

WRI Submission to Belém Mission to 1.5

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I. Key messages

1. **The Belém Mission to 1.5 can draw on science-based targets and indicators to identify priority areas for implementation:** the [State of Climate Action report](#) series translates the 1.5 degrees C goal into measurable sectoral milestones for 2030, 2035 and 2050. Drawing on the report's findings on where progress is on track, off track, or moving in the wrong direction, the Mission can help identify priority areas for action, the pace of acceleration required, and where finance, capacity building, technology transfer and implementation support should be prioritized.
2. **The Mission can encourage countries to develop voluntary sectoral strategies to help translate NDCs into implementation:** these strategies could draw from long-term climate plans aligned with national net-zero targets and 1.5C to identify concrete policies, investment priorities, support needs and enabling reforms in areas highlighted by the Global Stocktake and the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience, including for renewable energy, energy efficiency, transitioning away from fossil fuels, transport, forests, water, health, ecosystems, biodiversity and infrastructure.
3. **The Mission can prioritize solutions that deliver both mitigation and adaptation benefits:** because NDC and NAP implementation will be more durable, financeable and politically actionable when climate measures also strengthen food security, water security, livelihoods, biodiversity, fiscal resilience and climate risk reduction.
4. **The Mission can encourage countries to strengthen multi-level governance for accelerating the implementation of NDCs and NAPs:** by aligning national, regional and local governments across planning, finance, infrastructure and accountability systems, countries can translate national commitments into local action and ensure that local priorities, risks and investment needs shape national climate strategies.
5. **Just transition should be treated as an implementation requirement for NDCs, NAPs and transition planning:** countries need to integrate social dialogue, workforce transition, regional economic diversification, social protection, community participation and quality green jobs into climate plans, while using monitoring frameworks to track fiscal dependence on fossil fuels, labor market shifts, reskilling, social safety nets, investment in cleaner sectors and impacts on affected communities.
6. **International cooperative initiatives can be used as delivery vehicles for priority transitions:** initiatives on coal, methane, fossil fuel finance reform, clean power deployment and industrial decarbonization can help countries move from commitments to implementation by supporting policy coordination, peer learning, technical assistance and access to finance, but they should have clearer objectives, stronger accountability, improved

monitoring and reporting, and better support for countries with high fossil fuel dependence and limited implementation capacity.

7. **Adaptation, resilience and nature should be treated as macro-critical economic and fiscal priorities:** Ministries of Finance need strengthened capacity to assess climate and ecosystem risks, integrate adaptation and nature into economic planning and public finance systems, and mobilize appropriate financing instruments across macro, sectoral and project levels.
8. **The Mission can identify financial system barriers that prevent NDC and NAP implementation from reaching scale:** beyond mobilizing more finance, this means addressing high costs of capital, debt and fiscal constraints, limited concessional finance, weak risk mitigation instruments, credit rating methodologies, long-term hedging gaps and regulatory frameworks that shape whether public and private finance can flow into climate-aligned investment.
9. **The Mission can help frame the energy transition as an integrated implementation agenda, not only a clean energy deployment or electrification agenda:** countries need support to modernize grids, manage rising electricity demand, mobilize and shift finance towards clean energy, responsibly scale critical mineral supply chains, and connect clean energy growth with a just, orderly, and equitable transition away from fossil fuels.
10. **The Mission can treat halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030 as a core implementation priority:** countries need support to diagnose drivers of deforestation and degradation, strengthen policy and institutional frameworks, scale restoration and sustainable forest management, improve forest monitoring and data systems, and align REDD+, results-based finance, concessional finance, private capital and sustainable forest value chains with national implementation needs.
11. **The Mission can recognize food loss and waste reduction as a concrete climate, methane and food security solution:** building on guidance from the [Global Action Drive](#), countries can be encouraged to embed food loss and waste into NDCs, NAPs and related climate policies through emissions reduction targets, monitoring and evaluation frameworks, implementation roadmaps, and finance that connects national and subnational actors delivering food recovery and waste reduction on the ground.
12. **Ocean action is [increasingly recognized](#) in NDCs, but remains insufficiently operationalized;** the Mission can help underscore the need for clearer ocean targets, timelines; clearer ministerial mandates; integrated ocean-climate planning; stronger data and monitoring systems; and finance-ready priorities across offshore renewables, maritime

decarbonization, aquatic food systems, coastal resilience and marine conservation.

13. **The Belém Mission to 1.5 can serve as a practical input to the second Global Stocktake:** its report can identify where action across priority areas is off track, where implementation support is most urgently needed, and what enabling conditions are required across priority sectors and systems, so that GST2 can be better equipped to become a platform for accelerating solutions.

II. Introduction

World Resources Institute (WRI) welcomes the opportunity to contribute to Belém Mission to 1.5's call for inputs and the opportunity to support its mandate of identifying high-impact opportunities, barriers, and actionable solutions for accelerating the ambition and implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs). This submission consolidates inputs from across WRI's global and national workstreams.

This submission focuses on how the Mission can help move from ambition to implementation. It recommends that the Mission focuses on (1) using science-based benchmarks to identify priority action areas, (2) implementation enabling systems: from national planning to delivery; (3) high-impact action areas and solutions, (4) strengthening international cooperation for ambition and implementation, and (5) proposed next steps for the Belem Mission to 1.5.

III. Using science-based benchmarks to identify priority action areas

To deliver its mandate, the Belém Mission to 1.5 can help translate the Paris Agreement's 1.5 degrees C goal into concrete, action-oriented recommendations that show what needs to change and exactly how fast. To do this, we propose that Türkiye, Australia, Brazil, and Azerbaijan draw from the Systems Change Lab's [State of Climate Action](#) report series, published by partners at World Resources Institute, Bezos Earth Fund, Climate Analytics, ClimateWorks Foundation, and the Climate High-Level Champions.

The *State of Climate Action* report translates the 1.5 degrees C goal into global, sector-specific benchmarks for 2030, 2035, and 2050 across power, buildings, industry, transport, forests and land, and food and agriculture. Together, these sectors account for nearly 90% of GHG emissions. Additionally, the series includes benchmarks for scaling up technological carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and climate finance, both of which are urgently needed to limit global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees C.

The value of this type of global framework is twofold. First, it can provide a top-down structural framework for prioritization of action areas by showing what needs to change and how fast. Second, it can operate as a report card, helping decision makers identify where progress is heading in the right direction but remains too slow, where trends are well off track, and where they are moving in the wrong direction entirely. The Mission could use this kind of approach to identify action areas that require elevated policy attention, additional finance, capacity building, technology transfer, or international cooperation.

Findings from the *State of Climate Action 2025* report, published in October 2025, are stark: while progress is heading in the right direction for most of the 45 indicators assessed, none are on track to achieve 2030 targets compatible with this temperature goal. The pace of change is promising, albeit still too slow, for 6 indicators and at well below the required speed for another 29. For 5 indicators, trends are heading in the wrong direction entirely. Data are insufficient to evaluate the remaining 5. Several bright spots do underscore that rapid change is possible. Private climate

finance, for instance, has increased sharply, shifting from well off track to off track, solar is the fastest-growing power source ever, and nascent innovations like green hydrogen saw meaningful one-year gains. Yet such positive changes have occurred alongside far more troubling trends. For electric vehicle sales — the only indicator previously on track — growth slowed, such that progress is now off track for 2030. Efforts to reduce coal-fired power and deforestation remain well off track for multiple installments to the report series in a row. And even consistent year-on-year growth in renewables is not enough, as, with each passing year, the pace of change needed to get on track for 2030 increases.

2025 Climate Action Report Card: Progress Toward 1.5°C-Aligned Benchmarks for 2030



This matters for the Mission because benchmarks and progress tracking can help identify where implementation support should be concentrated. Areas that remain well off track, such as reducing coal-fired power and halting deforestation, require more than broad ambition signals. They require systems-level planning, policy coherence, finance, institutional capacity, subnational implementation and international cooperation. The Mission can therefore use science-based benchmarks not only to identify priority sectors, but also to guide the delivery architecture needed to accelerate implementation.

At the same time, such a framework should be used carefully. Global benchmarks do not replace national circumstances, principles of equity, and nationally-determined pathways. This should inform, not prescribe, national decision-making. Moreover, while existing benchmark frameworks, including the *State of Climate Action* series, are strongest on mitigation, the Mission should also draw from parallel efforts to incorporate adaptation metrics, resilience indicators, and implementation frameworks for NAPs. Adaptation requires its own practical tools for priority setting, costing, institutional capacity and finance.

Ultimately, in this fragmented geopolitical era, we believe that the Belém Mission to 1.5 report must play a pivotal role in bridging science and policy under the UNFCCC. By including science-based benchmarks that demonstrate exactly what the world must do to limit warming to 1.5 degrees C, the Belém Mission to 1.5 would deliver this critical objective.

IV. Implementation enabling systems: from national planning to delivery

Many implementation challenges stem not from a lack of ambition or technical solutions, but from fragmentation across mandates, institutions, and levels of government. Climate outcomes are rarely determined by the actions of a single institution at the national level. Rather, they depend on coordination among national, regional, and local governments across planning, infrastructure, land use, housing, transport, energy, water, disaster risk reduction and public finance, among others.

1. Long-term Low-GHG Emission Development Strategies

Long-term low-GHG emission development strategies (LT-LEDS) are a critical tool to support NDC development and directly inform national and subnational climate change ambition and implementation. Long-term climate planning is more than a target-setting exercise. It is a country's blueprint for cutting emissions, strengthening resilience and delivering economic growth and equity. 80 LT-LEDS have been submitted to the UNFCCC and 91% of countries with LT-LEDS have updated their NDCs (*compared to less than 60% of countries without LT-LEDS*), demonstrating their practical relevance for countries near-term climate planning (Climate Watch. 2026).

Parties are encouraged to align their NDCs with 1.5 degrees C and LT-LEDS “towards just transitions to net zero.” At its core, a long-term climate strategy is a governance instrument to align implementation around climate and development objectives: breaking down ministerial silos, stress-testing near-term decisions against long-term goals, surfacing difficult trade-offs early and providing the certainty required to mobilize private capital at scale. The transformations required to move away from business as usual and limit global temperature rise — shifting agricultural systems, decarbonizing global shipping, rewiring energy systems and more — will take decades to deliver, but the regulatory action and investment needed to set them in motion must start now and must be sustained.

The growing movement among countries to transition away from fossil fuels makes long-term planning an economic and political imperative. Yet while around 145 countries have announced net zero targets, which requires urgent and substantial reductions in fossil fuel use, far fewer have a comprehensive strategy to deliver them. Without a foundation to guide the pace of sectoral change, a net zero target remains a wish, not a plan of action. A robust long-term climate strategy changes that — charting a course to cutting emissions while creating jobs, strengthening national security, improving health, delivering affordable, reliable clean energy, ensuring food security and leaving no community behind in the transition.

LT-LEDS are not a one-off exercise. Used strategically, LT-LEDS function as practical mechanisms that take a whole-of-government, whole-of-economy and whole-of-society approach — essential

to navigating the political, economic and social trade-offs that a low-carbon transition can bring. While the document itself can be published and revised, the underlying processes, analysis and dialogue can have lasting impact.

A robust plan surfaces trade-offs early — on land use, fiscal priorities and sectoral change — addressing tensions before they ignite, shifting short-term policymaking away from business as usual and providing the regulatory certainty that investors and the private sector need to commit capital at scale. This requires rigorous modelling and scenario planning — stress-testing options, answering critical policy questions and mapping the decisions that bring long-term climate and development goals into today's plans and policies. Countries that treat these as genuine governance tools rather than reporting exercises are better placed to drive lasting change.

Today's leaders must navigate an increasingly complex and uncertain world. Governments should be guided by long-term strategies to meet the needs of today without jeopardizing tomorrow. Capacity-building efforts should support the operationalization of LT-LEDS as living tools, updated when needed, and strengthen near-term planning to stress-test against them.

2. Strengthening Multilevel Governance

Strengthening multilevel governance is one of the highest impact opportunities to support the ambition and implementation of NDCs and NAPs. It can help align policies, planning processes, budgets and investment decisions across levels of government; improve coordination around climate finance and project pipelines; strengthen accountability and information sharing; and create institutional pathways for translating local priorities into national strategies and national commitments into local action. As highlighted in WRI's Working Paper [*Stronger NDCs With Cities, States, and Regions: Recommendations for National Governments*](#) robust and effective multilevel governance can ensure that NDCs and NAPs are informed by subnational priorities, climate risks, emissions data, development needs, investment opportunities and implementation experience. Integrating these perspectives can improve the ambition, credibility, and practicality of climate plans while ensuring national commitments are grounded in local realities.

Countries can strengthen implementation by creating structured mechanisms through which national ministries, subnational governments, development partners, financiers, and other stakeholders jointly identify barriers, align priorities and coordinated action. These mechanisms should go beyond consultation. They should support policy integration, information sharing, accountability and delivery. They should also help countries develop practical tools and guidance on project preparation, climate finance access, coordination mechanisms, data sharing and monitoring.

A second priority is to strengthen project pipelines. Many climate investments remain fragmented and too small to attract financing at scale. Countries can improve implementation by identifying, prioritizing, and aggregating climate projects emerging from subnational plans and investment strategies. Clustering projects around common sectors, geographies, or development objectives

can increase visibility to financiers and support more programmatic approaches to implementation.

A third priority is project preparation and bankability support. The gap between identified climate priorities and finance-ready projects remains a significant barrier to implementation. Technical assistance for project design, feasibility assessment, financial structuring and risk management can help transform local priorities into investable opportunities, especially where subnational governments face capacity constraints or limited access to specialized expertise. Countries also need mechanisms that connect projects with appropriate funding channels, including public finance, development finance, private investments, and blended finance instruments.

3. Illustrative example from Brazil

Brazil illustrates the importance of connecting national ambition with sectoral pathways, fiscal planning and multilevel governance. Institutional continuity and multilevel governance are foundational. The Plano Clima is expected to anchor climate policy across ministries and sectors, ensuring that subnational governments, the private sector and civil society are represented and empowered. At the same time, fragmented policy making across levels of government and the absence of comprehensive national transition roadmaps can constrain the ability to define sectoral pathways and align investment priorities with a net zero 2050 goal.

Land use and deforestation remain the highest-impact near-term lever in Brazil. In 2022, 70 percent of Brazil's emissions came from land use, land-use change and forestry and agriculture, making forest protection and restoration a cost-effective mitigation opportunity with the potential to turn this sector into a net carbon sink. The barrier is not technical alone, but also political and financial: sustained governance, enforcement and means of implementation are essential.

Brazil also shows why sectoral pathways and fiscal transition planning matter. Brazil's NDC sets an aggregate target, but sectoral carbon budgets are needed to reconcile socioeconomic development with climate action. Fossil fuel fiscal dependence is a structural barrier for some subnational governments, and successful transition requires integrated national strategies combining regulatory reform, financial innovation, infrastructure investment and social inclusion, with careful place-based planning for revenue-dependent regions. Brazil's experience also highlights the role of climate finance instruments, including the Fundo Clima, EcolInvest and the Brazilian Sustainable Taxonomy, in aligning financial flows with implementation needs.

V. High-impact action areas and solutions

4. Energy transition

Energy transition is a central action area for NDC implementation and for keeping 1.5 degrees C within reach. Clean energy uptake is growing rapidly, but not at the pace or scale required. In many countries, rising demand driven by economic growth, electrification and new sources of electricity demand is outstripping clean energy supply. At the same time, strained and congested grids, lack of energy security, energy poverty and increasing climate impacts on infrastructure are making the

transition more complex. The Mission should therefore treat energy as an implementation agenda involving infrastructure, finance, regulation, minerals, demand, communities and workforce.

First, countries need to modernize power systems. Bringing affordable, clean and reliable power to all people requires expanding and updating electricity infrastructure so grids can transmit clean energy from where it is produced to where it is used, operate more efficiently, withstand increasingly extreme weather, and connect distributed sources of electricity. Regional grid integration and power sharing can also improve reliability, expand access to renewables and lower costs where institutional arrangements support it.

Second, countries need to attract, shift and mobilize finance. Clean energy projects often have high upfront costs and are sensitive to higher interest rates, particularly in developing countries. Development banks, domestic fiscal policy, public finance institutions and private capital all have roles to play in lowering risks, supporting enabling policies and moving finance toward clean energy, grids, storage and efficiency. Finance should be connected to implementation plans and bankable project pipelines.

Third, the transition requires responsible critical mineral supply chains. Clean energy technologies rely on minerals such as copper, nickel, lithium and cobalt. Meeting demand while protecting people and nature will require shared guardrails for responsible mineral production, stronger governance, community engagement, remediation of legacy impacts, and circular approaches that reduce demand for primary materials through reuse and recycling.

Fourth, countries should support demand shifts from large energy users. Companies, cities, utilities and industrial energy users can help expand demand for clean power, but their ability to do so depends on policy and market reforms that make clean power accessible, affordable and reliable. Corporate procurement, green tariffs, direct power purchase arrangements, aggregated demand and collaboration between public and private actors can help create markets for clean energy while supporting industrial competitiveness.

Fifth, countries need to address siting and permitting barriers in ways that are efficient, transparent and inclusive. Local opposition to clean energy infrastructure can delay or prevent deployment when communities lack timely information, meaningful participation or confidence that benefits will be shared locally. Governments can improve implementation by engaging communities early, strengthening coordination among agencies, ensuring adequate staffing for permitting, setting clear review timelines, and using arrangements such as community benefits agreements where appropriate.

Finally, the energy transition depends on the workforce of the future. Countries should integrate green job creation and reskilling strategies into NDCs, NAPs and related implementation plans. This can help workers in shrinking sectors transition to expanding clean energy and other sectors, while ensuring that new jobs uphold decent wages, social protections and labor rights. Workforce strategies should be linked to just transition planning, regional economic diversification and social support programs.

The Mission can also recognize that accelerating clean energy deployment must be accompanied by a just, orderly, and equitable transition away from fossil fuels. In many contexts, clean energy growth is not yet translating into an absolute decline in fossil fuel use, as rising energy demand, long-lived fossil fuel assets, fiscal dependence on fossil fuel revenues, and fragmented policy coordination continue to reinforce carbon lock-in. Countries can therefore be encouraged and supported to develop coherent, nationally determined approaches that align clean energy deployment with the transition away from fossil fuels, while addressing energy security, fiscal resilience, economic diversification, workforce transition, social protection and subnational development priorities.

5. Forests and land use

Halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030 should be treated as a central action area for NDC and NAP implementation. Forests and land use are critical for climate stability, biodiversity conservation, ecosystem integrity, water security, food security, livelihoods and poverty eradication. They are also directly linked to the outcomes of the first Global Stocktake, which recognized the importance of halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030.

The Mission can help countries move from broad forest and land-use commitments to implementation-ready strategies. This requires identifying the specific drivers of deforestation and forest degradation in each national context; strengthening policy, legal, institutional and financial instruments; and establishing processes for tracking progress, reporting outcomes and improving implementation over time. Priority areas include halting deforestation, addressing forest degradation, scaling restoration, reforestation and afforestation, advancing sustainable forest management, supporting bioeconomy and agroforestry approaches, and strengthening forest conservation.

International cooperation will be essential to accelerate implementation. Countries need support to address technical gaps, strengthen institutional capacity, improve forest monitoring and data systems, and align measurement methodologies. Finance and market mechanisms should also be better aligned with implementation needs, including through REDD+, results-based finance, concessional finance, development finance, private capital, carbon markets where appropriate, and sustainable value chains for forest products. The Mission can help ensure that forest and land-use priorities are integrated into NDCs, NAPs, LT-LEDS, national development strategies and investment planning, while recognizing the role of Indigenous Peoples, local communities and other actors in delivering durable outcomes.

6. Food loss and waste

Reducing food loss and waste is one of the most immediate, cost-effective and impactful opportunities for strengthened food security, reduce methane and other greenhouse gases, cut waste and support resilient communities. Around 40% of the world's food supply is lost or wasted at some point along the supply chain. Failure to address the problem will continue to cost the

global economy more than US\$1 trillion, exacerbate global hunger, and result in 8-10% of global greenhouse gas emissions and 12% of methane emissions from production and landfills. Reducing food loss and waste is therefore a rare triple win: it can alleviate environmental impacts while saving money and improving livelihoods.

Many countries are already addressing food loss and waste in domestic policies, but are not always linking these efforts to their NDCs or NAPs. Inclusion in NDCs and relevant plans can unlock new sources of funding while leveraging political action and capital across sectors. The Mission can encourage countries and partners to translate existing commitments on food and waste into concrete policies and implementation roadmaps backed by political will, good policy practices and monitoring and evaluation frameworks.

The [Global Action Drive](#) (GAD), a group of non-governmental organizations working to advance action on food waste reduction at regional and national levels, has emphasized the importance of embedding food loss and waste into NDCs and related climate policies. Its [Practical Guide on Embedding Food Loss and Waste into Climate Policies](#) provides a framework for taking system-wide action and encourages countries to move from commitments to implementation.

International cooperation should also help unlock financial flows necessary to accelerate reductions in food waste, improve food security, cut methane emissions, and build resilience communities. These resources need to reach national and subnational actors delivering progress on the ground. Building on the outcomes from COP30, the Mission can also recognize the importance of continued support for relevant food recovery and food loss and waste reduction efforts under the Action Agenda, including support for the Plans to Accelerate Solutions (PAS) under the COP30 Action Agenda, in particular [Advancing Food Security and Nutrition through Food Recovery and Food Loss & Waste Reduction](#) (Axis 3; KO10).

The Mission can help endorse the following outcomes: (1) formally recognize the urgency and opportunity of advancing food loss and waste reductions as a climate solution, aligned with the priority focus on Zero Waste and Food Security at COP31, and beyond. (2) Translate existing global and national commitments on food and waste into concrete policies and implementation roadmaps backed by political will, on the basis of available science, good policy practices, and solid monitoring and evaluation frameworks. (3) Unlock financial flows necessary to accelerate reductions in food waste, improve food security, cut methane emissions, and build resilient communities. These financial resources must reach national and sub-national actors that are delivering progress on the ground.

7. Ocean-climate action

Ocean action should be treated as a core development and economic transition priority, not a niche marine agenda. It spans food security, energy security, livelihoods and coastal resilience, and cuts across NDCs, NAPs, and National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans. Delivering on ocean action requires integrating ocean solutions into sector-specific commitments on energy,

agriculture and infrastructure, rather than treating them as standalone issues outside mainstream climate planning and finance.

Ocean-based solutions, from marine conservation to decarbonizing shipping, could deliver up to [35% of the emissions reductions needed](#) to stay on a 1.5 degrees C pathway by 2050, yet high-impact sectors (offshore renewables, maritime decarbonization, aquatic food systems) represent only around 12% of all ocean actions in 2025 NDCs. While [90% of updated coastal and island NDCs](#) include at least one ocean action, and the 2025 NDC Synthesis Report confirms that ocean ecosystems and coastal and low-lying regions are among the priority areas countries are including in adaptation components, most NDCs still lack standalone targets, concrete timelines, and finance allocations for ocean priorities. Nature-based solutions, including coastal zone targets, are gaining visibility in the latest NDC round, but the gap between inclusion and implementation remains wide.

The central challenge is no longer whether ocean action belongs in climate plans. It does. The challenge is whether countries have the governance, data, technical capacity and investment pipelines to implement what they have already committed to. Ocean priorities are often under-specified in national planning documents. NAPs may describe ocean adaptation in general terms without concrete targets, timelines or finance allocations, and ocean priorities bundled into broader sectoral categories can become harder to translate into finance proposals and targeted support.

The Mission can support stronger guidance on how ocean actions are structured in NDCs and NAPs, technical assistance for implementation-ready ocean components, and data and monitoring systems that allow finance to move from allocation to measurable results. It can also recognize the particular role of SIDS and Pacific Island nations as knowledge holders, regional leaders and co-architects of ocean-climate solutions, not only as vulnerable beneficiaries.

8. Adaptation, resilience and nature

Adaptation must be treated as a core implementation priority for the Mission. Climate risks are macro-critical and unless proactively managed, they can negatively affect economic growth, jobs, fiscal balances, trade, inflation, financial sector stability, labor markets, poverty and debt sustainability. Ministries of finance therefore have a central role in anticipating, planning for and financing adaptation, using appropriate economic and financial tools to boost the impact and efficiency of adaptation action.

WRI co-leads the Adaptation, Resilience, and Nature workstream of the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, one of the most important global mechanisms supporting how Ministries of Finance around the world manage climate risks. The goal of this work is to support how countries anticipate, plan for, and finance climate adaptation, using the most appropriate economic and financial tools to boost the impact and efficiency of adaptation actions.

Adaptation, Resilience, and Nature is one of five Coalition [thematic priorities](#). This workstream supports Finance Ministries in understanding and managing the macro-fiscal risks associated with

climate change and ecosystem degradation. Climate risks are “macro-critical”, which means that they will, unless proactively managed, negatively affect such macroeconomic variables as economic growth, jobs, fiscal balances, trade, inflation, financial sector stability, labor markets, poverty, and debt sustainability. Appreciative of this, Coalition members have prioritized the need to strengthen their skills to effectively manage these risks across both *ex ante* risk reduction and *ex post* risk management.

A practical capacity-building framework for adaptation should address three levels of action. At the upstream or macro level, countries need the ability to assess physical climate risks and ecosystem degradation and understand how these aggregate into macroeconomic and fiscal impacts. At the midstream or sectoral level, countries need tools for scenario analysis, sectoral pathways, public financial management and fiscal instruments, that support adaptation and nature. At the downstream or project level, countries need capacity for priority-setting, benefit maximization, decision-making under uncertainty, public finance, blended finance, and information that promotes private investment in risk reduction.

The Mission can support outcomes that encourage capacity building for risk assessment, economic planning and finance. This includes practical tools for priority-setting, costing and implementation arrangements for adaptation and nature-based investments, including support to subnational and local governments. It also includes diverse approaches to financing resilience and nature, such as public finance, private investment, resilience bonds, disaster risk finance, safety nets and other instruments appropriate to national circumstances.

9. Just Transition

Ensuring that NDCs and NAPs are implemented in a just manner can help ensure that economic restructuring does not deepen existing inequalities but supports equitable sharing of opportunities and promotes decent work. Implementing the just transition elements of NDCs and NAPs relies on a few mechanisms:

- 1- Strengthening social dialogue and inclusivity. Enabling meaningful participation of workers, communities, and other rights holders including women, children, Indigenous Peoples, and historically excluded and marginalized groups and improving coordination between public and private actors will support inclusive decision-making and more effective policy implementation.
- 2- Centering community needs and priorities in transition planning. Communities increasingly want a meaningful role in shaping decisions that will affect their neighborhoods and futures. Implementation of national and subnational measures must be accompanied by examining how communities can be engaged before major decisions are made, how local governments can better understand and respond to community priorities, and what public processes and supports help build trust and accountability around infrastructure development. Approaches such as [using legally binding agreements](#) (like community benefits agreements) and project plans between developers and local communities/local governments help communities shape better outcomes from infrastructure development while building the governance capacity needed for more transparent, equitable, and

durable implementation.

- 3- Integrating just transition planning elements within NDCs, NAPs, and LT-LEDS. This can signal countries' commitment to achieving these goals. Embedding JT planning into overarching documents such as NDCs can make the transition away from fossil fuels more than an abstract commitment; it can provide a visible pathway to a just transition by considering workforce transition, regional economic diversification, and social protection in national planning. As countries develop national Transition Away from Fossil Fuel (TAFF) Roadmaps, any national, sectoral and subnational priorities for ensuring a just and equitable transition reflected in these roadmaps can also be showcased in NDCs and other national policy documents for mainstreaming and alignment and signaling to the whole economy what a justice oriented development pathway could look like.
- 4- Developing [national just transition monitoring frameworks](#) can help track indicators related to declining fiscal dependence on fossil fuels, shifts in economic and labor structures, [social safety nets](#) for affected communities, workforce transition programs including reskilling, and investment in cleaner economic sectors and [SMEs](#). Monitoring should also include procedural justice elements such as stakeholder participation and restorative justice measures such as environmental remediation of closed mines. Robust monitoring and evaluation systems can inform policymaking, improve accountability and transparency, guide resource allocation, and attract investment to support the transition.
- 5- Complementing national approaches with subnational and sectoral just transition strategies is critical in regions/sectors most exposed to fossil fuel phase-down, [where job losses and declining fiscal revenues can have significant local impacts](#). Strengthening access to finance for regional economic diversification, aligning national and local policies, and [applying lessons from existing transition experiences](#) at the national and [subnational levels](#) can help ensure that the transition supports resilient, inclusive, and locally driven development outcomes.
- 6- At the international level, establishing new initiatives such as a [Just Transition Technical Support Center/Network](#) could help address these gaps by facilitating technical assistance and knowledge exchange for countries implementing just transition measures. Developed under the [UNFCCC's Just Transition Work Programme \(JTWP\)](#), the network could support the operationalization of the Just Transition Mechanism by providing guidance, sharing lessons from existing support mechanisms such as the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) and Santiago Network, organizing expert working groups, and creating platforms for collaboration and exchange of good practices. Such a network would help countries navigate the social and economic dimensions of transitioning away from fossil fuels. A Just Transition Technical Support Center/Network could also strengthen international cooperation to enhance climate ambition and enable the effective implementation of just transition elements of NDCs and NAPs.
- 7- Integrating green job creation and reskilling strategies directly into NDCs and NAPs can help bridge the gap between climate ambition and social equity. They ensure the shift to a low-carbon economy creates decent work, mitigates job loss in high-emitting industries, and prevents vulnerable workers and communities from being left behind during economic restructuring. [Reskilling programs](#) that provide a deliberate pathway for workers in shrinking

sectors to transition to expanding green sectors or other sectors can minimize displacement. Training programs can target historically marginalized groups who often face barriers to accessing well-paying jobs in the low-carbon economy. Emphasizing “[quality green jobs](#),” with metrics to measure and track these jobs, helps ensure that new jobs in the low-carbon economy pay decent wages, provide robust social protections, and uphold labor rights.

VI. Strengthening international cooperation for ambition and implementation

Ambition and implementation should be understood as two sides of the same coin and multilateral arenas must both send political signals and support delivery.

First, international cooperation should support implementation readiness of countries’ NDCs and NAPs. This includes calls for providing technical assistance for countries to develop sectoral pathways, project preparation, bankability, adaptation planning, access to climate finance, multilevel governance, and monitoring systems. It also includes support for countries to integrate NDCs, NAPs, and LT-LEDS with national development plans, sector strategies, subnational development plans and public investment systems.

Second, international cooperation can support countries in translating collective signals from the Global Stocktake and the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience. Countries could be encouraged, on a voluntary basis, to develop sectoral strategies and progress updates that build on their existing NDCs and identify concrete policies, investment priorities, support needs and enabling reforms. These strategies could focus on priority areas highlighted in the Global Stocktake, including complex transition such as transitioning away from fossil fuels, driving down transport emissions, and halting and reversing deforestation, as well as adaptation and resilience priorities under the UAE Framework such as water, health, ecosystems, biodiversity and infrastructure. This approach would help countries plan complex transitions and connect global goals to nationally determined implementation pathways, economic planning, and understand the tangible benefits and potential costs of action for people and the economy.

Third, country platforms can serve as practical vehicles for translating NDC and NAP priorities into bankable investments, increasingly integrating adaptation and nature alongside mitigation. They should be designed to support nationally determined priorities while helping coordinate development partners, public finance, private investment, project preparation and implementation support. Dedicated support is also needed to build bankable project pipelines at the community and subnational levels, recognizing that a significant share of potential urban emissions reductions depends on effective national-subnational collaboration.

Fourth, reforming the international financial architecture is essential to this implementation agenda. MDB reform, domestic budget alignment, private capital mobilization, and stronger regulatory frameworks for climate finance need to advance in parallel. South-South cooperation and structured peer-learning spaces should be integral to this architecture, enabling countries to exchange practical experience on long-term planning, country platforms, adaptation finance, just

transition, fossil fuel transition planning, and the integration of climate priorities into national development strategies.

Fifth, international cooperation should provide targeted support for just transition. A Just Transition Technical Support Center or Network, developed under the UNFCCC's Just Transition Work Programme, could facilitate technical assistance and knowledge exchange for countries implementing just transition measures. Such a network could provide guidance, share lessons from existing support mechanisms, organize expert working groups and create platforms for collaboration and exchange of good practices.

Sixth, international cooperative initiatives can play a stronger role in moving from commitments to implementation. Coalitions focused on coal phase-down, methane abatement, fossil fuel finance reform, clean energy deployment and industrial decarbonization can support peer learning, policy coordination, technical assistance and access to finance. To maximize their contribution, these initiatives should become more delivery-oriented, with clearer objectives, stronger accountability, improved monitoring and reporting, and greater responsiveness to countries with high fossil fuel dependence and limited implementation capacity.

Seventh, international cooperation should support implementation of forest and land-use priorities. This includes technical cooperation and capacity building to address gaps in forest monitoring, data systems and measurement methodologies; institutional strengthening; REDD+, results-based finance, concessional finance and alignment with development finance and private capital; sustainable value chains for forest products; and regulatory improvements that support sustainable trade and address environmental crime. These efforts can help countries translate commitments to halt and reverse deforestation and forest degradation by 2030 into concrete national action and measurable results.

Finally, international cooperation on ocean-climate action should focus on making ocean priorities more visible, implementable and finance-ready across UNFCCC processes. The Enhanced Transparency Framework can play a stronger role by ensuring that ocean-based mitigation and adaptation actions are consistently reflected in Biennial Transparency Reports, technical expert reviews and synthesis reports, so that countries' needs can be matched with finance, technical assistance and peer learning. The Mission should also center SIDS and Pacific Island nations as regional leaders and co-architects of ocean-climate solutions, given their experience at the intersection of food security, coastal resilience and climate vulnerability. Building on the Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue, the Blue NDC Challenge and the political momentum toward COP31, the Mission can help establish a more coherent ocean-climate implementation agenda by tracking gaps between ocean-related needs and available support, directing partners toward unmet demand, and strengthening continuity across COP presidencies.

VII. Proposed next steps for the Belém Mission to 1.5

Looking ahead, the Belém Mission to 1.5 can help create a bridge between the first Global Stocktake, near-term implementation of NDCs, and the second Global Stocktake. The Mission's

report can provide a structured input into GST2 by clarifying where collective progress is off track, where implementation support is most urgently needed, and how countries and non-state actors can accelerate delivery up to 2035. To do this, the Mission could draw on science-based targets and indicators to identify priority areas for implementation and thereafter organize its findings around priority systems and sectors, including energy, forests and land use, food systems, oceans, cities and infrastructure, adaptation and resilience, finance, and just transition. It can also identify enabling conditions across these areas, including governance, project preparation, finance, capacity building, technology, data, monitoring and transparency. A key contribution of the Mission would be to show how mitigation and adaptation priorities can be advanced together, rather than treated as separate agendas. Many high-impact solutions deliver co-benefits across both: forest protection and restoration can reduce emissions, protect biodiversity, strengthen water security and reduce climate vulnerability; resilient, low-carbon infrastructure can reduce future losses while supporting cleaner growth; food loss and waste reduction can cut methane, improve food security and reduce pressure on land; ocean and coastal solutions can support livelihoods, resilience and mitigation; and just transition planning can strengthen social resilience while enabling economic restructuring. As a practical next step, the Mission could recommend voluntary sectoral, implementation and investment strategies that countries may submit to inform GST2, building on their existing NDCs, NAPs and LT-LEDS. These inputs could help track progress, identify support needs, share lessons, and strengthen international cooperation around implementation. In doing so, the Mission can help support a GST2 that serves as a platform for accelerating solutions across priority systems.