



**Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting
of the Parties to the Paris Agreement**

Sixth session

Baku, 11–22 November 2024

Item 11(a) of the provisional agenda

Matters relating to finance

New collective quantified goal on climate finance

**2024 high-level ministerial dialogue on the new collective
quantified goal on climate finance**

Summary report by the President

Summary

This report contains a summary of and recommendations arising from the deliberations at the 2024 high-level ministerial dialogue on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance, convened with a view to providing guidance for the deliberations on setting the new collective quantified goal on climate finance at the sixth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement. It has been prepared by the incoming President of that session, with the support of the secretariat, for consideration at that session. The dialogue included consideration of information provided by the co-chairs of the ad hoc work programme on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance and comprised plenary and breakout group sessions with the aim of facilitating interactive discussions and thereby substantively advancing towards a shared understanding of the goal and its elements.



Abbreviations and acronyms

CMA	Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement
COP	Conference of the Parties
HLMD	high-level ministerial dialogue
LDC	least developed country
NCQG	new collective quantified goal on climate finance
NDC	nationally determined contribution
SIDS	small island developing State(s)

I. Introduction

A. Mandate

1. The CMA decided to convene HLMDs starting in 2022 and ending in 2024, ensuring effective political engagement and open, meaningful and robust discussion, with a view to providing guidance on the direction of the ad hoc work programme on the NCQG for the following year, and invited the President of the COP to ensure the coherence and complementarity of the HLMDs.¹

2. CMA 5 emphasized the need for effective, inclusive and meaningful political engagement in relation to the NCQG, including but not limited to the 2024 HLMD, well in advance of CMA 6, and decided to convene the 2024 HLMD on the NCQG well before CMA 6 with a view to providing guidance for the deliberations on setting the NCQG at that session.²

3. CMA 3 requested the President of the COP to prepare a summary of the deliberations at each HLMD, including recommendations, for consideration by the CMA.³

4. CMA 5 decided that deliberations on setting the NCQG will continue and conclude at CMA 6 taking into consideration the annual report for 2024 prepared under the authority of the co-chairs of the ad hoc work programme on the NCQG.⁴

5. In the light of the need for effective, inclusive and meaningful political engagement in relation to the NCQG, including but not limited to the 2024 HLMD,⁵ the incoming Presidency of COP 29 took steps to intensify high-level engagement in a number of ways, including by holding an informal ministerial dialogue on the NCQG on 27 September 2024 during New York Climate Week on the margins of the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly, convening the 2024 HLMD on the NCQG and holding the Pre-COP from 10 to 11 October 2024.

6. During these events, Parties shared views on all elements of the NCQG. Although Parties made progress in terms of clarifying views and narrowing down options, there are still differing positions among Parties on all elements of the NCQG, and views on the structure of the goal, its quantum(s), sources and contributors continue to differ significantly.

B. Scope of the note

7. This report outlines the proceedings of the 2024 HLMD on the NCQG (see chap. II.II below) and provides a summary of the deliberations at the HLMD (see chap. II.0 below), including recommendations, with the aim of providing guidance for the deliberations on setting the NCQG at CMA 6.

C. Possible action by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement

8. CMA 6 may wish to consider this summary report in its deliberations on setting the NCQG.

¹ Decision [9/CMA.3](#), paras. 10 and 13.

² Decision [8/CMA.5](#), paras. 17–18.

³ Decision [9/CMA.3](#), para. 11.

⁴ Decision [8/CMA.5](#), para. 19. The report for 2024 is contained in document [FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/9](#) and [Add.1](#).

II. Proceedings

9. The 2024 HLMD on the NCQG, which was hosted by the incoming COP 29 Presidency and chaired by Mukhtar Babayev, the incoming President of COP 29, was held in Baku on 9 October 2024.⁶ The event was attended by some 300 participants, including 50 ministers, senior officials and heads of delegation, representing 65 Parties. In addition, eight representatives of non-governmental organizations, representing five of the nine observer constituencies in the UNFCCC process, participated as observers.

10. Opening remarks were delivered by Mukhtar Babayev; Amina J. Mohammed, Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations; Yasmine Fouad, Minister of Environment of Egypt; Chris Bowen, Minister for Climate Change and Energy of Australia; and Simon Stiell, UNFCCC Executive Secretary. Zaheer Fakir and Fiona Gilbert, co-chairs of the ad hoc work programme on the NCQG for 2024, then gave a scene-setting presentation.

11. The dialogue commenced with a plenary session, during which 14 ministers and 34 Party representatives shared views on the following question: how can the urgency to act, needs and priorities of developing countries, and the critical role of the NCQG to leverage greater support be translated into a milestone decision to be collectively adopted at COP 29?

12. Subsequently, Parties engaged in four parallel breakout group discussions, each facilitated by two ministers and the co-chairs of the ad hoc work programme, based on guiding questions provided by the incoming CMA 6 Presidency:

(a) What is your vision for the NCQG, its purpose and its scope?

(b) Given the increasing convergence among Parties around a multilayered structure focusing on providing, mobilizing and/or investment flows, how can the NCQG be structured to inspire the highest-level ambition and vision for climate action? How should the quantum be derived?

(c) Given the priorities and views already expressed on sources and contributors, what are your proposals on how these options could come together?

13. Following the breakout group discussions, the co-facilitators of each group provided a summary thereof during a plenary session.

14. The dialogue concluded with statements from representatives of two non-governmental organizations, and closing remarks were made by Adnan Amin, Chief Executive Officer of COP 28, and Yalchin Rafiyev, Chief Negotiator for the incoming Presidency of COP 29.

15. Parties and observer organizations were invited to submit their statements for publication on the UNFCCC website.⁷

Summary of the deliberations at the 2024 high-level ministerial dialogue on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance, including recommendations

1. Summary

16. At the HLMD, Parties underscored the importance of setting the NCQG at CMA 6, including agreeing on all its elements to reflect the urgency of action required to contribute to accelerating the achievement of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement.

17. Parties shared views on the elements of the NCQG, including the context in which the goal is set, its vision, purpose and scope; the goal's structure and deriving its quantum; options for the goal's sources and contributors; and other elements associated with the goal.

⁶ Information on the dialogue, including the agenda, a webcast recording and copies of statements delivered, is available at <https://unfccc.int/event/2024-high-level-ministerial-dialogue-on-the-new-collective-quantified-goal-on-climate-finance>.

⁷ As footnote 6 above.

The following summary provides a non-exhaustive overview of the discussions, without prejudice to the various views expressed.

18. In terms of the NCQG's **context, vision and purpose**, the views shared by most Parties highlighted the role of the NCQG in raising ambition for climate action and supporting the achievement of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement in accordance with Parties' national plans and strategies, including NDCs, national adaptation plans, adaptation communications and long-term low-emission development strategies. Many Parties highlighted the critical role of climate finance as an enabler for ambitious climate action that can provide confidence, predictability, and clarity of information on the provision and mobilization of climate finance as Parties prepare the next round of NDCs, with some cautioning against setting ambition as a precondition for the delivery of climate finance. Most Parties emphasized that the NCQG should be ambitious, transformative and contribute to accelerating climate action, yet several also mentioned it should also be realistic, actionable and achievable, with a view to keeping the 1.5 °C temperature goal of the Paris Agreement within reach.

19. Participants reiterated that paragraph 53 of decision [1/CP.21](#) provides the basis for setting the NCQG, with different interpretations shared on the mandate for it. While some participants emphasized that the principles and provisions of the Convention and the Paris Agreement, in particular Articles 2 and 9 of the Agreement, should provide the legal framework for the NCQG, others emphasized the provisions of the Paris Agreement providing the basis, in particular Article 9, paragraph 3.

20. In order to respond to current circumstances and existing challenges, many Parties underscored that the NCQG should respond to the best available science and the outcomes of the first global stocktake with a view to contributing to accelerating the achievement of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels; increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emission development in a manner that does not threaten food production; and making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.

21. Some Parties emphasized that the context section of the decision in which the NCQG is set should highlight the growing gap between the needs of developing country Parties and the financial support provided and mobilized, including the adaptation finance gap and gaps related to financing the response to loss and damage.

22. Many Parties noted that the NCQG should recognize the challenges and barriers faced by developing countries, including high levels of debt, limited fiscal space, the high cost of capital and unilateral measures, and acknowledged that, despite these challenges and barriers, developing countries continue to take ambitious climate action, emphasizing the opportunity the NCQG can seize in responding to some of these disablers.

23. Reflecting on the experience with the goal of jointly mobilizing USD 100 billion per year by 2020 and through to 2025, many Parties emphasized that, in order to rebuild trust in the multilateral process, the NCQG should significantly improve on the USD 100 billion goal and build on the lessons learned from its implementation, particularly by stressing the need to establish a common understanding of climate finance or agree on climate finance definitions and transparency arrangements from the outset. A large number of Parties also highlighted the importance of striking a balance between finance for mitigation and adaptation, deploying adequate and equitable financial instruments and ensuring that more finance reaches developing country Parties. Special consideration for those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant capacity constraints, such as the LDCs and SIDS, was highlighted.

24. Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, some Parties expressed views that the NCQG should take into account global solidarity and respect for human rights, including the rights of local communities, women and girls, children and Indigenous Peoples.

25. On the **thematic scope** of the NCQG, convergence of views emerged in relation to the goal's scope to cover mitigation and adaptation action, with divergence remaining on whether it should also cover finance for responding to loss and damage. Some Parties called for the NCQG to also support activities related to capacity-building, technology development and transfer, readiness and transparency, with some Parties highlighting a need to formulate sub-goals or subtargets for each area that are expressed either as amounts of United States dollars or as shares in percentages. Some Parties recognized the importance of financing just transitions to low-carbon development.

26. On the structure **and quantum(s)** of the NCQG, Parties highlighted the importance of a provision and mobilization goal for developing countries, with some recognizing the importance of grants and highly concessional loans for the LDCs and SIDS and for adaptation, with differing views expressed on financing for responding to loss and damage.

27. Views continue to differ as to whether the NCQG should be single-layered or multilayered, with a public finance goal for developing countries at its core in the form of finance provided and/or mobilized or whether it should also encompass an outer layer of investments from a wide range of actors beyond contributions from developed country Parties and covering all sources, including public, private and international sources. Some Parties argued that an investment layer would be global, while others proposed an investment layer being for developing country Parties.

28. Several developed country Parties argued that a multilayered NCQG with a global investment target could send strong signals to a wide range of actors within the global financial architecture to mobilize climate finance at a scale that responds to the needs and priorities of developing countries. Proponents of this approach also argued that developed country Parties would continue to provide financial resources to developing country Parties, and that an investment goal would not imply that it only applies to private sources of finance, nor that it focuses solely on mitigation actions.

29. Some Parties questioned the practicality of a multilayered goal and how it would be implemented, recognizing that there remain different understandings of the concept of an investment goal and highlighting the need for further clarification of the implications of such a goal and the opportunities associated with it. Some Parties also cautioned against an overly complex structure for the NCQG, which would make it difficult to track progress towards its achievement, especially because non-Party actors are not accountable under the Convention and the Paris Agreement.

30. Parties acknowledged that there are still several questions to address with respect to a multilayered goal for the NCQG, including in relation to a potential investment layer or target, including on:

- (a) Whether an investment layer would be global, for developing country Parties or both;
- (b) How to report on a multilayered goal, particularly on its investment layer and policy aspects;
- (c) Whether and how reporting mechanisms would be applied to non-Party actors, and how to ensure accountability in this context, given that non-Party actors are not accountable under the Convention and the Paris Agreement;
- (d) How to ensure predictability of climate finance for an investment layer;
- (e) How to ensure that investments do not exacerbate the circumstances faced by developing countries with regard to levels of debt and high costs of capital.

31. Many Parties noted the interlinkages between elements of the structure of the NCQG, notably whether it will comprise a provision and mobilization goal and/or an (international) investment goal, and its **quantum**, with some developed country Parties arguing that a goal for public finance support for developing countries alone would be in the range of hundreds of billions of United States dollars per year, with an opportunity for scaling up financial flows to trillions of United States dollars per year as part of a potential investment goal.

32. Proposals on the quantum of the NCQG by developing country Parties ranged from at least USD 1 trillion per year to USD 1.3 trillion per year. Developing country Parties voiced concerns about the lack of proposals relating to the quantum of the NCQG from developed country Parties, with those Parties emphasizing that the quantum would depend on the structure and time frame agreed.

33. Opinions continue to differ on the **contributors** for the NCQG. Many Parties highlighted that Article 9 of the Paris Agreement should provide the framing with some Parties emphasizing that climate finance shall be provided by developed country Parties to developing country Parties, and others emphasizing that the NCQG is mandated to be guided by Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Paris Agreement, which stipulates that developed country Parties should, as part of a global effort, continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance, implying that other Parties should follow.

34. Recognizing that the amount required to respond to the needs and priorities of developing countries is estimated to be in the range of trillions of United States dollars, some Parties underscored the need for responding to the scale of needs with a wide range of sources including by broadening the contributor base to include non-traditional support providers, such as private sector actors, philanthropic organizations, international financial institutions and other Parties, including those that already provide financial support to developing countries. Some of these Parties clarified that including contributions from other Parties would not involve redefining their status, but would instead recognize their efforts in providing financial support voluntarily and as part of a global effort. Some other Parties cautioned against renegotiating the provisions of the Paris Agreement by shifting the burden of providing financial support and the associated responsibilities to developing countries.

35. Some Parties highlighted the evolving nature of economic capabilities and that some Parties are already providing financial resources, including through South–South cooperation, which should be recognized under the NCQG. Some of these Parties emphasized that increasing the pool of contributors would not result in developed country Parties contributing less but in scaling up the financial resources needed to enable the transformation of the global economy to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement.

36. Some Parties called for establishing burden-sharing arrangements among developed country Parties as an element of delivering the NCQG with a view to ensuring predictability, transparency and accountability in the provision and mobilization of climate finance under the goal.

37. Parties reiterated and emphasized that climate finance under the NCQG will be from a wide variety of **sources and instruments**, noting the significant role of public funds. Many Parties recognized the importance of lowering the cost of capital, and some Parties highlighted the importance of deploying grant-based and highly concessional finance, particularly for the LDCs and SIDS and for adaptation, with differing views on whether financing for addressing loss and damage should be provided under the NCQG. Some Parties cautioned that, since investments flow to areas where there are financial returns, discussions on the NCQG should take into account the circumstances of countries, particularly vulnerable countries, for which attracting private investment may be challenging owing to investment risks.

38. Some Parties underscored that climate finance under the NCQG must promote the co-benefits of climate action and sustainable development. Developing country Parties mentioned that climate finance should be new and additional to official development assistance and other official flows, with some emphasizing the exclusion of fossil fuel subsidies, loans at market rates of return, domestic resources and export credits.

39. Some participants shared positive examples of innovative instruments that create fiscal space and alleviate debt burdens, including debt swaps, climate-resilient debt clauses for lending arrangements, and quantitative assessments of the value of nature-based solutions. It was noted that such instruments, which help to avoid exacerbating existing levels of debt in developing countries, should play a critical role in the NCQG.

40. Other elements associated with the NCQG were also discussed by Parties, including time frame(s), recipients, qualitative elements and transparency arrangements to track progress towards achieving the NCQG.

41. Some Parties shared views on the **time frame(s)** of the NCQG, underscoring the need for alignment with reporting cycles under the UNFCCC, most notably the NDC cycles. With this in mind, some Parties suggested an annual goal, to be achieved over a 5- or 10-year period, or an annual goal to be achieved by a target year in 5 or 10 years' time, with views predominantly converging around a 10-year time frame.

42. On the review and/or revision of the NCQG, several Parties highlighted the importance of periodically reviewing progress in implementing the NCQG in its various aspects, which could be accomplished as part of the global stocktakes, and of making potential adjustments.

43. Regarding **recipients** of finance under the NCQG, Parties underscored that the NCQG will cover support for developing countries, with most Parties recognizing the special needs and circumstances of developing countries, particularly the LDCs and SIDS, and the need to ensure equitable geographical distribution of financial flows among all developing countries. Some Parties also highlighted the needs and special circumstances of Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean.

44. Parties underscored the importance of including strong **qualitative elements** within the NCQG, including elements that reflect efforts to simplify and enhance access to climate finance, and address challenges and barriers faced by developing countries.

45. Recognizing the challenges faced by many developing countries in **accessing** climate finance, some Parties called for the decision setting the NCQG to include provisions aimed at enhancing and simplifying access, streamlining processes under the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism and other climate funds and multilateral development banks and ensuring timely access to financial resources. Common messages mentioned were around prioritizing and standardizing direct access modalities, and enhancing human and institutional capacity in developing countries. Some Parties also called for setting allocations or minimum floors of finance for certain groups of countries, such as the LDCs and SIDS. In order to measure progress in enhancing access to climate finance, some Parties suggested defining and using indicators such as time taken for recipients to access climate finance, transaction costs involved, geographical distribution of recipients, and distribution of instruments by geographical region.

46. Recognizing the **barriers and challenges** faced by many developing countries in accessing climate finance, some Parties advocated for including in the NCQG provisions aimed at facilitating the mobilization of climate finance, removing barriers to investing in projects with climate outcomes, and addressing disenablers. Parties noted the need to enhance the quality of climate finance provided and mobilized, including through policies aimed at promoting ambitious climate action. Some Parties also mentioned the importance of scaling up the provision of grant-based and highly concessional finance, of supporting efforts to reduce the cost of capital for climate action taking into account debt sustainability, and of defining minimum levels for concessional financial terms and conditions. Furthermore, some Parties underscored the need to send strong political signals to actors within the wider financial architecture on the reform and systemic changes needed to further scale up finance from a wide variety of sources.

47. Parties underscored the importance of setting out clear **transparency arrangements** for tracking progress towards achieving the NCQG, building on the existing transparency arrangements under the Paris Agreement. Some Parties argued that such arrangements will be a prerequisite for fostering mutual trust and accountability. There are still differing views as to whether reporting on support provided and mobilized should be limited to developed country Parties or extended to other Parties and non-State actors. Some Parties emphasized the need to establish a climate finance definition or reach an agreement on what should be included and excluded as climate finance under the NCQG.

2. Recommendations

48. In the light of this, Parties may wish to consider engaging with one another prior to and during CMA 6 with a view to identifying bridging proposals. In doing so, Parties may wish to:

(a) Swiftly clarify outstanding questions on the structure of the NCQG to inform and help to advance options for the various elements of the goal. This includes questions of whether the NCQG will be single-layered or not, whether it will only have a core layer of finance provided and/or mobilized or also an outer investment layer, whether an investment layer would be global, for developing countries or both, and how transparency arrangements would relate to each layer;

(b) Clarify the scope of the NCQG, including by elaborating on potential options for how financing for responding to loss and damage could be considered under the NCQG;

(c) Clarify the time frame(s) of the NCQG, building on common messages heard at the 2024 HLMD;

(d) Explore options for how the priorities and needs of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant capacity constraints, such as the LDCs and SIDS, could be reflected in the NCQG;

(e) Engage on deriving the quantum of the NCQG;

(f) Explore options for how reducing barriers to accessing climate finance, addressing disenablers such as debt burdens and the high costs of capital, and increasing opportunities for enhancing the quality of climate finance could be translated into specific calls to action, and whether and how such calls would be directed to specific actors;

(g) Consider enhancing clarity on the sources and contributors of climate finance under the NCQG, and how they would be considered and communicated taking into account the provisions of the Paris Agreement, with the aim of scaling up financial resources as required in the light of developing countries' needs and priorities.
