作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的
《公约》缔约方会议
第三届会议
2021年10月31日至11月12日，格拉斯哥

《巴黎协定》之下的国家自主贡献

经修订的秘书处的综合报告

概要

本文件更新了2021年9月17日发布的FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/8号文件所载国家自主贡献综合报告的主要结论。它考虑到了截至2021年10月12日《巴黎协定》192个缔约方通报并登记在国家自主贡献临时登记册中的165份最新国家自主贡献的信息。
目录

简称和缩略语 .............................................................................................................. 3
一. 内容提要.................................................................................................................. 5
II. Mandate.................................................................................................................... 11
III. Background, scope and approach ........................................................................... 11
   A. Background........................................................................................................... 11
   B. Scope .................................................................................................................... 12
   C. Approach ............................................................................................................... 13
IV. Synthesis of information contained in nationally determined contributions .......... 13
   A. Overview .............................................................................................................. 13
   B. Scope and coverage ............................................................................................. 14
   C. Time frames and/or periods of implementation .................................................. 18
   D. Quantifiable information on the reference point(including, as appropriate, a base year) .... 18
   E. Assumptions and methodological approaches, including for estimating and accounting for anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and, as appropriate, removals .......... 19
   F. Planning and implementation processes .................................................................. 21
   G. Mitigation co-benefits resulting from adaptation action and/or economic diversification plans ........................................................................................................................... 25
   H. Fairness and ambition in the light of national circumstances ........................................ 26
I. Contribution towards achieving the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2, and towards Article 2, paragraph 1(a), and Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement ...... 27
J. Adaptation .................................................................................................................. 30
K. Domestic mitigation measures ...................................................................................... 37
L. Means of implementation ........................................................................................... 41
### 简称和缩略语

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>缩略语</th>
<th>全称</th>
<th>2006 IPCC 2006年气专委指南 2006年气专委国家温室气体清单指南</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>气候赋权行动</td>
<td>2006年气专委国家温室气体清单指南</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDM</td>
<td>清洁发展机制</td>
<td>作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH₄</td>
<td>甲烷</td>
<td>作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMA</td>
<td>《协定》/《公约》缔约方会议</td>
<td>缔约方会议</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO₂</td>
<td>二氧化碳</td>
<td>缔约方会议</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO₂ eq</td>
<td>二氧化碳当量</td>
<td>作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>缔约方会议</td>
<td>《公约》缔约方会议</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COVID-19</td>
<td>2019冠状病毒病</td>
<td>作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>国内生产总值</td>
<td>作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHG</td>
<td>温室气体</td>
<td>作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWP</td>
<td>全球变暖潜能值</td>
<td>作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWP-100*</td>
<td>100年时间跨度的全球变暖潜能值</td>
<td>作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HFC</td>
<td>氢氟碳化物</td>
<td>作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDC</td>
<td>预期国家自主贡献</td>
<td>作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔约方会议</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCC</td>
<td>气专委</td>
<td>政府间气候变化专门委员会</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPPU</td>
<td>工业加工和产品使用</td>
<td>政府间气候变化专门委员会</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IQR*</td>
<td>四分位差</td>
<td>政府间气候变化专门委员会</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT-LEDS</td>
<td>长期低排放发展战略</td>
<td>政府间气候变化专门委员会</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LULUCF</td>
<td>土地利用、土地利用变化与林业</td>
<td>政府间气候变化专门委员会</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N₂O</td>
<td>氧化亚氮</td>
<td>政府间气候变化专门委员会</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAP</td>
<td>国家适应计划</td>
<td>政府间气候变化专门委员会</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDC</td>
<td>国家自主贡献</td>
<td>政府间气候变化专门委员会</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NF₃</td>
<td>三氟化氮</td>
<td>政府间气候变化专门委员会</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC</td>
<td>全氟化碳</td>
<td>政府间气候变化专门委员会</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDD+</td>
<td>减少毁林所致排放量；减少森林退化所致排放量；养护森林碳储存；可持续森林管理；以及加强森林碳储存(第1/CP.16号决定，第70段)</td>
<td>政府间气候变化专门委员会</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*仅用于图表。
<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>可持续发展目标</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF₆</td>
<td>六氟化硫</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLCP*</td>
<td>短期气候污染物</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SR1.5</td>
<td>1.5°C 特别报告</td>
<td>政府间气候变化专门委员会关于全球升温1.5°C 的特别报告</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>社会经济共享路径</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
一. 内容提要

1. 《公约》缔约方会议第二十一次会议(COP 21)和《协定》/《公约》缔约方会议第二十二届会议(CMA 2)请秘书处就缔约方提交的国家自主贡献编写一份综合报告，本报告应此要求编写。鉴于原定 2020 年在格拉斯哥举行的联合国气候变化大会被推迟到 2021 年，以及 2019 冠状病毒病(COVID-19)疫情对编写国家自主贡献工作的影响，秘书处告知缔约方，秘书处将发布两版国家自主贡献综合报告：初版于 2021 年 2 月 28 日之前发布，完整版于 COP 预备会后于 2021 年 9 月 30 日至 10 月 2 日举行。此后，2021 年 9 月 3 日，秘书处通知缔约方，为确保 COP 26 收到现有最新资料，秘书处将在会议启动前夕于 2021 年 10 月 25 日之前对该报告的主要结论加以更新。

2. 本次对国家自主贡献综合报告主要结论的更新汇总了代表《巴黎协定》所有 192 个缔约方的 165 份最新国家自主贡献，包括截至 2021 年 10 月 12 日国家自主贡献临时登记册上登记的 143 个缔约方通报的 116 份新的或更新的国家自主贡献，涵盖了 2019 年全球排放总量的 94.1%，估计在不包括土地利用、土地利用变化与林业(LULUCF)的情况下，该年度全球排放总量为 524 亿吨二氧化碳当量。2

3. 本报告使用了 COP 和 CMA 关于促进国家自主贡献清晰、透明和可理解的信息的指导意见作为框架，用于汇总通报的国家自主贡献所载相关信息；此外，还汇总了国家自主贡献所载但指导意见未涵盖的其他信息，加以补充。汇总的信息是对所有提交信息的缔约方的整体情况总结。几乎所有缔约方都根据 COP 的指导意见，提供了促进国家自主贡献清晰、透明和可理解的必要信息，几乎所有提交了新的或更新的国家自主贡献的缔约方都已采用 CMA 的进一步相关指导意见。

4. 所有缔约方均提供了关于减缓目标或适应行动以及经济多样化计划产生的减缓协同效益的有关信息。减缓目标从整个经济体的绝对减排目标到低排放发展战略、计划和行动不等。在其国家自主贡献中：

(a) 大多数缔约方都提供了量化的减缓目标，以明确的数字目标表示，一些缔约方将战略、计划和行动作为国家自主贡献的组成部分，但没有可量化的信息；

(b) 大多数缔约方通报了整个经济体的目标，涵盖了 2006 年气专委指南中界定的所有或几乎所有部门，越来越多的缔约方在其新的或更新的国家自主贡献中转而使用绝对减排目标；

1 第 1/CMA.2 号决定，第 10 段。

2 除非另有说明，否则在本报告中，全球温室气体排放总量不包括林业和土地利用(LULUCF)产生的排放量，但包括国际海上和国际航空产生的排放量。

3 第 1/CP.21 号决定，第 27 段，以及第 4/CMA.1 号决定和附件一。

4 本报告使用以下词语指代在国家自主贡献中提及特定信息的缔约方的比例：“几个缔约方”——少于 10%；“一些缔约方”——10% 至 40%；“许多缔约方”——41% 至 70%；“大多数缔约方”——71% 至 90%；和“几乎所有缔约方”——超过 90%。
在温室气体方面，几乎所有的国家自主贡献都涵盖二氧化碳排放，大部分涵盖甲烷和氧化亚氮排放，许多涵盖氢氟碳化物排放，也有一些涵盖全氯化碳、六氟化硫和/或三氟化氮排放；

一些缔约方提供了其适应行动和/或经济多样化计划产生的减缓协同效益的有关信息，大多是结合其他目标提供的；

大多数提交了新的或更新的国家自主贡献的缔约方加强了到2025年和/或2030年减少或限制温室气体排放的承诺，显示出应对气候变化的更大雄心。

几乎所有缔约方都通报了2030年之前的国家自主贡献执行期，而另有几个缔约方则具体说明了到2025年、2035年、2040年或2050年的执行期。许多缔约方将2021年1月1日定为执行国家自主贡献的起始日期；另一些缔约方表示，它们于2020年或之前开始执行国家自主贡献；几个缔约方将从2022年开始执行。

几乎所有缔约方提供了其减缓目标和参考点的量化信息。在提交了新的或更新的国家自主贡献的缔约方中，几乎所有缔约方都更新了确定目标的依据，包括参考点和政策照旧的设想情况。虽然这类更新使国家自主贡献的质量提高，但由于目标排放量变化以外的原因，这类更新将导致一些缔约方2025年和2030年的估计排放量发生重大变化。

大多数缔约方提供了根据《巴黎协定》第六条开展自愿合作的信息。几乎所有的国家都表示，它们计划或可能至少采用一种类型的自愿合作。与此同时，一些缔约方对采用自愿合作设定了质量方面的限制。

考虑到《巴黎协定》所有缔约方的最新国家自主贡献的执行，全球温室气体排放总量(不含LULUCF)2025年估计约为547(527-567)亿吨二氧化碳当量，52030年约为549(515-583)亿吨二氧化碳当量。6

(a) 2025年全球温室气体排放总量比1990年(346亿吨二氧化碳当量)高58.1%，比2010年(474亿吨二氧化碳当量)高15.5%，比2019年(524亿吨二氧化碳当量)高4.3%；

(b) 2030年全球温室气体排放总量比1990年高58.7%，比2010年高15.9%，比2019年高4.7%。

5 除非另有说明，否则本报告使用的是《第六次评估报告》中的全球变暖潜能值，时间跨度为100年。如国家自主贡献列入了使用其他全球变暖潜能值(例如前几次评估报告中的全球变暖潜能值)计算出的温室气体排放量估计值，则对相应数值作了转换。更多信息，包括估算方法和做法，见FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/8/Add.3号文件。

6 除非另有说明，否则在本报告中，量化平均值后面列出了代表合计后的最小值和最大值的区间，因为有几个缔约方提供了其国家自主贡献的有条件和无条件要素，在某些情况下，还分别提供了这两种情况的数值区间。
11. 相比之下，通报了新的或更新的国家自主贡献的缔约方 2019 年温室气体排放总量估计为 263 亿吨二氧化碳当量，2025 年因执行其国家自主贡献而产生的温室气体排放总量估计约为 256(247-264)亿吨二氧化碳当量，2030 年约为 236(222-250)亿吨二氧化碳当量，这比根据它们此前提交的国家自主贡献估计的这两年的温室气体排放总量低 3.7(3.3-4.1)%和 11.0(10.1-12.0)%。以绝对值计算，这一组缔约方 2025 年和 2030 年的预计排放水平分别比根据其以往国家自主贡献计算的低 9.9(9.1-10.6)亿吨二氧化碳当量和 29.2(28.0-30.3)亿吨二氧化碳当量。与 2010 年的水平相比，现在，估计到 2025 年，这些缔约方的温室气体排放总量将减少 1.5+(1.8 至 -4.8)%，到 2030 年将减少 9.0(3.6-14.5)%。

12. 考虑到所有最新国家自主贡献的执行，2030 年全球温室气体排放总量预计将比 2010 年的水平高出 15.9%。根据《1.5°C 特别报告》，全球排放路径要符合不超过 1.5 摄氏度或超幅有限的目标，2030 年的全球人为二氧化碳净排放量需比 2010 年降低约 45%，2050 年左右达到净零排放。为了将全球变暖控制在 2 摄氏度以下，2030 年的二氧化碳排放量需比 2010 年降低约 25%，并在 2070 年左右达到净零排放。

13. 考虑到所有最新国家自主贡献的执行，2030 年全球温室气体排放总量预计将会比 2010 年的水平高出 15.9%。根据《1.5°C 特别报告》，全球排放路径要符合不超过 1.5 摄氏度或超幅有限的目标，2030 年的全球人为二氧化碳净排放量需比 2010 年降低约 45%，2050 年左右达到净零排放。为了将全球变暖控制在 2 摄氏度以下，2030 年的二氧化碳排放量需比 2010 年降低约 25%，并在 2070 年左右达到净零排放。

14. 在将全球变暖控制在 1.5 摄氏度以内可能性为 50%的情况下，碳预算中，根据最新的国家自主贡献计算出的 2020-2030 年累计二氧化碳排放量可能会消耗剩余碳预算的 89%，这样 2030 年后的碳预算约为 560 亿吨二氧化碳，相当于 2020-2030 年的年均二氧化碳排放量。同样，将全球变暖控制在 2 摄氏度以内可能性为很有可能的情况下，碳预算中，根据最新的国家自主贡献计算出的 2020-2030 年的累计二氧化碳排放量可能会消耗剩余碳预算的 39%左右。

15. 上文第 10、13 和 14 段中的信息意味着，迫切需要从现在到 2030 年大幅提高国家自主贡献的雄心，或者大幅超额完成最新的国家自主贡献，或者两者兼而有之，以达到气候变化审议的为将变暖控制在远低于 2 摄氏度或限制在 1.5 摄氏度以内许多情景中所建议的成本最优排放水平。如果不能在 2030 年之前减少排放量，之后将需要大幅减少排放量，以弥补在实现净零排放道路上的缓慢起步。《1.5°C 特别报告》确定，净零二氧化碳排放是在任何水平上阻止变暖的先决条件。

16. 一些缔约方提供了直至 2050 年及以后的长期减排愿景、战略和目标的信息，其中提到气候中立、碳中和、温室气体中性或净零排放。估计 2030 年这些缔约方的温室气体排放总量为 143(136 至 149)亿吨二氧化碳当量，与 2010 年相比减少 26(22-29)%。

7 气体论。2018 年，《气委关于在加强全球应对气候变化威胁、实现可持续发展和努力消除贫困的背景下全球升温高于工业化前水平 1.5°C 的影响和相关全球温室气体排放路径的特别报告》。V Masson-Delmotte、P Zhai、H-O Pörtner 等人(编著)。日内瓦：世界气象组织。可查阅 https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/。
17. 考虑到这种长期估计值的固有不确定性，上述信息表明，2050 年这些缔约方的温室气体排放总量可能比 2019 年低 83-88%，年人均排放量估计为 1.0-1.4 吨二氧化碳当量。到 2050 年，全球人均排放量在远低于 2 摄氏度和 1.5 摄氏度的情景下非常相似，分别为 1.6-2.4 吨二氧化碳当量和 0.6-1.2 吨二氧化碳当量。

18. 几乎所有缔约方都介绍了编制和执行国家自主贡献的方针。许多国家将其国家自主贡献与向可持续和/或低碳和有韧性的经济转型的承接近联系起来，同时考虑社会、环境和经济因素以及可持续发展目标。此外，还有许多缔约方表示，它们已将国家自主贡献目标、具体目标和政策纳入国家立法、监管和规划进程，作为确保执行的手段。

19. 许多缔约方强调了其减缓措施与未来发展优先事项之间的政策一致性和协调作用，这些优先事项包括可持续发展目标，对于通报了新的和更新的国家自主贡献的一些缔约方而言，优先事项还包括长期低排放战略以及 COVID-19 疫情后实现绿色恢复。

20. 许多缔约方提到关于国内利益攸关方协商的正式安排。大多数缔约方都表示，他们以包容和参与性的方式进行协商和参与，一些缔约方特别提到了对性别问题敏感的协商。

21. 缔约方越来越多地认识到，纳入性别视角是增强气候行动的雄心和有效性的一种手段。大多数缔约方在其国家自主贡献中提供了与性别有关的信息，许多缔约方声明，它们将在执行国家自主贡献时考虑到性别问题。在以往曾在国家自主贡献中提到性别问题的缔约方中，大多数在新的或更新的国家自主贡献中更详细地阐述了这一主题。一些缔约方提供了信息，说明性别问题如何已纳入或计划如何纳入执行国家自主贡献的主流。

22. 一些缔约方在其国家自主贡献中介绍了地方社区的作用以及土著人民的作用、处境和权利，描述了土著人民所特有的具体脆弱性，利用土著和当地知识加强气候努力的重要性，以及为加强土著人民参与气候行动并作出贡献的安排。

23. 几乎所有缔约方都提供了信息，说明采用一项或多项气候赋权行动要素促进执行气候行动和适应活动的情况，缔约方在其国家自主贡献中基本都就气候赋权行动的一般原则、过去的成就、未来的承诺以及需求和差距提供了更清晰和更详细的资料。

24. 大多数缔约方在其国家自主贡献中列出了与适应有关的信息。其中一些适应内容被指定为适应信息通报。缔约方提供的信息特别涉及适应相关研究；脆弱

8 在本报告中，(国内)减缓措施是指有助于实现国家自主贡献中确定的减缓目标的具体国内政策和行动，包括具有减缓协调效益的适应行动和经济多样化计划。

9 自上次提交国家自主贡献以来，在新的或更新的国家自主贡献中提到性别问题并将其视为贯穿各领域问题的缔约方比例大幅提高。


11 气候赋权行动是指《巴黎协定》第十二条下的工作，其目标是通过教育、培训、公众意识、公众参与、公众获取信息以及在这些问题上的国际合作（气候赋权行动的六个要素），增强社会所有成员参与气候行动的能力。
性；适应措施，特别是国家适应计划和部门行动；应急措施；与减缓和其他全球框架的协同增效；以及适应的监测和评估。

25. 与预期国家自主贡献相比，更多的国家自主贡献包含适应信息。国家自主贡献的适应部分(如包含在内)表明，各国更加重视国家适应规划，特别是国家适应计划制订和执行进程。与这些缔约方以往的国家自主贡献相比，新的或更新的国家自主贡献更详细地阐述了有限目标的量化适应目标和相关指标框架，适应努力与实现可持续发展目标工作之间的具体联系，以及适应和减缓之间的协同作用和协同效益。

26. 在适应优先事项方面，国家自主贡献表明，缔约方继续侧重于粮食生产和营养安全；淡水资源；陆地和湿地生态系统；人的健康；关键经济部门和服务业；灾害风险管理和预警；人类住区和城市地区；沿海地区和海平面上升；海洋生态系统；以及生计和贫困。

27. 几乎所有缔约方都介绍了国内减缓措施，这些措施是实现其国家自主贡献中的减缓目标和某些部门或领域(如能源供应、运输、建筑、工业、农业、LULUCF 以及废物处置)减缓目标的重要手段。

28. 缔约方提到最多的是用于生产可再生能源的国内减缓措施，其次是改善建筑能效的措施。一些缔约方通报了到 2030 年可再生能源在发电中所占份额(15%至100%)的量化目标；其中很多目标份额属于或高出气委按照 1.5 摄氏度路径设定的 47%至 65%的区间。12 对于通报了新的或更新的国家自主贡献的缔约方来说，与以往的国家自主贡献一样，可再生能源发电仍然是最常被提及的减缓办法，提及这一办法的缔约方所占比例自上一份国家自主贡献以来大幅上升(从55%升至 87%)。

29. 可再生能源的生产和向低碳或零碳燃料的转变，往往被视为与降低电力和其他燃料的碳强度相关，包括可为此提高能源供应的电气化率并对能源的最终用途进行电气化。在减少能源需求方面，经常提及提高能源效率和向更高效运输方式的转变。在所有减缓优先领域，缔约方经常指出，将废物转化为能源、改善对粪便和畜群的管理以及氟化气体替代是与减少非二氧化碳排放相关的关键减缓办法。缔约方经常将措施与循环经济概念联系起来，包括减少和回收废物。碳定价经常被认为可通过对温室气体排放定价，有效激励低碳行为和技术。

30. 关于加强土壤或植被固碳的措施，最常提到的是植树造林、再造林和植被恢复、可持续森林管理和减少毁林和森林退化。许多发展中国家缔约方指出，减少毁林是具有重大减缓潜力的优先事项，包括实施 REDD+活动。

31. 《1.5°C 特别报告》确定了被认为与符合 1.5°C 路径相关的减缓办法，包括：

(a) 到 2030 年停止对未减量煤炭的投资。一些缔约方通报了相应的措施，如到 2025 年逐步淘汰使用未减量煤炭发电；

(b) 到 2035-2050 年逐步淘汰化石燃料乘用车的销售。一些缔约方通报了相应的措施，包括 2030 年后禁止新登记柴油车和汽油车；

12 《1.5°C 特别报告》中关于到 2030 年按照 1.5 摄氏度(没有超幅或超幅有限)排放路径全球可再生能源在发电量中所占份额的四分位差。

13 循环经济是指持续利用资源，最大限度地减少废物，以减少对开采矿物、化石燃料和生物质等新资源的需求。
(c) 要求到2020年新建建筑接近于零能耗。一些缔约方通报了相应的措施，如要求2020年1月1日以后新建的建筑能耗几乎为零；

(d) 到2030年扩大森林覆盖率。一些缔约方通报了增加国家森林覆盖率的量化目标，例如将森林覆盖率提高到国土的60%，而不与农业部门争夺土地。

32. 一些缔约方考虑了适应行动和/或经济多样化计划产生的减缓协同效益。相较以往的国家自主贡献，在新的或更新的国家自主贡献中，更多缔约方报告了适应行动和经济多样化计划的减缓协同效益，包括关于具体项目、措施和活动以及由此产生的协同效益的信息。同样，更多缔约方提供了信息，说明对应对措施的社会和经济后果以及公正过渡和/或经济多样化的考量。

33. 具有减缓协同效益的适应行动和经济多样化计划包括造林和再造林活动、气候智能型农业、减少食物浪费、垂直农业、调整沿海生态系统、保护区养护计划，基于自然的解决方案、增加可再生能源在能源生产当中的份额、提高能源效率、二氧化碳捕获和储存、运输部门的燃料转换和燃料价格改革，以及为更好地进行废物管理向循环经济转型。

34. 几乎所有缔约方都在国家自主贡献中提到一些或所有执行手段，尽管这类信息的结构和深度差异巨大。虽然一些缔约方列入了介绍执行手段的专门章节，或在单独章节中介绍资金、技术和/或能力建设情况，但许多缔约方是在国家自主贡献的其他章节中提到或涉及执行手段的各个方面。

35. 许多缔约方提供了对执行国家自主贡献所需资金支持的量化估计。在新的或更新的国家自主贡献中，一些缔约方提供了对资金支持需求的量化估计，其中许多缔约方提供了更新的量化估计数，还有许多缔约方首次提供了估计数。

36. 许多缔约方确定了它们有意用于实施适应和减缓行动的某些类型的技术，例如节能电器、可再生能源技术、低排放或零排放车辆、混合燃料和气候智能型农业。此外，缔约方提到的主要技术需求领域是能源、农业、水、废物处置、运输以及气候观测和预警。

37. 大多数缔约方认为，能力建设是执行国家自主贡献的先决条件。确定了以下方面的能力建设需求：制定政策、将减缓和适应纳入部门规划进程，获得资金和提供必要的信息，以提高国家自主贡献的清晰度、透明度和易理解性。与以往的国家自主贡献相比，在新的或更新的国家自主贡献中，更多的缔约方表示需要适应能力建设。

38. 一些缔约方在其新的或更新的国家自主贡献中提到了COVID-19疫情的潜在影响。国家和全球温室气体排放的相关变化导致的长期影响将取决于疫情的持续时间以及恢复措施的性质和规模。目前，尚不清楚因COVID-19的影响而观察到的2019年至2020年二氧化碳排放总量的下降(在第一工作组向《第六次评估报告》提交的文件中估计约为7%)以及全球恢复一揽子计划的效应可能如何影响2025年和2030年的全球温室气体排放水平。14

II. Mandate

39. Under Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, each Party is to prepare, communicate and maintain successive NDCs that it intends to achieve. The communicated NDCs are to be recorded in a public registry maintained by the secretariat.\(^\text{15}\)

40. COP 21 invited Parties to communicate their first NDC no later than when the Party submits its respective instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of or accession to the Paris Agreement. A Party is also considered to have satisfied this provision, unless the Party decides otherwise, if it had communicated an INDC prior to becoming a Party to the Paris Agreement.\(^\text{16}\)

41. COP 21 requested Parties whose INDC pursuant to decision 1/CP.20 contains a time frame:

   (a) Up to 2025: to communicate by 2020 a new NDC, and to do so every five years thereafter pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 9, of the Paris Agreement;

   (b) Up to 2030: to communicate or update by 2020 their NDC, and to do so every five years thereafter pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 9, of the Paris Agreement.\(^\text{17}\)

42. COP 21 decided that Parties shall submit their NDCs to the secretariat at least 9–12 months in advance of the relevant CMA session with a view to facilitating the clarity, transparency and understanding of the NDCs, including through a synthesis report prepared by the secretariat.\(^\text{18}\)

43. Recalling that decision, CMA 2 requested the secretariat to make the synthesis report available to COP 26.\(^\text{19}\)

III. Background, scope and approach

A. Background

44. Owing to the circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Bureau of the governing bodies, at its meeting on 28 May 2020, decided to postpone from November 2020 to November 2021 the Glasgow Conference, including COP 26.\(^\text{20}\)

45. The pandemic has had an adverse impact on many Parties’ NDC preparation process, leading to challenges in meeting the timelines stipulated in decision 1/CP.21.

46. In view of the postponement of the Glasgow Conference and the impact of the pandemic on the NDC preparation process, the secretariat notified Parties on 13 August 2020 that it was planning to publish two editions of the NDC synthesis report: an initial version by 28 February 2021 based on the NDCs recorded in the interim NDC registry as at 31 December 2020; and the full version containing all the latest information, to be made available to COP 26 in accordance with decision 1/CMA.2.

\(^{15}\) Until the modalities and procedures for the operation and use of the public registry have been finalized under the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, NDCs are being recorded in the interim NDC registry (available at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/Pages/Home.aspx).

\(^{16}\) Decision 1/CP.21, para. 22.

\(^{17}\) Decision 1/CP.21, paras. 23–24.

\(^{18}\) Decision 1/CP.21, para. 25.

\(^{19}\) Decision 1/CMA.2, para. 10.

47. The initial version of the NDC synthesis report, along with its three technical addenda, was published on the UNFCCC website on 26 February 2021.\textsuperscript{21} It synthesizes information from 48 NDCs, representing 75 Parties, submitted as at 31 December 2020 as new or updated NDCs in response to paragraphs 23–24 of decision 1/CP.21, or as new NDCs in case the Party’s INDC was not converted automatically in accordance with paragraph 22 of that decision.\textsuperscript{54}

48. The full version of the NDC synthesis report, along with its three technical addenda, was published on 17 September 2021 on the basis of all NDCs recorded in the interim NDC registry as at 12 October 2021.\textsuperscript{22}

49. On 3 September 2021, the secretariat notified Parties\textsuperscript{23} that in order to ensure that COP 26 has before it the latest information available, the secretariat will issue an update of the key findings of the report shortly before its start, by 25 October 2021. The update of the key findings of the synthesis report contained in this document takes into account new or updated NDCs submitted to the secretariat between 31 July and 12 October 2021.

**B. Scope**

50. This is an update of the key findings of the NDC synthesis report being prepared for COP 26. It synthesizes information from the 165 latest available NDCs, representing all 192 Parties to the Paris Agreement,\textsuperscript{24} recorded in the interim NDC registry as at 12 October 2021.\textsuperscript{25,26} The three technical addenda referred to in paragraph 48 above could not be updated owing to the limited time available for the preparation of the update.

51. The 165 NDCs comprise 116 new or updated NDCs from 143 Parties\textsuperscript{27} and 49 NDCs from Parties that have not communicated new or updated NDCs in response to paragraphs 23–24 of decision 1/CP.21.

\textsuperscript{21} Available at \url{https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/nationally-determined-contributions-ndcs/nationally-determined-contributions-ndcs/ndc-synthesis-report}.

\textsuperscript{22} FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/8 and Add.1–3. Available at \url{https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/nationally-determined-contributions-ndcs/nationally-determined-contributions-ndcs/ndc-synthesis-report}.

\textsuperscript{23} The message to Parties is available at \url{https://unfccc.int/documents/306494}.

\textsuperscript{24} The European Union and its 27 member States communicated one joint NDC in accordance with Article 4, paras. 16–18, of the Paris Agreement, which for this report has been counted as one NDC representing 28 Parties.

\textsuperscript{25} A list of the NDCs covered by this version of the NDC synthesis report is available at \url{https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement/nationally-determined-contributions-ndcs/NDCC-submissions}.

\textsuperscript{26} Between 13 and 25 October 2021 the secretariat received new/updated NDCs from a number of Parties: Bahrain, Chad, Ghana, Japan (full version following up on the interim version submitted on 12 October 2021), Nauru, Pakistan (full version following up on the abridged version submitted on 12 October 2021) and Saudi Arabia. The secretariat also received an NDC submission from Iraq, which, at the time of the preparation of this report, was not a Party to the Paris Agreement. These NDC submissions have not been considered in this update.

\textsuperscript{27} Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Eswatini, European Union (and its 27 member States), Fiji, Gambia, Georgia, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Pakistan (abridged), Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ukraine, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
52. Under Article 4, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement, in communicating their NDCs, Parties are to provide the information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding in accordance with decision 1/CP.21 and any relevant decisions of the CMA.

53. For first NDCs, including those communicated or updated by 2020, this information may cover, as appropriate, quantifiable information on the reference point (including, as appropriate, a base year); time frames and/or periods of implementation; scope and coverage; planning processes; assumptions and methodological approaches, including for estimating and accounting for anthropogenic GHG emissions and, as appropriate, removals; and how the Party considers that its NDC is fair and ambitious in the light of its national circumstances, and how it contributes towards achieving the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2.

54. CMA 1 adopted further guidance on the information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding of NDCs. In communicating their second and subsequent NDCs, Parties shall provide the information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding contained in annex I to decision 4/CMA.1 as applicable to their NDCs. In addition, CMA 1 strongly encouraged Parties to provide this information in relation to their first NDC, including when communicating or updating it by 2020.

55. The guidance on the information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding is without prejudice to the inclusion of components other than information on mitigation in an NDC.

C. Approach

56. The guidance on the information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding of NDCs was used as a framework for synthesizing the relevant information contained in the communicated NDCs, which was supplemented by the synthesis of other information included in the NDCs but not covered by the guidance, such as on adaptation, means of implementation necessary for NDC implementation, domestic mitigation measures, and economic diversification plans and response measures.

57. The synthesis covers only the information communicated by Parties in their NDCs and the synthesized information is presented for all those Parties taken together.

58. In this report, the following terms are used to indicate the percentage of Parties whose NDCs mention particular information: “a few” for less than 10 per cent; “some” for 10–40 per cent; “many” for 41–70 per cent; “most” for 71–90 per cent; and “almost all” for more than 90 per cent.

IV. Synthesis of information contained in nationally determined contributions

A. Overview

59. This report considers the 165 latest available NDCs, representing all 192 Parties to the Paris Agreement, recorded in the interim NDC registry as at 12 October 2021, covering Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

28 Decisions 1/CP.21, para. 27; and 4/CMA.1, para. 9.
29 Decision 4/CMA.1, paras. 6–10 and annex I.
30 Decision 4/CMA.1, para. 8.
31 As per decision 1/CP.21, para. 25.
32 In this report, (domestic) mitigation measures refers to specific policies and actions that contribute to achieving mitigation objectives identified in NDCs, including adaptation actions and economic diversification plans with mitigation co-benefits.
33 The NDC of the European Union has been counted as reflecting the inclusion of particular information by its 27 member States.
94.1 per cent of total global emissions in 2019, which are estimated at 52.4 Gt CO₂ eq\textsuperscript{34} without LULUCF (and around 56.0 Gt CO₂ eq with LULUCF\textsuperscript{35}).

60. Almost all Parties provided the information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding of their NDCs in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement and decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 27. Of the Parties that submitted new or updated NDCs, almost all provided such elements of information, already applying the CMA guidance referred to in paragraph 54 above.

61. Most Parties provided information on adaptation, with a few identifying the adaptation component of their NDC as their adaptation communication, and a few provided information organized around the elements identified in the annex to decision 9/CMA.1.

62. In addition, almost all Parties provided other information, such as on the means of implementation necessary for NDC implementation; domestic mitigation measures; and/or economic diversification plans and response measures.

B. Scope and coverage

63. All Parties provided information on mitigation targets or mitigation co-benefits resulting from adaptation actions and/or economic diversification plans in their NDCs (see figure 1), which range from economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets to strategies, plans and actions for low-emission development, to be implemented within a specified timeframe or implementation period:

(a) Some Parties included absolute emission reduction targets expressed as an emission reduction from the level in a specified base year, ranging from 7.2 to 88.0 per cent. A few other Parties specified a year or time frame in which their emissions are expected to peak or reach a maximum level of absolute emissions (e.g. by 2030). In addition, a few of these Parties expressed their target as a carbon budget in addition to the absolute target, establishing an overall limit on GHGs to be emitted over a specified period of time (e.g. between 2021 and 2030);

(b) Many Parties included relative targets for reducing emissions below the ‘business as usual’ level by a specified target year, either for the whole economy or for specific sectors, ranging from 5 to 103.5 per cent and thus achieving carbon neutrality; or emission intensity targets for reducing specific GHG emissions per GDP unit relative to a base-year (e.g. 1990) level;

(c) Some Parties included strategies, plans and actions for low-emission development reflecting their particular national circumstances;

(d) Some Parties provided information on mitigation co-benefits resulting from their adaptation actions and/or economic diversification plans, mostly in combination with other targets.

\textsuperscript{34} Including emissions from countries that are not Parties to the Paris Agreement, a harmonization factor to ensure comparability with SSP scenarios assessed by the IPCC, and emissions from international aviation and maritime transport, which accounted for approximately 1.2 and 1.5 per cent, respectively, of total global emissions in 2019.

\textsuperscript{35} In line with anthropogenic land-use emissions and removals in the scenarios assessed by the IPCC, although actual directly induced net emissions from LULUCF could be higher.
64. Total global GHG emission levels (without LULUCF) taking into account implementation of the latest NDCs of all Parties to the Paris Agreement are estimated to be around 54.7 (52.7–56.7) Gt CO$_2$ eq in 2025 and 54.9 (51.5–58.3) Gt CO$_2$ eq in 2030\(^6\) (see figure 2).

65. Most Parties’ NDCs are unconditional, at least in part, with many including more ambitious conditional elements. The implementation of most conditional elements depends on access to enhanced financial resources, technology transfer and technical cooperation, and capacity-building support; availability of market-based mechanisms; and absorptive capacity of forests and other ecosystems. Total GHG emission levels resulting from implementation of the unconditional elements of the NDCs are estimated to be 55.5 (54.3–56.7) Gt CO$_2$ eq in 2025 and 56.4 (54.4–58.3) Gt CO$_2$ eq in 2030 (see figure 2).

66. When considering only the new or updated NDCs, the total GHG emissions of the relevant Parties are estimated to be around 25.6 (24.7–26.4) Gt CO$_2$ eq in 2025 and 23.6 (22.2–25.0) Gt CO$_2$ eq in 2030.

67. Of the Parties that submitted new or updated NDCs, most included unconditional components, and many included additional conditional elements. Compared with their previous NDCs, some 20 per cent more Parties included unconditional elements in their new or updated NDCs.

\(^6\) Unless otherwise noted, in this report the average of the quantification is followed by a range that represents the minimum and maximum values after aggregation for the Parties NDCs, since several presented conditional and unconditional elements of their NDCs and, in some cases, ranges of values for both.
Figure 2
Projected range and progression of emission levels

*Note:* The projected ranges cover the higher-emission end for unconditional elements of NDCs to the lower-emission end when also taking conditional elements of NDCs into account. Emissions from international aviation included are assumed constant by 2030 at the 2019 level (~628 Mt CO₂); emissions from international maritime transport of 755 Mt CO₂ eq in 2018 are assumed to be on a linear trajectory by 2030 towards the international maritime sector’s target of halving emissions by 2050 compared with the 2008 level. The comparison of total emissions resulting from implementation of the INDCs and the latest NDCs includes the difference in assumed bunker emissions (approximately 390 and 540 Mt CO₂ eq lower emissions in 2025 and 2030, respectively).

68. All Parties provided information on the scope and coverage of their NDCs, including sectors and gases covered.

69. Most Parties have economy-wide NDCs, with many covering all sectors defined in the 2006 IPCC Guidelines. All NDCs cover the energy sector, most cover agriculture, LULUCF, waste and IPPU (see figure 3).

70. Some Parties provided information on coverage of specific sectors of national importance, which are often a subset of one or more IPCC sectors, such as shipping and aviation, cooling, food production, transport, mining or buildings, while others mentioned specific carbon pools, oceans or blue carbon.

71. Almost all NDCs cover CO₂ emissions, most cover CH₄ and N₂O emissions, many cover HFC emissions and some cover PFC, SF₆ and NF₃ emissions. Some Parties included additional gases or emissions, including short-lived climate pollutants, such as black carbon, sulfur dioxide and non-methane volatile organic compounds (see figure 3).
72. The coverage of sectors and gases has increased in the new or updated NDCs compared with the Parties’ previous NDCs, covering 99.0 per cent (25.5 Gt CO₂ eq) of the Parties’ total economy-wide emissions in 2019, up from 97.3 per cent (25.1 Gt CO₂ eq) previously, resulting in most Parties having economy-wide NDCs, covering all 2006 IPCC Guidelines sectors (see figure 4).

73. Most Parties provided information on how they are striving to include all categories of anthropogenic emissions and removals in their NDCs over time, as well as explanations for the exclusion of any categories. Some Parties stated that they already have economy-wide NDCs including all sectors and GHGs. Some other Parties explained why certain sectors and/or gases had been excluded, such as owing to categories being negligible or insignificant, data unavailability or inaccuracy, or lack of technical capacity.

74. In addition to communicating information on mitigation targets or plans for the near to medium term, many Parties provided information on long-term mitigation visions, strategies or targets for up to and beyond 2050 that either have already been formulated or are under preparation. Of those Parties, most referred to climate neutrality, carbon neutrality, GHG neutrality or net zero emissions by 2030, 2040, 2050, 2060 or mid-century.\(^{37,38}\)

\(^{37}\) As at 12 October 2021, 33 Parties had communicated LT-LEDs, 32 of which had communicated a new or updated NDC; see https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/long-term-strategies.

\(^{38}\) See document FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/8/Add.3 for additional information on long-term goals.
C. **Time frames and/or periods of implementation**

75. All Parties communicated in their NDCs the time frame and/or period of implementation, which refers to a time in the future by or in which an objective is to be achieved.

76. Almost all Parties communicated a time frame and/or period of implementation of until 2030, while a few specified periods of until 2025, 2035, 2040 or 2050. Many Parties indicated 1 January 2021 as their starting date for NDC implementation; some started implementing their NDC in or before 2020; and a few Parties will start doing so from 2022.

77. All Parties communicated a target year, expressing a single-year target, a multi-year target (i.e. for a period of consecutive years) or multiple target years (i.e. several non-consecutive target years) depending on the target.

78. Most Parties communicated a single-year target for 2030, while a few indicated a single-year target for 2025, 2035 or 2040. A few Parties communicated multiple target years, including when target years were associated with the implementation of different policies and measures. A few other Parties indicated having a multi-year target for NDC implementation.

D. **Quantifiable information on the reference point (including, as appropriate, a base year)**

79. Most Parties provided quantified mitigation targets, expressed as clear numerical targets, while some included strategies, plans and actions as referred to in Article 4, paragraph 6, of the Paris Agreement or policies and measures as components of their NDCs for which there is no quantifiable information (see para. 63 above).

80. Most Parties also provided information on the reference year, base year, reference period or other starting point for measuring progress towards the target. Most of those Parties are measuring the achievement of their targets against a base-year level, with many selecting 1990 and others selecting a year between 2000 and 2020. Some have chosen to measure progress in terms of a deviation from a level in the target year, with most selecting 2030; and a few provided a reference period.

81. Almost all Parties further provided information on the reference indicator used to express their target. Most of those Parties chose as the reference indicator absolute GHG emissions, some the ‘business as usual’ GHG emission level, a few a GHG emission budget, and a few others emission intensity per GDP unit or sectoral ‘business as usual’ levels. Most Parties provided a quantified value for their reference indicator for either the base year, the target year or both, as appropriate.

82. Of the Parties that submitted new or updated NDCs, most updated the basis for defining their targets, including reference points and ‘business as usual’ scenarios. Although such updates lead to higher-quality NDCs, for some Parties they lead to significant changes in the estimated emission levels for 2025 and 2030, for reasons other than changes to target levels.

83. Most Parties that included strategies, plans and actions as referred to in Article 4, paragraph 6, of the Paris Agreement provided other information for clarification, including on expected levels of emission reduction or prevention, increased forest coverage, reduction of deforestation, energy efficiency targets, renewable energy share or other non-GHG policy targets.

84. Most Parties provided information on the sources of the emission data used for quantifying the reference point, many referring to national inventory reports and many to biennial reports, biennial update reports and/or national communications. Some Parties also referred to national documents and statistics, such as sector activity reports; national development plans and/or strategies; economic development projections; national climate change plans; energy master plans; national statistics on economy, energy and/or trade; waste
management strategies; national resource plans; energy road maps; national forest reports; and socioeconomic forecasts.

85. Many Parties presented information on the circumstances in which they may update the values of their reference indicators, such as owing to significant changes in specific financial, economic, technological and/or political conditions, or to impacts due to extreme natural disasters; or depending on scale of access to support and other means of implementation, expected improvements or modifications to activity data, variables or methodologies used in estimating national emissions, baselines or projections, or the results of the ongoing negotiations on common metrics; or to reflect the actual situation during the implementation period.

E. Assumptions and methodological approaches, including for estimating and accounting for anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and, as appropriate, removals

1. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change methodologies and metrics

86. Most Parties communicated information on the IPCC methodologies they used for estimating emissions and removals. Many referred to the 2006 IPCC Guidelines and some to the Revised 1996 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, while a few others mentioned that they used both sets of guidelines to cover different sectors.

87. Many Parties provided information on the metrics they used for estimating emissions and removals. Many of them used GWP values over a 100-year time-horizon from the AR5, while some used such values from the AR2 and some those from the AR4. A few Parties used GWP values as well as global temperature potential values from the AR5 for estimating their mitigation targets.

88. Most Parties also communicated information on the assumptions and methodological approaches to be used for accounting anthropogenic GHG emissions and, as appropriate, removals, corresponding to their NDCs. Most of them referred to the 2006 IPCC Guidelines, while some others referred to the Revised 1996 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories or the 2019 Refinement to the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories. Some also mentioned the IPCC Good Practice Guidance and Uncertainty Management in National Greenhouse Gas Inventories and/or the IPCC Good Practice Guidance for Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry.

89. In addition, some Parties also referred to the standard methods and procedures contained in the 2013 Revised Supplementary Methods and Good Practice Guidance Arising from the Kyoto Protocol and the 2013 Supplement to the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories: Wetlands.

2. Assumptions and methodological approaches

90. Many Parties expressed mitigation targets as a deviation from a ‘business as usual’ level, with most presenting quantitative baselines and mitigation scenarios and most providing updated information on the assumptions and approaches used to develop ‘business as usual’ scenarios, baselines or projections, such as baselines and projections being based on historical data and trends in emissions and economic parameters. Most of those Parties referred to key parameters and variables such as GDP and population and growth thereof, and cost–benefit analysis. They also provided sector-specific parameters, including energy consumption, energy demand and production, electricity grid capacity, urbanization rate, transportation network changes and vehicle numbers, forest growth rate, livestock trends, per capita waste generation, and energy and waste statistics per tourist.

91. A few Parties communicated additional information on other approaches used for estimating sector- or activity-specific emissions or baselines, including using regional data sources for downscaling data or generating data at the national level, and calculation tools or approaches for estimating short-lived climate pollutants or precursor emissions. Some Parties mentioned using specific modelling tools for estimating their emissions or baselines, such as The Integrated Market Allocation-Energy Flow Optimization Model System, Long-range
Energy Alternatives Planning, the Greenhouse Gas Abatement Cost Model, Green Economy Modelling, the PROSPECTS+ emissions scenario tool and the Ex-Ante Carbon-balance Tool.

92. Of the Parties that submitted new or updated NDCs, almost all provided more detailed information than previously on the assumptions, methodological approaches and procedures used for developing their baselines or mitigation scenarios.

3. Land use, land-use change and forestry

93. Some Parties consider addressing emissions and subsequent removals due to natural disturbances on managed land if such events occur. Almost all of them mentioned that they may use a statistical approach to identifying natural disturbances following relevant IPCC guidance.

94. Some Parties stated that emissions and removals from harvested wood products will be accounted for as part of their NDCs, with almost all indicating that they will use the production approach.

95. Some Parties mentioned that the effects of age-class structure in forests will be taken into account when estimating the mitigation contribution of forests by using a projected forward-looking forest reference level taking into account current management practices.

4. Voluntary cooperation under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement

96. Most Parties provided information relating to voluntary cooperation. Almost all of them communicated that they plan to or will possibly use voluntary cooperation in at least one of its scopes in implementing their NDCs (see figure 5) by directly or indirectly\(^3^9\) referring to the scopes in their NDCs: general use of voluntary cooperation under Article 6; use of cooperative approaches under Article 6, paragraph 2; use of the mechanism under Article 6, paragraph 4; use of non-market approaches under Article 6, paragraph 8; and use of the CDM.\(^4^0\) The share of Parties that indicated that they plan or will possibly use voluntary cooperation in at least one of its scopes has increased from 46 to 85 per cent in the new or updated NDCs compared with those Parties’ previous NDCs.

97. Many Parties communicated planned or possible use of cooperative approaches, followed by planned or possible use of the mechanism. Some mentioned that they plan to or will possibly make general use of voluntary cooperation, a few Parties indicated that they plan to or will possibly use the CDM, and a few referred to non-market approaches.

---

\(^{39}\) In this report, indirect references include international cooperation under Article 6, market-based mechanisms and non-market mechanisms.

\(^{40}\) Only direct references to use of the CDM were considered: an indirect reference to the CDM such as “international market-based mechanisms” was not considered a reference to the CDM.
98. Some Parties communicated the use of voluntary cooperation as a condition for achieving their mitigation targets.

99. On the other hand, some Parties have set limits on their use of voluntary cooperation: a few have limited their use of voluntary cooperation to achieving their conditional mitigation targets only; a few have set quantitative limits on their use of voluntary cooperation for achieving their mitigation targets, such as achieving unconditional targets primarily through domestic efforts but partially through voluntary cooperation; and some have set qualitative limits on their use of voluntary cooperation for achieving their mitigation targets, such as using units that adhere to standards and guidelines to ensure additionality, permanence or avoidance of double counting of emission reductions. The share of Parties that have set qualitative limits on their use of voluntary cooperation has increased, from 20 to 36 per cent, in the new or updated NDCs compared with those Parties’ previous NDCs.

F. Planning and implementation processes

100. Almost all Parties provided information on their NDC planning processes and most also referred to their implementation plans, communicating information on their institutional arrangements, stakeholder engagement processes and policy instruments, including legislation, strategies, plans and policies.

1. Domestic institutional arrangements

101. Most Parties indicated that domestic institutional arrangements are a key element of coordinating, planning and implementing climate change policy and action at the national and international level and fostering public participation. Most of them referred to specific arrangements in place for NDC preparation, such as inter-institutional commissions, councils and committees, led by a designated entity with a coordination role and including members from public entities, the private sector, non-governmental organizations and/or academia. A few other Parties communicated that such arrangements are under development.

102. Most Parties referred to formal arrangements in place for consulting various stakeholders, including the general public, local communities, indigenous peoples, private entities, business and trade associations, civil society organizations, youth associations, women’s associations, regional development partners, academia and research communities. Almost all of those Parties indicated that they conducted such consultation and engagement processes in an inclusive and participatory manner. Some of these Parties specifically referenced gender-sensitive consultations, referring to specific guidelines for ensuring gender sensitivity, such as during public consultations, and highlighting the inclusion of national gender machineries, gender and women’s groups, or non-governmental organizations in the process.
103. A few Parties mentioned the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action,\(^{41}\) which, under the leadership of the high-level champions, supports implementation of the Paris Agreement by strengthening collaboration between national Governments and cities, subnational regions, businesses, investors and civil society to accelerate action on climate change. In this context, some of those Parties also highlighted the voluntary commitments announced or pledged in collaboration with non-Party stakeholders.\(^{42}\)

104. Many Parties mentioned specific policy instruments in place to facilitate NDC implementation in addition to institutional arrangements, and some others mentioned instruments being under development. Such policy instruments include energy and/or climate strategies, low-emission development strategies, NDC implementation road maps, NDC action plans, laws and regulations on climate change, sectoral national mitigation and adaptation plans and NDC investment plans.

105. Some Parties included information on their domestic measurement, reporting and verification systems, while many others indicated that such systems are under development. Those Parties acknowledged the important role of such systems in continuously monitoring and tracking the status and progress of their NDCs and mitigation efforts, and highlighted that the results will be reflected in national inventory reports and/or biennial transparency reports, ensuring national and international transparency. A few Parties also highlighted that the feedback from such systems will be used to guide the preparation of their subsequent NDCs.

2. Gender

106. Most Parties provided information related to gender in their NDCs and some affirmed that they will take gender into account in implementing them.\(^{43}\)

107. Of the Parties that provided gender-related information, most referred to relevant policies and legislation or affirmed a general commitment to gender equality, while some included information on how gender had been or was planned to be mainstreamed in NDC implementation, and some on specific tools and methods, such as gender analyses or assessments, gender indicators, gender-disaggregated data, and gender-responsive budgeting, and a few included gender as a criterion for prioritizing activities.

108. Many Parties that referred to gender in their NDCs treated it as a cross-cutting issue to be addressed across adaptation and mitigation, with some focusing on adaptation. Some Parties considered gender exclusively in the context of adaptation. Some Parties mentioned taking gender into account in formulating and implementing their NAPs.

109. Many Parties referred to their planned gender-sensitive or gender-responsive climate action or generally elaborated on gender aspects in the context of specific sectors, including in the context of agriculture, energy, disaster, water, health, land use and forestry, fisheries, waste and education.

110. Some Parties highlighted the importance of providing capacity-building, finance and technology for gender-specific action and of these means of implementation being gender-responsive.

111. Some Parties implicitly or explicitly considered gender as it intersects with other social factors. Some Parties explicitly considered specific genders in the context of their differentiated needs and perspectives and the gender-differentiated impacts of and contributions to climate change and climate action. Most of them framed women as being vulnerable and some framed women as stakeholders or agents of change. A few Parties explicitly considered other genders.

\(^{41}\) See https://unfccc.int/climate-action/marrakech-partnership-for-global-climate-action.

\(^{42}\) Voluntary commitments by Parties and non-Party stakeholders are reported and tracked in order to capture the extent of climate action taken globally on the global climate action portal (https://climateaction.unfccc.int/) and in the Yearbook of Global Climate Action (see, e.g., https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/2020_Yearbook_final_0.pdf).

\(^{43}\) For more information on gender under the UNFCCC, see https://unfccc.int/topics/gender/workstreams/chronology-of-gender-in-the-intergovernmental-process.
112. Parties are increasingly considering gender in their NDCs and recognizing gender integration as a means of increasing the ambition and effectiveness of their climate action. The share of Parties referring to gender in the new or updated NDCs compared with their previous NDCs has increased significantly and the share of Parties considering gender as a cross-cutting issue has also risen (see figure 6).

113. Most Parties referenced gender in their first NDCs or for the first time in their new or updated NDCs, and many elaborated more on gender than in their previous NDCs, while a few considered gender to a similar or decreased extent.

Figure 6
Reference to gender in nationally determined contributions

3. Indigenous peoples and local communities

114. Some Parties described the role of indigenous peoples and local communities in the context of their NDCs, including the situation and consideration of the rights of indigenous peoples at the national level, such as legal and consultative arrangements for protecting their rights. They emphasized the vulnerabilities of indigenous peoples relating to their intrinsic relationship with forests and ecosystems and conditions of poverty. The benefits of drawing on indigenous knowledge and expertise, in particular for adaptation, were highlighted, as was the importance of combining traditional and modern practices and of ensuring the participation and leadership of indigenous peoples in climate efforts. Parties outlined how indigenous peoples were engaged in NDC preparation, including through consultations on sectoral proposals, risk assessment and analysis of indigenous knowledge.

115. In addition, some of those Parties elaborated on how actions identified in the NDC aim to benefit indigenous peoples by, for example, enhancing access to finance and technology; building capacities for reducing vulnerabilities as well as for leadership, negotiations and indigenous-led climate action; generating payments for ecosystems services; providing development opportunities; enhancing market access to indigenous products; and diversifying livelihoods. A few Parties specifically elaborated on the role of local communities in climate action, highlighting the importance of empowering such communities, building their capacity to adapt and ensuring their participation in related activities, such as through community-based adaptation plans, decentralization strategies and livelihood improvements, as well as through adaptation measures, such as mangrove restoration, that enhance the resilience of local communities to climate change.

4. Action for Climate Empowerment

116. Almost all Parties provided information on using one or more ACE elements to promote implementation of mitigation and adaptation activities. Some Parties indicated their

---

44 ACE denotes work under Article 12 of the Paris Agreement; its objective is to empower all members
intention, and the support needed, to systematically address ACE by developing national ACE strategies, incorporating ACE and its elements into general climate policies and plans, upholding ACE as a guiding principle and cross-cutting priority for climate action, and setting specific ACE-related targets.

117. Many Parties elaborated on climate education measures such as updating formal, informal and non-formal education curricula and programmes, establishing laws and policies to ensure provision of climate education, mainstreaming climate change in national education strategies and plans, and providing training and resources for teachers and educators. Many Parties included information on training measures, including integrating climate change into training programmes for civil servants and other stakeholders.45 The need for training was also highlighted in the context of achieving just transition and accessing green jobs.

118. Many Parties provided information on measures for raising public awareness, such as developing communication strategies, disseminating knowledge through traditional and new media, and implementing awareness-raising campaigns for specific sectors, such as health, biodiversity and energy efficiency. Most Parties mentioned public participation, including information on institutional arrangements (see paras. 101–105 above). Some Parties included information on public access to information, providing details on developing regulations and systems to guarantee and facilitate access to climate information and data.

119. In the new or updated NDCs, Parties generally communicated more clearly, and in more detail, than previously on general principles, past achievements, future commitments, and needs and gaps in relation to ACE. More Parties are explicitly referring to ACE as a necessary means of mobilizing and empowering society to deliver the mitigation and adaptation objectives outlined in their NDCs.

5. Best practices and other contextual matters

120. Many Parties communicated best practices for NDC preparation, such as institutionalizing climate policy development within joint planning frameworks; strengthening stakeholder capacity to participate more substantively in NDC preparation and implementation; designing planning and reporting systems for transparency and public scrutiny; incorporating experience and lessons learned from INDC preparation and implementation efforts; conducting extensive stakeholder consultation and peer review to enhance their understanding of the NDC; conducting a preliminary assessment of pre-2020 efforts to identify gaps and needs and develop an NDC road map; mainstreaming NDC goals in existing strategies, plans and policies to obtain political support and benefit from existing arrangements; partnering with regional and international organizations to develop a robust NDC; and establishing a scientific and quantitative system for analysing and assessing progress of implementation.

121. Although the first global stocktake will not be conducted until 2023, on the basis of their national circumstances and development pathways, many Parties highlighted other contextual aspirations and priority areas, such as maximizing synergies between short- and long-term climate commitments and the SDGs; adaptation and climate-resilient development; collaboration and support by developed country Parties and international organizations; deploying low-emission technologies to drive emission reduction, safeguarding food security and eradicating poverty; involving youth, local governments and communities and/or indigenous groups in a gender-responsive manner; just transition of the workforce; social and climate justice; circular economy; integrated resource management; oceans or blue carbon; disaster risk reduction; human health; energy production from renewable sources and/or energy efficiency; and reducing risks caused by loss and damage.

122. Of the Parties that submitted new or updated NDCs, some provided information on how their NDC preparation was informed by activities or events relevant to the collective

of society to engage in climate action through education, training, public awareness, public participation, public access to information, and international cooperation on these issues (the six ACE elements).

45 See paras. 202–205 below for more information on training measures in the context of capacity-building.
assessment of progress in addressing climate change, such as the United Nations Secretary-General’s calls to strengthen climate action and ambition during the 2018 high-level event on climate change, the recommendations from the Talanoa Call for Action, and/or the best available science, such as the SR1.5.\(^\text{46}\)

**G. Mitigation co-benefits resulting from adaptation action and/or economic diversification plans**

123. Some Parties considered mitigation co-benefits resulting from their adaptation action and/or economic diversification plans and a few mentioned that such co-benefits have been taken into account in their mitigation efforts. Many of those Parties considered social and economic consequences of response measures and included an economic diversification plan and/or a just transition or social pillar for designing climate policies that foster a just and equitable transition, and managing changes arising in relevant sectors due to the implementation of climate policies. Some other Parties considered positive and/or negative economic and social consequences of response measures without linking them to the mitigation co-benefits of their adaptation action and/or economic diversification plans. Some Parties presented their sectoral mitigation and adaptation plans in agriculture, energy, forestry, tourism and transport sector as transition or diversification plans.

124. The Parties highlighted unequal impacts on different groups of society or the workforce as consequences of response measures, with impacts on the workforce\(^\text{47}\) being the most frequently mentioned. Some plan to address such impacts by including the concept of just transition in their overall NDC implementation, such as a just transition mechanism and just transition funds; laws and strategies for protecting workers; a social mechanism for job creation, skills development and employment policies; and a consultation process for social protection. A few Parties paid special attention to addressing impacts of response measures on vulnerable groups and communities in relation to poverty, job opportunities and inequality during transition.

125. Some Parties considered economic diversification as part of their national development plans and climate policies to boost the country’s resilience to climate change and response measures. A few of them linked such plans to an existing poorly diversified economy and the impact of response measures on sectors of high economic importance, such as extraction of fossil fuels. Those Parties specifically mentioned economic diversification plans or actions focused on high-emitting sectors and sectors of economic importance. Such plans include enhancing education; increasing the share of energy generation using renewable sources; improving energy efficiency through regulatory measures, pricing signals and technology deployment in the fisheries, industry and buildings sectors; carbon dioxide capture and storage in the oil and gas industry; implementing fuel switch and fuel price reforms in the transport sector; moving to circular economy for better waste management; and adopting sustainable tourism practices to build the tourism sector.

126. Some Parties described how their adaptation action contributes to emission reduction, including their intention to consider mitigation co-benefits in NAP formulation. In terms of sectors, some described the potential co-benefits of various agricultural adaptation measures, including climate-smart agriculture, reducing food waste and vertical farming. Adaptation of coastal ecosystems was highlighted as another source of co-benefits, in particular planting mangroves and seagrass beds. Other sectors with potential co-benefits mentioned were forestry, natural resources and the environment, energy and waste.

127. Most Parties identified agriculture as a high priority for adaptation, either explicitly or as part of cross-sectoral adaptation efforts, and most are aiming to use mitigation

---


\(^\text{47}\) Such as low-income groups, women, young people, indigenous peoples and people with disabilities.
opportunities in the sector. Many Parties highlighted the need to focus on activities that have positive effects on mitigation and adaptation while ensuring food security.

### H. Fairness and ambition in the light of national circumstances

128. Almost all Parties explained, using different metrics, how they consider their NDCs to be fair and ambitious in the light of their national circumstances. 48

129. Those Parties included qualitative and/or quantitative information on how their NDCs represent progression and highest possible ambition, such as through increased estimated level of emission reductions; earlier projected peaking of emissions; enhancing mitigation efforts; increasing unconditional elements; including long-term targets; introducing and/or enhancing policies; elaborating on adaptation action; integrating climate goals into national policy instruments; enhanced linkages with the SDGs; using more accurate data and moving to higher-tier estimation; establishing arrangements for monitoring and/or tracking progress of implementation; enhancing the stakeholder consultation process; developing sector-based action plans for implementation; and presenting additional information to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding.

130. Many Parties framed fairness consideration within their past, current and future share in global and/or per capita emissions compared with global averages, or in relation to the trends in one or several metrics. Of the Parties that communicated new or updated NDCs, some indicated that, despite COVID-19 and its impacts on their economies, they are committed to implementing their NDCs to address climate change.

131. Many Parties provided information on ambition by linking their NDCs to their commitment to transition to a sustainable and/or low-carbon and resilient economy; some expressed that they have incorporated their NDC goals and policies into national legislative, regulatory and planning processes as a means of ensuring implementation; some addressed ambition in the context of the inclusive design of their NDCs, considering various cross-cutting aspects, such as investment plans, gender-responsiveness, education and just transition.

132. Many Parties expressed that their NDCs are in line with the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement or with the mitigation pathways for limiting global warming to well below 2 or 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. Of the Parties that communicated new or updated NDCs, most highlighted that they have enhanced their mitigation and/or adaptation contributions.

133. Total global GHG emission levels (without LULUCF) taking into account implementation of the latest NDCs of all Parties to the Paris Agreement are estimated to be around 1.4 Gt CO₂ eq. or on average 2.6 per cent, by 2025 and 3.6 Gt CO₂ eq. or on average 6.2 per cent, by 2030 below the levels indicated in the INDCs as at 4 April 2016.

134. When compared with implementation of the previous NDCs of Parties that had submitted new or updated NDCs as at 12 October 2021, implementation of their new or updated NDCs is estimated to result in a lower level of emissions by 3.7 (3.3–4.1) per cent in 2025 and 11.0 (10.1–12.0) per cent in 2030.

---

48 Metrics include capabilities; historic and current responsibility; climate justice; share in global emissions; level of per capita emissions; vulnerability to the adverse impacts of climate change; development and/or technological capacity; mitigation potential; cost of mitigation actions; degree of progression or progression beyond the current level of effort; and link to objectives of the Paris Agreement and its long-term global goals.

49 In this report, the term “progression” is used to refer to the difference between the estimated emission levels associated with implementation of Parties’ INDCs communicated to the secretariat as at 4 April 2016 and those according to the NDCs available in the interim NDC registry as at 12 October 2021. In the figures in this report the progression is shown from INDCs as at 4 April 2016 (grey shading), covered in document FCCC/CP/2016/2, to NDCs as at 12 October 2021 (blue shading), aggregated in this report.
I. Contribution towards achieving the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2, and towards Article 2, paragraph 1(a), and Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement

135. The information necessary to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding of NDCs includes information on:

(a) How the NDC contributes towards achieving the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2;

(b) How the NDC contributes towards Article 2, paragraph 1(a), and Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement.

136. Almost all Parties communicated information on the contribution of their NDCs towards achieving the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2, and towards Article 2, paragraph 1(a), and Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement.

137. Many Parties indicated that their level of emissions in the future is expected to fall within the scope of a global emission pathway that is consistent with the goal of keeping the global average temperature increase below 2 or 1.5 °C.

138. In that context, Parties highlighted their national mitigation and/or adaptation efforts, NDC targets, LT-LEDS, development pathways for decoupling emissions from economic growth, and mobilization of domestic and international support.

139. The projected total GHG emission level in 2025 is 58.1 per cent higher than in 1990 (34.6 Gt CO$_{2}$ eq), 45.2 per cent higher than in 2000 (37.7 Gt CO$_{2}$ eq), 27.2 per cent higher than in 2005 (43.0 Gt CO$_{2}$ eq), 15.5 per cent higher than in 2010 (47.4 Gt CO$_{2}$ eq), 7.5 per cent higher than in 2015 (50.9 Gt CO$_{2}$ eq) and 4.3 per cent higher than in 2019 (52.4 Gt CO$_{2}$ eq) (see figure 7).

140. For 2030, the projected total GHG emission level is 58.7 per cent higher than in 1990, 45.7 per cent higher than in 2000, 27.7 per cent higher than in 2005, 15.9 per cent higher than in 2010, 7.9 per cent higher than in 2015 and 4.7 per cent higher than 2019 (see figure 7).

141. In comparison, the estimated total GHG emission levels for 2030 associated with implementation of Parties’ INDCs implied stronger emission increases above historical levels: 69.2 (59.3–79.1) per cent above the 1990 level, 23.6 (16.4–30.9) per cent above the 2010 level and 11.6 (5.1–18.2) per cent above the 2019 level (see figure 7).

142. For Parties that communicated new or updated NDCs, their total GHG emissions are estimated to be 26.3 Gt CO$_{2}$ eq in 2019, and total GHG emission levels resulting from implementation of their NDCs are estimated to be around 25.6 (24.7–26.4) Gt CO$_{2}$ eq in 2025 and 23.6 (22.2–25.0) Gt CO$_{2}$ eq in 2030, which is about 1.5 (+1.8 to −4.8) per cent lower by 2025 and 9.0 (3.6–14.5) per cent lower by 2030 than in 2010 and 2.8 (+0.4 to −6.0) per cent lower by 2025 and 10.3 (4.9–15.6) per cent lower by 2030 than in 2019.

---

50 See document FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/8/Add.3 for additional information, including on estimation methods and assumptions used.
51 Decision 4/CMA.1, annex I, para. 7.
143. The total GHG emission level resulting from implementation of the unconditional elements of the NDCs is projected to be 7.5 (3.8–11.2) per cent higher in 2030 than in 2019; whereas the total GHG emission level resulting from implementation of the NDCs including conditional elements is projected to be only 2.0 per cent (−1.8 to +5.7) higher in 2030 than in 2019, indicating, if all NDCs (including their conditional elements) are fully implemented, the possibility of peaking of global emissions before 2030, with the lower bound of the 2030 emission level (51.5 Gt CO₂ eq) estimated to be up to 1.8 per cent below the 2019 level (52.4 Gt CO₂ eq) and 2.2 per cent below the lower bound of the estimated 2025 level (52.7 Gt CO₂ eq) (see figure 8).

144. In comparison, considering the full implementation of INDCs (including their conditional elements), a continuously increasing trend in emissions was estimated up to 2030, resulting in a global emission level of approximately 9.0 (5.1–12.8) per cent above the 2019 level. Implementation of only the unconditional elements of the INDCs was estimated to result in a global emission level in 2030 of approximately 14.3 (10.5–18.2) per cent above the 2019 level (see figure 8).

145. According to the latest NDCs, per capita emissions will equal 6.7 (6.5–7.0) t CO₂ eq in 2025 and, slightly lower, 6.5 (6.1–6.9) t CO₂ eq in 2030, which is, on average, 1.7 per cent lower in 2025 and 5.5 per cent lower in 2030 than in 2019.
146. Some Parties provided quantifiable information on their long-term mitigation visions, strategies and targets for up to and beyond 2050, many of which communicated LT-LEDS in response to Article 4, paragraph 19, of the Paris Agreement.52 The total GHG emission level of those Parties is estimated to be 14.3 (13.6–14.9) Gt CO$_2$ eq in 2030, which is 26 (22–29) per cent below their emission level in 2010.

147. On the basis of the information provided on long-term mitigation visions, strategies and targets in the NDCs, the total emissions in 2050 of the Parties with long-term targets are estimated at 2.2–3.2 Gt CO$_2$ eq. Mindful of the inherent uncertainty of such long-term estimates, the information indicates that these Parties’ total GHG emission level could be 83–88 per cent lower in 2050 than in 2019, with annual per capita emissions estimated at 1.0–1.4 t CO$_2$ eq. Global per capita emission levels by 2050 under the well-below 2 °C (“lower 2 °C”) and 1.5 °C scenarios (“1.5 °C with limited overshoot”) are very similar at 1.6–2.4 t CO$_2$ eq and 0.6–1.2 t CO$_2$ eq, respectively.

148. The COVID-19 pandemic was mentioned by some Parties in the new or updated NDCs, but most have not reflected the potential impacts of the pandemic in their NDCs. The longer-term effects of the related changes in national and global GHG emissions will depend on the duration of the pandemic and the nature and scale of recovery measures.

Comparison with scenarios considered by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

149. According to the SR1.5, net anthropogenic CO$_2$ emissions need to decline by about 45 per cent from the 2010 level by 2030 (40–60 per cent interquartile range), reaching net zero around 2050 (2045–2055 interquartile range), in order to be consistent with global emission pathways that feature no or limited temporary overshoot of the 1.5 °C warming level. The contribution of Working Group I to the AR653 conveyed a similar message in that the “very low GHG emissions” scenario considered is the only scenario in which warming is limited to around 1.5 °C and features net zero global CO$_2$ emissions around 2050. For limiting global warming to below 2 °C, CO$_2$ emissions need to decline by about 25 per cent from the 2010 level by 2030 on most pathways (10–30 per cent interquartile range) and reach net zero around 2070 (2065–2080 interquartile range). Deep reductions are required for non-CO$_2$ emissions as well.54

---

52 As at 12 October 2021, 33 Parties had communicated LT-LEDS, 32 of which had communicated a new or updated NDC; see https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/long-term-strategies.
54 Further information on all IPCC scenarios is available at https://data.ene.ieasa.ac.at/iamic-1.5c-explorer/.
Figure 9
Comparison of global emissions under scenarios assessed in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C with total global emissions according to nationally determined contributions

Note: The assessed global emission ranges (including LULUCF) for the IPCC scenarios provided in the SR1.5 (table 2.4) are shown with interquartile ranges. The illustrative SSP scenarios considered in the contribution of Working Group I to the AR6 are indicated (SSP2-4.5 by a yellow solid line, with an estimated end-of-century temperature of 2.7 (2.1–3.5) °C). The total GHG emission level resulting from implementation of the latest NDCs is compared with the emission levels for three of the scenario groups in the SR1.5 scenario database: a group of scenarios in which global mean temperature rise is kept at all times below 1.5 °C relative to the 1850–1900 (“below 1.5 °C”); a group of scenarios in which warming is kept at around 1.5 °C with a potential limited overshoot and then decrease of global mean temperature rise below 1.5 °C by the end of the century (“1.5 °C with limited overshoot”); and a third group that implies warming of well below 2 °C, that is above 1.5 °C by 2100 but with a likely chance of it being below 2 °C at all times (“lower 2 °C”). The latter group features scenarios with strong emission reductions in the 2020s or only after 2030.

150. The total global GHG emission level in 2030 taking into account implementation of the latest NDCs is expected to be 15.9 per cent above the 2010 level. Taken together with the information in figure 9 and paragraph 149 above, this implies an urgent need for either a significant increase in the level of ambition of NDCs between now and 2030 or a significant overachievement of the latest NDCs, or a combination of both, in order to attain cost-optimal emission levels suggested in many of the scenarios considered by the IPCC. If emissions are not reduced by 2030, they will need to be substantially reduced thereafter to compensate for the slow start on the path to net zero emissions. The SR1.5 identifies net zero CO₂ emissions as a prerequisite for halting warming at any level.

151. On the basis of the latest NDCs, cumulative CO₂ emissions in 2020–2030 are estimated to be around 444 (431–458) Gt.

152. In the context of the carbon budget consistent with 50 per cent likelihood of limiting warming to 1.5 °C, cumulative CO₂ emissions in 2020–2030 based on the latest NDCs would likely use up 89 per cent of the remaining carbon budget, leaving a post-2030 carbon budget of around 56 Gt CO₂, which is equivalent to the average annual CO₂ emissions in 2020–2030. Similarly, in the context of the carbon budget consistent with a likely chance of keeping warming below 2 °C, cumulative CO₂ emissions in 2020–2030 based on the latest NDCs would likely use up 39 per cent of the remaining carbon budget.

J. Adaptation

153. Adaptation involves responding to climate change by assessing impacts, vulnerability and risk; planning and implementing adaptation; making contingency arrangements for when impacts occur; addressing losses; and monitoring and evaluating adaptation efforts.
Arrangements have been developed under the Convention to facilitate adaptation, in particular NAPs, institutions such as the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, partnership structures for closing knowledge gaps, and provisions to facilitate support for, and transparency of, adaptation. Under the Paris Agreement, Parties may include an adaptation component in their NDCs.

1. **Scope**

154. Most Parties included an adaptation component in their NDCs, a few of which were designated as adaptation communications. In particular, they provided information on vulnerability and national circumstances; efforts to enhance adaptation-related research; adaptation measures, in particular NAPs and sectoral actions; contingency measures; synergies between adaptation and mitigation as well as with other global frameworks; and monitoring and evaluation of adaptation.

155. The information provided illustrates how Parties have advanced adaptation since the INDCs. For example:

   a) An increasing number of Parties provided information on adaptation, indicating the importance attached to adaptation by Parties from all regions and groups;

   b) Many Parties described the status of their process to formulate and implement NAPs, demonstrating how the NAP has been established as the main national instrument for adaptation and a key source of information for the NDCs.

156. Compared with their previous NDCs, Parties that communicated new or updated NDCs provided more detailed information on, in particular:

   a) Their national frameworks, thereby describing more integrated frameworks, in contrast to the multiple frameworks and individual projects described previously;

   b) Quantitative time-bound targets, in contrast to the qualitative and open-ended adaptation objectives provided previously, with a few highlighting the indicator frameworks that they intend to use for monitoring progress;

   c) Mitigation and sustainable development co-benefits of adaptation, as well as on other synergies between mitigation and adaptation.

157. Some Parties identified the adaptation component as their adaptation communication, a few provided information organized around the elements identified in the annex to decision 9/CMA.1 and a few announced their intention to prepare an adaptation communication.

2. **Impacts, risk and vulnerability**

158. Almost all of the adaptation components described key climatic changes, referring in particular to temperature increase, extreme temperatures, precipitation changes and sea level rise. These were identified as triggering various climate impacts, in particular extreme events (including rainfall events, storms and cyclones), flooding, drought, heatwaves, saltwater intrusion, ocean acidification, coral bleaching, erosion, landslides, fires and thawing ice and permafrost. Parties described how impacts affect vulnerable areas. Of particular concern are agriculture and other aspects of food security, water, biodiversity and ecosystems, health systems, infrastructure (in particular energy, transportation and tourism) and loss of territory, livelihoods and habitats. Parties highlighted groups and areas that are particularly vulnerable. As factors of vulnerability, they highlighted, for example, dependence on climate-sensitive sectors, status as a small island developing State, having complex and vulnerable ecosystems, location of population and infrastructure on coasts, and economic factors, in particular poverty and lack of other institutional, financial and technical capacities. Vulnerability has also increased as a result of COVID-19.

3. **Enhancing adaptation-related research for policymaking**

159. Most of the Parties that included an adaptation component considered how to enhance adaptation-relevant research, data, information and monitoring, and ensure that adaptation

---

55 See document FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/8/Add.1 for more details on quantitative targets.
efforts are informed by science. Some of the adaptation components described efforts to enhance research through, for example, data collection programmes, national census on impacts, monitoring systems, observation networks, research centres, strengthened weather services, climate and risk modelling, risk maps with climate data and scenarios, and international cooperation. Research efforts focus in particular on oceans, coastal areas, land use and ecosystems. Research related to specific impacts includes development of flood or multi-hazard monitoring systems, sea level research programmes and remote sensing monitoring of hydrometeorological extremes. To ensure that adaptation is guided by robust science and projections, Parties are aiming to develop, for example, integrated climate information systems, open-source data, data pooling and sharing platforms for accessing information, and forecasting tools and scenarios.

4. Pre-emptive adaptation

160. Many Parties that provided an adaptation component described the process for formulating and implementing their NAP and its status. Some indicated that they have developed a NAP, while others identified their intention to do so, including a timeline for completion or update and/or implementation. Some Parties outlined links between their NAP and NDC, including how the NAP provided the basis for the adaptation component, how both build on the same vulnerability assessment, and how the NAP and NDC can be aligned. Some Parties described the scope of their NAP, including in relation to enabling risk and vulnerability analysis; integrating adaptation into development planning; enhancing climate information; strengthening adaptive, institutional, policy and technical capacities; outlining and prioritizing adaptation needs, objectives, milestones and actions as well as costs of adaptation; providing a framework for planning, implementation and coordination; integrating adaptation across frameworks and sectors; enhancing financing, engagement and gender-responsiveness; strengthening monitoring and evaluation (including by defining quantifiable goals and indicators for priority sectors); and enabling consideration of co-benefits between mitigation and adaptation.

161. Parties also described other policy frameworks relevant to adaptation, including information on how such frameworks provide a basis for adaptation efforts and how adaptation is integrated into and strengthened under other frameworks, such as adaptation-specific frameworks, national climate plans, local government or community-level plans, sectoral plans relevant to adaptation priorities, disaster risk reduction policies, national and regional development frameworks and UNFCCC frameworks (e.g. national adaptation programmes of action, technology needs assessments and the economic diversification initiative). A few Parties highlighted the inclusion of adaptation considerations in their national constitution.
162. Parties provided a wide range of information on adaptation in various priority areas (see figure 10). The key efforts in those priority areas are described below.\textsuperscript{56}

163. Climate impacts pose multiple risks to food security, including reduced production of major crops (wheat, rice and maize) and redistribution of marine fisheries.\textsuperscript{57} In most adaptation components, measures for adapting food production systems and ensuring food security were prioritized, encompassing adaptation efforts in the areas of agriculture, livestock and fisheries. In agriculture, adaptation is being pursued via sectoral vulnerability analysis research, planning, diversification, financial mechanisms and insurance, systems for agroclimatic information and improvements to post-harvest processing. As technical solutions, Parties are focusing on, for example, temperature-, pest-, disease-, flood- and/or drought-resistant crops, seed banks, enhanced pest and disease control, enhanced irrigation and water use, and sustainable, climate-smart and integrated land-use and cultivation methods. Many adaptation components highlighted measures for enhancing resilience, sustainability and productivity of livestock and pastoralism, including research, disease control, rangeland management, more resilient breeds and feeds, insurance and diversification. The measures for enhancing sustainability of fisheries involve research, diversification, capacity-building, sustainable management, habitat protection and financial instruments (e.g. insurance).

\textsuperscript{56} See document FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/8/Add.1 for information on specific measures and quantitative targets in each priority area.

164. Climate change is expected to have negative impacts on human health up to 2050, including increased likelihood of undernutrition from diminished food production; injury, disease and death from more intense heatwaves and fires; and higher risks from food-, water- and vector-borne diseases.⁵⁸ Health was identified as an adaptation priority in many of the adaptation components, with relevant policy frameworks and plans described. The importance of building the capacity of health institutions and enhancing information and awareness was highlighted. Enhancing the climate resilience of public health systems was a recurring theme, with Parties aiming to build or improve related infrastructure. Parties are focusing on enhancing impact and disease surveillance and monitoring, providing training and education to healthcare professionals and communities, and performing vulnerability assessment and mapping. Measures tend to focus on improving sanitation and hygiene practices, as well as responding to climate-sensitive vector- or water-borne diseases, respiratory impacts and heatwaves.

165. According to current climate change projections, a large fraction of terrestrial species face an increased risk of extinction, with many regions projected to experience increased tree mortality and forest dieback owing to increased temperatures and drought.⁵⁹ Most adaptation components described adaptation efforts to protect terrestrial ecosystems and forests, with Parties aiming in particular to increase protected areas and connectivity, enhance urban biodiversity and forest areas, conserve vulnerable or threatened species, restore degraded lands and ecosystems and implement sustainable forest management and reforestation.

166. Global populations experiencing water scarcity and affected by major river floods are projected to increase, and climate change is expected to reduce raw water quality and pose risks to drinking water quality.⁶⁰ In most adaptation components, freshwater resources were identified as a priority area and measures for enhancing availability, efficiency and quality of water supplies were presented, including enhancing or building water infrastructure and water resource plans, strategies and systems. Parties are aiming to strengthen watershed management, efficiency of water use and irrigation. Integrated water resources management, protection and restoration of water-related ecosystems such as forests, wetlands and rivers, and supply diversification were highlighted measures. Efforts to promote transboundary water management and cooperation were also included.

167. Low-lying coastal areas are increasingly exposed to the risks associated with sea level rise as a result of increasing warming, which include saltwater intrusion, flooding, and infrastructure damage.⁶¹ Many adaptation components included measures for protecting coastal and low-lying areas, including river deltas, and addressing sea level rise, erosion and saltwater intrusion. A few identified preventing loss of land as a main adaptation objective, with efforts including assessing and monitoring impacts on and vulnerability of coasts and national plans for coastal protection and management, implementing nature-based solutions for coastal restoration and protection and defining standards, regulations and guidelines for construction and flood protection. Parties also described efforts to adopt integrated coastal zone management approaches.

168. Coastal ecosystems are being affected by ocean warming, sea level rise, oxygen loss, acidification, intensified marine heatwaves, and salinity intrusion. Sea level rise is impacting coastal ecosystems through habitat contraction, geographical species shift, and loss of ecosystem functionality and biodiversity.⁶² Some adaptation components outlined efforts to adapt ocean ecosystems to promote sustainable development while safeguarding oceans. Measures are focused on investing in ocean and the ‘blue’ economy and protecting marine and coastal ecosystems, with a focus on coral reefs, and seagrass and mangrove restoration and conservation. To support these measures, Parties identified steps to establish or strengthen related monitoring, surveillance and assessment systems and programmes.

---

⁵⁸ As footnote 57 above, pp.19–20.
⁵⁹ As footnote 57 above, pp.14–15.
⁶⁰ As footnote 57 above, p.14.
⁶¹ See p.8 of the SR1.5.
169. Climate change is expected to impact key economic sectors. For instance, patterns of energy demand will change in particular in terms of heating and cooling needs, and supply will be affected depending on sources, technologies and regions. Many adaptation components described efforts to adapt key economic sectors and services, in particular energy, infrastructure, transportation and tourism. Efforts in the energy sector include impact analysis and planning, protection of hydropower resources and installations, diversification (e.g. by expanding clean energy), energy efficiency, energy conservation (through standards, labels and awareness) and storage. A few Parties outlined adaptation plans for the mining sector, which include tools for ensuring operability of hydrocarbon facilities. Parties are aiming to ensure resilience of infrastructure through, for example, risk assessments for critical infrastructure, building codes and resilience standards, associated education, elevation and nature-based solutions. Transportation was a focus area in some adaptation components, with adaptation measures including enhancing risk evaluation, such as by using geographic information systems, and developing green road infrastructure. Tourism is to be addressed through, for example, mainstreaming climate risk in sectoral policies; financial instruments and insurance; diversification towards, for example, green tourism; and protecting key locations (e.g. winter resorts, coasts and heritage sites). In some adaptation components, the industrial sector was considered in adaptation planning.

170. Climate change is projected to slow down economic growth and make poverty reduction more difficult. Some adaptation components identified livelihoods as an adaptation priority area. Innovative livelihood strategies, social safeguards for vulnerable, financial assistance economic diversification were identified as being helpful in responding to loss of livelihoods.

171. Many key climate risks will impact urban areas, and major impacts are projected in rural areas on water supply, food security and agricultural income. Human habitats and settlements, including urban areas, were identified as priority areas in many adaptation components. Efforts in this area are aimed at adapting and enhancing the resilience of both rural and urban settlements, responding to human mobility needs and addressing forced displacement. Measures include conducting research to understand the links between climate and migration; improving housing and other infrastructure; establishing temporary resettlement and shelter programmes to support displaced people; creating migration opportunities and arrangements for relocation, while ensuring the right to remain. Some efforts are focused on adaptation of cities and urban areas, including through planning, vulnerability and risk assessment, upgrading informal settlements and creating urban greening and nature-based solutions.

172. Many adaptation components described measures for enhancing disaster risk management and early warning systems. Policy and institutional measures include enhancing risk assessment and monitoring, integrating disaster risk management into adaptation efforts, and establishing early warning systems, including a national multi-hazard early warning system, community-based systems, or systems specific to particular areas or sectors (e.g. coasts and rivers, forestry and ecosystems, water, agriculture, transportation, infrastructure, health and tourism) or hazards (e.g. for sea level rise, extreme events, disease outbreaks, drought and floods).

5. Contingency measures

173. Contingency measures for dealing with emergencies and impacts that occur regardless of adaptation efforts were highlighted in some adaptation components, such as strengthening resilience to impacts beyond the limits of adaptation through NAPs; search and rescue, contingency or emergency plans and systems; emergency shelters; humanitarian assistance civil defence; evacuation procedures; emergency or contingency funding; food reserves;

63 As footnote 57 above, p.19.
64 As footnote 57 above, p.20.
66 As footnote 65 above, p.616.
disaster insurance schemes; livelihood protection policies; and support for displaced persons. For the agriculture and livestock sectors, Parties referred to insurance and risk management mechanisms, as well as post-disaster relief. In the fisheries sector, measures include using financial instruments such as insurance against extreme events and establishing a minimum income for fishers. Measures were also suggested for health, infrastructure, coasts and tourism.

6. Monitoring and evaluation, and understanding progress

174. Many Parties described in their adaptation components their efforts to enhance monitoring and evaluation of adaptation, such as by focusing on tracking progress, reducing vulnerability, improving efficiency and effectiveness of actions, NAP implementation and support. Approaches included using systems for integrating climate and adaptation information, sectoral monitoring tools (e.g. in agriculture and tourism) and a platform for integrating tools for monitoring climate risk and low-emission development. Some of those Parties identified and described their intention to apply global, national or sectoral quantitative indicators for monitoring the development of specific climate parameters and impacts, and monitoring progress of specific measures and/or sectoral performance, including towards targets linked to a specific baseline. Quantified targets were identified in particular for the water, agriculture, forestry, sanitation, livestock, health, energy, transportation, hygiene, infrastructure and biodiversity sectors. See document FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/8/Add.2 for an overview of more specific targets defined for key adaptation areas.

7. Synergies with mitigation and sustainable development

175. Some Parties elaborated on synergies between adaptation and mitigation (mitigation co-benefits of adaptation action are covered in chap. IV.G above). A few Parties identified how their mitigation action can generate adaptation co-benefits. For example, in the energy sector, using renewable energy can also enhance energy security and access to water and reduce pollution. Other mitigation measures, such as fuel switching, increasing efficiency, and forest preservation, afforestation and reforestation, were described as having adaptation co-benefits (e.g. mangrove forests protect coastlines). The health co-benefits of emission reductions were also highlighted.

176. Some Parties described how their adaptation actions relate to sustainable development frameworks, describing the overall linkages and synergies between their adaptation efforts and efforts towards the SDGs; identifying the essential role of adaptation in the achievement of SDGs, as well as the role of sustainable development in successful adaptation; and emphasizing the importance and benefits of integrating implementation of climate and SDG-related efforts. Further, some Parties specified how adaptation in specific priority areas contributes to achieving individual SDGs. Figure 11 provides an overview of the specific synergies identified between adaptation efforts and efforts towards SDGs.
### K. Domestic mitigation measures

177. Under Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, Parties shall pursue domestic mitigation measures with the aim of achieving the objectives of their NDCs.

178. Almost all Parties outlined such measures in their NDCs as key instruments for achieving mitigation targets of their NDCs and/or specific priority areas of national importance, which are often a subset of one or more IPCC sectors, including energy supply, transport, buildings, industry, agriculture, LULUCF and waste. Most Parties communicated measures in the priority areas of energy supply, transport, LULUCF, buildings, agriculture and waste, while much fewer indicated measures in industry (see figure 12).

179. Many Parties communicated one or more quantitative mitigation targets specific to priority areas or sub-areas, which support and underpin their overall mitigation targets. Such quantitative mitigation targets were provided most frequently for energy supply by many Parties, followed by LULUCF and cross-cutting or other.

---

67 Covers measures targeting emissions from fuel use in industry, industrial process emissions and emissions from product use. For the scopes of the other priority areas, including cross-cutting or other, see document FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/8/Add.2.
Figure 12
Share of Parties referring to specific priority areas and sub-areas for domestic mitigation measures in nationally determined contributions

Note: If a Party communicated more than one measure for a specific priority area or sub-area, it was counted as one Party communicating measures for that area.

1. Sub-areas and mitigation options under priority areas

180. Of the sub-areas under priority areas communicated, energy generation, transmission and storage was most frequently identified by most Parties, followed by road transport; cross-cutting sub-area under buildings; solid waste disposal; forestry; and cross-cutting sub-area under agriculture (see figure 12), which together cover the most frequently indicated mitigation options (see figure 13).

181. Renewable energy generation was the most frequently indicated mitigation option, followed by improving energy efficiency of buildings; afforestation, reforestation and revegetation; multisector energy efficiency improvement; cross-cutting mitigation option under agriculture; and improving energy efficiency of transport (see figure 13). Some Parties communicated quantitative targets for renewable energy share (ranging from 15 to 100 per

---

68 Covers measures applicable to more than one sub-area under a priority area. For example, the cross-cutting sub-area under buildings covers measures applicable to both residential buildings and commercial or institutional buildings, and the cross-cutting sub-area of energy supply covers measures applicable to both energy generation, transmission and storage, and fossil fuel exploration, production, transport and distribution.

69 Refers in this report to expected key mitigation effects or categories of domestic mitigation measures, which were identified by analysing the trend in the measures set out in the new or updated NDCs and by referring to those identified in the previous NDC synthesis report and relevant IPCC reports, including the SR1.5.
cent) in electricity generation by 2030; and many of those target shares fall within or above the IPCC range of 47–65 per cent consistent with 1.5 °C pathways.\textsuperscript{70}

182. For the Parties that communicated new or updated NDCs, renewable energy generation continued, as in their previous NDCs, to be the most frequently indicated mitigation option and focus of quantitative mitigation targets, with the share of Parties indicating this option and target sharply increasing from 55 to 87 per cent and from 34 to 59 per cent, respectively, since their previous NDCs.

Figure 13
Share of Parties referring to the frequently indicated mitigation options in nationally determined contributions

Note: If a Party communicated more than one measure for one of the frequently indicated mitigation options, it was counted as one Party communicating measures for that option.

183. In the priority areas related to supply and end-use of energy such as energy supply, transport, buildings and industry, renewable energy generation and shifting to low- or zero-carbon fuels were frequently or widely indicated as key mitigation options relevant to reducing the carbon intensity of electricity and other fuels (see figure 13); electrification was mentioned in relation to increasing the share of final energy supplied by electricity and switching fuel use from fossil fuels to electricity in end-use sectors such as transport and buildings, benefiting from electricity with reduced carbon intensity; and improving energy efficiency and shifting to more efficient modes of transport were often referenced in relation to reducing energy demand.

184. More broadly across all priority areas, Parties frequently indicated waste reduction, waste-to-energy, improved management of manure and herds, and fluorinated gas substitution as key mitigation options relevant to reducing non-CO\textsubscript{2} emissions (see figure 13). In addition, Parties often communicated mitigation options related to circular economy,

\textsuperscript{70} The interquartile range of global renewable energy share in electricity generation by 2030 consistent with the emission pathways to 1.5 °C with no or limited overshoot in the SR1.5.
including reducing and recycling waste and promoting circular economy. Measures related to multisector carbon pricing were frequently identified as efficiently incentivizing low-carbon behaviours and technologies by putting a price on GHG emissions.

185. Most Parties included mitigation measures in the area of LULUCF in their NDCs. In terms of key mitigation options relevant to enhancing carbon sequestration in soil or vegetation, afforestation, reforestation, revegetation, sustainable forest management and reduced deforestation and forest degradation were most frequently indicated (see figure 13). In this context, many developing country Parties referred to reducing deforestation as a priority with high mitigation potential, including through efforts to implement REDD+ activities. Many Parties highlighted the importance of socioeconomic and environmental non-carbon benefits resulting from these mitigation activities, including for adaptation.

186. The SR1.5 identifies mitigation options considered relevant to aligning with 1.5 °C pathways, including:

(a) Halting investment in unabated coal by 2030. A few Parties communicated corresponding measures, such as phasing out use of unabated coal to produce electricity by 2025;

(b) Phasing out of sales of fossil-fuel passenger vehicles by 2035–2050. A few Parties communicated corresponding measures, including banning new registration of diesel and gasoline vehicles after 2030;

(c) Requiring newly constructed buildings to be near zero energy by 2020. Some Parties communicated corresponding measures, such as requiring new buildings constructed after 1 January 2020 to consume almost zero energy;

(d) Expanding forest cover by 2030. Some Parties communicated quantitative targets for increasing national forest cover, such as increasing forest cover to 60 per cent of the national territory without competing for land with the agriculture sector;

(e) Reducing food waste and loss. A few Parties communicated measures for reducing food waste as part of waste reduction, such as taking action through voluntary agreements with the food industry and expanding food waste collection to achieve zero food waste to landfill by 2030.

2. Coherence and synergies with development priorities

187. Many Parties highlighted policy coherence and synergies between their mitigation measures and development priorities. The share of Parties highlighting policy coherence and synergies has increased from 50 to 69 per cent in the new or updated NDCs compared with their previous NDCs.

188. Some identified domestic mitigation measures in the context of the longer-term measures and policies set out in their LT-LEDS and/or other relevant national long-term low-emission development strategies or laws; for example, by identifying domestic mitigation measures for the NDC on the basis of programmes of actions or mitigation options set out in the national LT-LEDS, by formalizing net zero emission targets by 2050 and by requiring governments to report on the implementation of measures in their NDCs at least once every five years to ensure oversight of progress towards the 2050 targets.

189. In addition, some Parties clarified the alignment between their mitigation measures and efforts towards specific SDGs, highlighting the multiple co-benefits of their measures for sustainable development and the cost-effectiveness of their measures in relation to sustainable development under their fiscal constraints, including those due to the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, some Parties communicated one or several specific SDGs in relation to which there are synergies with their priority areas or mitigation measures (see figure 14),

71 The SR1.5 refers to food waste as inappropriate human consumption of food that leads to food spoilage associated with inferior quality or overproduction, while it refers to food loss as the decrease in mass and nutritional value of food due to poor infrastructure, logistics and lack of storage technologies. The SR1.5 further states that decreasing food waste and loss contributes to land transition in line with 1.5 °C pathways by limiting various demands for land, including for production of food and livestock feed, that may compete with demand for land for afforestation.
with energy supply measures contributing to achieving SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy) and LULUCF measures contributing to achieving SDG 15 (life on land) most frequently indicated; and a few considered contribution to achieving SDGs as a criterion for identifying such measures to be included in their NDCs.

Figure 14
Synergies between efforts in mitigation priority areas and efforts towards Sustainable Development Goals identified in nationally determined contributions

Note: The shading reflects how frequently linkages were identified by Parties: the darker the shading, the more frequently linkages were identified.

190. Further, some of the Parties that communicated new or updated NDCs highlighted synergies between their mitigation measures and green recovery from the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, such as implementing a “Green New Deal” for accelerating implementation of the measures identified in the updated NDC.

L. Means of implementation

191. Almost all Parties provided information on some or all means of implementation in their NDCs, although the structure and depth of that information varied significantly. While some Parties included a dedicated section on means of implementation or separate sections on finance, technology and/or capacity-building, many mentioned or referred to aspects of means of implementation in other sections of their NDCs.

192. Some Parties provided information on specific climate finance, technology and capacity-building projects, including, for some, detailed information on financial and technical requirements, implementing entities and time frames.

193. Some Parties highlighted South–South, triangular or regional cooperation as support mechanisms for NDC implementation, including for specific aspects of financial assistance, capacity-building and technology development and transfer.

I. Finance

194. Almost all Parties provided information on finance as a means of NDC implementation, with most characterizing finance in terms of international support needed and some mentioning finance in relation to domestic implementation only. A few mentioned finance in the context of providing financial support for other countries’ NDC implementation. Many Parties provided qualitative information on how finance will be used as a means of implementation either in general or through specific actions for financing mitigation or adaptation support, such as earmarking public expenditure, establishing climate funds or supporting financial systems. Many also included quantitative information on financial investment or expenditure to support their NDCs, such as on financing specific technology development funds, economy-wide budgetary programmes or specific projects and needs for financial support.

195. Many Parties provided quantitative estimates of financial support needs, which were often expressed as total amounts over the time frame of the NDC. Many of them provided updated quantitative estimates of financial support needs and some others provided estimates
for the first time in their new or updated NDCs. Most of those Parties also made efforts to
differentiate quantitative estimates for conditional actions reliant on international support
from those for unconditional actions that may be financed from domestic sources.

196. Some Parties provided information on financial support needs across mitigation and
adaptation themes or sectors, and a few provided total estimates. Mitigation finance is needed
across renewable energy, energy efficiency, transport and forestry, while adaptation finance
is needed for activities related to water, agriculture, coastal protection and resilience.

2. Technology development and transfer

197. With regard to information on technology development and transfer for NDC
implementation, most Parties covered qualitative aspects and many also quantitative aspects.

198. Many Parties referred to technology development and transfer in the context of actions
that inherently address both adaptation and mitigation or focus on mitigation. Many Parties
also made reference to climate technology for adaptation.

199. Information provided by Parties on climate technology related matters was mainly on
specific technologies to be deployed; technology needs; policy, regulatory and legal aspects;
technology innovation, research and development; and support required by Parties or support
provided by Parties for technology development and transfer.

200. In terms of specific technologies that Parties intend to use for achieving their
adaptation and mitigation targets, the most frequently identified were cross-sectoral energy-
efficient appliances and processes, enhanced utilization of renewable energy technologies
such as hydropower, solar, wind and biomass, low- or zero-emission vehicles, blended fuel,
waste to energy technologies and climate-smart agriculture.

201. Technology needs mentioned by Parties were mainly in the areas of energy,
agriculture, water, waste, transport, climate observation and early warning. As regards
technology innovation, research and development, some Parties included information on
promoting collaboration between countries and promoting institutions, mechanisms, tools
and business models that foster progress in this area. Actions on policy, regulatory and legal
aspects commonly referred to by Parties include developing or updating policies and
strategies to promote technology innovation, promoting use of renewable energy and
accelerating adoption and transfer of climate technologies. A few Parties included specific
information on their intended provision of support to developing country Parties, while some
Parties indicated the support needed for development and deployment of clean technologies,
for example in the areas of energy, energy efficiency and agriculture. Some Parties referenced
technology needs assessments and technology action plans in identifying priority technology
needs in adaptation and mitigation.

3. Capacity-building

202. Many Parties identified capacity-building as a prerequisite for NDC implementation.
Many Parties provided a specific section containing information on capacity-building needs.
Capacity-building needs were identified for formulating policies, integrating mitigation and
adaptation into sectoral planning processes, accessing finance, and providing the necessary
information for clarity, transparency and understanding of NDCs. Capacity-building needs
were assessed in three ways: by thematic area, by sector and by category.

203. With regard to thematic areas, many Parties provided information on cross-cutting
capacity-building needs, whereas many others expressed capacity-building needs for
adaptation and some others for mitigation. Also, a few Parties indicated capacity-building
needs for addressing loss and damage and many Parties identified their efforts or needs in
relation to sectoral capacity-building. Many Parties identified capacity-building needs that
were multisectoral, followed by some others that identified needs relating to the subsector
other,\(^22\) buildings and infrastructure, energy and/or health.

\(^{22}\) Covers capacity-building needs and gaps applicable to sectors that do not fall within the sectors
identified for the data analysis, such as sustainable tourism, empowerment of women, youth
engagement, coastal areas, waste management, GHGs and land.
204. With regard to capacity-building categories, many Parties referred to cross-cutting capacity-building needs, mainly for facilitation of training, education, peer-to-peer learning and awareness-raising. Some Parties emphasized the importance of capacity-building to support institutional strengthening in order to ensure the sustainability and retention of capacities at the national level.

205. The share of Parties that referred to capacity-building in specific sections of their new or updated NDCs increased significantly compared with their previous NDCs, with the number of Parties indicating that capacity-building needs were mostly of a multisectoral nature having risen significantly. The number of Parties expressing capacity-building needs for adaptation also increased, this being the thematic area in which most capacity-building needs were expressed. Parties continued to emphasize the importance of capacity-building to support institutional strengthening in their new and updated NDCs.