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### **Biennial submissions from developed country Parties on their updated strategies and approaches for scaling up climate finance from 2014 to 2020**

#### **Compilation and synthesis report by the secretariat**

##### *Summary*

This document synthesizes the biennial submissions from developed country Parties in 2018 on their updated strategies and approaches for scaling up climate finance from 2014 to 2020. It has been prepared to inform the in-session workshops on long-term climate finance in accordance with decision 3/CP.24, paragraph 6.

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## Abbreviations and acronyms

AF	Adaptation Fund
AUD	Australian dollar
CAD	Canadian dollar
CHF	Swiss franc
COP	Conference of the Parties
CZK	Czech koruna
DKK	Danish krone
EIB	European Investment Bank
EU	European Union
GBP	pound sterling
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GEF-7	seventh replenishment of the Global Environment Facility Trust Fund
HUF	Hungarian forint
IRM	initial resource mobilization
LDC	least developed country
LDCF	Least Developed Countries Fund
MDB	multilateral development bank
NAP	national adaptation plan
NDC	nationally determined contribution
NOK	Norwegian krone
NZD	New Zealand dollar
ODA	official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
REDD-plus	reducing emissions from deforestation; reducing emissions from forest degradation; conservation of forest carbon stocks; sustainable management of forests; and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70)
SCCF	Special Climate Change Fund
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SEK	Swedish krona
SIDS	small island developing State

## I. Introduction

### A. Background and mandate

1. COP 19 decided<sup>1</sup> to continue deliberations on long-term climate finance from 2014 to 2020 on the basis of:

(a) Biennial submissions from developed country Parties on their updated strategies and approaches for scaling up climate finance from 2014 to 2020, including any available information on quantitative and qualitative elements of a pathway;

(b) Annual in-session workshops on long-term climate finance, to be organized by the secretariat;

(c) A biennial high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance.

2. Decision 3/CP.19, paragraph 10, outlines the following elements to be included in developed countries' biennial submissions referred to in paragraph 1(a) above:

(a) Information to increase clarity on the expected levels of climate finance mobilized from different sources;

(b) Information on policies, programmes and priorities;

(c) Information on actions and plans to mobilize additional finance;

(d) Information on how Parties are ensuring the balance between adaptation and mitigation, in particular the needs of developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change;

(e) Information on steps taken to enhance enabling environments, following on from the report of the co-chairs of the extended work programme on long-term finance.<sup>2</sup>

3. COP 24 requested the secretariat to prepare a compilation and synthesis of developed country Parties' biennial submissions to inform the annual in-session workshops referred to in paragraph 1(b) above.<sup>3</sup>

### B. Submissions received

4. The following Parties made biennial submissions in 2018 on their updated strategies and approaches for scaling up climate finance: Australia, Austria and the European Commission on behalf of the EU and its member States, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland.<sup>4</sup>

## II. Overview of information provided between 2014 and 2018

5. This chapter provides an overview of the three rounds of biennial submissions from developed country Parties (received in 2014, 2016 and 2018). The previous two compilation and synthesis reports were the main reference materials.<sup>5</sup>

6. Both the qualitative and quantitative information provided on expected levels of climate finance mobilized from different sources, as well as on current and previous levels of climate finance, have become more detailed in the more recent submissions. Particularly since the second round, many Parties have started to provide information on efforts to fulfil their climate finance announcements made and targets set prior to and at COP 21.

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<sup>1</sup> Decision 3/CP.19.

<sup>2</sup> FCCC/CP/2013/7.


<sup>3</sup> Decision 3/CP.24, para. 6.

<sup>4</sup> The submissions are available at <https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/workstreams/long-term-climate-finance-ltf>.

<sup>5</sup> FCCC/CP/2015/INF.1 and FCCC/CP/2017/INF.1.

7. The figure below provides an overview of the information provided in the three rounds of submissions on expected levels of climate finance mobilized from different sources.

**Overview of information provided by developed country Parties on expected levels of climate finance mobilized from different sources**



8. The quantitative and qualitative information provided on policies, programmes and priorities have also become more detailed in the more recent submissions. Since most policies and programmes have a lifespan of longer than two years, information contained in the earlier submissions was sometimes subsequently reiterated. For example, many climate support programmes and initiatives operate on a quadrennial cycle and so information thereon was reported in more than one round of the submissions, especially when the programmes were renewed following the replenishment of financial resources. Furthermore, the second- and third-round submissions contained information on new policies and programmes that were launched after the adoption of the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and described how their objectives and targets are in alignment.

9. In terms of programming priorities, the more recent submissions show that a growing number of support initiatives are focused on facilitating access to climate finance, assisting developing countries in formulating and implementing their NDCs and NAPs, and building partnerships and coalitions that connect proponents of climate action and providers of support. Capacity-building and technical assistance, as well as support programmes aimed at mobilizing private climate finance, were consistently identified as key components of support in all submission rounds. Information provided on geographical priorities, target groups and thematic and sectoral priorities has also become more detailed, particularly in the context of

describing bilateral and multilateral support programmes and initiatives. The LDCs, SIDS and countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change were consistently pinpointed in all rounds of the submissions as priority target groups for support, particularly grant-based adaptation support. In addition, increasing financial resources are being provided through multilateral channels, including MDBs and multilateral climate funds.

10. The more recent submissions contained more detailed information on developed countries' actions and plans for mobilizing climate finance from private and alternative sources and their provision of support in this regard. All submissions contained information on ongoing efforts to estimate private finance mobilized by public intervention, but the more recent submissions also included information on the disclosure initiatives that aim to enhance the transparency of private finance flows. Furthermore, the more recent submissions placed greater emphasis on the importance of making financial flows consistent with a pathway towards low-emission and climate-resilient development, and presented related actions and support programmes. The provision of continued support for alternative ways of mobilizing climate finance, including by reducing fossil fuel subsidies, using market mechanisms and implementing carbon pricing, was referred to in all submission rounds.

11. The developed country Parties indicated in all submission rounds that they are striving to increase the amount of resources provided for adaptation. The more recent submissions indicated that in some cases a balance between mitigation and adaptation support has nearly been achieved; that support for adaptation is country driven and based on the needs and priorities of developing countries; and that scaling up adaptation finance is contingent on developing countries' adaptation planning strategies and capacity to prepare adaptation project proposals. In this context, many of the more recent submissions contained information on how developed countries are supporting the formulation and implementation of NAPs and other adaptation planning processes, as well as the preparation of adaptation project proposals. Furthermore, submissions in all three rounds contained information on financial resources contributed to the AF, GCF, LDCF and SCCF, which have dedicated adaptation programmes.

12. In terms of steps taken to enhance enabling environments, in all three rounds the submissions included information on and examples of the policy frameworks and enabling environments that are conducive to accelerating the mobilization and delivery of public and private climate finance in both developed and developing countries. Since the second round, greater emphasis has been placed on assisting developing countries in preparing national climate strategies and plans, such as NDCs and NAPs, as an important step towards enhancing their policy and regulatory environments. In addition, the following were highlighted as key areas of support for enhancing enabling environments: mainstreaming climate change in national development strategies and plans; developing policy incentives and financial instruments that will stimulate investment in climate-friendly projects; enhancing the transparency of action and support; building institutional capacity and providing technical assistance to enhance access to climate finance; building partnerships and coalitions to promote exchange of best practices and lessons learned; and linking supply of climate finance with demand. In the more recent submissions, Parties emphasized the need to devise strategies and plans that will contribute to making climate finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low-emission and climate-resilient development.

### **III. Synthesis of information**

13. This chapter synthesizes the quantitative and qualitative information provided by developed country Parties in their third biennial submissions on their updated strategies and approaches for scaling up climate finance (hereinafter referred to as the submissions) on the basis of the elements of information referred to in paragraph 2 above.

## A. Expected levels of climate finance mobilized from different sources

14. In the submissions, Parties reiterated their full commitment to the goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020. They highlighted the urgent need for all countries to take action to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement. Some submissions referred to the collective road map that was jointly prepared by developed country Parties in 2016<sup>6</sup> or to relevant OECD reports<sup>78</sup> as evidence of the commitment to and progress towards meeting that goal.

15. A number of Parties provided information on their national circumstances and limitations on the provision of ex ante information. New Zealand stated that its high-level financial commitments and indicative forecasting of climate finance resources are subject to its Parliament's annual budgetary appropriation. In Finland, public climate finance is included in the annual public budget cycle and the rolling three-year financial time frames of the Government, which makes it challenging to provide any exact mid- or long-term predictions of its overall public climate finance.

16. The type and scope of the information included in the submissions on expected levels of climate finance varied. For example, many contained information on the climate finance announcements made by developed countries prior to and at COP 21, which often set out quantitative targets to be met within a certain time frame (typically in 2016–2020). Many Parties referenced their announcements in the submissions to illustrate their efforts to scale up climate finance.

17. Some submissions presented information on expected levels of climate finance based on multi-year budget appropriation. The EU projected that at least 20 per cent of its budget, which includes support provided to developing countries, will be allocated to climate-related items on the basis of its 2014–2020 multi-year financial framework, which integrates climate change considerations. Furthermore, several submissions presented information on multi-year contributions to programmes and initiatives supported by bilateral and multilateral channels as a way of enhancing the predictability of levels of climate finance up until and beyond 2020. In this regard, many submissions referred to contributions to GEF-7, which has a quadrennial programming period from 2018 to 2022.

18. Table 1 summarizes the quantitative information provided by developed country Parties on their expected levels of climate finance. The information in the table on contributions to multiannual programmes and initiatives may not be exhaustive; additional information can be found in the submissions.

19. Several submissions presented ex post information on annual climate finance flows (this information can be found in the annex) to demonstrate the upward trend in the amount of climate finance allocated and disbursed in recent years, thereby highlighting developed countries' commitment to scaling up or at least maintaining their current annual level of climate finance provision in the coming years. Some Parties mentioned that the amount of climate finance provided by them has almost or more than doubled over the years. Many Parties underlined that their climate finance support is systematically tracked, measured and reported against the OECD Development Assistance Committee Rio markers for climate change mitigation and adaptation.

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<sup>6</sup> See <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/climate-finance-roadmap-to-us100-billion.pdf>.

<sup>7</sup> OECD. 2015. *Climate Finance in 2013-14 and the USD 100 billion goal. A report by the OECD in collaboration with Climate Policy Initiative*. Available at <http://www.oecd.org/env/climate-finance-in-2013-14-and-the-usd-100-billion-goal-9789264249424-en.htm>.

<sup>8</sup> OECD. 2016. *2020 Projections of Climate Finance Towards the USD 100 Billion Goal. Technical Note*. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available at <https://www.oecd.org/environment/cc/oecd-climate-finance-projection.htm>.

Table 1  
**Information provided by developed country Parties in their third biennial submissions on their expected levels of climate finance**

<i>Party</i>	<i>Expected level of climate finance<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Time frame</i>
Australia	AUD 1.098 billion (committed)	2015/2016 –2019/2020
	AUD 200 million (estimated)	2018–2019
	AUD 200 million (estimated)	2019–2020
	AUD 2.25 million to Climate Finance Readiness for the Pacific	2016–2019
	AUD 300 million for Pacific climate change and disaster support package	2016–2020
	USD 15 million to the Global Green Growth Institute	2017–2019
	AUD 76.67 million to GEF-7	2018–2022
	Establishment of AUD 2 billion Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific in 2018	
Austria	At least EUR 0.5 billion (committed), in addition to the Austrian commitment to GCF IRM	2015–2020
	EUR 50.5 million pledge to GEF-7	2018–2022
Belgium	EUR 50 million in public climate finance per year (committed)	2016–2020
Canada	CAD 2.65 billion (committed)	2016–2020
	CAD 800 million	2020–2021
	CAD 200 million for the second phase of the Canadian Climate Fund for the Private Sector in Asia at the Asian Development Bank	2016/2017 –2020/2021
	CAD 250 million for the Canada–International Finance Corporation Blended Climate Finance Program	2017/2018 –2020/2021
	CAD 228.79 million to GEF-7	2018–2022
Czechia	CZK 40 million to the German Agency for International Cooperation for its Climate Finance Readiness Programme	2014–2019
	CZK 20 million for readiness activities in Western Balkan countries through the United Nations Environment Programme	2017–2019
Denmark	DKK 450 million to GEF-7	2018–2022
Estonia	EUR 1 million annually	2015–2020
	EUR 5 million from revenue from auctioning EU Emissions Trading System allowances	2015–2020
EU and its member States	At least 20% of the EU budget to be spent on climate-relevant activities	2014–2020
	EUR 1.5 billion (climate-specific public expenditure under the main EU cooperation and development programmes and instruments) <sup>b</sup>	2019
	EUR 1.6 billion (climate-specific public expenditure under the main EU cooperation and development programmes and instruments) <sup>b</sup>	2020
	EUR 10 billion to the African Renewable Energy Initiative	2015–2020
	Approximately EUR 1.9 billion to GEF-7	2018–2022
Finland	Around EUR 530 million in new investment funding for developing countries, a substantial part of which contributes to climate finance	2016–2019
	EUR 114 million to set up the Finland–International Finance Corporation Blended Finance for Climate Program	2017–2022
	EUR 15 million to the new Energy and Environment Partnership Trust Fund in Southern and East Africa	2018–2022
	EUR 31 million to GEF-7	2018–2022
France	EUR 5 billion, including EUR 1.5 billion in adaptation finance, with priority given to Africa, the LDCs and the countries most vulnerable to climate change, especially their agriculture sectors	By 2020
	EUR 3 billion to the African Renewable Energy Initiative	2016–2020
	EUR 30 million to Adapt'Action	2017–2020
	EUR 300 million to GEF-7	2018–2022



<i>Party</i>	<i>Expected level of climate finance<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Time frame</i>
Germany	Objective of doubling international climate finance from the target of EUR 2 billion in 2014 to EUR 4 billion by 2020 from budgetary sources and the grant equivalent of development loans	By 2020
	EUR 3 billion to the African Renewable Energy Initiative	2015–2020
	USD 5 billion for REDD-plus jointly with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Norway	2015–2020
	EUR 420 million to GEF-7	2018–2022
Hungary	HUF 2 billion (approx. EUR 6.1 million), including HUF 1 billion to GCF IRM	2016–2018
Ireland	EUR 175 million in public grant funding for climate finance	2016–2020
Italy	At least USD 4 billion	2015–2020
	USD 12 million to Africa’s Green and Climate Resilient Development	2018–2020
	EUR 92 million to GEF-7	2018–2022
	Approximately EUR 325 million to the African Development Fund	2018–2020
	Approximately EUR 14 million to the International Fund for Agricultural Development	2018–2020
	EUR 32 million to the Asian Development Fund	2018–2020
	EUR 760 million to the International Development Association	2018–2020
	EUR 4.5 million to the Multilateral Investment Fund	2018–2020
USD 28.3 million to the Multilateral Fund	2018–2020	
USD 12 million to Africa’s Green and Climate Resilient Development	2018–2020	
Japan	1.3 trillion Japanese yen (public and private finance)	In 2020
	USD 637 million to GEF-7	2018–2022
Lithuania	EUR 1 million from public and private sources annually, a voluntary doubling of resources	2018–2020
Luxembourg	EUR 120 million, including EUR 35 million to the GCF	2014–2020
	EUR 30 million to the Luxembourg–EIB Climate Finance Platform	2017–2020
Netherlands	EUR 3.89 billion in public finance and EUR 2.04 billion in mobilized private finance	2011–2020
	Estimated EUR 940 million (public and private)	2019
	Estimated EUR 960 million, at least EUR 480 million public finance and a similar amount in private finance	2020
	USD 35.3 million pledge to the World Bank Energy Sector Management Assistance Program	2017–2020
	Additional EUR 40 million per year for a new climate fund (EUR 30 million in 2019 and EUR 40 million in 2020)	2018–2021
	EUR 83 million to GEF-7	2018–2022
New Zealand	Up to NZD 200 million in climate-related support, an average NZD 60 million per year	2015–2019
	At least NZD 300 million in climate-related support, an average NZD 75 million per year	2019–2022
	NZD 65 million to support the Global Research Alliance on Agricultural Greenhouse Gases	2009–2020
	NZD 100 million for renewable energy projects in the Pacific	2013–2024
	NZD 8 million to GEF-7 and additional voluntary contribution of NZD 4 million	2018–2022
Norway	Finance for REDD-plus (pledged)	Until 2030
	REDD-plus finance at least at current levels; NOK 3 billion budget for 2018	Until 2020
	Contribution to the GCF to be doubled by 2020, if the GCF secures verified emission reductions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries	Until 2020
	Doubled ODA funds for renewable energy (planned); proposed budget for 2019 is NOK 1 122 million and NOK 1 875 million for Norfund, half of which will be invested in clean energy <sup>c</sup>	2017–2019
	NOK 36.9 million to the United Nations Partnership for Action on Green Economy	2017–2020

<i>Party</i>	<i>Expected level of climate finance<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Time frame</i>
	NOK 520 million to GEF-7	2018–2022
	NOK 1 065 million to the United Nations Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation	2018–2020
	NOK 50 million to the Global Green Growth Institute	2018–2020
Portugal	EUR 10 million in grant funding	2017–2020
Slovenia	Approximately EUR 3.5 million per year	Until 2020
	EUR 6–7 million per year	Until 2030
	EUR 1 million per year to the GCF	2019–2020
Spain	EUR 900 million	By 2020
Sweden	SEK 6.5 billion	2018–2022
	SEK 9.3 million for the Energy for the Poor pilot project in Kenya	2017–2019
	SEK 50 million for the National Resilience Programme in Bangladesh	2017–2021
	SEK 150 million to GEF-7	2018–2022
Switzerland	At least the same level of public climate as previously	2019–2020
United Kingdom	GBP 5.8 billion	2015–2020
	At least GBP 1.76 billion	2020
	USD 5 billion for tackling deforestation (joint pledge with Germany and Norway)	2015–2020
	GBP 250 million to GEF-7	2018–2022

<sup>a</sup> Including high-level commitments, estimated future annual climate finance flows and multiannual contributions through bilateral and multilateral channels.

<sup>b</sup> The figures for 2019 and 2020 are per the 2019 draft budget document of the EU.

<sup>c</sup> Subject to parliamentary approval.

20. Most submissions contained information on expected levels of public climate finance, but few contained quantitative information on expected levels of private climate finance. Most submissions indicated the difficulty of tracking and estimating private finance mobilized by public finance owing to the lack of an international methodology or reliable disaggregated data. In this context, some submissions highlighted ongoing work and initiatives that could facilitate tracking and estimating private climate finance in the future: for example, the OECD Research Collaborative is working to establish an international standard for measuring mobilized private finance. Furthermore, in the broader context of increasing the transparency of private finance, a number of submissions referred to financial disclosure initiatives, such as the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, that encourage the private sector to voluntarily disclose climate-related information.

21. Most submissions highlighted the key role of the private sector in reaching the investment level required to shift the world towards a low-carbon, climate-resilient pathway, and the importance of leveraging private finance using limited public finance. In this context, several submissions included information on Parties' financial commitments to multilateral funds and initiatives with the specific objective of leveraging private sector investment. Further information on Parties' prioritization of channels and instruments of climate finance, as well as of private climate finance, can be found in chapter III.B.3 and III.C below, respectively.

22. The submissions included quantitative information on developed countries' contributions to the multilateral funds under the UNFCCC. Many Parties underscored the importance of the success of the GCF and indicated their intention to engage in the GCF process or contribute to its replenishment. Many Parties reported their financial commitments, including by subnational and city governments, to the AF, LDCF and SCCF.

23. Few submissions included information on whether resources provided will be new and additional. Luxembourg stated that its international public climate finance is new and in addition to its ODA, and Germany stated that the climate finance that it provides every year through bilateral and multilateral cooperation is new and additional. However, no further information was provided on how climate finance is determined as being new and additional. Nevertheless, many submissions contained information on plans and actions for leveraging additional climate finance from the private sector using public climate finance, employing

innovative financial instruments to crowd in additional funding and fostering an environment conducive to attracting new private sector investment. Further information on mobilizing additional climate finance and fostering enabling environments can be found in chapter III.C and III.E below, respectively.

## **B. Policies, programmes and priorities**

### **1. Policies**

24. Almost all submissions attested to the intrinsic link between development and climate change (the latter amplifying the developmental challenges that countries face) and stressed that both the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development should be mainstreamed in climate action and support. Accordingly, most Parties' reported climate support policies aimed at achieving the Paris Agreement goals and the social and economic development goals of developing countries, such as reducing poverty, promoting economic growth and livelihoods, and building long-term disaster resilience. Australia noted that integrating climate change action into development assistance not only optimizes and protects investments and builds long-term resilience to negative climate impacts, but also enhances development objectives and prevents creation of new risks and exacerbation of existing risks. Finland has integrated the goals and objectives of the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol into its development policy, while recognizing that economic and social development and poverty eradication are the overriding priorities of developing countries. France referred to the urgency of taking into consideration the Paris Agreement goals in the provision of development assistance, and noted that the French Development Agency had committed to ensuring that its activities and development programmes are "100 per cent compatible with the Paris Agreement" and pursue low-carbon and climate-resilient long-term development. Belgium underlined the need to strengthen coordination and cooperation between the different actors involved in the climate and development spheres at the domestic and international level.

25. Most submissions underscored that developed countries' climate finance support should be based on the needs and priorities of developing countries and that climate assistance is most effective when it is driven by the developing countries. In this context, many submissions stated that climate finance support from developed countries is based on partnerships and collaboration with the recipient countries and relevant stakeholders. Switzerland conducts regular dialogues with its partner countries to set their priorities for collaboration for a period of approximately four years. Through this process, the partner country communicates its priorities to Switzerland and defines the scope of its own climate interventions. Norway has built solid partnerships with key forest countries by providing financial support for REDD-plus activities. By channelling support through its International Climate and Forest Initiative, Norway is aiming to support the countries' strategies for reducing emissions from forests and efforts to increase ambition in implementing the Paris Agreement through their NDCs.

26. Ensuring the effectiveness of climate finance was highlighted as a cross-cutting feature of developed countries' policies, in terms of climate finance resulting in the greatest possible impact on mitigation and adaptation results and leveraging private climate finance at scale using limited public finance. The increasing importance of the private sector in the development cooperation domain was emphasized in many submissions, particularly in the context of the goal under the Paris Agreement of making financial flows consistent with a pathway towards low-emission and climate-resilient development. Public-private partnerships and favourable policies and market conditions were indicated to be prerequisites for more effective and impactful climate finance. Transparency of climate action and support, which can build mutual accountability and trust between developed and developing countries, was also highlighted as key to enhancing the effectiveness of climate finance.

27. Several submissions mentioned that the periodic evaluation of climate finance support programmes (in terms of results, best practices and lessons learned) can also enhance the effectiveness of climate finance by creating a feedback loop. The EU tracks and monitors its private climate finance programmes in detail to evaluate progress, promote good performance

and ensure improvement over time. Australia independently evaluates the investment outcomes, quality, effectiveness and targeting of its climate assistance with a view to making improvements.

28. Gender policies were highlighted in several submissions as an important means of supporting and guiding efforts to promote gender equality and the active participation of women in climate financing. Through its Feminist International Assistance Policy, Canada supports the inclusion of females in designing and developing strategic responses to climate change. The policy ensures that climate-related planning, policymaking and financing address the particular needs and challenges of females, support employment and business opportunities for women, and strengthen women's economic empowerment. Sweden is also integrating gender into climate support and has systematically advocated for including gender equality considerations into the policies of MDBs and vertical climate funds. Sida, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, is working to integrate gender equality considerations into climate-specific finance and has reported a consistent rise in the level of integration of gender into bilateral climate finance in recent years.

## **2. Programmes**

29. Parties provided information on the programmes and initiatives that they have established or are supporting, many of which are dedicated to supporting developing countries' ambitions and efforts to formulate and implement plans for achieving the Paris Agreement goals.

30. Support has often been provided as part of the broader support schemes of development cooperation agencies and has linkages with the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Parties noted that many of their climate support programmes share the aims of the SDGs, such as eradicating poverty (SDG 1), reducing inequality (SDG 10), promoting greener economic growth and creating jobs (SDG 8), managing water resources (SDG 6) and promoting peace and stability (SDG 16).

31. In this context, many submissions highlighted activities that foster partnerships and dialogue with recipient countries to ensure that support is based on the needs and priorities identified in their national development strategies and plans, such as NDCs and NAPs. Partnerships that aim to facilitate the preparation and implementation of NDCs and NAPs promote coherence and buy-in and strengthen developing countries' ownership of climate action.

32. Examples were provided of programmes and initiatives that aim to facilitate the exchange of lessons learned and know-how among relevant national and regional stakeholders, or to connect public and private stakeholders, as well as city governments and non-State actors, in order to translate innovative ideas into concrete projects and to explore ways of implementing the Paris Agreement. Several Parties highlighted their continued support for the NDC Partnership, which assists developing countries in translating their NDCs into concrete strategies and implementable actions and enhances cooperation between countries and stakeholders to raise global ambition to implement the Paris Agreement and the SDGs. The One Planet Summit in 2017 highlighted the importance of global partnerships and coalition-building: it not only provided high-level political impetus to a number of initiatives that are contributing to mobilizing climate finance and redirecting investment, but also showcased ongoing climate action initiatives that could be scaled up with the right support.

33. Close cooperation with subnational governments and non-State actors, such as the private sector and civil society, was emphasized as a key feature of numerous programmes. Switzerland pointed out the knowledge, long-standing experience and networks of non-State actors and identified them as key players in international cooperation. Japan underscored the important role of local governments in the implementation of mitigation and adaptation measures in cities and the value of cooperation between cities, given that the Paris Agreement recognizes the participation of cities and other subnational authorities as an integral part of tackling climate change.

34. Parties recognized the importance of developing countries having access to multilateral climate funds. They outlined examples of technical assistance aimed at building

institutional capacity and strengthening policy environments, and identified facilities that support developing countries in preparing project proposals. Some emphasized their continued efforts to help develop investment-ready projects to encourage an increase in private finance.

35. Other important areas for support were raised in the submissions, including developing countries' preparation and implementation of NDCs and NAPs, and enhancing the transparency of action and support. Capacity-building support, of individuals and institutions, was emphasized as being a fundamental component of support across most areas. Capacity-building activities were seen as crucial to fostering enabling environments conducive to attracting additional climate finance and increasing the impact of the resources provided. More information on enabling environments can be found in chapter II.E below.

36. Many submissions indicated that support continues to be provided for the majority of the multi-year programmes previously reported. Table 2 presents some of the programmes, facilities and initiatives identified in the submissions; further examples can be found in the submissions.

Table 2

**Programmes, facilities and initiatives established or supported by developed country Parties for climate action in developing countries**

<i>Programme/facility/initiative</i>	<i>Description</i>
Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund	A fund-of-funds managed by EIB, which has unlocked new private investment in climate-related projects across Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean; with GCF support, EIB is in the process of setting up and fundraising for a follow-on fund, which aims to raise up to USD 750 million in total, mobilizing up to USD 30 billion in investment on the ground
Global Climate Partnership Fund	An innovative public-private partnership for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions with a fund volume of over USD 500 million, of which one third is from private investors; it focuses on financing energy efficiency and renewable energy projects for small and medium-sized enterprises and private households in developing countries, primarily in cooperation with local financial institutions
Global Resilience Partnership	A global platform that facilitates access to the latest knowledge and information on investing in resilience for development; it aims to influence policy, build networks and leverage opportunities for engagement to incorporate consideration of resilience at all levels
Weather and Climate Information and Services for Africa	A four-year programme designed to enhance the resilience of African people and economic development to weather-related shocks; it aims to improve the generation and use of weather and climate information and services across sub-Saharan Africa, with an initial focus on East Africa
Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative	A natural disaster risk insurance programme established by Japan and the World Bank in 2013, specifically designed for Pacific island countries; its objective is to support Pacific island countries that are vulnerable to natural disasters, such as typhoons, and to provide rapid and efficient response financing to them in the immediate aftermath of natural disasters
Sustainable Infrastructure Program – Latin America	Established by the United Kingdom in 2017 and to be delivered by the Inter-American Development Bank, the Program, focusing on Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, will enable and accelerate the implementation of the countries' NDCs, and support and catalyse private sector investment in low-carbon infrastructure by providing capital investment and technical assistance
Adapt <sup>2</sup> Action	Aiming to provide support to 15 African countries and SIDS for establishing a detailed forward-looking characterization of the climatic risks they are facing in order to identify and prioritize adaptation options, manage uncertainty and, ultimately, define and operationalize action plans and investment programmes
Global Green Growth Institute	As part of its work to support developing countries in achieving the SDGs and their national green growth targets, the Institute is working to address climate change by supporting member and partner countries in translating their climate commitments into concrete climate action, thereby accelerating the implementation of their NDCs under the Paris Agreement

### 3. Priorities

37. A substantial amount of climate finance support is channelled bilaterally through developed countries' development cooperation agencies and bilateral climate funds and initiatives. Bilateral programmes often have specific sectoral objectives and define recipient countries as target groups. Some developed countries are also providing support through multi-bilateral and regional channels.

38. Parties indicated in the submissions that they are continuing to increase their climate finance provided through multilateral channels, including through core contributions to MDBs and United Nations agencies and the replenishment of UNFCCC funds. Many developed countries choose to channel finance through MDBs because of their technical and financial expertise with climate finance, as well as their capacity and expertise in relation to using limited public finance to leverage private finance investments while aligning them with country-driven strategies. The EU mentioned the crucial role of MDBs in scaling up the mobilization of climate finance, through both their own resources and increased mobilization of private climate finance, and highlighted the unique technical and financial experience of EIB with climate change and in supporting the implementation of EU climate policies and developing countries' NDCs.

39. With respect to the UNFCCC funds, most Parties stressed the important role that the GCF should play in the evolving architecture of multilateral climate finance, and expressed their intention to continue to provide resources through the GCF. The need to strengthen the capacity of the GCF and make its work more effective, efficient and impactful was highlighted in several submissions. Many developed countries provide resources through the GEF, it being a catalyst for establishing a global approach to sustainable development, particularly addressing the drivers of environmental degradation and climate change. The AF, LDCF and SCCF were pinpointed by several Parties as channels for providing grant-based adaptation finance to the LDCs, SIDS and other particularly vulnerable countries.

40. According to the submissions, public climate finance will be prioritized for supporting adaptation in the LDCs, SIDS and particularly vulnerable countries where market-based financing is not viable, and also for supporting the early stages of technology demonstration, and readiness and capacity-building projects and programmes. Furthermore, Parties indicated that they will use available public funding in a targeted manner to increasingly promote the mobilization of private finance for mitigation and to support climate action by middle-income countries and non-sovereign proponents, notably the private sector. Noting that there is still a need for support to invigorate private sector engagement in adaptation, many developed countries are exploring how to broaden business opportunities in adaptation. Further information on developed countries' actions and plans for mobilizing private finance can be found in chapter III.C.1 below.

41. With regard to mitigation, developed countries are focusing on developing countries achieving transformational change towards low-carbon economic growth through targeted investment in innovative projects and replicable technologies and by removing barriers to private sector investment. However, most Parties identified adaptation as a priority for support, and confirmed their commitment to achieving a balance between support for adaptation and support for mitigation. Key sectoral priorities for adaptation include agriculture, food security, water resource management, disaster risk reduction, infrastructure, coastal zone management, land rehabilitation and soil improvement. There are also cross-cutting areas of support that yield both adaptation and mitigation co-benefits, with projects and programmes focusing primarily on the forest and agriculture sectors. Further information on developed countries' aim to balance the allocation of mitigation and adaptation finance can be found in chapter III.D below.

42. Many submissions included information, varying in scope and presentation, on the geographical distribution of climate finance support provided and related policies. In some submissions the main countries targeted were listed, while in others priority regions were indicated. Some Parties presented the proportionate ratios that they use to allocate their climate support to the different geographical regions, while others indicated that, if the request for support is related to a specific sector, for example REDD-plus, the support is

available regardless of region. The LDCs, SIDS and particularly vulnerable countries are prioritized in the projects and programmes supported by most developed countries.

## C. Actions and plans for mobilizing additional finance

43. The submissions presented information on developed countries' plans and actions for catalysing finance from private sources and efforts to mobilize finance from alternative sources.

### 1. Mobilizing private climate finance

44. Most developed country Parties are scaling up their mobilization of private climate finance towards putting the world on a low-carbon and climate-resilient path, and they reiterated their commitment to collectively engaging with developing countries and the private sector to scale up private climate finance within the broader framework of the development finance architecture. Many mentioned that their public funding is being used to address market failures and perceived climate change investment risk, and gave examples of elements of enabling environments required for scaling up private climate finance, such as political stability, functioning financial markets and policies conducive to attracting private climate investment.

45. There are institutions in developed countries that focus specifically on leveraging private climate finance, working closely with development cooperation agencies and relevant ministries to coordinate policies and actions and to encourage other industrial and commercial partners to co-invest and leverage additional capital (including Denmark's Climate Investment Fund, Finland's Finnfund, Germany's KfW and its private sector investment bank DEG, France's Proparco, Sweden's Swedfund, Norway's Norfund and Japan's Japan Bank for International Cooperation). Furthermore, there are programmes supported by developed countries (dedicated funds, investment platforms and financing facilities) that focus specifically on mobilizing private climate finance.

46. Developed countries channel their resources through MDBs owing to their expertise in translating private capital into energy and climate-relevant investments. Developed countries support the alignment of the climate and non-climate portfolios of MDBs and development finance institutions with the goals of the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The International Finance Corporation and the GCF Private Sector Facility were highlighted as examples of multilateral instruments that specialize in leveraging private climate finance.

47. The submissions highlighted the following focus areas of programmes, initiatives and facilities that support the mobilization of private climate finance: taking the first-loss position to de-risk private investment, enhancing business-to-business cooperation, creating innovative public-private partnerships, using carbon pricing systems and export credits, and strengthening technical and institutional capacity to support private sector and commercial investments. Table 3 presents examples of the programmes, initiatives and facilities mentioned in the submissions.

Table 3

#### Developed country Party programmes and initiatives for scaling up private climate finance

<i>Type/key feature</i>	<i>Examples</i>	<i>Description</i>
Financing facility	Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific	Established in November 2018 with AUD 2 billion capital, the Facility will provide loans to fund economic infrastructure projects in the Pacific region and have the capacity to lend to Pacific island countries and Timor-Leste and the private sector; it will provide non-concessional loans worth up to AUD 1.5 billion, supported by ODA grants of up to AUD 500 million

<i>Type/key feature</i>	<i>Examples</i>	<i>Description</i>
	Global Facility to Promote Quality Infrastructure Investment for Environmental Preservation and Sustainable Growth	Launched by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation with the objective of providing a wide range of financing support for infrastructure development, which is expected to help preserve the environment through partnerships with the private sector
Innovative financial instrument	Finland–International Finance Corporation Blended Finance for Climate Fund	A joint climate fund set up in 2017 by Finland and the World Bank’s private sector arm, the International Finance Corporation, to support renewable and clean energy solutions in developing countries; the EUR 114 million investment will be used over a five-year period to create markets and mobilize private investment to support climate-related work
	InsuResilience Global Partnership for Climate and Disaster Risk Finance and Insurance Solutions	In 2017, Germany committed EUR 110 to this initiative, which will provide access to direct or indirect insurance against climate risks for up to 400 million poor and vulnerable people in developing countries by 2020
	LuxFLAG	Launched in September 2016 with the goal of awarding an official label to funds that invest in climate action while respecting well-defined criteria; the LuxFLAG green bond label, launched in 2017, serves to reassure investors that a green bond follows internationally recognized standards and uses its proceeds to finance green projects
Specialized or dedicated fund	Canadian Climate Fund for the Private Sector in Asia	In May 2017, Canada announced CAD 200 million in funding for the second phase of this climate fund, which aims to catalyse private climate investment in Asian and Pacific developing countries, supports a range of adaptation efforts, creates good jobs and facilitates low-carbon, women-focused projects
	Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa	A multi-donor trust fund with the purpose of unlocking investment in small- and medium-scale sustainable energy projects in Africa; it has committed USD 64 million across its programmes for an investment pipeline worth around USD 1.5 billion since its launch, achieving over 500 MW new energy generation capacity
Public–private partnership	Finnpartnership	Aiming to increase business-to-business cooperation between companies in Finland and in developing countries
	Tropical Forest Alliance 2020	Supply chain companies, tropical forest countries, investors, development partners and civil society come together under this initiative to address the gap between commitment and action to halt commodity-driven deforestation

48. Many developing country Parties’ efforts to mobilize private climate finance are guided by the urgency of achieving the Paris Agreement goals by making financial flows consistent with a pathway towards low-emission and climate-resilient development. In this context, governments and the financial sector have started to shift capital flows at scale to set the global economy on a trajectory towards meeting the Paris Agreement temperature goal. The box below presents some examples of developed countries’ programmes and initiatives that aim to achieve the goal of making financial flows consistent with a pathway towards low-emission and climate-resilient development.



## **Developed country programmes and initiatives aimed at making financial flows consistent with a pathway towards low-emission and climate-resilient development**

### **European Union**

The European Commission established the EU High-Level Group on Sustainable Finance to help develop an overarching and comprehensive EU sustainable finance road map and requested the Group to advise on how to steer the flow of capital towards sustainable investments; identify steps that financial institutions and supervisors should take to protect the financial system from sustainability risks; and deploy policies across Europe. The Group prepared a report on financing a sustainable European economy and prepared policy recommendations with a view to informing the preparation of the European Commission's sustainable finance strategy.

### **France**

The One Planet Summit, convened in Paris on 12 December 2017 by the President of France together with the United Nations Secretary-General and the President of the World Bank, gave high-level political impetus to a number of initiatives that are contributing to redirecting investment and mobilizing public and private climate finance. Several initiatives were launched at the Summit, including a coalition in support of the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures; the Central Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System; a working group of six of the largest sovereign wealth funds to create a framework for integrating climate change into their decision-making (the framework was launched in Paris on 6 July 2018); and the Climate Action 100+ coalition, which brings together 289 institutional investors managing nearly USD 30 trillion in assets in order to scale up their engagement with systemically significant corporate greenhouse gas emitters.

### **Japan**

In 2017, the Ministry of the Environment hosted a high-level meeting on environmental preservation and sustainable growth finance, where major players in the finance industry engaged in open discussions. The meeting resulted in recommendations to promote green finance and shift focus towards environmental preservation and sustainable growth financing for the strategic shift to a decarbonized society.

### **Luxembourg**

On 27 September 2016, the Luxembourg Stock Exchange launched the first platform in the world entirely dedicated to green financial instruments, the Luxembourg Green Exchange. It is a preliminary project to promote Luxembourg's role in green finance.

### **Sweden**

Launched in 2017, the Stockholm Sustainable Finance Centre is a Government-funded cooperation between the Stockholm Environment Institute and the Stockholm School of Economics. It will provide research-based knowledge and know-how, including to developing countries, to support financial market actors in shifting capital flows towards fossil-free and sustainable pathways. Furthermore, in 2017, Sweden's advocacy contributed to the decision of the World Bank Group to phase out the financing of oil and gas prospecting by 2019, increase its support for adaptation, make its overall carbon footprint public and contribute to the implementation of Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement.

### **Switzerland**

The Swiss Government supports Swiss institutional investors by making available and accessible internationally comparable background information and tools that help motivate them to voluntarily consider climate-related risks and align their portfolios with a low-carbon and climate-resilient development pathway. In this context, all Swiss pension funds and insurance companies were invited in 2017 to test the climate compatibility of their portfolios free of charge. Around two thirds, in terms of assets under management, of the Swiss pension funds and insurance industry participated in the pilot. Switzerland is considering carrying out such tests on a regular basis to encourage its financial market to take effective action.

### **United Kingdom**

The United Kingdom is taking a range of actions to accelerate the growth of green finance, helping the world to progress towards meeting the challenge of mobilizing the USD 90 trillion investment required to address climate change. In 2017, the British Government convened a green finance task force of leaders from the private sector to deliver a series of recommendations on how government and the private sector can work together to accelerate growth in green finance. The British Government will respond to the recommendations of the task force in due course and has already announced the creation of a green finance institute to champion sustainable finance in the United Kingdom and abroad, building on the more than USD 24.5 billion in green bonds already listed on the London Stock Exchange.

## 2. Mobilizing alternative sources of climate finance

49. In addition to describing their efforts to mobilize private finance, several Parties emphasized the importance of mobilizing alternative sources of climate finance, particularly with regard to achieving the goal of jointly mobilizing USD 100 billion by 2020.

50. Many presented actions and plans for using carbon pricing to mobilize additional climate finance. Switzerland, for example, is among the first countries to put a price on carbon by introducing a carbon dioxide levy on fossil heating fuels. This efficient market-based approach has helped to mobilize domestic private sector investment in low-carbon technology. In addition, several EU countries are supporting initiatives related to carbon pricing, such as the Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, and noted that carbon pricing demonstrates to policymakers, businesses and investors the importance of taking emissions into consideration in decision-making.

51. Some Parties included information on existing market mechanisms in the submissions (e.g. the Joint Crediting Mechanism, the Transformative Carbon Asset Facility and the Partnership for Market Readiness under the World Bank) and showed their support for the new market mechanism under the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, a number of Parties affirmed their continued support for reforming fossil fuel subsidies.

## D. Balance between adaptation and mitigation, taking into account the needs of developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change

52. Most Parties stressed the importance of balancing climate finance support between adaptation and mitigation, and provided information on their policies and programming that prioritize adaptation support for the most vulnerable countries, such as the LDCs and SIDS. Noting the close relationship between adaptation and development issues, efforts are ongoing to mainstream adaptation in the development needs and priorities of developing countries. Some Parties noted the link between adaptation and international agreements and targets regarding disaster risk reduction, such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 under the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction.

53. Areas of adaptation support mentioned in the submissions include: strengthening early warning systems for extreme weather events; reducing vulnerability to drought and strengthening livelihoods; reinforcing integrated water and waste management; addressing deforestation and forest degradation, land rehabilitation and soil improvement; sustainable mobility; sustainable agriculture; climate-resilient infrastructure and biodiversity; and integrated coastal zone management.

54. Some submissions included targets, scales and timelines for the adaptation support that the developed country Parties will provide in the coming years in order to fulfil their commitments. France stated that its adaptation funding will be increased to EUR 1.5 billion per annum until 2020, with priority given to Africa, the LDCs and the countries most vulnerable to climate change, especially their agriculture sectors.

55. Some Parties indicated that they have already achieved a 50:50 balance in their provision of climate-related support within climate-related grant portfolios, while others indicated they are still striving for such a balance. Some noted that their support for adaptation projects and programmes remains driven essentially by demand and reflects the needs and priorities of developing countries. Finland noted that, at the multilateral level, achieving a balance between adaptation and mitigation support depends on the performance of the respective multilateral institutions, based on the needs and demands of developing countries.

56. In terms of multilateral channels of adaptation finance, some Parties referred to the GCF as the primary mechanism for channelling adaptation support, given that the GCF Board decided to aim for a 50:50 allocation of finance to mitigation and adaptation. UNFCCC funds that have a significant adaptation portfolio, such as the AF, LDCF and SCCF, were frequently cited as multilateral channels of adaptation finance. Other channels outside of the UNFCCC were also mentioned, including the United Nations Environment Programme, the United

Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction and the Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction.

57. While most Parties mentioned that mainly public finance will be used to support adaptation in the most vulnerable countries, several Parties informed of their plans and actions for scaling up private finance for adaptation. For example, Sida is supporting the initiative for coffee&climate, which is working to increase the climate resilience and adaptive capacity of small-scale coffee farmers in Latin America and Africa. Sida contributes half (SEK 7 million) of the initiative's budget, while the other half is provided mainly by international coffee companies.

## **E. Steps taken to enhance enabling environments**

58. All Parties noted in the submissions that the ambitious vision of the Paris Agreement cannot be achieved by means of finance alone; enabling environments and policy frameworks must serve as the foundation for all countries to transition to low-emission and climate-resilient societies. Various domestic enabling environments and policy frameworks have been put in place by developed countries to provide investment certainty and conducive market conditions and to increase market readiness for low-emission goods and services.

59. Furthermore, many Parties described the enabling environment required to make financial flows consistent with a pathway towards low-emission and climate-resilient development, including disclosure of climate-related risks and opportunities in order to better inform private investors of the financial and physical risks associated with climate change investment. In this context, the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures was established at the request of the Group of 20 finance ministers and central bank governors to encourage voluntary private-led disclosure of climate-related financial information in order to capture risks and opportunities.

60. Various enabling environments that can help developing countries to attract and better manage climate finance resources were highlighted, with credible long-term planning by developing countries being central to mobilizing climate finance in a country-driven manner. In that regard, developed countries are gearing their programmes towards supporting the formulation and implementation of NDCs, NAPs and other adaptation planning tools, and the translation of such plans into clear investment strategies. The NDC Partnership and the Pacific NDC Hub are examples of support mechanisms available at the international and regional level, respectively. Furthermore, the submissions highlighted numerous enabling environments and policy incentives that can help to scale up private climate finance, including tax incentives and subsidies for climate-friendly investment; standard-setting for green bonds; and making financial instruments that de-risk investments more accessible.

61. Finally, enhancing the transparency of action and support was highlighted as key to unlocking climate finance flows in developing countries. It not only promotes trust among Parties and strengthens the effectiveness of climate finance through the institutionalization of a monitoring and evaluation system, but also means that information is provided on where and how climate finance is being delivered and where gaps exist. In this respect, developed countries provide not only bilateral support for building the capacity of developing countries to enhance transparency, but also multilateral support, through the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency for example, for enhancing the institutional and technical capacities of developing countries.

## Annex

## Levels of climate finance provided to developing countries as reported in developed country Parties' biennial submissions

<i>Party</i>	<i>Levels of climate finance provided to developing countries, including past annual flows, and examples of programmes and initiatives supported<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Time frame<sup>b</sup></i>
Australia	AUD 249.47 million (actual)	2015–2016
	AUD 248.97 million (actual)	2016–2017
	AUD 200 million (estimated)	2017–2018
	AUD 42 million to the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, including AUD 24 million to the Facility's Readiness Fund	2008–2012
	AUD 18 million to the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Carbon Fund	2011–2012
	AUD 200 million to the GCF	2014–2018
Austria	EUR 40.5 million	2010
	EUR 33.5 million	2011
	EUR 45.1 million	2012
	EUR 142.2 million	2013
	EUR 141.2 million	2014
	EUR 169.4 million	2015
	EUR 26 million for the initial capitalization of the GCF	2015–2018
	EUR 189.3 million, including EUR 85 million provided through the Development Bank of Austria	2016
Belgium	Approximately EUR 35 million to international financial institutions' trust funds	2017
	More than EUR 200 million by the federal and regional Governments, <sup>c</sup> surpassing commitments made at COP 21	2016–2017
Belgium	Additional EUR 8 million to the LDCF	2018
Bulgaria	EUR 100 000 to the GCF	2015
Canada	CAD 1.2 billion worth of projects announced as part of CAD 2.6 billion commitment	Up to 2018
	CAD 190 million	2015
	CAD 655 million	2016
	CAD 300 million to GCF IRM	2015–2018
	CAD 550 million through Export Development Canada, which has issued CAD 1.5 billion in green bonds since 2014	Since 2016
Czechia	CZK 110 million to GCF IRM	2015–2018
	Approximately CZK 7.5 million	2016
Denmark	More than DKK 1 billion annually for a number of years	
	USD 70 million to the GCF	2014–2016
	More than DKK 1 billion in climate-relevant investments annually	2015 and 2016
	More than DKK 1 billion in climate-relevant private investments mobilized annually through investments managed by the Danish Development Finance Institution	2015–2016
Estonia	EUR 4.7 million for the environmentally sustainable development of partner countries (Afghanistan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova)	2011–2014
	EUR 1 million to the GCF	2015–2016

<i>Party</i>	<i>Levels of climate finance provided to developing countries, including past annual flows, and examples of programmes and initiatives supported<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Time frame<sup>b</sup></i>
EU and its member States	EUR 10.6 billion	2013
	EUR 20 billion, <sup>d</sup> including EUR 2.7 billion from the EU budget and EUR 1.9 billion from EIB	2016
	USD 4.7 billion to GCF IRM	2015–2018
	EUR 2.6 billion provided by EIB from all resources for investment in climate action in developing countries	2017
Finland	EUR 80 million to GCF IRM	2015–2018
	EUR 130 million to Finnfund	2016
	EUR 114 million mobilized through the Energy and Environment Partnership Programme in Africa	By 2016
France	More than EUR 29 billion	2005–2018
	EUR 90 million to the French Global Environment Facility	2015–2018
	More than EUR 3.3 billion in public climate finance	2016
	EUR 25 million to the LDCF	2016–2017
	Approximately EUR 3.8 billion through the French Development Agency	2017
Germany	EUR 3.36 billion in international climate finance from budgetary sources	2016
	EUR 5.17 billion in public finance mobilized from capital resources through KfW development bank and its subsidiary DEG	2016
	EUR 750 million to GCF IRM	2015–2018
	EUR 50 million to the LDCF	2017
	EUR 50 million to the AF	2017
	EUR 450 million through the International Climate Initiative	2018
	EUR 300 million to the German Climate Technology Initiative	2018
Greece	EUR 4.5 million	2017
Hungary	HUF 1 billion to GCF IRM	2015–2018
Ireland	EUR 52.7 million	2016
	EUR 64 million	2017
	EUR 4 million to the GCF	2016–2017
	EUR 300 000 to the AF	2017
	EUR 2 million to the LDCF	2016–2017
Italy	70% more public climate finance than in 2013–2014	2015–2016
	USD 16.36 million to the AF	2015–2017
	EUR 250 million to the GCF	2015–2018
Japan	USD 23.3 billion through ODA, other official flows and private finance	2015–2016
	USD 1.5 billion to GCF IRM	2015–2018
	Over USD 5 million to the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency	2017
Latvia	EUR 45 300	2011–2014
	EUR 50 000 to the Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership; additional voluntary contribution of EUR 35 000 in 2014	2011–2015
	EUR 350 000 to GCF IRM (as at December 2014)	2015–2018
Lithuania	Approximately EUR 2 million	2011–2018
Netherlands	EUR 229 million (public finance)	2011
	EUR 250 million (public finance)	2012
	EUR 287 million (public finance)	2013
	EUR 395 million (public finance)	2014
	EUR 493 million (public and private finance)	2015
	EUR 681 million (public and private finance)	2016
	EUR 810 million (public and private finance)	2017
	Estimated EUR 840 million (public and private finance)	2018
EUR 100 million to GCF IRM	2015–2018	

<i>Party</i>	<i>Levels of climate finance provided to developing countries, including past annual flows, and examples of programmes and initiatives supported<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Time frame<sup>b</sup></i>
New Zealand	Average of NZD 50 million per year	2015–2018
	NZD 3 million to GCF IRM	2015–2018
	NZD 1.5 million to the United Nations Development Programme for implementing the Montreal Protocol	2018
	NZD 3 million for establishing the Pacific Climate Change Centre in Samoa	2018
Norway	EUR 23 billion through its International Climate and Forest Initiative NOK 75 000 invested through its Government Pension Fund Global	Up to 2017 End of 2017
Portugal	EUR 2 million	2016
	EUR 3 million	2017
Romania	EUR 732 556 (multilateral) EUR 4 667 (bilateral)	2016
Slovakia	EUR 2 196 007	2015
	EUR 2 986 644	2016
Slovenia	EUR 1 960 525	2013
	EUR 2 266 840	2014
	EUR 2 393 155	2015
	EUR 2 976 505	2016
	EUR 3 750 808	2017
Spain	EUR 463 million	2014
	EUR 466 million	2015
	EUR 595 million	2016
Sweden	SEK 3 200 million through Sida	2017
	SEK 560 million to the GCF	2017
	SEK 150 million each to the AF, GEF and LDCF	2017
Switzerland	CHF 85.8 million (public)	2009
	CHF 333.1 million (public)	2016
United Kingdom	GBP 720 million to GCF IRM	2015–2018

<sup>a</sup> The examples of projects and programmes and figures may not be exhaustive; additional details can be found in the submissions.

<sup>b</sup> Information provided on time frame differed across the submissions, particularly when describing contributions to multiannual programmes and initiatives or multilateral funds. Some submissions referred to the year when the climate finance was pledged or contributed to the programme or fund, while others referred to the programming period in which the finance was disbursed.

<sup>c</sup> More details on the contributions of the regions can be found in the submission at <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/201810041701---AT-10-04-EU%20Submission%20on%20Strategies%20and%20Approaches.pdf>.

<sup>d</sup> EU figures include climate finance from public budgets and other development finance institutions.