



COP24 · KATOWICE 2018
UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE

PRE-COP 24 SUMMARY NOTE

Prepared by the incoming Polish Presidency

On October 23rd-24th 2018 the incoming Polish Presidency organized the preparatory meeting in advance of COP 24. 38 delegations were present, with 20 represented on a ministerial level.

This summary note was prepared under the authority of the incoming Polish Presidency. We tried to capture the discussions, which took place at the pre-COP in the most accurate way. Information contained therein should however be treated as non-exhaustive. It does not prejudice any positions or the final outcome of the negotiations. The summaries from the break-out discussion groups are attached to this note as presented to the Ministers and Ambassadors in the final plenary. These summaries were prepared under the authority of the incoming Polish Presidency with support from the co-facilitators of each topic.

The conversations among Parties present took place in a very positive and constructive spirit. There is much political will to finalize the Paris Agreement Work Program at COP 24. Indeed the Ministers gathered in Kraków appealed to the experts to accelerate their work in moving towards the bridging proposals. The discussions during the pre-COP seemed to point to much convergence on many issues. There is a desire to find the way forward. Yet much detailed work lies ahead and the negotiators must maintain their focus and an ambitious pace of work.

While the topics centered around mitigation, transparency, finance and adaptation were the focus of the pre-COP, with the discussion on the Talanoa Dialogue outcome crowning the meeting, there are other important topics signaled by the Ministers which require attention. The incoming Presidency recognizes this importance.

We hope that the attached summary notes of the sessions will be useful to Parties in their considerations between now and the COP24 in Katowice. We must hit the ground running. There is very little time left for the technical negotiations. The Parties will meet in Katowice with only one week of technical level negotiations ahead of them at which point the focus must be on fine-tuning the final compromise proposals.

The incoming Polish Presidency firmly believes - and the course of the pre-COP reaffirms this conviction - that landing the Work Program in Katowice is within reach provided every single occasion, bilateral or multilateral, between now and December is used for identifying potential landing grounds.

READ OUT FROM THE ADAPTATION BREAK OUT GROUP

Facilitated by

H.E. Ola Elvestuen (Norway) and H.E. John Silk (the Marshall Islands)

Parties were asked to respond to specific questions related to how we best can understand progress on adaptation under the Paris Agreement. Further what is the best approach to adaptation communication and where should the guidance be reflected.

Ministers expressed shared views on many key points:

- Adaptation is an issue of importance to **all countries** and an **essential component** of the Paris Agreement.
- There must be **parity** between mitigation and adaptation. This was also highlighted in the context of finance. An example was given of developed countries that had put specific 50/50 split on their climate finance among the two strands.
- There is a recognition that adaptation is a **shared challenge**, but that **developing countries** are faced with **particular challenges**, not just from climate change, but from multiple stressors. Therefore adaptation under the Paris Agreement must recognize the efforts by and the need for support for developing countries.
- It was also recognized that adaptation is **highly contextual**, at the same time it was stressed that adaptation is also **cross border**, for example migration associated with climate related events.
- There is a general understanding that the guidance and the elements in the guidance must be **clear and overarching**, but **specific enough** to enable the

assessment of progress towards the global goal, especially in the Global Stocktake.

- At the same time it was highlighted that guidance should not be prescriptive, **nor should adaptation communication represent an additional burden.** Hence the guidance must strike the right balance between these different considerations.
- It was also stressed that COP24 must deliver the relevant guidance to inform adaptation communications Parties will be delivering in the near term - in whatever form they may be.
- Further it was stressed that there is a need for **consistency** in the guidance both on communication and reporting.
- Most countries highlighted that it should be up to each country which “vehicle” they choose for adaptation communication and that each “vehicle” should have an ability to deliver the needed information as long as the guidance is common.
- Some Parties raised the question on how synergies between adaptation and mitigation are to be addressed and some pointed out that the **mitigation co-benefits of adaptation** actions should be treated as other provisions of the Article 4 of the Paris Agreement and be addressed through the transparency framework and the review.

The discussions also showed that there were differences in opinion – especially around two issues:

1. Should there be one guidance for all “vehicles” or should the guidance be “vehicle”- specific, for example NDCs, NAPs etc. Alternatively, should it be

the combination of the two with a common general set of guidelines for all “vehicles” and, in addition, a set of specific guidelines to fit each “vehicle”?

2. Should there be common or separate guidance for forward and backward looking information?

Irrespective of the differences in opinions on these two issues there was a sense that, considering the magnitude of the problem and the need for a robust outcome on adaptation, these issues must be solved and not stand in the way of an agreement on adaptation in Katowice.

READ OUT FROM THE MITIGATION BREAK OUT GROUP

Facilitated by

H.E. Miguel Arias Cañete (EU) and H.E. Masagos Zulkifli (Singapore)

PART 1

- We thank all Parties for the positive, rich and constructive discussions yesterday. We felt encouraged by the willingness to understand each other's positions and the search for a common ground. We believe Parties are not that far apart from each other.
- **On the purpose of the guidance**, a number of interventions underscored the importance of having clearer or robust guidance on ICTU to enable the tracking of progress towards achievement of NDC under the Enhanced Transparency Framework in accordance with the accounting guidance, to enable aggregation and assessment of collective progress under the Global Stocktake, to enable comparability and to build trust for ambitious climate action among Parties, while respecting diversity (and not aiming for uniformity).
- There was general agreement that paragraph 27 of 1/CP.21 was a useful starting point to consider further guidance on ICTU but there was also a wide spectrum of views on this guidance and its level of specificity. Some Parties called for specificity, whilst other Parties felt that the current list of elements as agreed in Paris was sufficient.
- Various suggestions for ICTU guidance on additional information to supplement the paragraph 27 elements could include: use of Article 6,

treatment of the land sector, renewable energy baseline information for renewable energy targets, mitigation co-benefits from adaptation actions, the linkage between action and support, and an explanation around fairness, ambition and progression, as appropriate.

- A number of Parties suggested the use of a structured summary table to reflect the tracking of progress towards implementation and achievement of an NDC.
- There was general consensus around the need to respect the diversity of NDCs and their nationally determined nature. As such, the guidance on ICTU is not meant to restrict Parties' national determination with respect to the type and substance of their respective NDCs.
- Some Parties suggested that the ICTU guidance should be simple, should not impose additional burdens, and should not be prescriptive.

PART 2

- **On the scope of NDCs**, Parties referred to Article 3 to describe elements that could be included in NDCs. Some Parties suggested that while ICTU addresses mitigation, this does not mean that Parties could not include other components. Some Parties have suggested that paragraph 27 should also be applicable to such components and reflect links between action and support.
- Some Parties underlined that Article 4.8 does not include any reference to bifurcated obligations. Other Parties mentioned that Article 4.4 stated that

developed country Parties should continue to take the lead with economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets.

- Some Parties suggested that guidance on mitigation co-benefits from adaptation actions, pursuant to Article 4.7, could be addressed under the ICTU guidance.
- Different views were also expressed **on the applicability** of the ICTU guidance. The general view is that the issue of differentiation has been settled in Paris and that we should not redefine “differentiation” when negotiating the Paris rulebook.
- Many parties underscored that there should not be a “one-size fits all” approach (i.e. a single set of guidance that would be mandatory for all Parties) because of the diversity in national circumstances and the overriding importance of national determination. Instead, the guidance should be based on the concept of applicability, for example, based on a “menu approach”, whereby the list could be broad enough to enable all Parties to draw from a single list of information in accordance with the NDC.
- Other parties suggested that some ICTU elements should be common to all NDCs and that other elements would be specific only to specific NDC types, which are nationally determined and based on voluntary actions.
- Overall, these discussions indicated a sense of direction at the political level that could expedite the negotiations at the expert level.

READ OUT FROM FINANCE BREAK OUT GROUP

Facilitated by

H.E. Jochen Flasbarth (Germany) and H.E. Miguel Ruiz Cabanas (Mexico)

- There was a general consensus, that predictability of climate finance is a very important issue for trust building between developed and developing countries as well as to enable countries to advance in planning and implementation of NDCs. It was also pointed out by Parties that a higher level of predictability will help to build confidence in the overall system. Some countries also highlighted that predictability is not a synonym of certainty.
- In this context, ex-ante communications were seen as at least an important cornerstone. Parties expressed the view, that in addition, the broader financial landscape is relevant for predictability of climate finance, which consists not only of public finance from traditional donors, but also from different sources, including private finance and non-traditional donors. Several parties also mentioned the upcoming mobilization of 100 bn from 2020 on, with a view of following that goal until 2025 as well as the recently started process on the replenishment of the Green Climate Fund as elements to enhance trust.
- Some Parties also mentioned the relevance of the long-term goal on aligning financial flows and its potential for unleashing finance.
- Parties as well emphasized the aspects of accessibility of climate finance. Several Parties called for enhanced need of financial resources in the light of the recent IPCC Special report on 1.5°C.
- Several parties underlined, that existing Strategies and Approaches on scaling up climate finance submission could be a blueprint for the new ex-

ante information, however there might be additional information needed to provide enhanced information. Parties pointed out to build a system that provides an inclusive set of information.

- Some Parties were of the view that captured information on the intended quantified contribution, information on policies and programming choices as well as on limitations/budgetary restrictions/ internal processes will form a good basis for the ex ante communication.
- Number of parties in this context acknowledged that domestic legal and institutional issues vary from country to country, including both budgetary cycles as well as domestic budget planning procedures and the demand driven approach of cooperation with partner countries, form limitations for preparation of longer-term information as well as on the granularity of data available ex-ante. Information provided in ex-ante communication should be seen as indicative and preliminary.
- Several Parties also mentioned the need to clarify aspects of how ex-ante information will be provided and processed.
- Another way to build trust mentioned by parties is by a robust and consistent ex-post transparency system, at the same time showing progress towards the existing goal.
- In this regard both finance provided and mobilized as well as finance received are important, and both should be reported, however taking into account differences both in capabilities of reporting parties, as well as different levels of information available.
- Several parties, both developed and developing informed that it could be useful to also have reporting information from any other country submitted on voluntary basis to provide a more comprehensive picture of the finance

landscape. Those information should follow general guidelines, however with obvious need for flexibilities.

READ OUT FROM TRANSPARENCY BREAK OUT GROUP

Facilitated by

H.E. James Shaw (New Zealand) and H.E. C.K. Mishra (India)

Areas where recurring views were heard:

- The goal of the enhanced transparency framework (ETF) is to promote action and to build trust among Parties that the Paris Agreement is working and the Parties are delivering on what they stated they would do in their NDCs.
- ETF should inform the GST, following aggregation of individual country reports.
- ETF should build on existing transparency framework, as a common framework that is applicable to all Parties with clearly defined flexibilities for those developing countries that need them in light of their capacities. Some Parties suggested capacity was also related to national circumstances.
- ETF should be dynamic. It should enable the Parties to progress over time and harness the benefits from the learning-by-doing process.
- Facilitative and non-punitive nature of the ETF is key.
- Standardization within the ETF was seen as a key aspect for it to serve the purpose of comparability of climate action.
- In operationalizing flexibility, there should be provisions for developing country Parties that are built into the specific provisions on the modalities, procedures and guidelines of the ETF. They should be applied in light of their capacities, reflect their different starting points and allow them to report information that they are capable of reporting.
- As Parties know their capacities best, the use of a specific flexibility should be based on self-determination. However an explanation on why a specific flexibility is used in view of one's capacity should be provided in the report.

- Flexibilities could be related to a number of issues: timing, scope and level of detail in the application of the MPGs of the ETF.
- The boundaries of flexibility (“bounded flexibility”) should be based on the experience from the current transparency systems.
- Capacity building activities that will help build long lasting human and institutional capacities and support for the preparation of the reports are important for the developing country parties. Capacity is built through engagement, participation and learning by doing. Technical review under the ETF could be essential in helping Parties by identifying areas for improving capacity.
- There is a need to continue with the ongoing capacity building effort and for funding and supporting the effort under the existing MRV system and the new ETF.
- At this point of the negotiations we need a strong political guidance from the Ministers and then technical work on the expert level can follow to finalise details of MPGs.

Topics on which Parties exchanged views, but an additional discussion in the lead-up and during COP24 is needed:

- Starting point of the new system and common or different submission date of first biennial transparency report, noting ETF would follow the end of the Pre-2020 reporting cycles, which could take up to 2024 for some parties, and possibility to have some overlap with current reporting to inform first round of global stocktake and avoid duplication of effort.
- Concept of transition: should all Parties start at the same time taking into account that not all Parties will be able to provide full scope of data at the

beginning but would rather progress over time (“learning by doing”)?

- How flexibilities should be bounded? Should they be time limited? What is the relationship between flexibility and national circumstances?
- What is the role of the expert review team and facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress regarding flexibilities and capacity constraints? How these activities and processes can help to enhance capacity and quality of reporting over time.
- The 2006 IPCC guidelines already have number of built in flexibilities and could allow for a greater comparability but still some Parties suggested that they may encounter difficulties to implement them from the beginning, in particular in the area of land use.

READ OUT FROM THE TALANOA DIALOGUE PLENARY SESSION

Facilitated by

H.E. Michał Kurtyka (Poland) and H.E. Inia Seruiratu (Fiji)

The aim of the session was to discuss with Parties the possible outcome of the political phase of the Talanoa Dialogue (TD), which will take place during the second week of COP24 in Katowice. Parties reemphasized the importance of the TD and noted the urgency of the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 Degrees Celsius (IPCC Report).

Parties expressed their thanks to the Presidencies for leading the TD process so far and reiterated their trust and confidence in the Presidencies to complete their mandate. The participants expressed views on both the form and substance of the possible outcome.

The Form

There were different forms of the outcome proposed by the participants of the session, including:

- COP Decision including substance relating to achieving Paris Agreement (PA) goals
- short, procedural COP decision / a paragraph in a COP decision
- ministerial declaration
- Presidencies' declaration, statement, report or summary
- a combination of the above

The vast majority of Parties presented no will to have a negotiated outcome, so that negotiators in Katowice can be focused on Paris Agreement Work Programme. The idea of the Presidencies' declaration, statement or report with an option to have an additional paragraph on TD in a COP decision resonated with many.

A few Parties expressed their expectation of no less than a strong, substantial COP decision or a ministerial declaration on the matter.

The substance

All Parties underlined the importance of having a substantive outcome providing inspiration to the world in relation to the PA goals. Many Parties underlined the substance is much more important than the form of the outcome. The most commonly evoked references to be included in the outcome:

- strong political message with a direct link to PA goals
- consideration of Parties' NDCs with a view to do more by 2020
- all stakeholders taking action together at all levels in all sectors
- urgency and scale of action as a response to the IPCC Report
- means of implementation as an important condition for increased climate action in developing countries
- political leadership and guidance needed
- input to 2019 September SG climate summit
- the importance of developing long-term low emissions development strategies

Parties welcomed the fact that during COP24 the IPCC Report will be presented both during the SBSTA and TD sessions, demonstrating Parties' resolve to recognise and refer to science, acknowledging the serious implications given in the IPCC Special Report.

The Polish and Fiji COP Presidencies will continue to closely work together in order to bring the TD to its successful conclusion at COP 24.