谅解备忘录再延长五年;
10. 授权执行秘书代表缔约方会议签署上文第 9 段所述谅解备忘录;
11. 鼓励联合国环境规划署作为气候技术中心的东道方, 与联合国工业发展组织合作, 并与气候技术中心和网络咨询委员会协商, 在开展与气候技术中心和网络工作有关的进一步活动, 包括执行气候技术中心和网络第三个工作方案的活动时, 落实上文第 1 段报告中的建议;

<sup>1</sup> FCCC/CP/2021/3.

<sup>2</sup> 依照第 12/CP.24 号决定, 第 7 段。

<sup>3</sup> [https://unfccc.int/ttclear/events/2021/2021\\_event07](https://unfccc.int/ttclear/events/2021/2021_event07).

<sup>4</sup> FCCC/CP/2021/3, 第 14-60 段。

<sup>5</sup> FCCC/CP/2021/3, 第 61-62 段。

<sup>6</sup> FCCC/CP/2021/3, 附件八。



12. 请气候技术中心和网络在与技术执行委员会的 2022 年联合年度报告中，以及在随后通过附属机构提交缔约方会议的报告中，说明其针对以上第 1 段报告所载建议采取的计划 and 行动；
13. 注意到气候技术中心和网络继续面临需要关注的各种挑战，包括资金有限和不足，履行职责提供广泛服务受到预算限制；还存在与管理结构有关的行政和联络问题；发展中国家的国家指定实体缺乏资源，无法更好地参与和发挥作用；网络成员之间的联络和协同作用有限；
14. 请气候技术中心和网络以及技术执行委员会探讨如何加强合作，从而提高技术机制的实效和效率；
15. 还请气候技术中心和网络在提供服务时加强私营部门网络成员的参与，以加强其作为气候技术“中间人”的地位；
16. 鼓励气候技术中心和网络加强努力，促进国家指定实体之间的积极合作；
17. 承认国家指定实体支持发展中国家缔约方向气候技术中心和网络提出技术援助请求发挥的有效作用，这种支持使收到的所有请求被视为合格，并鼓励它们继续提供这种支持；
18. 又鼓励气候技术中心和网络加大支持力度，加强发展中国家国家指定实体的能力，使它们能够发挥作用；
19. 重申应向气候技术中心和网络提供更多和可持续的资金支持，以便其充分和有效地执行任务；
20. 鼓励气候技术中心和网络与联合国环境规划署合作，并与咨询委员会协商，同《气候公约》秘书处一起，从各种来源，包括资金机制，双边、多边和私营部门渠道，慈善来源、东道组织和网络参与者进一步筹集更多的资金和实物捐助；
21. 请气候技术中心和网络继续与资金机制的经营实体合作，进一步加强它们之间的联系，以便扩大气候技术中心和网络向发展中国家缔约方提供的技术支持；
22. 决定将气候技术中心和网络有效实施情况的独立审查周期与推动履行《巴黎协定》与技术开发和转让有关事项向技术机制提供支持的有效性和充足性的定期评估结合起来，<sup>7</sup> 并将独立审查的周期从四年改为五年，直至缔约方会议第三十一届会议(2026 年)审查气候技术中心和网络的职能并决定是否延长其任期；<sup>8</sup>
23. 请附属履行机构在其第六十二届会议(2025 年)上开始考虑将气候技术中心和网络的独立审查与技术机制的定期评估的相关进程结合起来的有关事项，以期提出一项关于这一事项的决定草案，供《公约》缔约方会议第三十一届会议审议和通过；
24. 还请秘书处根据第 2/CP.17 号决定附件七第 20 段，在具备资金的情况下，委托有关机构对气候技术中心和网络的实效进行第三次独立审查，供缔约方会议第三十一届会议审议；

<sup>7</sup> 第 1/CP.21 号决定，第 69 段。

<sup>8</sup> 第 2/CP.17 号决定，附件七，第 23 段。

25. 又请秘书处在缔约方会议第三十一届会议期间组织一次对话会，审议对气候技术中心和网络有效实施情况的第三次独立审查结果。

第 11 次全体会议  
2021 年 11 月 12 日