

UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance

Seventh Biennial Assessment and
Overview of Climate Finance Flows



United Nations
Framework Convention on
Climate Change

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Special thanks go to the technical authors of the technical report, Stephanie Ockenden, Jessica Omukuti, Charlene Watson, and Dhruba Purkayastha for their valuable contribution in the collection, analysis and drafting of data and information in the preparation of this report.

Acknowledgments and appreciation go to all external contributors who offered views and perspectives at technical expert meetings and through the call for evidence respectively. Although they are too numerous to mention individually, their contributions are deeply appreciated.

Within the SCF, the seventh BA was prepared under the guidance of the co-facilitators, Tamim Alothimin and Karima Oustadi. The report has benefited from inputs and guidance from other SCF members in 2026 including Amjad Abdulla, Patricia Roy Akullo, Isobel Bartholomew, Diann Black-Layne, Davi Bonavides, Ryan Martinez Crosbie, Justine Coutu, Outi Honkatukia, Sho Ikeda, Ali Waqas Malik, Apollonia Miola, Faustin Munyazikwiye, Petrus Muteyauli, Vicky Noens, Elena Pereira, Hendrikje Reich, Martin Stadelmann, Ekaterina Vasilenko, and Yolando Velasco.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY BY THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FINANCE OF THE SEVENTH BIENNIAL ASSESSMENT AND OVERVIEW OF CLIMATE FINANCE FLOWS

I. Introduction

A. Context and mandates

1. The seventh BA conducted by the SCF provides an updated overview of the latest data and trends on climate finance flows up until 2024, and an assessment of the implications of these flows for international efforts to address climate change. The seventh BA includes:

- (a) Information on recent developments in methodologies related to tracking climate finance at the international and domestic level, the operational definitions of climate finance in use, the indicators for measuring the impacts of climate finance, and improvements in tracking climate finance flows and measuring impacts and outcomes, as well as in methodologies for integrating climate change considerations into insurance, lending and investment decision-making processes and that include information relevant to tracking consistency with the long-term goal outlined in Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement;
- (b) An overview of global climate finance flows and of climate finance flows from developed to developing countries,¹ as well as available information on domestic climate finance and on South-South cooperation on climate finance;
- (c) An assessment of the effectiveness, ownership, accessibility and magnitude (in the context of broader flows) of climate finance flows;
- (d) Reflections on data and information therein that could inform the preparation of the first report on progress towards achieving the NCQG.

2. Since the first BA in 2014, the preparation of BAs has been guided by mandates from the COP and the CMA

to the SCF.² Following the sixth BA in 2024, the COP and the CMA provided further guidance to the SCF in the context of preparing the seventh BA,³ in particular on:

- (a) Continuing ongoing technical work on operational definitions of climate finance;
- (b) Continuing to consider the balance of mitigation and adaptation finance and the assessment of both public and private finance;
- (c) Considering further expanding the sources of information, as appropriate.

3. The seventh BA comprises this summary and recommendations prepared by the SCF, and a technical report prepared by experts under the guidance of the SCF.⁴ The technical report was subject to extensive stakeholder input and expert review, but remains a product of the external experts.

B. Scope and approach

4. The seventh BA focuses on climate finance flows in 2023–2024 and identifies trends in relation to previous years where possible. It draws on quantitative data from a wide range of sources, including but not limited to Parties' BTR1s and preliminary and partial data from forthcoming BTR2s, supplemented with other data from international organizations, international financial institutions, United Nations organizations, academia, non-governmental organizations, think tanks and the private sector, in order to provide the most comprehensive assessment from available information and provide detailed insights into climate finance flows.

5. In compiling the estimates, efforts have been made to ensure that they are based on activities that align with the updated operational definition of

1) For the purpose of the overview of climate finance in the BA, various data sources are used to illustrate flows from developed to developing countries, without prejudice to the meaning of those terms in the context of the Convention and the Paris Agreement, including but not limited to flows from Annex I and Annex II Parties to non-Annex I Parties and MDBs; flows from OECD members to non-members; flows from OECD Development Assistance Committee members to countries eligible for OECD Development Assistance Committee official development assistance; and other relevant classifications.

2) Decisions 2/CP.17, para. 121(f); 1/CP.18, para. 71; 5/CP.18, para. 11; 3/CP.19, para. 11; 4/CP.24, paras. 4, 5 and 10; 11/CP.25, para. 9; and 5/CMA.2, para. 9.

3) Decisions 2/CP.29, para. 13, and 1/CP.30, paras. 11 and 13.

4) The technical report will be made available on the SCF web pages (<https://unfccc.int/SCF>).

climate finance of the SCF:⁵ Climate finance aims at reducing emissions and enhancing sinks of GHGs, aims at reducing vulnerability, increasing adaptive capacity, and mainstreaming and increasing resilience of human and ecological systems to negative climate impacts, and includes financing for actions identified in a country's NDC, adaptation communication, NAP, long-term low-emission development strategy or other national plan for implementing and achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement and the objective of the Convention.

6. The technical report does not aim to pre-empt the manner in which Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement is being implemented but is rather illustrative and demonstrates how countries may methodologically group approaches for making finance flows consistent with their national low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development pathways.

7. The technical report has also benefited from qualitative information from various sources, including inputs at technical expert meetings, responses to the relevant call for evidence⁶ and reports that explore topics related to climate finance.

C. Limitations to the data and information

8. In preparing the seventh BA, data and information were gathered from a wide range of sources. Gaps in and limitations of data and information on climate finance outlined in previous BAs persist and should be taken into consideration when deriving conclusions and policy considerations from the seventh BA.

9. As the seventh BA was prepared before the deadline for Parties to report information on climate finance provided and mobilized in 2023–2024 in their BTR2s, the SCF invited Parties to provide preliminary data on climate finance provided and mobilized and received for 2023–2024, as it did for the fifth and sixth BAs. The preliminary data are provisional and subject to change once Parties have submitted their BTR2s by the end of 2026. The partial data gathered result in an inconsistent number of reporting Parties over time and limits the confidence in key aggregate trends identified in the data as well as the potential to identify trends by geographical region or instrument. Furthermore, given that the scope

of reporting on climate finance provided and mobilized has been expanded under the ETF, caution should be exercised in comparing the trends from before 2020 with those after 2020.

10. In the area of global climate finance, challenges remain in filling gaps in data, particularly on private finance for adaptation activities and for activities in the AFOLU, waste, and water and sanitation sectors. In addition, methodologies for calculating climate finance based on total cost or incremental cost differ and therefore produce different estimates by activity. This places limits on the completeness of the data and interpretation of the relative shares of global climate finance across different thematic areas or sectors. Some data sources, such as those for renewable energy, provide activity-level data but may make country- and technology-level assumptions when addressing data gaps on finance flows.

11. Regarding domestic climate finance, although the number of jurisdictions with climate finance tracking systems in place or under development has increased from 55 to 79 since the sixth BA, publicly available data are limited to only 34 jurisdictions for 2023–2024. In addition, the range of approaches followed by countries and the degree of transparency provided, including on the use of disaggregated data to identify domestic public finance and thematic allocations, limits the ability to aggregate and incorporate such information into global data sets. The tracking of finance related to resilience and loss and damage is nascent, with taxonomies beginning to emerge but yet to drive significant data collection and reporting.⁷

12. Data on international climate finance flows are compiled using various methodologies and have varying interpretations. Flows from developed to developing countries – covering finance provided, mobilized and received – include a mix of reporting practices and points of measurement, including data based on disbursements to projects and recipients in the given year, on financial commitments made in the reporting year to activities that may be implemented over several years and on either inflows to, or outflows from, multilateral institutions. Information on South–South cooperation in relation to climate finance flows has shown continuous improvement but remains underreported.⁸ The level of

5) See document FCCC/CP/2024/6/Add.1–FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/8/Add.1, paras. 11–13.

6) Available at <https://unfccc.int/documents/651991>.

7) References to finance for loss and damage do not constitute a determination by the SCF that finance for loss and damage is or is not included in the operational definition of climate finance of the SCF.

8) Noting the voluntary nature of the reporting exercise.

granularity and details reported, including classifications of data, such as by geographical region and bilateral or multilateral channel, is not uniform across data sources.

13. The SCF will continue to contribute, through its activities, to the progressive improvement of the measurement, reporting and verification of climate finance in future BAs in order to help to address these challenges and limitations.

II. Key findings

A. Methodological issues related to transparency of climate finance

14. Since the first BA (2014), significant improvements have been realized in the tracking of climate finance. Climate finance is regularly reported on by official actors, that is, by Parties, financial institutions and international organizations, with greater transparency in the definitions and methodologies used. Notable advances have been made towards transparent reporting, with data systems and online portals making available project-level and semi-aggregated information, in particular information related to international climate finance flows, and by data aggregators. Although challenges and data gaps persist across sources of information, source-specific caveats are set out in the technical report where relevant to facilitate appropriate interpretations of the data in the light of their limitations.

15. **The quality and coverage of information on financial support provided to developing countries by developed country Parties has improved under the ETF.** Fifteen developed country Parties reported finance mobilized by public interventions using the new reporting format as part of their BTRs under the ETF. Eighteen developed country Parties reported grant only or grant-equivalent values of climate-specific finance alongside the face value of their support. More Parties are providing information at the project or programme level and data on disbursements of climate finance in addition to commitments, allowing for more disaggregated information on bilateral and multilateral climate finance flows.

16. **Information on financial support provided and mobilized has been reported by more Parties under the ETF than under the previous reporting system.** In total, 42 Parties (more than half of which were developed country Parties) reported information on climate finance

provided and mobilized in their BTR1s. Five of these Parties provided information on finance provided and mobilized using common tabular formats for the first time.

17. Challenges remain in reporting data on financial support under the ETF. Tracking private finance mobilized remains particularly challenging, with some developed country Parties noting that current methodologies do not fully capture finance mobilized through technical assistance, and others citing banking and commercial confidentiality as a barrier to project-level reporting. Institutional constraints compound these challenges, with smaller administrations citing limited staff capacity to manage the data intensity of the BTR and highlighting the high level of coordination required across numerous government entities. Methodological divergences that hinder the provision of a full overview of aggregate financial support include differences in reporting commitments and disbursements in a given calendar year, with some developed country Parties reporting both points of measurement. Methods to assess concessionality also differ; nine developed country Parties reported applying a standardized methodology to calculate concessionality for both bilateral and multilateral flows while others reported using their own approach.

18. **The coverage of data on financial support received shows improvement, with 73 developing country Parties reporting such information in their BTRs.** A total of 30 of the 73 developing country Parties had not submitted similar information in biennial update reports between 2021 and 2023 but did so in their BTRs, and 67 developing country Parties that reported such information in the BTRs improved the data coverage of their information on parameters related to channels, recipients, implementing agencies, instruments, status (committed or received), sector and subsector, and contribution to capacity-building and technology transfer objectives, most of which was reported for the first time using the common tabular format. Reporting on the use, impacts and results of support also improved substantially.

19. **Domestic climate finance tracking systems are being rolled out globally, with a 44 per cent increase in countries and jurisdictions, from 55 to 79, identified as having adopted or developed systems as compared with the sixth BA.** At least 79 countries and jurisdictions have reported that climate finance tracking systems are in place (41) or are under development (38), although associated financial data are only publicly

available for 34 countries and jurisdictions in the 2023–2024 reporting period. Where budget tagging systems are in place, publicly available information is limited and lacks clarity or disaggregated data to distinguish between reported domestic public finance and international finance provided and/or received (only eight jurisdictions provide information for 2023–2024). Recent methodological additions to some climate budget tagging approaches include the coverage of finance related to disaster risk management and to loss and damage (eight countries), as well as harmful expenditure in addition to climate-relevant expenditure (seven countries),⁹ although those additions are not widely adopted.

20. The number of jurisdictions publishing green and/or sustainable finance taxonomies and/or frameworks is growing, and they increasingly refer to supporting the goals of the Paris Agreement and considering national circumstances to support implementation of NDCs and NAPs. At least 19 jurisdictions have published new or updated taxonomies, or announced new developments in taxonomies, since the sixth BA, with some jurisdictions looking at the interoperability of their taxonomies under international initiatives respecting their national circumstances. With a coverage of at least 60 jurisdictions, taxonomies have become a widely used methodology across all regions for supporting climate-related investment. Some countries have introduced sustainable finance frameworks as alternative policy tools to taxonomies, providing high-level guidance, principles or strategies for directing capital towards environmental and social goals. Taxonomy development efforts are increasingly shifting to developing country jurisdictions, including the LDCs, which often receive technical assistance and support for this purpose from international financial institutions, MDBs, United Nations agencies, bilateral development agencies and non-governmental organizations. A small but increasing number of published climate-related taxonomies consider adaptation objectives (21), as compared with mitigation objectives (60), which is often the initial focus area of taxonomies. Since the sixth BA, more taxonomies have developed components on transition finance (24) and disaster risk reduction and management or loss and damage (23), either as a stand-alone category or as activities under a diverse set of economic sectors.¹⁰

21. Methodologies for measuring the impacts and

outcomes of climate finance continue to evolve across UNFCCC funds and other multilateral climate funds, MDBs and bilateral providers. Institutions are increasingly moving beyond reporting on volumes of finance towards more similarities in their results-based approaches that measure mitigation and adaptation outcomes at the project, portfolio and institutional level. Recent methodological developments include strengthened results frameworks, harmonized indicators, improved portfolio-level reporting, improved monitoring systems and greater transparency through project-level disclosures. While approaches to measuring mitigation outcomes have increasingly become comparable across institutions, methodologies for assessing adaptation outcomes continue to vary, reflecting the complexity of measuring them and the absence of universally applied metrics for doing so.

22. Despite these advances, important methodological challenges remain. Differences persist in institutional approaches to measuring adaptation outcomes, attributing climate finance results and verifying reported impacts. While mitigation indicators commonly focus on GHG emissions, adaptation indicators remain more diverse, often emphasizing beneficiaries reached, assets made climate resilient, institutions strengthened and adaptive capacity enhanced. Verification practices also differ across institutions, with many relying primarily on implementing entities' monitoring and evaluation systems, while the application of independent verification remains uneven. Continued efforts to improve the consistency, transparency and comparability of outcome measurement would strengthen the assessment of effectiveness of climate finance across institutions.

23. Methods and approaches used by the financial system and financial actors to integrate climate considerations into insurance, lending and investment decision-making, including information relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement, continue to evolve and gain traction across countries and institutions. A growing number of methodologies and tools is being developed and applied to strengthen climate-related information, support decision-making, improve risk management, enhance policy and governance frameworks, facilitate capital mobilization and help guide finance towards nationally determined climate and development objectives. While such approaches continue to evolve, their application must acknowledge the various concerns and safeguards

9) These reflect country-driven definitions and approaches and do not reflect multilaterally agreed criteria and individual country approaches may vary to reflect country circumstances and approaches.

10) The use of such terminology and concepts is typically specific to national contexts and circumstances.

raised by Parties in the context of implementing Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement outlined in paragraph 3 of decision 11/CMA.7. Additionally, it is important to note that there is no common interpretation of the scope of Article 2, paragraph 1(c), or the manner of its implementation.


B. Overview of climate finance flows in 2023–2024

24. Global climate finance flows in 2023–2024 increased by 32 per cent compared with those in 2021–2022, reaching an annual average of USD 1.9 trillion,¹¹ with approximately 9 per cent of global climate finance comprising cross-border flows to developing countries. The growth in finance flows was driven by increased private investment in key low

GHG emission technologies, including renewable energy electricity generation, and private household investment in electric vehicles and heat pumps. By sector, while noting that some year-on-year volatility is masked by biennial averages, compared with 2021–2022 global climate finance for clean energy systems increased by 56 per cent, sustainable transport by 29 per cent and buildings and infrastructure by 12 per cent. Global climate finance flows to the AFOLU sector declined by 30 per cent on average over 2023–2024 compared with those in 2021–2022, and finance to the water and wastewater sector declined by 14 per cent over the same time frame. Figure 1 provides a breakdown by sector of the trend in global climate finance flows, and figure 2 provides an overview of global climate finance and finance flows from developed to developing countries in 2023–2024.

Figure 1

Global climate finance flows in 2019–2024 by sector
(Billions of USD)



Source: Climate Policy Initiative. 2026. Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2026. Available at <https://glcf.climatepolicyinitiative.org/>.

Note: "Other sectors" includes policy, budget support and capacity-building; waste; disaster risk management; information and communication technology; and biodiversity, land and marine conservation. It also includes flows for which a specific sector is unspecified or unknown.

11) This figure represents aggregate climate-related investment from a range of domestic and international flows from public and private sources. The estimates on global climate finance are not to be conflated with international climate finance obligations and commitments under the Convention and the Paris Agreement.

25. Tracked global adaptation finance was estimated at USD 63 billion per year on average over 2023–2024, a decrease of 20 per cent compared with 2021–2022.¹²

Of tracked global adaptation finance, public finance amounted to USD 57 billion in 2023–2024. Taking into account cross-cutting finance targeting both adaptation and mitigation objectives, adaptation-relevant finance is estimated to have reached USD 108 billion and USD 101 billion in 2023 and 2024 respectively (compared with USD 126 billion and USD 134 billion in 2021 and 2022 respectively). Overall global climate finance flows are dominated by climate mitigation, with tracked adaptation flows representing 3 per cent of total flows, or 5 per cent when taking into account cross-cutting flows.¹³

26. The majority of adaptation-relevant finance is cross-sectoral, reflecting the intersecting nature of adaptation needs and investments, with some being concentrated in the water and wastewater sector (representing 32 per cent of total tracked adaptation finance over 2023–2024) and AFOLU sector (12 per cent). While some progress has been made in recent years to enhance the tracking of adaptation finance for the water and wastewater sector and for households, significant data gaps persist, limiting the ability to assess global flows, particularly of private finance for adaptation.

27. Eastern Asia, Northern and Western Europe, and North America continue to account for the majority of global climate finance by region, with 38, 17 and 16 per cent of commitments respectively in 2023–2024, primarily driven by domestic commitments in China, the European Union and the United States of America, while other regions, namely Africa, the rest of Asia, the rest of Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Oceania, accounted for the remaining 29 per cent. Overall, 16 per cent of global climate finance in 2023–2024 flowed across borders, with USD 183 billion per year (9 per cent) flowing to developing countries.

28. Global climate finance estimates over 2023–2024 are composed of 62 per cent private finance and 38 per cent public finance; the share of private finance has steadily increased over time, from 55 per cent in 2021 to 62 per cent in 2024. By financial instrument, balance sheet equity and project-level market rate debt represent the largest shares of total global flows, at 35 per cent each, followed by balance sheet debt, at 16 per cent. Grants and low-cost project debt (i.e. public concessional loans) represent 7 and 3 per cent of total flows respectively, with project-level equity accounting for the remaining 4 per cent. Growth in private finance (47 per cent) was greater than that in public finance (12 per cent). Domestic markets and households account for 85 per cent of the growth in investment, which includes increasing household investments in low GHG emission solutions such as electric vehicles, heat pumps and small-scale renewables. Global adaptation finance is predominantly from public sources, at 89 per cent in 2023–2024, composed of concessional and non-concessional loans and grants.

29. Domestic public climate finance remains a significant data gap in global estimates, although country-level tracking by national governments is advancing, particularly in developing countries. Available data remain limited and challenging to include in global estimates, but complementary analysis identifies country-level reporting of at least USD 322 billion per year in 2023–2024 across 38 countries and jurisdictions where data are available (including domestic and international finance). This represents a substantive improvement in reporting compared with available data from 25 countries and jurisdictions over 2021–2022 (USD 275 billion per year). Countries are increasingly adopting climate budget tagging systems as part of national budget planning or conducting research into their climate expenditure, alongside growing consideration for embedding climate finance within broader public financial management systems.

12) Since the publication of the sixth BA, tracked global adaptation finance estimates in 2021–2022 were revised upward from USD 63 billion to USD 80 billion on average per year owing to an improvement in the tracking of finance flows in the water and wastewater sector and of household investments in adaptation-related products.

13) Noting the challenges in data gaps for tracking adaptation finance flows.

Figure 2

Climate finance flows in 2023–2024
(Billions of USD)




Figure 2 (continued)

Global climate finance flows in 2021–2024

Sector			2021	2022	2023	2024	Data quality	Data completeness	Sources of data and relevant chapter in the BA
Global flows	Clean energy systems	Public	192	249	286	350	High	High	Chapter 2.2.4, CPI (2026a)
		Private	314	383	533	604			
		Total	506	631	818	954			
	Sustainable transport	Public	113	166	147	116	High	High	Chapter 2.2.5, CPI (2026a)
		Private	200	311	376	381			
		Total	313	477	522	497			
	Buildings and infrastructure	Public	134	137	127	128	High	Medium	Chapter 2.2.6, CPI (2026a)
		Private	179	184	220	236			
		Total	314	320	347	364			
	Industry	Public	14	25	19	20	Medium	Medium	Chapter 2.2.7, CPI (2026a)
		Private	8	8	9	9			
		Total	22	32	28	29			
	Water and wastewater	Public	44	51	33	39	Medium	Medium	Chapter 2.2.8, CPI (2026a)
		Private	3	8	13	6			
		Total	47	59	47	45			
	AFOLU	Public	30	22	20	18	High	Medium	Chapter 2.2.9, CPI (2026a)
		Private	7	4	4	2	Medium	Low	
		Total	37	26	23	21	–	–	
	Other sectors – mitigation ^a	Public	20	18	51	50	High	Medium	Chapter 2.2.10, CPI (2026a)
		Private	9	10	9	3	High	Low	
		Total	28	28	61	53	–	–	
	Other sectors – adaptation ^a	Public	37	25	25	28	High	Medium	
		Private	0	1	1	0	High	Low	
		Total	37	26	25	29	–	–	
	Other sectors – both mitigation and adaptation	Public	19	27	15	13	High	Medium	
		Private	7	1	5	3	High	Low	
		Total	26	27	20	16	–	–	

Figure 2 (continued)

Sector		2021	2022	2023	2024	Data quality	Data completeness	Sources of data and relevant chapter in the BA
Developed to developing countries	UNFCCC funds (AF, GCF, GEF, LDCF, SCCF) ^b	3.4	1.9	2.4	2.9	High	High	Chapter 2.3.2, CFU, OECD DAC CRDF
	Multilateral climate funds (including UNFCCC)	4.6	3.6	8.7	7.5	High	High	Chapter 2.3.2, CFU, OECD DAC CRDF
	Climate-specific finance through bilateral, regional and other channels	35.8	45.8	44.8	37.1	High	Medium	Chapter 2.3.1, BTRs, preliminary and partial data subject to change
	MDB climate finance attributed to developed countries	34.3	46.9	48.2	50.5	High	High	Chapter 2.3.2, OECD (2026)
	Mobilized private climate finance by bilateral, regional institutions	5.6	9.2	6.5	8.6	High	High	Chapter 2.3.4, OECD (2026)
	Mobilized private climate finance by multilateral channels	8.8	12.7	16.3	21.9	High	High	Chapter 2.3.4, OECD (2026)
	Other private finance ^b	19.9 – 32.6	16.3 – 26.3	34.2	29.7	Medium	Medium	Chapter 2.3.4, CPI (2026a)

Source: Climate Policy Initiative, 2026. *Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2026*. Available at <https://glcf.climatepolicyinitiative.org/>; OECD DAC, 2026. *Climate-related Development Finance Dataset*. Paris: OECD. Available at <https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/development-finance-for-climate-and-the-environment.html>. Data accessed 18 July 2026; CFU, 2026. *Climate Funds Update*. Available at <https://climatefundsupdate.org/>.

Notes: (a) "Other sectors" includes policy, budget support and capacity-building; waste; disaster risk management; information and communication technology; and biodiversity, land and marine conservation. It also includes flows for which a specific sector is unspecified or unknown. (b) Estimates for UNFCCC funds and other private finance cannot be aggregated with other channels. See section 2.3 of the technical report of the seventh BA for further information.

30. Climate finance from developed to developing countries can be estimated from a number of relevant sources of information. In line with previous BAs, different sources and channels are described below and no aggregate view is assessed. Therefore, these estimates differ from aggregate flows referred to in paragraph 24 above or in the SCF third progress report on the USD 100 billion goal.¹⁴

31. **Preliminary data from developed country Parties on climate finance provided and mobilized to developing countries in 2023–2024 reported climate-specific financial support of USD 58.5 billion on average per year.** These data have been gathered on a preliminary basis and are partial, given that not all Parties have yet reported, and reporting does not include all channels (in particular multilateral outflows and private finance mobilized by multilateral institutions). On a comparative basis, with the same set of reporting Parties, this amount represents a 7 per cent increase compared with the annual average of USD 54.4 billion in 2021–2022 in BTR1 data.

32. Financial support provided by developed country

Parties through bilateral, regional and other channels is reported at USD 40.9 billion per year on average over 2023–2024, a similar annual level to 2021–2022 (USD 40.8 billion). USD 6.6 billion on average annually was reported as finance mobilized, primarily by bilateral finance agencies and institutions. Financial support provided through multilateral channels, which generally is reported as contributions or inflows to UNFCCC funds and other multilateral climate funds and multilateral financial institutions, including MDBs, reached USD 11.0 billion on average annually. These preliminary data largely exclude outflows from multilateral institutions, which are significantly larger in scale than inflows and do not include private finance mobilized by multilateral institutions.

33. **UNFCCC funds and other multilateral climate funds¹⁵ approved a combined USD 8.7 billion and USD 7.5 billion for climate change projects in 2023 and 2024 respectively.¹⁶** The annual average for 2023–2024 (USD 8.1 billion) is almost double the 2021–2022 average (USD 4.1 billion) owing to a significant scale-up of the level of project approvals from the GCF, the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the International

14) SCF, 2026. *Third report on progress towards achieving the goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year to address the needs of developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation*. Bonn: UNFCCC. Available at <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/bodies/constituted-bodies/standing-committee-on-finance-scf/progress-report>.

15) UNFCCC funds and other multilateral climate funds refer to the GCF and the GEF (operating entities of the Financial Mechanism), the LDCF and the SCCF (funds serving the Convention and the Paris Agreement), the AF (fund established under the Kyoto Protocol and also serving the Paris Agreement) and others, including those operating under the Climate Investment Funds. See annex G to the technical report for more details.

16) Climate projects are projects listed by multilateral climate funds. Projects funded by the GEF reflect projects listed in the climate change focal area only.

Monetary Fund Resilience and Sustainability Trust. Together, UNFCCC funds such as the GCF, the GEF, the AF, the LDCF and the SCCF committed USD 2.4 billion in 2023 and USD 2.9 billion in 2024 to climate projects. In terms of contributions to UNFCCC funds, the period since the sixth BA has seen the announced pledges for the second replenishment of the GCF (for 2024–2027) decline from USD 13.6 billion to USD 10.6 billion. Although the number of contributing countries has risen from 32 to 35, one country communicated the withdrawal of its announced pledge for the second GCF replenishment, resulting in a noticeable reduction in contributions. As at 31 July 2026, received contributions for the second GCF replenishment amount to USD 5.6 billion. A recent announcement by a developed country of its intent to reduce its original pledge to the second GCF replenishment would lead to a reduction in confirmed pledges from USD 10.6 billion to approximately USD 9.6 billion. Twenty-two governments pledged an initial USD 3.9 billion for the ninth replenishment of the GEF (covering 2026–2030), which is a decrease of 27 per cent on the eighth replenishment, with expected pledges of several key donors not available as of June 2026. In 2025, the AF received USD 138 million in pledges from 11 countries, which was an increase from USD 133 million in 2024 but down from USD 188 million in 2023. In fiscal year 2025, the LDCF received USD 77 million in contributions, which was a substantial decrease compared with the contributions of USD 211 million in 2024 and USD 103 million in 2023. The SCCF received USD 39 million in contributions in fiscal year 2025, which was an increase from USD 32 million in 2024 and USD 14 million in 2023.

34. MDBs channelled USD 77.2 billion and USD 87.5 billion in climate finance to non-Annex I Parties in 2023 and 2024 respectively.¹⁷ The attribution of these

flows to developed countries, excluding externally managed resources, is estimated at USD 48.2 billion and USD 50.5 billion for 2023 and 2024 respectively. The annual average of USD 49.4 billion over this period represents a 22 per cent increase compared with the 2021–2022 level (USD 40.6 billion).


35. Private finance mobilized through bilateral and multilateral channels attributed to developed countries has continued to rise since 2021, increasing to USD 22.9 billion in 2023 and USD 30.5 billion in 2024. Private finance mobilized through bilateral channels reached USD 7.6 billion on average over 2023–2024, which ended the trend of low averages of between USD 4 billion and USD 5 billion over 2016–2020. Private finance mobilized by UNFCCC funds and other multilateral climate funds reached USD 3.3 billion on average per year, and that mobilized by MDBs reached USD 15.9 billion per year over 2023–2024.

36. The thematic distribution of finance from developed to developing countries in 2023–2024, through all channels of bilateral finance, the outflows of multilateral climate funds and MDBs, and private finance mobilized, shifted towards greater allocations of climate finance targeting mitigation objectives compared with in 2021–2022, while finance to both adaptation and cross-cutting objectives decreased as a relative share but increased modestly in absolute terms. Across finance channels, estimated thematic allocations varied: on average, mitigation attracted a 60 per cent share of bilateral climate finance, 32 per cent of multilateral climate fund finance, 68 per cent of MDB climate finance and 65 per cent of private climate finance mobilized. Corresponding numbers for adaptation are 26, 36, 29 and 6 per cent (see figure 3).¹⁸

17) Estimated from country-level data from joint reporting by MDBs and including externally managed resources in addition to their own accounts.

18) Data on the distribution of financial instruments by thematic area and by channel are not available for 2023–2024.

Figure 3



Source: OECD DAC. 2026. Climate-related Development Finance Dataset. Paris: OECD. Available at <https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/development-finance-for-climate-and-the-environment.html>. Data accessed 18 July 2026; OECD DAC. 2026. Mobilisation of Private Finance for Development. Paris: OECD. Available at <https://www.oecd.org/en/data/dashboards/mobilisation-of-private-finance-for-development.html>. Data accessed 24 July 2026.

Note: For bilateral climate finance, preliminary and partial estimates gathered from Parties in preparing the seventh BA were used.

37. Over 2023–2024, an estimated 38 per cent of public bilateral climate finance was provided through grants and an estimated 57 per cent through loans (see figure 4). Estimates show that 73 per cent of loans were extended on a concessional basis by bilateral climate finance providers.



38. Forty-six per cent of public finance provided through UNFCCC funds and other multilateral climate

funds in 2023–2024 was grant based, while 47 per cent was loan based. MDB finance is predominantly loan based, with 91 per cent of public finance provided through the MDBs extended through loans over 2023–2024. Approximately half of the loans provided by UNFCCC funds and other multilateral climate funds and a quarter of loans from the MDBs are concessional in nature, consistent with trends seen since 2021.

Figure 4

Finance provided and mobilized by developed countries by channel and financial instrument or leveraging mechanism

(Per cent distribution of annual average for 2023–2024 in United States dollars)

Public climate finance**Private finance mobilized**

Source: OECD, 2026. Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries in 2013–2024. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1787/ab5eb9ad-en>.

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 per cent owing to rounding.


39. Across all channels, private climate finance was mobilized by public finance providers through a diverse range of instruments in 2023–2024, depending on the providers' mandate, and the country and sectoral context. Instruments, as illustrated in figure 4, included direct investments in companies or special purpose

vehicles (23 per cent), syndicated loans (23 per cent), shares in collective investment vehicles (21 per cent) and guarantees (19 per cent). While direct investments in companies or special purpose vehicles were made by all public finance actors, their use of other instruments varied.


Figure 5

Geographical distribution of climate finance from developed to developing countries by volume and on a per capita basis by channel in 2023–2024


Bilateral public finance




Share of LDCs and SIDS




Per capita climate finance 2023–2024 per year (USD)




Multilateral climate funds




Share of LDCs and SIDS




Per capita climate finance 2023–2024 per year (USD)




MDBs




Share of LDCs and SIDS




Per capita climate finance 2023–2024 per year (USD)




Private finance mobilized



Share of LDCs and SIDS



Per capita climate finance 2023–2024 per year (USD)



40. Asia and Africa continue to receive the highest share of public climate finance from bilateral providers, UNFCCC funds and other multilateral climate funds and MDBs, while Latin America and the Caribbean received the most in climate finance from private finance mobilized. Asia and Africa secured 34 per cent and 30 per cent of finance from bilateral providers, and Africa and Asia secured 49 and 22 per cent of finance from UNFCCC funds and other multilateral climate funds respectively. Most MDB finance was directed to Asia and Africa (32 and 25 per cent respectively), while most private finance mobilized went to Latin America and the Caribbean (31 per cent), Africa (26 per cent) and Asia (23 per cent) (see figure 5).

41. UNFCCC funds and other multilateral climate funds increasingly provide the highest share of targeted support to SIDS and the LDCs. The amount of climate finance from UNFCCC funds and other multilateral climate funds to SIDS rose to 9 per cent over 2023–2024 and climate finance from UNFCCC funds and other multilateral climate funds to the LDCs rose to 29 per cent. Climate finance from bilateral providers and MDBs to SIDS reached 4 and 3 per cent respectively over 2023–2024, while support provided from bilateral providers and MDBs to the LDCs was 19 and 17 per cent respectively.

42. South–South cooperation finance flows provided through MDBs continued to increase from USD 19.2 billion in 2022 to USD 20.8 billion in 2024, and information on South–South cooperation on climate finance is improving but remains partial depending on the channel of reporting. In their BTR1s, a growing number of other Parties reported information on climate finance provided and mobilized on a voluntary basis, where such partial reporting aggregates to USD 1.5 billion and USD 2.2 billion in 2021 and 2022 respectively. Many Parties report on their voluntary South–South cooperation through other publicly available channels and such voluntary support continues to increase.

C. Assessment of climate finance flows in 2023–2024

43. Aligning international climate finance with the needs and priorities of developing countries and strengthening country ownership remain central to enhancing the effectiveness of international climate finance. UNFCCC funds and other multilateral climate funds, MDBs and bilateral providers increasingly seek to align their support with countries' NDCs, NAPs, long-term low-emission development strategies and other national

climate and development priorities. Many providers have strengthened country engagement processes, drawing on national planning instruments, consultation with governments and stakeholders, and country-led programming approaches to guide investment decisions. Country platforms and other coordination mechanisms are also becoming more prominent as vehicles for strengthening national ownership, improving coordination among public and private actors and aligning climate finance with broader development objectives. Nevertheless, approaches to assessing needs and operationalizing country ownership continue to vary across institutions and financing channels, and gaps remain in ensuring that finance, particularly for adaptation, reaches the countries and sectors with the greatest needs. More work is needed to assess effectiveness of climate finance by degree of alignment or ownership based on available heterogeneous data and information among climate finance providers.

44. UNFCCC funds and other multilateral climate funds, MDBs and bilateral providers continue to strengthen their measurement and reporting of the impacts and outcomes of climate finance. Recent updates to institutional results frameworks place greater emphasis on demonstrating climate-related results through the use of standardized indicators and portfolio-level reporting, rather than focusing on financial inputs and project activities. Increasing attention is being given to measuring GHG emission reductions, resilience-related outcomes, improvements to institutional capacity and impacts on beneficiaries, while digital monitoring systems and improved disclosure practices are enhancing transparency and accountability. At the same time, considerable differences remain across institutions in the methodologies used to measure adaptation outcomes, and verification approaches continue to vary, limiting the comparability of reported results across institutions.

45. Procedural and institutional reforms to enhance access to climate finance have improved flexibility and speed but structural barriers and fragmentation persist. UNFCCC funds and other multilateral climate funds have continued to strengthen access to climate finance through expanded readiness support mechanisms, project preparation facilities, simplified accreditation procedures and higher funding ceilings for vulnerable countries. MDBs and bilateral providers have also expanded support for project preparation, institutional capacity strengthening and investment planning. Several funds and MDBs have also shortened approval-to-disbursement cycles. Despite these efforts, many developing countries continue to face challenges related to limited institutional capacity, lengthy

approval processes, complex application requirements and high transaction costs. MDB concessional windows have shifted eligibility towards debt-sustainability and creditworthiness criteria rather than climate vulnerability. Systematic disbursement data across institutions remain scarce. Overall, a fragmented landscape of access arrangements across institutions and financing channels persists. Broader macroeconomic conditions, including a constrained fiscal space, debt vulnerabilities and the high costs of capital, are also increasingly recognized as important determinants of a country's ability to access investment capital for climate action.

46. Global total climate finance flows remain well below available estimates of the investment needed to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement (see figure 6) and represent aggregate climate-related investment from a range of domestic and international flows from public and private sources. As per estimates from CPI, although climate finance has continued to increase, current levels remain substantially below estimated investment needs for achieving the objective of the Convention and the goals of the Paris Agreement, as well as the national goals of developing countries. Of the USD 1.9 trillion in global climate finance flows in 2023–2024, USD 183 billion is cross-border finance to developing countries, and USD 63 billion per year on average over 2023–2024 is adaptation finance. As noted by the IPCC, sufficient global capital exists in principle to meet these needs, highlighting that the principal challenge lies in improving the allocation of capital towards low GHG emission and climate-resilient development pathways. In the context of downward trends in overall development

finance flows and in foreign direct investment, it remains to be seen to what extent climate-related finance flows will be affected.


47. A range of drivers and barriers continue to influence the scale of climate finance flows. Policy and regulatory signals provide direction for scaling up climate finance flows where they are needed, but the implementation of national climate strategies, sustainable finance frameworks and international initiatives – with diverse but incomplete participation – have shown uneven momentum in directing climate finance flows at the scale required. Public fiscal space remains under strain in many countries, with responses such as green bonds and climate-resilient debt clauses expanding in number and reach. The costs of capital remain a central constraint, as shown by the borrowing costs for renewable energy projects in developing countries being approximately twice those in developed countries.

48. Reflections on potential information and data to inform the preparation of the biennial report on the NCQG are provided in the seventh BA. The SCF was requested in paragraph 30 of decision [1/CMA.6](#) to prepare a report biennially, commencing in 2028, on collective progress towards all elements of that same decision, on the NCQG for consideration by the CMA. The technical report of the seventh BA provides reflections on quantitative and qualitative information relating to the preparation of the report on the NCQG,¹⁹ and information contained therein does not prejudge the approach of the SCF for the first report on progress towards achieving the NCQG.

19) See chapters 2.5 and 3.6 of the technical report of the seventh BA.

Figure 6

Global climate finance in the context of broader finance flows, opportunities and costs (United States dollars)



Notes: The substantive information contained in this figure is based on analysis from the technical report and is without prejudice to the views or interpretations of Parties..

III. Recommendations

49. On the basis of the key findings herein, the SCF invites the COP and the CMA to consider the following recommendations:

- (a) Encourage Parties to better track and report on climate finance provided, mobilized, needed and received in the common tabular format for their BTRs to the highest level of granularity possible, taking into account the flexibility for those countries that need it in the light of their capacities, in accordance with the modalities, procedures and guidelines of the ETF, in particular to report annual activity-level data;
- (b) Encourage Parties and climate finance providers to enhance their reporting on domestic and international climate finance in order to address data gaps;
- (c) Encourage climate finance providers and recipients to enhance their methodologies for measuring and reporting on portfolio-level results in terms of the impacts and outcomes of climate finance and to advance the development of indicators for measuring the outcomes of climate finance interventions;
- (d) Encourage climate finance providers to continue to enhance access to climate finance by promoting the complementarity and coherence of multilateral climate funds, to enhance country ownership, including through supporting modalities such as direct access entity and national implementing entity accreditation, and to improve the balance between support for mitigation and adaptation at the global level, taking into account country-driven approaches, capacities and priorities.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY BY THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FINANCE OF THE SEVENTH BIENNIAL ASSESSMENT AND OVERVIEW OF CLIMATE FINANCE FLOWS	3
I. Introduction	3
II. Key findings	5
III. Recommendations	19
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	22
INTRODUCTION	24
1. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES RELATED TO TRANSPARENCY OF CLIMATE FINANCE	29
1.1. Introduction	30
1.2. Updates on operational definitions of climate finance in use and methodologies to track climate finance	31
1.2.1. Update on approaches used by Parties in Biennial Transparency Reports	32
1.2.2. Updates on approaches used by other entities to track international public climate finance	36
1.2.3. Update on approaches used by other entities to track international private climate finance mobilized by public interventions	39
1.2.4. Update on approaches to track climate finance at country level	40
1.2.5. Methods used to aggregate estimates of climate finance flows	48
1.3. Methodologies for measuring climate finance outcomes	51
1.4. Updates on methodologies that integrate climate change considerations into insurance, lending and investment decision-making processes and that include information relevant to tracking consistency with the long- term goal outlined in Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement	53
2. OVERVIEW OF CLIMATE FINANCE FLOWS	63
2.1. Introduction	64
2.2. Global climate finance	65
2.2.1. Overview of global climate finance	65
2.2.2. Characteristics and distribution of global climate finance flows	70
2.2.3. Investments in clean energy systems	73
2.2.4. Investments in sustainable transport	76
2.2.5. Investments in buildings and infrastructure	77
2.2.6. Investments in industry	78
2.2.7. Investments in water and wastewater	78
2.2.8. Investments in sustainable agriculture, forestry and land use	79
2.2.9. Investments across all other sectors	80
2.2.10 Trends in non-primary global climate finance flows	81
2.2.11 Trends in domestic public climate finance flows	82
2.3. Climate finance flows from developed to developing countries	86
2.3.1. Bilateral flows	86
2.3.2. Multilateral flows	92
2.3.3. Private finance mobilized and other private finance flows to developing countries	97
2.3.4. Recipient perspective on climate finance flows	99
2.3.5. Summary of climate finance flows from developed to developing countries	100
2.3.6. Characteristics and distribution of climate finance flows from developed to developing countries	104
2.4. South–South cooperation on climate finance	111
2.5. Reflection on possible quantitative data and information, as appropriate, that could inform the SCF for the preparation of the first report on progress towards achieving the new collective quantified goal on climate finance	115
2.5.1. Elements for consideration in tracking and assessing future progress towards the NCQG	115
2.5.2. Summary of reflections	121

3. ASSESSMENT OF CLIMATE FINANCE FLOWS	123
3.1. Introduction	124
3.2. Trends in alignment with needs and country ownership	124
3.2.1. How are needs considered by different channels of climate finance	124
3.2.2. How are countries ensuring ownership and alignment	126
3.2.3. Alignment of flows with the needs of developing countries	128
3.3. Trends in the impacts and outcomes of climate finance	132
3.3.1. Expected and actual results of MCFs, MDBs and bilateral sources	133
3.3.2. Leverage and mobilization of finance, including the use of innovative instruments	141
3.3.3. Co-benefits from mobilization and use of climate finance in 2023–2024	144
3.4. Trends in access to bilateral, regional and multilateral concessional climate finance	145
3.4.1. Eligibility for concessional finance	145
3.4.2. Timeliness of climate finance	147
3.4.3. Access through local entities	148
3.5. Climate finance in context	152
3.5.1. Climate finance in the context of global finance, opportunities and costs	152
3.5.2. Climate finance in the context of development finance flows	155
3.5.3. Consideration of the drivers and barriers for climate finance flows	161
3.6. Reflection on possible qualitative data and information, as appropriate, that could inform the SCF for the preparation of the first report on progress towards achieving the new collective quantified goal on climate finance . . .	168
ANNEXES	173
Annex A: Country and institution groupings used in the seventh BA	174
Annex B: Compilation of operational definitions of climate finance in use by Parties and various institutions	182
Annex C: Information on climate finance received in the first biennial transparency reports	194
Annex D: Compilation of methodologies in use by various sources of information on global climate finance flows and assessment of quality, completeness, and sectoral classifications of data on global climate finance flows	204
Annex E: Compilation of methodologies in use by various sources of information on developed-to-developing country climate finance flows and assessments of quality and completeness	207
Annex F: Climate finance tracked and reported at country-level	210
Annex G: Overview of projects approved by multilateral climate funds (2021–2024)	212
Annex H: Submissions received in response to the call for evidence	214
REFERENCES	215

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	Asian Development Bank	DFI	development finance institution, including bilateral, regional or national development banks
AF	Adaptation Fund	DGM	Dedicated Grant Mechanism
AFB	Adaptation Fund Board	DNSH	Do-No-Significant-Harm
AFCIA	Adaptation Fund Climate Innovation Accelerator	DTU	Technical University of Denmark
AFD	Agence Francaise de Development	EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
AfDB	African Development Bank	EC	European Commission
AGN	African Group of Negotiators	EDFI	European Development Finance Institutions
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank	EIB	European Investment Bank
AILAC	Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean	EIG	Environmental Integrity Group
Annex I Party	Party included in Annex I to the Convention	EMPEA	Emerging Markets Private Equity Association
Annex II Party	Party included in Annex II to the Convention	ESG	environmental, social and governance
AODP	Asset Owners Disclosure Project	ETF	enhanced transparency framework under the Paris Agreement
AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States	EU	European Union
ASAP	Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme	EV	Electric vehicle
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations	FC4S	Financial Centres for Sustainability
AUM	assets under management	FCPF	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
BA	biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows	FDI	foreign direct investment
BCBS	Basel Committee on Banking Supervision	FIP	Forest Investment Program
BCG	Boston Consulting Group	FONERWA	Rwanda's Green Fund
BEV	battery electric vehicle	Frankfurt School	Frankfurt School of Finance and Management
BIS	Bank for International Settlements	FSB	Financial Stability Board
BNEF	Bloomberg New Energy Finance	FS-UNEP Centre	Frankfurt School – UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate & Sustainable Energy Finance
BR	biennial report	GABC	Global Alliance for Buildings and Construction
BR4	fourth biennial report	GABV	Global Alliance for Banking on Values
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa	GCCA	Global Climate Change Alliance
BTR	biennial transparency report	GCF	Green Climate Fund
BUR	biennial update report	GDP	gross domestic product
CAF	Development Bank of Latin America	GEEREF	Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund
CBI	Climate Bonds Initiative	GEF	Global Environment Facility
CBIT	Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency	GEVA	Greenhouse Gas Emissions per Unit of Value Added
CCCA	Collective Commitment to Climate Action	GFANZ	Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero
CCRIF	Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility	GFLAC	Group for Climate Finance in Latin America and the Caribbean
CCS	carbon capture and storage	GHG	greenhouse gas
CDM	clean development mechanism	GICCC	Global Investor Coalition on Climate Change
CDP	Carbon Disclosure Project	GIIN	Global Impact Investing Network
CESEE	Central, Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe	GIZ	German Agency for International Cooperation
CFU	Climate Funds Update	GNI	gross national income
CIF	Climate Investment Funds	GPFI	Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion
CISL	Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership	GRI	Global Reporting Initiative
CMA	Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement	GTREI	Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment
CMP	Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol	G7	Group of 7
COP	Conference of the Parties	G20	Group of 20
CO₂	carbon dioxide	IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
CO₂ eq	carbon dioxide equivalent	IAIS	International Association of Insurance Supervisors
CPEIR	climate public expenditure and institutional review	IAR	international assessment and review
CPI	Climate Policy Initiative	IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
CPIC	Coalition for Private Investment in Conservation	ICA	international consultation and analysis
CRGE	Climate Resilient Green Economy	ICD	Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector
CRIN	Charities Responsible Investment Network	iCI	Initiative Climat International
CRS	Creditor Reporting System	ICMA	International Capital Market Association
CTF	common tabular format	I4CE	Institute for Climate Economics
DAC	Development Assistance Committee	IDBG	Inter-American Development Bank Group
d-CPEIR	District-level Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Review	IDFC	International Development Finance Club

IEA	International Energy Agency	PPCR	Pilot Program for Climate Resilience
IEN	Intentional Endowments Network	PPF	Project Preparation Facility
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development	PPIAF	Public – Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility
IFC	International Finance Corporation	PRI	Principles for Responsible Investment
IIGCC	Institutional Investor Group on Climate Change	REDD+	reducing emissions from deforestation; reducing emissions from forest degradation; conservation of forest carbon stocks; sustainable management of forests; and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (decision 1/CP.16, para.70)
IISD	International Institute for Sustainable Development		
IMF	International Monetary Fund	RPS	Required Policy Scenario
INFFs	integrated national financing frameworks	RPSF	Readiness and Preparatory Support Program
INDC	intended nationally determined contribution	S&P	Standard and Poor's
INGO	international non-governmental organization	SAP	Simplified Approval Process
INSPIRE	International Network for Sustainable Financial Policy Insights, Research and Exchange	SASB	Sustainability Accounting Standards Board
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change	SBN	Sustainable Banking Network
IPSF	International Platform on Sustainable Finance	SBSTA	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
IRENA	International Renewable Energy Agency		
IRMF	integrated results management framework	SBTi	Science-Based Targets initiative
IsDB	Islamic Development Bank	SCCF	Special Climate Change Fund
JBIC	Japan Bank for International Cooperation	SCF	Standing Committee on Finance
KfW	<i>Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau</i> (Reconstruction Credit Institute)	SDA	sectoral decarbonization approach
KPI	key performance indicator	SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
LCOE	levelized cost of electricity	SIDA	Sweden's International Development Agency
LDC	least developed country	SIDS	small island developing State(s)
LDCF	Least Developed Countries Fund	SME	small and medium-sized enterprise
LDC Group	Least Developed Countries Group	SNGWOFI	Observatory on Subnational Government Finance and Investment
LT-LEDS	long-term low-emission development strategies	SREP	Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program in Low Income Countries
MDB	multilateral development bank	SSE	Sustainable Stock Exchanges
MMR	Monitoring Mechanism Regulation	TCFD	Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures
MPG	modalities, procedures and guidelines	TCLP	Transformational Change Learning Partnership
MRV	measurement, reporting and verification	TNA	technology needs assessment
MSME	micro, small and medium-sized enterprises	TOSSD	Total Official Support for Sustainable Development
NAMA	nationally appropriate mitigation action	TPI	Transition Pathway Initiative
NAP	national adaptation plan	TSC	Technical screening criteria
NAPA	national adaptation programme of action	UCLG	United Cities and Local Government
NC	national communication	UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
NDA	national designated authority	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
NDB	New Development Bank	UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
NDC	nationally determined contribution	UNEP Centre	UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate and Sustainable Energy Finance
NDR	report on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement	UNEP FI	United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative
NeST	Network of Southern Think Tanks	UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
NGFS	Central Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System	UNFCCC RCC	UNFCCC Regional Collaboration Centres
NGO	non-governmental organization	UNGC	United Nations Global Compact
non-Annex I Party	Party not included in Annex I to the Convention	UN-REDD Programme	United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries
NZEB	nearly zero-energy building	V20	Vulnerable Twenty
ODA	Official Development Assistance	WBG	World Bank Group
ODI	Overseas Development Institute	WRI	World Resources Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development	WWF	World Wildlife Fund
OECD DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Assistance Committee		
OECM	One Earth Climate Model		
OOF	other official flows		
PACTA	Paris Agreement Capital Transition Assessment		
PCAF	Partnership for Carbon Accounting Financials		
PFG	Project Formulation Grant		
PHEV	plug-in hybrid electric vehicle		
PMR	Partnership for Market Readiness		
POPs	persistent organic pollutants		

INTRODUCTION

Background and objectives

1. The seventh BA comprises two products: an executive summary and recommendations prepared by the SCF, which is included in the annual report to the COP at its thirty-first session and to the CMA at its eighth session; and a technical report consisting of a metadata analysis of existing work and available data prepared by external experts under the guidance of the SCF and presented in an interactive format on the BA web page.¹

2. As in previous BAs, the preparation of the seventh BA was guided by mandates given to the SCF by the COP and the CMA.²

3. The objectives of the seventh BA include the following:

- Provide an updated overview of global climate finance flows, including international finance flows from developed to developing countries, as well as South–South cooperation and domestic climate finance based on available data;
- Provide an overview of the objectives of the Convention, the long-term goals set out in the Paris Agreement, and the financial instruments used, their implications and how they assist in enhancing the flows from developed to developing countries;
- Follow up on the recommendations made in previous BAs in relation to efforts aimed at improving the methodologies used for tracking public and private climate finance flows, overcoming data gaps and improving the

effectiveness of climate finance flows;

- Follow up on relevant mandates given to the SCF in the context of the seventh BA, particularly on:
 - Continuing ongoing technical work on operational definitions of climate finance;³
 - Continuing to consider the balance of mitigation and adaptation finance and the assessment of both public and private finance;⁴
 - Considering further expanding the sources of information, as appropriate.⁵
- Reflect on possible data and information, as appropriate, that could inform the SCF for the preparation of the first report on progress towards achieving the new collective quantified goal on climate finance in 2028.

Scope

4. The seventh BA provides an overview of the latest data and trends on climate finance flows. It draws data from a wide range of sources of information, including but not limited to BTRs (supplemented with other data from the OECD), international financial institutions, United Nations organizations, academia, NGOs, think-tanks, and the private sector in order to enhance the comprehensiveness of this report and provide insights into climate finance flows. The report has also benefited from qualitative information from various sources, including responses to the call for evidence issued by the wide range of reports that explore topics related to climate finance.

1) Available at: <https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/resources/biennial-assessment-and-overview-of-climate-finance-flows>


2) Decisions 2/CP.17, para. 121(f), 1/CP.18, para. 71, 5/CP.18, para. 11, 3/CP.19, para. 11, 4/CP.24, paras. 4,5,10, 11/CP.25, para. 9, and decision 5/CMA.2, para. 9.

3) Decision 2/CP.29, para. 13.

4) Decision 1/CP.30, para. 11.

5) Decision 1/CP.30, para. 13.

Figure 0.1

Overview of scope and content within each chapter of the biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows

5. Chapter 1 considers methodological issues related to transparency of climate finance, including the latest developments and improvements in the measurement, reporting and verification of climate finance flows. It also includes updates on operational definitions of climate finance in use, improvements in methods to track impact metrics and outcomes, and updates in methods which integrate climate change considerations into insurance, lending and investment decision-making processes and which include information relevant to tracking consistent with the long-term goal outlined in Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement.

6. Chapter 2 provides an updated overview of the latest data on climate finance flows, focusing on the years 2023 and 2024 while also identifying emerging and new trends over previous years. The chapter compiles information from multiple sources of data to arrive at aggregate estimates for global climate finance flows (public and private), flows from developed to developing countries (public and available data on mobilized private finance through public interventions), domestic climate

finance and South–South cooperation, as well as the other climate-related flows for the period.

7. Chapter 3 assesses the climate finance flows presented in chapter 2 and considers whether climate finance flows are effective in terms of achieving impacts and outcomes, whether they are aligned with the needs of developing countries (including their thematic and geographical distribution), whether barriers to accessing climate finance are being addressed, and whether climate finance flows are responding to policy and regulatory drivers and their role in the context of broader financial stocks, flows, risks and opportunities.

8. Reflections on possible data and information, as appropriate, which could inform the SCF for the preparation of the first report on progress towards achieving the new collective quantified goal on climate finance (NCQG) in 2028, are included in chapter 2, with a focus on quantitative elements, and in chapter 3, with a focus on qualitative elements. These sections aim to inform the SCF's preparation of the NCQG report

Table 0.1

Follow up on recommendations from previous biennial assessments and overview of climate finance flows, where relevant

Area of recommendation	Fifth BA recommendation	Relevant section(s)
Party-level reporting: improve reporting on climate finance provided, mobilized, needed and received in the first BTRs, as well as domestic climate finance, to address data gaps.	Para. 35(a, b, g);	1.3, 1.4, 2.3, 2.5
Data coverage and granularity: improve tracking from all sources, including activity and country-level data, private finance mobilized, adaptation and resilience, and mitigation in the AFOLU and water and sanitation sectors.	Paragraph 35(c, d)	1.3, 2.2, 2.5
Qualitative aspects, impact and outcomes: enhance measuring and reporting on climate finance results and impacts, qualitative aspects including policies related to strong enabling environments and delivering result, on Indigenous Peoples and Local communities, on gender-related aspects of climate finance, as well as qualitative aspects such as policies and approaches related to strong enabling environments, and encourage developing countries to take advantage of availability modalities to strengthen capacities for tracking effectiveness and impacts	Paragraph 36(a, b)	1.5, 3.3
Access and delivery: enhance access by promoting the complementarity and coherence of multilateral climate funds to country ownership, considering balance between support for mitigation and adaptation at the global level, taking into account country-driven approaches, capacities and priorities, and increasing the scale of climate finance for the LDCs and SIDS and from development finance institutions to support investment for NDCs.	Paragraph 36(c)	3.2, 3.3

throughout 2027 and 2028, as mandated by the CMA,⁶ and do not prejudice any approach or decision to be taken by the SCF in this regard.

9. In contrast to the sixth BA, the seventh BA does not include a fourth chapter on mapping information relevant to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement in line with the mandate to the SCF that this work would take place every four years.⁷

10. Throughout each chapter, efforts have been made to respond to SCF recommendations in previous BAs as relevant, as shown in table 0.1.

Approach used in the preparation of the seventh biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows

11. The seventh BA technical report is the result of meta-analysis (including a literature review and outreach for external contributions through technical expert meetings as part of the SCF meetings in 2025 and 2026) and a call for evidence. The technical report was prepared based on the general outline of the seventh biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows agreed at the thirty-seventh meeting of

the Standing Committee on Finance and endorsed by the Conference of the Parties at its thirtieth session (November 2025). Valuable input has been provided by 12 Party and non-Party stakeholders in response to the call for evidence issued by the SCF in November 2025.⁸

The term “climate finance” as used in this report

12. As was the case with the previous BAs, the term ‘climate finance’ refers to the financial resources dedicated to adapting to and mitigating climate change globally, including in the context of financial flows to developing countries. Global climate finance is important for making progress towards the objective of the Convention and the goals set out in the Paris Agreement.

13. In the preparation of the sixth BA, the SCF updated its operational definition of climate finance as: “*Climate finance aims at reducing emissions and enhancing sinks of greenhouse gases, aims at reducing vulnerability, increasing adaptive capacity, and mainstreaming and increasing resilience of human and ecological systems to negative climate impacts, and includes financing for actions identified in a country’s nationally determined contribution, adaptation communication, national adaptation plan, long-term low-emission development strategy or other national plan for implementing and achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement and the objective of the Convention.*”

6) Decision 1/CMA.6, para. 30.

7) Decision 4/CP.24, para. 10.

8) Submissions under the call for the evidence the seventh BA are available at <https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/resources/standing-committee-on-finance-info-repository#Biennial-assessment-and-overview-of-climate-finance-flows-of-the-Standing-Committee-on-Finance>.

Work undertaken to improve the quality and coverage of data

14. Additional work was undertaken to improve the quality and coverage of the data and information in each chapter of the BA, with the objective of contributing to the progressive improvement of information on climate finance flows. CMA 1 decided to set the due date for Parties' submission of their first biennial transparency reports (BTR) under the enhanced transparency framework (ETF) of the Paris Agreement to no later than 31 December 2024. The second BTRs, with official data on climate finance provided and mobilized in 2023 and 2024, are due no later than 31 December 2026. In the course of preparing the seventh BA, the SCF invited Parties to provide preliminary data on climate finance provided and mobilized as well as received for the years 2023 and 2024. These data are preliminary and subject to change once the official second BTRs are submitted at the end of 2026.

15. In the areas of global climate finance, domestic climate finance and international climate finance, efforts were made to improve data coverage. For example, in previous BAs, low- and high-bound estimates of global climate finance were provided to reflect differences in the quality and granularity of available data. Low-bound estimates were based on highly granular project-level data, while high-bound estimates included less granular aggregate data to fill data gaps while avoiding double counting. As the quality of data has improved, the low- and high-bound ranges are obsolete, and a single estimate of global climate finance is provided in the seventh BA. In addition, efforts were made to comprehensively review countries' public budget and expenditure statements and tracking systems with a view to enhancing the availability of data on domestic climate finance.

Approach taken in organizing information and data

16. While the BA aims to provide the latest available data and trends on climate finance flows from various sources, aggregate data are presented for the 2023–2024 period given data availability constraints. The approach to organizing information and data is as follows:

- Global climate finance flows: as in previous BAs, global climate finance estimates were gathered against an operational definition of climate finance as stated above (para. 13). Efforts are made to avoid double counting finance flows by focusing on project-level activities and the primary financing of a new physical asset or activity. The global climate finance estimates cover public and private finance, as well as international and domestic finance, to

the extent that these are covered by the sources of information outlined in section 2.2. An overview of other finance flows not included in global climate finance estimates is provided in a section on non-primary market global climate finance flows (section 2.2.10). In global climate finance estimates, a mix of full investment costs and incremental or component costs are included based on the type of activity and data source used, and in general are conservative. Further information on domestic climate finance from other sources of information are covered in a section on domestic climate finance (section 2.2.11). The estimates on global climate finance are not to be conflated with international climate finance obligations and commitments under the Convention and the Paris Agreement.

- Climate finance flows from developed to developing countries: as in previous BAs, data on climate finance flows from developed to developing countries draws primarily from official reporting by developed country Parties on financial support provided and mobilized under the Convention (through biennial reports), and the Paris Agreement (through BTRs). However, official data is only available from the first BTRs up to and including the year 2022. Preliminary data gathered from Parties on climate finance provided and mobilized for 2023–2024 is presented; however, this data is partial and provisional and subject to change once official data in the second BTRs are submitted by the end of 2026. Analysis of distribution by geographical regions or financial instruments in reported BTR data, as well as approaches used in the underlying assumptions, definitions and methodologies, is therefore limited to the years 2021–2022. Data on climate finance reported by developing country Parties is also covered in this section. These data are complemented by information on commitments by multilateral climate funds and commitments by multilateral development banks' (MDBs) own resources to projects in developing countries that are attributable to developed countries. Data on bilateral and multilateral flows to developing countries from primary data sources – such as the DAC CRS, IDFC and other databases – complement these data sources to provide more granularity with regard to sectors and themes. Estimates of mobilized private finance flows in developing countries were gathered from MDBs, IDFC and OECD analytical work, but do not differentiate between private finance originating in developed countries and private finance mobilized locally in developing countries.
- South–South Cooperation: as in previous BAs, data

on South–South cooperation on climate finance draws from various data sources, including reporting by non-Annex I Parties under Convention, through biennial update reports (BURs), and by other Parties under the Paris Agreement (through BTRs). Other data sources on bilateral and multilateral climate finance flows from developing countries, where available, include the DAC CRS, TOSSD, IDFC, and other sources. Data on commitments by multilateral climate funds and MDBs attributable to developing country Parties are provided to complement this information.

17. The use of the terms ‘developed and developing countries’ or ‘South–South’ in this report are used by the authors to describe data or country classifications from various sources. Please refer to annex A for the different country classifications used by various data sources. For the purpose of the overview of climate finance in the BA, various data sources are used to illustrate flows from developed to developing countries, without prejudice to the meaning of those terms in the context of the Convention and the Paris Agreement. The classifications used include, but are not limited to, Parties included in Annex II/Annex I to the Convention to Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention, including through multilateral channels; OECD members to non-OECD members; OECD DAC members to countries eligible for OECD DAC official development assistance; and other relevant classifications. For South–South, this refers to non-Annex I, non-OECD DAC members and other similar classifications.

Limitations to the data and analysis presented in the report

18. Since the fifth BA, the SCF has invited Parties to provide preliminary data on climate finance provided, and mobilized and received to support the preparation of the BA ahead of the official reporting deadline for the data years under assessment (e.g. 2019–2020 in the fifth BA, 2021–2022 in the sixth BA, 2023–2024 in the seventh BA). Ten Parties provided preliminary information, while data on another 22 Parties was available from publicly available data sources. Nevertheless, the preliminary and partial data gathered results in inconsistent number of reporting Parties over time and limits confidence in both key aggregate trends identified in the data, as well as the potential to identify trends by geographical region or instruments. Furthermore, compared to reporting under the Convention, the information in BTRs under the ETF of the Paris Agreement expands the scope of reporting on

climate finance provided and mobilized; caution should therefore be exercised in comparing trends from before 2020 to 2024.

19. In the area of global climate finance, challenges remain in filling data gaps, particularly on domestic public finance, private finance for adaptation activities, and for activities in the AFOLU, waste and water and sanitation sectors. Methodologies for calculating climate finance based on total cost or incremental cost produce different estimates by activity. This potentially leads to limitations regarding the completeness of data and any interpretation of the relative shares of global climate finance going to different themes or sectors. Some data sources, such as those for renewable energy, provide activity-level data, but may make country- and technology-level assumptions on finance flows to fill data gaps that affect the confidence in key findings related to the domestic and international origin of finance flows and the instruments used.

20. Regarding domestic climate finance, there is a notable increase in the number of countries developing climate finance reporting systems. However, country-led approaches vary, including in the financial amounts tracked; for example, public expenditure may refer to ex ante budget allocations or ex post actual expenditures. Time lags in implementation, along with the range of approaches followed by countries, have led to limited reporting of publicly available data and of data that can be globally aggregated; for example, domestic reporting systems may track both domestic and international finance flows, while public reporting doesn’t allow these flows to be disaggregated.

21. Data on international climate finance flows are compiled using various methodologies and have varying interpretations. Flows from developed to developing countries – covering finance provided, mobilized and received – include a mix of reporting practices and points of measurement. Data may be based on disbursements to projects and recipients in the given year or on financial commitments made in the reporting year to activities that may be implemented over several years. For multilateral organizations, data may also be based on either inflows to or outflows. Information on South–South cooperation in climate finance flows, while improving, remains relatively underreported. The level of granularity and details reported on, including classifications of data by geographical region and by bilateral or multilateral channel, are not uniform across data sources.

1

Methodological issues related to transparency of climate finance

1.1. Introduction

22. This chapter provides an update on ongoing work related to the Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) of climate finance information since the publication of the 2024 sixth BA. It responds to a request by the COP for the SCF to take into consideration relevant work by other bodies and entities on the MRV of support and the tracking of climate finance,⁹ as well as to consider ways of strengthening methodologies for reporting climate finance.¹⁰


23. Information on approaches and methodologies for the MRV of climate finance is valued in the UNFCCC process, particularly in the context of the Paris Agreement and Party reporting of transparent and consistent information on support provided and mobilized to developing countries under the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF).¹¹ Looking ahead, the latest status of climate finance tracking methodologies

and future developments could also inform possible data and approaches for assessing progress towards the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG).

24. The climate finance system comprises of a variety of actors – a number of which are active in tracking climate finance, including data providers (both public finance providers and commercial entities), aggregators of data, and organisations reporting and commentating on climate finance – as illustrated in figure 1.1. This visualization highlights primary and secondary data sources drawn upon for the BA's estimates of climate finance. This chapter provides updates on the definitions, measurement and reporting approaches of each key source, and estimates presented in this report should be interpreted in the context of these methodological approaches. Further detail on sectoral scope and coverage of sources is outlined in chapter 2, figure 2.4 and annexes D and E.

Figure 1.1

Sources of information: data providers, aggregators and reporters of climate finance



Notes: Abbreviations: Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF), BNEF Energy Transition Investment Trends (BNEF ETIT), Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs), BTR Compilation and Synthesis (BTR C&S), Climate Funds Update (CFU), Climate Policy Initiative (CPI), CPI Global Landscape of Climate Finance (CPI GLCF), Development Finance Institutions (DFIs), IDFC Green Finance Mapping (IDFC GFM), International Energy Agency World Energy Outlook (IEA WEO), IHS Markit (IHS), Infrastructure Journal Global (IJGlobal), Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), MDB Joint Reports on Climate Finance (MDB JR CF), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), OECD Climate-related Development Finance database (OECD CRDF), OECD Development Assistance Committee Creditor Reporting System (OECD DAC CRS), Total Official Support to Sustainable Development (TOSSD).

9) Decision 1/CP.18, Para. 71.

10) Decision 5/CP.18, Para. 11.

11) Paris Agreement, Article 9, para 7.

25. A number of formal processes exist for the reporting of international climate finance, including the UNFCCC's Enhanced Transparency Framework and Biennial Reporting, and more widely the statistical systems and standards of the OECD Development Assistance Committee Creditor Reporting System (OECD DAC CRS) for climate-related development finance, as well as joint tracking initiatives across the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and International Development Finance Club (IDFC). Organizations such as the Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) also play an active role in aggregating data across sources to present an overview of global climate finance flows. Recent developments in methodologies and reporting approaches have led to increased coverage in reporting across Parties and institutions, including enhanced data systems for collecting granular information and continuing improvements in the completeness and quality of aggregated estimates of climate finance. However, differences remain in definitions, measurement and reporting practices.

26. This chapter on methodological issues related to the transparency of climate finance is structured as follows:

- Section 1.2 provides the latest updates on operational definitions of climate finance in use and methodologies to track climate finance;
- Section 1.3 contains information on emerging methodologies for measuring mitigation and adaptation finance outcomes;
- Section 1.4 provides insights into emerging methodologies which integrate climate change considerations into insurance, lending and investment decision-making processes, and which include information relevant to tracking consistency of finance flows with the long-term goal outlined in Article 2, paragraph 1(c) of the Paris Agreement.

1.2. Updates on operational definitions of climate finance in use and methodologies to track climate finance

27. In 2024, the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) adopted an updated operational definition of climate finance, following COP28's request, and building on information in the SCF's 2023 report on clustering types of climate finance definitions in use: "*Climate finance aims at reducing emissions and enhancing sinks of greenhouse gases, aims at reducing vulnerability, increasing adaptive capacity, and mainstreaming and increasing resilience*

of human and ecological systems to negative climate impacts, and includes financing for actions identified in a country's nationally determined contribution, adaptation communication, national adaptation plan, long-term low-emission development strategy or other national plan for implementing and achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement and the objective of the Convention." (SCF, 2024)

28. This updated definition retains the broad scope of the SCF's prior operational definition (SCF, 2021), while explicitly referencing the goals of the Paris Agreement and capturing greater specificity with respect to financing nationally determined climate action. The latest operational definition guides the SCF in its future work, including this BA, where a number of key institutions have lightly revised their definitions to demonstrate alignment with the Paris Agreement and with national climate plans. However, it is crucial to note that there is no universal definition of climate finance, and that the SCF operational definition is designed for the purpose of guiding the SCF's technical work.

29. As covered in previous BAs, the following subsections provide updates on approaches to track climate finance across definitions, methodologies, expansions in scope and coverage, and improvements in databases and statistical systems. For more detailed descriptions of each methodology, please refer to previous BAs and the compilations and summaries provided in Annexes A, B, D and E.

Annex A: Country and institution groupings used in sources of data referenced in the seventh BA

Annex B: Compilation of operational definitions of climate finance in use by Parties and various institutions

Annex C: Information on climate finance received in the first biennial transparency reports

Annex D: Compilation of methodologies in use by various sources of information on global climate finance flows and assessment of quality, completeness, and sectoral classifications of data

Annex E: Compilation of methodologies in use by various sources of information on developed-to-developing country climate finance flows and assessments of quality and completeness

1.2.1. Update on approaches used by Parties in Biennial Transparency Reports

30. Party reporting to the Convention under the Enhanced Transparency Framework is intended to provide clarity on support provided and mobilized, and needed and received, by relevant individual Parties, and – to the extent that it is possible – to provide an overview of aggregate financial support provided and mobilized.

31. For the first time, this BA draws on formal reporting from Parties on information on financial support provided and mobilized, as well as support needed and received, under Article 9 of the Paris Agreement. This includes formally reported information for the years 2021–22, which was not available for the sixth BA. With the submission of the first Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs), Parties have also provided information on the underlying assumptions, definitions and methodologies for reporting parameters applied in accordance with the modalities, procedures and guidelines (MPGs) for the enhanced transparency framework for action and support set out in decision 18/CMA.1 (UNFCCC, 2018).

32. The MPGs state that developed country Parties shall provide information on financial support provided and mobilized in accordance with the MPGs. Other Parties that provide support should also provide such information and, in doing so, are encouraged to use the MPGs.¹² In reporting information on support received, developing country Parties should describe the underlying assumptions, definitions and methodologies used.¹³

33. As of 30 June 2026, 133 Parties have submitted their first BTRs, including 89 Parties submitting accompanying CTF-tables on climate finance support provided and mobilized or needed and received.

Financial support provided and mobilized

34. This section focuses on the methods outlined by 42 Parties that submitted information on financial support provided and mobilized in their first BTRs. The 42 Parties include 26 developed country Parties, 15 other Parties, and 1 Party unspecified. “Other Parties” provided a clear statement that they were reporting on financial support provided on a voluntary basis as “other Parties”, or underwent the technical expert review in line with the requirements of reporting as Other Parties, or had also submitted information on financial support

needed and received by developing country Parties. Parties for which it was unclear whether the Parties were reporting as developed country Parties or “other Parties” are categorized as “Unspecified”. 40 Parties submitted CTF-tables with information on finance provided and mobilized, and 2 Parties provided information in their BTR narrative report.

35. The paragraphs below provide an overview of the underlying assumptions, definitions and methodologies used by developed country Parties in accordance with the elements listed in paragraph 121 of the MPGs. Information on the underlying assumptions, definitions and methodologies that other Parties are encouraged to provide is included where available. Approaches used in relation to key parameters on climate finance data include:

- **Climate-specific support through bilateral, regional and other channels:** 19 developed country Parties provided information on climate-specific support based on their use of the OECD DAC Rio markers, and through applying coefficients of between 30 and 100 per cent to discount the full value of projects. Eight Parties (three developed country Parties and five other Parties) reported using OECD Rio marker data but did not specify the use of climate coefficients. Seven Parties (three developed country Parties and four other Parties) applied case-by-case methodologies in identifying the climate-specific components of each project or reported climate-specific projects or programmes.
- **Information on recipient country, region, project, programme and activity through bilateral, regional and other channels:** 36 Parties (25 developed country Parties and 11 other Parties) provided data at project or activity level. The project-level data varied in the level of information, ranging from the country of the project to the location of the project. Three Parties (one developed country Party and two other Parties providing support) provided data at the aggregate country or region level by type of support (mitigation, adaptation).
- **Core general and climate-specific support to multilateral funds and institutions:** Parties reporting on their support through multilateral channels can distinguish between core general contributions (representing unearmarked inflows) and climate-specific contributions (either earmarked

12) Annex to decision 18/CMA.1, para 118.

13) Annex to decision 18/CMA.1, para. 131.

or imputed inflows, or attributed outflows). 27 Parties (20 developed country Parties and 7 other Parties providing support) reported core general inflow contributions while two Parties reported outflow contributions. 21 Parties reported 'imputed climate shares' of their general contribution to multilateral institution to calculate their climate specific contribution. Where imputed shares are not available from the OECD (see section 1.2.2), Parties stated they used shares provided directly by the institution or their own estimate.

- **Status of support:** For climate finance channelled through bilateral, regional and other channels, 23 Parties (13 developed country Parties and 10 other Parties providing support) reported support as disbursements, nine reported commitments only, whereas six Parties (four developed country Parties and two other Parties providing support) reported both commitments and disbursements, depending on the project. For reported multilateral flows, 21 Parties (17 developed country Parties and 4 other Parties providing support) reported funds as disbursements, while three Parties reported commitments to multilateral climate funds and five Parties (three developed country Parties and two other Parties providing support) reported both commitments and disbursements for different institutions and funds; one Party reported commitment for 2021 and disbursed for 2022. Parties clarified that the practice of reporting both commitments and disbursements reflects the latest project status, with each project/programme reported on either on a commitment or disbursement basis.
- **Funding source:** 15 Parties (13 developed country Parties and 2 other Parties providing support) report both ODA and OOF as primary funding sources for financing through bilateral channels; 15 Parties (8 developed country Parties and 7 other Parties providing support) channelled bilateral finance through ODA only; and two developed country Parties reported ODA, OOF and 'other' as funding sources for bilateral finance. While all Parties reported ODA as a funding source for multilateral finance, 10 Parties also included OOF, and three Parties also reported OOF and 'other' as funding sources for multilateral finance.
- **Financial instrument:** For finance provided through a bilateral channel, 21 Parties (12 developed country Parties and 9 other Parties providing support) reported providing grant-based bilateral support only (i.e. ODA), while 15 Parties reported a range of instruments, such as loans (concessional, non-concessional and concessionality unspecified), equities, debt instruments, and guarantees. 24 Parties reported both the face value and grant equivalent level of climate finance support provided, of which 10 Parties reported through applying the OECD DAC grant equivalent method to estimated bilateral concessional loan amounts, and four Parties reported based on concessionality criteria of development finance institutions or public banks. For multilateral contributions, 20 Parties (14 developed country Parties and 6 other Parties providing support) reported providing only grant-based multilateral contributions. Eight developed country Parties reported grant-equivalent levels for multilateral contributions using OECD DAC grant equivalent method, while seven Parties reported relying on the concessionality frameworks of multilateral development banks.
- **Type of support:** 33 Parties (25 developed country Parties and 8 other Parties) reported climate-specific bilateral support across the three categories of mitigation, adaptation and cross-cutting support. Four Parties (one developed country Party and three other Parties) reported one or two of the categories, while four other Parties did not specify. For multilateral flows, 27 Parties (24 developed country Parties and 3 other Parties) reported multilateral support targeting mitigation, adaptation and cross-cutting support, three Parties (one developed country Party and two other Parties) reported cross-cutting support only, and two other Parties reported mitigation and cross-cutting support.
- **Sector and subsector:** For bilateral reporting, 23 Parties (18 developed country Parties and 5 other Parties) reported using OECD DAC sector classifications mapped to ETF categories, while seven Parties (five developed country Parties and two other Parties) utilized UNFCCC sector classifications. For multilateral reporting, 19 Parties (16 developed country Parties and 3 other Parties) reported using OECD DAC sector codes mapped to ETF sector categories. At the subsector level, 20 Parties (16 developed country Parties and 4 other Parties) used five-digit OECD DAC CRS purpose codes.
- **Finance mobilized by public interventions:** 18 Parties (15 developed country Parties and 3 other Parties) reported information in the new CTF on finance mobilized by public interventions. 1 developed country Party only reported information on the amount of public resources used to mobilize support and did not report any mobilized amounts due to confidentiality concerns of reporting

project-level data. 12 developed country Parties referred to applying standard instrument-specific methodologies developed by the OECD to estimate the causal relationship and point of measurement, while the other developed country Parties referred to applying the MDB methodologies, case-by-case methods, or did not specify.

- **Use of calendar and fiscal years:** 33 Parties (22 developed country Parties and 11 other Parties) reported on a calendar year basis, while four Parties (three developed country Parties and one other Party) specified that their reporting was based on fiscal years, and one developed country Party reported a mixed approach (i.e. reporting 2021 data by calendar year, and 2022 data by fiscal year while transitioning its reporting system). Four other Parties did not provide such information.
- **Exchange rate information:** Of the 42 Parties (26 developed country Parties, 15 other Parties and 1 unspecified) that reported climate finance provided and mobilized, 24 Parties (19 developed country Parties and 5 other Parties) used OECD reference exchange rates for reporting in United States dollars, seven Parties (four developed country Parties and three other Parties) used the exchange rate provided by their national or central banks, while two developed country Parties reported in United States dollars. Three other Parties did not specify the source of information on the exchange rate.

36. In accordance with paragraph 121(r) of the MPGs, which relates to how Parties determine that financial resources are new and additional, 21 Parties (18 developed country Parties and 3 other Parties) define new and additional finance as resources newly committed or disbursed within the reporting year or exceeding what was previously reported in their BR/NC, without duplicating previously reported data or previously reported BR/NC levels. Seven Parties (six developed country Parties and one other Party) indicated demonstrating additionality through progression beyond earlier multi-year commitments. Four Parties defined additionality using budget-based criteria, where new climate finance comes from fresh annual appropriations or climate-specific budget lines, while two Parties framed additionality as exceeding the target of 0.7 per cent of GNI relative to ODA baselines.

37. In accordance with paragraph 121(s) of the MPGs, Parties reported demonstrating financial progression in various ways, reflecting different national budget systems and commitment cycles. 15 developed country Parties reported higher levels of climate finance in 2021–2022

compared with previous reporting cycles, citing increased annual disbursements and commitments, and two other Parties reported progression as an increase from their previous level. Six developed country Parties showed progression through expanded multi-year climate finance pledges, while five developed country Parties reported demonstrating progression by broadening their climate finance portfolios or providing Paris-Agreement-aligned climate finance for the first time.

38. In accordance with paragraph 121(p) of the MPGs, several Parties reported their support is aligned with partner country-climate plans (e.g. NDCs and NAPs). Parties in their first BTR indicated how their support reflects the needs and priorities of developing countries, drawing from partner-country planning instruments and vulnerability assessments. Around 19 Parties reported alignment with NDCs, NAPs, long-term strategies, or national climate and national development plans. 10 developed country Parties reported relying on structured consultations with a partner country. Five other country Parties reported aligning their support with the national climate plan of the partner country, while two Parties reported climate support based on consultation with partner countries.

39. Parties also reported how their climate finance approaches align with the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement in accordance with paragraph 121(q) of the MPGs, including limiting global temperature rise, enhancing resilience, and ensuring consistency of financial flows with low-emission and climate-resilient pathways. 18 developed country Parties referenced direct alignment with the Paris Agreement long-term goals through policy tools or national legal and institutional frameworks. Among these, 10 developed country Parties reported embedding Paris alignment into their national climate or development policies. Six Parties reported applying a formal screening process for Paris alignment. Four other Parties reporting voluntarily reported aligning their national policies with the Paris Agreement.

40. Parties reported including measures to avoid double counting of climate finance in accordance with paragraph 121(m) of the MPGs, whether across providers, across channels or between public and private flows. In cases of multi-provider contributions, Parties reported arrangements to avoid overlap between bilateral and multilateral reporting or to ensure that Rio marker scoring does not exceed 100 per cent when activities contribute to both mitigation and adaptation. 17 Parties (13 developed country Parties and 4 other Parties) relied primarily on the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System or

MDB joint-approach methodologies to ensure consistency and prevent duplicate entries. Eight developed country Parties reported addressing double counting through project or programme level, such as reporting regional or multi-country activities once, attributing funding only to the share of the reporting Party that prevent increase in climate totals when both mitigation and adaptation markers apply.

41. Overall, in response to the sixth BA's recommendation for Parties to better track and report on climate finance provided and mobilized through the BTR and CTFs, reporting on mobilized private finance has become more standardized. There is an increase in reporting on the methodologies used to calculate finance mobilized through public intervention, as well as clearer identification of the establishment of causal links between public interventions and private flows. The new reporting table has facilitated the reporting of grant equivalents alongside face value, providing information on concessionality together with the methodologies used for the grant equivalent calculation. In detailing approaches to avoiding double counting, information submitted has moved from general narrative statements to reporting on specific methodologies and calculation procedures used, including for Article 6. The reporting has improved in terms of how provided and mobilized climate finance addresses the needs and priorities of partner countries. Challenges remain, however, in the data gap in the reporting of multilateral climate finance outflows. Almost all Parties reported multilateral support on an inflow basis, which cannot capture actual project-level expenditure. The reporting of grant equivalents also remains incomplete. This limits the comparability and aggregation of the grant component of non-grant instruments.

Financial support needed and received

42. Information on climate finance received by developing country Parties is drawn primarily from Biennial Transparency Reports submitted by Parties under the ETF established by Article 13 of the Paris Agreement. Of the 133 Parties that submitted BTRs by 30 June 2026, 73 Parties provided information on climate


finance received data, of which 44 Parties provided information in CTFs structured to capture information including on financial instruments, channel and sector, while 29 Parties reported their climate finance received information in their BTRs. Information reported by Parties in their CTFs included more disaggregated data information in line with MPG, while varying levels of aggregation, including by channel or sources, sector, theme or instrument. Table C.1 in annex C provides further information on the coverage extended in BTRs compared to previous BURs and shows improved coverage of data and different parameters reported for almost all developing country Parties reporting climate finance received.

43. Of the 73 Parties that reported information on climate finance received, 58 Parties provided information at project level, and 15 Parties provided information at channel or source level, institution level, sector or theme level, or by annual aggregate. 69 of 73 Parties provided timeframe information while 67 Parties provided information on the channel of delivery. 66 Parties provided the type of support, 63 Parties reported financial instrument(s) information and whether the finance represented a commitment or funds received, while 49 Parties included information on subsectors and on use, impact and results. Contributions to technology development and transfer objectives was reported by 56 Parties, while contributions to capacity-building objectives was reported by 57 Parties.

44. The overlap between BTR and BUR reporting periods has been recognized. The final BURs for non-Annex I Parties are those that are submitted no later than 31 December 2024; however, Parties continue to submit their BURs. Since the sixth BA, 21 Parties have submitted their BURs as at 31 December 2025. BURs and BTRs report information on climate finance received across past and future time periods, reflecting project cycles, as illustrated in figure 1.2 (compared to the distinct reporting time frames for finance provided). To avoid double counting, information on climate finance received included in the seventh BA draws from BURs only for the 13 Parties that have not yet submitted their BTRs.

Figure 1.2

Number of BURs submitted by non-Annex I Parties



Source: Biennial Update Report submissions from Non-Annex I Parties, as at 31 December 2025.

45. In response to the sixth BA's recommendation for Parties to better track and report on climate finance provided, mobilized and received, particularly at the activity-level where possible (Paragraph 52.a.), the introduction of the new CTFs has improved the granularity of information reported in BTRs. In comparison with the submission of such information in biennial update reports between 2021 and 2023, 30 of the 73 developing country Parties had not submitted similar information in biennial update reports but did so in their BTRs.

46. For reporting on climate finance received, a major improvement is the increased volume of reporting and granularity of reported data. The introduction of CTFs has standardized how disaggregated data on financial instruments, channels and sectors is captured across different Parties. Parties reporting through CTFs provided more detailed information than those providing reporting in their BTRs, including on activity status (77 per cent) and use impact and results (68 per cent). However, significant gaps/limitations exist with regards to inconsistencies in reporting timeframes, which represent a systemic challenge that hinders the compilation and comparability of climate finance data. Parties reported varying temporal scopes, ranging from specific two-year windows to decade-long cumulative totals, often influenced by institutional data availability or project cycles. The absence of a harmonized reporting period makes it difficult to aggregate climate finance information (see chapter 2 for assessment of

completeness and quality in 2023-2024 reporting).

1.2.2. Update on approaches used by other entities to track international public climate finance

Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD DAC) climate-related development finance reporting and database

47. The OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (OECD DAC CRS) provides a measurement framework and statistical system for tracking development finance. It integrates activity-level data across bilateral and multilateral providers, measuring both donor effort (as indicated by the ODA grant equivalent measure) and financial flows to eligible recipients, including climate-related finance flows. These are underpinned by financial definitions and classifications which enable consistent data collection across governments, Development Finance Institutions (DFIs), Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), and multilateral funds.

48. Over time, the OECD DAC statistical system has expanded its scope of reporting. In 2023 and 2025, Estonia and Latvia respectively became the latest members to join the OECD DAC and report into the CRS (see annex A for the full OECD DAC membership list). The system also increasingly captures finance provided and voluntarily reported from non-DAC members (see chapter

2, section 2.4 for update on coverage of non-OECD DAC members reporting on South–South flows to the OECD), as well as finance provided by philanthropic foundations (see chapter 2, section 2.3.3).

49. New methodologies and reporting rules have been introduced within the OECD DAC to capture a broader coverage of official development finance flows. In addition to tracking all Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Other Official Flows (OOF), reporting is now collected from bilateral donors on Private Sector Instruments (PSI), starting from 2023 data. Methodologies for reporting on PSIs include loans to the private sector, guarantees, equity investments, mezzanine finance instruments and reimbursable grants (OECD DAC, 2024a). Under certain conditions, PSI activities are included in ODA, such as where donor effort involves providing capital transfers to PSIs or is expressed in grant equivalents for individual activities. Private finance mobilized by official development finance (including ODA, OOF and PSI) is outside of official development finance and outlined subsequently (see section 1.2.3).

50. Climate-related development finance is tracked through the OECD DAC system. Providers reporting on bilateral flows apply the Rio marker definition and methodology to qualitatively identify whether, and to what extent, the activities reported pursue climate change as a ‘principal’ or ‘significant’ objective (across climate change mitigation and/or adaptation). The Rio markers must be reported for ODA-eligible activities and are voluntarily reported for activities covered by OOF and PSI (OECD DAC, 2024c). Following the 2021 OECD DAC Declaration on a new approach to align development co-operation with the goals of the Paris Agreement, the OECD issued updated indicative tables to guide the harmonization of reporting on the Rio Markers across DAC members (OECD DAC, 2021; OECD DAC, 2024d).

51. Rio markers were originally designed to track the integration of environmental objectives rather than to quantify climate finance, and as such only allow for an approximate quantification of climate-related development finance. A number of Parties draw on the Rio marker definitions for their international reporting of bilateral finance, with many reporting that they apply adjustments (i.e. coefficients or climate shares) to transform their data for the purpose of reporting financial amounts to UN Conventions and towards quantified goals. This can lead to significant variations in reporting practices across Parties (see section 1.2.1 for a summary of BTR1 reporting practices). The OECD DAC now periodically surveys its membership to provide

greater transparency on such reporting practices. The latest survey, conducted in 2024, identified 26 OECD DAC members that based their reporting to the UNFCCC on Rio marker data with some form of adjustment, with 20 members applying fixed coefficients to activity amounts linked to the Rio marker values as their main reporting method, and another 6 members using a more elaborate approach to select the activities to report and/or to determine the climate-specific shares (OECD DAC, 2024e).

52. The DAC statistical system tracks both inflows to multilateral institutions and outflows from multilateral institutions. Multilateral providers report their climate-related development finance outflows using the Rio markers (e.g. the Global Environment Facility), or through applying the Joint MDB Methodology (see subsequent sub-section). To estimate climate-related inflows associated with core multilateral contributions, the OECD Secretariat calculates ‘imputed multilateral shares’, and now routinely makes these shares available to support Party reporting on climate-specific inflows related to their core contributions. Efforts over time have led to fully converged statistics and the calculation of imputed shares for over 30 different multilateral providers (OECD, 2025e).

53. To support greater transparency in OECD member reporting to the UNFCCC, the OECD DAC publishes online ‘Climate-related Development Finance’ (CRDF) activity-level datasets (see section 1.2.5 for further details), including information on gender-related activities based on the OECD’s gender marker approach (See chapter 3, box 3.1).

54. The OECD DAC verifies its data through rigorous quality assurance processes, including automated validation against reporting directives, cross-checks of item-level data against aggregates, and donor-specific audits during statistical peer reviews. For climate-related development finance, Rio marker data undergoes peer validation, with the release of activity-level data providing full transparency.

Multilateral development bank and IDFC common principles for joint reporting

55. Since 2012, the MDBs have published joint reports on climate finance on behalf of a growing group of 10 institutions composed of the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), the Inter-American Development Bank Group (IDBG), the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB),

the New Development Bank (NDB) and the World Bank Group (WBG).

56. Reporting captures climate finance committed to all countries in which the MDBs operate, disaggregated by low-, middle- and high-income countries. This reflects financing from the MDBs as well as from external sources channelled through and managed by the MDBs. The identification and estimation of climate finance is based on a joint MDB climate finance tracking and reporting methodology, which was first developed across MDBs in 2011, and which from 2014 has included both public and private co-financing in its reporting (see section 1.2.3).

57. Since 2011, the International Development Finance Club (IDFC) – a group of 27 national and regional development banks across developed and developing countries – have conducted an annual mapping of their ‘green finance’ contributions, which include climate finance alongside finance targeting biodiversity and other environmental objectives. Reporting reflects institutional-level finance commitments presented as aggregate-level flows and by theme, sector, sub-sectoral technologies, financial instruments and regional distributions. Through a dedicated three-year capacity-building programme (2023–2025, facilitated by the IDFC Climate Facility and implemented by the IDFC Secretariat in partnership with CPI), IDFC members have strengthened the robustness and consistency of their green finance tracking; most recently, 23 of 27 IDFC members – including the newest member, the Development Bank of Rwanda (BRD) – have participated in the group’s annual surveys and reporting (IDFC, 2025).

58. Since 2015, the MDBs and IDFC have collaborated and collectively agreed on Common Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Finance and Common Principles for Climate Change Mitigation Finance, with a view to harmonizing their reporting. The latest revisions, published in 2022 and 2023 (ADB et al., 2022; ADB et al., 2023), have applied to reporting on finance flows since 2023 and 2024 respectively.

59. Key features of the MDB-IDFC Common Principles include the use of exhaustive eligibility lists for identifying climate change mitigation activities and a three-step assessment process for identifying climate change adaptation activities, taking into account climate change vulnerability and project specifics. Adaptation is now also viewed as imperative for resilient development,

and tracking has therefore been expanded to wider sectors such as education, health, social protection, financial services and research and innovation for adaptation solutions. In addition, the estimation of climate finance is limited to projects, project components, elements or proportions of projects that are explicitly linked to addressing climate change (see annex B and further details in sixth BA).

60. MDBs verify their data through dual-expert reviews and final certifications against standardized mitigation/adaptation criteria, with transparency provided through annual Joint MDB Climate Finance Reports and growing project-level disclosures. Currently, the MDBs are advancing a digitalization project aimed at improving transparency and making their joint climate finance data more accessible and user friendly. In future, more detailed data will be provided through an interactive web platform, allowing users to access the data they need in both tabular and graphical formats, a where a pilot MDB Climate Finance Dashboard is currently available.¹⁴ In addition, all the MDBs and DFIs also report activity-level data to the OECD DAC system (as outlined in the section above), with some commercially sensitive private sector-related activities reported at aggregated levels.

Multilateral climate funds

61. Multilateral climate funds (MCFs), such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF), Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Adaptation Fund (AF), continue to publish project-level activity data on their respective websites. For example, the GCF’s Open Data Library provides a platform enabling access through dashboards and databases to review the GCF’s portfolio and project/programme-level data.

62. Climate Funds Update (CFU) is an independent website maintained by the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Washington, DC, that offers annually standardized and aggregated project-level information from 30 multilateral climate funds, including information on pledges, approved commitments and disbursed funds (CFU, as at May 2026). In collating project approvals data from funds that target multiple objectives or thematic focuses, such as the GEF, CFU applies assumptions to capture only projects that are exclusively dedicated to climate change.

63. In addition, the GCF, GEF, AF and a number of multilateral funds (including the CIFs) also report on activity-level data to the OECD DAC system, following its

14) See: <https://www.eib.org/en/about/partners/development-banks/climate-finance-dashboard>

international standards to enable robust aggregation of multilateral outflows.

Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD)

64. The Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD) statistical framework aims to provide a comprehensive global picture of official and officially supported resource flows provided to promote sustainable development of developing countries¹⁵ and contributions to international public goods. It is designed to promote greater transparency and accountability regarding the full array of officially supported development finance, including resources provided through South–South co-operation, triangular co-operation and multilateral institutions, as well as by emerging and traditional donors and private finance mobilized through official interventions. The scope is also broader than that of official development finance measures captured by the OECD DAC. From 2023 onwards, reporting categorizes activities that contribute to international public goods and that address challenges or issues of a global nature as distinct from activities that provide direct benefits to developing countries. This includes, for example, domestic finance and modalities such as R&D in areas of global reach such as renewable energy.

65. In 2025, TOSSD issued instructions to assist countries and institutions in reporting to TOSSD. Since the sixth BA, reporting coverage has expanded to include a total of 126 providers including provider countries, multilateral organisations (the bulk of UN entities, all Multilateral Development Banks but EBRD and the World Bank) and South–South co-operation providers (TOSSD, 2025a; TOSSD, 2025b). The reporting instructions outline requirements for activity-level reporting, including the coding of projects based on their Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) and target focus, for example, “SDG 13 Climate Action” and “Target 13.4 Implement the UNFCCC”, alongside the use of keywords such as #Mitigation, #Adaptation and #Gender (see annex B). See section 2.4 for reported information.

1.2.3. Update on approaches used by other entities to track international private climate finance mobilized by public interventions

66. Since 2013, the OECD DAC has been working to

measure and collect data on the amounts mobilized from the private sector by official development finance interventions (including ODA, OOF and PSI), in close collaboration with experts from bilateral and multilateral development finance institutions (DFIs) and the climate community through the OECD-led Research Collaborative on Tracking Finance for Climate Action. The sixth BA outlined the OECD DAC’s instrument-specific approach to collecting activity-level data across bilateral and multilateral providers for eight financial instruments or leveraging mechanisms: syndicated loans, guarantees, shares in collective investment vehicles, direct investment in companies or special purpose vehicles, credit lines, project finance, simple co-financing arrangements, and mobilization through technical assistance activities, for which reporting guidance was issued in 2024 (with reporting starting from 2023 data).

67. In 2025, the OECD DAC issued a *Handbook on measuring and reporting on Private Finance Mobilized by Official Development Finance* (OECD DAC, 2025a) to strengthen capacity and knowledge on the OECD methodology for measuring private finance mobilization, as well as on how to report on mobilization in practice.

68. Within the OECD DAC statistical systems, climate-related private finance mobilized by bilateral public interventions is tracked using the Rio markers. According to the OECD’s latest survey of its 33 OECD DAC members, 20 members indicated that they are or are likely to report private finance mobilized flows in their Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs) to the UNFCCC, including those reporting partially. Ten members indicated that they intend to use the same fixed coefficients applied to their bilateral public flows when reporting Rio-marked private finance mobilized (OECD DAC, 2024e).

69. The MDBs are implementing the definitions and recommendations of the MDB Taskforce on Private Investment Mobilisation for tracking the private share of climate co-finance. This methodology focuses on assessing the private finance mobilized by an MDB on a project-by-project basis, such as “private direct mobilization” and “private indirect mobilization”.

70. Further refinements of the OECD methodology and MDB approach are underway, including the MDB-OECD DAC Working Group on Mobilisation to support collaborative approaches. Work to date has focused on

15) TOSSD defines recipients using multidimensional criteria reflecting the three dimensions of sustainable development based on: i) Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, ii) Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) iii) the country index of the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN), and iv) the Multidimensional Vulnerability Index of the United Nations (UN MVI), and adjusted for any countries and territories that have activated the TOSSD opt-in or opt-out procedure (TOSSD, 2025). This differs from UNFCCC’s non-Annex I Parties and OECD’s ODA Eligible lists of recipients. See [List-TOSSD-recipients.pdf](#).

enhancing the tracking of mobilization and catalysation, initially through the development of a conceptual framework that includes an aligned definition across MDBs and the OECD DAC and a common typology of catalytic policy-based and investment-based interventions (OECD DAC, 2026g).

71. In response to the sixth BA's recommendation to continue improving methodologies for tracking private finance mobilized and data reported (paragraph 52(b)), recent developments by the OECD and MDBs demonstrate continued progress. Data for 2023-2024 are now available for eight financial instruments within the OECD DAC CRS, and these methods and data support Party reporting on private finance mobilized within BTRs.

1.2.4. Update on approaches to track climate finance at country level

Overview of countries tracking climate finance within national budgets and systems

72. Country-level climate finance tagging and tracking can inform and drive policy decisions towards scaling up domestic and international resource mobilization to meet national climate change goals. A range of objectives and benefits have been identified, including making spending and needs more visible and transparent, thereby supporting accountability and oversight; improving the alignment, governance and prioritization of climate change policy in budget decisions; and providing better evidence to support effective implementation (CABRI, 2021; OECD, 2021; UNDP, 2019, 2025; World Bank, 2021). Domestic tagging and tracking systems can also support the mobilization of climate finance, for example by identifying needs, informing the implementation of NDCs, enhancing MRV and accountability, and strengthening a country's framework for green bonds, as in the case of Indonesia's Green Sukuk Bond. More broadly, while green budgeting is an evolving practice and evidence of its impact remains limited given the time lags involved, recent analysis suggests a shift from tagging for transparency to stronger linkages with budget prioritization and climate policy outcomes (OECD, 2024a).

73. Under the UNFCCC's ETF, Party reporting on domestic climate budgets and/or expenditures is not an explicit requirement in BTRs. However, such information can strengthen BTR reporting through substantiating climate action with quantifiable finance information, in particular with respect to outlined needs and conditional actions in NDCs, and through highlighting domestic

financing/co-financing. Domestic tagging and tracking systems can also assist developing country Parties in reporting on financial support provided. In the most recent BTR1, Ethiopia reported information on domestic climate budgets, while Uzbekistan reported such information in the most recent round of updated NDCs.

74. In the context of the BA and this update, **climate budget tagging** refers to defining and introducing climate-specific categories or tags to planned public expenditures (ex-ante), while **tracking** describes the application of the tags to systematically monitor the climate-relevant expenditure (ex-post). **Green budgeting** refers to the use of budget tools to understand the environmental impact of spending decisions and to align public budgets with climate and environmental goals. In practice, this means integrating climate and environmental considerations across policies and practices, considering taxation, spending, and investment decisions, and can include tagging budget lines (including through the integration into statistical systems), assessing impacts, and tracking whether budgets are consistent with national climate commitments (OECD, 2024a).

75. Overall, there has been continued development in the uptake and application of country-level approaches, assessments and reporting on climate finance. This includes a significant increase in national governments and/or ministries integrating climate change tagging into public financial management systems and green budgeting (UNDP, 2022). There have also been continued collaborations among government agencies, international organizations, research institutes and think tanks. These include the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) support for country-level Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Reviews (CPEIRs), which typically provide a baseline for more systematic tracking; CPI's country-level and sectoral climate finance landscapes (i.e. Brazil 2025, South Africa 2025, Ethiopia 2026); IMF and WBG technical assistance in the context of Article IV consultations, Climate Policy Diagnostics and Country Climate and Development Reports (CCDRs); and the Initiative for Climate Action Transparency (ICAT) Climate Finance Transparency Framework, which aims to strengthen national systems for tracking climate finance in support of implementing NDCs and reporting to the UNFCCC, with recent applications in Belize, Ivory Coast and Morocco.

76. Best efforts to assess progress regarding country-level tagging and tracking has identified a total of 41 jurisdictions with regular tracking systems in place,

and at least another 38 jurisdictions in the process of developing climate budget tagging or tracking systems (as of August 2026). Overall 24 additional jurisdictions are now applying and/or advancing country-level tagging and tracking compared to 55 jurisdictions identified in the sixth BA. Regional trends remain similar to previous BAs, identifying a predominance of climate-budget tagging methodologies in developing countries. While ten Annex I jurisdictions utilize climate budget tagging (eight of which have publicly available information), 31 Non-Annex I jurisdictions have systems in place (20 of which have available information), and another 38 Non-Annex I countries are developing tracking systems (five of which have available information from initial pilot systems or reports).

77. As detailed in the sixth BA, approaches for budget tagging and climate expenditure tracking continue to draw on a variety of approaches, and have a range of objectives. Key design considerations for national tagging and tracking include defining what counts as climate-relevant, deciding the coverage of the system (for example, whether to cover domestic budgets only, or to also include international public finance flows), and choosing how to estimate relevance or weights. To identify and/or classify climate-relevant finance, approaches cover a broad range of sectors and themes, commonly including climate change mitigation and adaptation. Countries often follow one of two approaches. Under a CPEIR-based approach, relevant budget lines, programmes or components are tagged as having no, low, medium or high relevance to climate mitigation or adaptation outcomes. Alternatively, countries may use of the OECD DAC Rio markers to identify activities as having either principal or significant climate mitigation or adaptation objectives (see annex B). Approaches to quantifying these climate-relevant finance flows vary, including full-costing approaches, cost-component approaches based on identified sub-activities within programmes or budget lines, and the application of different relevance or weightings when accounting for climate relevant finance (See sixth BA for further details). It is noted that countries are developing approaches that fit their institutional contexts, data systems, and policy objectives rather than applying generic or uniform systems (UNDP, 2025; IEEFA, 2025).

78. While this update does not seek to provide a

comprehensive overview of the range of approaches applied, key developments, features and updates include:

- A small and growing trend in country-level approaches explicitly tracking disaster risk management, disaster risk finance and, increasingly, loss and damage, beyond general climate change adaptation tagging (Choi et al, 2023). Best efforts have identified nine countries now reporting such financing under a dedicated category (including Bahamas, Bangladesh, Honduras, Madagascar, Pakistan, Tonga and Timor-Leste), of which three (Bahamas, Honduras and Madagascar) report it separate to, or alongside, climate-related expenditure. Most recently, this includes Vanuatu's establishment of a typology for loss and damage and plans for future reporting, as set out within its 2025 Loss and Damage Policy.¹⁶ In addition, the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) has continued to develop practical budget tagging and tracking tools for DRR, most recently conducting a 2025 pilot for Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation Budget Tagging in Mauritius.¹⁷
- Emerging practices of countries starting to identify and review harmful or climate-negative expenditures, such as France, Indonesia and Ireland (OECD, 2024a), as well as Spain, Uzbekistan, Rwanda, and Togo, alongside independent CSO assessments. For example, Togo tags 'positive', 'mixed' and 'unfavourable' expenditures in its climate-related budget exercise, with a view to orienting public resources towards sustainable projects and reflecting the country's commitment to "aligning its public finances with the Sustainable Development Goals, national and international climate commitments, and the legitimate expectations of its citizens regarding adaptation to and mitigation of the effects of climate change and environmental conservation" (Ministère des Finances et du Budget, 2026). CSO studies such as GFLAC's (the Climate Finance Group for Latin America and the Caribbean) Sustainable Finance Index annually monitors national and international revenues and expenditure related to climate change, alongside extractive industries.¹⁸ Their most recent assessment, applied to 20 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean on available data to 2024, found

16) See: Vanuatu Loss and Damage Policy - Climate Change Laws of the World

17) See: Disaster risk reduction and climate change adaption budget tagging: Mauritius country report

18) See: GFLAC (2025) Índice de finanzas sostenibles 2025. Available at: https://www.gflac.org/_files/ugd/32948d_d4261c8522ef47c1906bf3d3b8e57fdd.pdf

that carbon-intensive budgets were five times higher than sustainable budgets.¹⁹ CPI's Indonesia Power Sector Finance Dashboard tracks investment trends in both renewable energy and fossil fuel power plants to provide insight on the energy transition.²⁰

- Examples of gender-responsive climate budgeting and gender-responsive budget tagging from Indonesia,²¹ where climate change adaptation, mitigation and gender responsive budgets are all tagged as key thematics.

79. There is additionally a growing trend towards embedding climate finance within broader public financial management, although significant progress is still to be made towards systematic tracking. This is reflected, for example, in priorities underscored by the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action (CFMCA, 2023; 2026), initiatives such as the Inclusive Budgeting and Financing for Climate Change in Africa,²² and guidance such as UNDP's 2025 report, *Using Public Financial Management to Implement NDCs and NAPs*, which sets out approaches for translating climate commitments into budgeting and spending decisions, including through climate budget tagging and expenditure tracking (UNDP, 2025). Most recently, the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) programme²³ fully launched the PEFA Climate Framework to assess climate-responsive public financial management (CRPFM). This includes the development of indicators related to readiness for tracking climate-related expenditure, alongside broader measures of integration ranging from assessing budget alignment with climate strategies to climate-responsive tax administration and procurement (PEFA, 2024). To date, 20 national climate assessments and 2 subnational climate assessments have been completed. These indicate that mainstreaming of climate change tracking of public expenditures into PFMs remains at an early stage in practice, with only 6 out of the 22 jurisdictions assessed having made initial or partial progress (PEFA, 2026.).

80. Considerations and approaches are also emerging for how to align climate/green budget tagging within official statistical systems (such as the Government Finance Statistics frameworks, national accounts, or

environmental accounts) to ensure the sustainability of climate mainstreaming in PFM and support more comparable international data on climate and environmental expenditure (Pizarro et al, 2021; Pizarro, 2023; OECD, 2024a). For example, the OECD's subnational climate-expenditure tracking draws on National Accounts data (i.e. Classification of Functions of Government Statistics (COFOG) based data) and the EU Taxonomy of Sustainable Activities to identify climate-significant expenditure, investment and revenues across OECD and EU countries from 2001-2023 (33 jurisdictions in total as of December 2025). The approach relies significantly on the use of broad 'proxy-coefficients' to estimate the climate-significance of economic sub-sectors and therefore provides only partial and indicative estimates of subnational climate finance, driven by an interest to explore the contribution of cities and regions (OECD, 2022b, see annex B). Most recently, global consultations are underway to consider enhancements to the System of Environmental-Economic Accounting Central Framework (SEEA CF), endorsed by the United Nations Statistical Commission (UNSC), including responding to emerging demands for integrated environmental and economic data supporting policymaking in areas such as climate change. Specific proposals under consideration include the development of accounting for climate change expenditures, the inclusion of a new Classification of Environmental Purposes (building on current approaches to classify by activity), and extending the scope of environmental activities.²⁴ The public reporting of climate-relevant budgets and expenditures continues to vary significantly among countries in terms of accessibility, level of information provided, and the format of publication used. Some jurisdictions present publicly available information on online portals (e.g. Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, EU, Philippines), and most other countries do report climate-relevant spending as part of their annual budget formation or review. Differences exist, however, with regard to whether the climate-relevant allocations are presented in the general budget (e.g. Nicaragua), whether these are annexed (e.g. France, Ireland, Italy, Mexico), or whether these are presented through separate reports (e.g. Honduras or the new Budget Vert exercises of several West African countries). Separate reporting can also take the form of

19) GFLAC July 2026 submission to UNFCCC SCF: [GFLAC's_Submission_Final-SCF_7th_BA.pdf](#).

20) See <https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/dataviz/indonesia-power-sector-finance-dashboard/>

21) See https://files.acquia.undp.org/public/migration/id/INS-Final---Gender-Responsive-Climate-Budgeting-Handbook_tobepublished.pdf.

22) See: *Inclusive Budgeting and Financing for Climate Change in Africa* - a 5-year program and partnership between CABRI, the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), the International Budget Partnership (IBP) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).

23) PEFA is an acknowledged standard for Public Financial Management (PFM) assessments, through providing a framework for assessing and reporting on the strengths and weaknesses of PFM through quantitative indicators. The PEFA program was first initiated in 2001 by seven international development partners: The European Commission, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the governments of France, Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom to harmonize the assessment of PRM across partner organizations.

24) See: *Global consultations: SEEA Central Framework update | System of Environmental Economic Accounting*.

dedicated citizen, climate or SDG budgets, which is the case for Bangladesh, Cambodia, Ghana and Nepal, or through external oversight bodies such as New Zealand's Environmental Commissioner.

81. The diversity of domestic tracking systems, limited reporting and lack of available detailed information (i.e. of semi-aggregated or activity level information) continues to pose a challenge to the global assessment of domestic climate-relevant finance. Annex F provides a compilation of retrievable information on domestic climate-relevant public finance, taken from BTRs, reported figures in national budget reports, and/or reported climate expenditures, including from CPEIRs and other studies. At present, most publicly available information is based on ex-ante reported budgets with lower levels of information related to climate-relevant expenditure (ex-post).

82. The approaches outlined in this section relate to country-level systems for tagging and tracking predominantly domestic public finance in addition to, in some cases, international public finance flows through budget systems. Wider initiatives to track finance at country level are now also emerging, including, for example, CPI's Net Zero Finance Tracker (NZFT)²⁵ national dashboards, which track private climate finance rather than public expenditure. The NZFT is an independent, freely accessible tool providing comprehensive and transparent data on the financial sector's climate transition efforts and their real-economy impact. It tracks major financial institutions globally, from commitments and internal action to investment in clean energy and fossil fuels. The platform currently covers 1,500 institutions, representing around USD 286 trillion in assets – approximately 60 per cent of the global financial system.

83. In response to the sixth BA's recommendation to enhance the tracking and reporting of domestic climate finance flows (paragraph 52(d); paragraph 53(a)), while there is evidence of considerable progress in the application of climate budget tagging at national level – and a growing body of guidance and tools to specifically inform Parties in their development and implementation of NDCs and AdComms – the transparency and level of reporting on domestic climate finance remains limited, including on underlying methodologies and the accessibility of publicly available information. Moreover,

national systems developed for individual country contexts and objectives, while supporting national budget management, hinder meaningful international country comparisons and aggregation of information to contribute to the overview of global climate finance flows.

Sustainable finance taxonomies

84. Green and sustainable finance taxonomies are classification systems that define which economic activities, assets or projects qualify as "green," "sustainable" or "transition-aligned". In doing so, they establish transparent operational definitions for climate and environmental finance to guide investors, policymakers and financial institutions towards climate and environmental goals. Taxonomy approaches typically rely on typologies, activity lists and/or technical screening criteria to identify activities. In addition, some approaches may apply wider principles such as "do no significant harm" tests and minimum social safeguards to exclude harmful activities, and some may provide guidance to support users in transition finance. They are enabling frameworks, providing clear criteria for both the public and private sectors to classify assets and activities, guide sustainable investments and ensure credible and robust actions. Sustainable finance taxonomies introduced by financial regulators, banking associations, national governments and international organizations are particularly used to mobilize the private sector through providing clear sustainable finance definitions to guide green bonds, investment funds, private sector loans, company reporting and alignment with climate goals. Some countries may choose to introduce Sustainable Finance Frameworks as alternative broader policy tools, providing high-level guidance, principles, or strategies for directing capital toward environmental and social goals, often without granular classification, while some countries such as Georgia and Mongolia embed taxonomies within their broader sustainable finance framework.²⁶

85. The sixth BA reported on the global proliferation of taxonomies established in particular since 2020, both official and market-facing, across a diversity of actors and economic and geographical contexts. It outlines in detail many key characteristics and trends (see sixth BA, section 1.3.3). Official taxonomies such as the ASEAN Taxonomy for Sustainable Finance, China's Green Bond Endorsed Project Catalogue,²⁷ the EU's Taxonomy for Sustainable

25) See: <https://netzerofinancetracker.climatepolicyinitiative.org>

26) See for example the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's Green Financing Framework available at <https://ndmc.gov.sa/en/the-kingdom-of-saudi-arabia-s-green-financing-framework>, or further case studies from SBFN member countries Georgia, Indonesia Mongolia or Morocco available at https://www.sbfnetwork.org/sites/default/files/2025/Mar/SBFN_Sustainable_Finance_Roadmap-Toolkit_Guide_0.pdf.

27) See: <https://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengxinwen/202502/P020250220628637927734.pdf>

Activities,²⁸ the Joint MDC-IFC Common Principles (see section 1.2.2) have been periodically updated and offer international reference points, alongside global market-based taxonomies including the Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI)²⁹ and International Capital Market Association (ICMA)³⁰ (see annex B).

86. It is estimated that there are now over 60 sustainable finance taxonomies in use or under development (author analysis; CBI, 2026; TRI, 2025; COP30, 2025; IFC SBFN, 2024), with a distinct rise in the number of published taxonomies and updates to established taxonomies. As compared to the sixth BA, at least 19 jurisdictions have published new or updated taxonomies, or announced new developments. The UK taxonomy project was retracted in 2025.³¹ The Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI) reports that, as of August 2026, there are at least 41 published jurisdictional taxonomies with over 22 in development and four published regional frameworks (figure 1.3). Additionally, international, national, and regional frameworks that guide specific industries (such as banking associations) or support regional interoperability have been emerging. The Sustainable Banking and Finance Network assesses that,

as of April 2024, three-quarters of advanced economies are now covered by a national or regional sustainable finance taxonomy (IFC SBFN, 2024). CBI's latest analysis also finds that approximately three-quarters of Annex I countries and just over a third of non-Annex I countries are covered by national taxonomies. Taxonomies are expanding rapidly in large developing country financial markets, with Brazil launching its Sustainable Taxonomy Phase 1 in 2025, Hong Kong Monetary Authority publishing its Taxonomy for Sustainable Finance Phase 2A³² in 2026, and India's Climate Finance Taxonomy³³ released for consultation in 2025 (with finalization pending). Taxonomies are also being developed in smaller developing country contexts, including El Salvador (2025),³⁴ Papua New Guinea (2026),³⁵ Senegal (2025)³⁶ and Panama (2024),³⁷ with institutional support of development partners and UN agencies. Altogether, analysis indicates the increasing global coverage of taxonomies with taxonomies in place or under development in at least 29 jurisdictions in Asia, 16 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 7 in Africa, 4 in Oceania, 3 in Europe (including EU-wide taxonomy), and 1 in North America.

28) See: EU taxonomy for sustainable activities - Finance - European Commission

29) See: <https://www.climatebonds.net/standard-assurance/climate-bonds-standard>

30) See: <https://www.icmagroup.org/sustainable-finance/the-principles-guidelines-and-handbooks>

31) See: <https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/uk-green-taxonomy>

32) See: <https://brdr.hkma.gov.hk/eng/doc-ldg/docId/20260122-5-EN>

33) See: http://dea.gov.in/files/announcements_documents/DraftFrameworkIndiasClimateFinanceTaxonomyPublication6thMay2025.pdf

34) See <https://ssf.gob.sv/taxonomiaverdeelsalvador/>


35) See https://www.bankpng.gov.pg/sites/default/files/2026-03/PNG_Inclusive_Green_Finance_Taxonomy_Version_2_%28March_2026%29.pdf

36) See <https://www.climatebonds.net/news-events/media/videos/senegal-green-taxonomy>

37) See <https://supervalores.gob.pa/files/taxonomia/Taxonomia-Finanzas-Sostenibles-Panama.pdf>

Figure 1.3

National and regional sustainable finance taxonomies published over time



Source: Climate Bonds Initiative, Analysis shared for seventh BA, as of August 2026.

87. An update to key aspects and commonalities of taxonomy design is included in table 1.1, demonstrating several overarching design features and principles that

jurisdictions take into account when developing their own classification systems for financing sustainable economic activities.

Table 1.1

Design features of 36 existing green and sustainable finance taxonomies

Includes	Yes	Future development	No	Unspecified	Other	Comparison to sixth BA, whereby features included as 'yes'
Adaptation	21	7	4	3	–	12
DRR / L&D elements	23	–	3	10	–	15
Transition component	24	1	11	–	–	14
Just Transition references	18	–	9	3	6 (limited, Minimum Social Safeguards)	13
National context considered in design	32	–	–	3	1 (not applicable – CBI)	22
In line with Paris Agreement or 1.5C target	30	–	–	6	–	19
Science-based design	31	–	–	5	–	20
DNSH principle	25	1	6	4	–	17

Source: analysis by the technical authors, based on primary methodology documents.

88. Having evolved from simple lists of sectors and activities, over time taxonomies have increased in complexity, responding to the needs of providing greater market clarity and ambition in sustainability performance (IFC SBFN, 2024). In recent years, there has been a growing focus on interoperability, considering common elements and principles, regional frameworks, and alignment between national systems (G20 Sustainable Finance Roadmap, 2021; WBG et al, 2023; IFC, 2024). Key initiatives include the multi-jurisdiction Common Ground Taxonomy to enhance interoperability of taxonomies across EU, China and Singapore (IPFS, 2024), the Common Framework of Sustainable Finance Taxonomies for Latin America and the Caribbean (UNEP FI, 2023), and most recently the Roadmap for Advancing Interoperability and Comparability of Sustainable Finance Taxonomies (the Taxonomy Roadmap Initiative) and the multi-stakeholder ‘Super Taxonomy’ Plan to Accelerate Solutions under the Action Agenda announced at COP30 (TRI, 2024a,b). Such efforts recognize the need to balance national contexts and policy sovereignty with common standards that facilitate cross-border investment through lowering transaction costs and reporting burdens, and providing greater investor certainty and market confidence.

89. Recent developments respond to greater need for guidance and criteria in previously under-represented sectors and thematic areas, and include:

- **Updated criteria and expansion of tools for adaptation and resilience:** UNDRR and CBI Climate Bonds Resilience Taxonomy (CBI, 2024, 2025a); EU Taxonomy adaptation criteria updated to introduce a four-phase structured approach, including screening and climate risk assessment (awaiting adoption³⁸); UNEP FI’s *Adaptation Finance*

Taxonomy Playbook (UNEP FI, 2026); CPI analysis on adaptation and resilience best practices for financial institutions;³⁹ and the ASEAN Capital Markets Forum forthcoming guide on adaptation for resilience, to serve as a companion to the ASEAN Taxonomy.⁴⁰

- **Integration of nature into climate taxonomies:** UNEP FI’s forthcoming *Net-Zero Nature Positive Taxonomy Guidance Framework*; Costa Rica’s *Sustainable Finance Taxonomy Phase 2* focused on biodiversity.⁴¹
- **Taxonomies for cross-cutting thematic:** UNEP FI’s 2018 Sustainable Blue Economy Finance Principles⁴² to support sustainable investment in the ocean economy.
- **Taxonomies for methane, short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs), and other super pollutants:** CPI and CBI’s *Methane Abatement in Sustainable Taxonomies* report (CPI and Climate Bonds 2025) presents sector-specific best practices and measures from a comparative analysis of approaches across Colombia, the EU, Indonesia, South Africa, and Thailand; CPI and the Climate & Clean Air Coalition’s forthcoming report⁴³ will present a first pilot for a taxonomy to track the abatement of super pollutants including methane; the *Clean Air Fund and CPI’s State of Global Air Quality Funding 2025* report⁴⁴ which analyses international finance flows for air quality improvements, including from black carbon emission reductions.

90. Figure 1.4 below illustrates the range of activities relevant to climate change mitigation that are reflected in existing taxonomies and activity lists, based on a sample of 14 country-level taxonomies. This does not reflect multilaterally agreed criteria, and individual country approaches may vary to reflect country circumstances and approaches.

38) See: Commission seeks feedback on revision of criteria for sustainable economic activities - Finance

39) See: Responding to Risk: Tracking Financial Institutions’ Progress on Adaptation and Resilience - CPI

40) See: New white paper lays groundwork for adaptation finance guide supporting ASEAN Taxonomy – United Nations Environment – Finance Initiative

41) See <https://www.unepfi.org/publications/taxonomia-de-finanzas-sostenibles-de-costa-rica/>.


42) See: The Principles – United Nations Environment – Finance Initiative

43) See: <https://www.ccaoalition.org/projects/super-pollutant-investment-analysis>

44) See: <https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/the-state-of-air-quality-funding-2025>

Figure 1.4

Mapping of activities relevant to climate change mitigation among existing positive activity lists and taxonomies



Source: CBI, based on analysis of the following jurisdictions: ASEAN, Australia, Brazil, China, Colombia, EU, Indonesia, Mexico, Mongolia, Rwanda, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Panama

91. Taxonomies increasingly incorporate **transition** considerations, while recognizing these terms remain evolving concepts. Early adopters of transition taxonomies are ASEAN countries such as Singapore that deploy a traffic-light system, including ‘red’ phase-out activities as well as ‘amber’ activities with technical criteria and sunset timelines for transitioning towards regional and national climate pathways.⁴⁵ CBI (2025) provides a global assessment of approaches and identifies six ‘Taxonomy Transition Mechanisms’ to demonstrate the diverse ways in which that transition is facilitated and recognized within taxonomies. The BRICS Transition Finance Framework (BRICS Business Council, 2024) outlines key principles and broad considerations for mobilizing capital toward transition activities, reflecting the bloc’s shared commitment to facilitating low-carbon development while accounting for the distinct economic contexts and industrial structures of its member states.

92. **Just transition** principles are also beginning to emerge alongside social objectives, such as considerations for worker protection and community engagement (TRI, 2025). Examples include Brazil’s Sustainable Taxonomy, which uniquely links environmental goals to social justice, including through establishment of a Gender and Racial Equality Index; the World Bank’s Just Transition Taxonomy, which identifies 57 economic activities that may guide investment for a just coal transition; and the LAC Common Framework of Sustainable Finance Taxonomies, which also identifies broad themes surrounding decent work and employment generation, quality of life, inclusive and sustainable communities and societies, sustainable cities, and gender equality (Government of Brazil, 2025; UNEP FI 2023; WB, 2024c).

93. Taxonomies enable standardized **reporting** under mandated regimes and support climate-related financial disclosures by quantifying sustainable investments, providing transparency, and aiding greenwashing prevention and transition tracking. For example, EU reporting highlights that, in 2024, 22.7 per cent of reporting companies’ capital investments were aligned with the EU Taxonomy (a total of EUR 273 billion), and that the average taxonomy-aligned Green Asset Ratio was 2.8 per cent (corresponding to EUR 816 billion).⁴⁶

1.2.5. Methods used to aggregate estimates of climate finance flows

94. The Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) continues to provide a leading source of comprehensive information on aggregate global climate finance flows through its annual *Global Landscape of Climate Finance* reports, published since 2011. The most recent, published in 2026, reports on global climate finance flows in 2024 (CPI, 2026a). The focus is on global primary capital flows supporting climate mitigation, adaptation and resilience, with finance tracked from its original source of financing, through financial intermediaries and the deployment of instruments, to recipients. CPI’s estimates are the main source of aggregate information for the BA’s estimates of global climate finance flows (see chapter 2). These estimates of global climate finance include international and domestic, public and private finance flows. Neither CPI in its reports, or the BA, conflates these global flows with international climate finance obligations and commitments under the Convention and the Paris Agreement.

95. CPI applies a tracking methodology focused on categorizing and quantifying climate investment flows, policy support and capacity-building expenditures through an operational definition (see annex B) and tracking framework. In doing so, it normalizes and aggregates information from over 30 primary and secondary sources including:⁴⁷

- Public finance data from the OECD DAC CRS, MDB and IDFC reporting, multilateral climate funds reported through the CFU (as introduced in section 1.2.2), and evidence gathered through CPIs surveys of national and international development finance institutions.
- Private finance data from the Luxembourg Green Exchange, Bloomberg NEF, the IEA, IRENA and IJ Global (as introduced in chapter 2, section 2.2.2.)

96. CPI’s methodology for climate finance includes Carbon Capture, Utilisation and Storage (CCUS) and other carbon removal technologies when demonstrating 100 per cent carbon removal capacity, but avoids the inclusion of investments that risk carbon lock-in. For example, it does not include fossil-fuel-based, lower-carbon, and energy-efficient generation transactions, such as financing for efficiency retrofits of coal-fired power plants or investment in nuclear.

97. CPI’s methodology enables robust and consistent

45) See <https://www.mas.gov.sg/development/sustainable-finance/taxonomy>.

46) See https://finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/08dd5091-6d7f-45ed-8dc1-2583007594c4_en?filename=251106-sustainable-finance-taxonomy-factsheet_en.pdf

47) See: CPI (2025e), Chapter 3: Data Collection and Processing, including Table 5: Data Sources, for details.

estimates to be aggregated and presented over a time series, where a key feature of CPI's tracking is the standardization and consolidation of project- and activity-level data across a variety of sources in order to ensure data comparability, climate-relevance (through only counting investments that directly contribute to climate mitigation or adaptation, including through use of coefficients applied to OECD DAC data), and avoidance of double counting (through only counting real economy investments and excluding secondary market transactions.) For example, CPI does not count support mechanisms or other public subsidies whose primary function is to repay initial investment costs, such as feed-in-tariffs. CPI's approach does not currently differentiate between mobilized and independently committed private finance. Indirect financing and risk mitigation instruments (such as guarantees) are currently excluded from CPI's framework because they may not lead to financial outflows and to avoid risk of double counting. This exclusion, however, may significantly underestimate finance flows, especially for institutional investors and other actors who primarily invest through intermediated channels. (CPI, 2025e).

98. CPI transparently recognizes limitations in its approach, in particular the evidence gaps where tracking remains difficult. This includes private finance for adaptation, mitigation activities in the AFOLU, waste, and water and sanitation sectors, public domestic finance reported by countries, and information on South–South co-operation and flows (CPI, 2024b; CPI, 2025e; CPI, 2026a). Recent improvements in CPI's data coverage include enhanced data for the water and sanitation sector (based on an assessment of climate-relevance) and transport and energy, and revisions to historical estimates (see box 2.2 for details on how methodological improvements have improved data over time).

99. CPI annually publish their latest climate finance data as part of their Global Landscape of Climate Finance Data Dashboard and interactive data tools (CPI, 2026b), providing access to semi-aggregated information for a range of users (although detailed country-level/project-level information remains unavailable owing to data limitations and confidentiality).

Developed to developing country flows

100. Climate finance flows from developed to developing countries are officially reported to the UNFCCC biennial reports submitted by Parties. However, challenges in reporting – in particular on multilateral flows and significant data gaps on finance received – alongside time lags in collating official data result in significant

limitations and only partial aggregations for 2023–2024 (see section 2.3.1). As such, while BR/BUR/BTR reporting provides a key source of information for bilateral support provided, this is supplemented by reporting from multilateral climate funds, MDBs, and aggregated time series data from the OECD (see section 2.3.2).

101. The OECD DAC CRS 'Climate-related development finance' (CRDF) dataset (OECD, 2026 – forthcoming) in particular provides a key source for aggregated information for the BA's estimates of multilateral climate finance flows from developed to developing countries (see chapter 2, figure 2.4) owing to its standardized statistical system for collating activity-level data, recording both inflows (core contributions or unearmarked flows) to the multilateral institutions and their full outflows, and ensuring double counting is avoided through accounting for inflows and outflows separately. This enables data to be presented from both a provider and recipient perspective (based on inflows and outflows respectively) and overcomes the inherent challenges of individual/organisation-level reporting on multilateral flows through its converged statistical system that captures and reconciles both inflow and outflow data.

102. The intergovernmental organization OECD (2026) and the non-governmental organization Oxfam (2026) (drawing on OECD DAC CRDF data) estimate climate finance in context of progress towards the USD 100 billion climate finance goal (see UNFCCC SCF's Third Progress Report on the USD 100 billion goal, UNFCCC SCF 2026b). A key distinguishing characteristic of both their estimates is the approach to the attribution of multilateral finance flows from developed countries to developing countries. Such approaches seek to reflect and attribute to developed countries only their share of multilateral outflows, reflecting that MDBs and MCFs include both developed and developing country shareholders. The OECD's methodology (also used by Oxfam) reflects replenishment participations by individual countries, as well as, where applicable, the institutions' capacity to raise funds from capital markets (see section 2.3.6, in particular figure 2.13, and SCF's sixth BA for further methodological details).

Improvements in tracking climate finance over time


103. Since the first Biennial Assessment (2014), significant improvements have been realized in the tracking of climate finance. Climate finance definitions and methodologies are now established and have converged across leading organizations. Climate finance is regularly reported on by official actors, i.e. across Parties, financial institutions, and international organizations. Notable

advances have been made towards the transparency of reporting, with data systems and online portals making available project-level and semi-aggregated information, in particular related to international climate finance flows reported under the UNFCCC and by the MCFs, MDBs, and OECD. In 2026, the OECD has for the first time fully converged statistics for bilateral and multilateral climate reporting. Item-level data are reported to the OECD DAC CRS and aggregated into a single harmonized reporting system that reconciles inflow and outflow reporting, thereby ensuring no double counting.

104. At the country level, following the proliferation of sustainable taxonomies, a number of key collaborations and partnerships have formed to promote greater harmonization and interoperability among country and regional approaches. Despite progress, significant gaps remain in reporting on domestic finance; in tracking challenging sectors such as adaptation, resilience, AFOLU, water and waste; in tracking new areas of transitional sectors and technologies, methane and other super pollutants, typically in hard-to-abate sectors; and in advancing the linked tracking of gender and social justice metrics.

Figure 1.5

Illustration of progress in definitions, methodologies, reporting coverage and data aggregation systems over time



Source: Authors' analysis.

105. While no single definition of climate finance exists, a core cluster of eligibility criteria, classifications and taxonomies is now well established, providing greater understanding and transparency of climate finance. Across these frameworks, approaches are more similar than different (e.g. OECD Rio markers, MDB-IFC

common principles, CBI and EU Sustainable Finance Taxonomies). Updates and refinements, enhanced guidance documents and tools continue to emerge to support greater application and quality in reporting. These include updates focused on aligning definitions with the Paris Agreement, considering approaches to

decarbonization pathways and transitions, and signalling support for national climate plans, NDCs and NAPs. Recent initiatives have focused on harmonization and greater interoperability across approaches (e.g. MDB-IDFC Common Principles, EU-China-Singapore Taxonomies, and regional taxonomies across LAC, ASEAN, etc.).

106. Methodologies have advanced, supporting refined measurements of climate-specific finance flows (e.g. through the use of components, coefficients and relevance weightings) and improved coverage, notably through the expansion of approaches to estimate private finance mobilized by public sector interventions. However, significant limitations remain in tracking adaptation finance, and while new developments including taxonomies are emerging for adaptation, resilience and loss & damage, these are yet to become established.

107. For international climate finance flows, regular reporting is now underway, including, for the first time, through Parties' Biennial Transparency Reports to the UNFCCC, alongside annual reports and online databases of the MCFs and the Joint MBDs. Activity-level data is increasingly reported to, aggregated and published by the OECD DAC, which provides transparency and aids Party reporting to the UNFCCC. However, BTR reporting by developing country Parties on finance received is significantly limited, and reporting on finance provided through multilateral channels remains partial, inconsistent and challenging to aggregate.

108. For global climate finance flows, CPI continues as the leading source of information, drawing upon developments across the system and enhancing transparency through its classification framework and publication of semi-aggregated data. CPI is also

spearheading efforts to improve data methods and aggregation, including a recent focus on tracking adaptation finance particularly for waste and wastewater, agri-food and small-scale farming (CPI, 2024a). However, significant gaps remain in the public reporting of domestic finance and in the tracking of private finance for adaptation and resilience across the AFOLU, water and waste sectors, including at granular levels, to support aggregation and improve the comprehensiveness and quality of global climate finance estimates.

109. Following concerted efforts across Parties, financial institutions, international organizations and civil society, the global picture of climate finance flows – while not fully complete nor detailed – plays a catalytical role in informing investment gaps, assessing progress towards climate goals and identifying areas for enhanced focused and support. There is now growing evidence of tracking efforts shifting from a focus on visibility to becoming key enabling tools, integrating and stimulating climate finance across green budgets to green bonds.

1.3. Methodologies for measuring climate finance outcomes

110. The fifth and sixth BAs provided a comprehensive analysis of the methodologies used over the preceding assessment periods to measure the impacts and outcomes of climate finance. Building on this foundation, this section presents updated insights into the methodologies currently applied by multilateral and bilateral institutions, as well as other international organizations, to assess mitigation and adaptation outcomes (see table 1.2). The analysis spans project, portfolio and institutional levels, reflecting the increasing sophistication and breadth of climate finance tracking frameworks.

Table 1.2

Illustrative results chain commonly used in climate finance monitoring and evaluation frameworks

Results chain	What it means	Typical climate finance example
Inputs	Financial and other resources committed	Grants, loans, guarantees
Activities	Actions undertaken using the inputs	Installation of renewable energy generation systems, drip irrigation systems installed
Outputs	Direct and tangible deliverables produced by the activities	MW installed, KM of irrigation infrastructure upgraded
Outcomes	Changes resulting from the use of those outputs	Increased renewable electricity generation, improved irrigation efficiency
Impacts	Longer-term development and climate effects	Low-emission and climate-resilient development

111. Across institutions, a clear shift is observable from the tracking of climate finance volumes towards more standardized and comparable results-based measurement systems. This evolution reflects a growing emphasis on consistency, attribution and comparability of reported outcomes. Institutions are increasingly seeking to demonstrate not only the scale of finance provided, but also the tangible climate results achieved, thereby supporting the credibility and usefulness of reported data for policy and decision-making.

112. MCFs, including the GCF and GEF, have collectively introduced methodological updates that signal a transition from activity-based reporting toward the demonstration of systemic, aggregated and institutionally enabled climate outcomes. At the project level, these updates have contributed to clearer articulation of outcomes and impact indicators, alongside greater standardization and comparability across projects. For example, the GCF continues to require project-level results frameworks and has strengthened guidance under its Results Monitoring and Evaluation policy to enhance the consistency of impact reporting (GCF, 2025h). The Adaptation Fund has revised its Strategic Results Framework to sharpen outcome-level indicators and expanded the use of standardized indicator sets to enhance aggregation and comparability (AF, 2025f). Similarly, the GEF has reinforced the mandatory use of core indicators under its eighth replenishment cycle (GEF-8), ensuring more consistent reporting across its project portfolio (GEF, 2022b). Collectively, these developments reflect an increased emphasis on measuring changes in resilience, emissions trajectories and institutional capacity, rather than simply tracking activities delivered.

113. At the portfolio level, MCFs have increasingly treated portfolios as vehicles for cumulative and strategic impact. The GCF has enhanced its monitoring and reporting architecture through improved disclosure of portfolio status and the deployment of digital monitoring systems, enabling more systematic tracking of progress against its Strategic Plan (GCF, 2024a, 2025g).⁴⁸ The GEF, through the introduction of Results Measurement Framework (RMF) Tier 2 under GEF-8, has formalized portfolio-level effectiveness and performance metrics.⁴⁹ The Adaptation Fund has similarly strengthened its approach by introducing impact-level results and associated core indicators that allow for aggregation across projects at the portfolio level (AF, 2024a). In addition, MCFs have placed greater emphasis on

coherence and scale by framing portfolio results in terms of collective contributions to global objectives, including the Global Goal on Adaptation, thereby linking individual interventions to broader systemic outcomes (AF, 2025e; GCF, 2024e). In the context of the first MCF joint results report in 2025, the MCFs have agreed on a set of common measurement parameters for portfolio-level results reporting across institutions. These cover six common indicators in four result themes (GCF, 2025e):

- Mitigation: Direct GHG emissions reduced or avoided (Tonnes of CO₂ eq)
- Adaptation: People supported for strengthened climate resilience (Number (men/women))
- Energy and technology: Low-emission energy capacity installed (MW) and Energy savings (MWh)
- Nature: Area under sustainable management practices (Hectare)

114. At the institutional level, MCFs have increasingly focused on their effectiveness in enabling countries to respond to climate change. The GCF has embedded results management into its corporate reporting, strategic planning and portfolio oversight processes, supported by enhanced monitoring systems and improved transparency of portfolio performance (GCF, 2025g). The Adaptation Fund has incorporated institutional capacity outcomes into its Strategic Results Framework, although these remain largely derived from aggregated project-level results (AF, 2024e). The GEF has advanced institutional performance tracking using corporate scorecards and RMF Tier 2 indicators, which provide a structured approach to assessing effectiveness at the institutional level (GEF, 2022b, 2024d). Overall, these developments indicate a growing alignment between institutional performance frameworks and country-level climate outcomes.

115. MDBs have also implemented significant updates to their methodologies for tracking climate finance impacts and outcomes. At the project level, MDBs have strengthened results frameworks by introducing clearer results logic, including explicit theories of change, baselines and pre-defined output and outcome indicators linked to mitigation and adaptation objectives. The adoption of the MDB Common Approach requires projects to systematically map expected results, such as greenhouse gas emissions reductions or resilience outcomes (ADB et al., 2024b). In parallel, the Common Principles for Climate Mitigation Finance Tracking have

48) See also GCF Results-based management available at <https://www.greenclimate.fund/projects/results-based-management>.

49) GEF/C.68/03.

tightened accounting methodologies by establishing minimum technical thresholds and eligibility criteria (ADB et al., 2023). These changes mark a shift away from input-based reporting (such as amounts disbursed) and towards results-oriented project design and monitoring, thereby improving comparability across institutions.

116. At the portfolio level, MDBs have advanced harmonization, aggregation and transparency through coordinated reporting approaches. The Common Approach to Measuring Climate Results establishes a harmonized indicator architecture that facilitates consistent aggregation of results across institutions (ADB et al., 2024b). In addition, MDBs have committed to publishing detailed, machine-readable project-level data through interactive platforms, moving beyond traditional narrative reporting formats (ADB et al., 2024a). This transition enhances transparency, enables independent aggregation and supports cross-institutional comparison, representing a significant step toward more robust and auditable portfolio-level reporting.

117. Bilateral programmes have also introduced methodological improvements, particularly through the adoption of key performance indicators (KPIs), enhanced disclosure practices and the introduction of quality assurance mechanisms. For instance, the United Kingdom's International Climate Finance (ICF) programme reports institutional KPIs focused on outcomes, including metrics such as people reached and greenhouse gas emissions avoided (UK ICF, 2024). The publication of methodologies and data pipelines further strengthens transparency and accountability. These developments incentivize outcome-focused portfolio management and reinforce upward accountability, shifting the emphasis from financial inputs to measurable climate results.

118. Despite these advances, differences remain in the availability and application of data and indicators for tracking climate finance impacts and outcomes. In particular, approaches to measuring adaptation outcomes continue to vary across institutions, reflecting ongoing methodological development and the absence of universally applied metrics other than the number of beneficiaries. While various pilot approaches and indicator frameworks have been introduced, a fully consistent and comparable system for measuring adaptation outcomes has not yet been established. In addition, practices related to verification of reported results differ across institutions. Many outcome assessments rely on the monitoring and evaluation systems of implementing entities, while the use of third-

party verification and independent evaluation varies depending on institutional mandates, resources and project characteristics.

1.4. Update on methodologies that integrate climate change considerations into insurance, lending and investment decision-making processes and that include information relevant to tracking consistency with the long-term goal outlined in Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement

119. The fourth, fifth and sixth BAs provided an in-depth overview of a large number of approaches used within the financial system and by financial actors to integrate climate considerations into insurance, lending and investment-decision making, that might be considered relevant methodologies for tracking action and measures to implement Article 2, paragraph 1(c) of the Paris Agreement. (hereafter referred to as Article 2.1(c)).

120. COP30 (decision 11/CMA.7, paragraph 3) acknowledged concerns and the need for safeguards in the context of the implementation of Article 2.1(c) including:

- The need to pursue all three long-term goals of the Paris Agreement together, so that implementation of Article 2, paragraph 1(c) of the Paris Agreement will facilitate the collective achievement of the goals articulated in Article 2, paragraph 1(a–b);
- That Article 2, paragraph 1(c) of the Paris Agreement is complementary to and no substitute for the provision and mobilization of financial support to developing countries under Article 9 of the Paris Agreement;
- That efforts for making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development are nationally determined, taking into account country-driven strategies and the bottom-up nature of the Paris Agreement, respecting national sovereignty and taking into account different national circumstances, timeframes and approaches of Parties, in particular developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change;
- The need to ensure that collective efforts for and deliberations on implementing Article 2, paragraph

1(c) are undertaken in a facilitative, enabling, non-punitive and non-prescriptive manner;

- The need to ensure transparency and to avoid creating an additional burden for Parties, including with regard to reporting and implementation

121. Additionally, Parties agreed that there is no common interpretation on the scope or manner of implementation of Article 2.1(c). This section therefore does not aim to pre-empt or prejudice the manner in which Article 2.1(c) is being implemented, but is rather illustrative, and demonstrates how countries may methodologically group approaches to making finance flows consistent with their national low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development pathways.

122. This section provides updates to the sixth BA's non-exhaustive overview of the methods and

approaches that may be relevant to the integration of climate change considerations into financial decision-making, and to tracking and assessing consistency with Article 2.1(c), including its reference to Article 9 of the Paris Agreement. The methods and approaches in the seventh BA are grouped by broad categories which actors state their methods and approaches serve, covering public and private sector actors at the portfolio- and project-level. Table 1.3 provides a non-exhaustive summary of the identified categories of methodologies and approaches organized by categories. Overlaps exist where approaches/methods serve multiple categories – for example, climate-related disclosures for corporates and FIs are relevant to both building awareness and foundation evidence, as well as for delivering financial system stability – or where these categories are interlinked – for example, fiscal policy tools and approaches maximize the impact of public

Table 1.3

Abbreviated, non-exhaustive list of methods and approaches in use that may or may not be relevant to the integration of climate change considerations into financial decision-making and to tracking of consistency with Article 2.1(c) grouped by broad categories

Broad categories for which methodologies can be applied	Explanation	Methods or approaches included
Tools for climate assessments and finance tracking	Tools and approaches that generate, analyse and report data, influencing engagement with climate change, policy and financing challenges	Climate-related macro-economic modelling and analysis; GHG emissions and transition risk assessments; physical risk and vulnerability assessments; cost-benefit methodologies assessing mitigation and adaptation/resilience to counterfactuals; third-party assessments of investment needs, incentives and capital flows via sectors, themes and actors; identification of mitigation, adaptation and resilience spending as well as climate-related insured losses and payouts
Frameworks and governance structures	Tools and approaches that facilitate the broad uptake of action and just and managed transition across actors and sectors, encouraging coordination, cooperation, efficiency	Sustainable finance taxonomies or frameworks; transition and just transition finance taxonomies; disclosure frameworks; transition planning and transition plans; sectoral transition planning; climate or ESG benchmarks; climate and ESG labelling; managed financing planning and coordination; policy engagement; stewardship
Consistency of projects, portfolios and entities	Tools and approaches that can be applied to discrete entities, portfolios and projects shift insurance, finance and investment decision making transparently	Decarbonization targets, portfolio alignment, Paris Agreement or SDG alignment methodologies; third-party alignment indicators and trackers for MDB and DFI financing; green asset management of central bank portfolios
Financial stability and information	Tools and approaches based on climate-related financial risk disclosure that seek to ensure financial actors account for and manage climate risk in their operations	Climate-related disclosures for corporates and FIs; climate scenarios stress-testing (at micro- and macro-prudential); risk-sharing for sustainability (monetary fiscal coordination); collateral frameworks; macroprudential credit allocation policies
Fiscal policy and public finance management	Tools and approaches that can be applied by government policymakers to identify costs and benefits of action and to promote nationally driven pathways	Climate-related budget and tagging; green procurement; climate-related investment plans; impact and cost-benefit assessments of economic, climate and environmental policies; taxation; carbon markets and credits; subsidy reforms; disaster risk financing strategies and liquidity management, public-private insurance mechanisms and regional risk pools
Mobilization and deployment of capital	Tools and approaches that can raise capital and channel capital to be used for mitigation and adaptation investments and projects	Financing, investment, underwriting and insurance targets; national/regional climate funds; green, social and sustainability-linked bonds; catastrophe bonds; debt-for-climate/nature swaps; climate-resilient debt clauses; financial inclusion initiatives; reserve requirements; credit operations/liquidity facilities

policy approaches while also having the potential to raise capital that can be deployed for climate action. The table is not necessarily conclusive and only aims to demonstrate the ways in which countries may cluster their actions. It is not intended to prejudice the manner in which countries are implementing Article 2.1(c).

123. Building foundational evidence and raising awareness through climate assessments and finance tracking. Approaches and methods that generate and share information on financing and investment can be used by institutions to make the case for climate action, to inform that action, but also to raise public support and inform advocacy efforts. This includes macro-economic

modelling and forecasting that evaluates potential economic and financial impacts of climate change and transition policies. In 2025, the NGFS released short-term climate scenarios that included a real-economy financial-sector feedback loop; while these were designed for an audience of central banks and supervisors, they also act as awareness-raising tools given their public availability and accessible takeaways (NGFS, 2025). Cost-benefit analysis, instead, evaluates the costs of a project against expected benefits to aid decision-making. In 2025, adaptation and resilience investments across a subset of countries suggested that every USD 1 invested leads to over USD 10 in benefits, seeking to make the economic case for adaptation today (Brandon et al.,

2025). Some countries have also made use of jurisdiction-wide composite assessments of the climate alignment of their financial sector entities through voluntary or mandatory participation, such as the PACTA Climate Test in Switzerland (BAFU, 2026).⁵⁰

124. A number of third-party assessments can be included in this category. These include assessments by institutions such as the IEA, as well as by academics and civil society. These assessments have often focused on particular sectors, actors or flows, for example, global energy investment by technology (IEA, 2025c), fossil fuel financing from banks (Banking on Climate Chaos, 2025) and agricultural subsidies that might be environmentally harmful (TESS, 2025). Other assessments have used comparative approaches to assess consistent and non-consistent finance flows according to different definitions of “green” and “non-aligned” finance flows or energy finance ratios (BNEF, 2025b; CPI, 2025; IEA, 2026a; ILB, 2025; Reclaim Finance, 2025). Total spending is also included in many assessment methodologies, but this is discussed in detail in chapter 2. Growth has also been seen in efforts to enhance information related to adaptation and resilience-building in listed companies and to identify revenue-generating products and services, particularly by seeking to structure opportunity areas (MSCI Institute, 2026; BCG, 2025), as well as in similar efforts for banks (e.g. UNEP FI, 2023a). Lastly, insurance companies, central banks, public environmental agencies and meteorological offices compile financial data related to economic costs, as well as insured and non-insured losses from weather-related events and climate impacts (AON 2026; EEA, 2025; NGFS, 2026b; SwissRe, 2026).

125. The choice of underlying metrics and data points is a critical component of any methodology for integrating climate considerations into financial decision-making, and this is particularly relevant for the credibility of climate assessments and tracking of finance. Available evidence points to a broadening set of climate-related metrics employed in the financial sector, which are moving beyond a singular focus on GHG-emission data and which are increasingly asset-class and sector-specific, continuing a trend identified in previous BAs. In addition, transition-oriented, forward-looking metrics are being developed which capture a wide-range of financial or sectoral output and efficiency-metrics related to research and development, operating and capital expenditures,

asset or production characteristics, and revenue composition from sustainable or environmentally harmful activities (OECD, 2026f).⁵¹ Furthermore, industry and disclosure frameworks may include metrics related to policy engagement, stewardship, or governance and strategy, including reporting practices and remuneration incentives. Adaptation and climate-related metrics are established as well, but further exploratory work is being conducted by public and private financial actors to move from broad climate information towards sector- and context-specific metrics that account for different exposures to different climate hazards and diverse geographical (including local) exposure to physical climate risks.

126. Establishing frameworks and governance structures as tools to speed finance flow and seek interoperability of approaches. Governments, as well as private sector institutions and initiatives, have developed overarching sustainable finance policy frameworks, roadmaps and guidance documents that serve as orientation tools for a holistic approach to making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low GHG emissions and climate resilient development. For example, a global review of 110 countries finds that 51 per cent of climate-related transparency policies in the financial sector take the form of financial guidance and principle frameworks (33 per cent), or strategies and roadmaps (18 per cent). As of 2025, 67 countries have been found to have adopted at least one roadmap or strategy related to sustainable finance (OECD, 2026e). Such national sustainable finance or green and transition financing frameworks (and also private sector frameworks) bring together a multitude of individual sustainable finance tools, such as taxonomies (see section 1.2.4 above), disclosure frameworks, and transition plans to set an overarching direction of travel for financing and investing in sustainable economic activities.⁵² The sixth BA underlined the growth in sustainable finance taxonomies based on criteria or principles, which are being used as tools to guide capital allocation decisions and track finance flows. Growth continued in 2025–2026, as noted in section 1.2.4 above. Household and public spending largely remain out of scope of these taxonomies. At the end of 2024, the Climate Bonds Initiative launched the Climate Bonds Resilience Taxonomy, providing a framework for adaptation and resilience bond issuances across infrastructure,

50) Detailed information regarding the PACTA methodology is available at <https://pacta.rmi.org/>.

51) See also BA6, Table 1.3 for detailed information.

52) See for example the <https://www.ndmc.gov.sa/investorsrelations/Documents/Green-Financing-Framework-KSA-16April2024.pdf>, <https://www.qcb.gov.qa/Documents/Sustainable%20Lending%20-%20English.pdf>, https://finance.ec.europa.eu/sustainable-finance/overview-sustainable-finance_en; and a multitude of private sector frameworks such as Citi, DBS, Deutsche Bank, Kigali International Financial Center, First Abu Dhabi Bank, Standard Chartered.

agriculture, health, and social systems,⁵³ while the fourth iteration of the ASEAN taxonomy continues to build out social themes as well as embedding adaptation and nature (ASEAN Taxonomy Board, 2025). At COP30, the Principles for Taxonomy Interoperability were released by the Taxonomy Roadmap Initiative in an effort to reduce fragmentation between taxonomies that could pose a barrier for scaling up investment, while recognizing national circumstances and contexts (Taxonomy Roadmap Initiative, 2025).

127. Financial climate-risk disclosure frameworks are driving towards comparability of mandated disclosures. The 2023 ISSB sustainability and climate-related disclosure standards, built from TCFD recommendations, are considered a global disclosure benchmark to encourage comparable information across jurisdictions (and consolidate other frameworks), though it is focused on single materiality (the provision of information on the climate and environmental impact on the financial standings of corporates), rather than information on the impact of corporates on the climate, the environment and society (so called, double materiality). In June 2025, ISSB published guidance on transition plan disclosures, seeking alignment with existing frameworks on how transition goals, risks and efforts are reported on, including both adaptation and mitigation, while maintaining jurisdictional flexibility (IFRS, 2025).

128. Demand for forward-looking transition plans were noted to have grown in the sixth BA from private sector actors (corporates and FIs) as well as governments and regulatory agencies. Although it has multiple use cases, transition finance is widely understood as a whole-of-economy approach towards climate and environment sustainability with mandatory and voluntary frameworks existing (CPI, 2025g; Robins et al., 2025; ASEAN Capital Markets Forum, 2024), encompassing varying operational definitions and activities within the scope of transition finance (CPI, 2025c). A particular value-add of transition plans often cited by financial sector participants and stakeholders is their ability to provide more granular information, for example prospective capital expenditure (CAPEX) and business strategy, on how climate- and economic transitions targets will be pursued, thus lending credibility to sustainability claims (UNEP FI, 2025, RMI, 2026). Some transition plans include how companies will contribute to a just transition and how accountability

will be embedded into governance structures (Becker et al., 2024), giving rise to transparency and the ability to provide taxonomy-consistent: inconsistent asset ratios or taxonomy-aligned capital expenditures (e.g. EU Platform on Sustainable Finance, 2025). In line with a whole-of-economy approach, transition planning prioritizes engagement and dialogue rather than rapid divestment and a link to wider corporate governance and engagement with policymakers (ASEAN Capital Markets Forum, 2024; BNEF, 2024; IFRS 2025; OECD, 2022a, see also the sixth BA, para 166). Third-party institutions also employ information from transition plan disclosures to evaluate real-economy and non-financial institutions' climate targets, such as the CDP-WWF temperature scores, which, in turn, can inform closer alignment of operational transition planning with announced climate targets (CDP and WWF, 2026). A gap is emerging between mandatory transition plan disclosures and those where disclosures are in the voluntary sector (LSE, 2026).

129. Climate or ESG labelling and certification schemes for financial products raise investor confidence, while climate or ESG benchmarks determine performance of investment portfolios, often against climate scenarios. A diversity of labels has been around for some time, such as the Label ISR, a state-backed certification in France,⁵⁴ and investor-driven GRESB for real estate and infrastructure. These labels and standards – such as the Climate Bonds Standard and Certification Scheme, confirming debt instruments, assets or entities meet certain criteria – and certification organizations – such as the B Corp, assessing the overall social and environmental performance of a company (with over 10,000 businesses now certified, though not evenly distributed globally)⁵⁵ – have continued to evolve since their establishment. The EU Climate Transition Benchmark and EU Paris Aligned Benchmark have also undergone revisions since their 2020 rollout.⁵⁶

130. Driving the consistency of projects, portfolios and entities. The sixth BA outlined the steady growth in decarbonization target-setting frameworks and portfolio alignment methodologies. Many sub-sector initiatives (e.g. NZOA or NZBA under the GFANZ umbrella) or third-party target setting initiatives (e.g. SBTi and TPI), developed voluntary guidance documents and target-setting protocols for member institutions, increasingly seeking near- and mid-term action (rather than long-

53) See <https://www.climatebonds.net/expertise/resilience-finance>.

54) See <https://www.lelabelisr.fr>.

55) See <https://www.bcorporation.net/en-us/>.

56) See: https://finance.ec.europa.eu/sustainable-finance/disclosures/eu-labels-benchmarks-climate-esg-and-benchmarks-esg-disclosures_en.

time horizons). A number of alliances have ceased operations, paused, or undergone structural changes, with momentum now reliant on individual, former-alliance members, although the Net Zero Asset Owners Alliance remains in early 2026 (ESGtoday, 2026). With a number of portfolio and target assessment methods tailored to sector or asset classes, the work of coalitions are dependent on foundational climate assessments, covering transition and physical climate risks, and linked to transition and sectoral plans (see above) that can be aggregated to the portfolio level. Differing methodological design choices still exist, in particular regarding the choice of reference scenarios, climate models, and available global, regional and national pathways in line with 1.5C and 2C targets. Important references include scenarios provided by the IPCC, IEA, NGFS, OECM, as well as national pathways communicated through NDCs and an increasing number of sectoral pathways or roadmaps, such as those by SBTi,⁵⁷ in the maritime sector⁵⁸ or by particular countries⁵⁹ (see sixth BA section 1.6.2 and 1.6.3, and annex F).

131. The 2019 MDB Paris Agreement Alignment framework (PAA) remains the most detailed public-sector alignment framework, including guidance on investments in social services and health, as well as capturing financial intermediation, corporate financing, policy-based lending, and direct lending operations (ADB et al, n.d.). Individual MDBs and DFIs have also adjusted their lending criteria or exclusion policies in recent years (Gebel and Ryfisch, 2023). Third-parties have additionally developed composite alignment indicators of MDBs, private FIs and corporates (e.g. E3G's Public Bank Climate Tracker Matrix, or CPI's Net Zero Finance Tracker).

132. As central banks are also large institutional investors, their asset management influences the transition, in addition to holding climate-related financial risk (addressed in the financial stability and supervision objective below). With sovereign bonds comprising a large share of many central bank reserve portfolios, tools such as ASCOR, which assesses the climate consistency of sovereign debt, remain relevant (ASCOR, Scheer et al., 2023), while approaches and methods that will ultimately shift central bank portfolios also overlap with objectives of protecting against undue financial risks and raising and deploying capital, as noted in below sections.

133. Strategic asset allocation that reduces and terminates financing, investment or underwriting of economic activities inconsistent with low-GHG emissions and climate resilient development pathways may also be considered a tool. As noted above, transition plan frameworks and coalitions have prioritized engagement and coordination over divestment in an effort to address socio-economic considerations of divestment in particular, as well as the need to ensure adequate investment that seeks to allow service provision to continue (e.g. in the case of energy supply).

134. Delivering financial stability and information via disclosures, risk management and financial supervision. The sixth BA found climate risk integration advancing across corporates, FIs and in financial supervision, through mandatory and voluntary initiatives, with the acknowledgement of disclosure as a pre-requisite to managing climate-related risks. The ISSB sustainability and climate-related disclosure standards continued to be taken up. For example, in 2025, The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan announced a staged adoption of standards based on the turnover, assets and number of employees of its companies.⁶⁰ Many disclosure rules apply only to large listed companies, thereby exempting, for example, SMEs, while many have periods of compliance extending towards 2030. Scope change and delay have also occurred. In 2025, ISSB eased proposed amendments to Scope 3 financed emissions reporting, while the EU, with its own disclosure system that is interoperable with ISSB, narrowed the scope of its disclosures and delayed obligation to disclose (IFRS, 2025: European Parliament, 2026). The demand for the integration of a wider set of environmental and social risks into disclosures continues to grow, with non-mandated disclosure possible through third-sector institutions (e.g. through CDP).

135. Climate scenario stress testing, applied at multiple scales to both physical and transition risk, is becoming widely used by supervisors. In 2025, NGFS provided new reference scenarios⁶¹ focussed on the short term (2025–2030), covering acute physical risks (NGFS, 2025). The ECB provides an example of the integration of flood risk from NGFS scenarios into stress-testing (ECB, 2025). NGFS are also increasingly providing guidance on nature risks, which are noted to be more complex than climate-related risks due to the diversity and context-specificity of

57) Available at <https://sciencebasedtargets.org/sector-resources-summary>.

58) <https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Environment/Documents/annex/MEPC%2080/Annex%2015.pdf>

59) For example Japan's sectoral decarbonization roadmaps, available at https://www.meti.go.jp/english/policy/energy_environment/transition_finance/index.html.

60) See <https://www.ifrs.org/content/dam/ifrs/publications/sustainability-jurisdictions/pdf-profiles/pakistan-ifrs-profile.pdf>.

61) See also: <https://www.ngfs.net/ngfs-scenarios-portal/>

ecosystems subject to degradation (NGFS, 2026b).

136. There are calls for better general coordination between central banks and government on policy to encourage the investments required for economic and environmental resilience. This includes when setting monetary policy (such as interest rate decisions, asset purchases or in their lending frameworks) (CEP, 2025) and prudential policy (such as changes in capital requirements or mandating risk disclosures). Though each jurisdiction will determine its own central bank's mandate with respect to climate change, approaches and methods available to central banks, such as shifting collateral frameworks and macro-prudential credit allocation (see NGFS, 2026a), can be seen throughout section 1.4 with a dual function of both protecting the central bank balance sheet from financial risks from climate change and raising and deploying capital. At present, only about 2 per cent of all climate-related financial policies concern monetary policy-making (OECD, 2026f). However, central banks are enhancing their analytical understanding of the macroeconomic and financial implications and transmission channels of climate impacts and transition policies, which are assessed to have significant effects on headline inflation, interest rates, and economic output – although these effects are expected to vary according to climate scenarios as well as climate and energy policy choices. Such work is designed to inform central bank's monetary policy approaches towards their core mandate of ensuring price stability, while considering trade-offs such as economic activity and employment (NGFS, 2026a).

137. Maximizing the impact of fiscal and financial policy and public finance management. A diversity of climate-related public financial management approaches and methods in the public sector were illustrated in the sixth BA6 with application highly dependent on country context. Climate budget-tagging systems had expanded into a number of jurisdictions, with some cases of tracking of potentially inconsistent expenditure, alongside climate-positive spending (See section 1.2.4). Public procurement remains a large fraction of GDP, and 'green' procurement, while existing as a concept, has seen little development in recent years. Growth was seen in the number of NDCs including investment plans or private sector mobilization strategies (NDC synthesis report, 2025), that can shape public policy.

138. The sixth BA notes growth in green fiscal incentives that promote climate-consistent activities. These can include a range of tax incentives, subsidies, or targeted

support schemes for research and development, municipal public procurement or firm- and household-level investment in green technologies and products (IISD, 2025). Fiscal incentives also play an important role in supporting resilience investment, such as climate-adapted renovations and retrofitting of private housing, and in the building sector more broadly. Other fiscal incentives, such as carbon pricing, are being implemented to raise and earmark revenues for green spending and social protection, but fossil fuel and agricultural subsidy reform remains limited. These fiscal instruments are hard to generalize, being very specific to national and subnational sectoral public policy objectives, including growth and development, food and energy security, affordability and social protection and economic stability objectives, for example (Feyertag et al, 2023). The EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism came into force in early 2026. Other countries are considering how to best apply carbon pricing domestically and regionally, or through supply corridors (IISD, 2025). Carbon pricing does not constitute a universally applicable approach. Fiscal policy also includes pre-arranged public financing instruments and budgetary reserves that are able to manage the fiscal impacts of climate-related disasters. These ensure immediate fiscal response and liquidity in the face of climate impacts, including regional risk pools of CCRIF, ARC and contingent credit lines (ICR, 2021). Regulatory refinements in the insurance market and public-private insurance schemes for climate-related hazards are being explored and scaled up in many regions in response to increasing insurance claims. Policy reforms or direct public financial backing for insurance markets are used to reduce existing insurance protection gaps and spread financial risks across a wider set of geographies, hazard types, sectors and public and private actors. In developing countries where insurance markets are often nascent, PDBs and international partners can play important roles in facilitating technical expertise and support for insurance market development and enhancing insurance access (CPI, 2026a).

139. Mobilizing and deploying capital. Financing targets for climate solutions, including climate mitigation or adaptation, create momentum for actors to raise and deploy capital. A number of countries are continuing to advance national vehicles to channel climate finance, including Country Platforms: a Country Platforms Hub was launched at COP30 to strengthen country leadership and ownership. There is also continued growth in green and sustainability-linked bond issuances, that raise capital from financial markets for climate-aligned activities (CBI, 2025c).

140. Noted as underdeveloped relative to need in the sixth BA, a number of efforts continue to raise adaptation finance and promote resilience. Catastrophe bonds are insurance-linked securities that have parametric triggers (they can also be considered as a fiscal tool) and which are an important but limited instrument for developing country resilience finance (Schroders, 2025). In 2025, Hurricane Melissa triggered a USD 150 million cat bond from the World Bank Group.⁶² Another form of raising finance for climate-action is debt-for-climate swaps, enhancing debt sustainability and fiscal space. The sixth BA registered over 10 transactions since 2015, though limited by high transaction costs and uncertain private creditor participation. At FFD4 in Seville, 2025, a Global Hub for Debt Swaps for Development was announced, but structural barriers remain to greater uptake (CPI, 2025b). Climate-resilient debt clauses (CRDCs) also preserve fiscal space post climate-related disaster by postponing or pausing debt service. A Debt Pause Clause Alliance was established at FFD4 to mainstream standardized state-contingent debt clauses in sovereign lending (CPI, 2025a).

141. At the individual, local community, and SME level, financial inclusion enhances access to capital for climate action but is not comprehensively tracked globally. It remains, however, part of sustainability planning such as in Morocco, and part of sustainable finance strategies, such as in the EU.⁶³ Inclusive financial systems are also well articulated in the FFD4 outcome.⁶⁴

142. The sixth BA also highlighted the emerging area of central bank operations to increase climate-consistent finance, with a number of tools and approaches being gradually pursued. Central banks lend to eligible financial institutions through credit facilities, or they can make asset purchases, for example, and these actions then lead to liabilities for which reserves need to be held to maintain stability. The relevance to Article 2.1(c) of such actions depends on the degree to which they promote or discourage climate action. In the Philippines, as part of efforts to strengthen sustainable finance, the single borrower limit for loans, credits and guarantees has been increased, while the reserve requirements ratio for existing or new sustainable bonds issued by banks has been lowered where projects or activities align with categories outlined in the Philippines' strategic investment priority plan, sustainable finance framework, guiding principles, ASEAN taxonomy, or

national taxonomy (NGFS, 2026a, box 3). Bangladesh has introduced refinancing schemes that increase liquidity for sustainable agriculture and renewable energy projects when non-bank financial institutions meet specific environmental criteria (NGFS, 2026a). Interpretations differ on the degree to which these are stability measures (either price-focussed or system-wide) and uptake depends on the differing national and regional mandates of central banks and supervisors (NGFS, 2026a).

143. The landscape of methods and approaches relevant to tracking consistency with Article 2.1(c) spread across six broad categories. These methods and approaches promote information-sharing (including through multilateral governance structures), raise awareness among various actors, and build the economic and financial case for climate action. Increasingly, methods and approaches seek to drive the consistency of projects, portfolios and entities transparently, recognizing current and future climate-related risks, and striving for credibility in order to reduce risks of greenwashing. Yet there remain challenges in understanding global progress towards approaches and methods relevant to tracking consistency with the long-term goal outlined in Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement:

- There are different concepts and themes being used by actors that are relevant to the integration of climate considerations into financial decision-making processes and to tracking and assessing consistency of finance flows with the objectives of the Paris Agreement. This includes the use of actors of various concepts such as directing, aligning, orienting, transitioning, shifting or attracting flows. Divergence remains in what it means to pursue Article 2.1(c) (SCF, 2023);⁶⁵
- Climate-related data gaps remain that could shape existing financial flows and assets, as well as prospective financial decisions. This includes climate-related risks, small and medium-size enterprises, and climate-resilient pathways and scenarios (UNEP FI, 2024; OECD Research Collaborative Tracking Finance for Climate Action, 2023; NGFS 2022);
- The choices of metrics, including those for GHG emissions, resilience and more, can differ considerably. This could depend on what is most appropriate for the flows and stocks being

62) See <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/11/07/hurricane-melissa-triggers-100-payout-of-150-million-world-bank-catastrophe-bond-for-jamaica>.

63) See <https://sdgs.un.org/partnerships/roadmap-inclusive-sdg-financing-framework> and https://finance.ec.europa.eu/sustainable-finance/overview-sustainable-finance_en#the-eu-sustainable-finance-framework.

64) A/RES/79/323.

65) See also FCCC/PA/CMA/2025/19/Add.1 - Decision 11/CMA.7, para 2.

considered (potentially comprising private equity, corporate debt, real estate and infrastructure portfolios and sovereign bonds), but also reflects the choices made in the strategy to follow (e.g. net zero by 2050, versus various reference pathways and scenarios) (OECD 2026e);

- While interoperable and aggregable methods are ideal to scale up climate finance flows, in particular cross-border financing, it remains important to acknowledge context-specificity and the nationally determined manner in which actions might be pursued. A multitude of methods, objectives, governance frameworks and tools that are not interoperable can increase fragmentation, lead to data inconsistency and increase transition costs (WBG, IMF, OECD, 2023);
- Where methods exist, they are often complex and require advanced capacities to navigate. Given the breadth of actors and finance flows and stocks engaged, this can provide a barrier for adoption for SMEs and smaller financial institutions – as well as a barrier in aggregating action to identify progress;
- The extent and diversity of finance actors and finance flows and stocks being addressed by Article 2.1(c), influence the goal through a variety of methods and use cases. There is much complexity, therefore, in disentangling interlinkages and causal relationships between layers of actors and mechanisms upstream, and these actions are hard to attribute; nor do they guarantee real-economy impact on emission reductions or climate resilience.

2

Overview of climate finance flows



2.1. Introduction

144. This chapter provides an overview of climate finance flows in 2023 and 2024, based on the latest available data gathered and compiled from a range of sources. It also outlines an assessment of the quality and completeness of the data to inform interpretation.

145. Section 2.2 presents an overview of global climate finance flows, combining best estimates of domestic and international flows from both public and private sources, based predominantly on aggregations by the CPI. Section 2.3 collates and consolidates best available data to estimate climate finance flows from developed to developing countries and presents an analysis of their characteristics and distribution; section 2.4 reflects on available data and estimates for South–South cooperation on climate finance; and section 2.5 provides reflections on possible quantitative data and information that could inform the SCF in preparing the first report on progress toward achieving the NCQG.

146. The consolidation of climate finance estimates in this chapter draws on the best available sources of information on climate finance and uses their respective definitions, measurement methodologies and statistical classifications. As such, this overview does not itself establish nor apply adjustments to reflect its own definition or accounting approach. Where several data sources are used to illustrate flows from developed to developing countries, this is without prejudice to the meaning of those terms in the context of the Convention and the Paris Agreement, including but not limited to: Parties included in Annex II/Annex I to the Convention; Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention; MDB donors and shareholders; OECD members/non-OECD members; OECD DAC members; countries on the

OECD DAC list as eligible for ODA; and other relevant classifications from various sources (see annex A). Such reporting differences are explicitly laid out throughout this chapter (see in particular table 2.8).

147. Estimates presented in this chapter draw on the best available data, reflecting significant improvements made over time in tracking climate finance (See chapter 1). In aggregating data across sources, significant care is taken to obtain accurate and comparable global climate finance estimates, including by assessing the data quality and completeness of each data source (see details in box 2.1). In order to ensure there is no double counting, CPI's aggregation principles and data checks are followed, in particular to ensure that only real economy investments are captured (see section 1.2.5). A conservative approach is followed to minimize risks of over-reporting, in particular where data lacks sufficient detail or granularity to assess climate-relevance or double counting. While the coverage and completeness of data have significantly improved over time, significant gaps persist in sectors such as public domestic finance, as well as in the tracking of private finance for adaptation, resilience and across the AFOLU, water and waste and other cross-cutting sectors. As such, it is important to interpret presented data in light of these limitations, and as conservative estimates of total climate finance flows.

148. Estimated climate finance flows are presented in United States dollars, annualized, at current (i.e. inflation-unadjusted) prices and at face value for the reporting year unless otherwise specified. These conventions follow standard financial reporting practice. Significant exchange rate volatility or inflationary changes over time can affect comparability, and reported estimates should therefore be interpreted accordingly when considering year-on-year comparisons or trends over time.

Box 2.1

Assessing completeness and quality of global climate finance estimates

Data completeness considers the estimated level of coverage of all climate-related flows. A high level of completeness for a sector or dataset implies the availability of full or almost complete reporting across relevant sources, origin and destination, sectors and instruments. A medium level means that there are identified gaps in reporting (for example for particular sub-sectors, countries of origin/destination or instruments, or where the latest time period of data may be unavailable given reporting cycles), but where overall coverage is still considered reasonable. A low level of completeness implies significant gaps in reporting, which would prevent any robust analysis and interpretation of trends and levels of finance flows.

Data quality reflects the quality and transparency of reported information, considering the clarity and consistent use of definitions, measurement methodologies and accounting frameworks, quality assurance and validation. Information on definitions is crucial to ensuring all finance flows are consistent with a low GHG emissions and climate-resilient pathway, and aligned with the SCF's Operational Definition.

The level of detail and granularity of available data is also a key determinant of quality, given the importance of activity/project level data to ensure no double counting across datasets and robust aggregation, and the use of descriptive statistic to allow for an analysis of global climate finance flows by theme, sector, geography and instrument. High quality denotes clear definitions and established guidance, and reporting formats and data systems which provide project/semi- aggregated data. Medium quality denotes a range of definitions/measurement approaches, and largely semi-aggregated data, meaning data is not consistent in aggregation but of similar or broad comparability, where sufficient information is available to ensure no significant double counting. Low quality implies that data are only in aggregated format, with **few** details on the underpinning definitions and descriptions to enable analysis.

Across the seventh BA data, completeness and quality is assessed for each sector and summarized in table 2.1 in the following section. For the summary of developed-to-developing country flows – recognizing the range of relevant sources – table 2.1(cont.) summarizes the main sources with the highest completeness and quality scores. Further details and assessment are provided in sections 2.2 and 2.3, and annexes D and E.

2.2. Global climate finance

2.2.1. Overview of global climate finance

149. This section provides an overview of global public and private climate finance flows, focused on 2023–2024. Sections 2.2.3–2.2.11 explore climate finance flows by economic sector, considering non-primary flows, and domestic budgets and expenditures, based on available data and complementary information. A breakdown of global climate finance estimates by sector, source (public, private), and channels of finance from developed to developing countries is illustrated in figures 2.3 and 2.4 and summarized in the corresponding tables. This is presented alongside an assessment of the quality and completeness of data gathered from key sources.

150. Annual global climate finance flows from both domestic and international sources are estimated to have reached USD 1,891 billion and USD 2,008 billion in 2023 and 2024 respectively, equating to USD 1,949 billion on average per year over 2023–2024. This represents a 32 per cent increase in climate finance compared with 2021–2022. This increase was driven primarily by significant growth in investments in clean energy (56 per

cent increase over the period) and sustainable transport (29 per cent increase over the period), and where finance for mitigation continues to dominate global climate finance flows. In contrast, other sectors – in particular agriculture, forestry and other land uses (AFOLU), water and wastewater, and waste – had lower levels of investment over 2023–2024; in these sectors, adaptation and mitigation are both more complex and harder to track. Overall, while total estimates of global climate finance flows have continued to increase year-on-year, behind this figure are two key trends: firstly, the rate of growth over the past four years has been decreasing such that global climate finance grew only by 6 per cent on average in 2024; and secondly, global adaptation finance levels remain significantly low, representing only 3–5 per cent of total global climate finance in 2023–2024, with significant challenges in tracking adaptation flows (see figure 2.2).

151. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 present a sectoral disaggregation of global climate finance flows. These estimates reflect the most complete picture since tracking began, including data improvements spearheaded by CPI's aggregation of new data for the water and wastewater sector, biofuels and improved integration of data in the energy sector, and where CPI has also

updated its historical time series of data for 2017–2024 (See box 2.2). The quality and comprehensiveness of the aggregated data sources has been assessed (see box 2.1), reflecting improvements in data coverage over time. In practical terms, for the assessment of global finance flows, low-quality data limit further disaggregation and

distributional analysis. Where such data have not been included headline figures in subsequent analysis, the picture for certain assessments therefore remains partial, although complementary information is presented in sectoral sections 2.2.3 to 2.2.11.

Box 2.2

Methodological changes and improved data coverage since the sixth BA (2024)

The latest estimates of global climate finance reflect the following improvements since the 2024 *Sixth Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows* report, driven forward through CPI's GLCF 2025 and 2026 (CPI 2025b; CPI 2026a; CPI 2026c):

- Expanded coverage of data sources: expanded methodology in the energy sector to capture a fuller picture of transmission and distribution investments and biofuels financing using BNEF Energy Transition data; a new method for tracking finance for water and sanitation based on assessing the climate-relevance of investments; new data in the transport sector, expanding country coverage of finance for two- three- and four-wheeled vehicles and metro transit; complementary green bond data from the Luxembourg Green Exchange; and, more broadly, enhanced coverage through additional surveys of new DFIs in emerging and developing economies (CPI, 2026a).
- Enhanced integration of key datasets: enhanced integration of key datasets, including those from BNEF and IEA, into CPI's GLCF aggregation; improved methods for distinguishing South–South financing flows; and retrospective update to the

time series, allowing for a more robust and consistent data set over 2017–2024.


- Data gaps and complementary data sources: Notwithstanding recent improvements in data quality and gaps, a number of data limitations persist in estimating global climate finance flows, particularly in tracking adaptation finance, data gaps in domestic public finance, and across the AFOLU, water and wastewater, and other cross-cutting sectors (including areas such as nature, super pollutants and other emerging sectors). Complementary data sources are presented alongside estimates derived from CPI's GLCF to provide additional information and insight into the order of magnitude of financial flows where robust data are not yet available. See, in particular, section 2.2.11 on domestic finance and section 2.2.8 on investment in sustainable AFOLU sectors.

Figure 2.1 below presents a comparison of CPI's methodological improvements to the coverage of data in the Global Landscape Reports, comparing current and past methodologies over time. This demonstrates how methodological improvements have improved data coverage and led to higher estimates when applied retrospectively in former years, whereas for more recent years the latest methodological improvements have improved data quality and refined estimates, resulting in slightly lower estimates of climate finance.

Figure 2.1

Illustration of data coverage improvements over time in the context of estimating global climate finance flows

(Billions of USD, current)




Source: Adapted from CPI (2026c) with additional 2024 data point. "Previous Methodology" refers to financial flows reported in the GLCF 2025 (CPI, 2025d).

Figure 2.2

Global climate finance flows over time and by theme

(Billions of USD, current, annualized estimates and annual growth (percentage change))




Source: CPI (2026b).

Figure 2.3

Global climate finance flows in 2019–24 by sector

(Billions of USD, current, annualized averages)



Source: CPI (2026b).

Notes: "Other sectors" includes: policy, budget support and capacity building; waste; disaster-risk management; information and communication technology; biodiversity, land and marine conservation. Alongside flows, specific sectoral detail is unspecified or unknown.

Figure 2.4

Climate finance flows, 2023–2024

(Billions of USD, annualized




Table 2.1

Global climate finance flows in 2021–2024 by sector and assessment of data quality and completeness
(Billions of US dollars, current, annualized)

Sector			2021	2022	2023	2024	Data quality	Data completeness	Sources of data and relevant chapter in the BA
Global flows	Clean energy systems	Public	192	249	286	350	High	High	Chapter 2.2.4, CPI (2026a)
		Private	314	383	533	604			
		Total	506	631	818	954			
	Sustainable transport	Public	113	166	147	116	High	High	Chapter 2.2.5, CPI (2026a)
		Private	200	311	376	381			
		Total	313	477	522	497			
	Buildings and infrastructure	Public	134	137	127	128	High	Medium	Chapter 2.2.6, CPI (2026a)
		Private	179	184	220	236			
		Total	314	320	347	364			
	Industry	Public	14	25	19	20	Medium	Medium	Chapter 2.2.7, CPI (2026a)
		Private	8	8	9	9			
		Total	22	32	28	29			
	Water and wastewater	Public	44	51	33	39	Medium	Medium	Chapter 2.2.8, CPI (2026a)
		Private	3	8	13	6			
		Total	47	59	47	45			
	AFOLU	Public	30	22	20	18	High	Medium	Chapter 2.2.9, CPI (2026a)
		Private	7	4	4	2	Medium	Low	
		Total	37	26	23	21	–	–	
	Other sectors – mitigation ^a	Public	20	18	51	50	High	Medium	Chapter 2.2.10, CPI (2026a)
		Private	9	10	9	3	High	Low	
		Total	28	28	61	53	–	–	
	Other sectors – adaptation ^a	Public	37	25	25	28	High	Medium	
		Private	0	1	1	0	High	Low	
		Total	37	26	25	29	–	–	
	Other sectors – both mitigation and adaptation	Public	19	27	15	13	High	Medium	
		Private	7	1	5	3	High	Low	
		Total	26	27	20	16	–	–	

Source: CPI (2026b).

Notes: 'Other sectors' includes policy, budget support and capacity building; waste; disaster-risk management; information and communication technology; and biodiversity, land and marine conservation. It also includes flows for which a specific sector is unspecified or unknown. Sub-totals may not appear to add to presented totals owing to rounding and an extremely small level of unknown classifications (representing less than 0.1% of total estimates).

Table 2.1 (cont.)

Sector		2021	2022	2023	2024	Data quality	Data completeness	Sources of data and relevant chapter in the BA
Developed to developing countries	UNFCCC funds (AF, GCF, GEF, LDCF, SCCF) ^b	3.4	1.9	2.4	2.9	High	High	Chapter 2.3.2, CFU, OECD DAC CRDF
	Multilateral climate funds (including UNFCCC)	4.6	3.6	8.7	7.5	High	High	Chapter 2.3.2, CFU, OECD DAC CRDF
	Climate-specific finance through bilateral, regional and other channels	35.8	45.8	44.8	37.1	High	Medium	Chapter 2.3.1, BTRs, preliminary and partial data subject to change
	MDB climate finance attributed to developed countries	34.3	46.9	48.2	50.5	High	High	Chapter 2.3.2, OECD (2026)
	Mobilized private climate finance by bilateral, regional institutions	5.6	9.2	6.5	8.6	High	High	Chapter 2.3.4, OECD (2026)
	Mobilized private climate finance by multilateral channels	8.8	12.7	16.3	21.9	High	High	Chapter 2.3.4, OECD (2026)
	Other private finance ^a	19.9 - 32.6	16.3 - 26.3	34.2	29.7	Medium	Medium	Chapter 2.3.4, CPI (2026a)

Source: Climate Policy Initiative. 2026. *Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2026*. Available at <https://glcf.climatepolicyinitiative.org/>; OECD DAC. 2026. *Climate-related Development Finance Dataset*. Paris: OECD. Available at <https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/development-finance-for-climate-and-the-environment.html>. Data accessed 18 July 2026; CFU. 2026. *Climate Funds Update*. Available at <https://climatefundsupdate.org/>.

Notes: Presented flows are from developed to developing countries; see section 2.3 further information. (a) Presented flows include project approvals and committed outflows to Multilateral Climate Funds, including UNFCCC funds, and therefore cannot be added cumulatively to the UNFCCC funds row above. (b) Bilateral finance estimates for 2023 and 2024 are based on preliminary BTR reporting and estimates are partial. (c) "Other Private" finance is estimated based on CPI (2026b) and includes all international private finance from advanced economies (based on IMF classifications) to emerging market and developing economies. These private flows may not be fully additional to estimates of private finance mobilized and therefore cannot be added cumulatively to the rows above.

2.2.2. Characteristics and distribution of global climate finance flows

Thematic distribution across adaptation and mitigation

152. Trends in global climate finance are driven by climate change mitigation, where the shift to electrification and scaling of low GHG emission technologies is dominating the change across key economic sectors. Over 2023 and 2024, 95 per cent of global climate finance flows targeted mitigation objectives. When finance for cross-cutting activities targeting both adaptation and mitigation is included, the total share of mitigation-relevant global climate finance reaches 97 per cent.

153. Global climate finance for adaptation and resilience cuts across all sectors of the economy. Within total global climate finance flows, tracked finance for adaptation reached USD 63 billion and USD 64 billion in 2023 and 2024, respectively. Taking into account finance targeting cross-cutting activities, adaptation-relevant global climate finance reached USD 108 and USD 101 billion in 2023 and 2024, respectively. Overall adaptation and adaptation-relevant finance represents 3-5 per cent of global climate finance flows on average over the period. Compared with 2021–2022, tracked adaptation finance decreased as a share of global climate finance from

5–9 per cent, and by 20 per cent in absolute levels (an average decline of USD 16-25 billion).

154. The majority of adaptation-relevant finance is cross-sectoral, reflecting the intersecting nature of adaptation needs and investments, with additional concentrations in the water and wastewater and AFOLU sectors. Household-level adaptation, including the management of heat and water use, insurance and emergency response to extreme weather events, is poorly tracked, but is likely to be a significant driver of financial flows. CPI (2024b) undertook an analysis of household adaptation finance based on an assessment of the likelihood that a range of household products contribute to adaptation, and indicatively estimated additional household adaptation finance of USD 17 to 78 billion per year (CPI, 2026a). These estimates are not included in total global climate finance estimates because the methodology and data coverage remain under development. However, for illustrative purposes, their inclusion could increase estimates of adaptation finance to approximately USD 80–140 billion per year and adaptation-relevant finance to approximately USD 120–180 billion per year.⁶⁶

155. Of tracked adaptation and adaptation-relevant finance over 2023–2024, 84–89 per cent is public finance, of which 72–73 per cent is international

66) Indicative approximations, rounded to nearest USD 10bn.

public finance – statistical coincidence, reflecting the greater completeness of international public finance datasets compared with domestic and private finance data, especially with respect to tracking private sector investments and expenditures to adaptation, as well as the challenges in attracting private capital to adaptation-related investments.

156. The sixth Biennial Assessment noted the significant data and reporting challenges in tracking adaptation and resilience finance, and encouraged climate finance and data providers to enhance the tracking of such flows (sixth BA recommendations, para 53 (b) and (c). While some progress has been made (for example, through CPI's improvements in tracking water and

Table 2.2

Estimates of global climate finance by thematic (2017–2024)

(Billions of USD, current, annualized)

Source	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Adaptation-only (1)	32	38	48	57	78	82	63	64
Cross-cutting finance (2)	28	22	18	22	49	52	46	36
Mitigation-only (3)	858	812	933	942	1 204	1 492	1 783	1 907
<i>Total adaptation-relevant (1+2)</i>	60	60	66	79	126	134	108	101
<i>Total mitigation-relevant (2+3)</i>	886	833	951	964	1 252	1 545	1 828	1 943

Source: CPI (2026b).

wastewater flows; see section 2.2.7), further progress is required, given the significant importance of finance for adaptation and resilience the need to track finance for loss and damage going forward.

Finance sources and instruments

157. Global climate finance estimates in 2023–2024 comprised 62 per cent private finance and 38 per cent public finance. The share of private finance has steadily increased over time as the economic case for climate action improves. By financial instrument, balance sheet equity and project-level market rate debt⁶⁷ each


represent 35 per cent of the total global flows, followed by balance sheet debt (16 per cent). Low-cost project debt (i.e. public concessional loans⁶⁸) and grants represent 3 per cent and 7 per cent of the total, respectively. Private climate finance has grown faster than public flows. CPI (2026a) finds that domestic markets and households are now driving the growth in investment, accounting for USD 1,106 billion or 57 per cent of finance in 2023–24, reflecting increasing household investments in low-carbon solutions such as EVs, heat pumps and small-scale renewables.

67) Refers to market-rate loans extended under standard market conditions; examples include, but are not limited to, term loans, credit facilities, bridge loans, mezzanine debt, etc.

68) Refers to low-cost loans extended at terms preferable to those prevailing on the market.

Figure 2.5

Breakdown of global climate finance by instrument, 2023–24 average
(Billions of USD, annualized average 2023–24, current)



Source: CPI (2026b).

Geographical distribution⁶⁹

158. The geographical distribution of global climate finance is highly concentrated, with the majority of global climate finance flows in 2023–2024 to and within Eastern Asia (38 per cent), Northern and Western Europe (17 per cent) and North America (16 per cent). All other regions account for less than 29 per cent of global flows (USD 674 billion per year over 2023–2024). CPI (2026a) highlight that advanced economies and China account for the majority of finance as of 2024, but other emerging economies and developing countries (excluding LDCs) are growing at the fastest rates (a 25 per cent compound annual growth rate since 2022), reflective


of the significant investment opportunities across South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. East Asia and Oceania continue to receive the highest share of adaptation-relevant finance (receiving 23 per cent over 2023–2024), followed by Sub-Saharan Africa (receiving 17 per cent) and Latin America & the Caribbean (receiving 12 per cent). Of global climate finance flows, an average of USD 41 billion per year in 2023–2024 went to and/or originated from LDCs, while USD 9.2 billion flowed to and within SIDS. Overall, 16 per cent of global climate finance in 2023–2024 flowed across borders, with an average of USD 183 billion (9 per cent) per year flowing to developing countries.⁷⁰

69) Geographical analysis draws on CPI's GLCF (2026) based on use of M49 Regional classification for UN Statistics. Development status based on IMF World Economic Outlook Groups classification.

70) Estimated from CPI's GLCF (2026b) based on all international finance flows (16 per cent of total global climate finance flows) and international finance flows to all emerging market and developing economies. This excludes transregional flows where the exact destination is uncertain.

Figure 2.6

Breakdown of global climate finance by geographical distribution, 2023–2024 average (Distribution by USD commitment, annualized)



Source: CPI (2026), adjusted from GLCF. Note: Geographical regions based on GLCF and use of M49 Regional classification for UN Statistics.


2.2.3. Investment in clean energy systems

159. Total investment in clean energy systems is estimated to have reached USD 818 and USD 954 billion in 2023 and 2024, respectively, increasing by 56 per cent on average compared to 2021–2022 levels and driving the increase in global climate finance and mitigation flows (CPI, 2026). Of total investments, the large majority is concentrated in power and heat generation, while two per cent supports fuel production (i.e. biofuels and hydrogen), and less than one per cent supports key enablers such as policy and capacity building (USD 3 billion per year 2023–2024).

160. While investments have increased, the costs of renewable energy have decreased significantly over time, with levelized costs per MWh stabilizing and renewable energy becoming the most cost-competitive source of new electricity, particularly in recent years amid global volatility of energy prices driven by global disruptions (CPI, 2026a; IRENA, 2026). More than 90 per cent of utility-scale renewable projects commissioned in 2025 delivered power below the cost of the cheapest new fossil-fuel alternative, and installed renewables helped avoid an estimated USD 480 billion in fossil-fuel costs in 2025 (IRENA, 2026).

Figure 2.7

Global weighted levelized cost of electricity for solar and wind energy (2010–2025) (USD per MWh)



Source: IRENA (2026).

Table 2.3

Estimates of global investment in clean energy systems (2017–2024)

Source	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
CPI: total	362	337	382	402	506	631	818	954
Of which public	152	116	134	131	192	249	286	350
Of which private	210	221	248	271	314	383	533	604
CPI: transmission and distribution (not included in CPI totals)	—	—	—	—	—	—	86	121
IEA: transmission and distribution (electricity networks)	308	296	293	296	314	322	353	403
IEA: nuclear	38	37	41	47	61	69	71	77

Source: CPI (2026b), IEA (2026b), CPI (2026a). Note: CPI transmission and distribution estimates are not currently included in CPI's GLCF totals given concerns over climate-relevance, and are only available for 2023–24 (CPI, 2026a, Annex); however CPI's additional transmissions and distribution indicative estimates do adjust for climate-relevance (CPI, 2025e). IEA electricity network Estimates, as included by IEA in their estimation of both clean energy and total energy investments, are without assessment or adjustment for climate-relevance; as such, these figures may be considered additional to CPI's totals, but represent a higher bound.


161. Based on CPI's analysis, private investments dominate global finance flows for clean energy, driven by domestic commercial financial institutions, corporations and, increasingly private households, on average representing 64 per cent of finance over 2023–2024. The ratio of private to public investment has remained relatively stable in the last five years. Public finance is concentrated in state-owned financial institutions and enterprises, followed by national DFIs, while international public finance represented 6 per cent of global investments in 2023–2024. The pattern of financing and the role of actors varies significantly by technology, geography and context, reflecting differences in cost-competitiveness and risk. Such analysis highlights the importance of public finance shifting focus to the

barriers to private investment, in particular in relation to grid infrastructure, project preparation and energy access (CPI, 2026a).

162. The IEA's World Energy Investment provides a global benchmark for tracking trends across the energy sector, and assesses that clean energy (including renewables, nuclear and CCUS) represented 83 per cent of investment across total global power generation investments in 2023–24. Across regions, the IEA demonstrates that many advanced economies have surpassed a 90 per cent share of investment in 'low-emissions generation', while investment levels in emerging and developing economies, particularly across Africa and Asia, are growing at faster rates (IEA, 2026a).

Figure 2.8

Low-emissions share of total electricity generation investment (2015–2026)



Source: IEA (2026).

Notes: "Low-emissions generation" refers to renewables, nuclear, renewable waste and fossil fuel power with CCUS. Regional groupings based on IEA's methodology; see Methodological Annex in IEA (2026a).

163. Across technologies, Solar PV dominates clean energy investment and growth, accounting for 58 per cent of total clean energy finance (USD 512 billion per year in 2023–2024) reflecting its cost-competitiveness. This is followed by significant investment in onshore wind (21 per cent; USD 183 billion in 2023–2024) and, to a lesser extent, offshore wind (6 per cent; USD 53 billion per year 2023–2024) (CPI, 2026). Estimates presented by CPI for renewable generation and energy storage reflect installed capacity, while Bloomberg New Energy Finance reviews global clean energy supply chain investments. It reports that financing across the solar supply chain


peaked in 2023 before declining, while financing for battery and battery metal production has grown significantly since 2021, reflecting wider economic trends and the impacts of greater electrification across economic sectors, particularly electric vehicles (BloombergNEF, 2026). Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BloombergNEF) reports that renewables funding dropped 9.5 per cent in 2025 as market reform in China dampened activity, and that hydrogen and nuclear investment also saw a slight decline (BNEF, 2026). The Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute reports that, while public funding has underpinned much of the development of CCS,

developments in 2025 demonstrate that CCS is entering a new phase of financial maturity. Projects in Europe secured non-recourse debt financing for the first time, and institutional capital beginning to scale, including through carbon markets (GCCSI, 2025). The IEA estimates that investment in CCUS grew from USD 1 billion in 2023

to USD 4 billion in 2024 and USD 5 billion in 2025. The pipeline of new projects would imply a tenfold increase in CCUS investment by 2027, although a significant proportion of projects have yet to reach financial close (IEA, 2024b; 2025c; 2026a).

Figure 2.9

Energy sector technology investment (2023–2024)
(Distribution in USD billion, current)



Source: CPI (2026a) and additional data provided by CPI.

164. CPI’s estimates for total investment in clean energy do not include nuclear, while the IEA reports investment levels in nuclear energy of USD 77 billion in 2024 (IEA, 2026a). The IEA also includes investment in battery storage and electricity networks in its clean energy estimates, which reached USD 58 billion and USD 403 billion, respectively, in 2024 (IEA, 2026a). These estimates make no assumption or adjustment for climate relevance. CPI recognizes electricity transmission and distribution and smart grids as key enablers of the transition to a clean energy system but do not currently include such investments in their estimations, given concerns over their climate-relevance. CPI presents complementary analysis that tracks climate-relevant transmission and distribution finance at USD 121 billion in 2024 (CPI, 2026d), noting this as an area for future analytical

refinement (see annex D).


2.2.4. Investment in sustainable transport

165. Total global investment in sustainable transport is estimated to have reached USD 522 billion in 2023, before declining to USD 497 billion in 2024. The decline in 2024 was driven in particular by reductions in public sector investment from national DFIs, which had peaked significantly in 2022, reflecting COVID-19 recovery investments. Meanwhile, private finance, having significantly increased since 2017, is now stabilizing. Overall, average investment in 2023–2024 was still 29 per cent higher than in 2021–2022.

Figure 2.10

Estimates of global investment in sustainable transport (2017–2024)

(Billions of USD, current, annualized)



Source: CPI (2026b).

166. Road transportation accounts for the largest share of investment and growth over time, representing 84 per cent of total finance to sustainable transport in 2023–2024 (USD 426 billion per year). This is driven by the shift to electric vehicles (EVs) and private sector investments from commercial financial institutions and households, alongside public sector investment in EV charging infrastructure. EV car sales gained strong momentum in the last decade, supported by falling battery prices, more affordable models and favorable policies. EVs grew from representing 1 per cent of total car sales in 2016 to accounting for 22 per cent in 2024 (IEA, 2026a; BloombergNEF, 2026). There are, however, significant regional variations in the shift to electric transport, with China, Europe and North America driving the trend, while market shares are also rising rapidly in some developing countries such as Viet Nam, Uruguay and Thailand (IEA, 2026a).

167. Other tracked modes of transport include finance to rail and public transport (13 per cent; USD 64 billion per year 2023–2024), and aviation and waterways (which make up less than one per cent). CPI presents complementary analysis for metro rail in urban developments, identifying indicative levels of investment

of USD 112 billion in 2023 and USD 102 billion in 2024 and noting this as an area for future methodological development (see annex D).

168. Investment levels in green shipping remain driven by public sector support for decarbonization. Activities related to the production of alternative fuels are accounted for within the energy sector, presented above, and remain an area for further methodological refinement by CPI.

2.2.5. Investment in buildings and infrastructure

169. Total global investment in building and infrastructure is estimated at USD 347 billion in 2023 and USD 364 billion in 2024. Investments have steadily increased over time, rising by 12 per cent on average compared to 2021–2022 levels, and have been driven particularly by households and private finance.

170. Climate-related investments in buildings and infrastructure are driven by the adoption of energy efficiency measures in construction (73 per cent in 2023–24) and heating and cooling technologies including

heat pumps (20 per cent in 2023–2024). Climate finance in these sectors can be challenging to track given their disbursed nature across end-users and technologies.

171. The IEA highlights that energy efficiency investments in buildings and industry are one of the most stable and resilient investment areas, reflecting lower risk, proven returns, and compatibility with existing financing structures (IEA, 2026a). In contrast, the uptake

of heat pumps and air conditioning is significantly expanding, with households playing a key role in driving this rise and decisions strongly influenced by public policy. This includes electricity pricing as well as policies targeting building retrofits and efficient appliances, with recent measures concentrating on direct subsidies and grants to overcome upfront cost barriers (IEA, 2026a). Investments are most heavily concentrated in advanced economies across Europe and North America.

Table 2.4

Estimates of global climate investment in buildings and infrastructure (2017–2024)
(Billions of USD, current, annualized)

Source	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
CPI: total	285	286	298	300	314	320	347	364
<i>Of which public</i>	108	102	113	126	134	137	127	128
<i>Of which private</i>	177	184	185	174	179	184	220	236
Energy efficiency (in construction)	–	–	228	217	240	249	263	258
Heat pumps	–	–	56	57	57	55	67	76
Resilient infrastructure	–	–	1	1	0	0	1	2
Other	–	–	14	25	16	16	16	28

Source: CPI (2026a,b). Additional data provided by CPI.

2.2.6. Investment in industry

172. Tracking climate finance across industrial sectors is challenging owing to commercial sensitivity and challenges with data availability; these challenges persist despite improvements since the sixth BA, with the integration of the IEA's data into CPI estimates.

173. Total tracked global investment in industry is estimated at USD 28 billion in 2023 and USD 29 billion in 2024. Investments have fluctuated year-on-year over the past 10 years but increased by an average of 5 per cent compared with 2021–2022 levels, driven by domestic finance from State-owned enterprises, corporations and commercial financial institutions. The IEA highlights that energy efficiency and electrification investments in industry are influenced by financing conditions and commercial risk. Higher interest rates create a conservative investment environment, while volatile energy prices can shift investment decisions towards cost-saving upgrades rather than capital-intensive investments (IEA, 2026a).

2.2.7. Investment in water and wastewater

174. CPI has spearheaded advances to improve the tracking of water-related investments through assessing the climate relevance of household adaptation-related products such as surface drains and rainwater harvesting systems (CPI, 2025e). Recognizing that continued methodological work is required to refine estimates, CPI is conservative in the estimates included in its recent GLCF and reflected in the totals presented in this seventh BA. As such, estimates for investment in water and wastewater represent lower bounds, with investment in water and wastewater estimated at USD 47.3 billion in 2023 and USD 44.8 billion in 2024.

175. Of estimated finance flows within the sector, 40 per cent is for water supply and sanitation, and 34 per cent is for wastewater treatment, with both strongly supported by domestic and international public finance over 2023–2024.

176. The majority of identified finance within the water and wastewater sectors is estimated to target adaptation, with investments targeting adaptation-only objectives

reaching USD 24.2 billion per year in 2023–2024 (53 per cent), investments targeting both adaptation and mitigation objectives reaching USD 9.7 billion per year (21 per cent), and investments targeting mitigation-only objectives accounting for USD 12.1 billion per year (26 per cent).

2.2.8. Investment in sustainable agriculture, forestry and land-use including fisheries (AFOLU)

177. The agriculture, forestry and other land use sector (AFOLU) encompasses the protection, management and sustainable use of forests, grasslands, wetlands and coastal ecosystems, including regenerative agricultural practices and livestock systems.⁷¹ This also includes other land-based and fisheries activities which reduce related greenhouse gas emissions, protect critical carbon sinks, and where the restoration of degraded land and nature-based solutions offer the potential for carbon dioxide removal (CDR). The sector also contributes to adaptation and resilience, where AFOLU investments can strengthen resilience to drought, flooding, land degradation and food insecurity, often delivering wider co-benefits for biodiversity and water regulation to coastal, rural and other local communities and their livelihoods.

178. Tracking climate-relevant finance within these sectors is challenging, reflecting the diverse and dispersed nature of activities and actors. The sector is also significantly impacted by drivers of land-use change from agricultural production, mining, and resource extraction, pollution and urbanization, where climate-related measures are often not capital investments but expenditures related to a range of measures (including regulatory, policy-oriented and management activities)

which occur in other sectors and which are embedded into wider actions, amplifying the challenge in tracking climate-relevant financial flows.

179. Tracked estimates of finance to AFOLU reached USD 23.3 billion in 2023 and USD 20.5 billion in 2024. Flows have been variable over the past decade, driven in particular by large rises and falls in investment in forestry, which peaked in 2021. Over 2023–2024, available data indicate that 36 per cent of AFOLU finance was directed to agriculture, 28 per cent to forestry and 8 per cent to policy, national budget support and capacity building, while the quality of data for over a quarter of flows was of insufficient quality to identify sectoral trends.

180. The thematic focus of climate finance flows across the AFOLU sector is mixed. Over 2023–2024, 43 per cent targets mitigation as the only objective, 29 per cent targets adaptation as the only objective, and 28 per cent targets both adaptation and mitigation. Recognizing the cross-cutting nature of activities across the AFOLU sector, this mix is expected, although reporting approaches may underrepresent the truly cross-cutting nature and wider benefits of such actions.

181. Most of the finance reported in the AFOLU sector is public finance (86 per cent on average over 2023–2024), reflecting higher coverage in tracking these flows relative to private finance as well as the barriers and limitations to attracting private finance to these sectors. Tracked finance is also significantly international, reflecting the significant data gap in tracking domestic finance.

71) The scope of the AFOLU sector for the purpose of global analysis is narrower than the broader agrifood systems definition applied in CPI's Landscape of Climate Finance for Agrifood Systems, which also captures climate finance across the wider value chain, including food processing, transport, storage, retail and consumption. See: <https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/landscape-of-climate-finance-for-agrifood-systems-2025/>

Table 2.5

Estimates of global climate finance in agriculture, forestry and other land-use sectors (2017–2024)

(Billions of USD, current, annualized)

Source	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
CPI: total	29.3	20.0	15.5	20.6	37.0	25.9	23.3	20.5
Of which public	26.8	19.8	14.7	17.8	29.6	22.2	19.8	18.1
Of which private	2.5	0.2	0.7	2.8	7.4	3.7	3.5	2.4
Agriculture	0.7	0.8	5.6	7.4	7.7	9.6	7.0	8.9
Food and dietary measures	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Forestry	11.5	4.2	5.7	9.6	18.6	7.6	6.2	6.0
Fisheries	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.3
Policy and national budget support and capacity building	0.0	0.0	0.3	1.0	2.1	3.1	2.5	0.8
Other/unknown	17.1	15.0	3.7	2.5	8.6	5.5	7.5	4.5

Source: CPI (2026b).

182. Broader evidence highlights the importance and scale of wider finance sources in this sector. UNEP's *State of Finance for Nature* report series highlights domestic public finance – specifically domestic budgets and expenditures at the national and subnational levels – as the most stable, sustainable and significant source of funding for nature. UNEP also estimates nature-related private finance flows at USD 23.4 billion in 2024, particularly from biodiversity offsets, bonds and funds, certified commodity supply chains, and payments for ecosystem services (UNEP, 2026). This estimate is an order of magnitude higher than the tracked private climate finance to the AFOLU sector presented in this report, reflecting differences in scope (noting that not all nature-related activities can be considered to have climate objectives) and accounting methodologies. Despite these differences, such information is nevertheless indicative of the scale of data gaps.

183. UNEP's *State of Finance for Forests* estimates forest finance flows using public and private finance data from certified commodity supply chains, impact investing, carbon markets, biodiversity credits and offsets, private philanthropic contributions to forests, and private investments mobilized by public finance. It estimates total forest finance of USD 84.5 billion in 2023, of which domestic public finance for forests is estimated at USD 75 billion and total private finance flows USD 7.5 billion (UNEP, 2025b).

184. The OECD DAC tracks development finance for the Sustainable Ocean Economy, which, while not all climate-

relevant, provides some insight into related finance for fisheries and coastal ecosystem protection. In 2024, ODA for marine protection was estimated at USD 8.1 billion, while ODA for sustainable fisheries practices was estimated at USD 5.4 billion (OECD DAC, n.d.).

185. CPI has developed a methodology to track the agrifood landscape, which extends the definition of AFOLU to also include food and diets, biodiversity, land and marine ecosystems, looking across the entire value chain from production to processing to distribution, consumption and food waste. It estimates that project-level climate finance to agrifood systems reached USD 94.9 billion in 2021–2022 (CPI, 2025h).

186. Overall, important data gaps continue to constrain a full assessment of AFOLU and nature finance (including ocean finance for marine ecosystem conservation and sustainable fisheries), while wider data sources shed light on the potential scale of data gaps. CPI highlights persistent weaknesses in the tracking of domestic public expenditure, domestic private investment, and inconsistent classifications across agriculture, forestry, land restoration and related adaptation activities (CPI, 2025e).

2.2.9. Investment across all other sectors

187. **Cross-cutting sectors**, including general policy, national budget and capacity building support, disaster-risk management, biodiversity, land and

marine conservation, information and communication technology and waste, account for an average of USD 102 billion per year over 2023–2024. Of this total, 64 per cent is unspecified, reflecting lower-quality data.

188. Climate finance for waste is estimated at USD 16.3 billion in 2023 and USD 10.1 billion in 2024, of which almost three-quarters was private finance, predominantly from international corporations. Finance targeted mitigation or both adaptation and mitigation objectives.

189. Climate finance for information and communications technology (ICT) is estimated at USD 0.9 billion in 2023 and USD 2.0 billion in 2024, focused on mitigation objectives and all public finance, largely through multilateral development finance institutions.

2.2.10. Trends in non-primary global climate finance flows

190. CPI's GLCF methodology and the total estimates of climate finance presented in the preceding sections of section 2.2 are based on capturing only real economy investments (also referred to as primary capital flows). To avoid double counting, secondary market transactions (non-primary flows) are therefore not categorically included in CPI's analysis. These include aggregated estimates of carbon market and biodiversity offset transactions, proceeds from financial instruments such as sustainability-linked bonds⁷² and equity, and investment in the technology development value chain, including research and development and manufacturing facilities. Such flows can, however, be considered significant as financial instruments for catalysing climate finance or as indicators of future market development and growth. This section therefore provides an overview of trends associated with non-primary climate finance flows.

191. Carbon markets and pricing: Finance can flow through compliance markets and regulated carbon pricing, providing revenues for public budgets (i.e. emissions trading systems (ETS) and carbon taxes); through project finance and credit purchases from international cooperation or voluntary carbon markets; and through national offsets, driven in particular by corporate demand. The World Bank reports that ETS and carbon tax revenues contributing to public budgets (largely in developed economies) reached USD 104 billion, USD 105 billion and USD 107 billion in 2023,

2024 and 2025, respectively (World Bank, 2024g; 2026). Over the past decade, average carbon prices have nearly doubled, from USD 10/t CO₂ eq in 2016 to USD 21/t CO₂ eq in 2026. However, the World Bank highlights that recent disruptions to global commodity markets and potential adjustments to trading schemes and carbon taxes could be highly significant over 2026–2027.

192. Ecosystem Marketplace reports that total reported transaction value of the Voluntary Carbon Market (VCM), mobilizing both public and private finance, was USD 755 million and USD 535 million in 2023 and 2024, respectively (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2025). This is below the highest observed level of USD 2.1 billion in 2021, which was noted as an exceptional period. Ecosystem Marketplace points to supply and demand volatility and transition in the VCM market from older methodologies to new supplies of credits that demonstrate higher integrity, noting that projects with high ratings or high integrity labels are increasingly sought by buyers in both compliance and voluntary carbon credit markets. Nature-based solutions (including REDD+) continue to grow in market share, with a growing premium on removal credits, including engineered solutions, in particular biochar. Emerging approaches are also complementing carbon finance through co-benefit certifications and results-based payment mechanisms, such as biodiversity offsets, and approaches which prioritize ecosystem recovery, poverty reduction and community engagement alongside carbon accounting. New demand for VCMs is also evolving, including through interdependencies between compliance and voluntary markets. For example, under the International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), established in 2016, eligible credits began trading in 2024 under its first compliance phase.

193. Article 6 of the Paris Agreement established the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM), a new international market-based carbon mechanism (and its successor the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism) to enable international cooperation to tackle climate change and unlock financial support for developing countries. The Article 6.4 Supervisory Body is tasked with supervising the requirements and processes needed to operationalize the mechanism, including developing and approving standards, tools and guidelines, supported by a Methodological Experts Panel. In 2024, core elements of Article 6.4 were agreed, and

72) CPI's GLCF methodology does however use proceeds from green bonds from the LGX dataset as a supplementary data source.

the first credit issuance under Article 6.4 was made in February 2026 to a clean cooking project in Myanmar, coordinated with authorized participants from the Republic of Korea.⁷³ Under Article 6.2 and provisions for bilateral trade in Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs), Switzerland and Thailand realized the first transfer of Article 6.2 carbon credits⁷⁴ in 2024.

194. Green and sustainability-linked bonds: Bonds play a central role in mobilizing climate finance by enabling governments, development banks and corporations to raise large-scale, long-term capital from institutional investors for low-carbon and climate-resilient projects. Green bonds, social bonds, sustainability bonds and sustainability-linked bonds channel proceeds or performance incentives toward eligible climate and environmental projects, and towards broader social objectives. Country frameworks for such bonds set eligibility and drive incentives (see section 1.2.4). The Climate Bonds Initiative estimates that Green, Social, Sustainability and Sustainability-linked bonds (GSS+) reached USD 1.0 trillion in 2025, wherein Green bonds amounted to USD 671 billion in 2024 and USD 654 billion in 2025 (CBI, 2026). CPI's methodology, GLCF reports and the total estimated global climate finance flows reported in the preceding section 2.2 incorporate green bond data (but not sustainability-linked bonds) where these estimates can fill data gaps by approximating primary investment flows in sectors where underlying project-level finance data is unavailable, primarily in sectors such as waste, water and wastewater, transport, AFOLU, and adaptation.

195. Research, Development and Deployment (RD&D) and manufacturing: Spending on low-carbon research, development and demonstration (RD&D) has experienced sustained growth in the past decade but is now slowing. The IEA estimate global public energy RD&D budgets for low-carbon activities reach USD 40.8 billion in 2023 and USD 42.6 billion in 2024 (IEA, 2026d). The IEA World Energy Investment report presents for the first time estimates for investment trends in clean energy technology manufacturing from companies, venture capital funds and governments, which peaked in 2023 at USD 227 billion for batteries, EVs and renewable energy technologies driven by investments from China, the EU and USA, but where manufacturing investments in particular from China in solar PV and wind declined

in 2024 and 2025, stabilizing at approximately USD 200 billion (IEA 2026a; 2026c). The TOSSD framework is emerging as a new data source for tracking Research & Development flows for SDG 13 across a range of sectors, whereby partial estimates for climate-related R&D expenditures from a limited number of countries reporting⁷⁵ reached USD 2.8 billion and USD 4.7 billion in 2023 and 2024 respectively.

196. Insurance: Insurance is primarily a risk-transfer and de-risking tool rather than a primary channel of climate-finance investment flows, as finance materializes only when claims are paid out; however, insurance can catalyse and mobilize climate-related investments by reducing risk for investors and borrowers. The insurance market is also innovating to respond to climate-related risks and supporting climate-resilience, such as through parametric insurance schemes for coastal ecosystems and communities which enable faster disaster recovery through the provision of immediate liquidity after an extreme weather event and the de-risking of payments and obligations (including blue carbon credits) in the event of disruption. CPI's GLCF methodology and the global climate finance estimates presented in preceding sections exclude insurance instruments and actual climate-related insurance flows on the basis that they do not capture real-economy investments. Given the rapidly growing global insurance market and expanding insurance flows that enable climate resilience, this presents an emerging methodological and data gap in current global climate finance estimates.

2.2.11. Trends in domestic public climate finance flows

197. Climate finance data from national and subnational governments on domestic public finance remains limited, as reflected in chapter 1 (section 1.2.4). While there is a growing prevalence of domestic budget tagging and tracking approaches, as of August 2026 only 34 countries have been identified as publicly self-reporting on their domestic budget investments and expenditures during the 2023–2024 period (for one or both years). In addition, estimates for eight other countries is available for the 2023–2024 reporting period through other sources of information. Annex F provides a summary of estimates of domestic budget expenditure

73) UN Climate Change, "UN carbon market approves first-ever issuance of credits under the Paris Agreement," 26 February 2026, <https://unfccc.int/news/un-carbon-market-approves-first-ever-issuance-of-credits-under-the-paris-agreement>

74) Thailand's Initial Report under Article 6.2 (submitted to the UNFCCC) Initial report referred to in decision 2/CMA.3, annex, paragraph 4, by Thailand. See: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/202312071650---Article%206.2%20Initial%20Report_Thailand_V1.0.pdf

75) Includes reporting from Australia, Austria, Canada, EU, France, Italy, Poland, Qatar, Sweden and USA. Note not all countries report in each year.

and investments per country, reflecting best efforts to compile available information from individual country budget reports. The limited level of transparency and variety of country-level approaches adopted hinders robust aggregations for a global overview. Available data from 32 jurisdictions in 2023 and 31 jurisdictions in 2024 identifies public climate finance tracked through country-level systems of USD 325 billion on average per year over 2023–2024. This represents a rise since the sixth BA, both in absolute terms and in the number of jurisdictions reporting. Public climate finance was estimated at an average of USD 281 billion per year over 2021–22, based on estimates from 24 jurisdictions in 2021 and 27 jurisdictions in 2022 (see figure 2.11). The increase is predominantly attributed to a greater number of countries reporting. However, reported information remains limited; for example, only 11–14 countries reported mitigation- and/or adaptation-specific thematic allocations each year. Of climate finance tracked through country-level systems in 2023–2024, 6 per cent (USD 20.4 billion) was reported as adaptation-related and 28 per cent (USD 90.3 billion) as mitigation-related, with information unavailable for the remaining 66 per cent.


198. A significant limitation of the available information from country-level reporting systems relates to the lack of clarity or disaggregated data needed to distinguish between reported domestic public finance and international finance provided and/or received. Such information is necessary for aggregate reporting exercises, such as this BA, to identify domestic public finance tracked through country-level systems. From a sample of nine jurisdictions for which information is available⁷⁶ (six in 2023 and six in 2024), identifiable domestic public climate finance is estimated at an average of USD 169 billion per year over 2023–2024, representing 87–100 per cent of reported total public climate finance budgets/expenditures across the jurisdictions reporting. Reconciling country-level reporting for a limited subset of countries with global estimates is challenging, in particular due to difficulties in assessing potential double counting with public subsidies and market-reported private investment flows. The extent to which country-level reporting closes the domestic public finance gap within global estimates cannot therefore be quantified. However, a considerable share of these reported flows is likely to be additional to global estimates presented in this report.⁷⁷

76) Nine jurisdictions: Austria, Colombia, EU, France, Ghana, Honduras, Ireland, New Zealand, and Uzbekistan.

77) For example, analysis by the authors on a sample of 3 European countries and the EU, identified domestic public climate finance from country-level reporting as USD 167 billion on average per year 2023–2024, whilst reported domestic public climate finance flows included in global estimates in CPI's GLCF and this report for all of Western Europe reached USD 69 billion.

Figure 2.11

Public climate finance from country-level reporting and identified domestic public climate finance (Billions of USD, annualized / number of jurisdictions reporting)




Source: See annex F, compilation of available information by UNFCCC SCF Secretariat on a best-effort basis.

199. As a complementary source of information, the OECD's Subnational Climate-Expenditure Tracking provides indicative estimates of climate-significant expenditure and investment across OECD and EU countries based on harmonized national accounts data (see chapter 1, section 1.2.4). The OECD reports that, between 2010 and 2023, subnational governments' climate-significant expenditures and investments


increased by an average of 2.3 per cent and 2.5 per cent annually, with wide disparities across countries observed, as illustrated for 2023 in the figure 2.12. In 2023, subnational governments accounted for, on average, 60 per cent of public climate-significant expenditure and 68 per cent of public climate-significant investment across 33 OECD and EU countries, representing 1.4 per cent and 0.4 per cent of GDP, respectively (OECD, 2026).

Figure 2.12

Subnational climate-expenditure and investment of OECD and EU countries
(Billions of USD, annualized, 2021–2023)



(2023 billions of USD, per person, and percentage GDP)



Source: OECD Subnational Climate-Expenditure Tracking (2026)

200. A further complementary source of domestic finance information can be gathered from cofinancing data across key funds such as the GEF and GCF. While data is not systematically tracked or aggregated, studies such as GEF's Evaluation of Cofinancing highlight that recipient country governments are the most important source of cofinancing for GEF activities, especially for national projects. Climate change mitigation and adaptation projects reported cofinancing commitments of 32 percent and 40 per cent, respectively, over the GEF-6 and GEF-7 phases (GEF IEO, 2025). Across UNFCCC Funds, CPI estimate that over 2019–2023, 17 per cent of project finance was from national governments and 2 per cent from national development banks (CPI, 2025i).

2.3. Climate finance flows from developed to developing countries

201. This section provides information on public and private climate finance flows from developed to developing countries for 2023 and 2024, drawing on the range of information sources outlined in chapter 1. It presents data on climate finance provided through bilateral and multilateral channels (including multilateral funds and MDBs), private finance mobilized, other private finance (where data are available), followed by data from the recipient perspective. As this BA draws on official reporting from the first Biennial Transparency Reports (BTR1s) for 2021–2022 for the first time, sections 2.3.1–2.3.3 also present details of this reporting.

202. International public climate finance data are assessed to be comprehensive and of high quality, based on official reporting by government agencies, DFIs and MDBs, supported by the definitions, methodologies and data systems outlined in chapter 1. In comparison, data on private finance flows from developed –to developing countries are limited, given their often confidential nature and the scarcity of information related to origin and, therefore, the ability to attribute private finance to developed countries. An exception is official reporting on private finance mobilized by international public interventions. Estimates are consolidated and summarized in section 2.3.5, including breakdowns of inflows and outflows, attribution approaches and corresponding estimates. However, aggregate estimates are not presented, given the range of approaches, data quality limitations and data gaps (see table 2.1(cont.)).

203. Climate finance flows from developed to developing countries are a subset of global climate finance flows, and the range of estimates can be broader than the sources

of information and reporting relevant to the USD 100 billion goal, as presented in the SCF's *3rd Progress Report* (SCF 2026b).

2.3.1. Bilateral flows

Climate-specific finance reported by Parties

204. This section provides an overview of official climate finance data submitted by Parties under the reporting systems of the Convention and the Paris Agreement. For full transparency, data submitted by Parties is presented with a focus on Parties that shall provide such information in line with the respective decisions and reporting guidelines of the Convention and the Paris Agreement (Annex II Parties under the Convention reporting system and developed country Parties under the ETF of the Paris Agreement, respectively). Information on data submitted by other Parties voluntarily is also covered in section 2.4 on South–South cooperation on climate finance

205. In their first BTRs under the ETF of the Paris Agreement, 42 Parties submitted official data on financial support provided and mobilized in the years 2021 and 2022. This data replaces the preliminary data published in the sixth BA for the same reporting years. The second BTRs, covering the years 2023 and 2024, are due to be submitted at the end of 2026. In preparing the seventh BA, Parties were invited to provide preliminary estimates for climate finance provided, mobilized and received in 2023 and 2024. Ten Parties provided preliminary data, and publicly available data were gathered for a further 22 Parties.

206. It is important to note that the preliminary data published in this report are subject to change after the official submissions are made at the end of 2026. Due to the partial and provisional nature of the preliminary data, analysis is limited to overall climate-specific aggregates by channel and theme (e.g. mitigation and adaptation), while analysis of geographical and instrument breakdowns is provided for the years up to 2022.

207. Preliminary and partial data on climate-specific financial support provided and mobilized by 32 Parties stood at USD 60.3 billion in 2023 and USD 56.7 billion in 2024, averaging USD 58.5 billion annually (figure 2.13). Almost all of the finance (99.9 per cent) was reported by developed country Parties. On a comparative basis, with the same set of reporting Parties, this represents a 7 per cent increase compared with the annual average of USD


54.4 billion in 2021–2022.

208. In the first BTR reporting period, covering 2021 and 2022, USD 55.9 billion and USD 74.4 billion, respectively, in climate-specific financial support was provided and mobilized. Of this support, 97 per cent was reported by 26 developed country Parties, with the remainder by

15 other Parties reporting on a voluntary basis and one unspecified Party.⁷⁸ When assessed on a comparable basis with data for 2019 and 2020, this represents a significant increase of 20 per cent, applying the same set of Parties and excluding finance mobilized data in 2021 and 2022 from the calculation.

Figure 2.13

Climate-specific financial support provided and mobilized as reported by Parties in official reporting (2019–2022) and preliminary estimates (2023–2024)



Source: Data for 2019 and 2020 are sourced from fifth biennial reports of 35 Parties (24 Annex II Parties and 11 other Annex I Parties); data for 2021 and 2022 are sourced from the first BTRs of 42 Parties (26 developed country Parties and 15 other Parties and 1 unspecified); and data for 2023 and 2024 are based on individual preliminary data estimates from 10 Parties and publicly available information from 22 Parties (EEA 2026).

Note: Preliminary data are partial and provisional and subject to change once official data are submitted by the end of 2026. Under the reporting guidelines for biennial reports, Annex II Parties to the UNFCCC shall report on financial support provided to developing countries. Under the ETF of the Paris Agreement, developed country Parties shall report on financial support provided and mobilized to developing countries. Other Parties are encouraged to report on a voluntary basis. Given the differences in reporting formats and guidelines, it is not possible to compare trends between the years before and after 2020. For preliminary data, Parties were referred to as developed country Parties or other Parties according to their first BTRs.

209. Climate-specific finance delivered through bilateral, regional and other channels represented 64 per cent of total climate-specific finance in the first BTR reporting period over 2021 and 2022, averaging USD 40.8 billion annually (figure 2.13). Despite fewer Parties reporting, preliminary data for 2023 and 2024 reveals similar annual levels of USD 40.9 billion on average, indicating a likely increase once full and official data is reported.

Finance delivered through multilateral channels, which generally consist of Parties' contributions or inflows to multilateral climate funds and multilateral development banks, stood at 16 per cent (averaging USD 11.0 billion annually). On an annual basis, these inflows represent a smaller volume than the outflows from the same multilateral institutions to climate projects in developing countries (see section 2.3.2 below). Core general

78) "Other Parties" provided a clear statement that they were reporting on financial support provided on a voluntary basis as "other Parties", or underwent the technical expert review in line with the requirements of reporting as Other Parties, or had also submitted information on financial support needed and received by developing country Parties. Parties for which it was unclear whether the Parties were reporting as developed country Parties or "other Parties" are categorized as "Unspecified". 0.02 per cent of financial support (USD 14.8 million) was reported by Parties for which it was unclear whether the Parties were reporting as developed country Parties or "other Parties".


contributions to multilateral institutions that Parties are able to confirm as climate-specific remained stable, at USD 11–14 billion over the period.

210. Finance mobilized by public interventions represented 25 per cent in the first BTRs despite only

22 Parties reporting under these formats for the first time. Data on finance mobilized is less available in preliminary data, representing 11 per cent of the total, compared with 19 per cent of support delivered through multilateral channels and 70 per cent through bilateral, regional and other channels.

Figure 2.14

Climate-specific financial support provided and mobilized through different channels by theme (Billions of USD)



Source: Data for 2019 and 2020 are sourced from the fifth biennial reports of 35 Parties (24 Annex II Parties and 11 other Annex I Parties); data for 2021 and 2022 are sourced from first BTRs of 42 Parties (26 developed country Parties, 15 other Parties and 1 unspecified); and data for 2023 and 2024 are based on individual preliminary data estimates from 10 Parties and publicly available information of 22 Parties (EEA 2026).

Note: Preliminary data are partial and provisional and subject to change once official data are submitted by the end of 2026. Given differences in reporting formats for the 2019–2020 and 2021–2022 periods, as well as the partial and provisional preliminary data for 2023–2024, data on the share of total climate-specific finance are not comparable across the years.


211. Mitigation finance continued to account for the largest share of climate-specific finance delivered through bilateral channels, representing 53 per cent of the annual average for 2021–2022 (figure 2.14). Finance for cross-cutting activities that contribute to both adaptation and mitigation objectives saw a significant increase, accounting for 25 per cent of finance compared with 12 per cent in 2019–2020, driven by a tripling of finance for this theme in 2022. Meanwhile, finance for adaptation held a share of 22 per cent in 2021–2022 compared to 2019–2020, although absolute volumes remained stable over the two periods. Preliminary data for 2023–2024 indicates a rebound of adaptation finance, with an 18 per cent increase in absolute volumes and a 26 per cent share

in finance delivered through bilateral, regional and other channels.

212. At the geographical level, the majority of climate-specific bilateral finance for 2021–2022 was channelled through Asia (36 per cent; annual average USD 14.7 billion), followed by Africa (24 per cent; annual average USD 9.9 billion), Americas (12 per cent; annual average USD 4.9 billion), Europe (3 per cent) and Oceania (1 per cent). 17 per cent of bilateral flows was allocated to global projects or to unspecified regions; 15 per cent (or USD 6.1 billion) of the bilateral climate finance flow was allocated to least developed countries; and 3 per cent (or USD 1.1 billion) went to SIDs (figure 2.15).

Figure 2.15

Geographic distribution of bilateral climate finance flow 2021–2022



Note: Bilateral finance provided: USD 40.8 billion per year 2021–2022

213. Parties can report a variety of financial instruments used to provide financial support, including grants, concessional and non-concessional loans, equity and guarantees. In delivering climate-specific financial support through bilateral channels, grant-based instruments accounted for the largest share at 39 per cent in 2021–2022. Concessional loans accounted for 29 per cent, while for loans for which it was not specified whether they were concessional or non-concessional accounted for 15 per cent. Non-concessional loans and equity accounted for 4 per cent each, and insurance represented 3 per cent.


214. 48 per cent of the total adaptation finance was grant-based, while mitigation finance was predominantly

loan-based, accounting for 61 per cent. Other instruments used to provide and mobilize climate finance are equity, insurance while some instruments were not specified (figure 2.16).

215. According to the reporting guidelines, Parties may also report the grant equivalent value of financial support provided to developing country Parties on a voluntary basis. Of the 26 Parties that provided this information, eight reported a grant equivalent value of USD 1.6 billion for non-grant instruments with a face value of USD 8.9 billion. In 2022, 11 Parties reported a grant equivalent value of USD 3.2 billion for non-grant instruments with a face value of USD 18.2 billion.

Figure 2.16

Instruments used for bilateral climate finance flow 2021–2022



Box 2.3

Understanding climate finance financial instruments and mechanisms for climate finance

Climate finance is delivered through a range of financial instruments and leveraging mechanisms. Common instruments include:

- **Grants** – Financial transfers that do not require repayment.
- **Loans and debt instruments** – Repayable financing provided at either concessional or market-based terms.
- **Equity** – Direct investment in projects or companies.
- **Guarantees, insurance and other risk-sharing instruments** – Mechanisms designed to reduce financial risk and mobilize additional investment.
- **Leveraging mechanisms** – Approaches that mobilize, amplify, or redirect additional climate finance beyond the initial public outlay by improving the risk-return profile of investments.
- **Debt-for-climate or debt-for-nature swaps** – Debt swaps

redirect a portion of sovereign debt service toward agreed climate investments, helping create fiscal space.

Climate finance may be extended on concessional or non-concessional terms, whereby different providers apply different definitions and ‘concessional tests’:

- **OECD DAC** classifies a loan as concessional if it meets a minimum grant element, with thresholds that vary by income group and whether the recipient is public or private;
- **MDBs** distinguish concessional from non-concessional finance mainly by the source of funds and the level of subsidy embedded in the terms, with concessional lending typically supported by external grant resources and non-concessional lending offered on near-market terms;
- **The GCF** bases concessional on the minimum subsidy needed to make a project viable, rather than a fixed threshold;
- **The GEF** generally provides grants and other highly concessional finance through specific trust funds and windows.

Forward-looking information in biennial communication under Article 9 paragraph 5 of the Paris Agreement

216. Parties requested the SCF to include in the BA information reported in biennial communications under Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement, as appropriate. Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement states that developed country Parties shall biennially communicate indicative quantitative and qualitative information related to paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 9, as applicable, including, as available, projected levels of public financial resources to be provided to developing country Parties. Other Parties providing resources are encouraged to communicate such information biennially on a voluntary basis. In response to the mandate, Parties submitted their first, second and third biennial communications in 2020, 2022 and 2024 according to the types of information specified in the annex to decision 12/CMA.1. The most recent third compilation and synthesis was considered at the seventh session of the CMA and the thirtieth session of the COP. In addition, Parties agreed to update the types of information to be provided in biennial communications under Article 9, paragraph 5, to reflect how this information may support the implementation of the NCQG.

217. The third compilation and synthesis covers submissions by 37 Parties, an increase from the 35 Parties considered in the second compilation and synthesis. Thirty-one Parties provided ex ante quantitative information on the provision of financial support. Qualitative information related to ensuring country ownership and alignment with needs, as well as access, is covered in sections 3.2 and 3.4. For a more detailed overview, please refer to the third compilation and synthesis report.

218. The nature of the quantitative information on projected levels of climate financial support can vary from an overall funding envelope for a target period (e.g. 2021 to 2025) to an annual target or a target to be reached by a given year. Of 27 Parties providing such information, 19 provided it on an annual basis, and eight on a cumulative basis. Most commitments were ongoing and due to conclude at the end of 2025, while the third biennial communications were being submitted at the end of 2024. Ten Parties provided information on the status of projected levels of climate finance stated in previous biennial communications and emphasized that they are confident in their ability to meet those levels by the end of their stated time frame. Of those 10 Parties, 7 provided information on projected levels by a target year and 3 over an annual time period. Three Parties provided

information on the status against a cumulative target yet to conclude.

219. In their third biennial communications, some Parties reaffirmed their commitment to contributing to achieving the goal of developed country Parties to jointly mobilize USD 100 billion per year by 2020 and through to 2025. Compared with the information in the second biennial communications, seven Parties reported an increase in projected climate finance, while two Parties reported a decrease. Some Parties acknowledged the adoption of decision 1/CMA.6 on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance and emphasized their intention to contribute to the mobilization and provision of climate finance thereunder. Three Parties stated that they are in the process of determining their climate finance contributions in this regard

220. Many Parties detailed efforts to achieve a balance between mitigation and adaptation finance. In total, 13 Parties provided information on efforts to at least double their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation from 2019 levels by 2025, in the context of achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation in the provision of scaled-up financial resources, recalling Article 9, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement. Three Parties emphasized their commitment to at least tripling their contributions to adaptation finance, while four Parties reported allocating more than 50 per cent of grant-equivalent bilateral support to adaptation. Some Parties reported that they provide climate finance through multilateral climate funds such as the AF and the GCF, which often have targets aimed at achieving a balance in the provision of mitigation and adaptation finance.

221. Many Parties outlined a range of approaches to mobilizing additional climate finance from a wide variety of sources, including through public-private partnerships, deploying de-risking instruments and supporting developing countries in creating enabling environments conducive to attracting private investment. Some Parties specified quantitative ambitions for private climate finance mobilization:

222. Most Parties identified challenges and barriers in relation to mobilizing and delivering climate finance, in particular relating to annual budget cycles that limit the ability to provide long-term climate finance projections, different planning cycles between contributor and partner countries, and difficulties in accessing climate finance for the LDCs and SIDS. Debt vulnerabilities, exchange rate fluctuations, high inflation rates, varying technical capacities of implementing partners, and gaps

in regulatory frameworks were also cited as constraints on private sector investment. Several Parties reported exploring multi-annual arrangements for multilateral climate funds and individual climate projects as a way to improve the predictability of climate finance flows despite annual parliamentary approval requirements.

Bilateral climate-related development finance reported by OECD DAC

223. Bilateral climate-related development finance to ODA-eligible countries, as reported to the OECD DAC by its members, as well as by Croatia, Liechtenstein and Monaco, following the Rio marker approach, reached USD 37.5–65.1 billion in 2023 and USD 24.0–58.9 billion in 2024. The lower bound reflects finance targeting climate as a principal objective, while the upper bound reflects total finance targeting climate as a principal and/or significant objective. Of total climate-related development finance over 2023–2024, 50 per cent was identified as targeting climate change as a principal objective (OECD DAC CRDF dataset,⁷⁹ 2026).

224. The OECD DAC CRS also tracks finance on a grant equivalent basis. In 2024, total bilateral climate-related development finance on a grant equivalent basis from OECD DAC members, as well as that reported by Croatia, Liechtenstein and Monaco, amounted to USD 14.9–39.8 billion. The lower bound reflects finance targeting climate as a principal objective, while the upper bound reflected finance targeting climate as a principal and/or significant objective.⁸⁰

Bilateral climate finance reported by Oxfam

225. Oxfam, in its *Climate Finance Shadow* report series, makes its own assessment of climate-specific finance based on adjustments to the OECD DAC CRDF Rio marker data through the use of coefficients, in addition to discounting loans to deduct the estimated debt service repayment (including principal and interest payments), to approximate grant-equivalent values. Oxfam's estimated bilateral climate-specific 'net-assistance' reached USD 21.6–30.7 billion in 2023 and USD 18.9–28.0 billion in 2024, a 44–48 per cent increase compared to 2021–22 estimates. The range reflects Oxfam's methodology, which adjusts Rio marker data and is not comparable to the OECD DAC climate-related development finance range based on the Rio marker categories (see Oxfam (2026) and SCF (2026b) for details).

Bilateral climate finance reported by the OECD

226. The OECD, in its *Climate Finance and the USD 100 Billion Goal* report series, focuses on reporting climate finance provided and mobilized by developed countries for climate action in developing countries. For bilateral flows, the OECD aggregates bilateral public climate finance data based on countries' advance reporting to the OECD of information in their UNFCCC BR/BTR reports (or equivalent) for the purpose of aligning the OECD report series with national approaches to reporting to the UNFCCC on climate finance provided. The OECD estimates bilateral climate-specific finance reached USD 50.2 billion in 2023 and USD 43.9 billion in 2024 (see OECD (2026) and SCF (2026b) for details).

Bilateral climate finance reported by the International Development Finance Club (IDFC)

227. IDFC's latest reporting outlines bilateral climate finance flows from its OECD-based Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) to projects in non-OECD countries, where finance reached USD 29.8 billion in 2023 and USD 19.2 billion in 2024, with 2023 a notable peak compared to average finance levels of 2019–22. The majority of IDFC's climate finance is committed by non-OECD countries to domestic finance and mitigation, while OECD members prioritize adaptation and cross-cutting projects to a greater extent in their international financing (see chapter 3) (IDFC, 2024; 2025).

Climate-related officially supported export credits reported by the OECD

228. The OECD Export Credit Group collates statistics on climate-related, officially supported export credits provided and reported by its members. Climate-related export credits remain small but reached an average of USD 5.1 billion on average over 2023–24, a significant increase from the 2021–2022 average of USD 2.2 billion, driven by a small number of large projects (OECD, 2026a).

2.3.2. Multilateral flows

229. Multilateral climate funds under the UNFCCC include flows channelled by the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, which also serve the Paris Agreement (the GCF and the GEF); the new Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD); funds serving the Convention and the Paris Agreement (the LDCF and the SCCF); and the Adaptation Fund, established

79) Includes ODA, Non-export Credit OOF and PSI.

80) From OECD DAC CRS, where total bilateral climate-related development finance on a commitment basis was USD 60.8 billion in 2024, and where coverage of data set is not directly comparable with the OECD DAC CRDF dataset.

under the Kyoto Protocol and also serving the Paris Agreement. In addition, a number of multilateral climate funds operated by other institutions also exist, including those operating under the Climate Investment Funds (CIF), those administered by the World Bank and, most recently, the IMF Resilience and Sustainability Trust (see list of identified MCFs for the purpose of this BA in annex G), alongside climate-related finance flowing through broader multilateral and international organizations.

230. Multilateral climate finance through the MDBs include those channelled by the AfDB, ADB, AIIB, Council of Europe Development Bank, EBRD, EIB, IDBG, IsDB, NDB and World Bank Group.

231. Multilateral flows can be measured as ‘inflows’ from providers (i.e. country donors), or ‘outflows’ to recipients, and on a ‘pledge’, ‘deposit’, ‘commitment’, ‘approvals’ or ‘disbursement’ basis (see chapter 1 for further details). This section presents further information on data reported by Parties on climate-specific finance delivered through multilateral channels (generally consisting of inflows to multilateral institutions), based on the BTR data shown in section 2.3.1, and provides an overview of the outflows reported by the multilateral institutions themselves, typically on a project approval or commitment basis unless otherwise stated. Multilateral outflows can also be attributed to developed or developing countries (see table 2.7, table 2.8 and table 2.10 for attributed levels).

Further information on climate-specific inflows to multilateral institutions reported by Parties

232. As noted above, the climate-specific finance delivered through multilateral channels reported by Parties was USD 9.7 billion in 2021 and USD 10.6 billion in 2022. Inflows were recorded at USD 6.7 billion in 2021 and USD 8 billion in 2022, while outflows, consisting mainly of the EU reporting of financing by the European Investment Bank to projects in developing countries, stood at USD 3.1 billion in 2021 and USD 2.7 billion in 2022.

233. This climate-specific multilateral finance includes is inflows to multilateral climate funds (49 per cent), multilateral financial institutions (36 per cent), specialized UN bodies (6 per cent), while remaining multilateral flows were either reported as ‘other institutions’ or were not specified. Parties also reported core general contributions averaging USD 11.3 billion in 2021–2022, which Parties were not able to confirm as climate-specific (USD 12 billion in 2019–2020). Of multilateral core inflows, 67 per cent are contributions to MDBs, IFIs and regional development banks, while 20 per cent are contributions to multilateral climate funds and 8 per cent to specialized

UN bodies.

234. The majority of climate-specific multilateral inflows (71 per cent) were reported as global allocations. The recipient region, country or organizations for multilateral finance are reported mostly for earmarked multilateral finance. Africa received the largest share of outflows (30 per cent) from the multilateral channels. Asia received 23 per cent of outflow share, followed by Americas (11 per cent) and Europe (19 per cent).

235. The finance from the multilateral channel remains significantly grant-based. The climate-specific inflows are predominantly grant-based, with 95 per cent of finance for adaptation activities provided in the form of grants in 2021–2022, while cross-cutting mitigation finance had a 96 per cent grant component.

Further information on multilateral climate funds reported by funds and aggregators

236. Table 2.6 provides a summary of projects and financing approved by multilateral climate funds by the end 2025, as collated by the Climate Funds Update (CFU), in addition to supplementary data from the OECD DAC CRDF dataset. The funds are categorized thematically as adaptation funds, REDD+ funds, mitigation funds and multiple objective/cross-cutting funds. Annex G provides further detail by individual fund.

237. Multilateral climate funds approved projects in developing countries with a combined total of USD 8.7 billion in 2023 and USD 7.5 billion in 2024. The annual average over 2023–2024 (USD 8.1 billion) was almost double the 2021–2022 average (USD 4.1 billion), owing to a significant scaling up of the level of project approvals from the GCF, IFAD and IMF’s Resilience and Sustainability Trust.

238. Project approvals through the ‘UNFCCC Funds’ (GCF, GEF, AF, LDCE, and SCCF) to climate projects were estimated at USD 2.4 billion in 2023 and USD 2.9 billion in 2024. In CFU’s consolidation of project approval data, GEF projects targeting only climate change focal areas are captured, while cross-cutting projects targeting multiple focal areas are not reflected.

239. The OECD DAC CRDF tracks both inflows and outflows (on a commitment basis) to MCF, including UNFCCC funds, where inflows to UNFCCC Funds from developed countries are recorded as USD 4.6 billion in 2023 and USD 3.1 billion in 2024. Tables 2.8 and 2.10 in the following sections presents both inflows and outflows from developed to developing countries and South–

South providers, respectively. In addition to reporting on MCFs, estimates are included for inflows to and outflows from multilateral organizations and broader funds that report to OECD DAC CRS on climate-related flows, such as the FAO, UNDP and UNEP, Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research Fund (CGIAR Fund), Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and Joint Sustainable Development Goals Fund.

240. Looking forward, financing from multilateral climate funds is expected to rise, based on preliminary 2025 estimates, pledges and new replenishment rounds reported by CFU and the respective funds:

- The total value of projects approved under UNFCCC Funds, consolidated by CFU, reached USD 3.9 billion in 2025.
- Under the GCF, approvals reached a record level of USD 3.3 billion in 2025 (GCF, 2026). In terms of inflows, the period since the sixth BA has seen the announced pledges for the GCF second replenishment for the years 2024 to 2027 decline from USD 12.7 billion to USD 10.6 billion, although the number of contributing countries has risen from 32 to 35, one country communicated their withdrawal of their announced pledge for GCF-2.⁸¹ To date, confirmed pledges equate to USD 10.0 billion, and received contributions to date (as of July 2026) are USD 5.5 billion (GCF, 2026). Recent announcements indicate confirmed pledges are due to reduce further to approximately USD 9 billion.⁸² The GCF '50by30' vision is for the GCF to efficiently and impactfully manage a USD 50 billion portfolio by 2030, up from a cumulative portfolio of USD 19.3 billion in 2025 (GCF, 2025).
- Under the Green Environment Facility (GEF), climate project approvals tracked by CFU are estimated at USD 63 million in 2025, while climate-related projects approved in FY25 (reported by the GEF) reached USD 738 million. Announced pledges total USD 3.9 billion for the GEF over its ninth replenishment period (GEF-9, 2026-30) (GEF, 2026), with a proposed 9 per cent allocation to the Climate Change Focal Area. In addition, the GEF prioritizes integrated programmes and has targets of 80 per cent for climate-related financing (based on the Rio markers), 65 per cent for mitigation, and 45 per cent for adaptation, as well as allocating 35 per cent of resources to LDCs and SIDS.⁸³
- The Adaptation Fund (AF), Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) raise funds annually. Climate adaptation project approvals tracked by CFU reached USD 209 million, USD 239 million and USD 15 million, respectively, in 2025. In 2025, new pledges were made to the AF (USD 135 million),⁸⁴ LDCF (USD 45 million)⁸⁵ and SCCF (USD 2 million)⁸⁶ (GEF, 2025).
- The new Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) was established at COP 27 and operationalized at COP 28. Given its recent establishment, no inflows, project approvals or outflows are recorded up to 2024 in the headline data presented in the table 2.7. It is, however, noted that, to date, a total of USD 823 million has been pledged by 27 partners, of which signed contribution agreements have reached USD 631 million from 25 partners⁸⁷ and USD 486 million had been received as at July 2026 (FRLD, 2026). Financial flows will be recorded in future reporting

81) See <https://www.greenclimate.fund/about/news-and-updates/green-climate-fund-statement-united-states-withdrawal-gcf>

82) On 12 May 2026, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland informed the GCF Secretariat of its decision to reduce its original pledge for the second replenishment period of GCF (GCF-2) from GBP 1.62 billion to GBP 815 million. Once the contribution agreement is formally amended to reflect this change, the relevant database and documents will be updated accordingly. <https://www.greenclimate.fund/board-document/gcf-b42-inf09>

83) See: GEF_R.9.21_GEF-9 Programming Scenarios and Global Environmental Benefits Targets.pdf

84) See <https://www.adaptation-fund.org/adaptation-fund-year-in-review-2025/>.

85) See <https://www.iied.org/shrinking-pot-how-can-ldc-climate-fund-keep-targets>.

86) See <https://www.nrdc.org/resources/climate-funds-pledge-tracker>.

87) See: <https://www.frlid.org/funding>

Table 2.6

Overview of projects approved by Multilateral Climate Funds (2017-2025)

(Project approvals (outflows), USD billions, current, annualized)


	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Adaptation funds	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.9	0.4	1.3	0.9	1.8
Mitigation funds	0.8	1.2	0.8	1.6	1.9	0.6	0.3	0.4	1.4
REDD+ funds	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.6
Multiple-objective funds/ cross-cutting projects	1.0	1.7	1.8	1.3	1.4	2.5	7.0	5.9	1.4p*
<i>Total multilateral climate funds</i>	2.6	3.8	3.5	4.0	4.6	3.6	8.7	7.5	5.2p*
<i>Total UNFCCC funds (GCF, GEF, AF, LDCF, and SCCF)</i>	1.3	2.4	2.1	2.8	3.4	1.9	2.4	2.9	3.9

Source: CFU (n.d.), and supplementary data from OECD DAC CRDF (2026) for reporting on the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), IMF Resilience and Sustainability Trust (IMF-RST) and Nordic Development Fund (NDF). *No data is yet available for IFAD, IM-RST and NDF for 2025 and, as such, estimates presented for 2025 are partial.

241. Figure 2.17 illustrates the funding cycle across the principal multilateral climate funds, comparing cumulative pledges, project commitments, disbursements and remaining resources yet to be committed or disbursed. While several funds have substantially increased approvals, sizeable balances remain to be disbursed, reflecting the time required for project preparation, implementation and financial delivery. Differences between pledges, commitments and

disbursements therefore provide an indication of the pace at which resources move through institutional funding cycles. Based on best available data, of the financial pledges made to the UNFCCC funds, 69 per cent (up from 62 per cent in the sixth BA) has already been committed to project activities and 19 per cent (down from 27 per cent in the sixth BA) of pledges remain to be committed. Of project commitments, 40 per cent have been disbursed, and 60 per cent remain to be disbursed.

Figure 2.17

Cumulative pledges, project commitments and disbursements of climate finance (USD millions) through selected multilateral climate funds since 2001

Source: All data retrieved from <https://fiftrustee.worldbank.org/en/about/unit/dfi/fiftrustee/funds>, as at 12 July 2026. Data for GEF provided by the GEF Secretariat, as at 30 June. It includes GEF Climate Change focal area only, covering GEF-5 to GEF-8 period.

Multilateral flows through multilateral development banks reported by funds and aggregators

242. The Joint Report of the MDBs highlighted total public climate finance to low- and middle-income economies of USD 74.7 billion and USD 85.1 billion in 2023 and 2024, respectively (EIB et al., 2026), from MDBs' own and externally managed resources (i.e. trust funds such as the GEF and GCF). This represents an average increase of 42 per cent compared with 2021–22 levels. Most recently, the Joint MDBs reported on 2025 finance levels, where total public climate finance to low- and middle-income economies reached USD 102.6 billion (EIB et al., 2026). MDBs also finance activities of high-income countries, in particular through EIB. These flows are also reported, with a number of HICs being non-Annex I countries and a number of LMICs being Annex I countries. Table 2.8 below presents total MDB climate finance outflows to all countries alongside finance to non-Annex I countries.

243. MDB climate finance outflows are reported to the OECD DAC CRS, in addition to bilateral donors reporting information on core contributions (inflows) to MDBs. As such, the OECD is able to reconcile the reporting of inflows and outflows in order to estimate imputed climate-

related inflows and provide both provider and recipient perspectives on climate-related development finance flows. From the OECD DAC's consolidated CRDF dataset, total multilateral imputed climate-related inflows were estimated at USD 6.6 billion in 2023 and USD 4.8 billion in 2024, and outflows were reported at USD 69.6 in 2023 and USD 74.6 billion in 2024.

244. There are a variety of approaches to estimate the attribution of MDB climate finance to developing countries, including methods from the OECD, CPI and Oxfam (see previous BAs). Table 2.7 below presents the time series of MDB outflows, reported by MDBs and attributable to developed countries, based on the OECD approach, which reflects the most recent and historical replenishment participations by individual countries, as well as, where applicable, the institutions' capacity to raise funds from the capital markets (OECD, 2024b). In 2023 and 2024, MDB outflows to developing countries attributed to developed countries are estimated at USD 48.2 billion and USD 50.5 billion, a 22 per cent increase from 2020–2021 levels. Flows attributed to developing countries are considered as South–South flows (see section 2.4).

Table 2.7**Multilateral climate finance from MDBs to developing countries, and attributable to developed countries**

	Total climate finance outflows reported by MDBs ^{a,b} (reflecting MDB own resources and external resources under management)	Total climate finance outflows reported by MDBs to Non-Annex I Parties ^{a,b} (reflecting MDB own resources and external resources under management)	Total MDB outflows to developing countries reported to OECD ^c (reflecting MDB own resources)	MDB outflows to developing countries attributed to developed countries by OECD ^c	
					Share of total outflows
2021	82.7	43.4	n/k	34.3	n/k
2022	99.7	52.1	66.1	46.9	71%
2023	125.0	65.7	n/k	48.2	n/k
2024	136.6	74.4	71.3	50.5	71%
2025	162.5	90.4	—	—	—

Source: EIB et al. (2024; 2025; 2026). ^aMDB Climate Finance Dashboard (n.d). ^cOECD (2023; 2024; 2026).

Note: Total climate finance outflows reported by MDBs includes outflows to all countries of operation including low-, middle- and high-income countries based on the World Bank Group's classification list. Total MDB outflows to developing countries reported to OECD includes ODA eligible countries and/or non-Annex I Parties. Share of total outflows represents total MDB-attributed outflows per year as a share of total MDB outflows to ODA eligible and/or non-Annex I Parties reported to OECD, while recognizing that attributed outflows are estimated for each multilateral institution following a specific methodology outlined in OECD (2026a).

2.3.3. Private finance mobilized and other private finance flows to developing countries


245. As noted above in section 2.3.1, the first BTRs provided a common tabular format for Parties to report on the finance mobilized by public interventions. Fifteen developed country Parties reported finance mobilized at USD 10.3 billion in 2021 and USD 17.9 billion in 2022. A further six other Parties reported mobilized finance of USD 450 million in 2021 and USD 175 million in 2022. In addition to the information on thematic objectives presented above, this section provides further information on the types and amounts of public interventions used to mobilize finance and their geographical distribution, noting that such information from BTRs is predominantly

limited to mobilized finance through bilateral channels as Parties do not have information on the mobilized finance by multilateral institutions which is covered in further detail below.

246. The leveraging mechanisms reported by bilateral providers were mostly grants (49 per cent), followed by multiple financial instruments (21 per cent). Other financial instruments reported include equity and guarantees, each accounting for 5 per cent. Loans (concessional, non -concessional and those with unspecified concessionality) accounted for 4 per cent, while other mechanisms, including mezzanine finance and insurance, accounted for 2 per cent and 1 per cent, respectively.

Figure 2.18

Leveraging mechanism for private finance mobilized, 2021–2022




247. 48 per cent of the finance mobilized in 2021–2022 remain unspecified by region or is targeted globally. Asia was the second largest beneficiary of mobilized private finance (34 per cent) in 2021–22, followed by Africa (13

per cent) and Americas (5 per cent). Of total private finance mobilized in 2021–2022, only 2 per cent targeted projects in LDCs and less than 1 per cent targeted project in SIDs.

Figure 2.19

Geographic distribution of climate finance flow 2021–2022



Note: Private finance mobilized: USD 14.2 billion per year 2021–2022.

248. The OECD DAC reports on private finance mobilized to ODA eligible countries, whereby climate-related finance is reported at USD 29.3 billion in 2023 and USD 33.8 billion in 2024 (OECD, 2026a).

249. The Joint MDBs also report on private finance directly and indirectly mobilized through their portfolio. Total private mobilization reported by the Joint MDBs (with corrections to ensure no double counting across multiple MDBs) for projects in low- and middle-income economies reached USD 28.6 billion in 2023, USD 33.0 billion in 2024, and USD 35.2 billion in 2025.

250. The OECD DAC collects private financial flows from philanthropic foundations. Reporting captured within the CRDF dataset from 27 private donors and foundations to date highlights USD 1.3 billion and USD 1.0 billion in climate-related philanthropic finance provided to ODA-eligible countries in 2023 and 2024, respectively (OECD DAC, 2026a).

251. CPI's Global Landscape of Climate Finance (GLCF) and the global climate finance flows presented in section 2.2 include international flows from developed to developing countries. These are based on international climate finance flows from advanced to emerging market and developing economies and are estimated to have reached USD 28.8 billion in 2023 and USD 27.4 billion in 2024.

252. UNCTAD reports on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and sustainable finance trends through tracking announcements and investment to sectors relevant to the SDGs. UNCTAD's analysis does not estimate climate or renewable energy FDI directly; instead, it tracks renewable energy project announcements and international project finance deals, which do not represent actual FDI flows. UNCTAD's World Investment Report 2026 reports on investments announced to greenfield projects in developing economies in renewable energy, declining from USD 205 billion in 2023 to USD 109 billion in 2024 and USD 55 billion in 2025. It also

reports on international project finance for renewable energy projects, where investment reached USD 203 billion in 2023, USD 185 billion in 2024 and USD 224 billion in 2025.⁸⁸ UNCTAD draws on these complementary sources to explain a declining trend in renewable energy investment to developing countries, as capital is shifting to strategic sectors and high financing costs constrained clean energy project pipelines.

2.3.4. Recipient perspective on climate finance flows

253. Of the 73 Parties providing information on climate-specific support received in their first BTRs, USD 88.5 billion was reported by Parties as support either committed or received between 1999–2040. Almost 81 per cent of the support received was reported for projects starting between 2014–2025 (figure 2.20), while 16.3 billion was reported as either committed or received for projects starting in 2021 and 2022. The committed and received figure extends up to 2040, reflecting multi-year pledges and pipeline projects. The highest share of climate finance is reported as received. Mitigation


receives the largest share of climate finance support (49 per cent), followed equal shares for cross-cutting activities and adaptation activities (23 per cent each).

254. Grants remain the most frequently reported financial instruments, accounting for 21 per cent, followed by concessional loans at 18 per cent. Grant financing is primarily reported for adaptation and cross-cutting projects. Loans, whether concessional, non-concessional, or of unspecified concessional, account for approximately 38 per cent. Other financial instruments reported include equity, guarantees, and technical assistance, each accounting for less than 5 per cent, while 8 per cent of climate finance support received was provided through multiple financial instruments, covering two or more instruments.

255. The majority (55 per cent) of climate finance support received is reported through multilateral channels, such as development banks, multilateral climate funds and other financial institutions, while 16 per cent is reported through bilateral channels, including international NGOs. A further 5 per cent, respectively, is reported through regional and private channels.

Figure 2.20

Climate-specific support received reported by Parties in their first BTR



88) World Investment Report 2026: International Investment in a Turbulent Era

256. Additionally, non-Annex I Parties could submit Biennial Update Reports (BURs) until 31 December 2024. Twenty-one Parties submitted BURs after 30 June 2024, the cut-off date for the sixth BA. Of the 21 BURs submitted, 13 BURs from non-Annex I Parties that had not yet submitted BTRs were considered for this analysis. Of these, 10 provided information on climate finance received or committed in tabular formats at the project level, amounting to USD 5.6 billion. Most Parties included project titles, funding sources and amounts received. Seven of the 10 Parties reported timeframe information, with varying levels of detail. Approximately 55 per cent (USD 2.4 billion) was reported for projects with start years between 2016 and 2020, while a further 39 per cent (USD 1.7 billion) covered projects starting between 2021 and 2025, reflecting both active disbursements and pipeline commitments. Projects starting before 2016 accounted for less than 6 per cent of the total amount with timeframe data. Two Parties did not include any timeframe information at the project level.

257. Reporting on financial instruments and types of support was partial, covering 2.4 billion. Only three of the 10 Parties reported financial instruments at the project level; among these, grants dominated, accounting for USD 1.6 billion, while loans and debt instruments amounted to USD 459 million and equity instruments accounted for USD 275 million. Five of the 10 Parties reported the type of support – adaptation, mitigation, or cross-cutting – with adaptation and cross-cutting each accounting for USD 1.3 billion and mitigation accounting for USD 477 million. Sector-level information was provided by four of the 10 Parties, with agriculture, energy, water and general environment being the most commonly cited categories.

258. With respect to funding channels, 58 per cent of climate finance was reported through multilateral channels. MDBs, UN agencies and other multilateral institutions accounted for the largest share at USD 2.2 billion, followed by multilateral climate funds, including the GCF, GEF and Adaptation Fund at USD 779 million. Climate finance received or committed through bilateral channels accounted for 7 per cent (USD 369 million), while private finance accounted for 7 per cent (USD 370 million). Around 27 per cent of reported finance (USD 1.4 billion) remain unspecified.

2.3.5. Summary of climate finance flows from developed to developing countries

259. Table 2.8 summarizes the range of data sources and estimates for 2021–2024 that are relevant to informing on climate finance flows from developed to developing countries, as outlined in the section above. Different data sources follow different approaches, for example to the categorization of providers and recipients and in the methodological approaches for estimating climate finance. In addition, some datasets are of variable data quality, and some datasets are only partial.

260. In considering the key data sources to most robustly estimate climate finance from developed to developing countries, emphasis is placed on data sources that are of highest quality and completeness, alongside datasets which reflect key characteristics for tracking developed to developing country flows, such as the reporting of outflows and use of attribution methodologies. Highlighted below are the datasets which are considered the most informative in this context, including Party-level reporting to the UNFCCC through BTRs, the CFU and OECD DAC CRDF datasets, which robustly compiles multilateral fund and MDB outflows respectively, and the OECD's Climate Finance and the USD 100 billion goal series, which applies attribution rules to estimate multilateral flows from developed to developing countries.

261. Owing to the variety of approaches, different sources of information outlined in the table are not directly comparable and cannot be combined to provide a robust total estimate of climate finance flows from developed to developing countries. This is particularly the case in reporting on bilateral and multilateral flows, where different categorizations of funds and organizations mean that finance can be recorded differently across sources of information. For example, certain contributions may be recorded as either bilateral (including bi-multi flows) or multilateral, while some reporting may only capture inflows or outflows. Combining such different sources of information could lead to inconsistencies and double counting.

Table 2.8

Summary overview of estimates of bilateral, multilateral and private finance from developed to developing countries, for 2021–2024, across sources of information

(Billions of USD, current, annualized)

		2021	2022	2023	2024	Data quality	Data completeness	Geographical split		Source of data
								Provider	Recipient	
UNFCCC funds (AF, GCF, GEF, LDCF, SCCF)	Inflows (Imputed)	3.1	3.4	4.6	3.1	High	High	OECD DAC + Bulgaria, Liechtenstein, Malta and Monaco ⁸⁹	N/A	OECD DAC CRDF (provider perspective)
	Project approvals, unattributed	3.4	1.9	2.4	2.9	High	High	N/A	Developing countries	CFU & supplementary data OECD DAC CRDF
	Outflows, unattributed	3.9	2.0	3.4	4.4	High	Medium	N/A	List of ODA recipients	OECD DAC CRDF (recipient perspective)
<i>Bilateral</i>										
Bilateral, regional and other, climate-specific support provided	BTRs (preliminary data 2023–24)	34.3 (developed only)	43.5 (developed only)	44.8 p	37.1 p	High	Medium / high	Developed and other Parties reporting on finance provided	Parties reported on as recipients	BTR -finance provided
Bilateral climate-related development finance	ODA, non-export credit OOF and PSI. Rio marker data (lower bound significant, upper bound principal)	16.6–43.6	25.1–58.6	37.5–65.1	24.0–58.9	High	High	OECD DAC members and Croatia, Liechtenstein and Monaco	List of ODA recipients	OECD DAC CRDF (provider perspective)
Bilateral climate-specific finance provided	Advanced BTR data	34.5	41	50.2	43.9	High	High	Annex II Parties, all EU MS, Liechtenstein and Monaco	List of ODA recipients and /or non-Annex I list of Parties	OECD (2026)
Bilateral net assistance climate-specific finance provided	Rio marker data adjusted to proxy climate specific, and concessionality	11.6–16.4	16.5–23.4	21.6–30.7	18.9–28.0	Medium	High	Annex II Parties, EU MS, Liechtenstein and Monaco (as included in OECD DAC CRDF dataset)	List of ODA recipients	Oxfam (2026).
Climate finance IDFC	Subset of DFIs	14.9	21.1	29.8	19.2	High	High	OECD-based DFIs	Non-OECD countries	IDFC

89) Belarus, Liechtenstein, Malta & Monaco contributions to GCF included on basis of inclusion as providers in OECD's Climate Finance and the USD 100 billion Goal Report Series.

		2021	2022	2023	2024	Data quality	Data completeness	Geographical split		Source of data
								Provider	Recipient	
Climate-related officially supported export credits	Export credits	2.1	2.4	5.6	4.6	Medium	Medium	Annex II Parties, EU member States, Lichtenstein and Monaco	List of ODA recipients and /or non-Annex I list of Parties	OECD (2026)
<i>Multilateral</i>										
Multilateral climate funds (including UNFCCC funds) & other multilateral organisations (excluding MDBs)	Inflows (imputed)	3.7	3.8	12.0	3.7	High	High	OECD DAC and Belarus, Croatia, Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Malta and Monaco	N/A	OECD DAC CRDF (provider perspective)
	MCF project approvals/ committed outflows, unattributed	4.6	3.6	8.7	7.5	High	High	N/A	Developing countries	CFU & supplementary information from OECD DAC CRDF (recipient perspective)
	Outflows, commitment basis, unattributed	4.6	3.8	10.2	9.8	High	Medium	N/A	List of ODA recipients	OECD DAC CRDF (recipient perspective)
MDB climate finance	Inflows (imputed)	3.9	4.2	6.6	4.8	High	High	OECD DAC and Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus and Malta	N/A	OECD DAC CRDF (provider perspective)
	Outflows – MDB Joint Reporting (own resources and external)	51.6	60.9	74.7	85.1	Medium	High	N/A	Low and middle-income economies	MDB Joint Reporting
	Outflows – MDB Joint reporting (own resources and external)	43.4	52.1	65.7	74.4	Medium	High	N/A	Non-Annex I Parties	MDB Joint Reporting
	Outflows, unattributed	48.3	66.0	69.6	74.6	High	High	N/A	List of ODA recipients	OECD DAC CRDF (recipient perspective)
	Outflows - attributed to developed countries	34.3	46.9	48.2	50.5	High	High	Annex II Parties, all EU MS, Liechtenstein Monaco.	List of ODA recipients and /or non-Annex I list of Parties	OECD \$100bn Series
Total Multilateral, (funds, MDBs, and other multilateral organisations)	Mixed reporting, largely on an inflow basis	9.7 (developed only)	10.6 (developed only)	10.9 p	11.1 p	Low	Low	Developed and other Parties reporting on finance provided	N/A; Parties reported on as recipients	BTR – finance provided

		2021	2022	2023	2024	Data quality	Data completeness	Geographical split		Source of data
								Provider	Recipient	
Attributed multilateral climate flows (funds, MDBs, and other multilateral organisations)	Attributed outflows – OECD methodology	38.7	50.6	54.1	57.7	High	High	Annex II Parties, all EU MS, Liechtenstein and Monaco	List of ODA recipients and /or non-Annex I list of Parties	OECD (2026)
	Net assistance attributed outflows – Oxfam methodology	8.2–8.3	11.4–11.6	9.3–11.9	13.8–16.7	Medium	High	Annex II Parties, all EU MS, Liechtenstein and Monaco	OECD DAC List of ODA Eligible Countries and additional non-Annex I Parties included in OECD DAC CRDF dataset	Oxfam (2026)
<i>Private finance</i>										
<i>Mobilized through bilateral channels</i>										
Mobilized private climate finance by bilateral, regional institutions	Mixed reporting, largely bilateral	10.3 (developed only)	18.0 (developed only)	4.6 p	8.5 p	Medium	Medium	Developed and other Parties reporting on finance provided	Parties reported on as recipients	BTR – finance mobilized
	Mobilized from bilateral interventions	5.6	9.2	6.5	8.6	High	High	Annex II Parties, all EU MS, Liechtenstein and Monaco.	List of ODA recipients and/or non-Annex I Parties	OECD (2026)
Mobilized private climate finance by multilateral channels	MDBs direct and indirect	13.0	15.4	28.6	33.0	High	High	N/A	Low- and middle-income economies	MDB Joint Reporting
	Mobilized from multilateral interventions and attributed	8.8	12.7	16.3	21.9	High	High	Annex II Parties, all EU MS, Liechtenstein and Monaco	List of ODA recipients and/or non-Annex I Parties	OECD (2026)
Other private finance	Private	19.9	16.3	28.8	27.4	Medium	Medium	Advanced economies	Emergng market and developing economies	CPI (2026)
	Philanthropy	0.5–2.2	0.9–2.4	0.5–1.3	0.6–1.0	High	Medium	Private Donors and Foundations	List of ODA recipients	OECD DAC CRDF

Note: ‘p’ denotes the use of preliminary BTR data on climate finance provided and mobilized based on advanced estimates for 2023–2024, and where reporting is partial. ‘Private’ finance is estimated based on CPI (2026b), as all international private finance from advanced economies to emerging market and developing economies, based on IMF WEO classifications.

2.3.6. Characteristics and distribution of climate finance flows from developed to developing countries

262. This section analyses the key characteristics of climate finance flows provided and mobilized from developed to developing countries across the major channels and sources of finance. International finance is particularly important in the context of the Convention, with public finance flows playing a catalytic role in building capacity, supporting enabling environments and mobilizing private sector actors and financial flows.

263. Analysis is based on the best available data, drawing on relevant sources of information as presented in the preceding section 2.3. This places emphasis on the preliminary Party-level reporting of climate finance provided and mobilized where comprehensive data are available, and complements this analysis with more complete and detailed activity-level datasets from CFU, OECD and the OECD DAC CRDF. Table 2.9 below summarizes key characteristics by main channel of climate finance provided and mobilized over 2023–2024.

Table 2.9

Characteristics of climate finance flows from developed to developing countries in 2023–2024 by channel, theme and instrument, drawing on best available data

(Billions of USD, current, annualized 2023–24 average and per cent distribution)

	Channel				
		Bilateral climate finance ^a	Multilateral climate funds ^b	MDB climate finance ^c	Private climate finance mobilized ^d
Annual average 2023–2024		41.0p	8.1	49.4	26.7
Thematic Focus	Adaptation	26%	36%	29%	6%
	Mitigation	60%	32%	68%	65%
	Cross-cutting	14%	32%	3%	29%
Instrument	Grants	38%	46%	8%	—
	Loans	57%	47%	91%	
	Other	5%	7%	2%	
Leveraging mechanism	Direct investment in companies/SPVs	—			23%
	Guarantees				19%
	Syndicated loans				23%
	Credit lines				5%
	Simple co-financing				9%
	Shares in CIVs				21%

Source: a) Preliminary BTR2 data, supplemented by instrument distribution from OECD (2026); b) CFU (2026) and additional fund data from OECD DAC CRDF (2026), supplemented by thematic distribution from OECD DAC CRS CRDF (2026) and instrument distribution from OECD (2026); c) OECD (2026) to capture attributed multilateral outflows, supplemented by thematic distribution from OECD DAC CRS; d) OECD (2026), supplemented by thematic distribution from OECD DAC CRS Private Finance Mobilized (2026a)

Thematic distribution across adaptation and mitigation

264. Assessing the thematic distribution of climate finance provided and mobilized is challenging given the inherent differences in the types of activities across adaptation, resilience and mitigation. While the reporting of climate-specific finance has advanced significantly in recent years, in particular through the ETF BTRs, greater transparency in Party-level reporting and the use of coefficients to estimate climate-specific shares, fundamental differences between adaptation and

mitigation finance can make comparisons challenging. In contrast to the technology specific and energy-related focus of mitigation finance, adaptation finance is integrated and cross-cutting and relies significantly on risk-mitigating instruments for resilience and loss and damage. These characteristics can make adaptation finance harder to identify, meaning that data gaps persist. There is also uncertainty around cross-cutting finance, where a single activity supports both adaptation and mitigation and its contribution to each objective cannot

be distinguished, but where different data aggregators treat the categorization of cross-cutting activities in a variety of ways.

265. A second challenge is that thematic shares are often reported at face value without adjusting for the financial instrument used. Grants, loans, and equity have different grant-equivalent values, so nominal amounts can give a very different picture from grant-equivalent accounting. Taken together, these issues mean that headline ratios of adaptation and mitigation finance should be interpreted cautiously, as they may reflect reporting conventions as much as underlying finance flows.

266. Bilateral and MDB finance providers allocate the highest levels of public finance and mobilized private finance to climate mitigation objectives. Approximately 60 per cent of bilateral climate-specific public finance in 2023–2024 targeted mitigation only, compared with 68 per cent of MDB public finance. Of private climate finance mobilized by bilateral and multilateral public


interventions, 65 per cent targets mitigation-only objectives, while only approximately 6 per cent targets adaption-only objectives, reflective of the challenges of attracting private finance towards adaptation.

267. Multilateral climate funds provide the highest targeted share of climate finance to adaptation, where approximately 36 per cent of MCF flows in 2023–2024 targeted adaptation objectives, rising to up to 68 per cent when taking into account the proportion of finance targeting both adaptation and mitigation objectives.

268. In comparing portfolios, both the strategies and reporting approaches of providers may be significant drivers of thematic distributions. A number of MCFs have set thematic balance objectives and also apply the Rio marker approach in their reporting, which is well suited to identifying activities targeting multiple objectives. In comparison, MDBs focus on narrowing their accounting to identify specific components, which may underestimate finance for genuinely cross-cutting activities.

Figure 2.21

Thematic objective of climate finance from developed to developing countries in 2023–2024



Source: Bilateral: Preliminary BTR2 data; MCF: OECD DAC CRDF (2026); MDB: OECD DAC CRS CRDF (2026); Private: OECD DAC CRS Private Finance Mobilized (2026b).

Finance sources and instruments

269. Over 2023–2024, 38 per cent of public bilateral climate finance was estimated as provided through grants, and an estimated 57 per cent through loans, of which the OECD estimate that 73 per cent of loans extended by bilateral providers were concessional.

270. Of the public finance provided through the multilateral climate funds in 2023–24, 46 per cent was grant-based, particularly for adaptation, while 47 per cent was provided through loans. The OECD estimates

that slightly less than half of loans through MCFs are concessional in nature. MDB finance is increasingly loan-based, with 91 per cent of public finance provided through MDBs extended through loans in 2023–2024. The OECD estimates that slightly less than a quarter of MDB loan portfolios were concessional.

271. Across all channels, private climate finance was mobilized by public finance providers through an increasingly diverse range of instruments in 2023–2024, depending on mandate, the relevance of instruments


and country, and sectoral context, including direct investments in companies or special-purpose vehicles (23 per cent), syndicated loans (23 per cent), shares in collective investment vehicles (21 per cent) and guarantees

(19 per cent). While direct investments in companies or special-purpose vehicles were made by all public finance actors, the use of other instruments varied.


Figure 2.22

Climate finance from developed to developing countries in 2023–2024 by channel and financial instrument

Public Climate Finance



Private Finance Mobilized



Source: OECD (2026).

Geographical distribution


272. In summary, Asia and Africa continued to receive the highest share of public climate-related finance across bilateral providers, MCFs and MDBs in 2023–2024, whereby allocations are approximated at 31 and 28 per cent of finance from public finance channels to ODA-eligible countries. In comparison, most private finance mobilized went to Latin America and the Caribbean (31 per cent), followed by Africa (26 per cent) and Asia (23 per cent) (see figure 2.23).

273. Multilateral climate funds (including other

multilateral organizations reporting climate-related outflows) increasingly provide the highest share of targeted support to SIDS and LDCs. MCF finance to SIDS rose to 9 per cent over 2023–2024 (compared to 7 per cent in 2021–2022), and MCF financing to LDCs rose to 29 per cent (compared to 18 per cent in 2021–2022). Climate finance allocated to SIDS from bilateral providers and MDBs accounted for 4 per cent from each source in 2023–2024, while the shares of support to LDCs were 19 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively. Focusing on UNFCCC funds, LDCs and SIDS received an estimated 23 per cent and 9 per cent of finance in 2023–2024.

Figure 2.23

Geographical distribution of climate finance from developed to developing countries by volume and on a per capita basis by different channels 2023–2024



Source: a) OECD DAC CRDF dataset (2026b), MCF includes funds and climate-related outflow reporting from other multilateral organizations; b) OECD DAC Private Finance Mobilized dataset (2026c).

274. The geographical analysis presented in Figure 2.20 uses activity-level data from the OECD DAC CRDF and OECD Private Finance Mobilized datasets, as the best available sources of information for assessing the geographical distribution of international climate finance flows from developed to developing countries. The per capita analysis shows financial flows relative to population size across regions. The analysis is approximate, given limitations including the large share of finance directed to global, regional and multi-country initiatives that cannot be allocated, and the fact that per capita measures do not reflect differences in purchasing power, climate vulnerability or greenhouse gas emissions. The analysis is therefore not directly comparable to regional climate finance needs, but it can provide useful insight into regional allocations and trends, while recognizing that allocations within and across regions may vary significantly.

275. Asia was a key beneficiary of international climate finance analysed, receiving, on average, 31 per cent of commitments in 2023–2024:

- Of bilateral climate-related finance, Asia received 34 per cent of commitments, similar to 2021–22 allocations, with finance distributed across mitigation (53 per cent), adaptation (24 per cent), and cross-cutting objectives (23 per cent), while loans accounted for the majority of finance (72 per cent), followed by grants (23 per cent).
- Asia received 22 per cent of finance from multilateral climate funds and other multilateral organizations, maintaining 2021–22 levels, with finance distributed across adaptation (40 per cent), mitigation (29 per cent) and cross-cutting objectives (32 per cent). Financing was composed of loans (57 per cent) and grants (37 per cent).
- From MDB resources in 2023–2024, 32 per cent of climate finance was committed to Asia. Of the total, 65 per cent of commitments targeted mitigation objectives and 33 per cent adaptation. Financing was dominated by loans (95 per cent) and grants (2 per cent).
- Of private finance mobilized, Asia received 23 per cent of flows through a range of instruments and leveraging mechanisms, including direct investments in companies and SPVs, simple co-financing and guarantees.
- Across all channels, Asia received an estimated USD 12 per capita on average per year in 2023–2024, indicating that, while it received the largest share of total international climate finance, on a per capita basis it received the lowest share. Finance was

distributed across 35 identified recipient countries in addition to finance to multi-country regional programmes and initiatives.

276. Africa was the second major recipient region of international climate finance flows, receiving an approximate 28 per cent of commitments in 2023–2024:

- Of bilateral climate-related finance, Africa received 30 per cent of commitments, similar to 2021–22 allocations, with finance distributed across adaptation (38 per cent), mitigation (32 per cent) and cross-cutting objectives (30 per cent), while grants accounted for the majority of finance (64 per cent), followed by loans (29 per cent).
- Africa received 49 per cent of finance from multilateral climate funds and other multilateral organizations, a higher share than 2021–22, with finance distributed across adaptation (39 per cent), mitigation (31 per cent) and cross-cutting objectives (30 per cent). Financing was composed of loans (71 per cent) and grants (23 per cent).
- From MDB resources in 2023–2024, 25 per cent of climate finance was committed to Africa. Of the total, 59 per cent of commitments targeted mitigation objectives and 40 per cent adaptation. Financing was mainly through loans (82 per cent) and grants (17 per cent).
- Of private finance mobilized, Africa received 26 per cent of flows through a range of instruments and leveraging mechanisms, including direct investments in companies and SPVs, simple co-financing and guarantees.
- Across all channels, Africa received an estimated USD 33 per capita on average in 2023–2024, and finance was distributed across 54 identified recipient countries in addition to finance to multi-country regional programs and initiatives.

277. Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and South America secured, on average, 18 per cent of international climate finance flows in 2023–2024:

- Of bilateral climate-related finance, LAC and South America received 8 per cent of commitments, similar to 2021–22 allocations, with finance distributed across mitigation (43 per cent) and cross-cutting objectives (39 per cent), and finance targeting adaptation-only objectives receiving the smallest share (17 per cent). Loans accounted for just over half of finance (54 per cent), followed by grants (36 per cent), with other instruments, including a variety of PSI instruments, accounting for the remainder (10

per cent).

- LAC and South America received 17 per cent of finance from multilateral climate funds and other multilateral organizations, a lower share than 2021–2022, with finance distributed across cross-cutting objectives (41 per cent), mitigation (33 per cent) and adaptation (26 per cent). Loans accounted for over half of finance (56 per cent), followed by grants (39 per cent).
- From MDB resources in 2023–2024, 21 per cent of climate finance was committed to LAC and South America. Commitments targeting mitigation objectives accounted for 65 per cent, and 27 per cent for adaptation. Financing was dominated by loans (80 per cent) and other instruments, including PSI instruments (19 per cent), with grants accounting for only a small share (1 per cent).
- Of private finance mobilized, LAC and South America received 31 per cent of flows, the largest recipient region through a range of financial instruments.
- Across all channels, LAC and South America received an estimated USD 48 per capita on average in 2023–2024. Finance was distributed across 27 identified recipient countries in addition to finance to multi-country regional programs and initiatives.

278. Europe, covering the European subregions Eastern Europe and Southern Europe and including ODA-eligible Annex I Parties, received 10 per cent of international climate finance on average in 2023–2024:

- Of bilateral climate-related finance, Europe received 9 per cent of commitments, with finance distributed predominantly to mitigation (69 per cent) and cross-cutting objectives (26 per cent), with the lowest share to adaptation (5 per cent). Grants accounted for the majority of finance (63 per cent), followed by loans (30 per cent).
- Europe received just 2 per cent of finance from multilateral climate funds and other multilateral organizations, with finance evenly distributed across adaptation (34 per cent), mitigation (34 per cent) and cross-cutting objectives (32 per cent). Financing was driven predominantly by loans (75 per cent) and grants (25 per cent).
- From MDB resources in 2023–2024, 11 per cent of climate finance was committed to Europe. Finance targeting mitigation objectives dominated (80 per cent), with 18 per cent allocated to adaptation. Financing was dominated by loans (96 per cent) and other instruments, including PSI instruments (4 per

cent), and no finance was extended through grants.

- Of private finance mobilized, Europe received 13 per cent of flows through a range of instruments, including guarantees and insurance and direct investment in companies and SPVs.
- Across all channels, Europe received an estimated USD 118 per capita on average, with finance distributed across 10 identified recipient countries.

279. Oceania, including all Pacific island countries and territories that are Non-Annex I Parties to the Convention, received on average 1.0 per cent of international climate finance flows committed in 2023–2024:

- Of bilateral climate-related finance, Oceania received 1.6 per cent of commitments, maintaining 2021–22 allocations, with finance targeting adaptation receiving half of flows (50 per cent), the highest share across all regions, and cross-cutting objectives receiving 41 per cent. In contrast, finance for mitigation received the lowest share (8 per cent). Finance was dominated by grants, which accounted for 98 per cent of finance, with 2 per cent provided through loans.
- Oceania received 2.4 per cent of finance from multilateral climate funds and other multilateral organizations, with finance distributed across adaptation (50 per cent), mitigation (20 per cent) and cross-cutting objectives (31 per cent). Financing was composed of loans (55 per cent) and grants (45 per cent).
- From MDB resources in 2023–2024, 0.6 per cent of climate finance was committed to Oceania. Of the total, 69 per cent of commitments targeted adaptation objectives and 31 per cent adaptation. Financing was mainly through grants (72 per cent) and loans (28 per cent).
- Of private finance mobilized, Oceania received 0.1 per cent of flows through simple co-financing.
- Across all channels, Oceania received an estimated USD 124 per capita on average, the highest per capita allocation across all regions. Finance was allocated across 15 identified recipient countries in addition to finance to multi-country regional programmes and initiatives, and allocations per country were often significantly higher than the regional average.

Identifying climate finance from developed countries to least developed countries and small island developing States

280. Article 9 of the Paris Agreement emphasizes that the provision of scaled-up financial resources should take into

account the priorities and needs of the LDCs and SIDS, which are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant capacity constraints, and that both public and grant-based resources are required to support adaptation.

281. The least developed countries (LDCs) are highly exposed to extreme weather and food and water insecurity, and climate-driven losses are already severe and rising. The vulnerability of LDCs is driven by structural factors – poverty, limited services, climate sensitive livelihoods and constrained institutional capacity – which sharply limit adaptation options (IPCC, 2023). There are 45 LDCs included in the analysis up to 2024 (see annex A):

- Of total climate-related bilateral finance, 19 per cent was allocated to LDCs in 2023–2024, of which 49 per cent targeted adaptation objectives, 14 per cent mitigation and 37 per cent cross-cutting objectives. Finance was predominantly extended through grants (71 per cent) and loans (29 per cent).
- Multilateral climate funds and other multilateral organizations allocated 29 per cent of total climate finance to LDCs in 2023–2024, an increase from 2021–22. Of this finance, 40 per cent targeted adaptation, 21 per cent targeted mitigation and 40 per cent targeted cross-cutting objectives. Of the total, 70 per cent was provided as grants and 29 per cent as loans.
- MDB finance committed to the LDCs accounted for 17 per cent of total MDB climate finance in 2023–2024, a decline from 2021–22. Of this amount, 52 per cent was committed to adaptation and 48 per cent to mitigation objectives. Of the total provided to LDCs, 26 per cent was provided as grants and 74 per cent as loans.
- Of private finance mobilized in 2023–2024, 2 per cent was distributed to LDCs, predominantly through simple co-financing (75 per cent) alongside a variety of instruments and leveraging mechanisms.
- Across all channels, LDCs received an average of USD 23 per capita in 2023–2024, allocated across 44 identified LDCs.

282. Small island developing States (SIDS) are highly exposed to climate change impacts, including more intense and frequent extreme weather events, coastal flooding, erosion and sea level rise. Their small size, remoteness and narrow resource base increase their sensitivity to shocks, while many SIDS economies remain heavily dependent on a limited number of sectors, including tourism, fisheries and other ocean-based

activities. SIDS often face low adaptive capacity, high infrastructure and adaptation costs relative to GDP, and constrained access to finance, alongside broader technical, institutional and governance constraints. These characteristics make climate-resilient development particularly challenging and raise the cost of technology, infrastructure and service delivery.

- Of total climate-related bilateral finance, 4 per cent was committed to SIDS in 2023–24, of which 36 per cent targeted adaptation objectives, 17 per cent mitigation and 48 per cent cross-cutting objectives. Finance was predominantly extended through grants (75 per cent) and loans (25 per cent).
- Multilateral climate funds and other multilateral organizations allocated 9 per cent for SIDS in 2023–2024, an increase compared to 2021–2022. Of the total commitments, adaptation accounted for 34 per cent, mitigation 24 per cent and cross-cutting objectives 42 per cent. Finance was distributed through loans (65 per cent) and grants (34 per cent).
- MDB climate finance committed to SIDS in 2023–2024 reached 4 per cent of total commitments. Of this amount, 45 per cent was committed to adaptation, 43 per cent to mitigation, and 12 per cent to cross-cutting objectives. Loans made up 80 per cent of MDB commitments to SIDS, while grants made up 20 per cent.
- Of private finance mobilized in 2023–2024, 2 per cent was distributed to SIDS across a variety of instruments and leveraging mechanisms.
- Across all channels, SIDS received finance of USD 93 per capita on average over 2023–2024, allocated across 32 identified States.

2.4. South–South cooperation on climate finance

283. This section captures data on climate finance flows available from voluntary reporting on South–South flows and triangular cooperation. These data include voluntary reporting by other Parties on climate finance provided and mobilized in national reports to the UNFCCC; reporting to the OECD CRS and TOSSD; flows from IDFC member institutions in non-OECD countries to other non-OECD countries; and MDB and climate fund financing that can be attributed to developing countries based on their shareholding. Any such contributions by developing country Parties are made on a voluntary basis, and nothing in paragraphs 8 and 9 of decision 1/CMA.6 affects any Party's development or recipient status (decision 1/CMA.6, paragraphs 9 and 10; Article 9, paragraph 2, of

the Paris Agreement). The data presented in this section are accordingly without prejudice to the classification of any Party under the Convention or the Paris Agreement.

284. Under the ETF, a number of “other Parties” provided a clear statement that they were reporting on a voluntary basis as “other Parties” or had also submitted information on financial support needed and received by developing country Parties. Bilateral finance provided and mobilized by other Parties reached USD 1.5 billion in 2021 and USD 2.2 billion in 2022.

285. A number of non-Annex I Parties, such as the Republic of Korea, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Türkiye and Thailand report on their South–South cooperation to the OECD DAC CRS and the TOSSD reporting framework. The Republic of Korea, as an OECD DAC member, reported bilateral climate-related finance of up to USD 3.1 billion in 2023 and USD 3.6 billion in 2024 to the OECD DAC CRS. The coverage of the TOSSD reporting framework is also expanding, with financial contributions reported as South–South and triangular cooperation and addressing SDG 13, which focuses on climate action, reaching USD 3.3 in 2023 and 3.5 billion in 2024. A high volume of climate-related finance in the TOSSD framework was identified as targeting multiple SDGs alongside SDG 13, reflecting the strong synergies and interconnected nature of climate action with other sustainable development objectives, such as clean water and sanitation (SDG 6) and affordable and clean energy (SDG 7) (see table 2.10 for all reporting).

286. IDFC member institutions based in non-OECD countries continue to provide rising levels of climate finance to other non-OECD countries, committing USD 7.6 billion in 2023 and USD 5 billion in 2024 (IDFC, 2024; 2025).

287. South–South providers contribute to UNFCCC funds. For example, total contributions to the GCF include USD 370 million from the Republic of Korea, in addition to contributions from Chile, Colombia, Indonesia and Israel (GCF, n.d.). Contributions to the FRLD include USD 100 million from the UAE and USD 7 million from the Republic of Korea (FRLD, n.d.).

288. Several South–South providers make contributions to regional funds, core contributions to MDBs, and are also shareholders of MDBs. As such, imputed inflows and attributed multilateral outflows can be estimated where data is available, as presented in table 2.10. Contributions to regional funds driven by South–South providers include the OPEC Fund for International Development,

reaching USD 135 million per year in climate-related outflows in 2023–24, and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, reaching USD 23 million per year in 2023–24. South–South providers account for a particularly significant share of contributions to the Islamic Development Bank, for which total outflows are recorded as USD 2.3 billion on average per year in 2023–24. Multilateral finance flows attributable to developing countries accounted for an estimated USD 20.8 billion of MDB public climate finance outflows (approximately 29 per cent), USD 0.7 billion of public climate finance outflows from multilateral climate funds, and USD 6.7 billion of private climate finance mobilized by multilateral providers in 2024, based on the OECD’s estimation approach (see section 2.4).

289. CPI’s Global Landscape of Climate Finance (GLCF) and the global climate finance flows presented in section 2.2 include international flows from non-advanced to emerging markets and developing economies, estimated at USD 5.5 billion on average per year in 2023–2024, a significant rise from 2021–22 levels.

290. The World Resources Institute (WRI) estimates that climate finance provided by 14 non-Annex II countries reached approximately USD 16 billion in 2023, rising significantly from USD 5 billion in 2013. WRI finds that, over 2013–23, multilateral public finance dominated, accounting for 65.7 per cent of total finance and rising to nearly 80 per cent by 2023. Bilateral public finance accounted for 17.3 per cent, export credits for 15.2 per cent, and mobilized private finance for 1.9 per cent. Non-multilateral finance has an uneven distribution, with China contributing the largest share, followed by the Republic of Korea, India and Brazil. Low-income countries received just 8 per cent of total finance, over half of which (50 per cent) was concentrated in Ethiopia (WRI, 2026).

291. There are several other recent examples of South–South and triangular co-operation. Countries like the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are providing support to other developing countries through initiatives such as ‘KSRelief’, a humanitarian and relief centre which has cumulatively provided USD 8.5 billion in financial support since its establishment in May 2025. This is equivalent to an annual average of approximately USD 850 million per year, and extends across a variety of sectors, including food, water and environmental sanitation, and early recovery.

Table 2.10

Estimated South–South climate finance flows 2021–2024 and characteristics (*where available*)

Notes		2021	2022	2023	2024	Data quality	Data completeness	Geographical split		Source of data
								Provider	Recipient	
Bilateral										
Bilateral, regional and other, climate-specific support provided	BTRs – finance provided	1.5	2.2	–	–	Medium	Low	Parties reporting on finance provided	Parties reported on as recipients	BTR – reporting by other Parties
South–South bilateral climate finance	Subset of DFIs	2.0	2.7	7.6	5	Medium	High	OECD-based DFIs	Non-OECD countries	IDFC
	ODA, Non-export credit OOF and PSI. Rio marker data (lower bound significant, upper bound principal)	0.6–1.5	0.6–2.2	1.5–3.1	1.5–3.6	High	Low	Korea, Qatar, Thailand, Türkiye and UAE	List of ODA recipients	OECD DAC CRDF
	TOSSD reporting on SDG 13 and climate keywords	1.5	1.8	3.3	3.5	High	Low	Reporting from 14 providers ⁹⁰	Non-Annex I and/or ODA recipients	TOSSD
Multilateral										
UNFCCC funds (AF, GCF, GEF, LDCF, SCCF)	Inflows (imputed)	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.07	High	Low	Korea, Qatar	N/A	OECD DAC CRDF (provider perspective)
Multilateral climate funds (including UNFCCC funds) & other multilateral organisations	Inflows (imputed)	0.05	0.04	0.08	0.11	High	Low	Non-Annex I and/or non-OECD DAC reporting ⁹¹	N/A	OECD DAC CRDF (provider perspective)
	Attributed outflows	N/K	0.4	N/K	0.7	High	High	N/K	List of ODA recipients and /or non-Annex I list of Parties	OECD (2026)

90) Reporting to TOSSD from Azerbaijan, Chinese Taipei, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Israel, Kazakhstan, Korea, Kuwait, Mexico, Qatar, Thailand, Türkiye, UAE. Note not all countries report each year.

91) Reporting to OECD DAC CRS by Azerbaijan, Israel, Kazakhstan, Korea, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Türkiye, and UAE.

MDB climate finance	Inflows (imputed)	0.20	0.21	0.33	0.34	High	Low	Non-Annex I and/or non-OECD DAC reporting ⁹²	N/A	OECD DAC CRDF (provider perspective)
	Attributed outflows	N/K	19.2	Unknown	20.8	High	High	N/K	List of ODA recipients and /or non-Annex I list of Parties	OECD (2026)
<i>Private finance</i>										
<i>Mobilized through bilateral channels</i>										
Mobilized private climate finance by bilateral, regional institutions	BTRs – finance mobilized	0.004	0.001	–	–	Low	Low	Parties reporting on finance provided	Parties reported on as recipients	BTR – mobilized
Mobilized private climate finance by multilateral channels	Mobilized from multilateral interventions and attributed	N/K	N/K	N/K	6.7	High	High	N/K	List of ODA recipients and/or non-Annex I list of Parties	OECD (2026)
Other private finance	Private	2.3	1.4	5.5	5.5	High	Medium	Non-advanced economies	Emergng market and developing economies	CPI (2026)

92) Includes for MDB imputed inflows Non-Annex I and/or non-OECD DAC reporting to OECD DAC CRS by Azerbaijan, Israel, Korea, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Türkiye, and UAE.

2.5. Reflection on possible quantitative data and information, as appropriate, that could inform the SCF for the preparation of the first report on progress towards achieving the new collective quantified goal on climate finance

292. The New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance established under Decision 1/CMA.6 at COP 29 (2024) sets out several quantitative elements for supporting climate action in developing countries paraphrased from paragraphs 7, 8 and 16:

- Call on all actors to work together to enable the scaling up of financing to developing country Parties for climate action from all public and private sources to at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035;
- A goal, with developed country Parties taking the lead, of at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035 for developing country Parties for climate action, from a wide variety of sources;⁹³
- An effort to at least triple annual outflows from the UNFCCC's multilateral climate funds from 2022 levels by 2030 at the latest.

293. In addition, in the following year CMA 7 called for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 in the context of the NCQG decision.⁹⁴

294. The SCF is mandated to prepare a report biennially, commencing in 2028, on collective progress towards all

elements of the NCQG, based on all relevant and available sources including information provided in BTRs, project-level data from, for example, multilateral development banks, multilateral climate funds and other financial institutions, while also considering regional balance and disaggregated information related to LDCs and SIDS.⁹⁵

295. This section considers key elements related to possible data and quantitative finance information that could inform the SCF in the preparation of the first report on progress towards achieving the NCQG. It draws on findings from chapter 1 and this chapter (in particular, experiences with the first BTRs); experience and recommendations from previous BAs; the SCF's USD 100 billion Progress Reports; the SCF's work on climate finance definitions; expert sessions, including the technical expert session on available information, data, sources and approaches to monitor the new collective quantified goal on climate finance, held by the SCF in June 2025;⁹⁶ and relevant literature.

2.5.1. Elements for consideration in tracking and assessing future progress towards the NCQG

296. The SCF's 2023 report on clustering types of climate finance definitions in use provides a useful framework for identifying relevant parameters to consider in tracking climate finance flows (SCF, 2023).⁹⁷ The table 2.11 below provides a reflection of potential key 'clustered elements' using this framework, alongside the elements of the NCQG decision.

93) This paragraph of the decision reaffirms, in this context, Article 9 of the Paris Agreement and decides to set a goal, in extension of the goal referred to in paragraph 53 of decision 1/CP.21.

94) Decision 1/CMA.7, para. 53.

95) Decision 1/CMA.6, para 30, 32 and 35.

96) Presentations are available at <https://unfccc.int/event/thirty-seventh-standing-committee-on-finance-meeting>

97) Available at <https://unfccc.int/documents/633431>

Table 2.11

The NCQG and key elements for consideration in tracking and assessing future progress

Clusters	Relevant NCQG elements for supporting climate action in developing countries
Scope (i.e. geographical)	• USD 1.3 trillion - all actors, all public and private sources (para. 7); • USD 300 billion - developed countries taking the lead, wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources (para. 8) • South–South cooperation, on a voluntary basis (para. 9); • Reflect the needs and priorities of developing countries, especially LDCs and SIDS (para. 5, 14, 17).
Climate-related aspects (i.e. thematic categories, policy priorities and wider characteristics)	• Accelerate the achievement of Article 2 (para.1); • Reflecting the needs and priorities of developing country Parties, and support implementation of climate plans (para 5, 17); • In a context of meaningful and ambitious mitigation and adaptation action, and transparency in implementation (para 8); • Balance between adaptation and mitigation (para. 17); • Scale up adaptation finance, taking into account the global goal on adaptation (para. 18); • Finance responding to loss and damage (para. 14, 19); • Support just transitions (para. 20); • Benefits to vulnerable communities and groups, (para. 26).
Finance-related aspects (i.e. sources, channels, instruments)	• Wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources (para. 8); Importance of bilateral channels (para.11). MDBs (para 12); • Public and grant-based resources and highly concessional finance, particularly for adaptation and responding to loss and damage, especially for LDCs and SIDS; (para 14, 23e-f); • Increasing the mobilization ratio of finance mobilized from public sources by 2030 (para.15); • Increase in public resources through the UNFCCC Funds,⁹⁸ • Triple annual outflows from UNFCCC Funds from 2022 levels by 2030 (para. 16); • Scaling up of innovative sources and innovative instruments (e.g. first-loss instruments, guarantees, local currency financing and foreign exchange risk instruments) (para 15, 23a); • Enhancing access to climate finance (para 21-24).
Accounting Methods (i.e. valorization, points of measurement, attribution)	• Voluntary intention to count all climate-related outflows and climate-related finance mobilized by MDBs (para 8).

297. Based on the data and information reflected in chapter 2, key reflections and elements for consideration in informing the NCQG are outlined below.

298. Firstly, the broad scope of financial flows across the variety of source and channels within the NCQG decision requires **continued use and development of data sources and statistical systems as drawn on for the seventh BA**, alongside expansion in coverage of data.

Reflection on global climate finance datasets that could inform the quantitative elements of the NCQG

299. Disaggregating global datasets will be vital to robustly inform on flows from all actors and sources and to track external flows to developing countries towards the USD 1.3 trillion goal. Key reports, such as the Baku to Belém Roadmap (COP30, 2025), and leading advisory groups, such as the Independent High-Level Expert Group

on Climate Finance, regard the call to scale up finance to USD 1.3 trillion as referring to external finance flows to developing countries, alongside enhanced domestic foundations (e.g. IHLEG, 2025).

300. Addressing key data gaps, as outlined in section 2.2 and annexes D and E, will be crucial to enhancing the comprehensiveness of future reporting. In particular, improvements are needed in tracking international private finance flows; improving data methodologies and sources for adaptation, AFOLU, industry, water and waste; for financing to LDCs and SIDS; and enhancing systems for tracking international finance aligned with national priorities.

301. Given the focus on external finance flows, a key additional data requirement is to ensure quality and granularity of data in identifying both the origin and

⁹⁸ UNFCCC Funds refers to the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism (i.e. Global Environment Facility, Green Climate Fund, and Fund for responding to Loss and Damage), Adaptation Fund, Least Developed Countries Fund and Special Climate Change Fund.

destination of finance. Geographic specificity is listed as a common data gap in the project-level data sources used by CPI's GLCF, and CPI applies methodologies to approximate for missing information. However, it is unclear to what extent estimates of international or domestic origin of climate finance result from the application of proxy methods. In addition, finance provided by multilateral institutions, such as climate funds and multilateral or regional development banks, is disaggregated according to the ownership shares of contributing member States to ascertain its international or domestic origin (CPI, 2025e). With regard to data gaps, the GLCF provides an in-depth overview of data gaps by sectors and actors across public domestic and international finance, and public domestic finance but does not differentiate between information gaps in private finance sourced internationally (as opposed to private finance derived domestically), as shown in the figure 2.24.

302. Several global finance datasets on external finance flows lack the descriptive granularity to assess their relevance to climate action. During the technical expert session held by the SCF in June 2025 on available

information, data, sources and approaches to monitoring the NCQG, foreign direct investment (FDI) statistics and estimates of total investments in climate-relevant sectors were highlighted as potential relevant data points (Jachnik, 2025; Sulstarova 2025). According to UNCTAD, FDI accounted for 44 per cent of all external flows to developing economies in 2023, followed by remittances at 34 per cent, ODA at 12 per cent and foreign portfolio investment at 11 per cent (Sulstarova 2025). However, UNCTAD data on FDI does not specify the climate relevance of flows due to the level of granularity reported being limited to high level sector aggregates. Similarly, IMF data on remittances is limited to geographic origin and destination captured in the balance of payments statistics. In its World Investment Report, UNCTAD refers to data on announced investments in greenfield projects in industrial sectors and international project finance in infrastructure. Announced project investment data is more prone to overestimation, as some projects may not reach construction or become operational, while data on financial commitments may underestimate financial flows as many projects have open-ended financing arrangements.

Figure 2.24

Data coverage in the global landscape of climate finance
(Billions of USD)

	Private	Public international	Public domestic	Unknown
MITIGATION	1 232	134 ↑	541 ↑	<1
Energy systems	604 ↑ 65	48	300 55	N/A
Transport	381 ↑	23	89 ↑	N/A 55
Buildings and infrastructure	233	21	105	N/A
AFOLU	1	3	3	N/A
Industry	9	4	15	N/A
Waste	3	1	3	N/A
Water and wastewater	1 ↑	4	10	<1
Other and cross-sectoral		30	15	N/A
ADAPTATION	4 17–25	41 ↑	19 ↑	<1
Water and wastewater	3 ↑	8	12	<1
AFOLU	<1	5	<1	N/A
Other and cross-sectoral	<1	21	7	N/A
DUAL BENEFITS	9 ↑	22 ↑	5 ↑	<1
Water and wastewater	2	3	2	<1
AFOLU	1	4	3	N/A
Buildings and infrastructure	3	1	<1	N/A
Waste	3	1	<1	N/A
Other and cross-sectoral	<1	12	1	N/A

Tracked
Limited tracking
Under methodological iteration by CIP for inclusion in future CPI reports
Not tracked
↑ Complemented with new data sources in 2024

Note: In addition to the sectors listed above, the information and communications technology sector made up USD 2 billion of climate mitigation finance in 2024.

303. With the emergence of new regional development banks and pooled funding under South–South cooperation, new methodological approaches may be required to consider how to distinguish and attribute voluntary South–South financial flows while recognizing that projects supported through such initiatives may be funded through unearmarked finance from the same country of origin (i.e. excluding co-finance).

304. Given the persistent data challenges and gaps that have been highlighted across the series of Biennial Assessments, it may be beneficial to identify complementary analytical approaches focused on

investment trends and systemic shifts, noting that, for broader sources, the private nature of finance (such as private investments from philanthropy, households, and those independent of public interventions, especially in identifying international finance) makes tracking more complex (SCF, 2025; Falduto and Jachnik, 2025). The technical expert session held by the SCF in June 2025 on available information, data, sources and approaches to monitoring the NCQG heard that identifying a single number aligned with the USD 1.3 trillion description may be difficult due to different definitions, overlapping scopes and data gaps (Jachnik, 2025).

305. Broader consideration may also be given to other non-primary flows that are currently not captured in the CPI GLCF owing to its focus on primary capital flows (as reflected in section 2.2.11 above). These include external investment in capital market financial instruments, such as bonds or equity purchases, through either passive or active investing; external investment in value chains upstream of technology development, such as in research and development, demonstration and manufacturing facilities; and remittances, particularly for household-level expenditure that supports renewable or adaptation solutions. Furthermore, enabling measures that do not feature in a standard assessment of capital flows, such as measures to increase fiscal space, debt swaps and guarantees, would be important to track in order to capture efforts that enable the scaling up of financing. Recurrent expenditure, including salaries and operational costs, is also not fully included in CPI's investment-focused methodology and GLCF estimates. For example, finance for the payment of environmental protection officers, park rangers, and control and enforcement costs is currently a data gap, although these are recognized as important activities for protecting natural resources from land-use change, degradation and unsustainable practices.

Reflections on Party-level climate finance datasets that could inform the quantitative elements of the NCQG

306. Datasets tracking international finance flows from developed to developing countries provide a strong foundation regarding data completeness and quality, in particular in national reporting to the UNFCCC (see section 2.3 and annex E). The transparency framework provides a good basis for reporting on South-South cooperation (see section 2.4), while noting that such reporting is voluntary and currently limited. Improvements may be required to ensure measurement and accounting frameworks track all relevant metrics, points of measurement, and perspectives in a comprehensive and comparable manner.

307. For bilateral flows reported under the ETF and first BTRs, of 42 Parties reporting on climate finance provided and mobilized, this includes 26 developed country Parties, 15 other Parties and one unspecified as of June 2026. Other sources of data on bilateral flows that could be relevant to tracking international finance flows through South-South cooperation include data collected through the OECD DAC CRS and TOSSD reporting framework (with up to 14 countries reporting, as of July 2026). Complementary reports from think tanks and civil society organizations may also support wider data gathering on an ad hoc basis.

308. A key limitation in BTR data that affects their aggregation to inform a full accurate overview of finance flows to developing countries is differences in Parties' use of calendar or fiscal years when reporting climate finance and in the points of measurement used. Finance may be reported as committed (typically the full amount to be financed by the Party over the life of the activity) or disbursed (the amounts transferred in a given year, which may include several disbursements for multi-year activities). For climate finance delivered through bilateral, regional and other channels, 22 Parties reported support in terms of disbursements only, 9 reported commitments only, whereas 6 Parties reported both commitments and disbursements, depending on the project. It is important to note that both points of measurements are complementary and relevant to understanding finance flows set aside and actual transfers. In addition, other datasets, such as those reported under the EU governance regulation, provide data on both commitments and disbursements (referred to as provided amounts) in a calendar year, while headline ODA figures are based on disbursements.

309. In addition to tracking bilateral flows across the range of instruments in reporting systems, the NCQG (para 14) also acknowledges the role of grant-based resources and highly concessional finance. Developed country Parties may optionally report on a grant-equivalent basis under the current ETF BTR reporting tables, a key metric to tracking progress on the provision of concessional finance emphasized in the NCQG. However, reporting to date is partial across countries and draws on a range of approaches, while BTR1 reporting includes 21 Parties reporting grant-equivalent level of bilateral climate finance support provided to date. Other sources of official information such as OECD DAC CRS include comprehensive reporting of grant-equivalent values for climate-related development finance against a standardized calculation methodology.

310. In reporting on private finance mobilized, the new ETF and BTRs now provide a standard template for Parties to report on finance mobilized by bilateral providers. Reporting to date deploys a range of approaches, including drawing on the significant progress made in recent years by the OECD DAC in developing standard instrument-specific methodologies for estimating private finance mobilized through loans to the private sector, guarantees, equity investments, mezzanine finance instruments and reimbursable grants, while limiting double counting and over-estimation (See chapter 1). Other approaches include case-by-case analysis or

applied MDB methodologies to estimate mobilized finance. However, only 14 developed country Parties reported such data, with one Party citing confidentiality concerns. Greater transparency and harmonization of approaches may be needed going forward. At the same, it is important to note that such information reported by Parties is likely to be limited to finance mobilized through bilateral channels only, as Parties do not have access to data on finance mobilized by multilateral institutions. This underscores the necessity for non-Party data sources to complement overall views on climate finance to developing countries (see next section).

311. As of June 2026, 73 developing country Parties have reported information on climate finance received, of which 38 Parties provided information in CTFs structured to capture information, among others, on financial instruments, channel, and sector, while 26 Parties reported their climate finance received information in the BTR. The quality of reporting has significantly improved with introduction of the new CTFs; however, significant gaps and limitations remain, in particular with regards to inconsistencies in reporting on timeframes, which represent a systemic challenge to the compilation and comparability of climate finance data (see chapter 1). Greater harmonization of reporting approaches may be needed in order for this information to be used to its fullest potential in tracking quantified data on finance received.

Reflections on multilateral climate finance datasets that could inform the NCQG quantitative elements

312. Under the BTRs, developed country Parties may report on inflows they provide to multilateral institutions and/or any outflows from multilateral institutions. For the vast majority of data reported, Parties currently report inflow data as determined by funding decisions taken by Parties to make core contributions to different multilateral institutions (the key exception being the outflows to projects in developing countries financed by the EIB, which are reported by the EU). The climate-specific amounts of inflows to multilateral institutions are imputed from the share of climate-specific outflows of total outflows from that institution in a given year. In an aggregate overview, it is not possible to add up both inflows and outflows, as they represent both sides of the balance sheet and would constitute double counting. Existing approaches to aggregation focus on outflows only, and the attribution of outflows to developed countries is based on assumptions of ownership shares and capital contributions (see section 2.3.2). However, data on inflows may be of value in a reporting system that aims to recognize a Party's efforts that would not be

captured by a sole focus on multilateral outflows. Inflows have an important role in supporting the effective use of grant-based public finance for climate action through the multilateral system and have the added benefit of accurately reflecting the decision-making agency of Parties.

313. In order to inform tracking against the effort to at least triple annual outflows from the UNFCCC's multilateral climate funds from 2022 levels by 2030 at the latest (para 16), data on project level finance approvals from multilateral climate funds are available from each fund on a timely basis as they are actioned through the regular Board decision-making processes. Consolidated datasets tracking project approvals are available from a range of initiatives, including CFU (see chapter 1), although assumptions may be applied to identify climate-relevant activities or adjust approval data to reflect project cancellations or changes. To accurately report on MCF financial flows, systematic tracking of climate-relevant financial commitments and disbursements on a consistent calendar year basis is required. MCFs currently report to the OECD DAC on this basis for finance provided to ODA-eligible recipients. These datasets could be validated by MCFs for use in UNFCCC reporting and broadened to include all developing countries (i.e. including non-Annex I, non-ODA eligible countries) to ensure completeness in tracking. Baselines should also be clarified for key elements, such as 2022 levels, to enable progress in increasing flows from multilateral climate funds to be tracked.

314. For multilateral flows, the NCQG decision notes the intent to track outflows from MDBs; however, Party-level reporting is inherently ill-suited to tracking MDB outflows given that countries provide unearmarked contributions to MDBs and do not have information on climate-relevance or outflows at the time of making core contributions. Consolidated datasets are available through MDB reporting under their Joint Reporting approach (see chapter 1), including the Joint MDB methodology for assessing "private direct mobilization" and "private indirect mobilization", and through MDBs reporting of activity-level data for ODA-eligible countries to the OECD DAC. Across datasets, there are gaps in quality and completeness for activity-level data for non-ODA eligible countries that are also non-Annex I Parties. In addition, while several MDBs publish activity-level data, the aggregates published through joint MDB reporting are not available at the activity level owing to commercial factors. In recent years, MDBs have made efforts to publish country-level data and further breakdowns; however, to assist in tracking aggregate finance across multiple

channels and conducting granular analysis, country-level data on finance provided from MDBs' own resources, disaggregated by theme and instrument, are required.

Reflections on tracking key characteristics and elements of the NCQG

315. Across all datasets, a second consideration is that **tracking key climate-related characteristics and elements emphasized in the NCQG decision requires development of current thematic definitions and methodological approaches**. The decision highlights considerations that may be relevant for the SCF to consider in its future preparation of the NCQG report, for example the context of meaningful and ambitious mitigation and adaptation action and transparency in implementation; thematic balance; and new areas of focuses, including adaptation finance taking into account the new Global Goal on Adaptation, finance for responding to loss and damage, support for just transitions, and vulnerable communities and groups. The SCF's updated operational definition for climate finance (see introduction, paragraph 12) explicitly references the goals of the Paris Agreement and provides greater specificity with respect to financing nationally determined climate action. New definitions and methodologies are also beginning to emerge for tracking finance for loss and damage and just transitions (see chapter 1). At the same time, further efforts are needed to enhance the tracking of adaptation finance and improve approaches for tracking gender-responsive climate finance (see sixth BA recommendations). Further discussion on the qualitative dimensions of these characteristics is in section 3.6.

316. The third element for consideration is the **tracking of innovative financial instruments and alternative sources that require new methodologies and accounting frameworks**. While significant progress has been made in recent years (see chapter 1), broader methodological work is required to ensure wider innovative instruments, as emphasized under the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T⁹⁹ (COP30, 2025), are incentivized through climate finance accounting. Continued improvements are also needed in estimating the mobilization and catalysation effects of instruments and public sector interventions in order to track their effectiveness in scaling up financial flows (Falduto and Jachnik, 2025). Expanded accounting frameworks may be required to capture new and alternative sources and to consider measures such as debt swaps, insurance and other risk-reducing leveraging mechanisms.

317. Lastly, **advanced reporting timelines and transparency are required for a timely assessment of NCQG progress and accountability**. Experience from the SCF's USD 100bn goal Progress Report demonstrates that time lags in national reporting to the UNFCCC is a key challenge. Across relevant information sources (UNFCCC, OECD and Oxfam), the preference is to draw on national reporting through the ETF BTRs; however, owing to the two-year cycle of reporting, official information for 2023–24 flows is not available until the end of December 2026. The UNFCCC and OECD request preliminary reporting to produce their reports, while Oxfam attempts to proxy climate-specific reporting through applying adjustments to the OECD's Rio marker data. While the three organizations are all fundamentally seeking to capture the same information, the lack of available data can lead to significant discrepancies in figures. The NCQG decision formally invites advanced reporting by the end of June 2028 on financial support provided and mobilized in 2025–26. For some Parties, for example the EU, data is typically publicly available by September of the following year. It will be important that all developed country Parties report fully in a timely manner, and that such information is made publicly available to ensure transparency. The SCF may wish to consider streamlined processes for compiling its report, including allowing for relevant sources that may only be available subsequently (e.g. civil society reports that may draw on the end of June reporting). Future BTR timelines could also be reviewed with a view to future NCQG reporting post-2028.

2.5.2. Summary of reflections

318. Significant advances have been realized over the past decade in tracking climate finance flows; however, the establishment of the NCQG brings forward new tracking requirements. Reporting and accounting frameworks need to be enhanced given the broader and distinct layers of the new goal, and it will be crucial to build on existing systems. New characteristics, such as loss and damage and just transitions, require definitions, and new innovative instruments require new measurement methodologies. Key opportunities include:

- **National reporting to the UNFCCC:** SBSTA will undertake a review of the MPGs by the end of 2028,⁹⁹ providing the opportunity to consider NCQG-related requirements for reporting on finance in BTRs, including facilitating reporting on wider


99) Decision 18/CMA.1, paragraph 2.

characteristics and reviewing timelines.

- **Country-level climate budget tagging and tracking systems:** Development of country-level taxonomies and wider systems are crucial to support developing country reporting on international finance received, in addition to advancing reporting of domestic public climate finance.
- **Complementary use of international statistical systems and wider analysis:** Statistical systems that can consolidate and reconcile time-series data from a range of actors and sources, and distinguish and disaggregate flows by countries of origin and destination, will be essential to ensuring the robust presentation of data, in particular by avoiding double counting. Existing statistical databases and systems, such as the OECD DAC CRS, could play a key role in providing robust information on MCF and multilateral outflows that are inherently difficult to track through national reporting, complementing Party-level reporting on inflows. A harmonized

framework would support a consistent assessment of progress, for example by establishing baselines and tracking changes in distribution and scaling up overtime. In addition, wider analysis will be valuable for reporting on the broader scope of flows under the NCQG. Where single estimates may be challenging, trends and alignment metrics may be provide useful information.

319. A concerted and collaborative effort is required from climate finance providers, recipients, multilateral and other financial institutions to build consensus and convergence across emerging definitions and boundaries, and to accelerate data collections so that new NCQG characteristics and elements can be reflected on in reporting on 2025–26 flows by 2028.



3

Assessment of climate finance flows

3.1. Introduction

320. This chapter provides an assessment of climate finance flows presented in chapter 2, including their alignment with the needs and priorities of developing countries, their effectiveness in delivering results, and issues related to access and enabling conditions. In accordance with mandates to the SCF, the chapter considers both quantitative and qualitative aspects of climate finance, including impacts and outcomes as well as challenges and opportunities in the provision and mobilization of finance. The assessment complements the overview of flows by examining their purpose, composition and implications for achieving the objectives of the Convention and the goals of the Paris Agreement.

321. Consistent with previous BAs, this chapter assesses the effectiveness of climate finance through several interrelated dimensions. It considers the extent to which climate finance is aligned with the needs and priorities of developing countries and supports country ownership (section 3.2). It then assesses evidence on impact and outcomes (section 3.3), followed by trends in access to concessional finance (section 3.4). While these dimensions do not provide an exhaustive assessment of climate finance effectiveness, they reflect the framing adopted in previous BAs and provide a basis for assessing key aspects of how climate finance contributes to the objectives of the Convention and the Paris Agreement. Consistent with previous BAs, the assessment also considers selected cross-cutting considerations, including gender responsiveness, where relevant across these dimensions. Section 3.5 situates climate finance within the broader context of global and development finance flows, including drivers and barriers. Finally, Section 3.6 provides reflections on qualitative information that may inform the work of the SCF, including the context of the preparation of the first report on progress towards achieving the NCQG on climate finance.

322. The analysis draws on a range of available information from multiple sources, including Party reporting under the ETF, data from MCFs and MDBs and bilateral providers and information from international organisations, research institutions and other stakeholders. As in previous BAs, variations in definitions, methodologies and reporting practices across sources – as well as data gaps and limitations – should all be considered when interpreting the findings presented in this chapter.

3.2. Trends in alignment with needs and country ownership

323. Country ownership and responsiveness to the needs and priorities of developing countries are a core element of climate finance, as referenced in Article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Paris Agreement. Article 9, paragraph 3 emphasizes the importance of country-driven strategies and the needs and priorities of developing countries, while paragraph 4 calls for a balance between adaptation and mitigation, considering country-driven strategies and the priorities and needs of developing country Parties. Furthermore, Article 4, paragraph 5 of the Paris Agreement recognizes that enhanced support for developing country Parties in implementing NDCs will allow for higher ambition in their actions. Accordingly, MCFs, MDBs and bilateral providers have adopted approaches that seek to align climate finance with needs identified through national plans, strategies and planning processes, such as NDCs and NAPs. The sixth BA highlighted the importance of clearer and more comparable reporting, as well as improved visibility of how climate finance flows correspond to developing countries' identified needs (including those synthesized in the 2nd NDR) while strengthening linkages between finance tracking and national planning instruments such as NDCs and NAPs. This section therefore examines three related questions: (i) how climate finance providers identify and incorporate developing country needs into financing decisions; (ii) how developing countries articulate, prioritize and coordinate those needs through national planning and governance processes; and (iii) the extent to which observed climate finance flows align with the needs and priorities identified by developing countries during the period since the sixth BA.

3.2.1. How are needs considered by different channels of climate finance?

Multilateral Climate Funds

324. Since 2023, MCFs have strengthened the integration of developing country needs into their programming frameworks, allocation systems and approval processes. Alignment with national strategies has also been increasingly formalized. Across the funds, designated national authorities, operational focal points and accredited national entities continue to play central roles in coordinating programming and ensuring alignment with nationally identified priorities. Readiness and capacity-building windows have increasingly supported the preparation and implementation of NDCs, NAPs and other national planning processes, while programming has shifted towards more strategic, country-led

approaches. The GCF has continued to place country ownership at the centre of its programming model through National Designated Authorities (NDAs), Direct Access Entities, the Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme (RPSP) and the no-objection procedure, including through NDA-led Country Programmes and pipeline development aligned with national priorities (GCF, 2024c). Similarly, the Adaptation Fund (2022) has strengthened alignment with NDCs and NAPs through its Medium-Term Strategy (2023–2027) and Direct Access modality, while the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) have increasingly adopted programmatic investment planning designed around nationally determined priorities and sectoral transformation (CIF, 2025d). The GEF has also strengthened country ownership during GEF-8 through its Country Engagement Strategy (CES), Operational Focal Points and the System for Transparent Allocation of Resources (STAR), which supports predictable country allocations and structured country engagement (GEF IEO, 2026).

325. Collectively, these developments indicate a broader shift from project-by-project financing towards country-led and programmatic approaches that seek to strengthen alignment with national climate planning and investment priorities. However, strengthening country ownership through institutional arrangements does not necessarily ensure that available finance matches the scale of identified needs. For example, the GCF's most recent independent evaluation concluded that while country ownership is firmly embedded in the Fund's governing framework and policies, its operationalization remains uneven and fragmented, with procedural mechanisms such as no-objection letters not necessarily translating into sustained country ownership throughout project design and implementation (IEU, 2025a). Additionally, stronger alignment of projects with NDCs, NAPs and other national strategies does not in itself demonstrate that the volume, composition or timing of climate finance is sufficient to meet countries' identified mitigation and adaptation needs (SCF, 2024c, UNEP, 2025).

MDBs

326. Since 2023, MDBs have strengthened the consideration of country needs through upstream diagnostics, strategic alignment and programmatic approaches. A central instrument has been the expansion of Country Climate and Development Reports (CCDRs), which assess climate risks, emissions trajectories

and development priorities, and translate them into sequenced, fiscally grounded investment pathways. Between 2023 and 2025, 11 new CCDRs were developed, bringing cumulative coverage to 93 countries (WB, 2025c). CCDRs also estimate the investment needs associated with resilient and low-carbon development pathways across sectors, helping inform the engagement of MDBs with developing countries and the identification of priority investments alongside broader development objectives.¹⁰⁰ These country-specific assessments complement the broader synthesis of developing-country needs provided through the NDR, while also informing MDB country strategies and investment planning. However, CCDR estimates generally represent total investment requirements across sectors and financing sources, including public and private, domestic and international finance, and are therefore not directly comparable with reported climate finance flows (WB, n.d.; SCF, 2024c).

327. Additionally, several MDBs continue to allocate concessional resources through Performance Based Allocation (PBA) systems, particularly in concessional windows. These frameworks combine measures of country performance, institutional quality and debt sustainability with indicators of development need to determine resource allocations (OIF and OECD, 2026). While PBA systems seek to ensure that concessional finance is directed where it can be used effectively, they also ensure that governance performance, institutional capacity and debt-carrying capacity remain important determinants of access alongside countries' climate and development needs (OIF and OECD, 2026). Together, CCDRs and PBAs inform country partnership frameworks and investment pipelines, thus strengthening coherence between MDB operations and nationally identified climate and development priorities while ensuring that national priorities are reflected through country-led planning processes.

328. While MDB portfolios continue to support a broad range of development objectives beyond climate action, climate considerations are increasingly being integrated into country strategies, diagnostics and operational frameworks (ADB et al., 2024b; OECD, 2024g). MDBs have increasingly used NDCs and NAPs as vehicles for translating nationally identified climate needs into country strategies, investment priorities and results frameworks (ADB et al., 2024b,d). Sectoral interventions increasingly reflect nationally determined

100) See <https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/country-climate-development-reports>.

mitigation and adaptation priorities, while financing packages increasingly combine investment lending, policy support and technical assistance to facilitate implementation (ADB et al., 2024b, n.d). Programmatic approaches bundle lending, policy support and advisory services to move from strategic targets to operational delivery. Nevertheless, the extent to which climate considerations are systematically embedded across MDB portfolios continues to vary across institutions, financing instruments and sectors (IHLEG, 2023). While portfolio-level alignment has strengthened, challenges remain in scaling concessional resources, supporting adaptation at sufficient levels and ensuring consistency of entire portfolios with long-term, low-emission and climate-resilient pathways (ADB et al., n.d.).

Bilateral funds

329. In their biennial communications under Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement, developed country Parties indicate that bilateral climate finance is frequently delivered through development cooperation agencies and bilateral climate funds operating under country programmes developed in collaboration with national governments and implementing partners (UNFCCC, 2025e). Parties report that support is commonly identified through joint planning and consultation processes, recipient-led project proposals, ongoing dialogue with partner governments, and partner-country requests or competitive calls for proposals. Several Parties further indicate that bilateral support is demand-driven and aligned with developing country priorities, including those reflected in NDCs and NAPs and other national development strategies. Parties also highlight the role of in-country offices and technical expertise in maintaining close engagement with national institutions and ensuring that support reflects local circumstances and evolving needs. These approaches indicate increasing efforts to identify and respond to nationally determined climate needs through partner-country planning processes, although the methodologies used to assess needs remain heterogeneous across providers. Recent analysis also suggests that bilateral climate finance allocation reflects broader development cooperation patterns, whereby recipient needs are considered alongside recipient performance and donor strategic interests, including long-standing political, historical and economic relationships (OECD, 2024g). As with ODA more generally, bilateral climate finance allocation is influenced not only by countries' climate needs and priorities but also by broader development cooperation considerations, affecting both the likelihood of receiving finance and the volume allocated (OECD, 2023, 2026f).

330. Article 6 cooperative approaches and carbon markets have also gained prominence as channels for mobilizing finance to support implementation of NDCs. COP guidance and emerging practice increasingly emphasize that Article 6 activities should be aligned with host country priorities, contribute to sustainable development as determined by the host Party and support the implementation of nationally determined contributions (UNFCCC, 2021a,b; NDC Partnership, 2024). The World Bank reports that a growing number of countries are developing institutional and regulatory frameworks to integrate Article 6 into broader national climate planning, including NDC implementation, investment strategies and authorization procedures, with the aim of ensuring that carbon market activities respond to national needs rather than operate as standalone transactions (WB, 2024b, 2025d). Nevertheless, approaches to assessing alignment with national needs and development priorities remain heterogeneous across countries, reflecting differences in institutional arrangements, capacities and market maturity (OECD, 2024g). Overall, climate finance providers increasingly rely on nationally determined planning instruments, including NDCs, NAPs and other national development strategies, to identify and prioritize developing countries' climate finance needs (SCF, 2024c). However, the methodologies used to assess needs, translate them into financing decisions and evaluate whether those needs have been adequately met (including relative to the broader needs synthesized in the 2nd NDR) remain heterogeneous across institutions, which limits comparability across climate finance channels.

3.2.2. How are countries ensuring ownership and alignment?

331. While finance providers have adjusted instruments to better reflect national needs and priorities (section 3.2.1), countries have concurrently strengthened domestic mechanisms to articulate climate finance needs and enhance country ownership and alignment of climate finance. The second NDR highlights that countries increasingly identify and communicate their needs through NDCs, NAPs, LT-LEDS and other national planning processes, while emphasizing the importance of strengthening institutional coordination and implementation capacity to translate identified needs into investment priorities (SCF, 2024). Integration of NDCs and NAPs into national development planning remains a primary mechanism for institutionalizing these climate commitments. The 2025 NAP progress report similarly finds that the NAP process has shifted from formulation

towards implementation, with countries increasingly establishing institutional coordination mechanisms, undertaking comprehensive risk assessments, and integrating adaptation into sectoral planning and governance systems (UNFCCC LEG, 2026). The NDC synthesis reports provide evidence of continued progress in this regard. The 2024 synthesis report found that 48 per cent of reviewed NDCs reported integrating their targets, goals and policies into national legislative, regulatory and planning processes (UNFCCC, 2024). The 2025 synthesis report, which assessed the 64 new or updated NDCs submitted between 1 January 2024 and 30 September 2025, further highlighted efforts to strengthen implementation through governance arrangements, institutional coordination, financing strategies and alignment with the outcomes of the first global stocktake, with 88 per cent of Parties indicating that the global stocktake informed the preparation of their updated NDCs (UNFCCC, 2025d). Together, these findings suggest that countries are increasingly embedding climate objectives within domestic policy and planning frameworks, helping to strengthen policy coherence, connect climate priorities with budgeting and investment decisions, and reinforce country ownership and accountability for implementation.

332. Some countries have started to establish Country Platforms (CPs) as nationally led coordination mechanisms to translate identified climate finance needs into investment priorities and align climate finance with national development strategies (WB, 2024a). CPs bring together domestic institutions, development partners, MCFs, MDBs and private actors under unified investment frameworks anchored in NDCs, NAPs, long-term strategies and just transition plans (IHLEG, 2023). This responds to findings in the 2nd NDR that stronger national coordination mechanisms are needed to connect identified climate finance needs with implementation and financing strategies (SCF, 2024). The growing complexity of the international climate finance architecture, characterized by an increasing number of bilateral providers, MDBs, MCFs and specialized financing initiatives with differing mandates, eligibility criteria and reporting requirements, has increased coordination demands and transaction costs for recipient countries (OIF and OECD, 2026). By consolidating domestic budgets, concessional resources and private capital around nationally defined pathways, CPs aim to reduce fragmentation, improve coordination across financing sources and support more programmatic approaches to climate and development investment (ODI, 2024). Increasingly, national planning processes also seek to integrate gender considerations into climate finance

planning, recognizing that inclusive planning processes can strengthen country ownership and improve the responsiveness of climate investments to different groups of beneficiaries.

333. At the same time, national development plans encompass a wide range of economic and social priorities, and alignment with climate objectives is not always straightforward. Countries may adopt different approaches to linking climate and development priorities in accordance with their national circumstances, capacities and policy frameworks (OECD, 2019). In practice, CPs vary considerably in scope and ambition. In some contexts, they are designed to support system-level transformation across multiple sectors and investment areas, while in others they focus on more targeted programmes or sector-specific interventions aligned with national priorities (ODI, 2024). As a result, while CPs provide a framework to improve coordination and coherence, the extent and nature of alignment between development and climate objectives varies across countries and sectors.

334. Since 2021, the number of CPs has increased, including four Just Energy Transition Partnerships and additional country-led platforms focused on renewable energy deployment, coal phase-down, climate-resilient infrastructure and broader development objectives (WB, 2024a; WRI, 2025). While early efforts have concentrated on energy transition, there is growing attention to adaptation, resilience and just transition considerations. However, implementation of several JETPs has progressed more slowly than initially envisaged, reflecting delays in translating financing commitments into projects, evolving donor priorities, institutional and implementation challenges, and changes in the international political context (Karg, Gupta, Chen, 2025; OECD, 2025b; UK Government, 2025). Recent analysis suggests that JETPs are at a crossroads, with increasing emphasis on broadening their scope from supporting energy transitions alone towards enabling wider energy expansion, energy access and sustainable development objectives that better reflect partner-country priorities (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2025). At the same time, the launch of the Country Platforms Hub at COP30 further institutionalized this approach by supporting peer learning, coordination and the design of platforms aligned with national strategies (GCF, 2025b).

335. In parallel, the GCF announced 14 new CPs supported through its Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme, aimed at strengthening institutional capacity and developing investment frameworks

consistent with NDCs and NAPs (GCF, 2025b). In 2024, MDBs launched the Country Platforms for Climate Action initiative, committing to coordinate finance under countries' NDCs, NAPs and long-term strategies (WB, 2024a). These developments reflect a shift toward embedding climate commitments within domestic financing architectures.

336. Despite this progress, important gaps remain between countries' identified climate finance needs and the institutional arrangements available to translate those needs into investment programmes (ODI, 2024). CP remain concentrated in a limited number of countries and are often focused on the energy sector. Broader sectoral integration beyond energy, including adaptation, AFOLU, transport and industry remains uneven, and many platforms are in early implementation stages (Gilmour et al., 2025; ODI, 2023, 2024;). Questions remain regarding governance arrangements, transparency of financing structures and financial terms, and the extent to which country platforms can mobilize private investment at the scale required for climate and development objectives (ODI, 2024). The 2nd NDR highlights that many developing countries continue to identify institutional capacity, coordination across government, project preparation and access to finance as major constraints to addressing their identified climate finance needs (SCF, 2024). Continued refinement of country-led coordination models and expansion across sectors will be critical to strengthening ownership and alignment over time.

3.2.3. Alignment of flows with the needs of developing countries

337. Assessing whether the scale of climate finance flows at the global or international level aligns with the needs of developing countries is challenging because available estimates are not directly comparable. Needs assessments differ in their underlying costing methodologies, sectoral coverage, time horizons and assumptions regarding the respective roles of domestic and international finance (SCF, 2024c). Nevertheless, available evidence consistently indicates that the scale of developing countries' climate finance needs substantially exceeds current levels of climate finance:

- The 2nd NDR identified costed needs in 98 NDCs, amounting to approximately USD 455–584 billion per year. However, not all needs, particularly for adaptation, are costed; around 90 per cent of identified needs do not specify whether financing

is expected from domestic or international sources; and information on methodologies and assumptions underpinning many estimates is limited (SCF, 2024c);

- Other model-based assessments estimate annual mitigation investment needs of approximately USD 1.1–2.9 trillion for developing countries, with estimates ranging from USD 1.1–2.4 trillion through 2030 and increasing to as much as USD 2.9 trillion by 2035, while adaptation costs are estimated at approximately USD 310 billion per year by 2035 (SCF 2024c, UNEP AGR 2025).

338. As shown in chapter 2, climate finance flows in developing countries reached USD 1.185 trillion in 2023–2024, while international climate finance flows reached 1.334 billion. The SCF's third report on progress towards achieving the goal of jointly mobilizing USD 100 billion per year includes further information on how finance flows from developed countries address the needs and priorities of developing countries, including the thematic and sector alignment of climate finance aggregates in the context of the goal.

339. Consistent with this multidimensional assessment framework, this section assesses the alignment of climate finance flows with thematic needs of developing countries and efforts to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation. It also considers how the instruments in use align with the needs of developing countries in implementing national climate action plans, drawing on different sources and channels of finance.

Thematic alignment of flows and achieving a balance between adaptation and mitigation

340. While Parties have emphasized the importance of achieving balance between mitigation and adaptation finance, balance does not imply a fixed or equal 50/50 allocation across all sources and channels on aggregate. Article 9, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement refers to achieving a balance “between adaptation and mitigation, taking into account country-driven strategies and the priorities and needs of developing countries”. This framing recognizes that mitigation and adaptation needs differ across countries and evolve over time, and that financial requirements are shaped by vulnerability, emissions profiles and development pathways. Consequently, progress towards greater thematic balance should be assessed not only through changes in aggregate thematic shares, but also by the extent to which climate finance responds to nationally identified needs and priorities.

341. In recent years, efforts to achieve a greater thematic balance in climate finance have become increasingly associated with scaling up adaptation finance under the Paris Agreement:

- Decision 1/CMA.3 (Glasgow Climate Pact), paragraph 18, urged developed country Parties to at least double their collective provision of adaptation finance to developing countries from 2019 levels by 2025, in the context of achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation;¹⁰¹
- Decision 1/CMA.6 (NCQG) reaffirmed Article 9, paragraph 4 of the Paris Agreement (para 17) and recognized the need to dramatically scale up adaptation finance, including taking into account the Global Goal on Adaptation and the thematic and process-related targets referred to in paragraphs 9–10 of decision 2/CMA.5 on the global goal on adaptation (para 18);¹⁰²
- More recently, the Global Mutirão (Decision 1/CMA.7) called for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 and urged developed country Parties to increase the trajectory of their collective provision of adaptation finance.¹⁰³

342. Evidence presented in chapter 2 indicates gradual progress in increasing adaptation finance across the principal channels of international climate finance. Between 2023 and 2024, adaptation finance increased across MCFs, MDBs and bilateral public climate finance, while available evidence indicates that private finance mobilized for adaptation through public interventions remained comparatively limited. Nevertheless, mitigation continues to account for the larger share of climate finance across all reporting channels. Global estimates likewise indicate that although adaptation finance reached its highest recorded level in 2023, it continues to represent only a small proportion of total tracked climate finance (EIB et al., 2024; CPI, 2025d, 2026a; OECD, 2026a). These findings therefore suggest that while adaptation finance has grown steadily in absolute terms, progress towards greater thematic balance has been gradual and has not kept pace with the overall expansion of mitigation finance.

343. MCFs generally exhibit a more balanced thematic distribution than other international climate finance channels, reflecting their mandates under the Convention and the Paris Agreement and governance

arrangements that place greater emphasis on supporting adaptation in vulnerable developing countries. As shown in chapter 2, principal MCFs during 2023–2024 allocated a substantially larger share to adaptation than bilateral providers and MDBs, although important differences remain across individual funds. The GCF (2025f) continued to pursue its policy objective of maintaining a balanced mitigation and adaptation portfolio, reporting 58 per cent adaptation and 42 per cent mitigation in grant-equivalent terms, while the Adaptation Fund and the Least Developed Countries Fund remained almost exclusively adaptation-focused. During the 2023–2024 reporting period, the GEF approved USD 702 million for climate change mitigation through the GEF Trust Fund and USD 419 million for adaptation through the LDCF and the SCCF, reflecting the complementary mandates of the different GEF-managed funds (GEF, 2024f). Unlike the GCF, the GEF does not report a single thematic balance across its climate portfolio because mitigation and adaptation are financed through separate trust funds. Collectively, these thematic allocations demonstrate deliberate efforts by the multilateral climate funds to respond to COP and CMA guidance on strengthening adaptation finance. However, because MCFs account for only a relatively small share of total international public climate finance compared with bilateral providers and MDBs, their more balanced thematic portfolios have only a limited influence on the overall thematic distribution of international climate finance

344. In contrast to MCFs, joint MDB reporting indicates that MDB climate finance remained predominantly mitigation-oriented throughout the assessment period. In 2023, approximately 67 per cent of climate finance committed to low- and middle-income economies supported mitigation, and 33 per cent supported adaptation (ADB et al., 2024a). In 2024, the corresponding shares were 69 per cent and 31 per cent, indicating that although adaptation finance continued to increase in absolute terms, mitigation retained a broadly stable two-thirds share of MDB climate finance (EIB et al, 2025). Joint MDB reporting further indicates that adaptation finance nevertheless continued to increase in absolute terms compared with previous years, reflecting stronger institutional commitments to resilience, expanded methodologies for identifying adaptation finance, greater integration of adaptation into country strategies and investment programmes and increasing demand from borrowing countries

101) Decision 1/CMA.3, para 18.

102) Decision 1/CMA.6, para 17.

103) Decision 1/CMA.7, para. 53.

345. Bilateral climate finance continued to exhibit a predominantly mitigation-oriented profile during the assessment period, although adaptation finance increased further in both absolute and relative terms. OECD data indicate that in 2024, approximately half of bilateral climate finance targeted mitigation, while adaptation accounted for just over one-quarter of bilateral climate finance and cross-cutting activities represented around one-quarter (OECD, 2026A). Compared with earlier reporting periods, adaptation finance continued to increase, reflecting efforts by developed country Parties to implement commitments under the Glasgow Climate Pact and subsequent CMA decisions to scale up adaptation support. Among the 37 bilateral finance providers reporting climate finance in their first Biennial Transparency Reports, 20 reported providing more bilateral, regional and other climate finance for adaptation than for mitigation during the 2021–2022 reporting period. In their third biennial communications under Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement, Parties also reported on efforts to respond to the call to at least double their collective provision of adaptation finance from 2019 levels by 2025 in the context of achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation. Nineteen Parties highlighted efforts to strengthen the balance between mitigation and adaptation in their bilateral portfolios, of which four indicated that an approximate balance had nearly been achieved. Four Parties also reported allocating more than 50 per cent of their grant-equivalent bilateral climate finance to adaptation. Nevertheless, mitigation remained the dominant thematic focus of bilateral climate finance provided and mobilized. Considerable variation persists across bilateral providers, with adaptation shares differing according to provider priorities, regional focus, sectoral portfolios, financial instruments and approaches used to identify climate-relevant finance, including the application of Rio marker coefficients (UNFCCC, 2025b). Overall, the available evidence suggests that while bilateral adaptation finance has expanded substantially, further increases will be required if bilateral climate finance is to better reflect the priorities and needs identified by developing countries.

346. Comparisons of thematic balance across financing channels should be interpreted with caution because reported thematic shares reflect both institutional mandates and methodological approaches. MCFs, MDBs and bilateral providers apply different operational definitions, eligibility criteria and accounting approaches when identifying and reporting adaptation finance, including differences between reporting finance at face value and on a grant-equivalent basis. Consequently,

thematic shares reported by different institutions are not always directly comparable. The GCF illustrates this distinction: while it has adopted a policy objective of achieving a 50:50 balance between mitigation and adaptation, it reported that in 2023–2024, its portfolio reached near parity using nominal commitments, whereas adaptation represents a larger share when finance is expressed on a grant-equivalent basis (UNFCCC, 2025b). Such methodological differences should therefore be considered when assessing progress towards thematic balance across institutions. Reported thematic distributions should also be interpreted in the light of methodological challenges associated with identifying, classifying and tracking adaptation finance. Adaptation activities are frequently embedded within broader development programmes and therefore may not always be identified or reported as stand-alone adaptation investments (OECD, 2023c). Institutions also differ in their operational definitions, accounting methodologies and treatment of projects that simultaneously generate mitigation and adaptation benefits. As discussed in chapter 1, these methodological differences affect the comparability of reported thematic distributions and may result in adaptation finance being underestimated in aggregate statistics. These limitations should therefore be considered when interpreting relative shares of mitigation and adaptation finance across different data sources.

347. An increasing share of climate finance supports activities that deliver both mitigation and adaptation outcomes. As shown in chapter 2, the share of cross-cutting finance has increased across several providers in recent years. Consequently, assessments based solely on separate mitigation and adaptation categories may understate the extent to which climate finance contributes simultaneously to emissions reduction, resilience building and broader sustainable development objectives, particularly where projects generate both mitigation and adaptation benefits (OECD DAC, 2024b; CPI, 2025d).

348. Financing for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage represents an emerging dimension of the climate finance architecture. The 2nd NDR identifies substantial and growing needs associated with climate-induced loss and damage, particularly among vulnerable developing countries (SCF, 2024). Decision 5/CMA.5 operationalized the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage, while Decisions 11/CMA.6 and 8/CMA.7 provided successive guidance to the Fund and welcomed progress in its operationalization. Although these decisions, together with the initial capitalization of

the Fund, represent important progress, methodologies for identifying and tracking finance for loss and damage remain at an early stage of development and such finance is not yet systematically reflected in global climate finance statistics. Consequently, it is not yet possible to assess thematic trends in finance for loss and damage in a manner comparable to mitigation and adaptation finance.

How the share of instruments align with the needs of developing countries

349. Existing climate finance instruments are increasingly designed around the premise that developing country needs are heterogeneous, shaped by differing vulnerabilities, capacities, development priorities and risk contexts, and therefore require differentiated, flexible solutions. As highlighted by the 2nd NDR, countries also differ substantially in the scale, sectoral composition and financing characteristics of their identified needs, reinforcing the importance of financial instruments that can respond to diverse national circumstances (SCF, 2024). Instruments are designed to respond to these differing needs by matching financial terms to country risk and institutional capacity, embedding national ownership, supporting system-level transformation and addressing structural market failures.

350. At the same time, the selection and design of financial instruments are not determined by country circumstances alone but reflect the interaction between country needs, project characteristics, provider mandates and market conditions. In the case of sovereign operations, MDB and IFI financing is typically aligned with public expenditure frameworks, country programmes and financial conditions, and is often provided through loans and grants that support broader development and climate-related objectives.¹⁰⁴ In contrast, for non-sovereign and private sector operations, the choice of financial instruments is more closely linked to the financial characteristics of underlying investments, including their capacity to generate returns and attract private capital (IFC, 2024).¹⁰⁵ Instruments therefore vary not only in financial structure but also in the type of constraint they are designed to address.¹⁰⁶ Alignment with developing country needs therefore depends

on matching instrument choice to both structural barriers and context-specific conditions, including fiscal constraints, institutional capacity, debt sustainability, risk perception and implementation readiness.¹⁰⁷ The choice between grants, concessional loans and non-concessional finance should reflect recipient countries' creditworthiness, debt sustainability and broader financing circumstances, particularly in climate-vulnerable countries.¹⁰⁸¹⁰⁹

351. Concessionality is deployed differently across mitigation and adaptation finance, reflecting variations in revenue potential, risk profiles and country circumstances.¹¹⁰ Adaptation projects, particularly in LDCs and SIDS, often generate limited direct financial returns and therefore rely predominantly on grants and highly concessional finance to avoid placing unsustainable debt burdens on recipient countries (UNEP, 2024). By contrast, mitigation investments in renewable energy, energy efficiency and transport may generate revenue streams that enable blending with non-concessional finance and private capital (IEA, 2025c). Hence, concessional finance in mitigation contexts is frequently used to reduce risk and crowd in private investment, whereas in adaptation, it often constitutes the primary financing source. Concessionality is typically assessed using established methodologies, including grant-equivalent approaches under OECD DAC frameworks and the concessionality criteria applied by MDBs (see chapter 1). Countries with elevated debt vulnerability or high cost of capital generally require a greater share of grants or highly concessional finance to ensure that climate investments remain compatible with fiscal sustainability and debt sustainability analyses (OECD, 2024g).

352. Programmatic and platform-based approaches further support alignment with developing country needs by combining policy reform, institutional strengthening, technical assistance and investment finance within integrated country-led frameworks. Examples include CPs, sectoral investment plans and programmatic funding windows under MCFs and MDBs (ADB et al., 2024d; WB, 2024a). The CIF's Accelerating Coal Transition (ACT) programme and JETPs, for example, combine policy dialogue, technical assistance and investment packages

104) MDBs, 2024. Common approach to measuring climate results. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climatechange/publication/common-approach-to-measuring-climate-results>

105) MDBs, 2026. Mobilization of Private Finance by Multilateral Development Banks and Development Finance Institutions in 2024. <https://www.ifc.org/en/insights-reports/2026/mobilization-of-private-finance-by-mdbs-dfis-2024-joint-report>

106) OECD, 2025. Handbook on measuring and reporting on Mobilised Private Finance in OECD DAC statistics. [https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/STAT\(2025\)25/REV1/en/pdf](https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/STAT(2025)25/REV1/en/pdf)

107) MDBs, 2024. Joint Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) Statement for COP29 – MDBs' Support to Implementing the Paris Agreement. <https://www.ndb.int/news/joint-multilateral-development-banks-mdbs-statement-for-cop29-mdbs-support-to-implementing-the-paris-agreement/>

108) OECD (2025), *Global Outlook on Financing for Sustainable Development 2025: Towards a More Resilient and Inclusive Architecture*, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/753d5368-en>.

109) OECD (2026). *Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries in 2013–2024*.

110) OECD (2024). *Scaling Up Adaptation Finance in Developing Countries: Challenges and Opportunities*. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/scaling-up-adaptation-finance-in-developing-countries_b0878862-en/full-report.html

around nationally identified transition pathways.¹¹¹ Similarly, MDBs have increasingly used development policy financing and other programmatic lending instruments to support implementation of nationally determined climate and development priorities (WB, n.d.; OECD, 2024g). By moving beyond individual projects towards longer-term programmes of policy reform and institutional strengthening, these approaches seek to enhance country ownership, improve coordination across financing sources, and support implementation of priorities identified in NDCs, NAPs and other national strategies (ADB et al., 2024c).

353. Recent evidence, including findings from the 2nd NDR, suggests that the distribution of climate finance continues to reflect differences in institutional capacity rather than vulnerability alone. Evidence from more than 30 Francophone developing countries finds that mitigation finance has continued to increase, while adaptation remains persistently underfunded despite high levels of climate vulnerability (OIF and OECD, 2026). Countries with stronger institutional capacity tend to attract larger volumes of climate finance, whereas many LDCs and SIDS continue to experience limited access to private finance and insufficient support for project preparation and institutional strengthening. The assessment also finds that climate finance is not yet consistently aligned with national priorities articulated in NDCs and NAPs, highlighting the continued importance of readiness support, long-term investment planning and country-led programming (OIF and OECD, 2026).

354. Results-based and performance-linked instruments have increasingly been used to support implementation of country-defined climate priorities. Under the Warsaw Framework for REDD+, results-based payments are linked to verified emissions reductions,¹¹² while the GCF increasingly applies performance-based approaches that link disbursements to agreed mitigation, adaptation or institutional results rather than prescribed expenditure categories. These approaches seek to strengthen accountability while providing countries with flexibility in determining implementation pathways consistent with national strategies. Where voluntarily applied, results-based approaches have generally been designed to build on existing national monitoring, reporting and verification systems and to accommodate differences in institutional capacity and data availability.¹¹³ When

appropriately designed, they can strengthen national monitoring and evaluation systems while supporting country ownership and implementation of nationally determined climate objectives.

355. Overall, evidence indicates that alignment with developing country needs depends not only on the volume of climate finance provided but also on the appropriateness of the financial instruments used. Different instruments are suited to different financing contexts and investment needs (OECD, 2024g). Grants and highly concessional finance are generally more appropriate for countries with constrained fiscal space, high debt vulnerabilities or limited capacity to absorb additional debt, particularly for adaptation and capacity-building activities that generate limited direct financial returns (SCF, 2024). By contrast, concessional loans, guarantees, equity and blended finance may be better suited to investments with revenue-generating potential or where mobilizing private capital is an explicit objective (OECD, 2023c). This underscores that assessing the distribution of climate finance instruments requires considering recipient countries' economic and fiscal circumstances, debt sustainability and implementation capacity, alongside the characteristics of the activities being financed.¹¹⁴ The implications of debt sustainability and fiscal space for access to and provision of climate finance are discussed further in section 3.5.3.

3.3. Trends in the impacts and outcomes of climate finance

356. Building on the assessment of alignment with developing countries' needs and priorities in section 3.2, this section examines the impacts and outcomes of climate finance. It considers the extent to which climate finance has contributed to mitigation and adaptation outcomes, leveraged additional resources, and generated broader cross-cutting outcomes. In addition to climate-related results, the section recognizes that effective climate finance is expected to support broader objectives, including gender responsiveness and other sustainable development outcomes, consistent with the approaches adopted by MCFs, MDBs and bilateral providers in their results frameworks. The interpretation of climate finance outcomes should also be considered alongside the thematic distribution of climate finance discussed

111) See <https://www.cif.org/topics/accelerating-coal-transition>.

112) Available at <https://redd.unfccc.int/fact-sheets/warsaw-framework-for-redd.html>.

113) Decision 18/CMA.1.

114) See <https://ida.worldbank.org/en/financing/debt/debt-sustainability-grants>

in section 3.2.3, including the continuing imbalance between mitigation and adaptation finance.

3.3.1. Expected and actual results of MCFs, MDBs and bilateral sources

357. Under decision B.29/01, the GCF adopted an outcome-oriented Integrated Results Management Framework (IRMF) which provides a common results architecture for monitoring mitigation and adaptation outcomes across the portfolio (GCF, 2021). The framework includes core indicators such as GHG emissions avoided and the number of people benefiting from increased resilience. The Strategic Plan 2024–2027 further set targeted allocations, prioritizing enhanced access for developing countries and expanded private-sector engagement (GCF, 2023c). As reported in the 2023 Annual Report, GCF's portfolio reached approximately USD 13.5 billion across 243 projects in 129 developing countries (GCF, 2023a). In 2024, its portfolio increased to 16.0 billion in commitments across 286 approved projects (GCF, 2024a). By November 2025, this had increased to USD 18 billion across 314 projects (GCF, 2025c). In 2024, the private-sector portfolio reached USD 1.2 billion across 12 approved projects.¹¹⁵ The Readiness Programme expanded support for national planning, including assistance for national adaptation plans (NAPs), NDC 3.0 and country programming, strengthening countries' capacities to develop climate investment pipelines and access GCF resources (GCF, 2025c). More recent information indicates that, as of late 2025, the portfolio comprised approximately 336 approved projects, corresponding to USD 19.3 billion in GCF resources and around USD 78.7 billion in total project value including co-financing (GCF, 2025f). While programming metrics have advanced, many outcome indicators remain under implementation and not yet fully reported at scale.

358. Under GEF-8, the GEF established quantified targets across biodiversity, climate mitigation, land degradation, chemicals and international waters (GEF, 2022a). GEF-8 aims to avoid or reduce 1,850 million tonnes of GHG emissions, place 250 million hectares under improved management and restore 10 million hectares of degraded land by 2026, while ensuring at least 90 per cent of projects integrate gender-responsive measures (GEF, 2023a). By mid-2024, 85 per cent of GEF-8 resources had been programmed, exceeding the 80 per cent benchmark (GEF, 2024d). The Trust Fund disbursed USD 785 million in FY2024 against USD 1.37 billion in

receipts (GEF, 2024d). The Small Grants Programme approved 887 new projects between July 2023 and June 2024, completed 953, and managed 2,351 active projects in 127 countries, including 39 LDCs and 37 SIDS, mobilizing USD 88 million in grants matched by USD 81 million in co-financing. While programming progress is strong, most environmental outcomes remain in early implementation.

359. The CIF reporting for 2023–2024 reflects both strategic scaling and measurable delivery. The 2023 report highlights operationalization of Renewable Energy Integration and Nature, People and Climate programmes and strengthened emphasis on just transition, gender and youth (CIF, 2023a). In 2024, the CIF endorsed approximately USD 860 million in new investments targeting clean energy, the acceleration of coal transitions, as well as nature-based solutions and resilience, which is expected to mobilize several billion dollars in co-financing (CIF, 2024a). Reported outcomes include expanded resilience benefits for millions of people, sustainable management of millions of hectares and strengthened private-sector partnerships. For example, more than 68 million people are reported to have benefited from CIF's forestry and resilience funding in 2024 (CIF, 2024a). The launch of the CIF Capital Markets Mechanism further signals a shift toward leveraging private capital alongside country-led investment plans (CIF, 2025b).

360. The AF's Medium-Term Strategy (2023–2027) prioritizes locally led adaptation, innovation, direct access and gender equality (AF, 2022). Between 2023 and FY2025, approved projects increased from 155 to 199, and total approvals rose from USD 1.055 billion to USD 1.39 billion (AF, 2023a, 2024a). The Adaptation Fund expanded implementation across resilience-building, early warning systems and ecosystem restoration initiatives. The Fund also continued to strengthen institutional capacity in vulnerable countries through the expansion and re-accreditation of implementing entities and its direct access modality. The expansion of accredited implementing entities and continued use of the Fund's direct access modality are intended to strengthen institutional capacity and country ownership in vulnerable developing countries.

361. For 2023–2025, the World Bank's expectations were guided by its 2021–2025 Climate Action Plan and reinforced through its revised corporate scorecard framework introduced in 2024, which streamlined 22

115) Available at <https://www.greenclimate.fund/document/gcf10-impact-report>

indicators to track outcomes across poverty reduction, resilience, sustainability and private investment mobilization.¹¹⁶ The Bank expected to deepen the integration of climate considerations into development operations and expand financing in vulnerable regions. In practice, lending approvals in FY2023 included USD 14.3 billion for Eastern and Southern Africa and USD 11.3 billion for Western and Central Africa. By FY2025, total financing reached USD 118.5 billion in loans, grants, equity and guarantees, with USD 34 billion directed to Sub-Saharan Africa and USD 24.9 billion to Latin America and the Caribbean (WB, 2023a, 2025e). These outcomes suggest expansion in overall financing and strengthened climate-development integration, although outcome-level climate-specific results remain embedded within broader corporate reporting.

362. For 2023–2025, ADB expected to scale climate finance, align operations with the Paris Agreement and increase the share of climate finance toward its 2030 target of 50 per cent of total operations (ADB, n.d.). In 2023, ADB delivered USD 9.8 billion in climate finance (USD 5.5 billion mitigation and USD 4.3 billion adaptation) (ADB, 2024a). In 2024, climate commitments exceeded USD 12 billion, with approximately 60 per cent allocated to mitigation and 40 per cent to adaptation (ADB, 2025b). ADB also reported that 91 per cent of operations in 2024 supported climate action. These results indicate progress toward scaling finance and institutional alignment, supported by its Climate Change Action Plan (2023–2030) and the Innovative Finance Facility, although mitigation continues to represent the larger share.

363. Under its 2021–2025 Climate Change and Green Growth Framework, AfDB set expectations to align all new operations with the Paris Agreement, allocate at least 40 per cent of approvals to climate finance and achieve at least 50 per cent adaptation finance (AfDB, 2023). By 2024, 98 per cent of new projects were climate-informed, and USD 5.5 billion was allocated to climate finance, with a majority supporting adaptation and resilience (AfDB, n.d.). Expansion of initiatives such as the Africa Adaptation Acceleration Program and the Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa reflects progress toward implementation goals. While alignment targets have largely been met, overall climate finance volumes remain below the scale of Africa's identified needs.

364. For 2023–2025, EBRD expected to maintain

majority green finance, ensure full Paris alignment of new investments and implement its Climate Adaptation Action Plan (EBRD, 2023b). In reported outcomes, all new investments were confirmed as Paris-aligned, majority green finance was sustained, and enhanced transparency measures were introduced through TCFD and ISSB-aligned disclosures in 2024 (EBRD, 2024b). The portfolio continued to prioritize private-sector green investment, policy reform and sectoral transition support. These outcomes suggest strong institutional alignment and transparency improvements, although detailed adaptation outcome metrics remain less prominently reported.

365. For 2023–2025, IDB expected to scale climate finance, deepen climate integration across lending and mobilize private capital in Latin America and the Caribbean (IDB, 2023). In 2023, climate finance reached approximately USD 7.5 billion across public and private operations (IDB Invest, 2024). Strategic priorities included sustainable mobility, renewable energy and use of sustainable finance instruments (IDB, 2024). Overall, while financing volumes increased and climate considerations became more integrated into core operations, reporting on realized climate outcomes for 2023–2024 remains at an early stage for many institutions, limiting the extent to which impacts can be assessed relative to expected results.

366. Recent implementation evidence also illustrates how climate finance is increasingly delivering adaptation and resilience outcomes alongside immediate development and humanitarian objectives. For example, the Central Emergency Response Fund's Climate Action Account supports climate-smart humanitarian interventions that combine life-saving assistance with measures that strengthen adaptive capacity, including climate-resilient agriculture, anticipatory action, climate-smart WASH systems and community-led adaptation (UN OCHA, 2025). Early implementation results show improvements in crop yields, food security, livelihood resilience and reductions in negative coping strategies, illustrating how climate finance can simultaneously address immediate vulnerability while strengthening longer-term resilience (UN OCHA, 2025).

367. While these examples demonstrate positive project-level outcomes, recent assessments suggest that evidence of transformational impacts remains more limited. Reviews of climate finance implementation indicate

116) World Bank Group scorecard available at <https://scorecard.worldbank.org/en/home>

that resilience, gender equality and community-level benefits are increasingly documented, but that many interventions remain relatively small and fragmented, limiting their ability to catalyse systemic transformation

(OIF and OECD, 2026). This has reinforced calls for more programmatic approaches, country platforms and longer-term investment strategies capable of delivering economy-wide transitions.

Box 3.1

Tracking gender in climate finance

The SCF's sixth BA recommendations encourage climate finance providers and recipients, as well as data aggregators, to improve the tracking and granularity of reporting of data on gender-responsive climate finance (UNFCCC SCF, 2026).


The OECD DAC tracks gender-related development finance through a gender equality policy marker.¹¹⁷ Projects are identified and tagged as having gender equality as a principal objective or a significant objective, providing a measure of both dedicated gender-focused finance and

broader aid that integrates gender considerations. Within the OECD DAC statistical system, bilateral projects are reporting using the Rio markers (climate change mitigation, climate change adaptation,) and the DAC gender equality marker, allowing development co-operation that targets both environment and gender equality objectives to be tracked. In 2024, 69 per cent of climate-related bilateral development finance was identified as targeting gender either as a principal or significant objective, as illustrated in figure 3.1 below.

Figure 3.1

Climate-related bilateral development finance reported to OECD DAC 2014-2024, including upper and lower bound estimates and gender-related finance

(Volume and shares of ODA with gender equality objectives by Rio marker
Billions of USD, 2024 constant prices, DAC members, bilateral allocable ODA commitments, climate change mitigation and adaptation)



Source: OECD DAC CRS

117) See: [Development Finance for Gender Equality | OECD](#)

368. Reporting on bilateral climate finance has improved substantially through the OECD statistical system and Party reporting under the ETF, including information on financial flows, thematic allocation, sectors, financial instruments and mobilized private finance. However, comparable information on the outcomes and impacts of bilateral climate finance remains less developed. Bilateral providers generally assess results through a combination of annual monitoring, project completion reports, independent evaluations and periodic portfolio evaluations, using institution-specific results frameworks

and indicators. These evaluations often take place several years after project implementation to allow sufficient time for outcomes and impacts to materialize, particularly for interventions supporting adaptation, resilience, institutional strengthening and policy reform. As a result, approaches to measuring climate outcomes vary across providers, and differences in evaluation timing, methodologies and reporting practices continue to limit the comparability and aggregation of outcome information across bilateral climate finance.

Table 3.1

Expected and actual results of select MCFs

Funds and year of establishment	Expected results (2023–2024)		Reported results
Least Developed Countries Fund and Special Climate Change Fund 2002	From LDCF-approved projects as of September 2024 • 73.84 million direct beneficiaries • 14.04 million hectares expected to be better managed to withstand the effects of climate change From SCCF-approved projects as of September 2024 • 9.5 million people with reduced vulnerability • 5.29 million hectares of land withstanding the effects of climate change	1.52 million beneficiaries in FY24 (50% female)	Reported outcomes by 2024: • 710 million tonnes of CO₂eq already reduced/avoided • 371 million adaptation beneficiaries reached • 369.77 million MWh of energy savings realized • 156 million hectares under sustainable management practices
Pilot Program for Climate Resilience 2008	By 2023: • 60,043 people supported to cope with the effects of climate change • 328,597 ha covered by sustainable land and water management practices	By 2023: • 55,483,138 people supported to cope with the effects of climate change • 409,305 ha covered by sustainable land and water management practices • 2,915 km of climate resilient roads constructed or rehabilitated • 73,079 ha protected from flood, sea level rise and storm surge	
Clean Technology Fund 2008	–	By 2023: • 39.2 tons CO₂ emission reductions annually • 6,136 GWh annual energy savings • 22.8 GW of installed capacity	
Scaling up Renewable Energy Program 2010	–	By 2023: • 273,927 tons CO₂ eq of annual GHG emission reductions • 415,548 MWh annual electricity output • 536 MW of installed electricity capacity • 3,131,573 people with improved energy access	
Forest Investment Program 2009	–	By 2023: • 28.1 million tons CO₂eq GHG emissions reduced or avoided or enhanced carbon stocks • 36,290,451 ha covered by sustainable forest and land management practices • 3,145,370 people receiving livelihood co-benefits, 44% of whom are women	
Green Climate Fund 2015	In 2024–2027: • 190–280 million beneficiaries adopting low-emission climate resilient agricultural and fisheries practices that results in secure livelihoods and reconfigured food systems • Support for developing countries that conserves, protects and restores 120–190 million ha of terrestrial and marine areas		–

GEF 1991	In 2022–2026: • 515 million ha under conservation and sustainable management • 10 million ha of land and ecosystems under restoration • 1 850 million metric tons of CO₂e reduced	–
Adaptation Fund 2009	Not specified in the AF’s medium-term strategy for 2023–2027	By June 2024: • 3.94 million beneficiaries • 116 risk and vulnerability assessments conducted and 258 early warning systems installed • 1 558 113 ha of natural habitats and 24 757 metres of coastlines created, maintained, or improved
Climate Investment Funds	Not specified	By 2023: • 55 million people supported by resilience programming By 2024: • 68 million people benefitted from forestry and resilience investments • 42.7 million tons CO₂eq GHG emissions reduced/avoided, annually from energy investments • 38 million ha have been brought under sustainable and or water management practices

Sources: AF (2022), CIF (2023a, 2024a), GEF (2023a, 2024e), GCF (2023c, 2025e)

Table 3.2

Selection of climate-relevant impact indicators reported by multilateral development banks at the portfolio level for 2023–2024

MDB	Annual expected GHG emission reductions	Number of beneficiaries or other adaptation-related indicators
ADB	As of 2024: • 50.2 million metric tons of CO ₂ e emissions reduced annually through highway expansions, road constructions, clean energy use and construction of sustainable urban transport systems	As of 2024: • 23.1 million individuals gaining access to improved health and education services, as well as enhanced social protection; • 9.5 million poor and vulnerable people enjoying better access to water supply, sanitation services, infrastructure, and financing for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) • 52.8 million urban residents benefiting from upgraded services such as solid waste management, sanitation and drainage systems, green public transport, affordable treated water supply, and improved road network • 16.9 million rural inhabitants experiencing improved road connectivity, connection to reliable water and electricity supply, and reduced flood risks • 12.4 million women and girls becoming more resilient to disasters and other shocks, including pandemics
AfDB	Not specified	In 2023: • Connected 3.5 million people with improved transport services; • Connected 399 837 households to electricity, and thus benefitting about 2.4 million people, and 6,035 businesses; • Approximately 2.8 million people gained better access to healthcare • 1 007 498 people with access to water, 436 029 of whom are women • 8 031 498 people with access to sanitation, 4 096 409 of whom are women In 2024: • 3 574 539 people with improved access to transport, 1 834 113 of whom are women • Facilitated over 200 000 new electricity connections that benefited nearly 1 million people • Supported over 25 000 agribusinesses and reached over 1.5 million farmers with climate-resilient technologies • Overall, AfDB activities impacted 560 million people across Africa, including more than 240 million women
AIIB	28.5 million tons CO ₂ e GHG emissions (tCO ₂ e) per year avoided by AIIB's total energy sector projects. Of this, 5.7 million tCO ₂ e emissions avoidance per year correspond to projects approved in 2024.	Expected from projects approved by end of 2024: • 21.3 gigawatts (GW) of renewable generation capacity to be installed. Solar photovoltaic (PV) remains the most financed energy source (representing 9.3 GW of cumulative capacity financed), followed by hydropower (4.6 GW), and wind (1.3 GW) • 600 MW of new or improved cross-border electricity transmission capacity, improving regional cooperation • 971 million people to have access to urban mass transport through the electrification of urban transportation networks, electrical buses, and more efficient underground metro facilities • 51 223 km of road, rail or metro infrastructure to be constructed, upgraded or maintained across 62 projects • 410 million beneficiaries of improved transport access by enhanced roads, airports, and railways • 4 900 hectares of land protected through flood control infrastructure; • 13.85 million people to benefit from water disaster protection • 8.71 million people to gain improved access to safely managed drinking water supply services • 7.42 million people to benefit from better access to safely managed sanitation services • 22 million water users to have access to improved irrigation and drainage infrastructure

EBRD	10.8 million tonnes CO₂e/year in emissions reduction from projects approved in 2024 10.71 million tonnes of CO₂e reduced in 2023	In 2023: • 62 250 622 GJ in primary energy savings • 6 205 204 cubic meters of water saved • 5 117 MW of renewable energy capacity installed • 1 319 842 people connected to drinking water Expected impacts from projects approved in 2024: • 73.1 million GJ/year in primary energy savings • 16.6 million MWh/year of renewable electricity produced • 7 million individuals benefiting from new or improved municipal infrastructure • 4.1 million individuals benefiting from better digital coverage
EIB	652 600 tCO₂e/year in GHG emissions avoided expected in 2023. 2 180 600 tCO₂e/year in GHG emissions avoided expected in 2024	Results achieved in 2023: • 14 584 ha of forest or other habitat protected • 58 905 ha with improved management • 43 700 people benefiting from road construction or upgrading • 364 390 people served by new or upgraded water and sanitation infrastructure Expected impacts from infrastructure investments in 2024: • 187 317 ha of forest or other habitat protected • 122 500 ha of land with improved management • 5 545MW of renewable electricity generation capacity • 15 526GWh/year of electricity produced from renewable energy sources • 7 106 614 households that could be supplied with electricity generated • 1 768 000 people benefiting from safe drinking water
IDBG	–	–
IsDB	In 2024: • 410 971 tons of CO₂ emissions reduced. • 20 351 640 tCO₂e expected to be reduced from projects approved in 2024.	In 2024: • 2 742 MW of renewable energy installed • 3 505 628 households with improved access to sanitation services • 11 000 000 people with increased resilience expected from investments made in 2024 • 80 600 people with improved livelihoods and income expected from investments made in 2024
NDB	• 14.7 million tonnes/year in avoided CO₂ emissions expected from projects in the portfolio as at 31 December 2024 • 1.6 million tonnes/year expected from projects approved within the year ended 31 December 2024 • 13.1 million tonnes/year in CO₂ emissions to be avoided from projects in the portfolio as at December 31, 2023 • 500 million tonnes/year in CO₂ emissions to be avoided from projects approved within the year ended December 31, 2023	• 2 400 MW of renewable and clean energy capacity expected from projects in the portfolio as at 31 December 2024 • 400 MW of renewable and clean energy capacity expected from projects in the portfolio as at 31 December 2024 • 2 000 MW of renewable and clean energy generation capacity to be installed from projects in the portfolio as at December 31, 2023

World Bank Group (cumulative over portfolio)	In 2024: • 139.2 MtCO₂eq/year net greenhouse gas emissions reductions expected from investments made • 27.3 million tCO₂eq GHG emissions avoided/ reduced annually achieved from the Bank's Green Bonds program in 2023	In 2023: • 4 million people with new/improved electricity service because of the Bank's Sustainable Development Bonds program • 487 502 farmers adopting improved agricultural technology because of the Bank's Sustainable Development Bonds program • 27.5 million people benefitted from green bond projects because of the Bank's Sustainable Development Bonds program • 38.9 million MWh annual energy savings 4,876 MW of renewable energy capacity added because of the Bank's Sustainable Development Bonds program In 2024: • 24.3 million people provided with access to electricity • 27.6 million hectares of terrestrial and aquatic areas under enhanced conservation/management • 20.5 million people with strengthened food and nutrition security
---	--	--

Sources: ADB (2025a), AfDB (2024, 2025), AIIB (2025), EBRD (2023c, 2024), EIB (2024b, 2025), IsDB (2024a,b), NDB (2023, 2024), WB (2023, 2024d).

3.3.2. Leverage and mobilization of finance, including the use of innovative instruments.

Leverage and mobilization of finance

369. Since the sixth BA, MCFs, MDBs and bilateral finance providers expanded efforts to mobilize private capital alongside public climate resources through a combination of pipeline strengthening, blended finance, market-building and results-linked instruments. These efforts reflect a growing emphasis on using public climate finance strategically to catalyse private investment alongside direct public financing. Across providers, mobilization strategies have increasingly combined financial instruments with technical assistance, policy support and project preparation activities designed to improve the pipeline of investable climate projects.

370. Based on OECD data on public climate finance provided and mobilized private climate finance, the implied mobilization ratio increased from approximately 0.21 in 2021–2022 to 0.25 in 2023–2024 (OECD, 2026a). This suggests a strengthening of the catalytic role of public climate finance over the reporting period. However, this ratio should be interpreted with caution, as methodologies for attributing mobilized private finance differ across providers and financing channels.

371. Data reported by bilateral providers remain preliminary and do not yet permit robust assessment of trends in private finance mobilization. Differences in coverage between first Biennial Transparency Reports (BTR1s) and the preliminary information compiled for the seventh BA, together with variations in methodologies, attribution approaches and the treatment of mobilized

private finance, limit the comparability of reported results across providers. OECD analyses provide complementary information on private climate finance mobilized by developed countries, but these estimates are based on different reporting frameworks and are therefore not directly comparable with Party-reported data. Nevertheless, the available evidence from Party reports and OECD analyses indicates continued efforts by bilateral providers to expand the mobilization of private climate finance.

372. On an individual level, several countries reported marked private finance mobilization. For example, the United Kingdom's International Climate Finance reported cumulative private finance mobilization of approximately GBP 8.2 billion by 2024 across 81 bilateral and multilateral programmes, representing an increase of around 19 per cent relative to pre-2023 levels (UK Government, 2024). This reflects continued use of blended finance, guarantees and investment partnerships to mobilize private investment across multiple sectors.

373. Several countries reported achieving significant levels of private climate finance mobilization through diverse public interventions and institutional frameworks. Norway, for example, reported that mobilized private climate finance increased from USD 33 million in 2020 to USD 656 million in 2022, with the increase attributed primarily to investments made through the Climate Investment Fund (CIF), managed by Norfund.¹¹⁸ This illustrates the role that bilateral development finance institutions and dedicated climate investment vehicles can play in mobilizing private capital alongside public climate finance.

¹¹⁸ See <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Norways%20first%20Biennial%20Transparency%20Report%20under%20the%20Paris%20Agreement.pdf>

374. Bilateral providers reported targeted initiatives to mobilize private sector resources for adaptation finance. The Netherlands highlighted the Dutch Fund for Climate and Development, which aims to direct approximately 65 per cent of its investments towards adaptation and resilience projects in developing countries. Luxembourg reported support through the Blue Natural Capital Financing Facility and the Luxembourg-EIB Climate Finance Platform, which use blended finance and risk-sharing mechanisms to encourage private investment in nature-based solutions and climate-resilient infrastructure. These initiatives demonstrate growing efforts to extend mobilization approaches beyond mitigation into adaptation, although adaptation continues to attract a relatively limited share of mobilized private climate finance.

375. Several bilateral providers are increasingly utilizing innovative financial instruments to mobilize private climate finance. For example, Canada delivers a substantial share of its CAD 5.3 billion international climate finance commitment (2021-2026) through Unconditionally Repayable Contributions. As of March 2024, 63 per cent of the commitment had been delivered through this concessional instrument, which is designed to absorb project risk while allowing public capital to be recycled as repayments are received.¹¹⁹ This reflects broader experimentation by bilateral providers with innovative financial instruments intended to mobilize private investment while preserving scarce concessional resources

376. MCFs reported growing mobilization, reflecting expanded programming and greater engagement with private-sector investment (GCF, 2025e). The GCF approved approximately USD 1.2 billion for private-sector projects in 2024 while expanding direct access accreditation and readiness support to strengthen country pipelines and investment readiness (GCF, 2024a). These efforts seek to improve the enabling conditions for private investment alongside the provision of concessional finance.

377. MDBs and DFIs reported record levels of private finance mobilization during the reporting period. According to the Joint Report on the Mobilization of Private Finance by Multilateral Development Banks and Development Finance Institutions, MDBs and DFIs mobilized at least USD 87.9 billion in private finance for LICs and MICs in 2023, representing a 24 per cent increase over 2022 and the highest level reported since

joint reporting began (MDBs, and DFIs, 2025). In 2024, private finance mobilization for low- and middle-income countries increased further to USD 108.7 billion, while total mobilization across all income groups reached USD 278.5 billion (MDBs and DFIs, 2026). These trends reflect the increasing use of guarantees, blended finance, risk-sharing mechanisms and other innovative approaches to mobilize institutional and commercial capital alongside MDB financing.

378. Reported co-finance volumes illustrate substantial leveraging at project level. MDBs reported mobilizing USD 68.8 billion in co-financing for LMICs in 2023, of which approximately 41 per cent originated from private sources (ADB et al., 2024). Looking ahead, several institutions have announced more ambitious mobilization objectives. MDBs have committed to mobilizing USD 65 billion annually in private finance by 2030, while GEF-8 donor contributions of USD 3.6 billion are expected to leverage almost USD 30 billion in co-finance over the replenishment period (GEF, 2024c). Ex-post verification of mobilized private finance remains uneven across institutions, and many providers continue to report expected co-financing or leverage projections rather than realized mobilization. Consequently, methodological differences in attribution, reporting and verification continue to constrain direct comparison of leverage and mobilization performance across providers.

Use of innovative instruments

379. Since the sixth BA, there has been continued development and application of a broader set of innovative financial instruments and mechanisms aimed at mobilizing climate finance or enhancing fiscal space. Innovative instruments can encompass a broad range of concepts such as blended finance structures (first-loss tranches, concessional co-lending), guarantees and risk-sharing facilities, green and sustainability-linked bond issuance, results-based finance, debt-swap arrangements, aggregation and securitization facilities, and market-building technical assistance (local-currency green bond market support). This section provides a non-exhaustive overview of the trends in the use of several innovative instruments that serve the purpose of scaling up climate finance or increasing fiscal space since the sixth BA.

380. In terms of mobilization of private climate finance, there has been an growing trend in total private climate finance mobilized for ODA eligible countries since 2020, representing a 26 per cent increase since 2022 through

119) <https://international.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/corporate/transparency/evaluations/2025/climate-finance-programming-report>

to 2024 to USD 30.8 billion, (see section 2.3.3). This growth has been driven by multilateral providers, and where available data on the underlying instruments used to leverage private finance show that guarantees from multilateral providers were the main driver, tripling from 2022 levels.

381. Participation in blended finance structures, such as collective investment vehicles or direct investment in companies or SPVs, is another significant instrument used to mobilize private climate finance. However, the degree to which participation in catalytic risk capital, including mezzanine or junior tranches is growing is limited by the lack of data disclosure.¹²⁰ Catalytic, junior, mezzanine or concessional equity is a key instrument in blended finance structures, deployed on sub-market or first-loss terms specifically to absorb early-stage risk and improve the risk-return profile for follow-on investors, rather than to maximize direct returns (OECD, 2018).

382. Notable examples of bilateral funds and DFIs expanding the use of innovative blended finance structures to mobilize private investment include United Kingdom-supported facilities, including British International Investment, that have utilized equity investments, guarantees and catalytic capital to crowd in private finance, particularly in infrastructure and clean energy sectors (BII, 2024). These approaches complement multilateral efforts by targeting specific market barriers, including high cost of capital and limited access to long-term financing. Specialized platforms such as the Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG) have also played a role in mobilizing private finance in developing countries, particularly in higher-risk markets where private investment is otherwise limited. PIDG utilizes a combination of project development support, viability gap funding, guarantees and concessional capital to structure bankable infrastructure projects and attract private investors (PIDG, 2024). In April 2025, the World Bank Group's Private Sector Investment Lab (PSIL) launched the Frontier Opportunities Fund, an IFC-managed vehicle designed to deploy junior equity capital to absorb early-stage and first-loss risk in frontier markets, thereby catalysing additional private investment (World Bank, 2025f).

383. In the debt instrument space, innovative approaches have focused in recent years on securitization approaches and development of bonds linked to sustainability performance. Since 2023, MDBs have begun moving

from an "originate-and-hold" balance sheet model toward an "originate-to-distribute" (OtD) model, in which loans are packaged and sold to institutional investors rather than retained on the lending institution's own books. The World Bank Group's Private Sector Investment Lab (PSIL) identified OtD as one of its core workstreams and has driven the most concrete institutional output in this space to date (WB, n.d.).

384. The most advanced product to emerge from this effort is IFC's Emerging Markets Securitization Program (EMSP), which repackages IFC-originated loans into rated, tranchised securities. The inaugural transaction (EMS 2025-1), closed on 19 September 2025, was a USD 510 million collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed by loans to 57 borrowers across multiple sectors and regions. It was structured with USD 320 million and USD 50 million senior tranches sold to institutional investors, an insured mezzanine tranche, and a USD 60 million equity tranche jointly held by IFC and the UK's MOBILIST program (a Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office vehicle), which supplied the first-loss buffer needed to make the senior tranches investment-grade. A second transaction closed on 15 June 2026 (USD 509 million), adding a new Aa1-rated tranche and a broader institutional investor base (IFC, 2025).

385. In March 2026, the PSIL also announced that a working group of MDBs aims to develop distribution platforms that can pool MDB assets to achieve scale, diversification and liquidity, with a pilot MDB debt fund transaction planned by the World Bank Group Annual Meetings in October 2026 (WB, n.d.). IDB Invest's ReInvest+ programme, announced around COP30 (November 2025), also aggregates loans originated by Latin American and Caribbean regional banks.

386. In bond markets, notable innovations include the World Bank's USD 225 million outcome-linked bond tied to verified carbon removals, CIF's Capital Market Mechanism inaugural market access (USD 500 million bond in 2025), and The Bahamas' debt-for-nature transaction unlocking roughly USD 120–124 million for marine resilience through IDB and TNC support (CIF, 2025c; IDB, 2024; WB, 2024e). In 2024, Barbados completed the world's first debt-for-climate-resilience operation, replacing up to USD 300 million of higher-cost domestic bonds with a sovereign sustainability-linked loan carrying an interest rate of 3.25 per cent (approximately 4.1 per cent including guarantee fees),

120) See OECD (2026), *Mobilised private finance for development*

compared with coupons of up to 8 per cent on the retired bonds (IMF, 2024). The operation was supported by USD 300 million in guarantees provided jointly by the IDB and EIB. The USD 125 million in fiscal saving generated from the deal was redirected to the New South Coast Water Reclamation and Reuse Facility, along with mangrove conservation and agricultural resilience projects (IMF, 2024). These instruments were used to reduce risk and crowd in institutional investors, create repeatable capital-market channels for climate investment, and bridge the gap between public concessional finance and commercially viable projects.

387. Despite these developments, the use of innovative instruments across these channels remains uneven. Bilateral and specialized facilities have demonstrated flexibility in deploying tailored instruments, particularly in mitigation sectors with identifiable revenue streams (Convergence, 2024). However, scaling these approaches for adaptation investments and in LDCs and SIDS remains challenging owing to weaker revenue models, higher perceived risks and limited pipelines of bankable projects (UNEP, 2024a). Structural barriers, including limited pipelines of bankable projects, high perceived and actual risks, weak enabling environments and institutional capacity constraints, continue to limit the effectiveness and scalability of innovative financing instruments across sectors and country contexts (UNEP, 2024a).

3.3.3. Co-benefits from mobilization and use of climate finance in 2023–24

388. The sixth BA highlighted the growing integration of gender considerations into the governance, design and measurement of climate finance, while noting persistent evidence gaps in tracking gender-responsive outcomes. Building on those findings, this section considers selected co-benefits associated with climate finance mobilization and use during 2023–2024, including gender equality and social inclusion, employment, biodiversity, energy access and resilience. Reporting on these co-benefits has continued to expand across multilateral and bilateral providers, reflecting increasing efforts to capture the broader development outcomes of climate finance. However, differences in institutional frameworks, indicators and reporting methodologies continue to limit the comparability and aggregation of results.

389. Gender equality remains an important cross-cutting objective of climate finance. During the assessment period, providers increasingly integrated gender considerations into project design, implementation

and monitoring, with investments supporting women's economic empowerment through renewable energy value chains, climate-resilient agriculture and women-owned enterprises, while also promoting women's participation in climate-related decision-making and community resilience initiatives. For example, the IFC (2024) reported cumulative commitments of approximately USD 11 billion in gender-lens climate investments as of 2024, while the Adaptation Fund and the Green Climate Fund continued to strengthen gender-responsive approaches through innovation programmes, community-based adaptation initiatives and project-level gender action plans (AF, 2024d; GCF, 2024a). Despite these advances, comparable evidence on gender-related outcomes remains limited because institutions continue to apply different definitions, indicators and reporting approaches, making it difficult to assess aggregate impacts across providers.

390. Climate finance mobilization during 2023–2024 has generated measurable employment and local economic spillovers, particularly in renewable energy, transport, grid infrastructure and resilience projects. Globally, renewable energy employment reached approximately 16.2 million jobs in 2023, up from 13.2 million in 2022, reflecting expansion in solar, wind and battery value chains (IRENA, 2024). MDB and CIF reporting indicates that climate-financed investments have supported job creation not only directly through construction and operations, but also indirectly through SME development, local supply chains and service-sector growth (CIF, 2023a; EBRD, 2023, 2024). Collectively, these investments have generated local economic multipliers associated with climate-related infrastructure spending

391. Mobilized climate finance has also delivered ecosystem restoration and biodiversity co-benefits. In 2023, GEF-supported projects reported conserving or restoring approximately 100 million hectares of terrestrial and marine ecosystems (GEF, 2023). Nature-focused programming under CIF's Nature, People and Climate initiative and GCF forest and land-use projects has contributed to carbon sequestration, watershed protection and biodiversity gains alongside mitigation outcomes (CIF, 2024a; GCF, 2023a). These interventions generate multiple dividends, including enhanced ecosystem services, improved soil and water quality, and strengthened climate adaptation for rural communities dependent on natural resources. Such co-benefits are increasingly embedded within integrated landscape and food-system programmes.

392. Climate finance mobilization has also supported

energy access and affordability in developing countries. MDB investments in renewable generation, grid expansion and distributed energy systems have improved electricity access and reliability (EIB et al., 2025). GCF-supported solar and distributed energy programmes in Africa and Asia have reduced energy costs for households and small enterprises, contributing to productive uses of energy and microenterprise growth (GCF, 2024a). In addition, climate finance has increasingly supported access to clean cooking solutions, including clean cooking technologies and fuels, helping to reduce household air pollution, improve health outcomes, alleviate pressures on biomass resources and contribute to emissions reductions (IEA, 2024c). These interventions illustrate how mitigation-oriented finance can generate direct development co-benefits when aligned with access objectives.

393. Adaptation finance has delivered resilience and livelihood gains across water management, agriculture and food security systems. The GCA documents measurable resilience improvements linked to GCF and Adaptation Fund-supported projects in Africa and Asia, including strengthened early warning systems, improved irrigation efficiency and enhanced climate-smart agriculture (GCA, 2024). For example, GCF-financed water management projects in Morocco and agricultural resilience programmes in Niger have reported improvements in productivity and income stability while reducing vulnerability to climate shocks (GCF, 2023a). These outcomes demonstrate that adaptation finance not only reduces climate risk but can also enhance economic security and social stability when integrated into national development strategies.

3.4. Trends in access to bilateral, regional and multilateral concessional climate finance

394. Consistent with the framing adopted in the sixth BA, access to climate finance extends beyond formal eligibility to receive funding. It encompasses the ability of developing countries, national institutions and implementing entities to identify financing opportunities, prepare projects and programmes, meet institutional and fiduciary requirements, secure approval, receive timely disbursement and effectively implement climate action. Access is therefore shaped by both the design of climate finance mechanisms and the institutional capacities of recipient countries, including the availability of readiness support and project preparation, as well as broader financial and macroeconomic conditions. As

discussed in the sixth BA, access is influenced not only by eligibility criteria but also by readiness support, project preparation, accreditation processes and institutional capacities. Building on that assessment, this section focuses on developments during 2023–2025 related to eligibility, timeliness and access through local entities.

395. Building on this framing, this section considers three interrelated dimensions of access. First, it examines how eligibility criteria influence access to concessional climate finance across bilateral, regional and multilateral channels. Second, it considers the timeliness of climate finance, including project preparation, approval and disbursement processes. Finally, it assesses access through local entities as an important dimension of strengthening country ownership and improving the responsiveness of climate finance to national and local circumstances. While this section focuses primarily on institutional and procedural dimensions of access to concessional climate finance, access also influences the extent to which climate finance can support locally led climate action, including locally led adaptation.

3.4.1. Eligibility for concessional finance

396. Concessional finance remains an important source of climate finance for many developing countries, particularly for those facing high debt burdens, limited fiscal space and constrained access to capital markets (SCF, 2024c). Many climate investments, particularly those supporting adaptation, resilience and other public goods, generate limited commercial returns and therefore require grants or highly concessional financing (UNEP, 2024a). In such contexts, concessional resources can reduce financing costs, support debt sustainability and enable implementation of climate priorities identified in NDCs and NAPs without significantly increasing macroeconomic vulnerabilities (SCF, 2024c; IHLEG, 2022). Consequently, the eligibility criteria and access conditions governing concessional finance have become increasingly important determinants of the extent to which the international climate finance architecture responds to developing country needs.

397. Approaches to determining eligibility for concessional finance differ across institutions. For concessional finance provided through MDB concessional windows, eligibility and financing terms are generally determined by income levels, creditworthiness and debt sustainability frameworks rather than climate-specific criteria (WBG, 2026). Consequently, access to concessional resources does not always correspond directly to

countries' climate vulnerability or investment needs. By contrast, under the UNFCCC Financial Mechanism all developing country Parties are eligible to access climate finance, while several funds provide targeted support or priority access for particularly vulnerable country groups, including LDCs and SIDS.¹²¹ Outside the MDB system, some mechanisms, such as the IMF's Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST), also incorporate climate resilience objectives into their financing framework.

398. Between 2023 and 2025, several MCFs strengthened the prioritization of vulnerable countries within their concessional financing frameworks. The GCF (2023c) expanded its readiness envelope and reinforced support for LDCs, SIDS and African States, while the GEF (through the LDCF and SCCF) increased country funding ceilings, doubling the LDCF cap to USD 20 million per country and raising the SCCF ceiling for non-LDC SIDS to USD 3 million (GEF, 2024a). These reforms expanded the scale of concessional resources available to vulnerable countries and reflected continued efforts to align concessional finance with climate vulnerability and institutional capacity constraints.

399. By contrast, reforms across several MDB concessional windows increasingly incorporated debt sustainability and fiscal resilience into eligibility and financing decisions. The CIF (2023b) introduced annual country reclassification based on debt sustainability assessments, while the World Bank continued to link concessional access through IDA to debt and fiscal management assessments (WBG, 2025). Similarly, the ADB (2024b) aligns concessional assistance with the IMF–World Bank Debt Sustainability Framework for low-income countries, and the AfDB's African Development Fund (ADF-16) requires countries to meet debt sustainability criteria to access resources under its Climate Action Window (AfDB, 2025b). These reforms seek to target concessional resources towards countries with the greatest financing constraints while maintaining the long-term sustainability of concessional financing.

400. Access to concessional finance has also increasingly become linked to institutional performance, implementation capacity and fiduciary standards. Under the GCF Strategic Plan (2024–2027), countries are expected to demonstrate readiness and implementation capacity in order to access certain concessional instruments, while MDBs such as ADB and the World Bank (IDA) continue to incorporate country performance assessments and policy reforms into resource allocation

decisions (ADB, 2024d; GCF, 2023c; IDA, 2025). Although these measures are intended to strengthen effectiveness, fiduciary standards and accountability, they may also increase the administrative and institutional requirements associated with accessing concessional finance, particularly for countries with more limited institutional capacity (IEU, 2025a). These findings are consistent with the UK Taskforce on Access to Climate Finance (2024), which identifies accreditation requirements, complex application procedures, limited project preparation capacity and high transaction costs as persistent barriers to timely and equitable access to climate finance.

401. Eligibility conditions within institution-specific concessional financing frameworks have increasingly shifted from fixed multi-year classifications toward more frequent review cycles. The CIF (2023b) institutionalized annual country classification reviews and biennial policy updates, while the World Bank's IDA now updates eligibility and financing terms annually through its Resource Allocation and Eligibility Review, based on GNI per capita, creditworthiness and debt distress classifications under the IMF–World Bank Debt Sustainability Framework (WBG, 2025, 2026). Under the Sustainable Development Finance Policy, the grant-credit-blend mix is also reviewed annually to reflect evolving fiscal conditions (IDA, 2023). Similar review mechanisms operate across other MDB concessional windows, including the ADB (2024d). These more frequent assessments allow concessional financing terms to respond more rapidly to changes in countries' economic circumstances, while maintaining consistency with institutional financing policies.

402. Despite these reforms, many developing countries continue to face significant institutional barriers to accessing concessional climate finance. Recent evidence identifies accreditation requirements, complex application procedures, fiduciary standards, limited project preparation capacity and high transaction costs as persistent constraints, particularly for LDCs and SIDS (OIF and OECD, 2026). These challenges can reduce countries' abilities to access direct financing modalities despite high levels of climate vulnerability and increasing investment needs.

403. MDBs have also expanded blended financing arrangements to support countries transitioning between concessional and non-concessional financing (CGD, 2024c; G20 IEG, 2024). Under IDA20 (FY23–FY25) and IDA21

121) See UNFCCC (<https://unfccc.int/resource/ccsites/tanzania/conven/text/art11.htm>) and GCF Governing instrument (<https://www.greenclimate.fund/document/governing-instrument>)

(FY26–FY28), the World Bank formalized expanded blended access arrangements combining highly concessional IDA resources with non-concessional IBRD financing (WBG, 2025). Although these arrangements are not specific to climate finance, they influence the terms and composition of financing available for climate-related investment in countries with evolving income and credit profiles. Similar blended approaches are increasingly used across other MDBs, including the ADB, reflecting broader efforts to maintain access to development and climate finance while managing debt sustainability and credit risks (ADB, n.d).

404. Overall, reforms since the sixth BA have increased the flexibility of concessional financing frameworks and strengthened the targeting of vulnerable countries within several institutions. However, access to concessional climate finance remains shaped by a combination of institutional mandates, eligibility frameworks and administrative requirements that differ across providers (AF, 2022; GCF, 2024c). While these diverse approaches allow institutions to respond to their respective mandates, they also contribute to a fragmented financing landscape characterized by varying eligibility criteria, fiduciary standards and application procedures (AF, 2022; GCF, 2024c). As a result, coordination challenges, administrative complexity and procedural delays continue to affect timely and equitable access to concessional climate finance, particularly for countries with limited institutional capacity and urgent climate investment needs.

3.4.2. Timeliness of climate finance

405. Timely delivery of climate finance is an important dimension of effective access. While the scale of climate finance is often assessed in terms of commitments and approvals, the timing with which resources are mobilized, approved, committed and ultimately disbursed also affects countries' abilities to implement climate priorities. Delays can arise at different stages of the financing cycle, including project preparation, appraisal, approval, legal arrangements and disbursement, as well as through the pace at which pledged resources are translated into approved projects and financial transfers. The following section considers recent developments in the timeliness of climate finance across major delivery channels, drawing on evidence from MCFs, MDBs and bilateral providers.

406. Between 2023 and 2025, several MCFs and MDBs introduced procedural reforms aimed at shortening approval and disbursement cycles. The Green Climate Fund reported measurable improvements in project cycle efficiency, with the average time from approval to first disbursement declining from approximately 19 months in 2019 to less than 11 months in 2022 and further to around 9 months in 2023 as portfolio management systems matured (GCF, 2025d). The GCF also streamlined pre-Board processes, including standardized Independent Technical Advisory Panel (iTAP) assessments and clearer Board publication timelines, to reduce pre-approval bottlenecks (UNFCCC, 2023). MDBs undertook similar reforms. The World Bank initiated internal process adjustments to reduce the time from project concept to Board approval, targeting a reduction from roughly 19 months to approximately 12 months. Preliminary reporting suggests that early cycle compression gains were visible in 2024, although full time-series data are not yet publicly consolidated.¹²²

407. In addition to procedural aspects, the cost of accessing climate finance is closely linked to the timeliness and effectiveness of delivery. This includes both the cost of capital, particularly for countries facing high borrowing costs, and transaction costs associated with accessing and implementing finance, such as project preparation, approval processes and compliance requirements (UK Taskforce on Access to Finance, 2024). High transaction costs and complex procedures can delay project preparation, approval and disbursement, while elevated borrowing costs may limit countries' abilities to access and utilize available climate finance. These cost-related factors therefore represent an important dimension of effective access, particularly for LDCs and SIDS, and have been highlighted in discussions related to the NCQG on climate finance. Delays in project preparation and approval processes also highlight the continued importance of readiness and project preparation support in facilitating timely access to climate finance.

408. The GCF's Simplified Approval Process (SAP) was established to streamline application review and approval of smaller-scale projects with minimal environmental and social risks, reducing documentation requirements and facilitating faster access to GCF resources for projects with the potential for transformation and scaling up (GCF, 2017). Following updates approved under decision B.32/05, SAP became available for projects requiring GCF

122) See World Bank, 2024. Results and Performance of the World Bank Group 2024. Available at <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstreams/c663c184-6f3d-40fc-8175-34ee4b5a71eb/download>.

contribution of up to USD 25 million while reducing documentation requirements and simplifying review procedures to facilitate faster access to GCF resources (GCF, 2023b). At its 44th Board meeting, the GCF Board considered the Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) second evaluation of the SAP. The evaluation found that, despite successive reforms, the SAP continued to face high transaction costs and longer-than-anticipated processing times, limiting its ability to provide faster and simpler access relative to the regular project approval process (IEU, 2025b). With the Executive Director's "Efficient GCF" initiative reducing the project approval process to nine months, the evaluation concludes that the SAP's current 12-month median offers no comparative advantage in terms of project approval length, noting that delegation to the Executive Director could provide significant efficiency gains. The evaluation recommended that the Board discontinue the SAP modality in its current form and that the Board and the secretariat design and launch an alternative integrated access modality (IEU, 2025b). These findings are consistent with broader evidence that approval processes across multilateral climate funds commonly require between 18 and 36 months, with adaptation projects often experiencing particularly slow disbursement rates (OIF and OECD, 2026). Such delays reduce the responsiveness of climate finance to urgent national priorities and increase project preparation costs for recipient countries.

409. Despite these procedural improvements, systematic and comparable data on approval-to-disbursement timelines across funds and institutions remain limited (OECD, 2024e). Many institutions report commitments and approvals more consistently than actual disbursements, making it difficult to assess whether climate finance is reaching developing countries at the speed required for implementation (Lee, Landers, Matthews, 2023). The absence of harmonized reporting on time-to-disbursement creates uncertainty regarding realization risk (i.e. the gap between pledged or approved finance and funds effectively deployed on the ground). This challenge is particularly significant for adaptation finance, where projects often involve complex modalities, multiple implementing partners and limited revenue streams (OECD, 2023c). In vulnerable contexts, delays in disbursement can have disproportionate operational consequences, yet such timing metrics are rarely tracked in a standardized manner across providers (OECD, 2024e). These findings reinforce observations from the sixth BA that project preparation, readiness support and institutional capacity remain important determinants of timely access to climate finance.

3.4.3. Access through local entities

410. Access through local entities is an important dimension of strengthening country ownership, by increasing the role of national and subnational institutions in the design, implementation and oversight of climate finance. It can also support broader efforts to advance locally led adaptation by increasing the role of domestic institutions in climate finance delivery. However, locally led adaptation encompasses broader principles relating to community participation, locally led decision-making and equitable distribution of resources and is therefore not synonymous with access through local entities alone (OECD, 2023c, 2024e; WRI, n.d.). Access to climate finance through national and subnational institutions can improve responsiveness to local needs and strengthen country ownership by increasing the role of domestic institutions in the design and delivery of climate finance. Local entities are often better positioned to identify context-specific adaptation priorities, engage affected communities and integrate climate investments within national development planning and budgeting processes (IEU, 2025a). Direct access modalities can also strengthen institutional sustainability by building long-term fiduciary, environmental and social safeguards, and project management capacities within national institutions (AF, 2025c). Expanding access through local entities therefore supports alignment with NDCs and NAPS, while potentially improving timeliness and reducing transaction costs associated with multi-layered implementation structures.

411. The Adaptation Fund and the GCF have advanced direct access modalities that allow nationally accredited entities to receive and implement funding without reliance on multilateral intermediaries. These modalities are supported by readiness programmes that build fiduciary, environmental and social safeguard and monitoring capacities. To support DAEs, the GCF has established a dedicated window under its Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme, providing up to USD 1 million per accredited DAE over the 2024–2027 strategy period (GCF, 2025c). The DAE modality provides for:

- Providing post-accreditation support to clear any outstanding accreditation conditions before concluding legal agreements with GCF;
- Enhancing programming capacity for developing project proposals;
- Improving implementation capacity for effective project management, financial management, procurement and stakeholder engagement;

- Strengthening monitoring and reporting to comply with reporting and accountability requirements.

412. By channelling finance through domestic institutions, direct access mechanisms aim to embed climate action within national systems, reinforce institutional sustainability and align implementation with nationally determined priorities, including NDCs and NAPs.

413. Stakeholder submissions also highlight continuing limitations in understanding whether climate finance ultimately reaches local institutions and Indigenous Peoples (Quipa, 2026). Existing reporting systems generally identify overall project beneficiaries but provide limited information on delivery pathways, governance arrangements or whether finance reaches Indigenous Peoples through their own representative institutions rather than intermediary organizations (Quipa, 2026). Improving transparency around local delivery pathways would strengthen assessments of accessibility alongside broader measures of climate finance effectiveness.

414. Between 2023 and 2025, MCFs introduced reforms to improve accreditation efficiency and proportionality. In 2023, the GCF launched the 'Efficient GCF' initiative, establishing service standards and clearer processing timelines to shorten accreditation and project review cycles.¹²³ In 2024, the GCF adopted a Revised Accreditation Framework (RAF), which introduced risk-based and differentiated accreditation criteria designed to make requirements proportionate to

project size and institutional capacity (GCF, 2024d). The RAF reduces documentation redundancy, introduces tiered requirements depending on risk exposure, and simplifies review processes for smaller entities. The GCF also moved from fixed-term accreditation cycles to indefinite accreditation, accompanied by a strengthened Monitoring and Accountability Framework to ensure continuous oversight (GCF, n.d.). These reforms are intended to improve transparency and accessibility, particularly for national and subnational institutions.

415. Since 2008, MCFs have expanded opportunities for direct access by increasing the number of accredited national and regional entities. As at May 2026, a total of 189 entities are accredited to access funds from the GCF, GEF and AF, with the largest share accredited to the GCF (figure 3.2). This expansion reflects continued efforts to strengthen country ownership by enabling a broader range of national and regional institutions to access climate finance directly, rather than exclusively through international implementing entities.


416. Recent initiatives have also sought to enhance complementarity across climate finance mechanisms. Under the Barbados Implementation Modalities of the FRLD, countries may access funding through entities already accredited to the GCF, GEF and AF, thus building on existing accreditation systems and reducing the need for separate accreditation processes.¹²⁴ This approach seeks to accelerate access to finance while leveraging institutional capacities that have already been established through other multilateral climate funds.

123) GCF, n.d. Efficient GCF, <https://www.greenclimate.fund/about/efficient-gcf>.

124) See <https://www.frlid.org/nodebimaccess>.

Figure 3.2

Overview of entities accredited to the Adaptation Fund, the Green Climate Fund and the Global Environment Facility, including by type of entity




417. Despite progress in expanding accreditation, direct access entities continue to account for a relatively modest share of implementation. Approximately 69 per cent of GCF-accredited entities were DAEs (national and regional), although this reflects the number of accredited entities rather than the volume of finance channelled through them (GCF, 2023a). Nevertheless, the proportion of GCF projects implemented by DAEs

increased from 12 per cent in 2019 to 23 per cent in 2023 (GCF, 2024a), while the AF reported that nearly one-third of its portfolio (by number of projects) was implemented through NIEs by mid-2023 (AF, 2023a). These trends suggest gradual progress in strengthening direct access, although international entities continue to implement a substantial proportion of climate finance (figure 3.3).

Figure 3.3

Percentage of climate finance approved through different types of accredited implementing entities



Source: Author's research, based on Climate Funds Update, as at February 2026.

Note: The analysis includes projects of the following multilateral climate funds: AF, CTF, FIP, GEF (GEF6-8), GCF (IRM, GCF 1-2), LDCF, PPCR, SREP, SCCF

418. The GCF (2025a) introduced an accreditation upgrade mechanism allowing DAEs to expand their scope as institutional capacity strengthens, supporting progressive national ownership. Additionally, the GCF launched the Project-specific Assessment Approach (PSAA) as a pilot through to 2026 to facilitate access for entities that are not yet accredited. Under the PSAA, the assessment of an entity's institutional capacities against GCF accreditation standards is undertaken in parallel with the review of a specific funding proposal. This approach aims to reduce transaction costs and processing times, facilitate project implementation, and enable entities to build the institutional track record needed to pursue full GCF accreditation. While the PSAA is not exclusively targeted at DAEs, it may facilitate greater participation by national institutions in GCF programming by providing an alternative pathway to access GCF resources and, potentially, to full accreditation. As at 1 May 2026, 12 proposals had been approved under this pilot.¹²⁵ A review of the PSAA pilot framework will be presented to the GCF Board in late 2026 with a view to deciding on its continuation, institutionalization or discontinuation.¹²⁶ Complementary regional workshops and technical dialogues, such as the Adaptation Fund's 2024 Asia-Pacific workshop on financing locally led adaptation, further promoted

engagement of local governments and community organisations in project design and delivery (AF, 2024a).

419. Despite procedural reforms, significant structural constraints remain. Many national institutions continue to face challenges meeting fiduciary, procurement, environmental and social safeguard requirements for accreditation (IEU, 2023). Although accreditation frameworks have been simplified, compliance standards often remain complex relative to the scale and risk profile of locally led projects (AF, GCF, 2024c; UNFCCC, 2023). Standardized reporting templates and monitoring requirements are not always adapted to institutional capacity, leading to administrative burdens for smaller entities. The absence of fully graduated fiduciary frameworks, where accountability requirements scale proportionately to project size and risk, can limit practical access for subnational institutions. Consequently, while entity-level direct access has expanded, the volume of finance channelled directly through national systems remains comparatively lower than accreditation figures alone might suggest. Uganda's experience also illustrates that improving access requires strengthening domestic climate finance institutions alongside increasing international finance. National climate finance tracking systems can improve transparency, identify bottlenecks in

¹²⁵) GCF Project Specific Assessment Approach. Available at: <https://www.greenclimate.fund/access-funding/psaa>

¹²⁶) See <https://www.greenclimate.fund/board-document/gcf-b40-23>.

disbursement, strengthen coordination across ministries and provide evidence to support future resource mobilization (Government of Uganda, 2025).

3.5. Climate finance in context

420. The 2025 NDC Synthesis Report is clear that, despite progress, “major acceleration is still needed in terms of delivering faster and deeper emission reductions”. It further notes that implementation of NDCs falls short of what is necessary, according to the IPCC ranges, to limit warming to below 1.5 degrees Celsius with no or limited overshoot (UNFCCC, 2025d). It is suggested that the highest possible ambition is needed to limit this overshoot and return warming to well below 1.5 degrees Celsius by 2100 (Climate Analytics, 2025), a sentiment reiterated in the Mutirão COP30 outcome, which also recalls gaps in pre-2020 implementation by developed countries.¹²⁷ This reflects that each additional 0.1 degrees of warming over 1.5 degrees Celsius is associated with costs to ecosystems, people, enterprises, financial actors and economies; scaling up investments in mitigation and adaptation is thus urgent. Furthermore, the impacts of climate change are non-linear. The 2025 Tipping Points Report, for example, suggests that a number of earth systems risk collapse, leading to further climate change and cascading and irreversible impacts (Tipping Points, 2025). The longer it takes to act, the more

dramatic emission cuts will need to be to reach the Paris Agreement’s temperature targets.


421. The IPCC (Kreibiehl et. al, 2022) identified that there is, in principle, sufficient capital for the transition to pathways towards low-emission, climate-resilient development, but that the current distribution and flow of such capital is not readily available to support these transitions. A sole focus on scaling positive climate finance flows will be insufficient to meet the overarching objectives of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement. This does not mean that all finance flows must have explicit beneficial climate outcomes, but it does underscore the importance of integrating climate risk into finance and investment decision-making and avoiding support for negative climate outcomes. Without this, the effectiveness of climate finance flows can be called into question or even negated. It is within this context that it is relevant to consider the climate finance flows outlined in chapter 2 alongside broader finance flows, including total finance flows, needs and finance flowing towards actions that are potentially inconsistent with the Paris Agreement. It is acknowledged that embedding climate considerations into finance flows more broadly is a process that will need to be mindful of the socioeconomic impacts of these shifts.

127) Decision 1/CMA.7.

3.5.1. Climate finance in the context of global finance, opportunities and costs

Figure 3.4

Global climate finance in context of broader flows, opportunities and costs



422. Chapter 2 estimates that climate finance flows grew by 32 per cent in 2023–2024 compared with 2021–2022, reaching an annual average of USD 1.9 trillion. These data, compiled from multiple sources, reflect primary investment in assets that contribute directly or indirectly to mitigation and adaptation. The costs of the finance that allows these investments in the real economy to be made are not included in this total, to avoid double counting. For example, the data do not include risk-mitigation instruments such as insurance or guarantees. Secondary market transactions are also excluded from this figure, as these do not represent new investments targeting mitigation or adaptation outcomes but instead represent exchanges of existing assets. For example, green bonds are included in the total where they lead to new investment, but not when they are re-financed, and feed-in tariffs that repay investment costs are not included. This distinction between investment in primary assets and financing is important. While the former is most reflective of real economy impacts on mitigation and adaptation, the availability and affordability of financing determine whether this investment can go ahead. As in section 2.2, section 3.5 therefore discusses both investment and financing, which together lead to real-world impacts on emissions and climate-resilience.

423. Reflecting the growing maturity and favourable economics of low-emissions technologies, global clean energy investment continued its upward trajectory, reaching about USD 2 trillion per year on average during 2023–2024, a sizeable increase of about 50 per cent compared with 2021–2022 levels (USD 1.3 trillion). This spending remains unevenly distributed globally, as developing countries other than China account for only about 15 per cent of global clean energy spending, with the bulk of this spending concentrated in India, Brazil, Mexico, Viet Nam, Thailand, Indonesia, Nigeria and South Africa (IEA 2024b).

424. In parallel with clean energy investments, investments into emissions-intensive fossil fuel activities remain at high levels, reaching USD 1.1 trillion annually during 2023–2024, a 10 per cent increase compared with the 2021–2022 period. Government subsidies and support measures for fossil fuels averaged USD 974 billion in 2023–24, a 20 per cent decrease compared with the 2021–22 average of USD 1.22 trillion (Fossil Fuel Subsidy Tracker, 2025). The ratio of clean energy to fossil fuel

investments is rising. Despite these investment needs, pathways consistent with the 2 °C or 1.5 °C temperature goals require much higher multiples of clean energy investment, including in resilient grid infrastructure, relative to fossil fuel spending (BNEF, 2025a; IPCC, 2022). In needs scenarios, low-emission fuels and carbon removal technologies also comprise up to 6 per cent of investment needs in mitigation scenarios (see NDR2, para 38).

425. As in previous years, estimated total climate finance flows remain well below the estimated needs for low-emission and climate-resilient development transitions, with the largest investment gaps in developing countries. Annual global energy sector investment required to reach net zero by 2050 is estimated at around USD 4.45 trillion per year until 2035 (IEA, 2025c). The Second Needs Determination Report of the SCF (2024c) captured financing needs of developing countries, as stated in their NDCs, totalling USD 4.7–6.5 trillion, or USD 455–584 billion annually to 2030, although the report does not yet consider the most recent NDCs 3.0. The UNEP Adaptation Gap Report 2025 estimates a central range of adaptation finance needs of developing countries at USD 310–365 billion annually up to 2035. With regard to mitigation, the highest NDC investment needs have been reported by countries in Asia (USD 2.9 trillion), Africa (USD 970–979 billion), and Latin American and the Caribbean (USD 43 billion).¹²⁸ With regard to adaptation, the UNEP Adaptation Gap Report estimates the highest needs in East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa.¹²⁹

426. Investment needs can also be separated into interventions targeting specific climate and developmental outcomes. For example, the IEA (2025) estimates in its WEO Access scenario that annual investment needs to achieve universal clean cooking by 2040 would require USD 4 billion annually, and universal electricity access by 2035 would require USD 23 billion annually. Similarly, total annual adaptation investment needs for LDCs and SIDS combined are assessed to be at around USD 37 billion according to the recent Adaptation Gap report (UNEP, 2025a).

427. The urgency of investing in climate mitigation and adaptation is increasingly apparent in the face of growing climate impacts and their associated mounting costs.

¹²⁸ The second NDR highlights that costed needs are lower in some geographical regions than others, such as the Americas. This does not necessarily mean these regions have fewer needs but also that cost estimates are missing.

¹²⁹ See UNEP (2025a). Figure 4.1 Estimated costs of adaptation by region, income and sector (indicative central value) for developing countries in 2035.

In 2024, economic losses from natural catastrophes¹³⁰ reached USD 318 billion globally, according to SwissRe (2025), significantly higher than the 10-year average of USD 242 billion. Other available studies corroborate the trend of increasing economic costs from global warming and also highlight the uneven impacts, which disproportionately affect less developed countries as a percentage of GDP (AON, 2026; Munich Re, 2025; Richards, 2024). The rise in perils is accompanied by a growing insurance protection gap – the difference between potential losses and the amount of insurance cover purchased – which is particularly pronounced in less developed economies. Of the total economic losses in 2024, USD 137 billion were insured and USD 181 billion were uninsured. Climate impacts also threaten cultural heritage and biodiversity integrity. Forest fires in 2024, for example, led to dramatic forest losses, with the Brazilian Amazon experiencing the largest area burnt owing to preceding drought and heatwaves. In addition to estimated productivity losses equivalent to 1.5 per cent of Brazil's GDP,¹³¹ the Amazon is being brought closer to a tipping point where its rainforest ecosystem can no longer be maintained and irreversible forest dieback could occur.¹³²

428. With growing climate impacts, the economic benefits and opportunities of ambitious low-emissions and climate-resilient transitions are ever clearer. The NGFS network of central banks highlights the rising costs of climate inaction, noting that, according to their short-term scenarios, climate transition costs increase from 0.5 per cent to 1.3 per cent of global GDP if climate policies are delayed by three years. In addition, the consortium warns that the impacts of regional extreme weather could reach 6–12 per cent of GDP in some regions, noting in particular the potential impacts on the agricultural, energy and power sectors (NGFS, 2025). Although present public and private spending on adaptation remains difficult to assess (see chapter 2 above), emerging evidence points to considerable economic and financial benefits from climate-resilience investment, with studies

pointing to cost-benefit ratios of USD 4:1 and higher (Rising et al., 2026; IFC, 2026). Ministries of Finance therefore highlight the long-term 'macrocritical' nature of climate transition and adaptation investment that can safeguard debt sustainability and sustained economic growth.¹³³ Private financial markets also show increasing interest in climate-resilience market opportunities, which cover all regions and a range of economic sectors and involve substantial future operational and capital expenditure needs for businesses and the public sector alike.¹³⁴

429. Various studies have attempted to quantify the potential climate-related transition risks in emissions-intensive sectors and activities. Estimates of potential stranded assets along the global fossil fuel value chain range from USD 10 trillion to USD 30 trillion;¹³⁵ however, such modelling is highly dependent on the scope of activities included, as well as the assumed stringency of climate policies and future temperature pathways. As such, these estimates, which are global in nature, may not take into account different regional or national climate mitigation pathways, or may assume a uniform transition pathway.

430. Available data and trends align with the IPCC AR6 (2022) recognition that sustainable finance remains a growing but still niche field in the context of the global financial system. While the scale and volume of all investment and financing is challenging to simplify – as flows and stocks are under the purview of different owners and financial actors, and may overlap due to ownership and management structures – in 2024, global assets under management stood at USD 128 trillion (BCG 2025); global GDP reached USD 115 trillion; and global gross capital formation, a measure of capital investment, reached over USD 28 trillion in 2023.¹³⁶

130) Well above 90 per cent of it weather-related.

131) World Bank <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099090225110519398/pdf/P180939-f2acca28-b43e-48d2-93cf-9cf8754ef240.pdf>

132) WWF Living Planet Report

133) <https://www.financeministersforclimate.org/sites/default/files/2026-04/15th%20Ministerial%20Summary.pdf>.

134) See for example BCG (2025) that estimates global adaptation market size at between USD 0.5–1.3 trillion by 2030; and MSCI Institute (2026) or GFANZ (2026).


135) The term transition risks captures potential financial and business model risks to economic actors arising from changes in climate policy, technological change and legal challenges.

136) See World Development Indicators <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD> and <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.GDI.TOTL.CD>.

3.5.2. Climate finance in the context of development finance flows

Figure 3.5

Development Assistance Committee members' climate-related bilateral official development assistance and the share of the total



Source: OECD DAC. Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/development-finance-for-climate-and-the-environment.html>.

431. Figure 3.5 shows that climate-related ODA by DAC members increased to USD 52 billion average in 2023–24, an increase from an average of USD 48 billion in 2021–2022. As a share of total allocable ODA, climate-related support continued its upward trend, from 31.9 per cent during the 2021–2022 period to 35.0 per cent in 2023–24. The average increase, however, masks a 13 per cent decrease in climate-related ODA between 2023 and 2024: from USD 55.9 billion in 2023 to 48.6 billion in 2024. A similar pattern is evident for broader development financing: total ODA has increased by about USD 10 billion from 2021–2022 levels to USD 222 billion over the 2023–2024 period, despite a decrease in ODA between 2023 and 2024. The 2024 decrease of 9.3 per cent from 2023 was driven by significant aid cuts, most notably by France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the USA. The declining trend in ODA is expected to continue in the coming years, as preliminary data for 2025 estimates a 23 per cent decline in net ODA from DAC countries at USD 163 billion, and projections for 2026 are at around USD 153 billion (OECD, 2026b).

432. ODA is declining at a time of large climate finance needs. It remains to be seen to what extent climate-

related support will be affected by decreasing aid budgets, as global action on climate and environment remains a focus of development cooperation in most donor countries (aside from the USA, who has exited the Convention and Paris Agreement as well as the GCF).¹³⁷ Announcements of OECD DAC countries thus far point to: more targeted programming of public resources, particularly grants, towards countries that are particularly vulnerable; continued support for strategic multilateral funds and development banks, while also promoting efficiency reforms to enhance capital availability; and increasing attention to the mobilization of private finance and innovative sources and instruments.¹³⁸

433. A number of climate finance commitments by developed countries ended in 2025, which coincides with the onset of the NCQG. Commitments expiring in 2025 or early 2026 include: Australia, Canada, France, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. These forward-looking targets have provided greater predictability in climate finance flows to both developing countries and multilateral climate change funds, including in the

¹³⁷ See for example the revised German development cooperation strategy published in early 2026: <https://www.bmz.de/de/ministerium/grundsatz-ziele/zukunft-zusammen-global-gestalten-282480>.

¹³⁸ See <https://donortracker.org/> for various announcements.

context of Article 9, paragraph 5, communications. The next round of ex-ante Article 9.5 communications is due in 2026; in the interim, new commitments have been made by Parties including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Slovenia, Switzerland, the Netherlands (NDRC and E3G, 2026) and the United Kingdom.

434. Forward-looking plans are also relevant in the context of multilateral climate funds replenishment if the tripling of outflows under the NCQG is to be achieved. While some funds, such as the Adaptation Fund, have annual replenishments, the GEF launched its replenishment process in 2025, the GCF will follow in mid-2026, and the FRLD is expected to follow in 2027.

435. Special Drawing Rights (SDR) rechannelling is a mechanism for increasing the sources of climate finance (in contrast to those discussed in section 3.3, which are instruments for mobilizing climate finance). Reallocating unused SDRs from developed countries to developing countries increases the finance available for climate action, as SDRs imply lower costs for developing countries than sovereign borrowing than on capital markets. As such, they have the potential to increase a country's liquidity and fiscal space. SDRs are a reserve asset of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the largest allocation of which was made in 2021 following the COVID crisis. The USD 650 billion was distributed on the basis of IMF members' quota shares, rather than according to which countries most needed the reserve assets. About USD 433 billion was allocated to developed countries and remained unused, prompting discussion of how these SDRs could be rechannelled from developed to developing countries via new mechanisms. To date, the IMF's Resilience and Sustainability Trust, funded by SDR-denominated loans from IMF member States, has succeeded in rechannelling SDRs towards countries undertaking climate action. As at early 2025, the RST had disbursed USD 9.5 billion to 23 countries, out of USD 46.8 billion voluntarily pledged by donor countries (CPI, 2025f). SDRs also have the potential to boost MDB lending, including for climate action, should developed countries that are not using their allocations lend them to the MDBs. One estimate suggests that USD 1 billion of SDRs lent to MDBs could enable USD 4 billion in loans for climate and development projects in low- and middle-income countries (CGD, 2024a). Should the voluntary pledge of USD 100 billion to countries most in need, pledged in 2023,¹³⁹ be met, this could therefore result in USD 400 billion in flows to developing countries.

However, accounting rules for SDRs remain that complicate their rechannelling and their use to boost fiscal space or MDB capital.

436. Several MDBs have updated or revised their climate finance targets to 2030, having largely achieved their collectively and individually set post-2020 climate targets (see table 3.3). In support of the NCQG deliberations at COP29 in Baku, MDBs announced projections to collectively reach USD 120 billion in annual climate finance by 2030, of which USD 42 billion would be directed towards adaptation, and an additional USD 65 billion towards private mobilization. By COP 30, MDBs had reported USD 85 billion in climate finance directed to low- and middle-income economies in 2024 and USD 33 billion in private finance mobilization (ADB et al., 2025). The WBG exceeded its 35 per cent climate finance target and increased the target in 2024 to reach 45 per cent by fiscal year 2025. While extending its Climate Change Action Plan beyond 2025, the WBG retired its quantitative climate finance and climate co-benefits targets and will continue to focus support on client-driven demand, including for NDCs, NAPs and other national plans, as well as tracking and reporting on net GHG emissions and beneficiaries with enhanced resilience to climate risks.¹⁴⁰ The IDB has formulated new climate finance targets to 2030, including increasing its climate finance target to 45 per cent and setting a dedicated target for 50 percent of climate finance to be directed towards adaptation. The EIB extended its 2025 target to 2030, while the ADB set a new target for 2030 of directing 50 per cent of total financing going towards climate objectives. In addition, the ADB revised its target for the climate relevance of projects upwards, from 65 per cent of all projects to 75 per cent. MDB progress includes South-South flows, particularly via national development banks with international operations, such as the New Development Bank (NDB), IsDB and AIIB, which participate in joint MDB reporting. Other non-traditional bilateral contributors to development and climate finance are South-South in nature and are covered by voluntary reporting arrangements under the Paris Agreement.

437. MDBs can also play a role in increasing availability of climate finance through financial or operational reforms. The Heads of MDBs communicated in a Viewpoint Note in 2024 that, collectively, "efforts on balance sheet optimization and financial innovation are expected to generate additional lending headroom in the order of USD 300 billion to USD 400 billion over

139) See: <https://www.lazard.com/media/f0bbh2rg/20220208-lazard-white-paper.pdf>

140) See <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/statement/2026/06/29/update-on-the-world-bank-group-climate-change-action-plan>.

the next decade” (ADB et al., 2024e). While this refers to all MDB spending, MDB climate finance reached USD 138 billion as at 2024, 10 per cent higher than 2023. A number of reforms have been proposed and are being tracked (CGD, 2026). Some have proposed governance reforms, including increasing the voting share of developing countries (Prizzon et al., 2022). In addition to the potential role of MDBs in re-channelling SDRs (see above), MDBs could increase available lending headroom and thereby seek to close the climate investment gap, including through:

- Reform of MDB Capital Adequacy Frameworks (CAFs), which could increase climate finance without requiring immediate increases in paid-in capital from shareholders. Capital adequacy refers to the ability of an institution to honour its financial obligations in the event of defaults and, as such, CAFs establish the risk-management framework for MDB lending. The G20 Independent Review of MDB Capital Adequacy Frameworks (2022) found that reforms could increase lending headroom “substantially” and should be pursued without delay. Following a key recommendation from the G20 Independent Review, in 2025 S&P Global became the first credit rating agency to modify its rating methodology for the World Bank and other MDBs, resulting in estimated additional lending capacity of USD 600–800 billion while maintaining a triple-A rating on capital markets (ODI, 2025). Since then, Moody’s has also published for public comment a methodology update for rating multilateral financial institutions that proposes similar changes.¹⁴¹ There are a number of ways in which CAFs can be reformed, with mixed progress to date on their uptake (CGD, 2026).
- The use of hybrid capital, which allows MDBs to achieve higher leverage of their capital base by tapping into commercial capital markets.¹⁴² In 2024, the AfDB pioneered a hybrid capital issuance worth USD 750 million at an interest rate of 5.75 per cent, which attracted significant investor interest and was approximately six times oversubscribed. According

to some estimates, if all MDBs were to issue hybrid capital equivalent to 20 per cent of shareholder capital, this could add about USD 64 billion in additional equity, with a corresponding leverage to approximately USD 190–320 billion in additional lending headroom (CGD, 2024b).

- Increasing engagement by MDBs with institutional investors through securitization, which can free up capital and generate more funds for lending by, for example, pooling assets and loans and selling them to investors in return for future payments. In 2025, the IDB launched REINVEST+, a large-scale asset recycling and securitization platform aimed at bundling well-performing green or developmental loans from local banks in Latin America into marketable securities and offering them to institutional investors. This can free up the balance sheets of MDBs and local financial institutions for new investments, on the condition that these investments in turn support climate and developmental purposes.¹⁴³ Similar securitization platforms have been established by the IDB’s private sector arm, IDBInvest, as well as by the ADB, AfDB and IFC.

438. The climate finance conversation has also widened to encompass different ways of funding climate action. At COP30, outside the formal process and the UNFCCC Financial Mechanism, the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF) was launched with USD 6.7 billion in pledges.¹⁴⁴ The TFFF is a multilateral investment fund that seeks to pay eligible tropical forest countries for retaining forest cover. The TFFF will not operate like a conventional multilateral climate fund: pledged capital can be invested in capital markets to generate returns. The World Bank has been established as trustee and interim host, but many details are being worked out, including how funds will reach Indigenous People and local communities and how monitoring and evaluation will be undertaken. Not all pledges to the TFFF are equivalent: Norway has made its pledge conditional on reaching a higher amount of sponsor capital, and pledges take a variety of forms, including grants and investments.

141) See <https://events.moodyys.com/2026-mie26952-sovereign-credit-today>.

142) Hybrid capital is a long-term, interest-bearing asset similar to conventional bonds. However, they rank lower in repayment seniority and can therefore be used by MDBs, almost equivalent to shareholder paid-in capital, to raise additional capital in financial markets. Given these characteristics, hybrid capital issuances are considered higher risk assets than bonds with corresponding higher coupon rates and lower credit ratings.

143) See <https://www.iadb.org/en/news/idb-group-launches-reinvest-going-where-money-unlock-private-climate-finance>.

144) See the TFFF Watch Investment Tracker at: <https://tfffwatch.org/investment-tracker/>; See TFFF factsheets at: <https://tfff.earth/about-tfff/>; see announcement at: <https://cop30.br/en/news-about-cop30/over-5-5-billion-announced-for-tropical-forest-forever-facility-as-53-countries-endorse-the-historic-tfff-launch-declaration>

Table 3.3

Status of multilateral development bank post-2020 climate finance targets

MDB	Post-2020 targets	2024 status
AfDB	At least USD 25 billion cumulatively for 2020–2025, prioritizing adaptation finance Climate finance will be 40% of the total annual approvals, At least 50% of climate finance towards adaptation	USD 19.5 billion over 2020–2024 49% in 2024 and 55% in 2023 56% and 53% of climate finance towards adaptation in 2024 and 2023
ADB	Reaching 50% climate finance of total annual committed financing from by 2030 ¹⁴⁵ Climate finance from own resources to reach USD 100 billion cumulatively for 2019–2030, with an interim target of USD 35 billion for 2019–2024 75% of projects (by number of projects rather than amount of financing) on a three-year rolling average to support mitigation and adaptation by 2030	46% in 2024, 42% in 2023 USD 41.9 billion over 2019–2024 91% of ADB operations over 2022–2024 supporting mitigation and/or adaptation
AIIB	Over 50% share of climate finance in approvals every year until 2030; ¹⁴⁶ Climate finance to exceed USD 50 billion cumulatively during 2020–2030	67% in 2024, 60% in 2023 USD 19.8 billion cumulative as at 2024
EBRD	More than 50% of annual business investment supporting green finance by 2025 ^b	58% in 2024, 50% in 2023
EIB	More than 50% share of financing supporting climate action and environmental sustainability by 2025 and through 2026–2030 ¹⁴⁷ EUR 1 trillion climate and environmental sustainability finance over 2021–2030 15% of climate finance to support adaptation by 2025 and new target of EUR 30 billion cumulatively over 2026–2030	57% (EUR 51 billion) in 2024, (EUR 51 billion) of which EUR 42.6 billion from own resources (EIB only) ^c EUR 563 billion cumulatively as at end of 2024 10.6% of climate finance in 2024 (EUR 4.5 billion)
IDBG	At least 45% share of climate finance of total approved volume ^d USD 11.3 billion annual climate finance by 2030 at Group level USD 25 billion for adaptation over 2024–2030 (50% of IDBG climate finance)	45% in 2024 USD 8.2 billion in 2024 N/A
IsDB	35% share of climate financing of annual financial commitments by 2025 ^e	46% in 2024, 37% in 2023
NDB	40% share of mitigation and adaptation finance of overall approvals in 2022–2026	N/A (climate finance portfolio of USD 8.1 billion as at end 2024 and total portfolio of USD 35.2 billion)
World Bank Group	45% share of climate finance of total lending by Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 50% of IDA/IBRD climate finance supporting adaptation and resilience (WBG climate finance targets have been retired after 2025)	44% in FY2024, 41% in FY2023 33% in FY2024, 41% in FY2023

Source: Authors' analysis of MDB joint climate finance report 2024 and individual MDB annual and sustainability reports.

Notes: a. Climate finance share is calculated per cent of total approved regular financing, as regular financing excludes financing approved through the COVID-19 Crisis Recovery Facility and special operations such as the IBRD guarantee facility; b. Applies to all EBRD Annual Bank investment. EBRD green finance is composed of climate finance for both mitigation and adaptation as well as finance addressing other environmental objectives. EBRD does not have separate targets for climate action; c. Target applies to EIB only, excluding resources from European Investment Fund (EIF); d. Target for climate finance as share of total approvals applies to IDB bank only, excluding other IDB Group entities such as IDB Invest and IDB lab that have different targets and reporting modalities; e. IsDB climate finance target excludes operations of other IsDB Group members, including the Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector (ICD), the International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC) and the Islamic Corporation for the Insurance of Investment and Export Credit (ICIEC).


145) See <https://www.adb.org/news/infographics/climate-finance-2024>

146) See <https://www.aiib.org/en/news-events/impact-reports/sustainability-bond-impact/2024/index.html>

147) EIB. 2026. Climate Bank Roadmap Phase 2. 2026–2030. <https://www.eib.org/en/publications/20250240-eib-group-climate-bank-roadmap-phase-2-2026-2030>

439. Beyond the MDBs, a large number of PDBs at the regional, national and subnational levels – including in developing countries – continue to play an important role in delivering climate finance as intermediaries between international and domestic financial markets and actors. The PDBs that participated in the IDFC annual green finance mapping reported green finance commitments of USD 174 billion in 2024, of which USD 167 billion was climate finance. This represented a 13 per cent drop compared with 2023 levels (USD 199 billion) and a 40 per cent drop from the record 2022 levels (USD 288 billion) (see figure 3.6), although the decline was significantly driven by funding constraints affecting a few very large PDBs (IDFC, 2025). IDFC climate finance is mostly spent domestically (83 per cent), with 17 per cent committed internationally in 2024. International climate finance

from OECD to non-OECD institutions decreased from USD 30 billion in 2023 to USD 12 billion in 2024. According to CPI, IDFC members have provided more than 40 per cent of global public climate finance between 2019–2023, and their cumulative green finance of USD 1.27 trillion between 2019–2024 puts them on track to surpass the USD 1.3 trillion target by 2025 which was set out in the IDFC State of Ambition announcement (2021).¹⁴⁸ External analysis also highlights the significant potential of national PDBs, estimating their average annual renewable energy investment in G20 member countries at around USD 36 billion during 2016–2024, with 88 per cent of this finance realized by just three national PDBs in large developing countries (Oil Change International, 2026).

Figure 3.6**IDFC green finance commitments, 2020–2024**
(Billions of USD)


148) Available at [idfc-state-of-ambition-2021-final.pdf](https://www.idfc.org/state-of-ambition-2021-final.pdf).

440. Financial resources that are not specifically for developmental or climate purposes can also flow between countries and contribute to climate objectives. These include OOF, which consists of concessional loans, export credits and other financial instruments, and foreign direct investment (FDI), which plays a key role in economic development. While no information on total climate-related OOF was available for the period, climate-related export credits from OECD countries to developing countries reached a record USD 5.6 billion in 2023 and decreased slightly to USD 4.6 billion in 2024. The 2023–2024 annual average of USD 5.1 billion was more than double the 2021–2022 annual average of USD 2.25 billion (OECD 2026a). Similar to ODA, FDI into developing countries declined to an annual average of USD 866 billion average during 2023–2024, from an annual average of USD 915 billion during 2021–2022 (UNCTAD,

2025b). Although at low levels, FDI flows to LDCs and SIDS were stable or increased slightly during the period (USD 35 billion to LDCs and USD 154 billion to SIDS). Globally, including in developed countries, FDI declined by 22 per cent in 2024 compared with 2023. These downward trends were also reflected in international project finance, an important source of infrastructure finance, which fell by 26 per cent, with a particularly pronounced decline in LDCs. With the exception of health- and education-related FDI (+25 per cent), UNCTAD reported significant decreases between 2023 and 2024 in FDI to developing countries in sectors that are critical for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, such as infrastructure (-35 per cent), renewable energy (-31 per cent), water and sanitation (-30 per cent) and agrifood (-19 per cent).

Figure 3.7

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows
(Billions of USD)



Source: UNCTAD (2025a)

3.5.3. Consideration of the drivers and barriers for climate finance flows

441. The factors that shape climate investment and finance trends are diverse, with both supply- and

demand-side actions being relevant. These factors can act as either drivers of or barriers to scaling up climate finance. A number of recent processes have focussed on key barriers to scaling up and accessing finance for climate action in developing countries,¹⁴⁹ including

149) This includes the GST and NCQG. See [Decision 1/CMA.5](#) and [Decision 1/CMA.6](#), respectively

limited fiscal space, high costs of capital and barriers to accessing capital markets that necessitate international financial architecture reform. Such drivers and barriers can directly influence the real economy investment or indirectly influence mitigation and adaptation investment through the availability and affordability of finance, which determine whether an investment can go ahead. The predictability of bilateral and multilateral concessional finance sources has been addressed in section 3.4.2, highlighting the need for multiannual commitments from providers and MDB reform for both mitigation and adaptation objectives. This section instead focusses on key barriers identified in current discourse and trends towards addressing them.

Policy and governance trends directing finance and investment

442. Policy certainty and sectoral targets have played a major role in driving climate finance flows globally. Such signals from government actors inform businesses and financial actors, from commercial investors to central banks, about future direction. In this regard, economic actors are paying increasing attention to countries' NDCs and NAPs and are more likely to orient investment decisions towards national and sectoral pathways. As at the end 2024, however, the number of countries with economy-wide renewable energy targets remained unchanged at 89, while the number of countries with net zero targets decreased to 133, from 151 reported in 2023 (REN21, 2026).

443. International policy processes and commitments can also provide long-term signals for financial decision making, although many remain under development or negotiation and will ultimately need to be translated and integrated into national planning. International commitments that have received broad attention, but that will only apply to participating countries, include, among others:

- The comprehensive signals that emerged from the decision on the Global Stocktake in 2023 resonated with various actors in the financial sector and real economy and informed the preparation of the next cycle of NDCs.¹⁵⁰
- Discussions are ongoing on the use of levies, which can raise revenues domestically and, where designed to do so, can also expand

international public finance flows from developed countries to developing countries. The latter include internationally coordinated levies that would not require universal consensus and are estimated to have the potential to raise USD 20–60 billion a year by 2035. Interested governments, including Kenya, Barbados and France, joined forces to create the Global Solidarity Levies Taskforce at COP 28. Its membership was renewed at COP 30 and now comprises 15 developed and developing countries in total,¹⁵¹ with the aim of promoting the implementation of solidarity levies. Advanced discussions relate in particular to levies on business-class and first-class aviation and private jets (Global Solidarity Levies Taskforce, 2025). These approaches do not enjoy consensus, however, and work remains on the governance and use of proceeds, as governments generally avoid earmarking revenues for specific purposes in order to maintain budget flexibility. Furthermore, the distributional effects of levies across and within countries and their impacts on international trade must be considered alongside the revenue-generating potential of such proposals.¹⁵² Should governments instead decide to implement such levies domestically, countries could consider using the proceeds to increase bilateral climate finance targets or replenish multilateral climate change funds.

- Another policy development with the potential to expand the sources of finance that could be used for climate action is the UN Framework Convention on Tax Cooperation, which is intended to be a legally binding treaty seeking to reform global tax rules. The Convention seeks to tackle illicit financial flows and address rules governing the taxation of income from cross-border services, as well as cross-border tax dispute prevention and resolution. These measures have the potential to increase government revenues, particularly in developing countries.
- The Global Methane Pledge is another international pledge and action process, with participation having increased to 159 countries. The Pledge aims to reduce global methane emissions by 30 per cent by 2030. Based on IEA analysis, existing pledges suggest a 55 per cent reduction in oil and gas methane emissions by 2030, yet implementation is lagging behind, as existing policies would lead to a decreased of only about 25 per cent (IEA, 2025b).

¹⁵⁰) Decision 1/CMA.7, para 17.

¹⁵¹) In addition to the three Co-Chairs to the task force, Barbados, France and Kenya, other members include Antigua and Barbuda, Colombia, Denmark, Djibouti, Fiji, Marshall Islands, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, and Zambia.

¹⁵²) The CMA has reaffirmed that measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade (decision 1/CMA.7, paragraph 56)

444. While the Global Methane Pledge captures emissions from agriculture, wider AFOLU global climate policy signals have been weaker, in part owing to differences in mitigation potential by geography, and supply-chain interactions. The 2023 EU Deforestation Regulation has sought to promote traceable and deforestation-free products; however, implementation has been delayed. Such measures have generated differing views, including regarding implementation challenges, administrative burdens, compliance costs and potential trade-related implications (FERN, 2025). There remain considerable barriers to reducing AFOLU emissions, particularly those related to the lack of economic incentives for more sustainable production and consumption patterns and, in some geographies, access to alternative income sources in rural households (IPCC, 2022). Global adaptation policy signals have also been challenging to implement, given the strong role of the public sector in many adaptation actions for which interventions do not generate cash flows. Recent years have seen increasing awareness of nature-based solutions for adaptation, linked to wider multilateral conventions and policy objectives concerning the restoration and avoided degradation of habitats.

445. Sustainable finance policies and regulations are also relevant and continued to increase during the 2023–2024 period, with their roll-out extending to more developing country jurisdictions.¹⁵³ These are broad in nature, encompassing policy and regulatory measures across governments, central banks, financial regulators and public financial institutions, including sectoral regulations, supervisory frameworks, fiscal support mechanisms, market codes and standards (some of which are elaborated on below). In some large financial markets, climate- and ESG-related policies for the economic and financial sectors are being weakened, which has the potential to reduce policy certainty for low-emissions and renewable energy technologies, although the ultimate impact of these perceived shifts and weakening remains uncertain (Orbitas, 2025).

446. Sustainable finance taxonomies, as a tool to embed climate objectives in financial markets and real-economy investments, have been advanced in many countries over the 2023–2024 period. This is particularly the case for developing country jurisdictions (see also section 1.2.4). Such taxonomies drive national and regional climate investment and finance, while fora such as the Taxonomy Roadmap Initiative seek to enhance the global interoperability of the sustainable finance landscape

between countries, with the dual aim of enabling more cross-border climate finance flows while allowing commensurate space for national policy considerations and circumstances (Taxonomy Roadmap Initiative, 2025b). Such work at the global or regional level (UNEP-FI, 2023; ASEAN Taxonomy Board, 2025) revealed clear opportunities to align different terminology, sector or activity classifications and reporting frameworks, and to facilitate the use of taxonomies by international actors while maintaining differentiated low GHG emissions and climate resilient pathways at country, sector or activity level.

447. Cross-cutting features of access to finance that are not climate-specific include strong country-level governance and institutional capacities, particularly with regard to their influence on exchange rates, policy stability, contract enforcement, and the maintenance of political will and support (CFLI, 2021; Pienknagura, 2024). Fragility has been identified in previous BAs as an emerging factor in access to finance. Despite high climate finance needs, fragile and conflict-affected contexts tend to receive less climate finance owing to provider risk aversion, increased project implementation costs, low availability of implementing partners and human capital, and capacity flight (Alcayna and Cao, 2023).

448. Country cooperation on trade rules can also enhance the conditions for sustainable FDI. The WTO Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement,¹⁵⁴ concluded in 2024, includes a section on sustainable investments, including responsible business conduct standards, due diligence and safeguards. Challenging themes around trade, as raised in recent literature, include aligning international investment treaties with the Paris Agreement, investment protection standards to promote sustainable investments, and speeding up dispute-settlements that hinder climate and transition pathways (UNCTAD, 2023a; OECD Conference on Investment Treaties, 2024).

Trends in public incentives and fiscal space, including sovereign debt

449. Through fiscal policies, governments play a central role in driving finance flows through their budget allocations, systems of taxes and subsidies, state-owned enterprises and other market mechanisms. An increasing number of governments have implemented carbon pricing, seeking to integrate the cost of climate change in economic decision-making. There is no one-size-fits

153) See for example <https://gsfo.org/sustainable-finance-regulations-platform>.

154) Available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invfac_public_e/invfac_documentation_e.htm

all approach; however, carbon pricing continues to be a meaningful source of revenue for governments at the national and subnational level, depending on national contexts. Over USD 100 billion in 2023 (USD 104 billion) and 2024 (USD 102 billion) was raised through carbon pricing mechanisms, such as emissions allowance systems and carbon taxes, up from USD 95 billion in 2022. Globally, 80 ETS or carbon taxes are in operation, covering 28 percent of global emissions. Direct carbon pricing mechanisms are also under consideration and development in Brazil, Indonesia, India and Turkey. As at 2024, emissions coverage in the power and industrial sectors are close to 50 per cent, although agricultural emissions remain poorly covered by carbon pricing schemes. Domestic carbon pricing instruments have led to low-cost emission reduction measures. However, at the system-level, carbon prices (global average of USD 19) are significantly below price levels consistent with 2 °C or 1.5 °C temperature pathways,¹⁵⁵ and close to 70 per cent of global emissions are not covered by a price on carbon (WB, 2026a).

450. While the legal nature of carbon border adjustment policies is contested under the WTO regime, a number of countries are expressing interest in implementing such policies. With this, carbon pricing corridors of trade could emerge (OECD, 2025a, C2ES, 2026). The CMA has reaffirmed that measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade, and has requested the subsidiary bodies hold a dialogue on the role of trade at their sixty-fourth, sixty-sixth and sixty-eighth sessions, taking this into account (decision 1/CMA.7, paragraphs 56–57).

451. Carbon pricing has set the scene for carbon credit markets. Both emissions trading schemes and carbon taxes can interact with carbon credit markets where ETs may allow companies to use carbon credits to meet their obligations, while carbon taxes can be offset by credits, as determined by national policymakers. While voluntary carbon markets have suffered reputational decline and volatility in recent years (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2025), compliance markets experienced further developments in 2023–2024. Following the adoption of the framework

for Article 6 of the Paris Agreement at COP 29 in Baku,¹⁵⁶ Parties and private sector actors are building institutional capacity to engage with the mechanisms and integrate them into the wider carbon market landscape. As at August 2026, 165 transactions had been registered among Parties under Article 6, paragraph 2 (cooperative approaches), and 412 transactions under the Paris Agreement crediting mechanism had been approved between countries and other actors.¹⁵⁷ In late 2025, the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), which helps airlines meet their decarbonization targets through strictly verified carbon credits, established additional standards for its second phase (2027–2029) under which participation by members of the International Civil Aviation Organization is mandatory.¹⁵⁸ The scale of investment and finance in developing countries resulting from carbon market development remains to be seen.¹⁵⁹

452. Subsidies are inherently context specific, and the need to subsidize certain activities will vary across national and regional context in line with Article 4, paragraphs 7 and 10 of the Convention. Set at the national level and existing at both the national and subnational level, subsidies often have multiple objectives, including the protection of poor and vulnerable households and ensuring energy access. Fossil fuel and agricultural subsidies remain high and can incentivize emissions-intensive activities while concurrently addressing food and energy security. Reforming subsidies, where consistent with national circumstances and laws, has the potential to free up public spending, stabilize government revenues and level the playing field for other technologies. While government subsidies to fossil fuels were estimated at USD 974 million in 2023–2024 (Fossil Fuel Subsidy Tracker, 2025), one study estimated potentially environmentally harmful subsidies of USD 1.6 billion in 2023 in other sectors, such as non-energy mining, agriculture, fisheries, forestry, transport, water, construction and waste management, excluding fossil fuel subsidies (Earth Track, 2024). Reform of such subsidies also features in other forums. Fossil fuel subsidy reform is a feature of multiple efforts to reform the international financial architecture for sustainable development,¹⁶⁰ while the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework sets a target to eliminate, phase

155) See World Bank (2026), p.34 for a detailed discussion. The IPCC AR6 for example assumes marginal abatement costs of around USD 90 per tCO₂e by 2030 in its scenarios that limit global temperature rise to below 2°C.

156) For further information see <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/article6>.

157) See <https://article6pipeline.unepccc.org/global-data>, accessed August 2026.

158) See <https://www.icao.int/CORSIA>.

159) See also: <https://article6pipeline.unepccc.org/>.

160) See Table 4.1 in BA6 that outlines different initiatives towards IFA reform and their focus.

out or reform incentives, including subsidies, that are harmful for biodiversity.¹⁶¹ It is emphasized that subsidies often reflect particular regional or national policy contexts and economic realities, and that subsidy removal can have adverse distributional impacts that can, in some cases, be mitigated by redistribution measures. This points to a need for a managed and just transition in subsidy reform, including careful social and economic impact assessments, avoiding price spikes and avoiding risks of cutting supply ahead of demand.

453. Public procurement and expenditure can be a sizeable lever for directly driving climate finance flows and thereby incentivizing low-emissions and climate resilient economic sectors, given that the scale of public procurement is likely to exceed 10 per cent of global GDP and over USD 10 trillion per year (Fagan et al., 2022; OECD, 2025c). Largely designed and operated to contribute to public policy goals, state-owned enterprises, which are owned or controlled by governments and often operate in high-emitting sectors such as energy and infrastructure, have also come under scrutiny with respect to transitions to low-emission, climate-resilient development pathways (IISD, 2025; OECD, 2025e; De Kleine Feige, 2021). There is limited evidence on the volume of green public procurement and its impact on GHG emissions and economic development. A recent OECD survey from 2024 found that, while quantitative targets related to environmental or climate objectives have been established in a majority of countries (69 per cent), only 3 (10 per cent) measured their impact, and none of the countries disclosed dedicated financial information on green procurement (OECD, 2025c).

454. One driver of spending has been the issuance of bonds, including green, resilience and sustainability-linked bonds. Green bond issuances have increased by about 38 per cent since 2022, reaching USD 617 billion in 2024 (CBI, 2025c). Sovereign green bonds accounted for USD 134 billion of the issuances (a 66 per cent increase compared with 2022), providing valuable resources for supporting the future implementation of countries' climate plans, such as NDCs and NAPs. Several developing countries issued green bonds for the first time, including Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Kuwait, and the regular oversubscription of sovereign green bonds in developing countries points to the development of better-integrated sustainable financial markets that attract large investor interest, including from

international and institutional investors (Owusu-Mante, Chi, Gopalakrishnan, 2025). Several financial supervisors and central banks in developing countries, which can play a more proactive role in promoting green financial markets, are considering or developing preferential green bond and lending criteria or reserve requirements that could further encourage issuance (NGFS, 2026a). Other developments include the exploration of resilience and NatCAT bonds as dedicated financial instruments to scale up adaptation finance and secure pre-arranged disaster finance.¹⁶²

455. Emerging state-led financial instruments and mechanisms that support resilience in the face of climate change extend to a number of insurance products (as noted in section 2.2.10), as well as contingency funds and disaster-contingent credit lines that provide liquidity in the event of climate impacts. Since 2023, MDBs and bilateral creditors have also introduced climate-resilient debt clauses for the debt obligations of some developing countries. Countries can also strengthen financial resilience through fiscal buffers.

456. The reality of pressures on public budgets is global. Many developing countries are facing a "vicious circle" of rising borrowing costs (i.e. constraints on capital market access and therefore elevated debt burdens), leading to limited fiscal space – where governments are constrained in their abilities to increase spending and borrowing while maintaining stability – for adaptation and resilience investments, which in turn contributes to increasing climate vulnerability and subdued growth (Expert Review on Debt, Nature and Climate, 2025). A general improvement in debt sustainability indicators was found in 2024 (e.g. debt-to-GNI and debt-to-export revenues ratios); however, total debt stocks reached a record high of USD 8.9 trillion in low- and middle-income countries, and 2024 marked the third consecutive year of net debt outflows. Over the 2022–2024 period, developing countries' principal and interest payments on external debt were USD 741 billion higher than new external financing received (WB, 2025b).

457. The first GST recognized the connection between developing countries having sufficient fiscal space and advancing climate action,¹⁶³ while the recent FFD4 'Sevilla Commitment', adopted in July 2025, (Section E), and NCQG decision 1/CMA.6, paragraph 6, both acknowledged the need to urgently address debt sustainability and fiscal

161) Available at <https://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-15/cop-15-dec-04-en.pdf>.

162) See for example Tokyo resilience bond or CAF resilience bond for LATAM <https://www.climatebonds.net/news-events/blog/unlocking-next-trillion-dollar-frontier-climate-bonds-launches-new-cbri-explainer> and information on the NatCat market <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-10-21/catastrophe-bonds-huge-market-gains-put-reinsurers-on-backfoot>.

163) Decision 1/CMA.5.

space as critical enablers of developing countries' climate efforts and economic development.

458. A number of initiatives and reforms have since been advanced, which also act as drivers. Relevant developments include the roll-out of climate resilience debt clauses; debt –for-climate swaps in the form of additional debt relief for binding nature- and climate-related commitments; comprehensive debt restructuring; and closer collaboration among borrowing countries through the new Borrowers' Platform. The Sevilla Commitment included a strong focus on debt sustainability, covering areas such as a UNSG-convened working group on voluntary principles for responsible sovereign borrowing and lending (paragraph 48(a)); a single global central debt data registry (paragraph 48(c)); the scaling up of local-currency lending (paragraph 48(f)); a strengthened international facility for liquidity and debt management support to developing countries (paragraph 49(b)); and encouragement to strengthen available debt restructuring mechanisms, including in the context of G20, and among bilateral, multilateral and private creditors.¹⁶⁴

Trends in the costs of capital

459. Linking real-world investment decisions to financing decisions, the cost of capital affects the viability of investment choices. Whether for a sovereign government or project developer, if borrowing is very expensive or shareholders expect high returns on their equity, capital is less likely to flow. For sovereign governments, a large component of the cost of capital is the borrowing cost (the cost of debt), whether via loans or via the issuance of sovereign bonds. For project developers, for example, both the cost of borrowing and the cost of equity are important, with the latter referring to the return that shareholders expect from investing in an ownership stake. There are complex formulas for establishing the cost of capital and assessing whether it outweighs expected returns. Capital will flow only if expected returns are higher than these costs, thereby avoiding an increasing burden of debt. As such, the cost of capital is a key determinant of access to climate finance.

460. Studies have shown significantly higher sovereign borrowing costs and higher financing costs for private sector investments across developing countries. There remains considerable regional variability in the cost of capital within groups of countries. The Cost of Capital Observatory is seeking to provide up-to-date data, as

at late 2025, on the cost of capital for energy projects in emerging and developing economies, alongside case studies of how risks have been mitigated. With an initial focus on Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico and South Africa, data collection is expanding to Viet Nam, Senegal, Kenya, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. Its initial focus on solar PV and gas is also expanding to utility-scale batteries, offshore wind and hydroelectricity power. Recent data reiterate that costs of capital is at least double that seen in advanced economies for renewable energy projects and batteries, with substantial variation across the surveyed countries (IEA, 2025a). Firms in countries with higher climate vulnerability have also been found to face higher long-term borrowing costs (Kempa, 2025). Physical climate risk can also lead to higher insurance premiums. In North America and Europe insurance premiums and lending costs have been documented as significantly higher for homeowners and businesses located in areas at high risk of wildfires or flooding (Carroll et. al, 2025; US Department of Treasury Federal Insurance Office, 2025).

461. Real and perceived risks to investors play a critical role in variations in the cost of capital. The risks affecting the cost of capital result from a number of factors and are calculated and presented in a variety of ways. Default risk – the risk that a borrower, whether a government or corporation, cannot pay back its debt – can be reflected in credit ratings, for example (see below). Those with a higher default risk will pay a higher cost of capital. Country-specific risk factors are particularly important for the cost of sovereign debt. Strong GDP growth, low inflation and currency volatility, and government policy stability (including governance, legal systems and property rights, for example) all result in less investor aversion. Investors may also consider the debt-to-GDP ratio, a country's history of default and its vulnerability to shocks (such as those reflected in balance-of-payment indicators or the level of dependence on commodities and trade). Addressing these country-specific and global macroeconomic risks is complex and can require whole-of-government approaches and multilateral cooperation. It is worth acknowledging that, for these macroeconomic factors, reducing the cost of capital will apply across investment types, whether climate-related or not.

462. When it comes specifically to climate action, a number of project-related risks influence financing costs, particularly for private sector projects. Financial risks are generally assessed as higher for less mature

164) Available at <https://docs.un.org/en/A/CONF.227/2025/L.1>.

technologies and where there is uncertainty regarding revenue streams, often alongside high up-front costs and climate policy uncertainty (for example, regarding government subsidies, carbon pricing regimes and procurement processes). Discourse and data on the cost of capital are focused predominantly on mitigation, as these projects are more likely to have revenue streams than adaptation projects, which seek to reduce future costs or damages that can be difficult to estimate. However, this is changing as physical climate risks are increasingly priced into decision-making, creating a need to price in adaptation and resilience investments. The underlying economics and cost-benefit calculations for adaptation and resilience investments have improved in recent years. Various studies suggest benefits from adaptation investment of USD 4 to more than USD 10 per dollar spent, while broader socio-economic returns in terms of macro-economic growth and development are likely to be even higher, particularly in developing countries and those most exposed to climate impacts (Brandon et al, 2025; CDP, 2025; Systemiq 2025). Consequently, financial institutions and investors are developing a range of resilience frameworks,¹⁶⁵ and the climate adaptation market is now considered a promising growth market, especially in sectors such as agriculture, infrastructure, water and utilities, and data analytics (BCG, 2025; JP Morgan, 2025). A consistent finding in the literature on the cost of capital for climate adaptation investment is the mismatch in time horizons between conventional short- to medium-term financial structures and loan tenors, on the one hand, and resilience benefits, on the other. These benefits often accrue over longer time horizons and throughout the lifetime of assets, for example by reducing operational and maintenance costs or limiting revenue shortfalls linked to climate-related disruptions.¹⁶⁶ Opportunities have therefore been identified to align financial structures with the long-term nature of resilience benefits, extending payback periods to 10 years and beyond.

463. Efforts to reduce the costs of capital, for example in GST1 and the NCQG, have drawn greater attention to risk-mitigation tools such as insurance and guarantees, and the use of concessional finance flows for credit enhancement. MDBs, for example, have increasingly explored foreign exchange hedging and currency pools, domestic-currency financing and local financial market development to enhance financial market access and

investment profiles. The MDB reform agenda further emphasizes how MDBs can use guarantees to reduce macroeconomic country risks,¹⁶⁷ while the Green Guarantee Group (2025) is advancing recommendations to crowd in private finance and develop markets for climate action through the scaled use of guarantees. While some of these tools remain outside the scope of the global climate finance totals presented in chapter 2, addressing high costs of capital in developing countries could facilitate investment in the transition to low-emission, climate-resilient development pathways. The IEA estimates that in the energy system transition alone, reducing the cost of capital by 1 per cent would reduce financing costs of USD 150 billion a year (IEA, 2024a).

464. As central banks and financial supervisory authorities seek to integrate physical and transition climate risks into their macro- and microprudential frameworks (such as through capital requirement adjustments or climate-weighting policies), calculations of the cost of capital for low-emission, climate-resilient investments could shift. Countries that can demonstrate effective management of the physical and transition risks of climate change could see lower costs of capital, for example through enhancing their structural resilience through strong climate policies and the implementation of mitigation and adaptation actions, or, more specifically, by managing the impacts of climate change on public finance (as noted above).

Reforms in the multilateral financial architecture

465. The importance of reforming the multilateral financial architecture, while respecting the mandates and governing bodies of international financial institutions, is reiterated in the NCQG, with reference to its inclusion in the outcome of the first Global Stocktake. Various initiatives have been established in recent years to more the financial system towards more sustainable, climate-compatible and equitable outcomes. Their scope and the actors they involve vary but have predominantly focused on taxation and innovative sources for sustainable development and climate finance, as well as trade.¹⁶⁸ Such international financial architecture (IFA) reform presents an opportunity for internationally coordinated action on systemic challenges to investment and financing in developing countries. It is worth noting, however, that the IFA reform agenda is not climate-specific and therefore includes discourse taking place in other

165) See for example the *Investors Resilience Challenge* for DFIs, MDBs and private investors, or the *Climate Resilience Investment Framework (CRIF) 1.0* by the IIGCC.

166) See IFC (2026) and GFANZ (2026) for public and private sector examples of adaptation-specific financial structures.

167) See for example https://www.g20.in/content/dam/gtwenty/gtwenty_new/document/Cover%20with%20Inside%20page%204%20oct.pdf

168) Table 4.1 in BA6 outlines different initiatives towards IFA reform and their focus. See also UN (2023) and UNCTAD (2023).

multilateral forums (including, for example, the WTO, IMO and FFD), as well as actions by informal norm-setting groups, such as the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatment. Focusing on climate-relevant aspects of IFA, section 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 have already addressed MDB reform, sovereign debt sustainability and innovative sources of finance such as SDRs. This section therefore outlines additional aspects of IFA reform, including global economic governance and influencing borrowing costs.

466. IFA reform largely includes reform of institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, seeking greater representation and voice for developing countries in decision-making and norm-setting (United Nations, 2025, p.31). Climate change is also being increasingly recognized by institutions that set financial norms and rules, including the Financial Stability Board, Bank for International Settlements, International Organization of Securities Commissions and the International Accounting Standards Board. In contrast, the GCF, an operating entity of the Convention, recognized systemic transitions in 2023.¹⁶⁹ Setting out four stages along the climate investment cycle – covering enabling environments for climate action, de-risking of investments to mobilize finance at scale, accelerating climate innovation and greening the financial sector – it has since advanced projects that could contribute to achieving such systemic transitions.

467. With respect to reducing the borrowing costs, investment-grade credit ratings and sovereign ratings are key determinants of access to commercial pools of capital for countries and other public and private sector actors. Major credit rating agencies play a role in global financial markets by providing assessments of creditworthiness used by investors, banks and supervisors. Only 12 of 130 middle- and low-income countries are rated as investment grade (Sachs et al., 2025). While country-specific risk factors are particularly important for cost of capital for sovereign debt, as noted above, reforms seek to encourage major credit rating agencies to move beyond the inclusion of environmental, social and governance safeguards in their scores towards developing methods to integrate forward-looking climate change-related transition and physical risks. In this way, creditworthiness assessments could better account for the potential long-term, growth-enhancing effects of development and resilience spending, rather than constrain public budgets in the face of increasing climate

impacts (COP30, 2025a; Martin, 2024). Data limitations and uncertainty about the future challenge progress, but work needs to advance so that sovereigns, in particular, that implement adaptation and mitigation measures can be rewarded in the form of lower borrowing costs, thereby supporting investment in climate action (CEPR, 2025).

468. Similarly, the debt sustainability analysis (DSA) tools of the IMF and World Bank, underpin assessments of the solvency and creditworthiness of low-income countries. These tools have come under increasing scrutiny by policymakers and researchers, alongside calls to alleviate the elevated debt burden in many developing countries. They were also noted in the FFD4 Sevilla commitment (paragraph 51(f)). Least developed and climate-vulnerable countries face the most acute debt and fiscal pressures. Around 45 per cent of IDA-eligible countries and 74 per cent of SIDS are assessed as being in or at high risk of debt distress, and more than 40 per cent of countries in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean have high public debt-to-GDP ratios of above 60 per cent (Expert Review on Debt, Nature and Climate, 2025). One study assessed the current DSA methodology against actual development and climate spending needs in low-income countries and found that 46 of 62 countries would breach solvency limits and 16 would face liquidity constraints (Zucker-Marques, Gallagher, Volz, 2024). The DSA Framework is currently under review, including its debt burden thresholds and benchmarks for determining debt distress.¹⁷⁰

3.6. Reflection on possible qualitative data and information, as appropriate, that could inform the SCF for the preparation of the first report on progress towards achieving the new collective quantified goal on climate finance

469. Decision 1/CMA.6 requests the SCF to prepare a biennial report in 2028 on collective progress towards all elements of the NCQG.¹⁷¹ Section 2.5 reflected on possible data and information that could inform the tracking of progress on relevant quantitative elements of the NCQG decision. This section reflects on possible data and information that could inform the tracking of progress

169) Available at <https://www.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/document/20230501-gcf-1-progress-report.pdf>

170) Available at <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dsa/lic.htm>.

171) Decision 1/CMA.6, para 30.

on qualitative elements. In this regard, it is important to highlight the explicit mandate for the SCF to report on progress in the enhancement of access to climate finance and on the impacts, results and outcomes of climate finance flows for addressing the needs and priorities of developing country Parties.¹⁷²

470. As noted in section 2.5, the SCF's 2023 report on clustering the types of climate finance definitions in

use provides a useful framework for identifying relevant parameters to consider in tracking climate finance flows (SCF, 2023). Table 2.11 in section 2.5 reflecting potential key 'clustered elements' using the framework is reproduced here to highlight the potential qualitative elements of the NCQG decision for consideration in this section.

Table 3.4

The NCQG and key elements for consideration in tracking and assessing future progress

Clusters	Relevant NCQG elements for supporting climate action in developing countries
Scope <i>(i.e. geographical)</i>	• USD 1.3 trillion - all actors, all public and private sources (para. 7); • USD 300 billion - developed countries taking the lead, wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources (para. 8); • South–South cooperation, on a voluntary basis (para. 9); • Reflect needs and priorities of developing countries, esp. LDCs and SIDS (paras. 5, 14, 17).
Climate-related aspects <i>(i.e. thematic categories, policy priorities and wider characteristics)</i>	• Accelerate the achievement of Article 2 (para.1); • Reflect the needs and priorities of developing country Parties, and support implementation of climate plans (paras. 5, 17); • In a context of meaningful and ambitious mitigation and adaptation action, and transparency in implementation (para 8); • Balance between adaptation and mitigation (para. 17); • Scale up adaptation finance, taking into account the global goal on adaptation (para. 18); • Finance responding to loss and damage (paras. 14, 19); • Support just transitions (para. 20); • Benefits to vulnerable communities and groups (para. 26).
Finance-related aspects <i>(i.e. sources, channels, instruments)</i>	• Wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources (para. 8); • Importance of bilateral channels (para.11); • Public and grant-based resources and highly concessional finance, particularly for adaptation and responding to loss and damage, especially for LDCs and SIDS (paras. 14, 23e-f); • Increasing the mobilization ratio of finance mobilized from public sources by 2030 (para.15); • Increase in public resources through the UNFCCC Funds;¹⁷³ Triple annual outflows from UNFCCC Funds from 2022 levels by 2030 (para. 16); • Scaling up of innovative sources and innovative instruments (e.g. first-loss instruments, guarantees, local currency financing and foreign exchange risk instruments) (paras. 15, 23a); • Enhancing access to climate finance (paras. 21–24).
Accounting Methods <i>(i.e. valorization, points of measurement, attribution)</i>	• Voluntary intention to count all climate-related outflows and climate-related finance mobilized by MDBs (para 8).

471. In particular, qualitative elements of the NCQG may relate to considerations of the balance of adaptation and mitigation finance and the alignment with country-driven strategies and needs, access to climate finance, support to just transitions, enhancement of enabling environments, and the inclusion and extension of benefits to vulnerable communities and groups in climate

finance efforts. Based on the data and information reflected in chapter 3, key reflections and elements for particular consideration in informing the NCQG are outlined below.

Reflection on alignment with needs and priorities of

¹⁷²) Decision 1/CMA.6, para. 33.

¹⁷³) UNFCCC Funds refers to the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism (i.e. Global Environment Facility, Green Climate Fund, and Fund for responding to Loss and Damage), Adaptation Fund, Least Developed Countries Fund and Special Climate Change Fund.

developing country Parties

472. Several factors relating to the quality of climate finance rest on the context of addressing the needs and priorities of developing country Parties, as outlined in NDCs and NAPs. These include:

- Reflection on country ownership. Tracking progress towards this qualitative element of the NCQG may involve considering the extent to which finance flows are aligned with nationally identified priorities, embedded within national planning and budgeting systems, and supportive of institutional capacity development. Information from biennial transparency reports and related reporting under the enhanced transparency framework may contribute to such analysis. However, it is currently limited to narrative reporting by developed country Parties in their BTRs on their underlying assumptions, definitions and methodologies, for which they are requested to describe how they seek to ensure that support provided and mobilized effectively addresses needs and priorities. Their biennial communications under Article 9, paragraph 5, provide a forward-looking perspective on how bilateral dialogues take country priorities into account when programming. Current reporting fields in the common tabular formats for reporting financial support needed by developing country Parties provide space to indicate whether a need is anchored in a national strategy and/or NDC. However, such a field is not featured in the CTFs for climate finance provided, mobilized or received, limiting the ability to link reported climate finance flows with priorities set out in country plans. Similarly, MCFs and MDBs refer to national plans and country-driven strategies as part of strategic programming, but no information reflects, on an ex-post manner, how much of the finance flowing from these entities met needs specified in NDCs and NAPs.

The information on needs and priorities in national reports may itself require further improvement to support future assessments. The second NDR found that many needs are identified through quantifying and costing measures to reduce GHG emissions and increase adaptive capacities, which are presented as overall investment needs or costs of implementing climate action plans. NDCs provide the basis for identifying which measures may represent conditional or unconditional actions to reduce GHGs. However, this does not automatically translate into clear expectations regarding the specific needs required to implement measures and activities,

or the sources of finance (international, domestic, public or private) to be used to finance them, that can be matched to data on finance provided and mobilized.

- Reflection on the balance of mitigation and adaptation finance. As noted in section 3.2.3 above, this question may include several perspectives that consider whether it is most appropriate to examine the inputs into climate action and/or the outputs achieved, while noting how needs evolve. Tracking progress towards the qualitative element of balance may therefore require systematic monitoring of thematic shares over time, including the allocation of adaptation finance to least developed countries and small island developing States, and consideration of the extent to which thematic distribution corresponds to needs identified in nationally determined contributions, national adaptation plans and other national communications. Disaggregation by theme, region and country group may be central to this assessment, rather than an aggregate approach, given that the concept of balance is particularly context-specific and relates to nationally determined needs and priorities.
- Reflection on public grant-based and highly concessional finance. Information on the composition of finance by instrument, grant-equivalent values and concessional levels may be relevant in further understanding how qualitative improvements in fiscal space and debt vulnerabilities are managed. Consistency in grant-equivalent methodologies and transparency in reporting financial terms may enhance comparability across sources.

Reflection on enhancing impacts, results and outcomes (chapter 3.3)

473. The BA identifies evolving results frameworks and increasing emphasis on measurable mitigation and adaptation outcomes that could contribute to assessing meaningful and ambitious mitigation and adaptation action, and transparency on implementation that features in the NCQG decision. In assessing qualitative progress, available information on reported outcomes and portfolio-level results may provide contextual insight into whether finance is contributing to low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways in line with the needs and priorities of developing countries. Continued methodological convergence in outcome reporting, particularly for adaptation, may enhance robustness in this area.

474. The information from results frameworks in section 3.3 is largely separate from the tracking of finance flows by the same entities. The CTFs for information on climate finance needed and received, to be reported by developing country Parties, provide for reporting on uses, impacts and estimated results. However, the CTFs for climate finance provided and mobilized do not provide for reporting such information, which is typically available to bilateral partners responsible for decisions on project approvals in partnership with partner countries. MCFs and MDBs have built out extensive result frameworks and impact scorecards, but these have often been developed separately from their datasets on finance flows, making it difficult to link how the financial commitments are expected to achieve impacts. As shown in table 3.1, there are further gaps in comparing ex-ante expectations of impacts and the ex-post realization of impacts.

475. While striving for enhanced insights on the impact and effectiveness of climate finance, one key consideration is the capacity of recipient institutions – in particular local and small-scale actors – to comply with increasing monitoring, verification and reporting expectations, with a view to ensure inclusive access to sources of climate finance.

Reflection on enhancing access to climate finance (chapter 3.4)

476. Another consideration relates to efficient and effective access to climate finance, consistent with paragraphs 21–24 of Decision 1/CMA.6. The NCQG decision underscored ‘the importance of reducing existing constraints, challenges, systemic inequities and barriers to access to climate finance, welcomes ongoing efforts to improve access and urges all climate finance actors to strengthen their efforts to enhance efficient and effective access.’¹⁷⁴ The seventh BA identifies expansion of direct access modalities, while also noting that increases in the number of direct access entities do not necessarily translate into increases in the share of climate finance approved through those entities. In this context, transaction costs associated with accessing climate finance, including project preparation, approval processes, compliance requirements and reporting obligations, remain an important factor influencing effective access, particularly for developing countries with limited institutional capacity. Further insights into how different climate finance actors respond to the activities outlined in paragraphs 22 to 24 of the NCQG

may provide insight into progress made on enhancing efficient and effective access. Information on these elements may also inform the special assessment of access to climate finance requested by the CMA.¹⁷⁵

477. Information on the mobilization of finance from all actors, including mobilized private finance, may provide useful qualitative context for interpreting progress towards the NCQG. The seventh BA highlights that limited comparable information remains on approval-to-disbursement timelines and transaction costs, while documenting increasing volumes of mobilized private climate finance, particularly in mitigation sectors, alongside more limited mobilization in adaptation and vulnerable country contexts. Future assessments may therefore benefit from information on timeliness of disbursement, predictability of multi-year commitments and the extent to which finance is channelled through national and subnational entities, attribution methodologies, additionality, the distinction between expected and realized mobilization, and the sectoral and geographic distribution of mobilized private finance. Enhanced reporting through MDBs and MCFs annual reports, as well as Party reporting under the ETF and Article 9.5 biennial communications, could strengthen the evidence base for these aspects.

478. Finally, information relating to transparency in implementation and methodological consistency may strengthen future assessments. The seventh BA identifies several methodological areas where further convergence and improvements in reporting may strengthen future assessments. Continued improvements in transparency and methodological consistency in these areas may strengthen future assessments of progress towards the NCQG, including information on the mobilization of finance, with developed country Parties continuing to take the lead, consistent with Decision 1/CMA.6. Strengthening reporting under the ETF and continued harmonization of methodologies across institutions may be critical to enabling a more comprehensive and comparable assessment of qualitative progress towards the NCQG. The findings of the seventh BA therefore indicate that future NCQG progress reports may benefit from qualitative information that complements the assessment of progress towards the quantitative goal, while remaining consistent with the scope and guidance provided by the CMA. In addition to the qualitative information directly associated with the implementation of the quantitative goal under paragraphs 7–9 of

174) Decision 1/CMA.6, para. 21.

175) Decision 1/CMA.6, para. 34.

Decision 1/CMA.6, future assessments may also consider broader qualitative information where relevant and subject to further guidance from the CMA. This may include information relating to balance, accessibility, predictability and concessionality, as well as alignment with country-driven strategies and the needs and priorities of developing countries, the mobilization of finance, impacts and outcomes, and transparency in implementation. Such information could provide important context for interpreting quantitative progress,

while avoiding the implication that these elements constitute additional reporting requirements under the NCQG. Furthermore, where relevant and subject to future CMA guidance, qualitative information related to the inclusion and extension of benefits to vulnerable communities and groups (paragraph 26) and support for just transitions across sectors and thematic areas (paragraph 20) may provide additional context for interpreting progress towards the NCQG.

Annexes

Annex A: Country and institution groupings used in the seventh BA

Annex I Parties (43)	Annex II Parties (24)	OECD member countries (38)	DAC members (30)
Australia Austria Belarus Belgium Bulgaria Canada Croatia Cyprus Czechia Denmark Estonia EU Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Japan Latvia Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Monaco Netherlands (Kingdom of the) New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Romania Russian Federation Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Türkiye Ukraine United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland United States	Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Iceland Ireland Italy Japan Luxembourg Netherlands (Kingdom of the) New Zealand Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland Türkiye United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland United States	Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Colombia Costa Rica Czechia Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands (Kingdom of the) New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Republic of Korea Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Türkiye United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland United States	Australia Austria Belgium Canada Czechia Denmark Estonia EU Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Japan Luxembourg Netherlands (Kingdom of the) New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Republic of Korea Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland United States

Source: UNFCCC (Webpage: <https://unfccc.int/parties-observers>); OECD (Webpage: <https://www.oecd.org/en/about/members-partners.html>); OECD DAC (Webpage: <https://www.oecd.org/en/about/committees/development-assistance-committee.html>)

Non-Annex I Parties (155)

Afghanistan	Congo	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Nepal	South Africa
Albania	Cook Islands	Iraq	Nicaragua	South Sudan
Algeria	Costa Rica	Israel	Niger	Sri Lanka
Andorra	Côte d'Ivoire	Jamaica	Nigeria	State of Palestine
Angola	Cuba	Jordan	Niue	Sudan
Antigua and Barbuda	Democratic People's	Kazakhstan	North Macedonia	Suriname
Argentina	Republic of Korea	Kenya	Oman	Syrian Arab Republic
Armenia	Democratic Republic of	Kiribati	Pakistan	Tajikistan
Azerbaijan	the Congo	Kuwait	Palau	Thailand
Bahamas	Djibouti	Kyrgyzstan	Panama	Timor-Leste
Bahrain	Dominica	Lao People's Democratic	Papua New Guinea	Togo
Bangladesh	Dominican Republic	Republic	Paraguay	Tonga
Barbados	Ecuador	Lebanon	Peru	Trinidad and Tobago
Belize	Egypt	Lesotho	Philippines	Tunisia
Benin	El Salvador	Liberia	Qatar	Turkmenistan
Bhutan	Equatorial Guinea	Libya	Republic of Korea	Tuvalu
Bolivia (Plurinational	Eritrea	Madagascar	Republic of Moldova	Uganda
State of)	Eswatini	Malawi	Rwanda	United Arab Emirates
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Ethiopia	Malaysia	Saint Kitts and Nevis	United Republic of
Botswana	Fiji	Maldives	Saint Lucia	Tanzania
Brazil	Gabon	Mali	Saint Vincent and the	Uruguay
Brunei Darussalam	Gambia	Marshall Islands	Grenadines	Uzbekistan
Burkina Faso	Georgia	Mauritania	Samoa	Vanuatu
Burundi	Ghana	Mauritius	San Marino	Venezuela (Bolivarian
Cabo Verde	Grenada	Mexico	Sao Tome and Principe	Republic of)
Cambodia	Guatemala	Micronesia (Federated	Saudi Arabia	Viet Nam
Cameroon	Guinea	States of)	Senegal	Yemen
Central African Republic	Guinea-Bissau	Mongolia	Serbia	Zambia
Chad	Guyana	Montenegro	Seychelles	Zimbabwe
Chile	Haiti	Morocco	Sierra Leone	
China	Honduras	Mozambique	Singapore	
Colombia	India	Myanmar	Solomon Islands	
	Indonesia	Namibia	Somalia	

Source: UNFCCC (Webpage: <https://unfccc.int/parties-observers>).

List of ODA Recipients (141)

Afghanistan	Côte d'Ivoire	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Mozambique	South Africa
Albania	Cuba	Iraq	Myanmar	South Sudan
Algeria	Democratic People's	Jamaica	Namibia	Sri Lanka
Angola	Republic of Korea	Jordan	Nauru	Sudan
Argentina	Democratic Republic of	Kazakhstan	Nepal	Suriname
Armenia	the Congo	Kenya	Nicaragua	Syrian Arab Republic
Azerbaijan	Djibouti	Kiribati	Niger	Tajikistan
Bangladesh	Dominica	Kyrgyzstan	Nigeria	Tokelau*
Belarus	Dominican Republic	Lao People's Democratic	Niue	Thailand
Belize	Ecuador	Republic	North Macedonia	Timor-Leste
Benin	Egypt	Lebanon	Pakistan	Togo
Bhutan	El Salvador	Lesotho	Panama	Tonga
Bolivia (Plurinational	Equatorial Guinea	Liberia	Papua New Guinea	Tunisia
State of)	Eritrea	Libya	Paraguay	Türkiye
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Eswatini	Madagascar	Peru	Turkmenistan
Botswana	Ethiopia	Malawi	Philippines	Tuvalu
Brazil	Fiji	Malaysia	Republic of Moldova	Uganda
Burkina Faso	Gabon	Maldives	Rwanda	Ukraine
Burundi	Gambia	Mali	Saint Helena*	United Republic of
Cabo Verde	Georgia	Marshall Islands	Saint Lucia	Tanzania
Cambodia	Ghana	Mauritania	Saint Vincent and the	Uzbekistan
Cameroon	Grenada	Mauritius	Grenadines	Vanuatu
Central African Republic	Guatemala	Mexico	Samoa	Venezuela*
Chad	Guinea	Micronesia (Federated	Sao Tome and Principe	Viet Nam
China	Guinea-Bissau	States of)	Senegal	Wallis and Futuna* West
Comoros	Guyana	Mongolia	Serbia	Bank and Gaza Strip
Congo	Haiti	Montenegro	Sierra Leone	Yemen
Costa Rica	Honduras	Montserrat*	Solomon Islands	Zambia
	India	Morocco	Somalia	Zimbabwe
	Indonesia			

Source: OECD DAC ODA Eligible List (Website : <https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/oda-eligibility-and-conditions/dac-list-of-oda-recipients.html>)

* Countries and territories not classified in World Bank income groups. Estimated placement on the list.

LDCs, as of 2024 (45)

Afghanistan Angola Bangladesh Benin Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Central African Republic Chad	Comoros Democratic Republic of the Congo Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Gambia Guinea Guinea-Bissau Haiti	Lao People's Democratic Republic Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mozambique Myanmar Nepal	Niger Rwanda Sao Tome and Principe* Senegal Sierra Leone Solomon Islands Somalia South Sudan Sudan Timor-Leste Togo	Tuvalu Uganda United Republic of Tanzania Yemen Zambia
---	--	--	---	--

Source: https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc_list.pdf * São Tomé and Príncipe graduated end 2024

Small Island Developing States (SIDS) (39)

Antigua and Barbuda Bahamas Barbados Belize Cabo Verde Comoros* Cook Islands Cuba	Dominica Dominican Republic Fiji Grenada Guinea-Bissau* Guyana Haiti Jamaica	Kiribati* Maldives Marshall Islands Mauritius Micronesia (Federated States of) Naoero Niue Palau	Papua New Guinea Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Samoa Sao Tome and Principe Seychelles Singapore	Solomon Islands Suriname Timor-Leste Tonga Trinidad and Tobago Tuvalu Vanuatu
--	---	---	---	---

Source: <https://www.un.org/ohrlls/content/list-sids> Note: * Also Least Developed Country (LDC)

Regional Groupings

IDFC – regional groupings							
East Asia and the Pacific	Eastern Europe and Central Asia	Latin America and the Caribbean	Middle East and North Africa	South Asia	Sub-Saharan Africa	EU	Others
American Samoa, Cambodia, China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Fiji, Indonesia, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Myanmar, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Viet Nam	Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, ^a Kyrgyzstan, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Serbia, Tajikistan, Türkiye, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan	Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Belize, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen	Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka	Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe	Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden	Trans-regional: include funds that are channelled to more than channelled through multilateral climate funds Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, United Kingdom, and United States

Source: <https://www.idfc.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/idfc-gfm-2025-final.pdf>

a. This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 and the International Court of Justice Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.

MDBs – regional groupings							
EU	Latin America and the Caribbean	Middle East and North Africa	South Asia	Non-EU Europe	Sub-Saharan Africa	Central Asia	East Asia and the Pacific
Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark Estonia, Finland France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden	Anguilla, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Sint Eustatius and Saba, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Montserrat, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Barthélemy, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Sint Maarten(Dutch part), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State of Palestine, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, Western Sahara and Yemen	Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka	Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo,a, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Serbia, Switzerland, Türkiye, Ukraine and United Kingdom	Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea- Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Reunion, Rwanda, Saint Helena, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe	Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan	Cambodia, China, Cook Island, Fiji, Kiribati, Laos, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, New Caledonia, Palau, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Vietnam

Source: https://www.eib.org/files/publications/20240150_2023_joint_report_on_mdbs_climate_finance_en.pdf

a This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 and the International Court of Justice Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.

OECD – regional groupings								
Europe	Far East Asia	Middle East	North and Central America	North of Sahara	Oceania	South and Central Asia	South America	South of Sahara
Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Europe (regional), Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Republic of Moldova, Serbia, Türkiye and Ukraine	Cambodia, China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Far East Asia (regional), Indonesia, Lao, People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Viet Nam	Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Middle East (regional), State of Palestine, Syrian Arab Republic, West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Yemen	Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Montserrat, Nicaragua, North and Central America (regional), Panama, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, North of Sahara (regional) and Tunisia	Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Naoero, Niue, Oceania (regional), Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Wallis and Futuna	Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Central Asia (regional), Georgia, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, South and Central Asia (regional), South Asia (regional), Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan	Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, South America (regional), Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Saint Helena, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South of Sahara (regional), South Sudan, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe

Source: [https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/STAT\(2019\)20/FINAL/en/pdf](https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/STAT(2019)20/FINAL/en/pdf)

Note: There is also a "Regional and Unspecified" group, which includes "Africa (regional)", "America (regional)", "Asia (regional)" and "Developing countries (unspecified)".

Sudan is not classified in the North Sahara regional group but grouped in Northern African

a. This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 and the International Court of Justice Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.

UN statistics division M49 classification					
Africa	Latin America and the Caribbean	North America	Asia	Europe	Oceania
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe	Argentina, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	Canada, United States of America	Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, State of Palestine, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Türkiye, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, and Yemen	Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands (Kingdom of the), North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Naoero, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu

Source: <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/>.

Annex B: Compilation of operational definitions of climate finance in use by Parties and various institutions

The table below outlines key operational definitions in use based on selected external sources and should not be interpreted as agreed UNFCCC criteria.

Institution	Climate finance definition	Mitigation finance definition	Adaptation finance definition
UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) Source: Sixth Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows (SCF, 2024b)	Climate finance aims at reducing emissions and enhancing sinks of greenhouse gases, aims at reducing vulnerability, increasing adaptive capacity, and mainstreaming and increasing resilience of human and ecological systems to negative climate impacts, and includes financing for actions identified in a country's nationally determined contribution, adaptation communication, national adaptation plan, long-term low-emission development strategy or other national plan for implementing and achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement and the objective of the Convention.	–	–

Institution	Climate finance definition	Mitigation finance definition	Adaptation finance definition
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) Source: OECD DAC Converged Statistical Reporting Directives for the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) – Annex 20: Rio Markers (OECD DCD DAC, 2024b).	Rio markers were designed to track the mainstreaming of environmental considerations into development cooperation rather than providing a quantification of finance and provide separate markers for climate change mitigation and climate change adaptation. The application of Rio Markers is based on definitions and eligibility criteria, and guided by indicative sector/subsector tables and examples of qualifying activities to support harmonization in activity-level reporting across members. The Rio Markers distinguish between activities targeting climate change objectives as either “principal” or “significant”. Climate change mitigation/adaptation activities arising from a national action plan or strategy (e.g. NAPAs, NAPs, NAMAs or INDCs) automatically qualifies as principal objective, as the Conventions provide the motivation for the design of the activity.	An activity that contributes to the objective of stabilization of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system by promoting efforts to reduce or limit GHG emissions or to enhance GHG removal by sinks, in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement. Eligibility The activity contributes to (a) the mitigation of climate change by limiting anthropogenic emissions of GHGs, including gases regulated by the Montreal Protocol; or (b) the protection and/or enhancement of GHG sinks and reservoirs; or (c) the integration of climate change concerns with the recipient countries’ development objectives through institution-building, capacity development, strengthening the regulatory and policy framework, technology transfer or research; or (d) developing countries’ efforts to meet their obligations under the Convention and the Paris Agreement, namely the implementation and enhancement of mitigation actions. The activity will score “principal objective” if it directly and explicitly aims to achieve one or more of the above four criteria.	An activity that intends to reduce the vulnerability of human or natural systems to the current and expected impacts of climate change, including climate variability, by maintaining or increasing resilience, through increased ability to adapt to, or absorb, climate change stresses, shocks and variability and/ or by helping reduce exposure to them, in line with the Paris Agreement. This encompasses a range of activities from information and knowledge generation to capacity development, planning and the implementation of climate change adaptation actions. Eligibility (a) The climate change adaptation objective is explicitly indicated in the activity documentation; and (b) the activity contains specific measures targeting the adaptation definition. Carrying out an assessment of vulnerability to climate variability and change, either separately or as an integral part of agencies’ standard procedures, facilitates this approach. To guide scoring, a three-step approach is recommended as a “best practice”, in particular to justify a “principal” score: • Setting out the context of risks, vulnerabilities and impacts related to climate variability and climate change: for a project to be considered as one that contributes to adaptation to climate change, the context of climate vulnerability should be set out clearly using a robust evidence base. This could take a variety of forms, including use of material from existing analyses and reports, or original, bespoke climate vulnerability assessment analysis carried out as part of the preparation of a project. • Stating the intent to address the identified risks, vulnerabilities and impacts in project documentation: The project should set out how it intends to address the context- and location-specific climate change vulnerabilities, as set out in existing analyses, reports or the project’s climate vulnerability assessment. • Demonstrating a clear and direct link between the identified risks, vulnerabilities and impacts and the specific project activities: the project should explicitly address risk and vulnerabilities under current and future climate change as identified in the project documentation.

Institution	Climate finance definition	Mitigation finance definition	Adaptation finance definition
Common Principles of the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and International Development Finance Club (IDFC) Source: EIB et al, 2025; MDB-IDFC 2023, Common principles for climate mitigation finance tracking, version 5 (ADB et al, 2023); MDB-IDFC 2022, Common principles for climate change adaptation finance tracking (ADB et al, 2022).	Climate finance refers to the financial resources (from own accounts and MDB-managed external resources) committed to development operations and components thereof which enable activities that mitigate climate change and support adaptation to climate change.	– Climate change mitigation reduces, avoids, limits or sequesters greenhouse gas emissions to mitigate climate change. However, not all activities that reduce greenhouse gas emissions are eligible to be counted towards mitigation finance, which is calculated based on a list of activities that are compatible with low-emission pathways. An activity can be classified as climate change mitigation where the activity, by avoiding or reducing GHG emissions or increasing GHG sequestration, contributes substantially to the stabilisation of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level which prevents dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system consistent with the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement. Eligibility The Common Principles recognise that a substantial contribution to climate change mitigation can involve the following three categories: (1) Negative- or very-low-emission activities, which result in negative, zero or very low GHG emissions and are fully consistent with the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement, e.g., carbon sequestration in land use or some forms of renewable energy. Eligibility principle: have negative or near-zero net GHG emissions. (2) Transitional activities, which are still part of GHG-emissive systems, but are important for and contribute to the transition towards a climate-neutral economy, e.g., energy efficiency improvement in manufacturing that directly or indirectly uses fossil fuels. Eligibility principle: lack technologically or economically feasible very low-emission alternatives available; comply with high performance country or sector-specific standards, benchmarks or thresholds for GHG emissions or emission intensity that significantly exceed expected performance in a sector or activity; do not hamper the development or deployment of very low-emission activities; and do not lead to a lock-in of GHG emission-intensive assets that is inconsistent with the long-term goal of net-zero GHG emissions. (3) Enabling activities, which are instrumental in enabling other activities to make a substantial contribution to climate change mitigation, e.g., manufacture of very-low-emission technologies. Eligibility principle: are necessary for developing or implementing other eligible climate mitigation activities; do not hamper the development or deployment of negative or very low-emission activities; and do not lead to a lock-in of GHG emission-intensive assets that is inconsistent with the long-term goal of net-zero GHG emissions. No fixed quantitative thresholds are established within the eligibility list to facilitate the wish of individual institutions to set them according to own mandates and specific circumstances. Exclusion of activities related to support of upstream and midstream activities in the fossil fuel industry, electricity generation from coal or peat, and those that lead to deforestation. Both Brownfield and Greenfield activities are in scope but eligibility and criteria can differ, with a focus on ensuring that greenfield activities prevent long-term GHG lock-in and may enable structural changes required for meeting the long-term temperature goal, support emerging technologies with significant climate mitigation potential, meet global high-performance standards or high-efficiency benchmarks, or significantly exceed national or regional standards. National circumstances and capabilities are accounted for as potential mitigation activities should consider, where possible, country-appropriate or regional benchmarks to facilitate progress towards national goals and avoid long-term lock-ins. Policy actions, technical assistance and programmes in support of the eligible activities are also eligible, provided that the link to eligible activities is clear or sufficiently demonstrated. A list of eligible activities, screening criteria and guidance is provided in tables 2–12 of the common principles for climate mitigation finance tracking	Climate change adaptation aims to reduce the risks or vulnerabilities posed by climate change and to increase climate resilience. Eligibility Identification of climate change adaptation finance is the result of a three-step process and thus, for a project to be counted either fully or partially towards adaptation finance, it must: a. Set out the project's context of vulnerability to climate change. b. Make an explicit statement of intent to address this vulnerability as part of the project. c. Articulate a clear and direct link between the vulnerability and the specific project activities. The methodology follows a context- and location-specific, conservative and granular approach. It tracks financing only for those components and/or sub-components or elements or proportions of projects that directly contribute to or promote adaptation. It is important to note the following: a. The adaptation finance reported may not capture certain activities that might contribute significantly to resilience but cannot always be tracked in quantitative terms (for example, operational procedures that support adaptation to climate change) or might not be associated with costs (such as siting assets outside flood-prone areas). b. Climate adaptation finance, as defined by the methodology, is not intended to capture the value of an entire project or investment that may increase resilience as a result of specific adaptation activities that take place as part of the project. c. The adaptation finance reported captures financial support for actions aimed at, among others, averting, minimising and addressing the risk associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset events. It includes support for anticipatory actions needed to increase preparedness, reduce climate vulnerability, and adapt to the experienced and anticipated impacts of climate change, as well as financing of post-disaster recovery and reconstruction needed in the aftermath of climate shocks. A list of case studies of tracking adaptation finance is provided in annex C.2, table A.B.1 of the Joint MDB Climate Finance 2025 report.

Institution	Climate finance definition	Mitigation finance definition	Adaptation finance definition
Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD) Source: TOSSD Reporting Instructions (TOSSD, 2025)	The TOSSD statistical framework identifies projects based on their SDG focus, where reporting at activity level is required using multiple codes identifying the target(s) in the UN list of SDG targets (e.g. 13.1, 13.3). Reporting against SDG Targets applies where the activity directly and significantly contributes to the target. It is expected that, for most projects, the number of SDG targets should not exceed ten. In case where no direct link can be found to an SDG target, reporting can be made against the goal e.g. “13.0”. SDG 13 Climate Action Targets:¹⁷⁶ Target 13.1: Strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate related disasters Target 13.2: Integrate climate change measures into policies and planning Target 13.3: Build Knowledge and capacity to meet climate change Target 13.4: Implement the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Target 13.5: Promote mechanisms to raise capacity for planning and management Climate-related targets also include, for example: Target 7.1:¹⁷⁷ Increase global percentage of renewable energy Target 14.3:¹⁷⁸ Reduce ocean acidification Target 15.2:¹⁷⁹ End deforestation and restore degraded forests In addition, activities are also reported against keywords to identify activities of particular policy interest (including #ADAPATION and #MITIGATION). Cross-border resource flows related to mitigation and adaptation activities in TOSSD recipients are reportable in TOSSD's pillar I. (verified against general TOSSD eligibility criteria. Climate actions that convey transnational benefits (at global or regional levels) are included in TOSSD's pillar II.B. Climate adaptation actions in the provider country or in a non TOSSD recipient are generally excluded from TOSSD, given that adaptation is essentially a localised activity. If adaptation activities can be demonstrated to produce benefits to TOSSD recipients, they can be included. TOSSD does not by any means intend to replace reporting on climate actions to UNFCCC or other relevant organisations. The objective is rather to support greater transparency of climate-related activities.	Keyword: #MITIGATION to identify activities aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and enhancing greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs.	Keyword: #ADAPTATION to identify activities aimed at enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change.

¹⁷⁶) See <https://globalgoals.org/goals/13-climate-action/>

¹⁷⁷) See Goal 7: Affordable and clean energy - <https://globalgoals.org/goals/7-affordable-and-clean-energy/>

¹⁷⁸) See Goal 14: Life below water - <https://globalgoals.org/goals/14-life-below-water/>

¹⁷⁹) See Goal 15: Life on land - <https://globalgoals.org/goals/15-life-on-land/>

Institution	Climate finance definition	Mitigation finance definition	Adaptation finance definition
Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) Source: Buchner et al (2021), CPI (2025)	Aligned with the recommended operational definition of the SCF, CPI's definition captures capital flows directed towards low-carbon and climate-resilient development interventions with direct or indirect GHG mitigation or adaptation benefits, including to reflect post-Paris Agreement developments. CPI's working definition of climate finance consists of three elements: • Mitigation finance • Adaptation finance • Dual benefits finance - defined as resources directed to activities contributing to both "climate change mitigation" and "climate change adaptation" and meeting the respective. Exclusions include: • Private R&D in technology and investment for new green technologies (e.g. wind turbines), owing to assumption that these costs are capitalized and included in the investment amounts at the deployment stage of new projects and so including them would risk of double counting. • Policy-induced revenue support mechanisms or other public subsidies whose primary function is to pay back initial investment costs (to avoid double counting).	Mitigation finance is defined as resources directed to activities either: contributing to reducing or avoiding GHG emissions, including gases regulated by the Montreal Protocol; or maintaining or enhancing GHG sinks and reservoirs. Eligibility Positive list, drawing on OECD-DAC, MDB, IDFC and Multilateral Climate Funds approaches. Updated sector classification drawing, amongst others, from the following economic activities classifications: MDB (2021), CBI taxonomy (CBI, 2021), IPCC WG3's AR5 (IPCC, 2014), the EU taxonomy (EU Technical Expert Group on Sustainable Finance, 2020), OECD' CRS purpose codes (OECD, 2021a). It excludes: • Fossil fuel-based lower-carbon and energy-efficient generation (e.g. efficiency retrofits of coal-fired power plants) due to significant future carbon emissions lock-in • Nuclear, due to ongoing debates regarding risks and benefits. • Plug in hybrid electric vehicles given their potential to pollute depending on the drivers' behaviour	Adaptation finance is defined as resources directed at activities aimed at reducing the vulnerability of human or natural systems to the impacts of climate change and climate-related risks, by maintaining or increasing adaptive capacity and resilience. Eligibility Positive list, drawing on OECD-DAC, MDB, IDFC, Multilateral climate funds approaches, and approaches from commercial datasets including GWI, IJGlobal and LGX.

Institution	Climate finance definition	Mitigation finance definition	Adaptation finance definition
Climate Budget Tagging (CBT) and Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Reviews (CPEIRs) Source: UNDP (2019), <i>Knowing What You Spend: A guidance note for governments to track climate change finance in their budgets.</i>	The UNDP outlines that “Climate Budget Tagging” (CBT) is one of a set of climate related finance tools designed to help countries mainstream climate change in public financial management (PFM), focused on identifying, classifying, weighting and marking climate-relevant expenditures in a government’s budget system, enabling the estimation, monitoring and tracking of those expenditures. UNDPs guidance is intended to inform the design of CBT, but to not be prescriptive with respect to its implementation. Three key phases for developing a CBT process include: i) Identifying the objectives and purposes for CBT, ii) Determining the technical design through consideration of how to define and classify expenditures, assessing and measuring (weighting) climate-relevance, and iii) Implementing the tagging approach within PFM systems. The guidance provides examples based on case studies to inform technical design features, rather than outlining specific definitions and methodologies. This includes highlighting approaches to define climate expenditures that align with national climate strategies and action plans, use of typologies and application of international definitions such as the OECD DAC Rio markers and MDB Joint methodology.	–	–

Institution	Climate finance definition	Mitigation finance definition	Adaptation finance definition
OECD Green Budget Tagging Source: OECD (2021)	The OECD outlines that green budget tagging involves a comprehensive survey of all budgetary measures to identify those that impact green objectives (whether in a positive, neutral or negative way) – and where climate budget tagging exists within green budget tagging. Recognising significant differences in country contexts and public financial management systems, the OECD notes that each country must establish their objectives and purpose to determine what information is needed within a tagging process. Key decisions include: Defining what is green, deciding scope, developing a classifications system, and identifying information needs. Regarding definitions – the OECD emphasises the importance of considering linkages to existing principles, standards and metrics, including highlighting key definitions used by international organisations such as the OECD-DAC Rio markets and Joint MDB definition of climate finance, alongside the EU Taxonomy for sustainable finance and ICMA green bonds principles. Regarding scope – the OECD outlines that green budget tagging should as a minimum aim to cover budget measures in priority sectors such as agriculture, transport, energy, industry and the environment, where budget measures tend to have significant impacts on climate and environmental objectives, and aim for green budget tagging to include both positive and negative measures.	–	–

Institution	Climate finance definition	Mitigation finance definition	Adaptation finance definition
OECD Subnational Government Climate Finance Methodology Source: OECD (2022), Subnational Government Climate Expenditure and Revenue Tracking in OECD and EU Countries.	The OECD has developed an operational definition to track ‘climate-significant’ subnational government spending and investment, based on the EU Taxonomy’s principle of “significantly contributing to climate change mitigation and climate change adaptation” and taxonomy of economic activities from the 2020 EU Technical Expert Group on Sustainable Finance (TEG) report “Taxonomy: Final report of the Technical Expert Group on Sustainable Finance”. In applying this definition, activities are matched with the National Accounts Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG) categories in order to identify expenditure and investment that could be considered as contributing to climate adaptation or mitigation objectives. In practice this focused on key sectors such as transport and energy, environmental protection, waste, water management or housing development. Climate finance is then estimated by to calculating the climate-relevant share of expenditure/investment based on proxy co-efficients (e.g. % share of renewables as part of final energy consumption, as a proxy for energy), and refined through application of a ‘policy lens’ (i.e. an additional percentage reduction) based on the presence of national policies and plans. (See table 1.2 in OECD (2022) for assumptions to derive proxy-coefficients). In addition, by including both capital and current expenditure in the analysis, this study has a wider scope than most tracking efforts undertaken by other international organisations, which tend to focus exclusively on investment.	–	–

Institution	Climate finance definition	Mitigation finance definition	Adaptation finance definition
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Taxonomy for Sustainable Finance Source: ASEAN Taxonomy Board (2025).	The ASEAN Taxonomy for Sustainable Finance guides and harmonises the identification of sustainable economic activities across ASEAN Member States. It is designed to be science-based, interoperable with widely used international taxonomies such as the EU and Climate Bonds taxonomies (see below), and inclusive to the different stages of development of ASEAN Member States. The Taxonomy provides a multi-tiered framework that includes activity-level criteria for four environmental objectives for classification, three essential criteria, and a tiered traffic-light system for assessment drawing on technical screening criteria for focus sectors and enabling sectors. Environmental Objectives: • Climate change mitigation • Climate change adaptation • Protection of healthy ecosystems and biodiversity • Resource resilience and transition to circular economy. Essential Criteria: • Do no significant harm • Remedial measures to transition • Social Aspects. To be classified under the ASEAN Taxonomy, an activity must demonstrate that it appropriately contributes to at least one of the environmental objectives, and does not have any adverse effects on others. Furthermore, an activity must fulfil all three essential criteria.	The climate change mitigation objective focuses on decarbonisation pathways for Activities, requiring them to align with Member State specific pathways and decarbonisation trajectories in line with the Paris Agreement. An Activity shall be considered as fulfilling the objective of Climate Change Mitigation if it contributes to one or more of the following: 1. Avoids GHG emissions; 2. Reduces GHG emissions; or 3. Enables others to avoid or reduce GHG emissions. Common Climate Change Mitigation Activities include, but are not limited to: renewable energy generation, rehabilitation, retrofitting and/or replacement of energy-inefficient technology, production of energy-efficient technologies, as well as maintenance and strengthening of land based carbon stock and sinks, above and below ground. Guiding Principles: 1. Activity is in line with limiting global temperature rise to no more than 1.5°C in alignment with the Paris Agreement; or 2. Activity which is not already low- or zero-emissions, may be required to demonstrate the capability of avoiding or reducing GHG emissions in line with relevant best practices compared to the baseline scenario without the mitigating action.	The climate change adaptation focuses on managing expected negative effects of climate change, through identifying evidence and relevant information with regards to the impacts of climate change. The objective is to lower the negative effects caused by climate change and increase resilience to withstand adverse physical impacts of current and future climate change, through implementation of processes or actions. Activities must demonstrate resilience to identified negative impacts, ensure they do not cause maladaptation or undermine the adaptation efforts of others, and actively avoid increasing the physical climate risk for other stakeholders. Resilience is defined as the ability of the Activity to provide utility over time in the face of potential climate disruptions. The ASEAN Taxonomy is technology neutral and supplementary guidance on technology and solutions may come from the ATB and/or its members in the future. Guiding Principles: 1. Activity shall positively contribute to a reduction in material physical climate risk and/or shall reasonably reduce material physical risk from current and future climate change. This can include obvious physical risks, such as flooding, but also less immediately visible effects, such as impacts on health from higher temperatures. 2. Impact assessments under a broad range of climate scenarios shall be conducted to provide better understanding and insights on the effectiveness and benefits of the Activity. 3. Activity that enables adaptation of other Activities should reduce the impacts of material physical risk from other Activities and/or reduce barriers to adaptation through technology, services or products. 4. Activity must not adversely affect the adaptation efforts, or increase the physical risk, of other stakeholders. 5. Adaptation solutions should be location-specific and context-specific and shall be assessed and ranked in order of priority using the best available climate projections in order to prevent and/or reduce the adverse impacts on people, nature or assets.

Institution	Climate finance definition	Mitigation finance definition	Adaptation finance definition
China's Green Bond Endorsed Project Catalogue Source: 2021 Edition	The Taxonomy relies on a descriptive eligibility approach: projects are considered eligible for green bonds, if they meet the conditions set out in their respective descriptive explanation in the catalogue. Some but not all projects make reference to related national industrial standards, have simple quantitative requirements, and/or make a high-level mention of 'do no significant harm'. Key sectors include: • Energy-saving and carbon reduction industries • Environmental protection industry • Resource recycling industry • Energy/green/low-carbon transformation • Ecological protection, restoration and utilisation • Green upgrading of infra structure • Green services • Green trade The 2021 update (compared with the 2015 edition) removes the clean utilisation of coal and oil from the list of eligible projects. Nuclear energy and enabling activities including green services are included.	–	–

Institution	Climate finance definition	Mitigation finance definition	Adaptation finance definition
European Union (EU) Taxonomy for Sustainable Finance Source: EU (2025)	The EU Taxonomy is a classification system, identifying environmentally sustainable activities using technical screening criteria. Climate change adaptation and mitigation are two of six environmental objectives tracked. For an economic activity to be considered sustainable it must: • Make a substantial contribution to a least one environmental objective; • Do no significant harm to any other environmental objective; • Comply with minimum social safeguards; • Comply with the technical screening criteria.	An economic activity shall be considered to contribute substantially to climate change mitigation where that activity substantially contributes to the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level which prevents dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system by avoiding or reducing greenhouse gas emissions or enhancing greenhouse gas removals through any of the following means, including through process or product innovation, consistent with the long term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement: (a) generating, transmitting, storing, distributing or using renewable energy in line with Directive (EU) 2018/2001, including through using innovative technology with a potential for significant future savings or through necessary reinforcement or extension of the grid; (b) improving energy efficiency except for power generation activities that are referred to in Article 14(2a); (c) increasing clean or climate-neutral mobility; (d) switching to the use of sustainably sourced renewable materials; (e) increasing the use of environmentally safe carbon capture and utilisation (CCU) and carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies that deliver a net reduction in greenhouse gas emissions; (f) strengthening land carbon sinks, including through avoided deforestation and forest degradation, restoration of forests, sustainable management and restoration of croplands, grasslands and wetlands, afforestation, and regenerative agriculture; (g) establishing energy infrastructure required for enabling the decarbonisation of energy systems; (h) producing clean and efficient fuels from renewable or carbon-neutral sources; (i) enabling any of the above in accordance with Article 11a. For the purposes of paragraph 1, an economic activity for which there is no technologically and economically feasible low carbon alternative, shall be considered to contribute substantially to climate change mitigation as it supports the transition to a climate-neutral economy consistent with a pathway to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre industrial levels including by phasing out greenhouse gas emissions, in particular from solid fossil fuels, where that activity: I. has greenhouse gas emission levels that correspond to the best performance in the sector or industry; II. does not hamper the development and deployment of low-carbon alternatives; and III. does not lead to a lock-in in carbon-intensive assets considering the economic lifetime of those assets. Eligibility Technical sector-specific criteria apply for 70 climate change mitigation activities. In establishing thresholds for Taxonomy screening criteria, climate change mitigation objectives to mean net-zero emissions by 2050 and a 50–55% reduction by 2030 against 1990 levels, consistent with the commitments under the EU Green Deal.	An economic activity shall be considered to contribute substantially to climate change adaptation where: (a) that economic activity includes adaptation solutions that either substantially reduce the risk of adverse impact or substantially reduces the adverse impact of the current and expected future climate on that economic activity itself without increasing the risk of an adverse impact on other people, nature and assets; or where (b) that economic activity provides adaptation solutions that, in addition to the conditions laid down in Article 11a, contribute substantially to preventing or reducing the risk of adverse impact or substantially reduces the adverse impact of the current and expected future climate on other people, nature or assets, without increasing the risk of an adverse impact on other people, nature and assets. The adaptation solutions referred to in (a) shall be assessed and prioritised using the best available climate projections and shall, as a minimum, prevent or reduce: The location-specific and context-specific adverse impact of climate change on the economic activity; or (ii) The adverse impact that climate change may have on the environment within which the economic activity takes place Eligibility The following two-step process aims to demonstrate that an activity contributes to a substantial reduction of the negative effects of climate change: a. Assessing the expected negative physical effects of climate change on the underlying economic activity that is the focus of resilience-building efforts, drawing on robust evidence and leveraging appropriate climate information; b. Demonstrating how the economic activity will address the identified negative physical effects of climate change or will prevent an increase or shifting of these negative physical effects. The assessment of the contribution of the activity will vary based on its scope (asset, corporate, sector or market), as well as spatial and temporal scale. Moreover, the proposed approach recognises that an adaptation activity may target an entity (e.g. a corporation or a city) and/or a market, sector, or region Technical screening criteria for 68 climate change adaptation activities exist.

Institution	Climate finance definition	Mitigation finance definition	Adaptation finance definition
Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI) Taxonomy Source: Climate Bonds Mitigation Taxonomy (2021), Climate Bonds Resilience Taxonomy (2024), Climate Bonds Standard (2025)	The CBI standard is a science-based framework to define Paris-aligned projects and assets for climate change mitigation and climate change adaptation. The framework applies a classification system to identify asset types per sector, and asset specifics. Eligibility is determined by a traffic light system, and screening indicators where applicable (where relevant). The CBI's guidance on eligibility goes beyond its taxonomy. Bond certification requires compliance with detailed Sector Criteria, the Climate Resilience Principles, and the Climate Transition Principles.	The Climate Change Mitigation standard sets out asset types and sectoral screening criteria across the sectors of: • Energy • Transport • Water • Buildings • Land-use & marine resources • Industry • Waste & pollution control • Information & communications technology.	The Climate Change Adaptation & Resilience Taxonomy sets out a classification system and interim screening criteria for climate adaptation and resilience investments (and where the terms climate resilience and adaptation interchangeably). Investment types are categorised as adapting or enabling measures, or adapting or enabling activities. The taxonomy is organised by sector and sub-sector (based on standard classification systems) and into seven resilience themes: • Resilient infrastructure • Resilient agri-food systems • Resilient cities & settlements • Resilient social systems • Resilient health systems • Resilient natural systems • Resilient industry and commerce. The taxonomy then identifies how each investment contributes to climate resilience by specifying the climate impacts it aims to address, categorised by hazard consequences and their economic, social, and environmental impacts. Screening criteria then apply, and where eligibility criteria require: - The investment makes a substantial contribution to climate resilience. - Any maladaptation risks associated with the investment are managed; and - The investment does no significant harm (DNSH) to other sustainability objectives (specifically climate change mitigation).

Institution	Climate finance definition	Mitigation finance definition	Adaptation finance definition
International Capital Markets Association (ICMA) Source: ICMA (2021).	ICMA's The Green Bond Principles explicitly recognise several broad categories of eligibility for investments in green projects, which contribute to the following environmental objectives: • climate change mitigation, • climate change adaptation, • natural resource conservation, • biodiversity conservation, and • pollution prevention and control.	–	–

Annex C: Information on climate finance received in first biennial transparency reports

Table C.1: Coverage of available information on financial support received in first biennial transparency

Country	Format	Level of information	Title (of activity, programme or project)	Programme/ project description	Channel	Recipient entity	Implementing entity	Amount received	Time frame	Financial instrument	Status (committed or received)	Type of support	Sector	Subsector	Contribution to TD&T objectives	Contribution to CB objective	Status of activity (planned, ongoing, completed)	Use, impact and results	Additional information	Other
Algeria	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Both									
Argentina	BTR	Project level			Both						Received							Fully reported		
Armenia	CTF-FTC	Project level			Multilateral						Both							Partially reported		
Bangladesh	BTR	Project level			Both						Both							Fully reported		
Belarus	CTF-FTC	Project level									Received							Fully reported		
Belize	BTR	Project level			Both						Not reported									
Bhutan	BTR	Project level			Both						Committed									
Bolivia	BTR	Project level			Both						Both							Fully reported		
Burkina Faso	BTR	Institution level			Both						Both									
Burundi	BTR	Theme and sector Level			Not reported						Not reported									
Cambodia	BTR	Project level			Multilateral															
Central African Republic	BTR	Project level			Both						Received							Fully reported		
Chile	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Received							Fully reported		
China	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Received							Fully reported		

Country	Format	Level of information	Title (of activity, programme or project)	Programme/ project description	Channel	Recipient entity	Implementing entity	Amount received	Time frame	Financial instrument	Status (committed or received)	Type of support	Sector	Subsector	Contribution to TD&T objectives	Contribution to CB objective	Status of activity (planned, ongoing, completed)	Use, impact and results	Additional information	Other
Colombia	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Committed							Fully reported		
Costa Rica	BTR	Channel, sector and theme level			Both						Not reported							Not reported		
Côte d'Ivoire	CTF-FTC	Project level			Other						Both							Fully reported		
Cuba	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Both							Fully reported		
Dominica	BTR	Project level			Multilateral						Received							Fully reported		
Dominican Republic	BTR	Project level			Both						Both									
Ecuador	CTF-FTC	Finance received per year			Both						Received							Fully reported		
Egypt	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Both							Fully reported		
Gabon	BTR	Channel level			Multilateral						Not reported									
Georgia	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Received							Fully reported		
Ghana	CTF-FTC	Instrument level, sector level and theme level			Both						Not reported							Fully reported		
Guinea Bissau	CTF-FTC	Project level			Bilateral						Received							Fully reported		

Country	Format	Level of information	Title (of activity, programme or project)	Programme/ project description	Channel	Recipient entity	Implementing entity	Amount received	Time frame	Financial instrument	Status (committed or received)	Type of support	Sector	Subsector	Contribution to TD&T objectives	Contribution to CB objective	Status of activity (planned, ongoing, completed)	Use, impact and results	Additional information	Other
Guyana	CTF-FTC	Source, and instrument and sectors			Both						Both							Fully reported		
Honduras	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Both							Fully reported		
Indonesia	CTF-FTC	Institution level			Both						Received							Partially reported		
India	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Received							Fully reported		
Jordan	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Received							Fully reported		
Kazakhstan	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Committed							Partially reported		
Kenya	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Both							Partially reported		
Kyrgyzstan	BTR	Channel level			Both						Not reported							Not reported		
Lao PDR	CTF-FTC	Project level			Multilateral						Received							Partially reported		
Lebanon	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Both							Fully reported		
Malawi	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Both							Fully reported		
Malaysia	BTR	Project level			Multilateral						Not reported							Not reported		
Maldives	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Received							Fully reported		
Mauritius	CTF-FTC	Project level			Multilateral						Committed							Fully reported		
Mongolia	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Received							Fully reported		

Country	Format	Level of information	Title (of activity, programme or project)	Programme/ project description	Channel	Recipient entity	Implementing entity	Amount received	Time frame	Financial instrument	Status (committed or received)	Type of support	Sector	Subsector	Contribution to TD&T objectives	Contribution to CB objective	Status of activity (planned, ongoing, completed)	Use, impact and results	Additional information	Other
Montenegro	BTR	Project level			Multilateral						Committed							Not reported		
Morocco	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Both							Partially reported		
Namibia	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Received							Partially reported		
Nepal	BTR Annex	Project level			Both															
Nicaragua	BTR	Project level			Multilateral						Received							Fully reported		
Niger	CTF-FTC	Institutional level aggregate			Both						Received							Fully reported		
Nigeria	CTF-FTC	Institution level			Multilateral						Both							Fully reported		
Oman	BTR	Project level			Multilateral						Both							Fully reported		
Pakistan	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Both							Fully reported		
Panama	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Both							Fully reported		
Papua New Guinea	BTR	Project level			Both						Received							Not reported		
Paraguay	BTR	Project level			Both						Both							Not reported		
Peru	BTR	Channel level			Both						Not reported							Not reported		
Philippines	CTF-FTC	Project level			Not reported						Not reported							Not reported		
Rwanda	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Received							Fully reported		
Serbia	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Both							Fully reported		

Country	Format	Level of information	Title (of activity, programme or project)	Programme/ project description	Channel	Recipient entity	Implementing entity	Amount received	Time frame	Financial instrument	Status (committed or received)	Type of support	Sector	Subsector	Contribution to TD&T objectives	Contribution to CB objective	Status of activity (planned, ongoing, completed)	Use, impact and results	Additional information	Other
Seychelles	BTR	Sector level			Not reported						Received									
Solomon Island	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Both							Not reported		
South Africa	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Both							Fully reported		
Sri Lanka	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Both									
Thailand	BTR	Project level			Both						Received							Not reported		
Trinidad and Tobago	BTR	Channel level			Both						Both									
Tunisia	BTR	Project level			Both						Not reported							Not reported		
Türkiye	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Committed							Fully reported		
Tuvalu	BTR Annex	Project level			Both						Committed							Not reported		
Ukraine	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Not reported							Fully reported		
Uruguay	CTF-FTC	Project level			Multilateral						Received							Fully reported		
Uzbekistan	CTF-FTC	Project level			Both						Received							Fully reported		
Vanuatu	BTR	Channel and theme level			Both						Committed							Not reported		
Venezuela	Text only	Project			Multilateral						Both							Fully reported		
Zambia	Tabular	Project			Both						Received							Partially reported		
Zimbabwe	Tabular	Project			Both						Received							Partially reported		

[illegible]

[illegible]

Country	Earliest and latest year reported	Bilateral, regional and other channels				Multilateral channels				Private finance				Domestic/other/unspecified				Grand total
		Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Mitigation	Other/NR	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Mitigation	Other/NR	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Mitigation	Other/NR	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Mitigation	Other/NR	
Malaysia	2015–2026	-	-	-	-	-	5.6	305.5	2.9									314.0
Maldives	2014–2030	13.4	28.0	1.0	-	112.3	36.0	356.5	-									547.1
Mauritius	2016–2026	-	-	-	-	-	19.2	30.4	-									49.6
Mongolia	2021–2026	6.1	0.6	1.0	-	155.4	3.0	25.9	-									191.9
Morocco	2020–2030	128.3	106.7	321.0	120.1	788.7	0.6	494.2	250.0					-	-	0.1	-	2 209.5
Namibia	2017–2024	82.7	6.7	0.4	-	28.6	15.9	-	-									134.2
Nepal	2012–2029	51.9	-	-	-	139.8	42.1	176.2	-									409.9
Nicaragua	2016–2028	-	-	-	-	-	39.1	1.0	-									40.1
Niger	2020–2032	-	12.2	-	-	80.6	593.0	220.8	-									906.6
Nigeria	2018–2018	-	-	-	-	8.0	700.0	550.0	-									1 258.0
Oman	2020–2022	-	-	-	-	-	5.2	60.0	-									65.2
Pakistan	2020–2028	207.0	116.4	46.6	-	724.7	75.1	178.5	-									1 348.3
Panama	2017–2027	5.9	0.2	2.2	-	161.1	799.7	451.9	-									1 421.1
Papua New Guinea	2013–2030	32.1	50.7	-	-	11.8	121.1	108.9	-									324.7
Paraguay	2015–2030	0.7	20.8	1.1	-	206.0	339.2	62.3	-					-	-	0.8	-	631.0
Peru		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	50.1					-	-	-	26.6	76.7
Philippines		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-					¹ 322.9	-	638.0	-	1 960.9
Rwanda	2015–2029	26.6	-	421.0	-	190.2	-	401.7	-									1 039.4
Serbia	2015–2030	1.9	-	45.2	2.2	21.6	-	679.3	64.3					1.9	-	75.8	5.4	897.7
Seychelles	2020–2022	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-					80.3	-	13.5	-	93.7
Solomon Island	2006–2020	46.5	5.2	12.3	-	36.0	-	24.0						-	0.4	-	-	124.3

Country	Earliest and latest year reported	Bilateral, regional and other channels				Multilateral channels				Private finance				Domestic/other/unspecified				Grand total
		Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Mitigation	Other/NR	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Mitigation	Other/NR	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Mitigation	Other/NR	Adaptation	Cross-cutting	Mitigation	Other/NR	
South Africa	2012–2042	3.7	358.3	454.9	-	3.4	2.3	5.1	-									827.7
Sri Lanka	2016–2027	8.0	0.3	5.9	-	218.2	192.3	108.5	35.5									568.7
Thailand	2009–2030	67.6	325.8	133.2	-	21.0	14.5	540.9	-									1 102.9
Trinidad and Tobago	x	-	-	-	6.2	-	-	-	353.8									360.0
Tunisia	2020–2035	32.2	9.7	284.3	-	62.3	512.9	960.8	-					5.0	-	-	-	1 867.1
Türkiye	2023–2030	503.5	-	-	-	435.0		554.0	-									1 492.5
Tuvalu	2014–2029	-	-	-	25.6	-	-	-	22.8					-	-	-	0.1	48.5
Ukraine	2021–2022	50.7	10.2	294.7	-	129.6	56.4	063.3 ¹	-	-	-	0.2	-					1 605.1
Uruguay	2020–2028	-	-	-	-	25.6	5.7	13.9	35.5									80.7
Uzbekistan	2008–2043	-	-	-	-	145.7	187.0	635.1	-									967.8
Vanuatu	2023–2027	24.9	6.8	32.7	25.4	160.2	19.6	38.2	0.3									308.0
Venezuela	2024–2026	-	0.6	-	-	3.0	59.5	-	-									63.1
Zambia	2009–2037	715.2	320.1	497.2	-	726.8 ¹	499.7	399.1	-					6.2	-	-	-	4 164.2
Zimbabwe	2015–2030	-	16.1	6.5	-	108.2	25.7	60.6	0.3	-	-	6.1	-					223.5

Annex D: Compilation of methodologies in use by various sources of information on global climate finance flows and assessment of quality, completeness and sectoral classifications of data

Sector	Sources of data			Data assessment		Sectoral classifications / subsectors
	Flow	Primary	Aggregator	Reporting on expected results (ex ante)	Reporting on achieved results (ex post)	
Clean energy systems	Public	DFI Surveys, IDFC, MDB, OECD DAC	CPI	High – Activity-level data	High – High sub-sectoral coverage, further methodological analysis underway to improve the inclusion of transmission and distribution data	Power and heat generation; power and heat transmission and distribution; fuel production; fuel transmission and distribution; policy and national budget support and capacity building; other. By definition, CPI exclude Nuclear and most CCUS.
	Private	Bloomberg New Energy Finance, CPI				
Sustainable transport	Public	DFI Surveys, IDFC, MDB, OECD DAC	CPI	High – Activity-level data, including drawing on market sales data with assumptions	Medium – High sub-sectoral coverage, including recent expansion in coverage to include improved treatment of two-, -three- and four-wheeled vehicles. Data gaps in aviation and international shipping technological improvements not included (biofuels captured in clean energy)	Private road transport; rail and public transport; waterway; aviation; transport-oriented infrastructure and urban development; policy and national budget support and capacity building; other.
	Private	CPI, IEA				
Buildings and infrastructure	Public	DFI Surveys, IDFC, MDB, OECD DAC	CPI	High – Activity-level data, including drawing on market sales data with assumptions	Medium – High sub-sectoral coverage, but with data gaps persisting related to adaptation and household investments	Building and infrastructure construction work; HVAC and water heaters; appliances and lighting; policy and national budget support and capacity building; other.
	Private	CPI, IEA				
Industry	Public	DFI Surveys, IDFC, MDB, OECD DAC	CPI	Medium – Commercial sensitivity limits detailed data availability	Medium – Commercial sensitivity and data challenges lead to some data gaps related to private finance, in addition to gaps in tracking super-pollutants	Industrial, extraction and manufacturing processes; industry infrastructure and warehouse; policy and national budget support and capacity building; other.
	Private	CPI, IEA				

Sector	Sources of data			Data assessment		Sectoral classifications / subsectors
	Flow	Primary	Aggregator	Reporting on expected results (ex ante)	Reporting on achieved results (ex post)	
Water and wastewater	Public	DFI Surveys, IDFC, MDB, OECD DAC	CPI	Medium – Activity-level data, including estimated climate-relevance for household expenditures	Medium – Data gaps persist, including for domestic public finance and private finance, while recognizing recent improvements to assess household adaptation-related investments	Water supply and sanitation; wastewater treatment; policy and national budget support and capacity building; other.
	Private	CPI				
Agriculture, forestry and other land-use (AFOLU)	Public	DFI Surveys, IDFC, MDB, OECD DAC	CPI	High – Activity-level data	Medium – Moderate sub-sectoral coverage, noting domestic public finance data gaps and challenges tracking adaptation and nature finance	Agriculture; forestry; fisheries; food and diet; policy and national budget support and capacity building; other.
	Private	CPI		High – Activity-level data	Low – Significant data gaps persist	
Other sectors - mitigation	Public	DFI Surveys, IDFC, MDB, OECD DAC	CPI	High – Activity-level data	Medium – Moderate sub-sectoral coverage, noting domestic public finance data gaps	Biodiversity, land and marine conservation; disaster-risk management; Information Communication and Technology (ICT) including data centres and telecommunication networks; waste; policy and national budget support and capacity building; other.
	Private	CPI		High – Activity-level data	Low – Significant data gaps persist	
Other sectors - adaptation	Public	DFI Surveys, IDFC, MDB, OECD DAC	CPI	High – Activity-level data	Medium – Partial coverage owing to challenges in tracking adaptation finance, given conservative approaches, data gaps and complexities given the dependency on understanding context of investments to identify and assess climate adaptation-relevance	
	Private	CPI			Low – Limited publicly available information and significant data gaps persist	
Other sectors - both mitigation and adaptation	Public	DFI Surveys, IDFC, MDB, OECD DAC	CPI	High – Activity-level data	Medium – Moderate sub-sectoral coverage, noting domestic public finance data gaps	
	Private	CPI		High – Activity-level data	Low – Significant data gaps persist	

Sector	Sources of data			Data assessment		Sectoral classifications / subsectors
	Flow	Primary	Aggregator	Reporting on expected results (ex ante)	Reporting on achieved results (ex post)	
Domestic climate-related public investment		Country budget tagging / tracking	Authors	Low – Methodologies case-by-case per country, limited publicly available details	Low/Medium – 34 countries reporting, following mixed approaches, including some systematic tagging/tracking of budgets and/or expenditures	N/A – Public sector expenditure/ investment, economy-wide
		CPEIRs	Authors	Medium – CPEIR approach, applied case- by-case per country	Low – 2 countries following CPEIR approach, applied case- by-case per country	
		Other	Authors	Low –Range of one-off reports, see annex F	Low – 6 reports for other countries identified, often one-off studies for a particular year.	
		CPI	CPI	Medium – CPI Country Landscapes	Low – 3 country-level reports	

Source: Author consolidation across approaches in particular CPI (2026). **Notes:** Sector Classifications based on CPI (CPI, 2025)

Annex E: Compilation of methodologies in use by various sources of information on developed-to-developing country climate finance flows and assessments of quality and completeness

Sources of data			Data quality					Data completeness	
Channel	Flow	Source	Overall assessment of quality	Climate definitions/ guidance	Measurement approaches and reporting frameworks	Quality Assurance (QA) and validation	Granularity / detail	Overall assessment of data completeness	Completeness in origin reporting 2023–2024
<i>Bilateral</i>									
Bilateral, regional and other, climate-specific support provided		BTRs – finance provided	High	Range of approaches – Rio Markers and use of climate-coefficients most commonly cited,	ETF CTF & BTRs – Face Value and partial reporting of grant equivalents; mixed use of commitments and disbursements	Provider country-self reported	Activity-level/ semi-aggregated	Medium/ high	2021-22 (BTR1): 26 developed country Parties, with 15 other Parties reporting on a voluntary basis and 1 unspecified. 2023-24 (Preliminary BTR2): partial data based on individual preliminary data estimates from 10 Parties and publicly available information of 22 Parties
		BTRs – finance received	Low	Self-reporting by Parties, following range of approaches, See Annex C	ETF CTF & BTRs – – face value and partial reporting of grant equivalents; mixed use of commitments and disbursements	Recipient country-self reported	Activity-level/ semi-aggregated / aggregated	Low	2021-22 (BTR1): 73 Parties providing information.
Bilateral climate-related development finance		OECD DAC CRS CRDF	High	Rio markers – principal and significant	OECD DAC statistical system	OECD QA approach	Activity-level	High	All 34 OECD DAC members (including the EU), in addition to reporting from Croatia, Liechtenstein and Monaco
Bilateral climate-specific finance provided		OECD \$100bn Report Series	High	Self-reporting by Parties	Advanced BTR data ETF CTF and BTRs	OECD Secretariat sense checks on advanced BTR data	Activity-level/ semi-aggregated	High	39 ‘developed country’ jurisdictions (including the EU)
Bilateral net assistance climate-specific finance provided		Oxfam Shadow Report Series	Medium	Oxfam methodology – adjusted Rio marker data applying proxy climate-specific shares	Oxfam methodology – assumptions applied to approximate concessionality to assess ‘net assistance’	Drawing on OECD DAC CRDF dataset	Activity-level	High	Coverage based on OECD DAC CRS CRDF dataset: 37 ‘developed country’ jurisdictions (including the EU)

Sources of data			Data quality					Data completeness	
Channel	Flow	Source	Overall assessment of quality	Climate definitions/ guidance	Measurement approaches and reporting frameworks	Quality Assurance (QA) and validation	Granularity / detail	Overall assessment of data completeness	Completeness in origin reporting 2023–2024
Climate finance IDFC		IDFC	High	Joint MDC-IDFC common principles	DFI Surveys	Consolidation of survey responses and CPI aggregation	Activity-level/ semi-aggregated	High	Coverage based on reporting from group of now 27 national and regional development banks across developed and developing countries
Climate-related officially supported export credits		OECD \$100bn Series	Medium	Eligibility under the climate change sector understanding of the arrangement on officially supported export credits	OECD Export Credit Group database	OECD QA approach	Activity-level (only semi-aggregated data publicly available owing to commercial sensitivities)	Medium	
Multilateral									
Multilateral climate funds and other organizations (including UNFCCC)	Project approvals, outflows, unattributed	CFU	High	Data collected from individual funds. Only climate-only focused GEF projects included.	Project approval decisions tracked/collected from individual funds, project changes adjusted for retrospectively.	Validation typically with individual funds	Activity-level	Medium	Collated data from 17 multilateral funds (gaps include IFAD, IMF-RST and NDF)
	Inflows (imputed) & outflows	OECD DAC	High	MCF reporting to OECD, incl. use of Rio markers.	OECD DAC Statistical System, Converged Statistics and Imputed Climate Shares.	OECD QA Approach	Activity-level	High	Inflows: All 34 OECD DAC members (including the EU), in addition to reporting from Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Lichenstein, Malta and Monaco. Outflows: Reporting from 32 multilateral institutions Recipients: Records all ODA eligible and some non-ODA eligible non-Annex I countries, but not comprehensively, i.e. data gap on GEF, GCF

Sources of data			Data quality					Data completeness	
Channel	Flow	Source	Overall assessment of quality	Climate definitions/ guidance	Measurement approaches and reporting frameworks	Quality Assurance (QA) and validation	Granularity / detail	Overall assessment of data completeness	Completeness in origin reporting 2023–2024
MDB climate finance	Inflows (Imputed)	OECD DAC	High	Joint MDC-IDFC Common Principles	OECD DAC Statistical System, converged statistics and imputed climate shares	OECD QA Approach	Donor level core contributions imputed based on activity-level information	High	23 multilateral development banks
	Outflows – MDB joint reporting (own resources)	MDB joint reporting	High		MDB Joint Reporting and MDB Climate Finance Dashboard	Dual-expert reviews and final certifications against standardized criteria.	Activity-level	High	Reporting from 10 multilateral development banks
	Outflows	OECD DAC	High		OECD DAC Statistical System and MDB reporting to OECD.	OECD QA Approach	Activity-level	High	Coverage based on OECD DAC CRS CRDF dataset:
Attributed multilateral climate flows (funds and MDBs)	Attributed outflows - OECD	OECD \$100bn Series	0.33	Joint MDC-IDFC Common Principles & Rio Markers	OECD DAC Statistical System and attribution based on developed country shares of capital replenishments and callable capital (mobilization effect).	OECD QA Approach	Activity-level	High	Reporting from 10 multilateral development banks
	Attributed outflows and approximated net assistance - Oxfam		High		Oxfam analysis drawing on OECD DAC CRS CRDF attributed multilateral outflows and adjusted to proxy-grant elements (and for Rio marked data based on coefficients to estimate climate-specific shares ranging 30-100%)		Aggregated attributions	High	Coverage based on OECD DAC CRS CRDF dataset:
Private finance									

Sources of data			Data quality					Data completeness	
Channel	Flow	Source	Overall assessment of quality	Climate definitions/ guidance	Measurement approaches and reporting frameworks	Quality Assurance (QA) and validation	Granularity / detail	Overall assessment of data completeness	Completeness in origin reporting 2023–2024
Mobilized private climate finance by bilateral, regional institutions		BTRs – finance mobilized	Medium	Range of approaches – Rio Markers and use of climate-coefficients most commonly cited,	ETF CTF and BTRs – estimation approaches commonly based on OECD methods of	Provider country-self reported	Activity-level/ semi-aggregated	Medium	2021–22 (BTR1): 26 developed country Parties, with 15 other Parties reporting on a voluntary basis and 1 unspecified.
		OECD DAC	High	wRio markers – principal and significant	OECD DAC Statistical System and OECD approach for measuring and reporting on mobilized private finance	OECD QA Approach	Activity-level	High	
Mobilized private climate finance by multilateral channels	MDBs direct and indirect	MDB Joint Reporting	High	Joint MDC-IDFC common principles	MDB Joint Reporting & MDB Climate Finance Dashboard	Dual-expert reviews and final certifications against standardized criteria	Activity-level	High	Reporting from 10 multilateral development banks
	Mobilized from multilateral interventions	OECD DAC	High		OECD	OECD QA Approach	Activity-level	High	23 multilateral development banks 9 multilateral climate funds
Other private finance	Private	CPI	Medium	International finance reported under GLCF methodology	CPI GLCF aggregation	CPI QA Approach	Activity-level	Medium	Origin/destination of transregional flows unknown, and not included
	Philanthropy	OECD DAC	High	Rio markers – principal and significant	Voluntary reporting by private donors and philanthropic foundations to OECD DAC	OECD QA Approach	Activity-level	Medium	Reporting from 47 private donors and philanthropies, incl. reporting by 27 on climate-related flows in 2023–24.

Annex F: Climate finance tracked and reported at country-level

Country	Source of Information				Ex ante budget tagging or ex-post expenditure tracking	Annualized climate-relevant finance (USD billion) ¹⁸⁰			
	BURs / BTR	National Budget Reports	CPEIRs	Other		2021	2022	2023	2024
European Union		X			Budget tagging	167.624	135.876	174.697	65.510
Austria				x	Mix	1.917	3.695	9.145	11.438
France		X			Mix	37.138	28.959	34.601	41.780
Ireland		X			Mix	2.401	3.070	3.568	5.933
Italy		X			Expenditure tracking	1.795	5.227	3.073	2.482
Portugal		X			Budget tagging				3.369
Spain		X			Budget tagging			69.169	
Japan		X			Budget tagging	60.389	51.218	49.861	82.350
New Zealand		X			Budget tagging		0.507	0.665	0.741
Türkiye		X			Budget tagging	2.141	2.107	2.655	4.193
Argentina		X			Mix	0.066	2.049	2.116	0.976
Azerbaijan		X			Budget Tagging				0.588
Bahamas		X			Budget tagging	0.144			
Bangladesh		X			Mix	0.309	0.368	0.390	0.365
Benin		X			Budget tagging			0.805	0.909
Bhutan		X			Budget tagging		0.083	0.064	0.105
Bolivia					Budget tagging	0.635	0.478	0.449	
Brazil					Expenditure tracking	4660	4660	46660	
Chile		X			Budget tagging	0.411	0.296	0.262	0.256
Colombia		X		One-off study	Budget tagging	1.364	1.226	1.559	1.184
Ethiopia	X			CPI landscape (AFOLU)	Budget tagging			0.115	0.136
Georgia	X				Budget tagging				0.640
Ghana		X			Budget tagging	0.029	0.101	0.013	
Honduras		X			Mix	2.709	3.054	2.963	0.639
Malawi				WB study cited in BTR1	Budget tagging	0.267	0.066	0.073	0.63
Mexico		X			Budget tagging	4.082	3.638	11.093	12.781

180) Available information annualized based on either calendar or financial year, and where relevant presented as an annual average. Available information converted from national currency into USD, based on OECD or IMF exchange rates.

Country	Source of Information				Ex ante budget tagging or ex-post expenditure tracking	Annualized climate-relevant finance (USD billion) ¹⁸⁰			
	BURs / BTR	National Budget Reports	CPEIRs	Other		2021	2022	2023	2024
Namibia			X		Expenditure tracking	0.178	0.162	0.029	
Nepal		X		UNICEF study	Budget tagging	4.647	4.856	4.746	6.518
Nigeria					Expenditure tracking	374	374		
Niue					Budget tagging				0.001
Pakistan		X			Budget tagging			0.716	0.999
Philippines		X		CPI landscape	Budget tagging	5.725	5.318	8.145	9.485
Rwanda		X			Budget tagging				0.353
Senegal		X			Budget tagging				0.142
Seychelles					Budget tagging				0.120
Singapore		X			Expenditure tracking			2.083	2.101
South Africa					Expenditure tracking		1.094	0.970	
St. Vincent and the Grenadines		X		IMF study	Budget tagging	0.057	0.070	0.080	0.093
Togo		X			Budget tagging				0.158
Tonga		X		CPI landscape	Budget tagging		0.061	0.077	0.110
Uganda					Budget tagging			0.147	
Uzbekistan			X		Budget tagging	1.584	2.380	3.640	

Note: Compilation of available information by UNFCCC SCF Secretariat on a best effort basis, and building on the sixth and prior BAs.

Annex G: Overview of projects approved by multilateral climate funds (2021–2024)

Amount of funding approved (Millions of USD)

	2021	2022	2023	2024
Adaptation funds	941	369	1 286	896
Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP)	8	35	7	11
Adaptation Fund (AF)	93	125	138	107
Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA)	-	-	-	-
Global Environment Facility (GEF)	-	-	-	-
Green Climate Fund (GCF)	727	59	1 024	668
Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF)	88	130	96	98
Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR)	21	19	21	8
Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)	4	1	-	4
Mitigation funds	1 916	600	268	364
Clean Technology Fund (CTF)	420	77	161	131
Global Environment Facility (GEF)	123	51	2	42
Green Climate Fund (GCF)	1 369	432	41	185
Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR)	-	-	-	-
Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program (SREP)	4	40	64	5
REDD+ funds	375	184	141	352
Amazon Fund	-	-	27	211
BioCarbon Fund Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes (BioCarbon Fund ISFL)	-	-	15	42
Central African Forest Initiative (CAFI)	42	113	49	76
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF)	214	-	-	-
Forest Investment Program (FIP)	39	70	11	23
Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA)	-	-	-	-
UN-REDD Programme	80	-	39	-
Multiple-objective funds/cross-cutting projects	1 412	2 497	6 999	5 913
Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA)	-	-	-	-

	2021	2022	2023	2024
Global Environment Facility (GEF)	71	64	22	51
Green Climate Fund (GCF)	896	1 046	1 101	1 789
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)*	357	257	256	1 156
IMF-Resilience and Sustainability Trust (IMF-RST)*	-	1 063	5 578	2 858
Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF)	12	-	-	-
Nordic Development Fund (NDF)*	75	66	42	59
Total multilateral climate funds	4 644	3 650	8 694	7 525
UNFCCC funds (GCF, GEF, AF, LDCF, and SCCF)	3 384	1 909	2 424	2 945

Source: CFU (n.d.), and (*) supplementary reporting from the OECD DAC CRDF – recipient perspective, committed outflows (2026). Note: Amounts may not sum due to rounding. CFU project approvals record total finance in year of initial approval, where time-series data is retrospectively updated to reflect any changes to projects from delays, changes in finance volumes, cancellations or extensions. GEF project approvals estimated by CFU reflect projects that are recorded as climate change projects only, excluding climate projects across multi-focal areas.

Annex H: Submissions received in response to the call for evidence

The table below presents the stakeholders that responded to a call for evidence on information and data for the preparation of the seventh BA.

Submission	Date
India	6 August 2026
Center for Global Development	10 July 2026
GFLAC	3 July 2026
UNOCHA	1 July 2026
Global CCS Institute	30 June 2026
Oxfam	30 June 2026
Quipa Collective	30 June 2026
OECD-OIF	26 June 2026
Saudi Arabia	25 June 2026
Uganda	19 June 2026
CARE	15 June 2026
PARC Foundation	28 May 2026
KAPSARC	18 May 2026
Global CCS Institute	8 April 2026
OPEC	1 July 2024

REFERENCES

- Adaptation Fund. *Alignment of Adaptation Fund Portfolio with National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)*. Available at: <https://www.adaptation-fund.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Alignment-of-Adaptation-Fund-Portfolio-with-National-Adaptation-Plans-NAPs-and-Nationally-Determined-Contributions-NDCs-1.pdf>.
- Abdou, M., Dudou, H., Gerling, K., Kadissi, D., 2025. *Macroeconomic Exposure to the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: The Case of the Middle East and Central Asia*, IMF Working Paper No: WP/25/182 Washington, DC
- Adaptation Fund. 2022. *Medium-Term Strategy 2023–2027*. Bonn: Adaptation Fund. Available at: <https://www.adaptation-fund.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Medium-Term-Strategy-2023-2027.pdf>.
- Adaptation Fund. 2023. *Annual Performance Report for Fiscal Year 2023*. Bonn: Adaptation Fund. Available at: https://www.adaptation-fund.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/AFB.EFC_.32.3-Annual-Performance-Report-for-FY23_final_rev.1-1.pdf.
- Adaptation Fund. 2024a. *Annual Performance Report 2023*. Bonn: Adaptation Fund. Available at: <https://www.adaptation-fund.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/AF-APR-2023-English-final.pdf>.
- Adaptation Fund. 2024b. *Annual Performance Report for Fiscal Year 2024*. Bonn: Adaptation Fund. Available at: https://www.adaptation-fund.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/AFB.EFC_.34.8_Annual-Performance-Report-for-FY24.pdf.
- Adaptation Fund. 2024c. *Financing Locally Led Adaptation in Asia and the Pacific and AF Accreditation: Summary Report, 29–30 April 2024*. Bonn: Adaptation Fund. Available at: https://www.adaptation-fund.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Report_Financing-Locally-Led-Adaptation-in-Asia-and-the-Pacific-and-AF-Accreditation.pdf.
- Adaptation Fund. 2024d. *Innovation Funding*. Available at: <https://www.adaptation-fund.org/apply-funding/innovation-grants/>.
- Adaptation Fund. 2024e. *Update on the Strategic Results Framework revision process*. Available at: https://www.adaptation-fund.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/AFB.EFC_.34.Inf_.5_Update-on-the-SRF-Revision-Process_AF-Board-Document.pdf.
- Adaptation Fund (AF). 2025a. *AF Annual Performance Report 2025*. Washington D.C.: Adaptation Fund. Available at: <https://www.adaptation-fund.org/document/annual-performance-report-2025/>.
- Adaptation Fund. 2025b. *Alignment of Adaptation Fund Portfolio with National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)*. Available at: <https://www.adaptation-fund.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Alignment-of-Adaptation-Fund-Portfolio-with-National-Adaptation-Plans-NAPs-and-Nationally-Determined-Contributions-NDCs-1.pdf>.
- Adaptation Fund. 2025c. *Annual Performance Report 2024*. Bonn: Adaptation Fund. Available at: <https://www.adaptation-fund.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/AF-APR-2024-English-04.029.2025.pdf>.
- Adaptation Fund. 2025d. *Annual Report 2025: Accelerating Adaptation Impacts*. Bonn: Adaptation Fund. Available at: <https://www.adaptation-fund.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/AF-Annual-Performance-Report-2025.pdf>.
- Adaptation Fund. 2025e. *Update to the Adaptation Fund Strategic Results Framework*. Available at: <https://www.adaptation-fund.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/AFB.B.44.11-Update-to-the-Strategic-Results-Framework-of-the-Adaptation-Fund.pdf>.
- Adaptation Fund. 2025f. *Update to the Adaptation Fund Strategic Results Framework*. Available at: https://www.adaptation-fund.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/AFB.B.45.8-Update-to-the-Strategic-Results-Framework_16Sep2025.pdf.
- ADB, AfDB, AIIB, et al. 2022. *Joint Methodology for Tracking Climate Change Adaptation Finance*. Available at https://www.eib.org/attachments/lucalli/20220242_mdbs_joint_methodology_climate_finance_en.pdf.

ADB, AfDB, AIIB, et al. 2023. *Common Principles For Climate Mitigation Finance Tracking*. Revision version dated 5 December 2023. Available at: https://www.eib.org/attachments/documents/mdb_idfc_mitigation_common_principles_en.pdf.

ADB, AfDB, AIIB, et al. 2024a. *2023 Joint Report on Multilateral Development Banks' Climate Finance*. Available at: <https://publications.iadb.org/en/2023-joint-report-multilateral-development-banks-climate-finance>.

ADB, AfDB, AIIB, et al. 2024b. *A Common Approach to Measuring Climate Results*. Washington, D.C.: Multilateral Development Banks. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climatechange/publication/common-approach-to-measuring-climate-results>.

ADB, AfDB, AIIB, et al. 2024c. *Common approach to measuring climate results. Update on Indicators. November 2024*. Available at: <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/09981151112496502/pdf/IDU-99acbc4c-fed3-4876-8e94-7829cf8efe5d.pdf>.

ADB, AfDB, AIIB, et al. 2024d. *2024. Joint Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) Statement for COP29 – MDBs' Support to Implementing the Paris Agreement*. Available at: <https://www.ndb.int/news/joint-multilateral-development-banks-mdbs-statement-for-cop29-mdbs-support-to-implementing-the-paris-agreement/>.

ADB, AfDB, AIIB, et al. 2024e. *Viewpoint Note: MDBs Working as a System for Impact and Scale*. Available at: https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/who-we-are/partnership/_download/Heads-of-MDBs-Viewpoint-Note-20-April-2024.pdf.

ADB, AfDB, AIIB, et al. 2025. *Joint Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) Statement for COP30* Available at: <https://www.eib.org/files/press/JointMDBStatementForCOP30.pdf>.

ADB, AfDB, AIIB, et al. n.d. *Joint MDB Methodological Principles for Assessment of Paris Agreement Alignment*. n.d. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/paris-alignment/joint-mdb-paris-alignment-approach>.

African Development Bank Group (AfDB). n.d. *The African Development Bank Group's Climate Action and Financing*. Available at: <https://www.afdb.org/en/cop30/focus-africa/african-development-bank-groups-climate-action-and-financing>.

African Development Bank Group (AfDB). 2023. *Climate Change and Green Growth at the African Development Bank: Annual Report*. Abidjan: African Development Bank Group. Available at: https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/afdb_climate_change_and_green_growth_2023_annual_report.pdf.

African Development Bank Group (AfDB). 2024. *Annual Development Effectiveness Review 2024*. Abidjan: African Development Bank Group. Available at: <https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/annual-development-effectiveness-review-2024>.

African Development Bank Group (AfDB). 2024a. *Annual Development Effectiveness Review 2025*. Abidjan: African Development Bank Group. Available at: <https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/annual-development-effectiveness-review-2025>.

African Development Fund (ADF). 2025b. *ADF-16 Delivery and Results Report*. Abidjan: African Development Bank Group. Available at: https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/adf-16_drr_-oct_2025-en.pdf.

African Development Bank Group (AfDB). n.d. *The African Development Bank Group's Climate Action and Financing*. Available at: <https://www.afdb.org/en/cop30/focus-africa/african-development-bank-groups-climate-action-and-financing>.

Alcayna, T. and Y. Cao. 2023. *Breaking the Cycle: Practical Solutions to Unlock Climate Finance for Fragile States*. Washington, D.C.: Mercy Corps. Available at: <https://dldocs.mercycorps.org/BreakingtheCycleClimateFinance.pdf>.

Aon. 2026. *2026 Climate and Catastrophe Insight*. Available at: <https://www.aon.com/en/insights/reports/climate-and-catastrophe-report>.

ASEAN Capital Markets Forum. 2024. *ASEAN Transition Finance Guidance V.2. October 22, 2024*. Available at: <https://www.theacmf.org/initiatives/sustainable-finance/asean-transition-finance-guidance-v2>.

ASEAN Capital Markets Forum. 2025. *Phase 1 White Paper on Key Principles and Methodological Approaches*. Available at <https://www.unepfi.org/publications/white-paper-principles-approaches-adaptation-resilience-guide/>.

ASEAN Taxonomy Board. 2025. *ASEAN Taxonomy for Sustainable Finance, Version 4*. Available at: https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/ASEAN-Taxonomy-Sustainable-Finance-V4_06Nov25.pdf

Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2024a. *ADB Commits Record Climate Finance of Almost \$10 Billion in 2023*. Available at: <https://www.adb.org/news/adb-commits-record-climate-finance-almost-10-billion-2023>.

Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2024b. *Report on the 2024 Country Performance Assessment Exercise*. Manila: Asian Development Bank. Available at: <https://www.adb.org/documents/adb-policy-on-performance-based-allocation-of-adf-resources>.

Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2024. *Concessional Assistance Policy for the ADF 14 Period*. Manila: Asian Development Bank. Available at: <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/993901/concessional-assistance>

Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2024c. *Operations Manual, Policies and Procedures*. Manila: Asian Development Bank. Available at: <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/31483/om-d2.pdf>.

Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2024d. *Report on the 2024 Country Performance Assessment Exercise*. Manila: Asian Development Bank. Available at: <https://www.adb.org/documents/adb-policy-on-performance-based-allocation-of-adf-resources>.

Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2025a. *Climate Finance in 2024*. Available at: <https://www.adb.org/news/infographics/climate-finance-2024>.

Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2024 *Development Effectiveness Review*. Manila: Asian Development Bank. Available at: https://www.parlament.gv.at/dokument/XXVIII/III/279/imfname_1734171.pdf.

Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2025b. *Climate Finance in 2024*. Available at: <https://www.adb.org/news/infographics/climate-finance-2024>.

Asian Development Bank (ADB). n.d. *Climate Change Financing at ADB*. Available at: <https://data.adb.org/dataset/climate-change-financing-adb>.

Asian Development Bank (ADB). n.d. *Country Allocations and Assessments*. Available at: <https://www.adb.org/what-we-do/funds/adf/allocation-adf-resources>.

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). 2025. *AIIB Sustainable Development Bonds Impact Report 2024*. Beijing: Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Available at: https://www.aiib.org/en/treasury/_common/_download/AIIB-Sustainable-Development-Bonds-Impact-Report-2024-Web.pdf.

Banking on Climate Chaos. 2025. *Fossil Fuel Finance Report 2026*. Available at: <https://www.bankingonclimatechaos.org/?bank=JPMorgan%20Chase#fulldata-panel>.

Becker M, McGivern A, Axelsson K, et al. 2024. *Governing Net Zero: assessing convergence and gaps in the voluntary standards and guidelines landscape*. Oxford, UK: Oxford Net Zero. Available at: <https://netzeroclimate.org/oxford-net-zero-report-assesses-the-voluntary-standards-landscape/>.

BloombergNEF (BNEF). 2024. *Tracking Climate Transition Plans in the Financial Sector. Report*. Available at <https://about.bnef.com/insights/finance/tracking-climate-transition-plans-in-the-financial-sector/>.

BloombergNEF (BNEF). 2025a. *Energy Investment Trends 2025*. Available at: <https://about.bnef.com/insights/finance/energy-transition-investment-trends/>.

BloombergNEF. BNEF. 2025b. *Calculating an Energy Supply Banking Ratio*. Available at: <https://about.bnef.com/insights/finance/calculating-an-energy-supply-banking-ratio/>.

BloombergNEF (BNEF). 2026. *Energy Transition Investment Trends. Tracking global investment in the low-carbon transition 2026*. Available at: <https://about.bnef.com/insights/finance/energy-transition-investment-trends/>

Boosting MDB's investing capacity. 2022. *An Independent Review of Multilateral Development Banks' Capital Adequacy Frameworks*. Available at: https://www.dt.mef.gov.it/export/sites/sitodt/modules/documenti_it/news/news/CAF-Review-Report.pdf.

Boston Consulting Group (BCG). 2025a. *Global Asset Management 2025*. Boston: Boston Consulting Group. Available at: <https://www.bcg.com/press/29april2025-global-asset-management-record-high-critical-turning-point>.

Boston Consulting Group (BCG). 2025b. *The Private Equity Opportunity in Climate Adaptation and Resilience*. Boston: Boston Consulting Group. Available at: <https://www.bcg.com/publications/2025/investment-opportunities-in-climate-a-and-r>.

Brandon, K. et al. 2025. *Strengthening the Investment Case for Climate Adaptation: A Triple Dividend Approach*. Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.46830/wriwp.25.00019>.

BRICS Business Council. 2024. *BRICS Business Council Annual Report 2024*. Available at: https://bricsbusinesscouncil.co.in/pdf/BRICS_Annual_Report24.pdf.

British International Investment (BII). 2024. *BII Announces New Initiative under Mobilisation Facility to Scale Up Climate Finance in Emerging Economies*. London: British International Investment. Available at: <https://www.bii.co.uk/en/news-insight/news/bii-announces-new-initiative-under-mobilisation-facility-to-scale-up-climate-finance-in-emerging-economies/>.

Boosting MDB's investing capacity. 2022. *An Independent Review of Multilateral Development Banks' Capital Adequacy Frameworks*. Available at: https://www.dt.mef.gov.it/export/sites/sitodt/modules/documenti_it/news/news/CAF-Review-Report.pdf.

Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP). 2025. *The 2025 Disclosure Dividend*. Available at: <https://www.cdp.net/en/press-releases/unlocking-the-disclosure-dividend>.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2025. *The Just Energy Transition Partnership crossroads*. Available at: <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/10/the-just-energy-transition-partnership-crossroads>.

Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES). 2026. *Developments in Border Carbon Adjustments in the 119th Congress and Abroad. January 2026*. Arlington, VA: C2ES. Available at: <https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/developments-in-border-carbon-adjustments-in-the-119th-congress-and-abroad.pdf>.

Center for Global Development (CGD). 2024a. *Allocate SDRs Directly to Multilateral Development Banks. Blog post by Mark Plant and Vera Songwe, 21 October 2024*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development. Available at: <https://www.cgdev.org/blog/allocate-sdrs-directly-multilateral-development-banks>.

Center for Global Development (CGD). 2024b. *One Small Step for the AfDB, One Giant Leap for All MDBs. Blog post by Nancy Lee and Samuel Matthews, 11 March 2024*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development. Available at: <https://www.cgdev.org/blog/one-small-step-afdb-one-giant-leap-all-mdbs>.

Center for Global Development (CGD). 2024c. *The MDB Ships Are Turning but Not Yet on Course: Results of CGD's Updated MDB Reform Tracker*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development. Available at: <https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/updated-mdb-reform-tracker.pdf>.

Center for Global Development (CGD). 2026. *CAF 2.0: The Next Challenges for MDB Capital Adequacy*. CGD Note by Nancy Lee, 26 January 2026. Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development. Available at: <https://www.cgdev.org/publication/caf-20-next-challenges-mdb-capital-adequacy>.

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). 2025. *From Words to Deeds: Incorporating Climate Risks into Sovereign Credit Ratings*. VoxEU Column, 25 August 2025. Available at: <https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/words-deeds-incorporating-climate-risks-sovereign-credit-ratings>.

CFMCA. 2023. *Strengthening the Role of Ministries of Finance in Driving Climate Action A Framework and Guide for Ministers and Ministries of Finance*. Available at: https://www.financeministersforclimate.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/Full%20Guide%20Strengthening%20the%20role%20of%20Ministries%20of%20Finance_2.pdf.

CFMCA. 2026. *The Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action: Strategic Work Program 2026-2028*. Available at: <https://www.financeministersforclimate.org/sites/default/files/2026-04/CFMCA%20Strategic%20Work%20Program%202026-2028.pdf>.

CFU. 2026. *Climate Funds Update*. Available at <https://climatefundsupdate.org/>.

Choi, S., Weingaertner, L., Gaile, B., Monar, D., Broermann, S., Wickramasinghe, K., Nicholson, K., Tchané, Y. and Steele, P. (2023). *Tracking the money for climate adaptation and disaster risk reduction*. IIED, London. Available at: <https://www.iied.org/21261iied>.

Climate Analytics. 2025. *Rescuing 1.5°C*. Available at: <https://climateanalytics.org/publications/rescuing-1-5c>.

Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI). n.d. *Climate Bonds Taxonomy Database*. Available at: <https://www.climatebonds.net/expertise/taxonomy/climate-bonds-taxonomy>

Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI). 2021. *Climate Bonds Taxonomy – Mitigation*. Available at: <https://www.climatebonds.net/expertise/taxonomy/climate-bonds-mitigation-taxonomy>.

Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI). 2024. *Climate Bonds Resilience Taxonomy Methodology*. Available at: https://www.climatebonds.net/files/documents/Climate-Bonds_Resilience-Methodology_2024.pdf.

Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI). 2025a. *Climate Bonds Resilience Taxonomy – Methodology*. Available at: https://www.climatebonds.net/files/documents/supporting-documents/Climate-Bonds_Resilience-Methodology_2024.pdf.

Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI). 2025b. *Climate Bonds Standard: Globally recognised, Paris-aligned Certification of debt instruments, entities and assets using robust, science-based methodologies*. Version 4.3. Available at: https://www.climatebonds.net/files/documents/CBI_Standard_V4.3_FINAL_2025-08-20-102147_gbqn.pdf.

Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI). 2025c. *Global State of the Market 2024*. London: Climate Bonds Initiative. Available at: <https://www.climatebonds.net/data-insights/publications/global-state-market-2024>.

Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI). 2025d. *Taxonomy Roadmap Initiative Progress Report 2025*. London: Climate Bonds Initiative. Available at: <https://www.climatebonds.net/data-insights/publications/taxonomy-roadmap-initiative-progress-report-2025>.

Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI). 2025e. *Transition in Taxonomies: Understanding the Mechanisms that Facilitate Transition in Taxonomies*. Available at: https://www.climatebonds.net/files/documents/publications/Transitions-in-Taxonomies_EN.pdf.

Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI). 2026. *Sustainable Debt : Global State of the Market 2025*. Available at: <https://www.climatebonds.net/data-insights/publications/sustainable-debt-global-state-market-2025>

Climate Finance Leadership Initiative (CFLI). 2021. *Unlocking Private Climate Finance in Emerging Markets: Private Sector Considerations for Policymakers*. Available at: <https://www.globalinfrastructure.org/knowledge/unlocking-private-climate-finance-emerging-markets-private-sector-considerations>.

Climate Investment Funds (CIF). 2023a. *CIF Financial Terms and Conditions Policy FY24*. Washington, D.C.: Climate Investment Funds. Available at: https://www.cif.org/sites/cif_enc/files/meeting-documents/cif_financial_terms_and_conditions_policy_fy24.pdf.

Climate Investment Funds (CIF). *Annual Report 2023: Bolder Ambitions, More Urgency, Unflinching Determination*. Washington, D.C.: Climate Investment Funds. Available at: <https://www.cif.org/knowledge-documents/annual-report-2023-bolder-ambitions-more-urgency-unflinching-determination>.

Climate Investment Funds (CIF). 2023b. *CIF Financial Terms and Conditions Policy FY24*. Washington, D.C.: Climate Investment Funds. Available at: https://www.cif.org/sites/cif_enc/files/meeting-documents/cif_financial_terms_and_conditions_policy_fy24.pdf.

Climate Investment Funds (CIF). 2024. *Annual Report 2023*. Washington, D.C.: Climate Investment Funds. Available at: https://www.cif.org/sites/cif_enc/files/knowledge-documents/cif_annual_report_2023.pdf.

Climate Investment Funds (CIF). 2025a. *Annual Report 2024: Shifting Gears*. Washington, D.C.: Climate Investment Funds. Available at: <https://www.cif.org/knowledge-documents/annual-report-2024-shifting-gears>.

Climate Investment Funds (CIF). 2025b. *Architects of Innovation: Creating the CIF Capital Markets Mechanism*. Available at: <https://www.cif.org/news/architects-innovation-creating-cif-capital-markets-mechanism>.

Climate Investment Funds (CIF). 2025c. *CIF Capital Markets Mechanism Makes Historic Debut with Inaugural USD 500 Million Bond*. Washington, D.C.: Climate Investment Funds. Available at: <https://www.cif.org/news/ccmm-issuance>.

Climate Investment Funds (CIF). 2025d. *Strategic Directions: Executive Summary*. Available at: https://www.cif.org/sites/cif_enc/files/meeting-documents/cif-strategic-directions-executive-summary-april-2025.pdf.

Climate Policy Initiative (CPI). 2024a. *Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2024*. Available at: <https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/global-landscape-of-climate-finance-2024/>.

Climate Policy Initiative (CPI). 2024b. *Tracking and Mobilizing Private Sector Climate Adaptation Finance*. September 2024. Available at: <https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Tracking-and-Mobilizing-Private-Sector-Climate-Adaptation-Finance-2024.pdf>.

Climate Policy Initiative (CPI). 2025a. *Climate-Resilient Debt Clauses A primer for FiCS members*. Available at: <https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Climate-Resilient-Debt-Clauses-Primer.pdf>.

Climate Policy Initiative (CPI). 2025b. *Debt for Climate Swaps. A primer for FiCS members. February 2025*. Available at: <https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Debt-for-Climate-Swaps-Primer.pdf>.

Climate Policy Initiative (CPI). 2025c. *Developing an Operational Transition Finance Definition for Project-Level Financing*. Available at: <https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Transition-finance-definition-for-projects.pdf>.

Climate Policy Initiative (CPI). 2025d. *Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2025. Climate Policy Initiative*. Available at: <https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/global-landscape-of-climate-finance-2025/>.

Climate Policy Initiative (CPI). 2025e. *Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2025 - Tracking Methodology*. Available at: <https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Global-Landscape-of-Climate-Finance-2025-Methodology.pdf>.

Climate Policy Initiative (CPI). 2025f. *Primer for Climate-related Engagement with the IMF: Realizing the Potential of the Resilience and Sustainability Facility*. San Francisco: Climate Policy Initiative. Available at: <https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Primer-for-Climate-related-Engagement-with-the-IMF.pdf>.

Climate Policy Initiative (CPI). 2025g. *Using the Net Zero Finance Tracker to Assess Financial Institutions' Transition Plans*. Available at: <https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Using-the-NZFT-to-Assess-FI-Transition-Plans.pdf>.

Climate Policy Initiative (CPI). 2025h. *Landscape of Climate Finance for Agrifood Systems 2025*. Available at: <https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/landscape-of-climate-finance-for-agrifood-systems-2025/>.

Climate Policy Initiative (CPI). 2025i. *Strengthening Collaboration to Scale Climate and Development Finance*. Available at: <https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Strengthening-Collaboration-to-Scale-Climate-and-Development-Finance.pdf>.

Climate Policy Initiative (CPI). 2026a. *Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2026*. Available at: <https://glcf.climatepolicyinitiative.org/>.

Climate Policy Initiative (CPI). 2026b. *Global Landscape of Climate Finance Data* Dashboard. Available at: <https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/resources/data-visualizations/global-landscape-of-climate-finance-data-dashboard> - Data extracted 10th July 2026.

Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) and Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI). 2025. *Methane Abatement in Sustainable Taxonomies*. Available at: <https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Methane-Abatement-in-Sustainable-Taxonomies.pdf>

Convergence. 2024. *Convergence. The State of Blended Finance 2024*. Toronto: Convergence. Available at: <https://www.convergence.finance/resource/state-of-blended-finance-2024/view>.

COP30. 2025a. *Baku to Belem Roadmap to 1.3T*. Available at: <https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/workstreams/baku-to-belem-roadmap-to-13t>.

COP30. 2025b. *Report of the COP30 Circle of Finance Ministers on the Baku to Belem Roadmap to 1.3T*. Available at: <https://cop30.br/en/news-about-cop30/report-of-the-cop30-circle-of-finance-ministers-launched-during-imf-and-world-bank-meetings>.

De Kleine Feige, A. 2021. *State-Owned Enterprises and Climate Action*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Available at: <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/886671636136930215/pdf/State-Owned-Enterprises-and-Climate-Action.pdf>.

E3G. 2026. *E3G Public Bank Climate Tracker Matrix*. Available at: <https://www.e3g.org/matrix/>.

Earth Track. 2024. *Protecting Nature by Reforming Environmentally Harmful Subsidies: An Update*. Doug Koplow and Ronald Steenblik, September 2024. Available at: https://www.earthtrack.net/sites/default/files/documents/ehs_report_september-2024-update_final.pdf.

Ecosystem Marketplace. 2025. *State of the Voluntary Carbon Market 2025*. Available at: <https://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/publications/2025-state-of-the-voluntary-carbon-market-sovcm/>.

EIB et al. 2022. *2021 Joint Report on Multilateral Development Banks' Climate Finance report*. Available at: <https://www.eib.org/en/publications/2021-joint-report-on-multilateral-development-banks-climate-finance>.

EIB et al. 2024. *2023 Joint Report on Multilateral Development Banks' Climate Finance*. Available at: https://www.eib.org/attachments/lucalli/20240150_2023_joint_report_on_mdbs_climate_finance_en.pdf.

EIB et al. 2025. *2024 Joint Summary Report on Multilateral Development Banks Climate Finance*. Available at: <https://www.eib.org/2024-joint-report-on-mdbs-climate-finance>

EIB et al. 2026. *2025 Joint Summary Report on Multilateral Development Banks Climate Finance*. Available at: <https://www.eib.org/en/publications/20260117-2025-joint-summary-report-on-mdbs-climate-finance>

ESGtoday. 2026. *Net Zero Financial Service Providers Alliance Disbands*. January 28, 2026, Mark Segal. Available at: <https://www.esgtoday.com/net-zero-financial-service-providers-alliance-disbands/>.

EU. 2025. *EU Taxonomy Navigator: A simple and practical guide for users*. Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/sustainable-finance-taxonomy/>.

EU. 2026. *DIRECTIVE (EU) 2026/470 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL*. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202600470.

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 2023a. *Annual Review 2023*. London: EBRD. Available at: https://www.ebrd.com/content/dam/ebrd_dxp/assets/pdfs/communications-department/annual-review/annual-review-2023/ebrd-annual-review-2023-english.pdf.

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 2023b. *Climate Adaptation Action Plan 2023–2025*. London: EBRD. Available at: https://www.ebrd.com/content/dam/ebrd_dxp/assets/pdfs/green/climate-resilience/Climate-adaptation-action-plan-2023-25.pdf.

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 2023c. *Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures Report 2023*. London: EBRD. Available at: <https://www.ebrd.com/home/news-and-events/publications/tcfd-reports/tcfd-report-2023.html>.

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). . Available at: https://www.ebrd.com/content/dam/ebird_dxp/assets/pdfs/communications-department/annual-review/annual-review-2023/ebird-annual-review-2023-english.pdf.

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). *Sustainability Report 2023*. London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Available at: <https://www.ebrd.com/documents/environment/sustainability-report-2023-pdf.pdf>.

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 2024a. *Impact Report 2024*. London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Available at: https://www.ebrd.com/content/dam/ebird_dxp/assets/pdfs/communications-department/impact-report/ebird-impact-report-2024.pdf.

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 2024b. *Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures Report 2023*. London: EBRD. Available at: <https://www.ebrd.com/home/news-and-events/publications/tcfd-reports/tcfd-report-2023.html>.

European Central Bank (ECB). 2025. *Integrating climate risk into the 2025 EU-wide stress test: the effects of climate risks for firms*. Macroprudential Bulletin 32, November 2025.. EIB Global Impact Report 2023/2024. Luxembourg: European Investment Bank. Available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/financial-stability-publications/macroprudential-bulletin/html/ecb.mpbu202511_04.en.html.

European Environment Agency (EEA). 2026. *Support to developing countries - Reporting year 2024 – GovReg*. Available at: <https://reportnet.europa.eu/public/dataflow/1238>.

European Investment Bank (EIB). 2024a. *Climate Finance by Multilateral Development Banks Hits Record in 2023*. Available at: <https://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2024-344-climate-finance-by-multilateral-development-banks-hits-record-in-2023>.

European Investment Bank (EIB). 2024b. *EIB Global Impact Report 2023/2024*. Luxembourg: European Investment Bank. Available at: https://www.eib.org/files/publications/20240125_eib_global_impact_report_2023_2024_en.pdf.

European Investment Bank (EIB). 2025. *EIB Global Impact Report 2024/2025*. Luxembourg: European Investment Bank. Available at: <https://www.eib.org/files/publications/20250051-270625-eib-global-impact-report-2024-en.pdf>.

European Investment Bank (EIB). 2026. *EIB Group Climate Bank Roadmap Phase 2, 2026–2030*. Luxembourg: European Investment Bank. Available at: <https://www.eib.org/en/publications/20250240-eib-group-climate-bank-roadmap-phase-2-2026-2030>.

Expert Review on Debt, Nature and Climate. 2025. *Healthy Debt on a Healthy Planet: Towards a Virtuous Circle of Sovereign Debt, Nature and Climate Resilience. Final Report*. Available at: <https://debtnatureclimate.org/reports/healthy-debt-on-a-healthy-planet-towards-a-virtuous-circle-of-sovereign-debt-nature-and-climate-resilience/>.

Falduto, C. and R. Jachnik. 2025. *Unpacking the USD 300 billion goal and the USD 1.3 trillion scale up call in the NCQG*. OECD/IEA Climate Change Expert Group Papers, No. 2025/03, OECD Publishing, Paris. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1787/bb53df0c-en>

Falduto, C., J. Noels and R. Jachnik. 2024. *The New Collective Quantified Goal on climate finance: Options for reflecting the role of different sources, actors, and qualitative considerations*. OECD/IEA Climate Change Expert Group Papers, No. 2024/02, OECD Publishing, Paris. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1787/7b28309b-en>.

FERN. 2025. *Proposals to Simplify EUDR Threaten Forest Protection and EU's Credibility*. 16 June 2025. Available at: https://www.fern.org/fileadmin/uploads/fern/Documents/2025/Together4Forests_Proposals_to_simplify_EUDR_threaten_forest_protection_and_EU%E2%80%99s_credibility.pdf.

Feyertag, J., Watson, C. and Ryfisch, D. 2023. *Developing a collective framework for operationalising Article 2.1(c): lessons from six case studies*. San Francisco and London: ClimateWorks Foundation and ODI. Available at: https://media.odi.org/documents/Developing_a_collective_framework_for_operationalising_Article_2.1c.pdf.

Fossil Fuel Subsidy Tracker. 2025. Available at: <https://fossilfuelsubsidytracker.org/>.

Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD). 2025. *Report of the Board to the Conference of Parties at its thirtieth session and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its seventh session (Advance Version)*. Available at: <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Report%20of%20the%20FRLD%20Board%20to%20COP%2030-CMA%207.pdf>.

Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD). 2026. *Report of the Board to the Conference of the Parties at its thirty-first session and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its eighth session (Advance Version)*. Available at: <https://unfccc.int/documents/660235>

G20 Independent Expert Group (G20 IEG). 2024. *The G20 Independent Expert Group Report Card on Strengthening Multilateral Development Banks: An Incomplete Grade*. Available at: <https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/2024-10/IEG-report-triple-agenda-report-card-oct2024.pdf>.

G20 Sustainable Finance Working Group. 2021. *G20 Sustainable Finance Roadmap*

Gebel, AC., and Ryfisch D. 2023. *The Multilateral Development Banks in the run-up to Paris alignment*. Germanwatch. Available at <https://www.germanwatch.org/en/87992>.

Global Environment Facility Independent Evaluation Office (GEF IEO), 2025. *Evaluation of Cofinancing in the GEF*, Evaluation Report No. 168, Available at: <https://www.gefio.org/content/dam/partners/ieo/docs/mgr/eval/cofinancing.pdf>

Global Environment Facility Independent Evaluation Office (GEF IEO), 2026. *Evaluation of the GEF Country Engagement Strategy*. Global Environment Facility Independent Evaluation Office. Available at: <https://www.gefio.org/content/dam/partners/ieo/docs/mgr/eval/CES-background-study.pdf>.

GFLAC. 2024. *Sustainable Finance Index 2024* (data as of 2023). Available at: https://www.sustainablefinance4future.org/_files/ugd/32948d_1f5202bed92949d58f39ce038c404995.pdf.

Gilmour, A., J. Tanaka and S. Colenbrander. 2024. *Designing and Governing Country Platforms: What Role for the MDBs?* ODI Report. London: ODI. Available at: https://media.odi.org/documents/Designing_and_governing_country_platforms.pdf.

Global CCS Institute. 2025. *Global Status of CCS 2025: Staying the Course*. Available at: <https://www.globalccsinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Global-Status-of-CCS-2025-report-9-October.pdf>

Global Center on Adaptation (GCA). 2024. *State and Trends in Climate Adaptation Finance 2024*. Available at: <https://gca.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/State-and-Trends-in-Climate-Adaptation-Finance-2024.pdf>.

GEF Independent Evaluation Office (GEF IEO), 2026. *Evaluation of the GEF Country Engagement Strategy*. Global Environment Facility Independent Evaluation Office. Available at: <https://www.gefio.org/content/dam/partners/ieo/docs/mgr/eval/CES-background-study.pdf>.

Gilmour, A., J. Tanaka and S. Colenbrander. *Designing and Governing Country Platforms: What Role for the MDBs?* ODI Report. London: ODI Available at: https://media.odi.org/documents/Designing_and_governing_country_platforms.pdf.

Global Environment Facility (GEF). 2022a. *GEF-8 Programming Scenarios and Global Environmental Benefits Targets*. Washington, D.C.: GEF. Available at: https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/documents/2022-01/GEF_R.08_15_GEF-8%20Programming%20Scenarios%20and%20Global%20Environmental%20BenefitsTargets_Jan.05_0.pdf.

Global Environment Facility (GEF). 2022b. *Guidelines on the implementation of the GEF-8 results measurement framework*. https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/documents/2022-09/Results_Framework_Guidelines_2022_06_30.pdf.

Global Environment Facility (GEF). 2023a. *Annex 3: Global Environmental Benefits Targets*. Washington, D.C.: Global Environment Facility. Available at: https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/2023-01/GEF-8_PD_Annex3_GEBs.pdf.

Global Environment Facility (GEF). 2023b. *The GEF Monitoring Report 2023*. Washington, D.C.: Global Environment Facility. Available at: https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/documents/2024-01/EN_GEF.C.66.03_The_GEF_Monitoring_Report_2023_0.pdf.

Global Environment Facility (GEF). 2024a. *2024. GEF Deploys Additional High-Impact Climate Adaptation Funding*. Available at: <https://www.thegef.org/newsroom/news/gef-deploys-additional-high-impact-climate-adaptation-funding>.

Global Environment Facility (GEF). 2024b. *GEF-8 Scorecard: February 2024*. Washington, D.C.: Global Environment Facility. Available at: https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/documents/2024-02/GEFScorecard_FEB2024.pdf.

Global Environment Facility (GEF). 2024c. *GEF-8 to Date: Highlights*. Washington, D.C.: Global Environment Facility. Available at: https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/documents/2024-12/GEF8-1pager_2024_12.pdf.

Global Environment Facility (GEF). 2024d. *GEF-9 Corporate Scorecard 2024*. Available at: https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/documents/2024-03/GEFScorecard_FEB2024.pdf.

Global Environment Facility (GEF). 2024e. *GEF Deploys Additional High-Impact Climate Adaptation Funding*. Available at: <https://www.thegef.org/newsroom/news/gef-deploys-additional-high-impact-climate-adaptation-funding>.

Global Environment Facility (GEF). *Progress Report on the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund*. Washington, D.C.: Global Environment Facility. Available at: https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/documents/2024-12/EN_GEF.LDCF_SCCF_37_03_Rev.01_Progress%20Report%20on%20the%20LDCF%20and%20SCCF.pdf.

Global Environment Facility (GEF). 2024f. *Report of the Global Environment Facility to the twenty-ninth session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*. Available at: <https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/documents/2024-08/GEF%20Report%20to%20UNFCCC%20COP29.pdf>.

Global Environment Facility (GEF). 2025. *Report of the Global Environment Facility to the Thirtieth Session of the Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (Advance Version, 4 August 2025). Available at: <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/GEF%20Report%20to%20COP30.pdf>.

Global Environment Facility (GEF). *Annex 3: Global Environmental Benefits Targets*. Washington, D.C.: Global Environment Facility. Available at: https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/2023-01/GEF-8_PD_Annex3_GEBs.pdf.

Global Environment Facility (GEF). 2026. *Report of the Global Environment Facility to the Thirty-First Session of the Conference of The Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*. Available at: <https://unfccc.int/documents/660101>

Global Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ). 2026. *Investing in Resilience: Lessons from Private Finance for Unlocking Investment in Adaptation*. Available at: <https://assets.bbhub.io/company/sites/63/2026/06/GFANZ-Adaptation-Finance-Report-June-2026.pdf>.

Global Solidarity Levies Task Force. 2025. *The Untapped Potential of Solidarity Levies: Recommendations for the Future of Climate and Development Finance*. Available at: https://solidaritylevies.org/app/uploads/2025/11/GSTFL_TheUntappedPotentialOfSolidarityLevies_DigitalSinglePages-V2.pdf.

Global Tipping Points. 2025. *The Global Tipping Points Report 2025*. Available at: <https://global-tipping-points.org/>.

Government of Uganda. 2025. *State of Climate Finance Report for Uganda (2015–2025)*. Kampala: Government of Uganda. Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Uganda_submission.pdf.

Green Central Banking. 2025. *Monetary and fiscal policy coordination can confront the climate crisis*. May 8, 2025. Opinion by Sebastian Mang and Dominic Caddick. Available at: <https://greencentralbanking.com/2025/05/08/monetary-fiscal-policy-coordination/>.

Green Climate Fund (GCF). 2017. *Seventh Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*. Songdo, Republic of Korea: Green Climate Fund. Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Seventh%20Report%20of%20the%20GCF%20to%20UNFCCC%20COP_UNFCCC%20submission.pdf.

Green Climate Fund (GCF). 2021. *Integrated Results Management Framework and Results Tracking Tool*. Songdo, Republic of Korea: Green Climate Fund. Available at: <https://www.greenclimate.fund/decision/b29-01>.

Green Climate Fund (GCF). 2023a. *Annual Progress Report 2023*. Songdo, Republic of Korea: Green Climate Fund. Available at: <https://www.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/document/gcf-annual-report-2023-040919.pdf>.

Green Climate Fund (GCF). 2023b. *Programming Guidelines for the Simplified Approval Process*. Songdo, Republic of Korea: Green Climate Fund. Available at: <https://www.greenclimate.fund/document/programming-guidelines-simplified-approval-process-sap>.

Green Climate Fund (GCF). 2023c. *Strategic Plan for the Green Climate Fund 2024–2027*. Songdo, Republic of Korea: Green Climate Fund. Available at: <https://www.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/document/strategic-plan-gcf-2024-2027.pdf>.

Green Climate Fund (GCF). 2024a. *Annual Progress Report 2024*. Songdo, Republic of Korea: Green Climate Fund. Available at: <https://www.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/document/annual-progress-report-2024.pdf>.

Green Climate Fund (GCF). 2024d. *B.40/15: Revised Accreditation Framework*. Songdo, Republic of Korea: Green Climate Fund. Available at: <https://www.greenclimate.fund/decision/b40-15>.

Green Climate Fund (GCF). 2024c. *Readiness Strategy 2024–2027*. Songdo, Republic of Korea: Green Climate Fund. Available at: <https://www.greenclimate.fund/document/readiness-strategy-2024-2027>.

Green Climate Fund (GCF). 2024. *State and Trends in Climate Adaptation Finance 2024*. Available at: <https://gca.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/State-and-Trends-in-Climate-Adaptation-Finance-2024.pdf>.

Green Climate Fund (GCF). 2024e. *The multilateral climate funds action plan on complementarity and coherence*. Available at: <https://www.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/decision/b39/decision-b39-15-b39-a05.pdf>.

Green Climate Fund (GCF). 2025a. *Accreditation Framework of the Green Climate Fund*. Songdo, Republic of Korea: Green Climate Fund. Available at: <https://www.greenclimate.fund/document/accreditation-framework-green-climate-fund>.

Green Climate Fund (GCF). 2025b. *GCF at a Glance: Performance Metrics*. Songdo, Republic of Korea: Green Climate Fund. Available at: <https://gcfrod.blob.core.windows.net/public/odl/pdf/performance-metrics-1.pdf>.

Green Climate Fund (GCF). *Fourteen New Country Platforms Announced in Collaboration with GCF to Drive Country-Led Climate Solutions*. Available at: <https://www.greenclimate.fund/news/fourteen-new-country-platforms-announced-collaboration-gcf-drive-country-led-climate-solutions>.

Green Climate Fund (GCF). 2025c. *Fourteenth Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*. Available at: <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/14th%20Report%20of%20the%20GCF%20to%20COP%2030.pdf>.

Green Climate Fund (GCF). 2025d. *GCF at a Glance: Performance Metrics*. Songdo, Republic of Korea: Green Climate Fund. Available at: <https://gcfrod.blob.core.windows.net/public/odl/pdf/performance-metrics-1.pdf>.

Green Climate Fund (GCF). 2025e. *Multilateral Climate Funds Joint Results Report November 2025*. Available at: https://www.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/document/fw-mcfs-joint-results-report-2025_0.pdf.

Green Climate Fund (GCF). 2025f. *Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties*. Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cp2025_07a01a_adv.pdf.

Green Climate Fund (GCF). 2025g. *Status of the GCF resources, pipeline and portfolio*. Available at: <https://www.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/document/10-status-gcf-resources-pipelines-and-portfolio-performance-gcf-b41-inf13.pdf>.

Green Climate Fund (GCF). 2025h. *Updated monitoring and accountability framework for accredited entities*. Available at: <https://www.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/document/updated-monitoring-and-accountability-framework-accredited-entities-b42-2025.pdf>

Green Climate Fund (GCF). 2026. *Fifteenth Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (Advanced Version). Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/15th_Report_of_the_GCF_to_COP.pdf

Green Climate Fund (GCF). 2026. *Green Climate Fund Open Data Library*. Online resource available at: <https://data.greenclimate.fund/public>.

Green Climate Fund (GCF). n.d. *Efficient GCF*. Songdo, Republic of Korea: Green Climate Fund. Available at: <https://www.greenclimate.fund/about/efficient-gcf>.

Green Climate Fund (GCF). n.d. *Accreditation*. Songdo, Republic of Korea: Green Climate Fund. Available at: <https://www.greenclimate.fund/accreditation/process>.

Green Climate Fund (GCF). n.d. *Efficient GCF*. Songdo, Republic of Korea: Green Climate Fund. Available at: <https://www.greenclimate.fund/about/efficient-gcf>.

ICAT. 2024. *Climate Finance Transparency Guide*. Available at: https://climateactiontransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/ICAT_Report_Nov-15.pdf.

ICMA. 2021. *Overview and Recommendations for Sustainable Finance Taxonomies*. Available at: <https://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Sustainable-finance/ICMA-Overview-and-Recommendations-for-Sustainable-Finance-Taxonomies-May-2021-180521.pdf>.

ICR Facility. 2021. *Fiscal and Financial Policy for Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience Building in ACP Countries*. Climate Smart Investment Series. Available at: https://www.icr-facility.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/fiscal_and_financial_policy-en.pdf.

IDB Invest. 2024. *Climate Finance by Multilateral Development Banks Hits Historic Record in 2023*. Washington, D.C.: IDB Invest. Available at: <https://idbinvest.org/en/news-media/climate-finance-multilateral-development-banks-hits-historic-record-2023>.

IFRS. 2025a. *Amendments to Greenhouse Gas Emissions Disclosures* (Amendments to IFRS S2). Available at: <https://www.ifrs.org/projects/completed-projects/2025/amendments-to-disclosure-of-greenhouse-gas-emissions-s2/>.

IFRS. 2025b. *Disclosing information about an entity's climate-related transition, including information about transition plans, in accordance with IFRS S2. Guidance document*. Available at: <https://www.ifrs.org/content/dam/ifrs/supporting-implementation/ifrs-s2/transition-plan-disclosure-s2.pdf>.

Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU). 2023. *Evaluation Capacity Assessment of the Green Climate Fund's Direct Access Entities*. Songdo, Republic of Korea: Independent Evaluation Unit, Green Climate Fund. Available at: <https://ieu.greenclimate.fund/blog/evaluation-capacity-assessment-dae>.

Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU). 2025a. *Independent Evaluation of the GCF's Approach to Country Ownership (COA2025)*. Green Climate Fund Independent Evaluation Unit. Available at: https://ieu.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/document/250915-coa-final-report-top-web_2.pdf.

Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU). 2025b. *Independent Evaluation of the Green Climate Fund's Simplified Approval Process: Executive Summary*. Songdo, Republic of Korea: Independent Evaluation Unit, Green Climate Fund. Available at: <https://ieu.greenclimate.fund/sap2025/execsum>.

Independent High-Level Expert Group (IHLEG). 2022. *Finance for Climate Action: Scaling Up Investment for Climate and Development*. Available at: <https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/IHLEG-Finance-for-Climate-Action-1.pdf>

Independent High-Level Expert Group (IHLEG). 2023a. *Strengthening Multilateral Development Banks: The Triple Agenda*. Available at: <https://www.cgdev.org/publication/strengthening-multilateral-development-banks-triple-agenda>.

Independent High-Level Expert Group (IHLEG). *A Climate Finance Framework: Decisive Action to Deliver on the Paris Agreement*. Available at: <https://ndcpartnership.org/knowledge-portal/climate-toolbox/climate-finance-framework-decisive-action-deliver-paris-agreement>.

Independent High-Level Expert Group (IHLEG). 2023b. *Strengthening Multilateral Development Banks: The Triple Agenda*. Available at: <https://www.cgdev.org/publication/strengthening-multilateral-development-banks-triple-agenda>.

Independent High-Level Expert Group (IHLEG). 2025. *Delivering an integrated climate finance agenda in support of the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T*. Available at: <https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/publication/delivering-an-integrated-climate-finance-agenda-in-support-of-the-baku-to-belem-roadmap-to-1-3t/>.

Institut Louis Bachelier (ILB). 2025. *Green/Brown Ratio: A Zoom on the Energy Supply Ratio (ESR)*. April 2025. Paris: Institut Louis Bachelier. Available at: <https://www.institutlouisbachelier.org/en/154348-2/> and <https://cdn.prod.website->

Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA). 2025. *Analysing green budget frameworks: Lessons from global practices*. November 2025. <https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/2025-11/Analysing%20green%20budget%20frameworks-%20Lessons%20from%20global%20practices.pdf>.

Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IISD). 2025. *The USD 1.2 Trillion Problem: Why Every Energy Crisis Strengthens the Case for Clean Public Finance*. Available at: <https://www.iisd.org/articles/deep-dive/usd-12-trillion-problem-energy-crisis-strengthens-case-clean-public-finance>.

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 2023. *2023 IDB Climate Finance Database*. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank. Available at: <https://data.iadb.org/dataset/2023-idb-climate-finance-database>.

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 2024. *The Bahamas Launches Debt-for-Ocean Conservation Swap with IDB Support*. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank. Available at: <https://www.iadb.org/en/news/bahamas-launches-debt-ocean-conservation-swap-idb-support>.

International Development Association (IDA). 2023. *Sustainable Development Finance Policy*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. Available at: <https://ida.worldbank.org/en/financing/debt/sustainable-development-finance-policy>.

International Development Association (IDA). 2025. *Ending Poverty on a Livable Planet: Delivering Impact with Urgency and Ambition*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. Available at: <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099042525174542121/pdf/BOSIB-7a002896-02fc-42a9-b4f3-78737cf8b931.pdf>.

International Development Finance Club (IDFC). 2024. *IDFC Green Finance Mapping 2024*. Available at: <https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/idfc-green-finance-mapping-2024/>

International Development Finance Club (IDFC). 2025. *IDFC Green Finance Mapping Report 2025*. Available at: <https://www.idfc.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/idfc-gfm-2025-final.pdf>

International Energy Agency (IEA). 2024a. *World Energy Investment 2024*. Paris: International Energy Agency. Available at: <https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-investment-2024>.

International Energy Agency (IEA). . *Reducing the Cost of Capital*. Paris: International Energy Agency. Available at: <https://www.iea.org/reports/reducing-the-cost-of-capital>.

International Energy Agency (IEA). 2024c. *World Energy Outlook 2024*. Paris: IEA. Available at: <https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2024>.

International Energy Agency (IEA). 2025a. *Cost of capital expectations for 2025 diverge amid rising uncertainty*. Commentary – 01 August 2025. Available at: <https://www.iea.org/commentaries/cost-of-capital-expectations-for-2025-diverge-amid-rising-uncertainty>.

International Energy Agency (IEA). 2025b. *Global Methane Tracker 2025*. Paris: International Energy Agency. Available at: <https://www.iea.org/reports/global-methane-tracker-2025>.

International Energy Agency (IEA). 2025c. *World Energy Investment 2025*. Paris: IEA, 2025. Available at: <https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-investment-2025>.

International Energy Agency (IEA). 2026a. *World Energy Investment 2026*. IEA, Paris Available at: <https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-investment-2026>

International Energy Agency (IEA). 2026b. *World Energy Investment 2026 Datafile*. Available at: <https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-product/world-energy-investment-2026-datafile>.

International Energy Agency (IEA). 2026c. *Energy Technology Perspectives 2026*. Available at: <https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-technology-perspectives-2026>

International Energy Agency (IEA). 2026d. *Energy Technology RD&D Budgets Data Explorer*. Available at: <https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/energy-technology-rdd-budgets-data-explorer> Data accessed 11 August 2026.

International Finance Corporation (IFC). 2024. *Gender x Climate: Pursuing Gender-Inclusive Climate Investments*. Washington, D.C.: International Finance Corporation. Available at: <https://www.ifc.org/content/dam/ifc/doclink/2024/pursuing-gender-inclusive-climate-investments.pdf>.

International Finance Corporation (IFC). International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2024. *2024. Sustainable Banking and Finance Network Tool Kit: Sustainable Finance Taxonomies*. Developed by the IFC-facilitated Sustainable Banking and Finance Network (SBFN) in cooperation with the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH. Available at: https://www.sbfnetwork.org/sites/default/files/2025/Mar/SBFN-Toolkit_Sustainable-Finance-Taxonomies.pdf.

International Finance Corporation (IFC). 2025. *Emerging Markets Securitization Program (EMSP)*. <https://www.ifc.org/en/what-we-do/sector-expertise/syndicated-loans-and-mobilization/ifc-emerging-market-securitization-program>.

International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). 2025. *The State of BCAs. IISD report*. Available at: <https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2025-02/state-of-bcas-2025.pdf>.

International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2024a. *Climate Policies as a Catalyst for Green FDI. IMF Working Paper*. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. Available at: <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2024/03/01/Climate-Policies-as-a-Catalyst-for-Green-FDI-545450>.

International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2024b. *Statement by the IMF Staff Representative on Barbados*. 18 December 2024. Available at: <https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2024/368/article-A003-en.xml>.

International Monetary Fund (IMF). . *Climate Policies as a Catalyst for Green FDI. IMF Working Paper*. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. Available at: <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2024/03/01/Climate-Policies-as-a-Catalyst-for-Green-FDI-545450>.

International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 2022. "Investment and Finance." In *Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, by S. Kreibichl, T. Yong Jung, S. Battiston, P.E. Carvajal, C. Clapp, D. Dasgupta, N. Dube, R. Jachnik, K. Morita, N. Samargandi and M. Williams. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157926.017>.

International Platform on Sustainable Finance (IPSF). 2024. *Common Ground Taxonomy Multi-Jurisdiction Activity Tables*. November 2024. Available at: https://finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/e83394d0-daf1-487e-b1bf-922731767a10_en?filename=241113-common-ground-taxonomy-multi-jurisdiction-activity-tables_en.pdf.

International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). 2024. *Renewable Energy and Jobs: Annual Review 2024*. Abu Dhabi: IRENA. Available at: https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2024/Oct/IRENA_Renewable_energy_and_jobs_2024.pdf.

International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). 2026. *Renewable power generation costs in 2025*. Available at: <https://www.irena.org/Publications/2026/Jul/Renewable-Power-Generation-Costs-in-2025>

Islamic Development Bank (IsDB). 2024a. *Annual Report 2024*. Jeddah: Islamic Development Bank. Available at: <https://2024.ar.isdb.org/en/>.

Islamic Development Bank (IsDB). *Annual Development Effectiveness Report (ADER) 2024*. Jeddah: Islamic Development Bank. Available at: <https://www.isdb.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/2025-06/IsDB%20ADER%202024%20%28ENGLISH%29.pdf>.

Jachnik, R. 2025. *Information, Data Sources and Approaches to Monitor the NCQG*. Quantitative finance flow elements: OECD perspectives. 11 June 2025. UNFCCC SCF Technical Expert Session. Available at <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Raphael%20Jachnik.pdf>.

J.P. Morgan. 2025. *Climate Intuition: Unlocking Resilience Through Strategic Climate Adaptation*. Available at: <https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/sustainability/climate/unlocking-resilience-through-climate-adaptation>.

Karg, A., Gupta, J., Chen, Y. 2025. *Just Energy Transition Partnerships: An inclusive climate finance approach?* Energy Research & Social Science. Volume 125. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2025.104103>.

Kempa, K. 2025. "Physical Climate Risk and the Pricing of Bank Loans." *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*, vol. 137. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2025.103280>.

Lee, N., C. Landers and S. Matthews. 2023. *Concessional Climate Finance: Is the MDB Architecture Working?* Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development. Available at: <https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/concessional-climate-finance-mdb-architecture-working.pdf>.

Martin, M. 2024. *How to Ensure Debt Sustainability Accelerates Sustainable Development*. Series: Debt Sustainability Assessments and Their Role in the Global Financial Architecture. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Available at: <https://collections.fes.de/publikationen/ident/fes/21247>.

Ministère des Finances et du Budget. 2026. *Project de Budget Vert Togo 2026*. <https://finances.gouv.tg/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/BUDGET-VERT-TOGO-EXERCICE-2026-PROJET-27022026.pdf>.

Ministry of Finance Brazil. 2025. *Brazilian Sustainable Taxonomy. Introduction*. Available at: https://www.gov.br/fazenda/pt-br/orgaos/spe/sustainable-taxonomy-of-brazil/documents/00_tsb_introduction_en.pdf.

MSCI Institute. 2026. *The Hidden Adaptation Economy: A New View of Corporate Resilience and Opportunity*. Available at: https://www.msci-institute.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/The-Hidden-Adaptation-Economy-A-New-View-of-Corporate-Resilience-and-Opportunity-260326_1.pdf.

Multilateral Climate Funds (MCFs). 2025. *Multilateral Climate Funds Joint Results Report*. Available at: https://www.cif.org/sites/cif_enc/files/knowledge-documents/cfs-joint-results-report-2025.pdf.

Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and Development Finance Institutions (DFIs). 2025. *Mobilisation of Private Finance by Multilateral Development Banks and Development Finance Institutions: 2023 Joint Report*. Available at: <https://www.ifc.org/content/dam/ifc/doc/2025/2023-joint-report-mobilization-of-private-finance-by-mdbs-dfis.pdf>.

Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and Development Finance Institutions (DFIs). 2026. *Mobilization of Private Finance by Multilateral Development Banks and Development Finance Institutions 2024. Joint Report*. May 2026. Available at: <https://www.ifc.org/en/insights-reports/2026/mobilization-of-private-finance-by-mdbs-dfis-2024-joint-report>.

Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). (n.d). *Climate Finance Dashboard*. Available at: <https://www.eib.org/en/about/partners/development-banks/climate-finance-dashboard>. Data accessed 23rd July 2026.

Munich Re. 2025. *Natural Disasters in 2024. Munich Re NatCatSERVICE Factsheet, January 2025*. Available at: <https://www.munichre.com/content/dam/munichre/mrwebsitespressreleases/MunichRe-NatCAT-Stats2024-Full-Year-Factsheet.pdf>.

MSCI Institute. 2026. *The Hidden Adaptation Economy: A New View of Corporate Resilience and Opportunity*. Available at: https://www.msci-institute.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/The-Hidden-Adaptation-Economy-A-New-View-of-Corporate-Resilience-and-Opportunity-260326_1.pdf.

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and E3G. 2026. *Climate Finance Commitments Tracker*. By Joe Thwaites and Lily Hartzell, 20 March 2026. Available at: <https://www.nrdc.org/resources/climate-finance-commitment-tracker>.

NDC Partnership. 2024. *Article 6 Readiness Toolkit*. Available at: <https://ndcpartnership.org/knowledge-portal/climate-toolbox/article-6-readiness-toolkit>.

Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS). 2022. *Enhancing market transparency in green and transition finance*. Available at: https://www.ngfs.net/sites/default/files/medias/documents/enhancing_market_transparency_in_green_and_transition_finance.pdf.

Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS). 2025. *NGFS Short-term Climate Scenarios for Central Banks and Supervisors*. Paris: NGFS. Available at: <https://www.ngfs.net/en/publications-and-statistics/publications/ngfs-short-term-climate-scenarios-central-banks-and-supervisors>.

Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS). 2026a. *Greening Monetary Policy Operations: Exploring Additional Options*. NGFS Technical Note. Paris: NGFS. Available at: <https://www.ngfs.net/en/publications-and-statistics/publications/greening-monetary-policy-operations-exploring-additional-options>.

Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS). 2026b. *NGFS 2026 Nature Package*. Available at: <https://www.ngfs.net/en/publications-and-statistics/publications/ngfs-2026-nature-package>.

New Development Bank (NDB). 2023. *Annual Report 2023*. Shanghai: New Development Bank. Available at: https://www.ndb.int/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/NDB_AnnualReport2023.pdf.

New Development Bank (NDB). 2024. *Annual Report 2024*. Shanghai: New Development Bank. Available at: https://www.ndb.int/annual-report/2024/pdf/NDB_AR_2024_complete.pdf.

OECD Research Collaborative Tracking Finance for Climate Action. 2023. *Workshop Summary. Metrics for Climate Transition and Net-Zero GHGs in Finance. Supporting climate policy goals and avoiding greenwashing*. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/events/2023/2/workshop-on-metrics-for-climate-transition-and-net-zero-ghgs-in-finance/metrics%20for%20climate%20transition%2022-02-23%20workshop-policy-summary.pdf/_jcr_content/renditions/original/metrics%20for%20climate%20transition%2022-02-23%20workshop-policy-summary.pdf.

OIF and OECD. 2026. *Access to Finance for Climate and Biodiversity: From Global Commitments to Country Action*. Québec, Canada: Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable (IFDD). Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1787/dd7f4014-en>.

Oil Change International. 2026. *Untapped Potential: National Development Banks Can Anchor Just Energy Transitions*. 9 July 2026. Available at: <https://oilchange.org/publications/untapped-potential-national-development-banks-can-anchor-just-energy-transition/>.

Orbitas. 2025. *The “2025 Retreat” of Financial Institution Climate Action Is No Reason to Panic*. Available at: <https://orbitas.finance/financial-institution-climate-action/>.

OECD DAC (n.d.). *Data Platform on Development Finance for the Sustainable Ocean Economy*. Available at: <https://oecd-main.shinyapps.io/ocean/> – Data accessed July 2026.

OECD DAC. 2021. *OECD DAC Declaration on a new approach to align development cooperation with the goals of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change*. DAC/CHAIR(2021)1/FINAL. Available at: <https://one.oecd.org/document/DAC/CHAIR%282021%291/FINAL/en/pdf>.

OECD DAC. 2024a. *Handbook on Private Sector Instruments*. DAC Working Party on Development Finance Statistics. Available at: [https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/STAT\(2024\)15/en/pdf](https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/STAT(2024)15/en/pdf).

OECD DAC. 2024c. *Converged Statistical Reporting Directives for the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and the Annual DAC Questionnaire*. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Available at: [https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC\(2024\)40/FINAL/en/pdf](https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC(2024)40/FINAL/en/pdf).

OECD DAC. 2024c. *Converged Statistical Reporting Directives for the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and the Annual DAC Questionnaire. Annex 20 – Rio Markers*. Available at: <https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC%282024%2940/ADD2/FINAL/en/pdf>.

OECD DAC. 2024d. *Indicative tables supporting the reporting of development finance statistics in support of climate change adaptation, mitigation or biodiversity to the OECD DAC, using the Rio Markers methodology*. Available at: https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwebfs.oecd.org%2Fclimate%2FRio_markers_indicative_tables_2024_approved.xlsx.

OECD DCD DAC. 2024e. *Results of the survey on coefficients applied to Climate Change Rio marker data when reporting to the UNFCCC*. DAC Working Party on Development Finance Statistics. Available at: [https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/STAT\(2024\)28/REV1/en/pdf](https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/STAT(2024)28/REV1/en/pdf).

OECD DAC. 2025. *Handbook on measuring and reporting on Mobilized Private Finance in OECD DAC statistics*. Available at: [https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/STAT\(2025\)25/REV1/en/pdf](https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/STAT(2025)25/REV1/en/pdf).

OECD DAC. 2026a. *Mobilisation of Private Finance for Development*. Paris: OECD. Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/en/data/dashboards/mobilisation-of-private-finance-for-development.html>. Data Accessed 24th July 2026.

OECD DAC. 2026b. *Climate-related Development Finance Dataset*. Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/development-finance-for-climate-and-the-environment.html> Data Accessed 18th July 2026.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2018. *OECD DAC Blended Finance Principles for Unlocking Commercial Finance for the Sustainable Development Goals*. Paris: OECD. Available at: <https://www.convergence.finance/resource/oecd-dac-blended-finance-principles-for-unlocking-commercial-finance-for-the-sustainable-development-goals/view>.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2019. *Aligning Development Co-operation and Climate Action: The Only Way Forward*. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1787/5099ad91-en>.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2021. *Green Budget Tagging: Introductory Guidance & Principles*. OECD Publishing, Paris. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1787/fe7bfcc4-en>.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2022a. *OECD Guidance on Transition Finance: Ensuring Credibility of Corporate Climate Transition Plans*. Green Finance and Investment, OECD Publishing, Paris. <https://doi.org/10.1787/7c68a1ee-en>.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2022b. *Subnational Government Climate Expenditure and Revenue Tracking in OECD and EU Countries. OECD Regional Development Papers*. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/07/subnational-government-climate-expenditure-and-revenue-tracking-in-oecd-and-eu-countries_114b09af/1e8016d4-en.pdf.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2023a. *Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries in 2013–2021*. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2023/11/climate-finance-provided-and-mobilised-by-developed-countries-in-2013-2021_517fec8e/e20d2bc7-en.pdf.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2023b. *Development Co-operation Report 2023: Debating the Aid System*. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1787/f6edc3c2-en>.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2023c. *Scaling Up Adaptation Finance in Developing Countries: Challenges and Opportunities for International Providers*. Green Finance and Investment series. Paris: OECD Publishing,. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1787/b0878862-en>.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2024a. *Beyond Green Tagging: How can Public Budgeting Support Climate Goals*. OECD Publishing. OECD Papers on Budgeting, Volume 2024/06. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/12/beyond-green-tagging_2985aba5/b154d49b-en.pdf.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2024b. *Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries in 2013–2022, Climate Finance and the USD 100 Billion Goal*. OECD Publishing, Paris. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1787/19150727-en>

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2024d. *Data Insights: Climate and development finance FAQ*. Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/en/data/insights/data-explainers/2024/12/climate-and-development-finance-faq.html>.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2024e. *Development Co-operation Report 2024: Tackling Poverty and Inequalities through the Green Transition*. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1787/357b63f7-en>.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2024f. *Green Budgeting in OECD Countries 2024*. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/04/green-budgeting-in-oecd-countries-2024_3c771827/9aea61f0-en.pdf.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2024g. *Integrating Climate Action into Development Finance*. OECD Development Perspectives, No. 45. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1787/41d16c83-en>.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2024g. *Measuring Progress in Adapting to a Changing Climate: Insights from OECD countries*. OECD Publishing, Paris. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1787/8cfe45af-en>.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2025a. *Effective Carbon Rates 2025: Recent Trends in Taxes on Energy Use and Carbon Pricing. OECD Series on Carbon Pricing and Energy Taxation*. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1787/a5a5d71f-en>.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2025b. *Ensuring a just transition to net-zero emissions*. OECD Net Zero+ Policy Papers No.15. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/05/ensuring-a-just-transition-to-net-zero-emissions_5b5994ea/a3da7080-en.pdf.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2025c. *FDI in Figures*. October 2025. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/fdi-in-figures-october-2025_57d0218c-en.html.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2025d. *Government at a Glance 2025*. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1787/0efd0bcd-en>.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2025e. *Imputed multilateral shares for climate*. Available at: https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwebfs.oecd.org%2Fclimate%2FImputed_multilateral_shares_climate.xlsx&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2025f. *State-Owned Enterprises and Sustainability: Leading by Example*. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1787/c99c7ef0-en>.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2026a. *Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries in 2013–2024. Climate Finance and the USD 100 Billion Goal series*. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1787/ab5eb9ad-en>.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2026b. *International Aid Fell Sharply in 2025, Says OECD*. Press release, 9 April 2026. Paris: OECD. Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/en/about/news/press-releases/2026/04/international-aid-fell-sharply-in-2025-says-oecd.html>.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2026d. *Mobilisation of Private Finance for Development*. Paris: OECD. Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/en/data/dashboards/mobilisation-of-private-finance-for-development.html>. Data Accessed 24th July 2026.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2026e. *OECD Data Explorer Subnational Government Climate Finance Database*. Data extracted 4th May 2026.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2026f. *OECD Review on Aligning Finance with Climate Goals 2026: Different Policy Playbooks, Untapped Investment Opportunities*. Green Finance and Investment. OECD Publishing, Paris. <https://doi.org/10.1787/79415c38-en>.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2026g. *DAC Working Party on Development Finance Statistics: Ways forward to pursue exploratory work on Catalysation*, 9-11 March 2026 meeting of the DAC Working Party on development finance statistics. Meeting Document: DCD/DAC/STAT(2026)7 Available at: [https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/STAT\(2026\)7/en/pdf](https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/STAT(2026)7/en/pdf)

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Conference on Investment Treaties. 2024. *Future of Investment Treaties Track 1 -- Investment Treaties and Climate Change Methods to align investment treaty benefits for energy investment with the Paris Agreement and net zero*. Note by the Secretariat. DAF/INV/TR1/WD(2024)1. Available at: [https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/INV/TR1/WD\(2024\)1/en/pdf](https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/INV/TR1/WD(2024)1/en/pdf).

Owusu-Mante, S., Chi, K. H. K., & Gopalakrishnan, T. (2025). *Sovereign green bonds in practice: effectiveness as a climate finance instrument in emerging economies*. Climate Policy, 1–15. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2025.2586572>.

Overseas Development Institute (ODI). 2023. *Taking stock of Just Energy Transition Partnerships*. Available at: <https://media.odi.org/documents/ODI-SM-JustEnergyTransition-PB-Nov23-Proof03.pdf>.

Overseas Development Institute (ODI). 2025. *The \$600 Billion Question: How Far Can Multilateral Development Banks Go?* Expert comment by Chris Humphrey, 21 October 2025. London: ODI. Available at: <https://odi.org/en/insights/the-600-billion-question-how-far-can-multilateral-development-banks-go/>.

Oxfam. 2025. *Climate Finance Shadow Report 2025: Analysing progress on climate finance under the Paris Agreement*. Oxfam & CARE. Available at: <https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/climate-finance-shadow-report-2025-analysing-progress-on-climate-finance-under-621735/>.

Oxfam. 2026. *Climate Finance Short Changed, 2026 Update: Estimating the real value of the \$100 billion commitment for 2023-24*. Climate-Specific Net Assistance (CSNA) Methodology Note. Available at: <https://oxfam.app.box.com/s/xd4gxsukektejj92ydtk1e1xedb0jte>.

PEFA. 2024. *Supplementary Framework for Assessing Climate-Responsive Public Financial Management*. Available at: <https://www.pefa.org/resources/supplementary-framework-assessing-climate-responsive-public-financial-management>.

PEFA.2026. *Online repository of assessments*, Available here: <https://www.pefa.org/index.php/assessments>. Data extracted 24 August 2026.

<https://www.pefa.org/resources/supplementary-framework-assessing-climate-responsive-public-financial-management> Philea & Wings. 2025. *International Philanthropy Commitment on Climate Change – Progress Report 1*. Available at: <https://philea.issuelab.org/resource/international-philanthropy-commitment-on-climate-change-progress-report-1.html>.

Orbitas. 2025. *The “2025 Retreat” of Financial Institution Climate Action Is No Reason to Panic*. Available at: <https://orbitas.finance/financial-institution-climate-action/>.

Pienknagura, S. 2024. *Climate Policies as a Catalyst for Green FDI*. IMF Working Paper. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. Available at: <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2024/03/01/Climate-Policies-as-a-Catalyst-for-Green-FDI-545450>.

Pizarro, R. 2023. *An integrated approach to the Classification of Public Environmental Expenditure*. ENV/EPOC/WPEI(2023)7.

Pizarro, R., Delgado, R., Eguino, H., & Pereira, A. L. (2021). *Climate Change Public Budget Tagging: Connections across Financial and Environmental Classification Systems*. <https://doi.org/10.18235/0003021>.

Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG). 2024. *Sustainability and Impact Report 2024*. London: Private Infrastructure Development Group. Available at: <https://pidg.org/wp-content/uploads/PIDG-2024-Sustainability-and-Impact-report-Final-Digital-2.pdf>.

Prizzon, A., Bains, M., Chakrabarti S. et al. 2022. *Governance of multilateral development banks. Options for reform*. London: ODI. September 2022. Available at: https://media.odi.org/documents/ODI_Report_Governance_of_multilateral_development_banks_options_for_reform.pdf.

Quipa. 2026. *Submission to the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF): Call for Evidence for the Seventh Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows*. Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Quipa_Submission_to_SCF_7th_BA_300626.pdf.

Reclaim Finance. 2026. *2025 banks' energy financing ratios: the good, the bad and how to move forward*. Available at: <https://reclaimfinance.org/site/en/2026/01/20/2025-banks-energy-financing-ratios-the-good-the-bad-and-how-to-move-forward/>.

REN21. 2026. *Renewables 2025 Global Status Report*. Forthcoming.

Rising J et al. 2026. *The macroeconomic case for investing in climate adaptation*. London: Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science. Available at: 10.21953/researchonline.lse.ac.uk.00137972.

Robins N, Curran B, Plyska O, et al. 2023. *Mobilising global debt markets for a just transition*. Policy insight. London: Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment. Available at: <https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Mobilising-global-debt-markets-for-a-just-transition-policy-insight.pdf>.

Standing Committee on Finance (SCF). 2024c. *Second Report on the Determination of the Needs of Developing Country Parties Related to Implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement*. Bonn: UNFCCC. Available at: <https://unfccc.int/documents/641873>.

Sachs, J. et al. 2025. *Lowering the Cost of Capital for Climate and SDG Finance in Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs)*. New York: Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment. Available at: <https://ccsi.columbia.edu/content/lowering-cost-of-capital-climate-sdgs-emdes>.

Scheer A, Honneth J, Hizliok S, et al. 2023. *ASCOR framework: methodology note*. London: Transition Pathway Initiative. Available at <https://transitionpathwayinitiative.org/publications/2023-ascor-framework-methodology-note>

Schroders. 2025. *Not all index cat bonds are the same: Why an "own" view of risk matters*. Insights 10/11/2025. Available at: <https://www.schroders.com/en-ch/ch/professional/insights/not-all-index-cat-bonds-are-the-same-why-an-own-view-of-risk-matters/>.

Standing Committee on Finance (SCF). 2023a. *Report of the Standing Committee on Finance. Addendum. Synthesis of views regarding ways to achieve Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement*. Available at: <https://unfccc.int/documents/632307>.

Standing Committee on Finance (SCF). 2023b. *Report on clustering types of climate finance definitions in use*. Technical Report. UNFCCC. Available at: <https://unfccc.int/documents/633431>.

Standing Committee on Finance (SCF). 2024a. *Report on common practices regarding climate finance definitions, reporting and accounting methods*. Technical Report. UNFCCC. Available at: <https://unfccc.int/documents/641150>.

Standing Committee on Finance (SCF). 2024b. *Sixth Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows*. Technical Report. Bonn. UNFCCC. Available at: <https://unfccc.int/documents/641834>.

Standing Committee on Finance (SCF). 2024c. *Second report on progress towards achieving the goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year to address the needs of developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation*. Bonn: UNFCCC. Available at: <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/bodies/constituted-bodies/standing-committee-on-finance-scf/progress-report>.

Standing Committee on Finance (SCF). 2024c. *Second Report on the Determination of the Needs of Developing Country Parties Related to Implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement*. Bonn: UNFCCC. Available at: <https://unfccc.int/documents/641873>.

SwissRe. 2025. *sigma 1/2025: Natural catastrophes: insured losses on trend to USD 145 billion in 2025*. Available at: <https://www.swissre.com/institute/research/sigma-research/sigma-2025-01-natural-catastrophes-trend.html>.

SYSTEMIQ. 2025. *Returns on Resilience: Investing in Adaptation to Drive Prosperity, Growth and Competitiveness*. London: SYSTEMIQ. Available at: <https://www.systemiq.earth/the-returns-on-resilience/>.

Taxonomy Roadmap Initiative. 2025a. *Principles for Taxonomy Interoperability A contribution to COP30 to support global interoperability of sustainable finance taxonomies*. Available at: <https://www.unepfi.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Principles-for-Taxonomy-Interoperability-English.pdf>.

Taxonomy Roadmap Initiative. 2025b. *Advancing Sustainable Finance Taxonomies and Interoperability: Taxonomy Roadmap Initiative Progress Report*. Available at: https://taxonomiesroadmap.org/assets/COP30_Taxonomy%20Roadmap%20Initiative_Progress%20Report_Nov%202025-v1LypICW.pdf

Tol, R.S.J. 2024. "A Meta-analysis of the Total Economic Impact of Climate Change." *Energy Policy*, vol. 185.

TOSSD. 2025a. *TOSSD Reporting Instructions*. Available at: https://www.tossd.org/content/dam/tossd/en/methodology-pdfs/reporting_instructions.pdf.

TOSSD. 2025b. *Total Official Support for Sustainable Development*. Available at <https://tossd.online/about>.

TOSSD. 2026. *Total Official Support for Sustainable Development – Data Visualisation Tool*. Available at <https://tossd.online>. Data extracted 27th August 2026.

U.S. Department of the Treasury, Federal Insurance Office. 2025. *Analyses of U.S. Homeowners Insurance Markets, 2018–2022: Climate-Related Risks and Other Factors*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Treasury. Available at: <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2791>.

UN DESA. 2024. *Financing for Sustainable Development Report 2024. Financing for Sustainable Development Report*. New York: UN DESA. Available at <https://desapublications.un.org/publications/financing-sustainable-development-report-2024>.

United Kingdom Government. 2024. *UK International Climate Finance Results 2024*. London: HM Government. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6707afea366f494ab2e7b65b/ICF_report_pdf_101024.pdf.

United Kingdom Government. 2025. *12-month Just Energy Transition Partnership leaders' update 2025*. 9 December 2025, World News Story. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/12-month-just-energy-transition-partnership-leaders-update-2025>.

United Kingdom Taskforce on Access to Finance. 2024. *Annual Report 2024*. Available at: <https://ndcpartnership.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/annual-report-taskforce-access-climate-finance-2024.pdf>.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2023a. *Energy transition calls for faster investment treaty reforms*. 30 August 2023. Available at: <https://unctad.org/news/energy-transition-calls-faster-investment-treaty-reforms>.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2023b. *World Trade and Investment Report 2023. Chapter IV. Reforming the International Financial Architecture: The View from UNCTAD*. Available at https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/tdr2023ch4_en.pdf.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2025a. *Investment Statistics and Trends*. Geneva: UNCTAD. Available at: <https://unctad.org/topic/investment/investment-statistics-and-trends>.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2025b. *World Investment Report 2024*. Geneva: United Nations. Available at: <https://unctad.org/publication/world-investment-report-2024>.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2025c. *World Investment Report 2025*. World Investment Report. Geneva, Switzerland: UNCTAD. Available at: <https://unctad.org/publication/world-investment-report-2025>

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2019. *Knowing What You Spend: A guidance note for governments to track climate change finance in their budgets*. Available at: <https://www.undp.org/publications/knowning-what-you-spend-guidance-note-governments-track-climate-change-finance-their-budgets>.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2022. *Global Climate Public Finance Review*. Available at: <https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2022-09/UNDP-Global-Climate-Public-Finance-Review-2022.pdf>.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2025. *Using Public Financial Management to Implement NDCs and NAPs*. Available at: <https://www.undp.org/asia-pacific/publications/using-public-financial-management-implement-ndcs-and-naps>.

United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 2025a. *Adaptation Gap Report 2025: Running on empty. The world is gearing up for climate resilience — without the money to get there* [Neufeldt, H., Hammill, A., Leiter, T., Magnan, A., Watkiss, P., Bakhtiari, F., Bueno Rubial, P., Butera, B., Canales, N., Chapagain, D., Christiansen, L., Dale, T., Milford, F., Niles, K., Njuguna, L., Pauw, P., Singh, C. and Yang, G.]. Nairobi. Available at: <https://www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report-2025>

United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 2025b. *State of Finance for Forests 2025*. Available at: United Kingdom Government. 2024. UK International Climate Finance Results 2024. London: HM Government. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6707afea366f494ab2e7b65b/ICF_report_pdf_101024.pdf.

United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI). 2026a. *Adaptation Finance Taxonomy Playbook*. Available at: <https://www.unepfi.org/themes/climate-change/adaptation-finance-taxonomy-playbook/>

United Nations. 2024. *Pact for the Future, Global Digital Compact and Declaration on Future Generations: Summit of the Future Outcome Documents*. New York: United Nations. Available at: https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/sotf-pact_for_the_future_adopted.pdf.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). *Investment Statistics and Trends*. Geneva: UNCTAD. Available at: <https://unctad.org/topic/investment/investment-statistics-and-trends>.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). *World Investment Report 2024*. Geneva: United Nations. Available at: <https://unctad.org/publication/world-investment-report-2024>.

<https://www.unep.org/resources/report/state-finance-forests-2025>.

United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 2026. *State of Finance for Nature 2026*. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme. Available at: <https://www.unep.org/resources/state-finance-nature-2026>.

United Nations Environment Programme – Finance Initiative (UNEP-FI). 2023a. *Climate Adaptation Target Setting. Principles for Responsible Banking: Guidance for banks*. Geneva, Switzerland. Available at: <https://www.unepfi.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/PRB-Adaptation-Tar-get-Setting-Guidance.pdf>.

United Nations Environment Programme – Finance Initiative (UNEP-FI). 2023b. *Common Framework for Sustainable Finance Taxonomies for Latin America and the Caribbean*. Available at <https://www.unepfi.org/publications/common-framework-for-sustainable-finance-taxonomies-for-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/>.

United Nations Environment Programme – Finance Initiative (UNEP-FI). 2024. *2024 Climate Risk Landscape Report*. Geneva, Switzerland: UNEP FI. Available at: <https://www.unepfi.org/themes/climate-change/2024-climate-risk-landscape/>.

United Nations Environment Programme – Finance Initiative (UNEP-FI). 2025. *Making the transition nature-positive: How sustainable finance taxonomies can play a key role*. Available at: <https://www.unepfi.org/news/making-the-transition-nature-positive-how-sustainable-finance-taxonomies-can-play-a-key-role/>.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Least Developed Countries Expert Group. 2026. *National Adaptation Plans 2025: Progress in the Process to Formulate and Implement National Adaptation Plans*. Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/NAP_progress_report_2025.pdf.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). *Guidance on Cooperative Approaches Referred to in Article 6, Paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement*. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 2015. Paris Agreement. Available at: https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 2018. *Modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework for action and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement, Decision 18/CMA.1*. Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/CMA2018_03a02E.pdf#page=18.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 2021a. *Guidance on Cooperative Approaches Referred to in Article 6, Paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement*.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 2021b. *Rules, Modalities and Procedures for the Mechanism Established by Article 6, Paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement*. 2021.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 2022. *Reference Manual for the Enhanced Transparency Framework under the Paris Agreement: Understanding the enhanced transparency framework and its linkages, Version 2*.

Rules, Modalities and Procedures for the Mechanism Established by Article 6, Paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement. 2021.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 2023. Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties*. Bonn: UNFCCC. Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cp2023_L08E.pdf.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 2024. *Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement: Synthesis Report*. Bonn: UNFCCC. Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2024_10_adv.pdf.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 2025. *Annual Report of the Board of the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage*. Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cop2025_10a1_cma2025_14a1_adv.pdf

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 2025b. *Biennial transparency reports and national inventory reports*. Synthesis report by the secretariat. Available at: <https://unfccc.int/documents/651012>.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 2025c. *Compilation of First Biennial Transparency Reports, including CTF tables related to support provided and received*. Party reporting available at: <https://unfccc.int/first-biennial-transparency-reports>.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 2025d. *Nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement*. Synthesis report by the secretariat. Available at: <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/nationally-determined-contributions-ndcs/2025-ndc-synthesis-report>.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 2025e. *Third Biennial Communications in Accordance with Article 9, Paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement: Compilation and Synthesis Report by the Secretariat*. Bonn: UNFCCC. Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cp2025_02_cma2025_03E.pdf.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Least Developed Countries Expert Group. 2026. *National Adaptation Plans 2025: Progress in the Process to Formulate and Implement National Adaptation Plans*. Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/NAP_progress_report_2025.pdf.

United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR). 2023. *Budget Tagging for Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation, United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR)*. Available at: <https://www.undrr.org/publication/documents-and-publications/budget-tagging-disaster-risk-reduction-and-climate-change#downloads>

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). 2025. *Summary Note on the Thematic CERF Funding Envelope for Climate-Smart Humanitarian Action*. 2025. Available at: https://cerf.un.org/sites/default/files/resources/CERF_UFE_2025-I_Climate_Action_Envelope_Note.pdf.

United Nations. 2023. *Reforms to the International Financial Architecture. Our Common Agenda Policy Brief 6*. May 2023. Available at: <https://sdgs.un.org/sites/default/files/2023-08/our-common-agenda-policy-brief-international-finance-architecture-en.pdf>.

United Nations. 2024. *Pact for the Future, Global Digital Compact and Declaration on Future Generations: Summit of the Future Outcome Documents*. New York: United Nations. Available at: https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/sotf-pact_for_the_future_adopted.pdf.

U.S. Department of the Treasury, Federal Insurance Office. 2025. *Analyses of U.S. Homeowners Insurance Markets, 2018–2022: Climate-Related Risks and Other Factors*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Treasury. Available at: <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2791>.

World Bank Group, IMF and OECD. 2023. *Activating Alignment: Applying the G20 Principles for Sustainable Finance Alignment with a Focus on Climate Change Mitigation*. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at: <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099091323151039750>.

World Bank Group. 2025. *Financing Solutions for IDA-Eligible Countries*. Available at: <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/55f0632430a178e49216c36d4ed541c4-0340012024/original/Financing-Solutions-for-IDA-Eligible-Countries.pdf>.

World Bank Group. 2026. *IDA Financial Products Overview. Updated 8 April 2026*. Available at: <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/74b666ec80119259f29b625cd3f04556-0340012024/original/IDA-financial-products-overview.pdf>.

World Bank. 2021. *Climate Change Budget Tagging: A Review of International Experience*. Available at: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/ca65ecfc-90b8-5b40-a6e7-689d14c8cccf/content>.

World Bank. 2023a. *Annual Report 2023: A New Era in Development*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/annual-report-2023>.

World Bank. 2023b. *The World Bank Impact Report: Sustainable Development Bonds and Green Bonds*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Available at: <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/667f95939700497452d00a1544ba2d01-0340022024/original/World-Bank-IBRD-FY23-IMPACT-REPORT.pdf>.

World Bank. 2024a. *Country Platforms for Climate Action: MDB Statement of Common Understanding and Way Forward*. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.

World Bank. 2024b. *2023 Joint Report on Multilateral Development Banks' Climate Finance*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Available at: https://www.eib.org/files/publications/20240150_2023_joint_report_on_mdbs_climate_finance_en.pdf.

World Bank. *World Bank State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2024*. Washington, DC: World Bank. <http://hdl.handle.net/10986/41544>.

World Bank. 2024c. *Just Transition Taxonomy. Narrative Report*. Available at: <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/4170363805a08d5eaca17fbd62db45d2-0340012024/original/World-Bank-Just-Transition-Taxonomy-2024.pdf>.

World Bank. 2024d. *The World Bank Impact Report: Sustainable Development Bonds and Green Bonds*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Available at: <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/d8c088d3286decf305a7c0f3fe667130-0340022025/original/World-Bank-IBRD-FY24-IMPACT-REPORT.pdf>.

World Bank. 2024e. *World Bank's USD 225 Million Amazon Reforestation-Linked Outcome Bond Signals Growing Investor Base Eager to Link Financial Returns to Positive Development Outcomes*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/08/20/world-bank-s-usd-225-million-amazon-reforestation-linked-outcome-bond-signals-growing-investor-base-eager-to-link-finance>.

World Bank. 2024f. *2023 Joint Report on Multilateral Development Banks' Climate Finance*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Available at: https://www.eib.org/files/publications/20240150_2023_joint_report_on_mdbs_climate_finance_en.pdf.

World Bank. 2024g. *State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2024*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-2127-1>

World Bank. 2025a. *Brazil's Burning Bill*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Available at: <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099090225110519398/pdf/P180939-f2acca28-b43e-48d2-93cf-9cf8754ef240.pdf>.

World Bank. 2025b. *International Debt Report 2025*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-2262-9>.

World Bank. 2025c. *Jobs in a Changing Climate: Insights from World Bank Group Country Climate and Development Reports Covering 93 Economies*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Available at: <http://hdl.handle.net/10986/43941>.

World Bank. 2025d. *Unlocking the Potential of Article 6 for Climate Action*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

World Bank. 2025e. *World Bank Group Annual Report 2025: Creating Jobs, Growing Economies*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/annual-report>.

World Bank. 2025f. *World Bank Group Launches Next Phase of Private Sector Investment Lab with Expanded Membership and Focus on Job Creation*. Press Release. April 23, 2025. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/04/23/world-bank-group-launches-next-phase-of-private-sector-investment-lab-with-expanded-membership-and-focus-on-job-creation>.

World Bank. 2026. *State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2026*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/state-and-trends-of-carbon-pricing>.

World Bank. n.d. *World Bank Group Scorecard*. Available at: <https://scorecard.worldbank.org/en/home>.

World Bank. *Country Climate and Development Reports (CCDRs)*. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/country-climate-development-reports>.

World Bank. n.d. *Private Sector Investment Lab (PSIL) Brief*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/unit/brief/private-sector-investment-lab>.

World Bank. n.d. *World Bank Group Scorecard*. Available at: <https://scorecard.worldbank.org/en/home>.

World Resources Institute (WRI). 2025. *Are Country Platforms the key to delivering green growth at scale?* Available at: <https://www.wri.org/technical-perspectives/country-platforms-delivering-green-growth-scale>.

World Resources Institute (WRI). *Principles for Locally Led Adaptation*. n.d. Available at: <https://www.wri.org/initiatives/locally-led-adaptation/principles-locally-led-adaptation>.

World Resources Institute (WRI). *"Beyond the usual suspects: Assessing climate finance from the largest non-Annex II economies."* Working Paper. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. Available online at <https://doi.org/10.46830/wriwp.25.00079>

Zetsche, D.A., Pflücke-Mahoux, M. 2026. *Sustainable Finance Taxonomies Around the World An Empirical Legal Analysis*. University of Luxembourg Law Working Paper No. 2026-02. Available at: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=6120206> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6120206>.

Zucker-Marques, M., K.P. Gallagher and U. Volz. 2024. *"Debt Sustainability Analysis as if Development Really Mattered."* Development, vol. 67, pp. 158–166. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41301-025-00438-6>.



FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT

Climate Finance subdivision
Means of Implementation division

United Nations Climate Change Secretariat (UNFCCC)
Platz der Vereinten Nationen 1
53113 Bonn, Germany

E-mail: standingcommittee@unfccc.int



United Nations
Framework Convention on
Climate Change