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作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议 的《公约》缔约方会议 第三届会议 2021年11月1日至12日,格拉斯哥

### 《巴黎协定》之下的国家自主贡献

气候变化框架公约

#### 秘书处的综合报告

概要

本报告汇总了截至 2020 年 12 月 31 日由 75 个缔约方根据第 1/CP.21 号决定 通报并记录在国家自主贡献临时登记册中的 48 份新的或更新的国家自主贡献所 载信息。



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### 简称和缩略语

2006 IPCC Guidelines ACE AR CDM	《2006年气专委指南》	《2006年气专委国家温室气体清单指南》 气候赋权行动 政府间气候变化专门委员会评估报告 清洁发展机制
CH4 CMA	《协定》/《公约》缔约 方会议	甲烷 作为《巴黎协定》缔约方会议的《公约》缔 约方会议
СМР	《议定书》/《公约》缔 约方会议	作为《京都议定书》缔约方会议的《公约》 缔约方会议
CO2		二氧化碳
CO2 eq		二氧化碳当量
COP	缔约方会议	《公约》缔约方会议
COVID-19		2019 冠状病毒病
GDP		国内生产总值
GHG		温室气体
GWP		全球变暖潜能值
HFC		氢氟碳化物
INDC		预期国家自主贡献
IPCC	气专委	政府间气候变化专门委员会
IPPU		工业加工和产品使用
LT-LEDS		长期低排放发展战略
LULUCF		土地利用、土地利用变化与林业
$N_2O$		氧化亚氮
NAP		国家适应计划
NDC		国家自主贡献
NF <sub>3</sub>		三氟化氮
PaMs*		政策和措施
PFC		全氟化碳
REDD+		减少毁林所致排放;减少森林退化所致排
		放;养护森林碳储存;可持续森林管理;以
		及加强森林碳储存(第 1/CP.16 号决定,第 70
		段)
SDG		可持续发展目标
SF <sub>6</sub>		六氟化硫
SLCP*		短期气候污染物
SR1.5	1.5℃特别报告	政府间气候变化专门委员会关于全球温升 1.5℃的特别报告

<sup>\*</sup> 仅用于图示。

#### 一. 内容提要

1. 缔约方会议第二十一届会议(COP 21)和《协定》/《公约》缔约方会议第二 届会议(CMA 2)请秘书处就缔约方提交的国家自主贡献编写一份综合报告, <sup>1</sup>本 报告应此要求编写。鉴于原定在格拉斯哥举行的联合国气候变化大会从 2020 年 推迟到 2021 年,以及 2019 冠状病毒病大流行对编写国家自主贡献工作的影响, 秘书处告知缔约方,秘书处将发布两版国家自主贡献综合报告:初版于 2021 年 2 月 28 日之前发布,最后版本在 COP 26 之前发布。

2. 本报告的初版汇总了截至 2020 年 12 月 31 日由 75 个缔约方提交的 48 份国家 自主贡献所载信息。这些国家自主贡献或根据第 1/CP.21 号决定第 23-24 段、作 为新的或更新的国家自主贡献提交,或在缔约方的预期国家自主贡献没有按照上 述决定第 22 段自动转换的情况下、作为新的国家自主贡献提交。本报告审议的 国家自主贡献约涉及《巴黎协定》40%的缔约方,涉及的排放量约为 2017 年全球 温室气体排放量的 30%。

3. 缔约方会议和《协定》/《公约》缔约方会议关于促进国家自主贡献清晰、 透明和可理解的信息的指导意见<sup>2</sup>充当了一个框架,用于汇总通报的国家自主贡 献所载相关信息;对国家自主贡献所载但指导意见未涵盖的其他信息的汇总,对 该框架作了补充。汇总的信息是对所有提交信息的缔约方的整体情况总结。

 几乎所有<sup>3</sup> 缔约方都根据缔约方会议的指导意见,提供了促进国家自主贡献 清晰、透明和可理解的必要信息,许多缔约方已采用《协定》/《公约》缔约方 会议的进一步相关指导意见。<sup>4</sup>

5. 所有缔约方都提供了关于减缓目标的信息,特别是 2025 年和/或 2030 年的目标。减缓目标从整个经济体的绝对减排目标到低排放发展战略、计划和行动不等。在新的或更新的国家自主贡献中:

(a) 几乎所有缔约方都提供了量化的减缓目标,以明确的数字目标表示,几个缔约方将战略、计划和行动作为国家自主贡献的组成部分,但没有可量化的信息;

(b) 许多缔约方加强了到 2025 年和/或 2030 年减少或限制温室气体排放的承诺,显示出应对气候变化的更大决心;

(c) 与以往相比,更多的缔约方通报了绝对减排目标,一些缔约方转为通 报全经济范围的目标,结果是大多数缔约方提出了全经济范围的国家自主贡献, 包含《2006年气专委指南》中界定的所有部门;

(d) 缔约方加大了对部门和温室气体的通报范围:其温室气体排放总量的 99.2%得到通报,上一次国家自主贡献的通报比例为 97.8%;所有缔约方都提供 了二氧化碳排放量,几乎所有缔约方都提供了甲烷和氧化亚氮排放量;大多数缔

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> 第 1/CMA.2 号决定, 第 10 段。

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> 第 1/CP.21 号决定,第 27 段;及第 4/CMA.1 号决定和附件一。

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>本报告使用以下词语指代在国家自主贡献中提及特定信息的缔约方的比例: "几个缔约方" — 少于 10%; "一些缔约方" — 10%至 40%; "许多缔约方" — 41%至 70%; "大 多数缔约方" — 71%至 90%; 和"几乎所有缔约方" — 超过 90%。

<sup>4</sup> 同上文脚注 2。

约方提供了氢氟碳化物排放量,许多缔约方提供了全氟化碳、六氟化硫和三氟化 氮排放量。

6. 几乎所有缔约方都通报了 2030 年之前的国家自主贡献执行期,另有几个缔 约方则具体说明了到 2025 年或 2050 年的执行期。许多缔约方将 2021 年 1 月 1 日 确定为执行国家自主贡献的开始日期;另有一些缔约方表示,它们已于 2020 年 或之前开始执行国家自主贡献;几个缔约方将在 2022 年开始执行国家自主贡献。

几乎所有缔约方都更新了确定目标的依据,包括参考点和政策照旧的设想情况。虽然这类更新使国家自主贡献的质量提高,但由于目标排放量变化以外的原因,这类更新将导致一些缔约方 2025 年和 2030 年的估计排放量发生重大变化。

8. 几乎所有缔约方都提供了关于依照《巴黎协定》第六条开展自愿合作的信息,表示计划或可能使用至少一种自愿合作形式的缔约方比例自上次提交国家自 主贡献以来增加了一倍以上。与此同时,比以往多得多的缔约方对采用自愿合作 实现减缓目标设定了量化的限制。

9. 许多缔约方都提及 COVID-19 疫情,但其中大多数缔约方没有在国家自主贡献中讨论疫情可能产生的影响。国家和全球温室气体排放的相关变化导致的长期影响将取决于疫情的持续时间以及恢复措施的性质和规模。

10. 执行新的或更新的国家自主贡献通报的目标产生的温室气体排放总量,2025 年估计约为140.4亿吨二氧化碳当量,2030年估计约为136.7亿吨二氧化碳当量,<sup>5</sup> 与缔约方在以前的国家自主贡献中提出的总排放水平相比,2025年约低 0.3%(3,800万吨二氧化碳当量),2030年约低2.8%(3.98亿吨二氧化碳当量)。<sup>6</sup>

11. 平均而言,估计缔约方的温室气体排放总量:

(a) 到2025年,比1990年排放量(137.7亿吨二氧化碳当量)高2.0%,比2010 年排放量(137.4亿吨二氧化碳当量)高2.2%,比2017年排放量(139.7亿吨二氧化 碳当量)高0.5%;

(b) 到 2030 年,比 1990 年下降 0.7%,比 2010 年下降 0.5%,比 2017 年下降 2.1%。

12. 如果仅执行国家自主贡献中的无条件要素,估计缔约方的排放量有可能在 2030 年之前达到峰值。如果国家自主贡献,包括有条件的要素得到全面执行, 估计 2030 年的排放量将低于目前的排放水平,这意味着缔约方的排放量有可能 在 2025 年之前或最晚在 2030 年达到峰值。执行条件性最强的要素取决于能否获 得更好的财政资源、技术转让和技术合作及能力建设支持;是否存在市场机制; 以及森林和其他生态系统的吸收能力。

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> 2025年温室气体总排放量估计为136.9至143.9亿吨二氧化碳当量,2030年为131.3至142.1 亿吨二氧化碳当量。这些区间代表提出的目标产生的最小值和最大值,也反映了执行国家自 主贡献中无条件和有条件要素的结果。

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> 除非另有说明,在本报告中,温室气体排放量不包括来自林业和其他土地利用(LULUCF)的排放;使用的是政府间气候变化专门委员会第四次评估报告中时间跨度为100年的全球变暖潜能值。对于使用其他全球变暖潜能值(例如第二次评估报告或第四次评估报告潜能值)列出温室 气体排放量估计值的国家自主贡献,已对相应数值作了转换。更多信息,包括估算方法和做 法,见本文件增编3。

13. 根据 1.5°C 特别报告7,全球排放路径要符合不超过 1.5 摄氏度或超幅有限的目标,2030年的全球人为二氧化碳净排放量需比 2010年降低约 45%,2050年 左右达到净零排放。为了将全球变暖控制在2摄氏度以下,2030年的二氧化碳排放量需比 2010年降低约 25%,并在 2070年左右达到净零排放。非二氧化碳的排放也需要大幅减少。因此,上文第 10-11 段提到的估计减排量远远达不到要求, 这表明缔约方还需进一步加强在《巴黎协定》下的减缓承诺。<sup>8</sup>

14. 为了清楚地了解国家自主贡献总和对实现《公约》第二条规定的目标,以及 对实现《巴黎协定》第二条第一款第(一)项和第四条第一款发挥的作用,国家自 主贡献综合报告的最后版本将对执行所有国家自主贡献实现的预计排放总量与气 专委评估的不同减缓情景和指标(包括实现 1.5 摄氏度和 2 摄氏度目标的全球排放 路径)进行比较。在这份初始报告中提供这类信息是不可能的,因为报告中包括 的国家自主贡献数量有限。

15. 根据新的或更新的国家自主贡献,2025年和2030年的人均温室气体排放量估计分别为6.52吨二氧化碳当量和6.19吨二氧化碳当量,2025年和2030年分别比2017年下降4.7%和9.6%。

16. 许多缔约方提供了直至 2050 年及以后的长期减缓愿景、战略和目标的信息,其中提到气候中立、碳中和、温室气体中性或零净排放。考虑到这类长期估计的固有不确定性,资料表明:

(a) 缔约方 2050 年的温室气体总和排放量可能比 2017 年低 87%-93%;

(b) 到 2050 年,这些缔约方的年度人均排放量估计为 0.5-1.0 吨二氧化碳当量,比 2017 年低 87%-93%,这表明,到 2050 年,人均排放量将处于 1.5°C 特别 报告所指的 2°C 和 1.5°C 但有较低超幅的情景范围内。

17. 大多数缔约方介绍了编制和执行国家自主贡献的做法。一些国家将其国家自 主贡献与向可持续和/或低碳和有复原力的经济转型的承诺联系起来,同时考虑 社会、环境和经济因素以及可持续发展目标。许多缔约方表示,它们已将国家自 主贡献目标、具体目标和政策纳入国家立法、监管和规划进程,作为确保执行的 手段。

18. 大多数缔约方强调了其减缓措施<sup>9</sup>与发展优先事项之间的政策一致性和协同 作用,这些优先事项包括长期低排放战略、可持续发展目标;对一些缔约方来 说,优先事项还包括在 COVID-19 疫情后实现绿色复苏。

19. 大多数缔约方提到关于利益攸关方协商的正式安排。几乎所有缔约方都表示,它们以包容和参与性的方式进行协商和参与,一些缔约方特别提到了对性别问题敏感的协商。

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> 气专委,2018年。《气专委关于在加强全球应对气候变化威胁、实现可持续发展和努力消除 贫困的背景下全球升温高于工业化前水平 1.5°C 的影响和相关全球温室气体排放路径的特别报 告》。Masson-Delmotte, Phai, H-O Pörtner, et al.(eds.)。日内瓦:世界气象组织。可查阅 https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/。

<sup>8 《</sup>巴黎协定》第四条第十一款的规定。

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> 在本报告中,(国内)减缓措施是指有助于减缓的具体政策和行动,包括具有减缓协同效益的适 应行动和经济多样化计划。

20. 缔约方越来越多地<sup>10</sup> 认识到,性别融合是增强气候行动的决心和有效性的一种手段。大多数缔约方在国家自主贡献中提到性别问题以及相关政策和立法,或确认对性别平等的总体承诺。许多以前在国家自主贡献中提到性别问题的缔约方 在新的或更新的国家自主贡献中更详细地阐述了这一主题。一些缔约方提供了信息,说明性别问题如何已纳入或计划如何纳入执行国家自主贡献的主流。

21. 几乎所有缔约方都提供了信息,说明采用一项或多项气候赋权行动要素促进 执行减缓和适应活动的情况,并就气候赋权行动的一般原则、过去的成就、未来 的承诺以及需求和差距提供了更清晰和更详细的资料。

22. 一些缔约方介绍了地方社区的作用以及土著人在国家自主贡献背景下的作用、处境和权利,强调土著人因其特殊处境导致的脆弱性。

23. 许多缔约方在国家自主贡献中纳入了关于适应的内容,其中一些作为适应信 息通报的内容。提供的信息涉及脆弱性;适应措施,包括部门行动;应急措施; 及对适应行动的监测和评估。

24. 与以往的国家自主贡献相比,关于适应的组成部分表明对适应规划,特别是 对国家适应计划的重视有所加强,并纳入了更多有时限的量化适应目标及相关的 指标框架。适应努力正在与可持续发展目标联系起来,适应和减缓之间更具体的 协同效应和共同效益得到阐述。

25. 就适应优先事项而言,根据国家自主贡献,缔约方继续重点致力于粮食安全和生产;陆地和湿地生态系统;人的健康;淡水资源;重点经济部门和服务业;灾难风险管理和预警;人类生境和城市地区;沿海地区和海平面上升;海洋生态系统;以及生计和贫困问题。

26. 几乎所有缔约方都概述了国内减缓措施,这些措施是在特定优先领域,如能 源供应、运输、建筑、工业、农业、土地利用、土地利用变化与林业以及废物处 置等领域实现减缓目标的重要手段。

27. 缔约方提到最多的是用于生产可再生能源的国内减缓措施,其次是提高能效的措施。几个缔约方通报了 2030 年之前可再生能源在供电组合中所占份额(从13%到 100%)的量化目标;其中一些目标份额处于气专委所述 47%至 65%的区间内,或高于该区间。<sup>11</sup>

28. 可再生能源的生产和向低碳或零碳燃料的转变,往往被视为与降低电力和其 他燃料的碳强度相关,包括可为此促进能源供应的电气化和最终用途。在减少能 源需求方面,经常提及提高能源效率和向更高效运输方式的转变。在所有优先的 减缓领域,缔约方将措施与循环经济概念(即持续利用资源,以减少对新开采资 源,包括对化石燃料的需求)联系起来,包括与减少和回收废物联系起来。碳定 价通过对排放的温室气体规定价格,被认为是向脱碳转变的有效支持。

29. 大多数缔约方确定了土地利用、土地利用变化与林业部门的国内减缓措施, 一些发展中国家缔约方将减少毁林作为具有很大减缓潜力的优先措施,包括为此

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> 自上次提交国家自主贡献以来,在新的或更新的国家自主贡献中提到性别问题并将其视为贯 穿各领域的问题的缔约方比例大幅提高。

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> 1.5°C特别报告中关于将全球变暖控制在 1.5 摄氏度以内(没有超幅或超幅有限)的排放路径模式所示 2030 年之前全球可再生能源在发电量中所占份额的四分位差。

开展减少毁林所致排放;减少森林退化所致排放;养护森林碳储存;可持续森林管理;以及加强森林碳储存(第1/CP.16号决定,第70段)活动。

30. 与以往的国家自主贡献相比,更多缔约方在新的或更新的国家自主贡献中报 告了适应行动和经济多样化计划产生的减缓协同效益,包括关于产生协同效益的 具体项目、措施和活动的信息。同样,更多缔约方提供了信息,说明对应对措施 的社会和经济后果的考量,包括关于公正过渡和经济多样化的信息。

31. 具有减缓协同效益的适应行动和经济多样化计划包括气候智能型农业、减少 食物浪费、垂直农业、调整沿海生态系统、增加可再生能源在能源生产当中的份额、提高能源效率、二氧化碳捕获和储存、运输部门的燃料转换和燃料价格改 革,以及为更好地进行废物管理向循环经济转型。

32. 几乎所有缔约方都在国家自主贡献中提到一些或所有执行手段,尽管这类信息的结构和深度差异巨大。虽然一些缔约方列入了介绍执行手段的专门章节,或 在单独章节中介绍资金、技术和/或能力建设情况,但许多缔约方是在国家自主 贡献的其他章节中提到或涉及执行手段的各个方面。

33. 一些缔约方提供了执行国家自主贡献所需资金支持的量化估计数: 大多数缔 约方更新了在以前国家自主贡献中提供的估计数,几个缔约方首次提供这方面的 估计数。提到的具体技术需求主要在农业、气候观测和预警、能源、工业、基础 设施和建筑、交通和水等领域。确定了以下方面的能力建设需求: 制定政策、将 减缓和适应纳入部门规划进程、获得资金和提供必要的信息,以提高国家自主贡 献的清晰度、透明度和易理解性。

34. 一些缔约方强调,南南合作、三角合作或区域合作可作为执行国家自主贡献,包括财政援助、能力建设以及技术开发和转让方面的支持机制。

[English only]

#### II. Mandate

35. Under Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, each Party is to prepare, communicate and maintain successive NDCs that it intends to achieve. The communicated NDCs are to be recorded in a public registry maintained by the secretariat.<sup>12</sup>

36. COP 21 invited Parties to communicate their first NDC no later than when the Party submits its respective instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of or accession to the Paris Agreement. A Party is also considered to have satisfied this provision, unless the Party decides otherwise, if it had communicated an INDC prior to becoming a Party to the Paris Agreement.<sup>13</sup>

37. COP 21 requested Parties whose INDC pursuant to decision 1/CP.20 contains a time frame:

(a) Up to 2025: to communicate by 2020 a new NDC, and to do so every five years thereafter pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 9, of the Paris Agreement;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Until the modalities and procedures for the operation and use of the public registry have been finalized under the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, NDCs are being recorded in the interim NDC registry (available at <u>https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/Pages/Home.aspx</u>).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Decision 1/CP.21, para. 22.

(b) Up to 2030: to communicate or update by 2020 their NDC, and to do so every five years thereafter pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 9, of the Paris Agreement.<sup>14</sup>

38. COP 21 decided that Parties shall submit their NDCs to the secretariat at least 9–12 months in advance of the relevant CMA session with a view to facilitating the clarity, transparency and understanding of the NDCs, including through a synthesis report prepared by the secretariat.<sup>15</sup>

39. Recalling that decision, CMA 2 requested the secretariat to make the synthesis report available to COP 26.<sup>16</sup>

#### III. Background, scope and approach

#### A. Background

40. Owing to the circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Bureau of COP 25, CMP 15 and CMA 2, at its meeting on 28 May 2020, decided to postpone from November 2020 to November 2021 the Glasgow Conference, including COP 26.<sup>17</sup>

41. The pandemic has had an adverse impact on many Parties' NDC preparation process, leading to challenges in meeting the timelines stipulated in decision 1/CP.21.

42. In view of the postponement of the Glasgow Conference and the impact of the pandemic on the NDC preparation process, the secretariat notified Parties on 13 August 2020 that it was planning to publish two editions of the NDC synthesis report: an initial version by 28 February 2021 based on the NDCs recorded in the interim NDC registry as at 31 December 2020; and the final version containing all the latest information, to be made available to COP 26 in accordance with decision 1/CMA.2.

43. To facilitate preparation of the report, the secretariat requested Parties to communicate in advance, if possible, the anticipated date of submission of their new or updated NDCs pursuant to paragraphs 23–24 of decision 1/CP.21.<sup>18</sup> In response, a number of Parties informed the secretariat of their planned submission dates in 2020 or 2021.

#### B. Scope

44. This is the initial version of the NDC synthesis report being prepared for COP 26. It synthesizes information from 48 NDCs, <sup>19</sup> representing 75 Parties, <sup>20</sup> submitted as at 31 December 2020 as new or updated NDCs in response paragraphs 23–24 of decision 1/CP.21, or as new NDCs in case the Party's INDC was not converted automatically in accordance with paragraph 22 of that decision.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Decision 1/CP.21, paras. 23–24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Decision 1/CP.21, para. 25.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Decision 1/CMA.2, para. 10.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> The notification is available at <a href="https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/message">https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/message</a> to parties and observers dates of cop 26.pdf.
<sup>18</sup> The notification is available at

https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/notification on ndc synthesis 2020 ec 2020 306.pdf. <sup>19</sup> From Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Chile,

Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, European Union and its 27 member States, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, Suriname, Switzerland, Thailand, Tonga, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Viet Nam and Zambia.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> The European Union and its member States communicated one joint NDC in accordance with Article 4, paras. 16–18, of the Paris Agreement, which for this report has been counted as one NDC representing 28 Parties (the European Union and its 27 member States).

45. It should be noted that, as at 25 February 2021, there were 163 NDCs recorded in the interim registry. However, consideration of NDCs for this version of the report was limited to those referred to in paragraph 44 above on account of many Parties' ongoing revision of the content of their NDCs. The final version of the NDC synthesis report, to be made available to COP 26, will be prepared on the basis of this initial version but taking into consideration all the latest NDCs recorded in the interim registry.

46. Under Article 4, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement, in communicating their NDCs, Parties are to provide the information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding in accordance with decision 1/CP.21 and any relevant decisions of the CMA.

47. For first NDCs, including those communicated or updated by 2020, this information may cover, as appropriate, quantifiable information on the reference point (including, as appropriate, a base year); time frames and/or periods of implementation; scope and coverage; planning processes; assumptions and methodological approaches, including for estimating and accounting for anthropogenic GHG emissions and, as appropriate, removals; and how the Party considers that its NDC is fair and ambitious in the light of its national circumstances, and how it contributes towards achieving the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2.<sup>21</sup>

48. CMA 1 adopted further guidance on the information to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding of NDCs. In communicating their second and subsequent NDCs, Parties shall provide the information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding contained in annex I to decision 4/CMA.1 as applicable to their NDCs. In addition, CMA 1 strongly encouraged Parties to provide this information in relation to their first NDC, including when communicating or updating it by 2020.<sup>22</sup>

49. The guidance on the information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding is without prejudice to the inclusion of components other than information on mitigation in an NDC.<sup>23</sup>

#### C. Approach

50. The guidance on the information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding of NDCs was used as a framework for synthesizing the relevant information contained in the communicated NDCs,<sup>24</sup> which was supplemented by the synthesis of other information included in the NDCs but not covered by the guidance, such as on adaptation and support.

51. The synthesis covers only the information communicated by Parties in their new or updated NDCs and the synthesized information is presented for all those Parties taken together.

52. In this report, the following terms are used to indicate the percentage of Parties whose NDCs mention particular information: "a few" for less than 10 per cent; "some" for 10–40 per cent; "many" for 41–70 per cent; "most" for 71–90 per cent; and "almost all" for more than 90 per cent.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Decisions 1/CP.21, para. 27; and 4/CMA.1, para. 9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Decision 4/CMA.1, paras. 6–10 and annex I.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Decision 4/CMA.1, para. 8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> As per decision 1/CP.21, para. 25.

# IV. Synthesis of information contained in new or updated nationally determined contributions

#### A. Overview

53. The 48 new or updated NDCs<sup>25</sup> considered for this report, representing 75 Parties, account for  $39.5^{26}$  per cent of the Parties to the Paris Agreement and  $28.8^{27}$  per cent of the global GHG emissions in 2017.

54. Almost all Parties provided the information necessary to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding of their NDCs in accordance with the COP guidance, with many already applying the further CMA guidance (see paras. 46–48 above). A few others provided some of the ICTU elements.

55. Many Parties provided information on adaptation, with some identifying the adaptation component of their NDC as their adaptation communication, and a few provided information organized around the elements identified in the annex to decision 9/CMA.1.

56. In addition, many Parties provided other information, such as on the means of implementation necessary for NDC implementation; domestic mitigation measures;<sup>28</sup> and economic diversification plans and response measures.

#### **B.** Scope and coverage

57. All the NDCs included information on mitigation targets (see figure 1), which range from economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets to strategies, plans and actions for low-emission development, to be implemented within a specified time frame or implementation period:

(a) Many Parties included absolute emission reduction targets expressed as an emission reduction from the level in a specified base year, ranging from 13 to 88 per cent. A few other Parties specified a year or time frame in which their emissions are expected to peak or reach a maximum level of absolute emissions (e.g. by 2030). In addition, some of these Parties expressed their target as a carbon budget in addition to the absolute target, establishing an overall limit on GHGs to be emitted over a specified period of time (e.g. between 2021 and 2030);

(b) Some Parties included relative targets for reducing emissions below the 'business as usual' level by a specified target year, either for the whole economy or for specific sectors, ranging from 11.5 to 53.5 per cent;

(c) A few Parties included strategies, plans and actions for low-emission development reflecting their particular national circumstances, or emission intensity targets for reducing specific GHG emissions per GDP unit relative to a base-year (e.g. 1990) level.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> The NDC of the European Union has been counted as reflecting the inclusion of particular information by its 27 member States.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> As at 25 February 2021, there were 190 Parties to the Paris Agreement.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> See addendum 3 to this document for additional information on the estimated GHG emission levels in this report and the method and approach to estimating them.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> In this report, (domestic) mitigation measures refers to specific policies and actions that contribute to mitigation, including adaptation actions and economic diversification plans with mitigation cobenefits.

#### Figure 1




Types of mitigation target and share of Parties that communicated them in nationally determined contributions

58. Total GHG emission levels<sup>29</sup> resulting from implementation of the NDCs considered for this report are projected to be around 14.04 (13.69–14.39) Gt CO<sub>2</sub> eq in 2025 and around 13.67 (13.13–14.21) Gt CO<sub>2</sub> eq in 2030 (see figure 2).<sup>30</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Unless otherwise noted, for this report, GHG emission levels exclude emissions from forestry and other land use or LULUCF; and GWPs with a 100-year time-horizon from the AR4 have been used. For NDCs that include estimates of GHG emissions using other GWP values (e.g. from the AR2 or AR5), a conversion has been applied.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> The ranges in parentheses in this report represent the minimum and maximum values after aggregation owing to many Parties presenting conditional and unconditional elements of their NDCs and, in some cases, ranges of values for both. The mid-point value is the average of the minimum and maximum values.



#### Figure 2 Projected range of greenhouse gas emission levels according to nationally determined contributions

*Note*: The projected ranges cover the higher-emission end for unconditional elements of NDCs to the lower-emission end when also taking conditional elements of NDCs into account.

59. Most Parties' NDCs are unconditional, at least in part, with some including more ambitious conditional elements. The implementation of the most conditional elements depends on access to enhanced financial resources, technology transfer and technical cooperation, and capacity-building support; availability of market-based mechanisms; and absorptive capacity of forests and other ecosystems.

60. The number of unconditional targets communicated has increased by around 5 per cent in the new or updated NDCs compared with the Parties' previous NDCs.

61. Total GHG emission levels resulting from implementation of the unconditional elements of the NDCs are estimated to be 14.27 (14.14–14.39) Gt CO<sub>2</sub> eq in 2025 and 14.04 (13.87–14.21) Gt CO<sub>2</sub> eq in 2030, which is 0.1 (0.1–0.3) per cent lower in 2025 and 2.6 (2.5–2.7) per cent lower in 2030 than according to the previous NDCs (see figure 2).

62. All Parties provided information on the scope and coverage of their NDCs, including sectors and gases covered.


63. Most Parties have economy-wide NDCs, covering all 2006 IPCC Guidelines sectors. All NDCs cover the energy sector and most cover waste, LULUCF, agriculture and IPPU.

64. A few Parties provided information on coverage of specific sectors of national importance, which are often a subset of one or more IPCC sectors, such as shipping and aviation, cooling or food production, while others mentioned specific carbon pools, oceans or blue carbon.

65. All NDCs cover  $CO_2$  emissions, while almost all cover  $CH_4$  and  $N_2O$  emissions, most cover HFC emissions and many cover PFC,  $SF_6$  and  $NF_3$  emissions. A few Parties included additional gases or emissions, including short-lived climate pollutants, such as black carbon, sulfur dioxide and non-methane volatile organic compounds.

66. The coverage of sectors and GHGs has increased in the new or updated NDCs compared with the Parties' previous NDCs (see figure 3), covering 99.2 per cent (13.86 Mt  $CO_2$  eq) of the Parties' total economy-wide emissions in 2017, up from 97.8 per cent (13.72 Mt  $CO_2$  eq) previously. The number of Parties communicating economy-wide targets has also increased (by around 7 per cent).

Figure 3



#### Sectors and greenhouse gases covered in nationally determined contributions

67. Almost all Parties provided information on how they are striving to include all categories of anthropogenic emissions and removals in their NDCs over time, as well as explanations for the exclusion of any categories. Many Parties stated that they already have economy-wide NDCs including all sectors and GHGs. Some Parties explained why certain sectors and/or gases had been excluded, such as owing to categories being negligible or insignificant, data unavailability or inaccuracy, or lack of technical capacity.

68. In addition to communicating information on mitigation targets or plans for the near to medium term, many Parties provided information on long-term mitigation visions, strategies or targets for up to and beyond 2050 that either have already been formulated or are under preparation. Most of the long-term goals refer to climate neutrality, carbon neutrality, GHG neutrality or net zero emissions by 2050, 2060 or mid-century. Compared with the previous NDCs, some 25 per cent more Parties referred to such long-term goals.<sup>31, 32</sup>

#### C. Time frames and/or periods of implementation

69. All Parties communicated in their NDCs the time frame and/or period of implementation, which refers to a time in the future by or in which an objective is to be achieved.

70. Almost all Parties communicated a period of implementation until 2030, while a few specified a period until 2025 and a few until 2050. Many Parties indicated 1 January 2021 as their starting date for NDC implementation; some started implementing their NDC in or before 2020; and a few Parties will start doing so in 2022.

71. All Parties communicated a target year, expressing a single-year target, a multi-year target (i.e. for a period of consecutive years) or multiple target years (i.e. several non-consecutive target years) depending on the target.

72. Most Parties communicated a single-year target for 2030, while a few indicated a single-year target for 2025. Some Parties communicated multiple target years, such as 2025, 2030 and/or 2050, including when target years were associated with the implementation of different policies and measures. A few Parties indicated having a multi-year target for NDC implementation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> As at 25 February 2021, 29 Parties had communicated LT-LEDS, 24 of which have communicated an new or updated NDC; see <u>https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/long-term-strategies</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> See addendum 3 to this document for additional information on long-term goals.

# **D.** Quantifiable information on the reference point (including, as appropriate, a base year)

73. Almost all Parties provided quantified mitigation targets, expressed as clear numerical targets, while a few included strategies, plans and actions as referred to in Article 4, paragraph 6, of the Paris Agreement or policies and measures as components of their NDCs for which there is no quantifiable information (see para. 57 above).

74. Almost all Parties also provided information on the reference year, base year, reference period or other starting point for measuring progress towards the target. Many of those Parties are measuring the achievement of their targets against a base-year level, with many selecting 1990 and others 2005, 2006, 2010, 2013 or 2017. Some have chosen to measure progress in terms of a deviation from a level in the target year, with most selecting 2030; and a few provided a reference period.

75. Almost all Parties further provided information on the reference indicator used to express their target. Many of those Parties chose as the reference indicator absolute GHG emissions, some the 'business as usual' GHG emission level, a few a GHG emission budget, and a few others emission intensity per GDP unit or sectoral 'business as usual' levels. Almost all Parties provided a quantified value for their reference indicator for either the base year, the target year or both, as appropriate.

76. Almost all Parties have updated the basis for defining their targets, including reference points and 'business as usual' scenarios. Although such updates lead to higher-quality NDCs, for some Parties they lead to significant changes in the estimated emission levels for 2025 and 2030, for reasons other than changes to target levels.

77. All Parties that included strategies, plans and actions as referred to in Article 4, paragraph 6, of the Paris Agreement provided other information for clarification, including on expected levels of emission reduction or prevention, increased forest coverage, reduction of deforestation, energy efficiency targets, renewable energy share or other non-GHG policy targets.

78. Most Parties provided information on the sources of the emission data used for quantifying the reference point, most referring to national inventory reports, and some to biennial reports, biennial update reports and/or national communications. Some Parties also referred to national documents and statistics, such as sector activity reports; national development plans and/or strategies; economic development projections; national climate change plans; energy master plans; national statistics on economy, energy and/or trade; waste management strategies; national resource plans; energy road maps; national forest reports; and socioeconomic forecasts.

79. Most Parties presented information on the circumstances in which they may update the values of their reference indicators, such as owing to significant changes in specific financial, economic, technological and/or political conditions, or to impacts due to extreme natural disasters; or depending on scale of access to support and other means of implementation, expected improvements or modifications to activity data, variables or methodologies used in estimating national emissions, baselines or projections, or the results of the ongoing negotiations on common metrics; or to reflect the actual situation during the implementation period.

# E. Assumptions and methodological approaches, including for estimating and accounting for anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and, as appropriate, removals

#### 1. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change methodologies and metrics

80. Almost all Parties communicated information on the IPCC methodologies and metrics they used for estimating emissions and removals. Most referred to the 2006 IPCC Guidelines and a few to the *Revised 1996 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories*, while a few others mentioned that they used both sets of guidelines to cover different sectors.

81. Most Parties provided information on the metrics they used for estimating emissions and removals. Many of them used GWP values over a 100-year time-horizon from the AR5, while some used such values from the AR2 and some those from the AR4. A few Parties used GWP values as well as global temperature potential values from the AR5 for estimating their mitigation targets.

82. Most Parties also communicated information on the assumptions and methodological approaches used for accounting anthropogenic GHG emissions and, as appropriate, removals. Almost all of them referred to the 2006 IPCC Guidelines, while a few others referred to the *Revised 1996 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories* or the 2019 *Refinement to the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories*. Some also mentioned the IPCC *Good Practice Guidance and Uncertainty Management in National Greenhouse Gas Inventories* and/or the IPCC *Good Practice Guidance for Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry.* 

83. In addition, a few Parties also referred to the standard methods and procedures contained in the 2013 Revised Supplementary Methods and Good Practice Guidance Arising from the Kyoto Protocol and the 2013 Supplement to the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories: Wetlands.

#### 2. Assumptions and methodological approaches

84. Some Parties expressed mitigation targets as a deviation from a 'business as usual' level, with many presenting quantitative baselines and mitigation scenarios and most providing updated information on the assumptions and approaches used to develop 'business as usual' scenarios, baselines or projections, such as baselines and projections being based on historical data and trends in emissions and economic parameters. Many of those Parties referred to key parameters and variables such as GDP and population and growth thereof, and cost–benefit analysis. They also provided sector-specific parameters, including energy consumption, energy demand and production, electricity grid capacity, urbanization rate, transportation network changes and vehicle numbers, forest growth rate, livestock trends, per capita waste generation, and energy and waste statistics per tourist.

85. Some Parties communicated additional information on other approaches used for estimating sector- or activity-specific emissions or baselines, including using regional data sources for downscaling data or generating data at the national level, and calculation tools or approaches for estimating short-lived climate pollutants or precursor emissions. Some Parties mentioned using specific modelling tools for estimating their emissions or baselines, such as The Integrated Market Allocation-Energy Flow Optimization Model System, Long-range Energy Alternatives Planning, the Greenhouse Gas Abatement Cost Model, Green Economy Modelling, the PROSPECTS+ emissions scenario tool and the Ex-Ante Carbon-balance Tool.

#### 3. Land use, land-use change and forestry

86. Many Parties intend to address emissions and subsequent removals due to natural disturbances on managed land if such events occur. Almost all of them mentioned that they will use a statistical approach to identifying natural disturbances following relevant IPCC guidance.

87. Many Parties stated that emissions and removals from harvested wood products will be accounted for as part of their NDCs: almost all indicated that they will use the production approach, with a few selecting the stock change approach and a few others the atmospheric flow approach.

88. Many Parties mentioned that the effects of age-class structure in forests will be taken into account when estimating the mitigation contribution of forests by using a projected forward-looking forest reference level taking into account current management practices.

#### 4. Voluntary cooperation under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement


89. Almost all Parties provided information relating to voluntary cooperation. Most of them, more than double compared with the previous NDCs, communicated that they plan to or will possibly use voluntary cooperation in at least one of its scopes in implementing their

NDCs (see figure 4) by directly or indirectly referring to the scopes in their NDCs: general use of voluntary cooperation under Article 6; use of cooperative approaches under Article 6, paragraph 2; use of the mechanism under Article 6, paragraph 4; use of non-market approaches under Article 6, paragraph 8; and use of the CDM.<sup>33</sup>

90. Most Parties communicated planned or possible use of cooperative approaches, followed by planned or possible use of the mechanism. Some Parties indicated that they plan to or will possibly make general use of voluntary cooperation, a few referred to the CDM and a few to non-market approaches.

#### Figure 4

Share of Parties indicating in nationally determined contributions the intention to use or possibility of using specific scopes of voluntary cooperation



91. A few Parties communicated the use of voluntary cooperation as a condition for achieving their mitigation targets.

92. On the other hand, many Parties have set limits on their use of voluntary cooperation: a few have limited their use of voluntary cooperation to achieving their conditional mitigation targets only; a few have set quantitative limits on their use of voluntary cooperation for achieving their mitigation targets, such as achieving unconditional targets primarily through domestic efforts but partially through voluntary cooperation; and many, a sharp increase from the few indicated in the analysis of the Parties' previous NDCs, have set qualitative limits on their use of voluntary cooperation for achieving their mitigation targets, such as using units that adhere to standards and guidelines to ensure additionality, permanence or avoidance of double counting of emission reductions.

#### F. Planning and implementation processes

93. Almost all Parties provided information on their NDC planning processes and most also referred to their implementation plans, communicating information on their institutional arrangements, stakeholder engagement processes and policy instruments, including legislation, strategies, plans and policies.

#### 1. Domestic institutional arrangements

94. Most Parties indicated that domestic institutional arrangements are a key element of coordinating, planning and implementing climate change policy and action at the national and international level and fostering public participation. Most referred to specific arrangements in place for NDC preparation, such as inter-institutional commissions, councils

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Only direct references to use of the CDM were considered: an indirect reference to the CDM such as "international market-based mechanisms" was not considered a reference to the CDM.

and committees, led by a designated entity with a coordination role and including members from public entities, the private sector, non-governmental organizations and/or academia. A few other Parties communicated that such arrangements are under development.

95. Most Parties referred to formal arrangements in place for consulting various stakeholders, including the general public, local communities, indigenous peoples, private entities, business and trade associations, civil society organizations, youth associations, women's associations, regional development partners, academia and research communities. Almost all of those Parties indicated that they conducted such consultation and engagement processes in an inclusive and participatory manner. Some Parties specifically referenced gender-sensitive consultations, referring to specific guidelines for ensuring gender sensitivity, such as during public consultations, and highlighting the inclusion of national gender machineries, gender and women's groups, or non-governmental organizations in the process.

96. Most Parties mentioned specific policy instruments in place to facilitate NDC implementation in addition to institutional arrangements, and some others mentioned instruments being under development. Such policy instruments include energy and/or climate strategies, low-emission development strategies, NDC implementation road maps, NDC action plans, laws and regulations on climate change, sectoral national mitigation and adaptation plans and NDC investment plans.

97. Some Parties included information on their domestic measurement, reporting and verification systems, while many others indicated that such systems are under development. Those Parties acknowledged the important role of such systems in continuously monitoring and tracking the status and progress of their NDCs and mitigation efforts, and highlighted that the results will be reflected in national inventory reports and/or biennial transparency reports, ensuring national and international transparency. A few Parties also highlighted that the feedback from such systems will be used to guide the preparation of their subsequent NDCs.

#### 2. Gender

98. Most Parties provided information related to gender in their NDCs and some affirmed that they will take gender into account in implementing them.<sup>34</sup>

99. Of the Parties that provided gender-related information, most referred to relevant policies and legislation or affirmed a general commitment to gender equality, while some included information on how gender had been or was planned to be mainstreamed in NDC implementation, and on specific tools and methods for this, such as gender-disaggregated data, gender analyses or assessments and gender-responsive budgeting, and a few included gender as a criterion for prioritizing activities.

100. Some Parties that referred to gender in their NDCs treated it as a cross-cutting issue to be addressed across adaptation and mitigation, with a few focusing on adaptation. A few Parties considered gender exclusively in the context of adaptation. Some Parties mentioned taking gender into account in formulating and implementing their NAPs.


101. When Parties referred to their planned gender-sensitive or gender-responsive climate action or generally elaborated on gender aspects in the context of specific sectors, they did so most frequently in the context of energy, disaster, agriculture, health, education and water.

102. Some Parties highlighted the importance of providing finance, technology and capacity-building for gender-specific action and of these means of implementation being gender-responsive.

103. Some Parties implicitly or explicitly considered gender as it intersects with other social factors. Some Parties explicitly considered specific genders in the context of their differentiated needs and perspectives and the gender-differentiated impacts of and contributions to climate change and climate action.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> For more information on gender under the UNFCCC, see <u>https://unfccc.int/topics/gender/workstreams/chronology-of-gender-in-the-intergovernmental-process.</u>

104. Parties are increasingly considering gender in their NDCs and recognizing gender integration as a means of increasing the ambition and effectiveness of their climate action. The share of Parties that referred to gender in the new or updated NDCs compared with their previous NDCs has increased significantly and the share of Parties considering gender as a cross-cutting issue has also risen (see figure 5). Many Parties referenced gender for the first time in their new or updated NDCs, some elaborated more on gender than in their previous NDCs, while a few considered gender to a similar or decreased extent.



#### Figure 5 Reference to gender in nationally determined contributions

#### 3. Indigenous peoples and local communities

105. Some Parties described the role of indigenous peoples and local communities in the context of their NDCs, including the situation and consideration of the rights of indigenous peoples at the national level, such as legal and consultative arrangements for protecting their rights. They emphasized the particular vulnerabilities of indigenous peoples relating to their intrinsic relationship with forests and ecosystems and situations of poverty. The benefits of drawing on indigenous knowledge, in particular for adaptation, were highlighted, as was the importance of combining traditional and modern practices. Parties outlined how indigenous peoples were engaged in NDC preparation, including through consultations on sectoral proposals, risk assessment and analysis of indigenous knowledge. In addition, some of those Parties elaborated on how actions identified in the NDC aim to benefit indigenous peoples by, for example, enhancing access to finance and technology, building capacity for leadership and negotiations, generating payments for ecosystems services and providing development opportunities.

#### 4. Action for Climate Empowerment<sup>35</sup>

106. Almost all Parties provided information on using one or more ACE elements to promote implementation of mitigation and adaptation activities. Some Parties indicated their intention to systematically address ACE by developing national ACE strategies, incorporating ACE into general climate policies and plans, upholding ACE as a guiding principle for climate action, and setting specific ACE-related targets.

107. Some Parties elaborated on climate education measures such as updating formal, informal and non-formal education curricula, establishing laws and policies to ensure provision of climate education, mainstreaming climate change in national education strategies and plans, and providing training and resources for teachers and educators. Some

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> ACE denotes work under Article 12 of the Paris Agreement; its objective is to empower all members of society to engage in climate action through education, training, public awareness, public participation, public access to information, and international cooperation on these issues (the six ACE elements).

Parties included information on training measures, including integrating climate change into training programmes for civil servants and other stakeholders.<sup>36</sup> The need for training was also highlighted in the context of achieving just transition and accessing green jobs.

108. Many Parties provided information on measures for raising public awareness, such as developing communication strategies, disseminating knowledge through traditional and new media, and implementing awareness-raising campaigns for specific sectors, such as health, biodiversity and disaster risk management. Almost all Parties mentioned public participation, including information on institutional arrangements (see paras. 94–97 above). Some Parties included information on public access to information, providing details on developing regulations and systems to guarantee and facilitate access to climate information and data.

109. In the new or updated NDCs, Parties communicated more clearly and in more detail than previously on general principles, past achievements, future commitments, and needs and gaps in relation to ACE. More Parties are explicitly referring to ACE as a necessary means of mobilizing and empowering society to deliver the mitigation and adaptation objectives outlined in their NDCs.

#### 5. Best practices and other contextual matters

110. Many Parties communicated best practices for NDC preparation, such as institutionalizing climate policy development within joint planning frameworks; strengthening stakeholder capacity to participate more substantively in NDC preparation and implementation; designing planning and reporting systems for transparency and public scrutiny; incorporating experience and lessons learned from INDC preparation and implementation efforts; conducting extensive stakeholder consultation and peer review to enhance their understanding of the NDC; conducting a preliminary assessment of pre-2020 efforts to identify gaps and needs and develop an NDC road map; mainstreaming NDC goals in existing strategies, plans and policies to obtain political support and benefit from existing arrangements; partnering with regional and international organizations to develop a robust NDC; and establishing a scientific and quantitative system for analysing and assessing progress of implementation.

111. On the basis of their national circumstances and development pathways, many Parties highlighted other contextual aspirations and priority areas, such as maximizing synergies between climate commitments and the SDGs; adaptation and climate-resilient development; collaboration and support by developed country Parties and international organizations; deploying low-emission technologies to drive emission reduction and support economic growth; safeguarding food security and eradicating poverty; involving youth, local governments and communities and/or indigenous groups in a gender-responsive manner; just transition of the workforce; social and climate justice; circular economy; oceans or blue carbon; disaster risk reduction; human health; energy production from renewable sources and/or energy efficiency; and reducing risks caused by loss and damage.

112. Although the first global stocktake will not be conducted until 2023, some Parties provided information specifically on how their NDC preparation was informed by activities or events relevant to the collective assessment of progress in addressing climate change, such as the United Nations Secretary-General's calls to strengthen climate action and ambition during the 2018 high-level event on climate change, the recommendations from the Talanoa Call for Action, and/or the best available science, such as the SR1.5.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Training as part of capacity-building efforts is addressed in paras. 0–0.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> IPCC. 2018. IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5 °C above Preindustrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty. V Masson-Delmotte, P Zhai, H-O Pörtner, et al. (eds.). Geneva: World Meteorological Organization. Available at https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/.

## G. Mitigation co-benefits resulting from adaptation action and/or economic diversification plans

113. Some Parties considered mitigation co-benefits resulting from their adaptation action and/or economic diversification plans and a few mentioned that such co-benefits have been taken into account in their mitigation efforts. Most of these Parties considered social and economic consequences of response measures and included an economic diversification plan and/or a just transition or social pillar for designing climate policies that foster a just and equitable transition, and managing changes arising in relevant sectors due to the implementation of climate policies. Some other Parties considered economic and social consequences of response measures without linking them to the mitigation co-benefits of their adaptation action and/or economic diversification plans. A few Parties presented their sectoral mitigation and adaptation plans as transition or diversification plans.

114. The Parties highlighted unequal impacts on different groups of society or the workforce as consequences of response measures, with impacts on the workforce<sup>38</sup> being the most frequently mentioned. Many plan to address such impacts by including the concept of just transition in their overall NDC implementation, such as a just transition mechanism and just transition funds; laws and strategies for protecting workers; a social mechanism for job creation, skills development and employment policies; and a consultation process for social protection. A few Parties paid special attention to addressing impacts of response measures on vulnerable groups and communities in relation to poverty and inequality.<sup>39</sup>

115. Some Parties considered economic diversification as part of their national development plans and climate policies to boost the country's resilience to climate change and response measures. A few others linked such plans to existing lowly diversified economy and the impact of response measures on sectors of high economic importance, such as extraction of fossil fuels. These Parties specifically mentioned economic diversification plans or actions focused on high-emitting sectors and sectors of economic importance. Such plans include increasing the share of energy generation using renewable sources; improving energy efficiency through regulatory measures, pricing signals and technology deployment in the fisheries, industry and buildings sectors; carbon dioxide capture and storage in the oil and gas industry; implementing fuel switch and fuel price reforms in the transport sector; moving to circular economy for better waste management; and adopting sustainable tourism practices to build the tourism sector.

116. Some Parties described how their adaptation action contributes to emission reduction, including their intention to consider mitigation co-benefits in NAP formulation. In terms of sectors, some described the potential co-benefits of various agricultural adaptation measures, including climate-smart agriculture, reducing food waste and vertical farming. Adaptation of coastal ecosystems was highlighted as another source of co-benefits, in particular planting mangroves and seagrass beds. Other sectors with potential co-benefits mentioned were forestry, natural resources and the environment, energy and waste.

117. Many Parties identified agriculture as a high priority for adaptation, either explicitly or as part of cross-sectoral adaptation efforts. They are also aiming to use mitigation opportunities in the sector. Some Parties highlighted the need to focus on activities that have positive effects on mitigation and adaptation while ensuring food security.

#### H. Fairness and ambition in the light of national circumstances

118. Almost all Parties explained, using different metrics, how they consider their NDCs to be fair and ambitious in the light of their national circumstances.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Impacts on the workforce include changes in number, scope and location of jobs, and skilling and reskilling requirements.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Such as low-income groups, women, young people, indigenous peoples and people with disabilities.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Metrics include capabilities; historic and current responsibility; climate justice; share in global emissions; level of per capita emissions; vulnerability to the adverse impacts of climate change;

119. They included qualitative and/or quantitative information on how their NDCs represent progression and highest possible ambition, such as through increased estimated level of emission reductions; earlier projected peaking of emissions; enhancing mitigation efforts; increasing unconditional elements; including long-term targets; introducing and/or enhancing policies; elaborating on adaptation action; integrating climate goals into national policy instruments; enhanced linkages with the SDGs; using more accurate data and moving to higher-tier estimation; establishing arrangements for monitoring and/or tracking progress of implementation; enhancing the stakeholder consultation process; developing sector-based action plans for implementation; and presenting additional information to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding.

120. Some Parties framed fairness consideration within their past, current and future share in global and/or per capita emissions compared with global averages, or in relation to the trends in one or several metrics. A few Parties indicated that, despite COVID-19 and its impacts on their economies, they are committed to implementing their NDCs to address climate change.

121. Many Parties highlighted that they have enhanced their mitigation and/or adaptation contributions. In addition, many expressed that their NDCs are in line with the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement and/or with the mitigation pathways for limiting global warming to 2 or 1.5  $^{\circ}$ C above pre-industrial levels.

122. Some Parties provided information on ambition by linking their NDCs to their commitment to transition to a sustainable and/or low-carbon and resilient economy: some expressed that they have incorporated their NDC goals and policies into national legislative, regulatory and planning processes as a means of ensuring implementation; some addressed ambition in the context of the inclusive design of their NDCs, considering various cross-cutting aspects, such as investment plans, gender-responsiveness, education and just transition.

123. The Parties' total emission levels resulting from implementation of their new or updated NDCs are estimated to be 38 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> eq lower (ranging from 94 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> eq lower to 18 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> eq higher) or on average 0.3 per cent lower (ranging from 0.7 per cent lower to 0.1 per cent higher) by 2025, and 398 (392–433) Mt CO<sub>2</sub> eq or 2.8 (2.5–3.2) per cent lower by 2030 than according to the Parties' previous NDCs.

#### I. Contribution towards achieving the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2, and towards Article 2, paragraph 1(a), and Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement<sup>41</sup>

124. The information necessary to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding of NDCs includes information on:<sup>42</sup>

(a) How the NDC contributes towards achieving the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2;

(b) How the NDC contributes towards Article 2, paragraph 1(a), and Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement.

125. Almost all Parties communicated information on the contribution of their NDCs towards achieving the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2, and towards Article 2, paragraph 1(a), and Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement.

development and/or technological capacity; mitigation potential; cost of mitigation actions; degree of progression or progression beyond the current level of effort; and link to objectives of the Paris Agreement and its long-term global goals.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> See addendum 3 to this document for additional information, including on estimation methods and assumptions used.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Decision 4/CMA.1, annex I, para. 7.

126. Many Parties indicated that their level of emissions in the future is expected to fall within the scope of a global emission pathway that is consistent with the goal of keeping the global average temperature increase below 2 or  $1.5 \,^{\circ}$ C.

127. In that context, Parties highlighted their national mitigation and/or adaptation efforts, NDC targets, LT-LEDS, development pathways for decoupling emissions from economic growth, and mobilization of domestic and international support.

128. The total GHG emission levels in 2025 of the Parties that submitted new or updated NDCs are on average projected to be 2.0 per cent higher than in 1990 (13.77 Gt CO<sub>2</sub> eq), 8.6 per cent higher than in 2000 (12.93 Gt CO<sub>2</sub> eq), 2.8 per cent higher than in 2005 (13.66 Gt CO<sub>2</sub> eq), 2.2 per cent higher than in 2010 (13.74 Gt CO<sub>2</sub> eq), 2.0 per cent higher than in 2015 (13.76 Gt CO<sub>2</sub> eq) and 0.5 per cent higher than in 2017 (13.97 Gt CO<sub>2</sub> eq).

129. For 2030, the Parties' total GHG emission levels are on average projected to be 0.7 per cent lower than in 1990, 5.8 per cent higher than in 2000, 0.1 per cent higher than in 2005, 0.5 per cent lower than in 2010, 0.6 per cent lower than in 2015 and 2.1 per cent lower than in 2017.


130. In 2030, the total GHG emission level resulting from implementation of the NDCs without taking into account conditional elements is projected to be, on average, slightly higher than in 2017, by 0.5 per cent (ranging from 0.7 per cent lower to 1.8 per cent higher); whereas the total GHG emission level resulting from implementation of the NDCs including conditional elements is projected to be, on average, 4.7 (3.5–6.0) per cent below the 2017 level.

131. The previous NDCs (without taking into account conditional elements) indicated a continuously increasing trend in emissions up to 2030, to 2.8 (1.6–3.9) per cent above the 2017 level; whereas the new or updated NDCs (without taking into account conditional elements) indicate the possibility, at the lower end of the emission range, of the Parties' emissions peaking before 2030, with their emissions in 2030 (13.87 Gt CO<sub>2</sub> eq) projected to be 1.9 per cent below the lower end of the projected 2025 target level (14.14 Gt CO<sub>2</sub> eq) and also just below the 2017 level (13.97 Gt CO<sub>2</sub> eq) (see figure 6).

132. If they are fully implemented (including conditional elements), the new or updated NDCs indicate the possibility of the Parties' emissions peaking before 2025, with the average estimate of emissions in 2025 (13.87 Gt  $CO_2$  eq) being slightly lower than in 2017 (13.97 Gt  $CO_2$  eq) (see figure 6).

133. According to the new or updated NDCs, per capita GHG emissions are estimated at 6.52 (6.36-6.68) t CO<sub>2</sub> eq in 2025 and 6.19 (5.94-6.43) t CO<sub>2</sub> eq in 2030, which is 4.7 (2.3-7.1) per cent lower in 2025 and 9.6 (6.0-13.2) per cent lower in 2030 than in 2017.

134. The COVID-19 pandemic was mentioned by many Parties in the new or updated NDCs, but most have not reflected the potential impacts of the pandemic in their NDCs. The longer-term effects of the related changes in national and global GHG emissions will depend on the duration of the pandemic and the nature and scale of recovery measures.



#### Historical and projected total greenhouse gas emissions according to nationally determined contributions

Figure 6

135. According to the SR1.5, to be consistent with global emission pathways with no or limited overshoot of the 1.5 °C goal, net anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions need to decline by about 45 per cent below the 2010 level by 2030 (40–60 per cent interquartile range), reaching net zero around 2050 (2045–2055 interquartile range); and for limiting global warming to below 2 °C, CO<sub>2</sub> emissions need to decline by about 25 per cent below the 2010 level by 2030 on most pathways (10–30 per cent interquartile range) and reach net zero around 2070 (2065–2080 interquartile range). Deep reductions are required for non-CO<sub>2</sub> emissions as well.<sup>43</sup>

136. With their GHG emissions in 2030 on average projected to be 0.5 per cent below the 2010 level (see para. 129 above), the scale of the total emission reduction expected to be achieved by the represented Parties (noting that this is only about 40 per cent of the Parties to the Paris Agreement) through implementation of the new or updated NDCs falls far short of the IPCC ranges referred to in paragraph 135 above.

137. In order to provide a clear picture of the combined contribution of NDCs towards achieving the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2, and towards Article 2, paragraph 1(a), and Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement, the final version of the NDC synthesis report will include a comparison of the projected total emissions resulting from implementation of all NDCs with different mitigation scenarios and indicators assessed by the IPCC, including global emission pathways towards the 1.5 and 2 °C goals. It will also include a comparison between implied future emissions and remaining cumulative emissions towards the 1.5 and 2 °C goals using (but not limited to) scenarios for global emission pathways. It was not possible to provide such information in this initial version of the report owing to the limited number of NDCs considered.

138. Many Parties provided information on their long-term mitigation visions, strategies and targets for up to and beyond 2050, many of which communicated LT-LEDS in response to Article 4, paragraph 19, of the Paris Agreement.<sup>44</sup>

139. On the basis of that information, the Parties' total GHG emissions in 2050 were estimated at 0.7-1.2 Gt CO<sub>2</sub> eq. Mindful of the inherent uncertainties surrounding such long-term estimates, this represents an emission reduction of 87–93 per cent below the 2017 level (estimated at 9.29 Gt CO<sub>2</sub> eq) by 2050.

#### J. Adaptation

140. Adaptation involves responding to climate change by assessing impacts, vulnerability and risk; planning and implementing adaptation; making contingency arrangements for when impacts occur; addressing losses; and monitoring and evaluating adaptation. Arrangements have been developed under the Convention to facilitate adaptation, in particular NAPs, institutions such as the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, partnership structures for closing knowledge gaps, and provisions to facilitate support for, and transparency of, adaptation. Under the Paris Agreement, Parties may include an adaptation component in their NDCs.

#### 1. Scope

141. Many Parties included an adaptation component in their NDCs, some of which were designated as adaptation communications. They provided information on vulnerability and national circumstances; efforts to enhance research; adaptation measures, in particular NAPs and sectoral actions; contingency measures; and monitoring and evaluation of adaptation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> See, for example, figure SPM.3a in IPCC. 2018. Summary for Policymakers. In: V Masson-Delmotte, P Zhai, H-O Pörtner, et al. (eds.). Global Warming of 1.5 °C: An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty. Geneva: World Meteorological Organization. Available at https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/chapter/spm/.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> As at 25 February 2021, 29 Parties had communicated LT-LEDS, 24 of which have communicated a new or updated NDC; see <u>https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/long-term-strategies</u>.

142. The information provided illustrates how Parties have advanced adaptation since their previous NDCs:

(a) They provided more detailed information and described more integrated national frameworks, in contrast to the multiple frameworks and individual projects described in their previous NDCs;

(b) More Parties described the status of their NAP process, illustrating how the NAP has been established as the main national instrument for adaptation;

(c) They included more quantitative time-bound targets, <sup>45</sup> in contrast to the qualitative and open-ended adaptation objectives provided previously; and some highlighted the indicator frameworks that they intend to use for monitoring progress;

(d) They included more detailed information on mitigation and sustainable development co-benefits of adaptation, as well as on other synergies between mitigation and adaptation;

(e) Some Parties identified the adaptation component as their adaptation communication, and a few provided information organized around the elements identified in the annex to decision 9/CMA.1;

(f) They described in more detail linkages of adaptation efforts with efforts under other international frameworks, such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, in particular describing how adaptation actions relate to specific SDGs.

#### 2. Impacts, risk and vulnerability

143. Most of the adaptation components described key climatic changes, referring in particular to temperature increase, extreme temperatures, precipitation changes and sea level rise. These were identified as triggering various climate impacts, in particular extreme events (including rainfall events, storms and cyclones), flooding, drought, heatwaves, saltwater intrusion, ocean acidification, coral bleaching, erosion and landslides. Parties described how impacts affect vulnerable areas. Of particular concern are agriculture and other aspects of food security, water, biodiversity and ecosystems, health systems, infrastructure (in particular energy) and loss of territory, livelihoods and habitats. Parties highlighted groups and areas that are particularly vulnerable. As factors of vulnerability, they highlighted, for example, dependence on climate-sensitive sectors, status as a small island developing State, having complex and vulnerable ecosystems, location of population and infrastructure on coasts, and economic factors, in particular poverty. Vulnerability has also increased as a result of COVID-19.

#### 3. Enhancing adaptation-related research for policymaking

144. Many of the Parties that included an adaptation component considered how to enhance adaptation-relevant research and ensure that adaptation efforts are informed by science. Some of the adaptation components described efforts to enhance research through, for example, climate, ocean and coastal data collection programmes, flood or multi-hazard monitoring systems, observation networks, research centres, strengthened weather services, systems to monitor land use and ecosystems, risk maps with climate data and scenarios, sea level research programmes and international cooperation. To ensure that adaptation is guided by robust science and projections, some Parties are aiming to develop, for example, integrated climate information systems, platforms for accessing information, and forecasting tools and scenarios.

#### 4. **Pre-emptive adaptation**


145. Many Parties that provided an adaptation component described the process for formulating and implementing their NAP and its status. Some indicated that they have developed a NAP, while others identified their intention to do so, including a timeline for completion or update. Some Parties outlined links between their NAP and NDC, including how the NAP provided the basis for the adaptation component, how both build on the same

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> See addendum 1 to this document for more details on quantitative targets.

vulnerability assessment, and how the NAP and NDC can be aligned. Some Parties described the scope of their NAP, including in relation to enabling risk and vulnerability analysis; enhancing climate information; strengthening adaptive, institutional, policy and technical capacities; outlining and prioritizing adaptation needs, objectives, milestones and actions as well as costs of adaptation; providing a framework for planning, implementation and coordination; integrating adaptation across sectors; enhancing financing, engagement and gender-responsiveness; strengthening monitoring and evaluation; and enabling consideration of co-benefits between mitigation and adaptation.

#### Figure 7

### Share of adaptation components of nationally determined contributions referring to specific adaptation priority areas and sectors



146. Parties provided a wide range of information on adaptation in various priority areas (see figure 7). The key efforts in those priority areas are described below.<sup>46</sup>

147. In most adaptation components, measures for adapting food production systems and ensuring food security were prioritized, encompassing adaptation efforts in the areas of agriculture, livestock and fisheries. Adaptation is being pursued via sectoral vulnerability analysis, planning and systems for agroclimatic information. As technical solutions, Parties are focusing on, for example, temperature- and drought-resistant crops, diversification, and sustainable and integrated land-use and cultivation methods. Some adaptation components highlighted measures for enhancing resilience, sustainability and productivity of livestock and pastoralism. The measures for enhancing sustainability of fisheries involve diversification, habitat protection and financial instruments.

148. Health was identified as an adaptation priority in most of the adaptation components, with relevant policy frameworks and plans described. The importance of building the capacity of health institutions and enhancing information and awareness was highlighted. Parties are focusing on enhanced impact and disease surveillance and monitoring and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> See addendum 1 to this document for information on specific measures and quantitative targets in each priority area.

vulnerability mapping. Measures tend to focus on responding to climate-sensitive vectorborne diseases, respiratory impacts and heatwaves.

149. Most adaptation components described adaptation efforts to protect terrestrial ecosystems and forests, with Parties aiming in particular to increase protected areas and connectivity, enhance urban biodiversity and implement sustainable forest management and reforestation.

150. In most adaptation components, freshwater resources was identified as a priority area and measures for enhancing availability, efficiency and quality of water supplies were presented, including enhancing water infrastructure and water resource plans, strategies and systems. Parties are aiming to strengthen watersheds, efficiency of water use and irrigation. Integrated water resources management, protection and restoration of water-related ecosystems such as forests, wetlands and rivers, and supply diversification were highlighted measures.

151. Many adaptation components included measures for protecting coastal and low-lying areas, including river deltas, and addressing sea level rise and saltwater intrusion. A few identified preventing loss of land as a main adaptation objective, with efforts including assessing and monitoring impacts on and vulnerability of coasts and national plans for coastal protection, and defining standards for construction and flood protection.

152. Some adaptation components outlined efforts to adapt ocean ecosystems to promote sustainable development while safeguarding oceans. Measures are focused on investing in ocean and the 'blue' economy and protecting marine and coastal ecosystems, with a focus on coral reefs and mangrove restoration.

153. Most adaptation components described efforts to adapt key economic sectors and services, in particular energy, infrastructure, transportation and tourism. Efforts in the energy sector include impact analysis and planning, expanding clean energy and energy efficiency, and conservation (through standards, labels and awareness). Some Parties outlined adaptation plans for the mining sector, which include tools for ensuring operability of hydrocarbon facilities. Parties are aiming to ensure resilience of infrastructure through building codes and resilience standards, elevation and nature-based solutions. Transportation was a focus area in some adaptation components, with adaptation measures including enhancing risk evaluation, such as by using geographic information systems, and developing green road infrastructure. Tourism is to be addressed by, for example, mainstreaming climate risk in sectoral policies, financial instruments and insurance. In some adaptation components, the industrial sector was considered in adaptation planning.

154. Some adaptation components identified livelihoods and the safety of communities as an adaptation priority area, focusing on responding to human mobility needs, forced displacement and impacts on settlements. Solutions include temporary resettlement, migration opportunities and, as a last resort, relocation, while ensuring right to remain. Innovative livelihood strategies, social safeguards and economic diversification were identified as being helpful in responding to loss of livelihoods.

155. Human habitats, including urban areas, was identified as a priority area in many adaptation components. Efforts in this area are aimed at adapting and enhancing the resilience of both rural and urban settlements, with a focus on housing and associated infrastructure. Some efforts are focused on adaptation of cities and urban areas, including through planning, risk assessment and upgrading informal settlements.

156. Many adaptation components described measures for enhancing disaster risk management and early warning systems. Policy and institutional measures include enhancing risk assessment and monitoring, integrating disaster risk management into adaptation efforts, and establishing early warning systems, including a national multi-hazard early warning system, or systems for coastal areas, forestry and ecosystems, the water sector, rivers, drought and agriculture.

#### 5. Contingency measures

157. Contingency measures for dealing with emergencies and impacts that occur regardless of adaptation efforts were highlighted in some adaptation components, such as strengthening

resilience to impacts beyond the limits of adaptation through NAPs, search and rescue plans, emergency shelters, humanitarian assistance civil defence, evacuation procedures, emergency funding, food reserves and disaster insurance schemes. For the agriculture and livestock sectors, Parties referred to insurance and risk management mechanisms, as well as post-disaster relief. In the fisheries sector, measures include using financial instruments such as insurance against extreme events, and establishing a minimum income for fishers.


#### 6. Monitoring and evaluation, and understanding progress

158. Many Parties described in their adaptation components their efforts to enhance monitoring and evaluation of adaptation, such as by focusing on tracking progress, reducing vulnerability, improving efficiency and effectiveness of actions, NAP implementation and support. Approaches included using systems for integrating climate and adaptation information, sectoral monitoring tools (e.g. in agriculture and tourism) and a platform for integrating tools for monitoring climate risk and low-emission development. Some of those Parties described their intention to apply global, national or sectoral indicators for monitoring progress of specific measures and/or sectoral performance towards targets linked to a specific baseline.

#### 7. Synergies with mitigation and sustainable development

159. Some Parties elaborated on synergies between adaptation and mitigation (mitigation co-benefits of adaptation action are covered in chapter IV.G above). A few Parties identified how their mitigation action can generate adaptation co-benefits, highlighting the potential of actions in the energy sector, such as using renewable energy, fuel switching and increasing efficiency, and forest preservation, afforestation and reforestation.

160. Some Parties described how their adaptation actions relate to sustainable development, identifying in particular the essential role of adaptation efforts in ensuring if and how adaptation in specific priority areas contributes to specific SDGs. Figure 8 provides an overview of synergies identified between adaptation efforts and specific SDGs.



### Synergies between efforts in adaptation priority areas and Sustainable Development Goals identified in nationally determined contributions

*Note*: The shading of the boxes reflects how frequently linkages were identified by Parties: the darker the shade, the more frequently linkages were identified.

Figure 8

#### K. Domestic mitigation measures<sup>47</sup>

161. Under Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, Parties shall pursue domestic mitigation measures with the aim of achieving the objectives of their NDCs.


162. Almost all Parties outlined such measures in their NDCs in specific priority areas of national importance, which are often a subset of one or more IPCC sectors, including energy supply, transport, buildings, industry,<sup>48</sup> agriculture, LULUCF and waste. Most Parties identified measures in each of these priority areas, but only some indicated them in industry (see figure 9).

163. Most Parties communicated one or more quantitative mitigation targets specific to priority areas or sub-areas, which support and underpin their overall mitigation targets (see figure 9). Such quantitative mitigation targets were provided most frequently for LULUCF by many Parties, followed by energy supply and cross-cutting or other.

164. Each domestic mitigation measure contributes to achieving an unconditional or conditional mitigation target or both unconditional and conditional mitigation targets identified in the NDC: measures were included by many Parties for achieving their unconditional targets in their NDCs; by some for achieving their conditional targets; and by some others for achieving both their unconditional and conditional targets.

Figure 9

### Share of Parties referring to specific priority areas and sub-areas for domestic mitigation measures in nationally determined contributions



*Note*: If a Party communicated more than one measure for a specific priority area or sub-area, it was counted as one Party communicating measures for that area.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> See addendum 2 to this document for additional information on domestic mitigation measures.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> This priority area covers measures targeting emissions from fuel use in industry, industrial process emissions and emissions from product use. For the scopes of the other priority areas, including crosscutting or other, see addendum 2 to this document.

#### 1. Sub-areas and mitigation options under priority areas

165. Of the sub-areas under priority areas communicated, energy generation, transmission and storage was most frequently identified by most Parties, followed by road transport and the cross-cutting sub-area<sup>49</sup> under buildings (see figure 9), which together cover the most frequently indicated mitigation options<sup>50</sup> (see figure 10).

166. Renewable energy generation was the most frequently indicated mitigation option, with the share of Parties indicating this option more than doubling since their previous NDCs, followed by improving energy efficiency of buildings and multisector energy efficiency improvement. A few Parties communicated quantitative targets for renewable energy share (ranging from 13 to 100 per cent) in the electricity mix by 2030; and some of those target shares fall within or above the IPCC range of 47–65 per cent.<sup>51</sup>




Figure 10

#### Share of Parties referring to the frequently indicated mitigation options in nationally determined contributions

*Note*: If a Party communicated more than one measure for one of the frequently indicated mitigation options, it was counted as one Party communicating measures for that option.

167. In the priority areas related to supply and end-use of energy such as energy supply, transport, buildings, industry and cross-cutting or other, renewable energy generation and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> The cross-cutting sub-area covers measures applicable to more than one sub-area under a priority area. For example, the cross-cutting sub-area under buildings covers measures applicable to both residential buildings and commercial or institutional buildings, and the cross-cutting sub-area of under energy supply covers measures applicable to both energy generation, transmission and storage, and fossil fuel exploration, production, transport and distribution.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> In this report, mitigation options refers to expected key mitigation effects or categories of domestic mitigation measures, which were identified on the basis of the analysis of the trend in the measures set out in the new or updated NDCs, and by referring to those identified in the previous NDC synthesis report and relevant IPCC reports, including the SR1.5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> The interquartile range of global renewable energy share in electricity generation by 2030 in the modelled emission pathways that limit global warming to 1.5 °C with no or limited overshoot in the SR1.5.

shifting to low- or zero-carbon fuels were frequently or widely indicated as key mitigation options relevant to reducing the carbon intensity of electricity and other fuels; electrification was mentioned in relation to increasing the share of final energy supplied by electricity and switching fuel use from fossil fuels to electricity in end-use sectors such as transport and buildings, benefiting from electricity with reduced carbon intensity; and improving energy efficiency and shifting to more efficient modes of transport were often referenced in relation to reducing energy demand (see figure 10). More broadly across all priority areas, Parties indicated mitigation options related to circular economy (i.e. continual use of resources to reduce demand for exploiting new resources, including fossil fuels), including reducing and recycling waste and promoting circular economy. Measures related to carbon pricing were identified as efficiently supporting the move towards decarbonization by putting a price on GHG emissions.

168. Parties indicated waste reduction, waste-to-energy, improved management of manure and herds, and fluorinated gas substitution as key mitigation options relevant to reducing non- $CO_2$  emissions (see figure 10). In terms of key options relevant to enhancing carbon sequestration in soil or vegetation, afforestation, reforestation and revegetation was most frequently indicated, followed by sustainable forest management and reduced deforestation and forest degradation.

169. Some developing country Parties referred to reducing deforestation as a priority with high mitigation potential, including by implementing REDD+ activities. Many of those Parties highlighted the importance of socioeconomic and environmental non-carbon benefits resulting from these mitigation activities, including for adaptation.

#### 2. Coherence and synergies with development priorities

170. Most Parties, more than double the share since their previous NDCs, highlighted policy coherence and synergies between their mitigation measures and development priorities. Many identified domestic mitigation measures in the context of the longer-term measures and policies set out in their LT-LEDS and/or other relevant national long-term low-emission development strategies or laws; for example, by identifying domestic mitigation measures for the NDC on the basis of programmes of actions set out in the national LT-LEDS.

171. In addition, some Parties clarified the alignment between their mitigation measures and specific SDGs, highlighting not only the multiple co-benefits of their measures for sustainable development but also the cost-effectiveness of their measures in relation to sustainable development under their fiscal constraints, including those due to the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, Parties identified one or several of the SDGs to which their mitigation measures contribute; and considered contribution to achieving SDGs as a criterion for identifying such measures to be included in the NDC.

172. Further, many Parties highlighted synergies between their mitigation measures and green recovery from the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, such as implementing a "Green New Deal" for accelerating implementation of the measures identified in the updated NDC.

#### L. Means of implementation

173. Almost all Parties provided information on some or all means of implementation in their NDCs, although the structure and depth of that information varied significantly. While some Parties included a dedicated section on means of implementation or separate sections on finance, technology and/or capacity-building, many mentioned or referred to aspects of means of implementation in other sections of their NDCs, as highlighted in figure 11.




Figure 11 Information on means of implementation in nationally determined contributions

174. Some Parties provided information on specific climate finance, technology and capacity-building projects, including, for some, detailed information on financial and technical requirements, implementing entities and time frames.

175. Some Parties highlighted South–South, triangular or regional cooperation as support mechanisms for NDC implementation, including for specific aspects of financial assistance, capacity-building and technology development and transfer.

#### 1. Finance

176. Almost all Parties provided information on finance as a means of NDC implementation, with many mentioning finance in relation to domestic implementation and many others characterizing finance in terms of international support needed. A few mentioned finance in the context of providing financial support for other countries' NDC implementation. Many Parties provided qualitative information on how finance will be used as a means of implementation either in general or through specific actions for financing mitigation or adaptation support, such as earmarking public expenditure, establishing climate funds or supporting financial systems. Some also included quantitative information on financing specific technology development funds, economy-wide budgetary programmes or specific projects and needs for financial support.

177. Some Parties provided quantitative estimates of financial support needs, of which most provided updated estimates and some provided estimates for the first time in their new or updated NDCs. Most estimates were expressed as total amounts over the time frame of the NDC. Some Parties differentiated quantitative estimates for conditional actions reliant on international support from those for unconditional actions that may be financed from domestic sources. Some of those Parties provided estimates for conditional actions only and some others did not specify which actions the estimates were for.

178. Some Parties provided information on financial support needs across mitigation and adaptation themes or sectors, and a few provided total estimates. Mitigation finance is needed across renewable energy, energy efficiency, transport and forestry. Some Parties provided estimates of adaptation finance support needed for activities related to water, agriculture, coastal protection and resilience. A few Parties referred to access to and mobilization and use of financial resources in the context of cooperative approaches under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.

#### 2. Technology development and transfer

179. With regard to information on technology development and transfer for NDC implementation, many Parties covered qualitative aspects and some also quantitative aspects.

180. Most of those Parties referred to technology development and transfer in the context of actions that inherently address both adaptation and mitigation or focus on mitigation. Some Parties also made reference to climate technology for adaptation.

181. Information provided by Parties on climate technology related matters was mainly on technology needs; specific technologies to be deployed; technology innovation, research and development; policy, regulatory and legal aspects; and support to be provided to other Parties for technology development and transfer.

182. Specific technology needs mentioned by Parties were mainly in the areas of agriculture, climate observation and early warning, energy, industry, infrastructure and buildings, transport and water. In terms of specific technologies that Parties intend to use for achieving their adaptation and mitigation targets, the most frequently identified were energy-efficient appliances and processes, renewable energy technologies, low- or zero-emission vehicles and hydrogen technologies. As regards technology innovation, research and development, some Parties included information on promoting institutions, mechanisms, tools and business models that foster progress in this area. Actions on policy, regulatory and legal aspects commonly referred to by Parties include developing or updating policies to promote technologies through private investment. A few Parties included specific information on their intended provision of support to developing country Parties for development and diffusion of climate technologies, for example in the areas of renewable energy and energy efficiency.

#### 3. Capacity-building

183. Many Parties identified capacity-building as a prerequisite for NDC implementation. Some provided a specific section containing information on capacity-building needs. Capacity-building needs for formulating policy, integrating mitigation and adaptation into sectoral planning processes, accessing finance and providing the necessary information for clarity, transparency and understanding of NDCs were identified.

184. With regard to capacity-building needs in thematic areas, some Parties provided information on cross-cutting capacity-building needs, whereas some others expressed capacity-building needs for adaptation and a few others for mitigation. Also, a few Parties indicated capacity-building needs for addressing loss and damage. Some Parties identified their efforts or needs in relation to sectoral capacity-building. The largest proportion of identified capacity-building needs were multisectoral, followed by needs relating to buildings and infrastructure, forestry and energy.

185. Some Parties emphasized the need to strengthen national ownership of capacitybuilding efforts to ensure sustainability and retention of capacity.