



## Submission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands on the Belem Mission to 1.5

### Introduction and approach:

For the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), the Belem Mission to 1.5 must inspire much greater ambition and much faster action, and address the bottlenecks that prevent them. This exercise must be holistic: mitigation, adaptation, and means of implementation are not separate tracks to be balanced against one another, but a linked response to a single threat. It must reaffirm that the purpose of our collective work to combat climate change is for the protection of people, ecosystems and future generations, and that it is the test which both ambition and implementation are assessed against.

As RMI, we are faced with a difficult reality: we rely on others to keep their promises and see them through, so that we have a chance at keeping our country safe and exercising our right to remain. We face hard limits to adaptation, thresholds beyond which no seawall, no relocation, and no volume of finance can prevent the loss of territory and livelihoods. Above 1.5°C, there is no adaptation that will be enough to protect us. Every tonne of greenhouse gas emitted, and every year of overshoot, moves us closer to those limits and into a permanent loss and damage reality. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has clarified that States carry binding obligations to protect the climate system, including through addressing fossil fuels, a legal foundation the Belem Mission to 1.5 should reinforce.

The best available science, as assessed by the IPCC, is the foundation for everything that follows. It defines the urgency of the threat, the speed of response required, and the direction in which ambition and implementation must be steered. The science is unambiguous: global emissions must fall by close to half this decade to keep 1.5°C within reach. The Seventh Assessment Round Working Group 3 Report will be particularly important in providing guidance on how this can be achieved.

This binds the agenda together: the scale of mitigation ambition and pace of implementation determines whether adaptation remains possible; and the credibility and delivery of means of implementation, particularly finance, determines the extent to which either can be implemented by those without the means to act alone. That implementation must itself be just, protecting workers and the most vulnerable, upholding human rights, and equipping all of society to understand, engage and own this transition.

Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), and the funds under the financial mechanism, are where these commitments become real. But they are stalling at the point of delivery. Trust in delivery has eroded because current commitments under the Paris Agreement, and its subsequent decisions, are not being kept. Rebuilding this trust starts with honoring what has already been promised.

The decisions we have collectively taken as part of the UNFCCC process should dictate our national behavior in terms of how we shape a climate-safe future. The value of the Belem Mission to 1.5 will be measured by the political capital it will generate to implement solutions that significantly move the needle on emissions reductions by 2030, and not only by the report it will produce this year. This submission focuses on the most urgent and highest-impact elements that should elevate ambition and implementation for NAPs and NDCs.

The elements proposed below differ in nature and the extent of their current development. Through their report concluding the work of the Belem Mission to 1.5, reflecting the urgency required, the Presidencies should identify the appropriate mandate, timetable and vehicle for accelerating the various solutions proposed to advance NDCs and NAPs. Delivering them will take effort on all fronts and, above all, leadership: from the COP Presidencies, from Parties, and from the institutions and coalitions that surround this process.

Our vision for COP 31 is an outcome that matches the Belem Mission to 1.5's mandate: a clear reaffirmation that overshoot must be minimized in scope and duration and eventually reversed; an urgent response to the NDC ambition and implementation gap that does not simply defer to the second Global Stocktake; an adaptation package that pairs the GGA targets with the finance and delivery mechanisms to meet them, including the NAP implementation support package; and finance commitments that are honored and front-loaded to support scaled-up near-term action.

To this end, the Marshall Islands is making seven key recommendations for the focus of the Belem Mission to 1.5 report:

1. Agreeing a global response to overshoot
2. Accelerating the transition away from fossil fuels
3. A comprehensive cross-sectoral approach to delivering emission reductions beyond energy
4. Elevating adaptation and promoting an on-time delivery of the Global Goal on Adaptation
5. Delivering what was promised on climate finance
6. Closing the adaptation finance gap
7. Accelerating uptake and implementation of technological solutions

These are explored in greater detail in the following section and summarised in the final section of this submission. It should be noted that many of these recommendations require a commitment to action beyond COP 31. This implies that the Belem Mission to 1.5 recommendations must be taken up and followed up by the political process on the road to and beyond the second Global Stocktake.

## Key recommendations:

### 1. Agreeing a global response to overshoot

**Treat overshoot as a temporary breach to be reversed as soon as possible, not a planning horizon.** We acknowledge that overshoot of 1.5°C is now likely, but we reject entirely any suggestion to treat higher temperatures as settled horizons for adaptation planning. Incremental levels of warming describe escalating risk, need and cost, not baselines to which NAPs should be designed. The larger and longer the overshoot, the greater the irreversible loss and damage and the faster hard adaptation limits arrive. Several of those hard limits are already observed. For RMI, prolonged overshoot erases our ability to meet the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) targets and exhausts the adaptation any NAP could deliver. The Belem Mission to 1.5 must reaffirm that the task of parties is to strictly limit the magnitude and duration of overshoot and bring temperatures back below 1.5°C as fast as possible, and help put us on a pathway to collectively do so. This reaffirmation should be anchored in the COP 31 outcome, and carried forward as the agreed framing for the second Global Stocktake, so that no process under the Convention and/or the Paris Agreement treats overshoot as a settled destination.

**Uphold the best available science as collated, assessed, and summarized by the IPCC, as the basis for the UNFCCC process.** The credibility of every decision under this process depends on grounding it in the best available science, as assessed by the IPCC. On overshoot, that science is clear and must be defended against dilution: 1.5°C remains the benchmark, overshoot is a dangerous breach to be minimized and reversed rather than a level to settle at. The same science also defines adaptation and loss and damage as the costs of inaction, which will grow exponentially as we reach, and overshoot, 1.5°C. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should reaffirm the best available science, and the IPCC, as the foundation for the decisions in the UNFCCC process. The most immediate next step is ensuring the IPCC's Seventh Assessment Report is delivered in time to inform the second Global Stocktake, a matter for Parties to secure through the IPCC process this year.

**Recognise carbon dioxide removal's (CDR) assessed scientific role.** CDR is being cast by some as an open-ended backstop, or as a tool to allow for continued fossil fuel expansion. The IPCC has identified that the role it should play is narrow, compensating for residual emissions and drawing temperatures down after a peak - a limited and necessary supplement to, and not a substitute for, deep emission cuts - and one that is most effective when deep emissions cuts have already occurred, especially through the transition away from fossil fuels. This understanding of the role of CDR in emissions reductions pathways is further confirmed in the recently published Highest Possible Ambition<sup>1</sup> scenario that updates the IPCC AR 6 assessed emissions pathways based on 2025 levels of global emissions. The report confirms that although CDR has some role to play in bringing overshoot temperatures back below 1.5°C pre-2100, it is no replacement for deep reductions in fossil fuel production and use. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should reflect this science clearly.

**Close the ambition gap with NDCs that keep 1.5°C within reach.** Successive rounds of NDCs have bent the curve. The latest cycle represents real progress, but the collective effort still falls well short of what the IPCC shows us is required, leaving the world on track to overshoot. The Belem Mission to 1.5 must live up to its name, clearly identifying that 1.5°C remains the benchmark for NDC alignment, recognizing the progress made, and pressing for

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<sup>1</sup> Climate Analytics and PIK (2025). Rescuing 1.5°C: New evidence on highest possible ambition to deliver the Paris Agreement. <https://ca1-clm.edcdn.com/publications/Rescuing1.5%C2%BAC.pdf?v=1762362849>

the steeper near-term ambition that closing the remaining gap demands. This will require the COP presidencies to work with Parties to submit 1.5°C-aligned NDCs where they have yet to submit, or to resubmit where their current NDCs have failed to align to 1.5°C. Several major emitters, including G20 members, have failed to submit 2035 NDCs or submitted NDCs without clear baselines and targets, or which have regressed in ambition. This is contrary to the Paris Agreement and unacceptable to us. Many other major emitters and other developed countries have submitted NDCs incompatible with global 1.5°C pathways. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should not accept this as a done deal. The COP 30 and COP 31 Presidencies, supported by the UN Secretary-General, should lead direct engagement with the Parties concerned this year to address their failings.

## **2. Accelerating the transition away from fossil fuels**

**Keep a focus on the achievement of the energy goals in the first global stocktake outcome that deliver real emission reductions.** Mature and cost-effective renewables are the core tool of energy decarbonization. Coordinated cuts to both fossil fuel supply and demand are needed to keep prices stable as the transition proceeds. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should endorse the spirit of international cooperation embodied in the Santa Marta process, and strive to amplify the solutions found in its work and those captured in the Brazilian Presidency's Roadmap on Transitioning Away From Fossil Fuels (TAFF) and the related activities under the Action Agenda. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should propose a process for regular and consistent tracking of the energy goals agreed under the first global stocktake, so as to inform timely responses ahead of their 2030 deadlines.

**Encourage the development of national, regional and sectoral TAFF roadmaps.** Building from the Presidency's global TAFF Roadmap, the Belem Mission to 1.5 should encourage the development of national, regional and fuel-specific roadmaps with concrete milestones, sectoral targets, and policy measures covering domestic energy use, demand reduction in the energy and other sectors, fossil fuel imports and exports, energy security considerations, domestic and international fossil finance including explicit and implicit subsidies, and economic diversification and just transition considerations, as well as investment and technical needs which may help to progress negotiated outcomes. The Pacific is exploring a 100% renewables roadmap, a joined-up regional strategy to accelerate the transition, achieve energy security and independence, and attract investment. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should encourage and showcase such regional roadmaps within its work, recognizing them as practical vehicles that translate global ambition into regional delivery that other regions can adapt to their own circumstances.

**Promote the reduction and elimination of fossil fuel subsidies.** Fossil fuel subsidies not only keep fossil fuels artificially cheaper, they hide the true environmental and health costs of fossil energy production. The Belem Mission to 1.5 process should urge Parties to commit to the transparent mapping of fossil fuel subsidies at the national level, to inform the second global stocktake and to promote the removal, reduction, restriction and redirection of fossil fuel subsidies.

**Commit to not building new oil, coal, or gas infrastructure.** Extraction from existing fossil fuel infrastructure is already putting us on a path to overshoot 1.5°C. The IPCC 6th Assessment Report made it clear that projected cumulative lifetime emissions from existing fossil fuel infrastructure are enough to prevent keeping 1.5°C within reach. The Belem Mission to 1.5 process should include high level recommendations for a COP 31 outcome that reflects these findings.

**Encourage the safe decommissioning and repurposing of fossil fuel infrastructure.** The impacts of fossil fuel infrastructure can linger beyond its useful life. Abandoned wells, asset corrosion, and methane leakage affect shared ecosystems, resulting in air, water, and ocean pollution. Safe, permanent decommissioning protocols, with costs clearly allocated, not only reduce runaway greenhouse emissions, but protect human, ecosystem and economic health long-term. Bringing together producer countries and first movers in dialogue on shared decommissioning protocols, and using processes like the Global Implementation Accelerator, or the Santa Marta Conference or others, would advance this element.

**Recommend limitations to fossil fuel use by new demand drivers, including data centers.** The Belem Mission to 1.5 must be alert to rising electricity demand from potential new drivers such as artificial intelligence and its related data centers. It should recommend commitments to ensure that new demand is met by clean capacity and curbed through efficiency measures, and not used to justify new fossil fuel exploration and generation.

**Reject nuclear energy, or carbon capture and storage (CCS) or other CDR technologies, as justifications for delay in ending dependence on fossil fuels within NDCs, LT-LEDS, TAFF roadmaps or in any other domestic energy plans.** Studies show that CCS and CDR technologies will have a role to play, but the Belem Mission to 1.5 should be clear about how far and how fast they can contribute: greenhouse gas emissions must halve this decade, a window in which CCS cannot meaningfully scale, and their costs, lead times and safety must be weighed accordingly. NDCs should bank on proven near-term solutions and not let longer-term options lock in fossil infrastructure or divert resources from solar, wind and storage. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should not include solutions predicated on these technologies and should encourage Parties to avoid an over-reliance on them in their NDCs and LT-LEDS.

**Propose global clean electrification targets for 2030 and 2035.** Electrification is a necessary complement to clean power generation to achieve the needed emission reductions. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should support a shared global goal as part of the negotiated COP31 outcomes to raise the share of electricity from clean generation in final energy consumption to at least 30% by 2030 and at least 35% by 2035. This should be accompanied by complementary milestones for high-impact end uses such as electric vehicles, industrial production, and building heating. This will also require support for countries without the means to invest in these changes themselves and where investment is unattractive for the private sector, including support for solutions tailored to local circumstances. This could also be a priority area for promoting international cooperation and investment for the Global Implementation Accelerator.

**Recommend targets to cut methane and other non-CO2 gases fast, including via the UN Secretary-General's Call to Action on Methane.** Cutting methane is the fastest and most cost-effective available brake on near-term warming, yet action is still lagging behind. A near-zero methane standard for oil and gas and an end to routine flaring and venting, alongside action on nitrous oxide and fluorinated gases, should be reflected directly in updated NDCs, enacted with urgency, and reported in BTRs. The UN Secretary-General's Call to Action and existing alliances, including the Global Methane Pledge, provide natural conduits for this ambition. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should urge major emitting Parties to take the actions required, and the COP Presidencies should champion those initiatives, including through the Action Agenda and Global Implementation Accelerator.

**Drive the decarbonization of international shipping and aviation.** Maritime and aviation emissions are rarely reflected in NDCs, yet keeping 1.5°C within reach is impossible without radically reducing them. A just and equitable transition of the maritime and aviation sectors

to 1.5°C aligned timelines, backed by clear fuel alternatives, investment and incentives, is an urgent priority for this year. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should reflect these priorities, and the Presidencies should support ambitious action in these sectors. This includes building political commitment for adoption of the International Maritime Organization's Net Zero Framework, full compliance with the first round of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)'s Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation, and putting in place targeted levies on frequent fliers and private jets. Primary responsibility for delivery sits with Parties acting through the IMO and ICAO to ensure global, just and equitable transitions.

**Champion the diversification of clean energy supply chains and investment in circular approaches.** The transition risks introducing new dependencies, including the concentration of critical minerals in a handful of producers and processors and the perpetuation of unjust patterns of resource extraction in developing countries and Indigenous communities. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should incorporate the insights of the UN Secretary-General's Initiative on Critical Energy Transition Minerals, recognize the importance of Free Prior and Informed Consent for mineral supply chains associated with Indigenous Peoples territories, support diversified supply chains, recycling and circular economy approaches, and local value addition, so that clean energy does not reproduce the geopolitical vulnerabilities and price shocks of the fossil era in a different form.

### **3. Take a comprehensive cross-sectoral approach to delivering emission reductions beyond energy**

**Halt and reverse deforestation and protect carbon sinks.** Forests are among the largest and most cost-effective carbon sinks available, yet deforestation continues to erode them, releasing stored carbon and undermining the ecosystems and biodiversity that climate stability depends on. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should draw upon existing initiatives and advance action to meet the global stocktake commitment to halt and reverse deforestation and forest degradation by 2030, by drawing on the COP 30 Presidency's Deforestation Roadmap, connecting it to NDC and national implementation plans, and supporting the finance and forest-country partnerships, including mechanisms that reward standing forests, needed to deliver it. This can also be supported in the context of the Global Implementation Accelerator.

**Cut emissions from waste.** Waste is a significant and often overlooked source of emissions, particularly methane from landfill and organic decomposition, and one where action delivers fast results alongside clear health and development benefits. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should urge parties to commit to reducing methane emissions from the waste sector by 30-35% below 2020 levels by 2030 and nearly 55% by 2050 in line with IPCC 1.5-aligned pathways. Waste is already often mentioned in Parties' NDCs, and its solutions are known and used. But waste management cannot advance everywhere in the same way: it has to be a coherent part of urban and rural planning and adapted to the geographies it serves. Densely populated continental cities, remote rural areas, and small dispersed atoll environments like RMI, where land is scarce and exporting or landfilling waste is acutely difficult, each demand different solutions and different support. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should help drive fit-for-purpose waste management, through the Action Agenda including through the COP 31 Presidency's Zero Waste Initiative, with recommendations on integrating it into spatial planning and tailoring finance and infrastructure to local realities.

**Transform agriculture and food systems.** Agriculture is both a source of emissions, especially methane and nitrous oxide, and one of the sectors most exposed to climate

impacts, placing it at the heart of both adaptation and mitigation. Many of the tools to be food secure but less emission-intensive already exist, from improved livestock feeds and low emission rice cultivation to better soil and water management. But they remain concentrated where they were developed rather than reaching the farmers who need them. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should support the scaling and transfer of these climate resilient and agroecological practices, by recommending the provision of the finance and capacity-building needed to operate them locally, and the channelling of dedicated grant finance to smallholders and the most vulnerable, so that climate action in agriculture strengthens food security. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should support phasing-out harmful agricultural subsidies, as current subsidies overwhelmingly favor high-emission industrial production and they can be immediately redirected to support climate-resilient, sustainable and regenerative agriculture. A just transition for the agricultural sector should deliver on all goals together: climate, biodiversity, food and development.

#### **4. Elevating adaptation and delivering the GGA on time**

**Reaffirm adaptation as a shared global responsibility rooted in justice, rather than a cost to be borne by those on the frontlines.** Adaptation is too often framed as the task of each vulnerable government to manage alone, but were it not for climate change, the developing world and SIDS would not be diverting scarce resources, year after year, to defend ourselves against a crisis we did not cause. **Adaptation is therefore not merely a development activity, it is a matter of justice, and the means to achieve it are the responsibility of those who created the problem.** The GGA is the global anchor for that responsibility: it makes resilience a shared objective, and the Belem Mission to 1.5, and COP 31 outcomes, should reaffirm it as a test of collective ambition, not of individual national effort.

**Address the transboundary dimensions of adaptation.** Many climate risks, including those impacting oceans, fisheries, water basins, food security, health and migration, cross borders and cannot be adapted to one country at a time. Sea level rise, heat and ocean acidification affect entire regions. Food security is among the clearest of these shared risks: climate impacts on agriculture and fisheries cross borders and supply chains, and for import-dependent atoll states they translate directly into nutrition and livelihood insecurity. Building climate resilient agriculture and food security is therefore a shared global priority that no country can secure alone. **The current architecture treats adaptation as almost entirely national, leaving these shared and systemic risks unaddressed.** The Belem Mission to 1.5 should establish how transboundary and regional adaptation is planned, governed and financed at the global level, including through regional cooperation, shared early warning and observation systems. Dedicated dialogues between Parties, industries and financial sectors organized around the major transboundary risks, should be convened and carried forward to the second global stocktake, so that shared risks are met with shared planning and shared governance rather than left to fall between national mandates.

**Recognise NAPs as an opportunity to build security.** Climate change is a threat multiplier, and the failure to implement adaptation in time drives displacement, food and water insecurity, and instability that cross borders. Many NAPs have been submitted, and many more will be submitted soon. The aggregation of these NAPs give a global direction for safety and should therefore be recognized not only as environmental or development instruments but as part of the global security agenda. Elevating them in the forums and to the actors that an environmental framing alone does not reach, could help mobilize the urgency and resources their delivery demands, as a cost effective part of defence planning and spending. For atoll nations like RMI, timely NAP delivery is inseparable from national security. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should identify how NAPs form a part of security

architecture, and Presidencies should carry this framing beyond the UNFCCC, into the UN Security Council, regional security forums and national defence planning.

**Recognize that adaptation is needed on two tracks: incremental and transformational.**

Incremental, project level measures are essential, but they are not sufficient on their own. As impacts intensify, whole communities require large-scale protection which touch upon several sectors at once. This means adaptation finance must also move beyond readiness and fragmented projects to fund the large-scale, multimillion dollar interventions that accelerate NAP implementation at multi-sectoral and transformational levels. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should recognize the need to deliver adaptation at multiple levels, and the finance required to do so. It should set out a range of solutions climate finance providers should deliver, from local grants to communities to major, multi-country investments, and transparently demonstrating their financial commitment to both tracks. Political leverage from COP Presidencies and other relevant stakeholders is needed to ensure the financial system caters to those adaptation needs, including by adopting multi-year programmatic windows for large scale adaptation projects.

**Make NAP delivery the route to GGA achievement, through spaces that find and clear the bottlenecks.** Most developing countries now have or are preparing NAPs, but implementation, not planning, is what will deliver the GGA targets by 2030, and the frameworks serving those targets are scattered across many UN and non-UN bodies with no single place for Parties to steer them. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should establish dedicated spaces for each thematic target - water, food and agriculture, health, ecosystems, infrastructure and settlements, poverty and livelihoods, and cultural heritage - in which Parties set the direction and call in the relevant institutions (i.e. WMO and UNDRR on early warning, WHO on health, FAO on food, the CBD on ecosystems, UN-Habitat on settlements). These spaces should build a shared picture of what has enabled delivery and where it stalls, surfacing the chokepoints, from technology and capacity limitations to the finance gap and limited access to finance, so that support is targeted where it is actually needed. Taking place before the second global stocktake, they would give all Parties a clear view of each sector's situation and turn the aggregate of NAPs into measurable progress toward the 2030 targets.

## **5. Delivering what was promised on climate finance**

**Implement Article 9 of the Paris Agreement and the NCQG, and demonstrate measurable progress.** The obligation already exists; developed countries are to provide and mobilize finance for developing countries. The NCQG converted these principles into explicit commitments, with developed countries to take the lead in mobilizing at least USD 300 billion per year for developing countries by 2035, within a broader effort to scale finance from all sources to USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035. Yet the funds the most vulnerable developing countries rely on are shrinking rather than growing. The task now is delivery and accountability, and progress should be demonstrable and tracked year on year, with a clear and rising trajectory rather than reaffirmed intentions. The NCQG progress review will be undertaken in 2028, however, we need a regular and comprehensive update. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should commit to an annual report which includes updates on climate finance from all finance providers, and incorporates updates on the delivery of the Baku to Belem Roadmap to \$1.3 trillion.

**Make finance predictable.** Climate action cannot be planned against finance that cannot be counted on, and predictability is essential for NDCs and NAPs. All finance providers should publish forward looking, multi-year projections of their climate finance, including developed countries through their biennial communications. Minimum allocation floors or funding

envelopes for SIDS should be established at the climate funds and the MDBs, given their acute exposure and thin margins. As one concrete and immediate step, the Belem Mission to 1.5 should commit to increase the GEF Special Climate Change Fund envelope for SIDS to USD 10 million, since it is the only dedicated fund for SIDS with a grant modality.

**Push access reforms to the finish line.** Developing countries, including RMI, face red tape at dozens of funds, banks, and bilateral providers, each with its own eligibility rules, application formats, and reporting templates, a burden that the smallest administrations cannot carry. The solutions are readily available: implement the access provisions of the NCQG, scale direct access, harmonize application and reporting requirements across the MDBs and bilateral providers, recognize accreditation mutually across the funds to end duplicative processes, adopt multi-year programmatic windows approved in a single decision, and reduce administration fees while allowing realistic implementation timelines. Prioritize regional and national funds and direct access entities that put resources under the control of those closest to the need, such as RMI's Marshall Islands' Resilience and Adaptation Trust Fund. The mandates to improve access are already agreed in Article 9.9 and paragraphs 21–24 of the NCQG decision. COP Presidency leadership, and MDB board members' leadership is required to ensure those mandates are delivered.

**A more coherent international system.** Decisions that affect climate change are also made beyond the UNFCCC, by the MDBs, the G7 and G20, the World Trade Organization, the IMF, bilateral providers and credit rating agencies and others. These bodies move on different timelines, answer to different mandates, and rarely align with what Parties agree under the Paris Agreement. Article 2.1c commits Parties to making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low emissions and climate resilient development, but that consistency cannot be achieved by the UNFCCC alone, since the decisions that shape those flows sit largely outside it. International cooperation is the only way to mainstream climate across all these forums, so that the same objective governs decisions wherever they are taken. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should encourage climate finance providers and decision-makers to identify and implement actions to reduce fragmentation and accelerate financial reform.

**Capitalize the Fund for Loss and Damage.** The Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) has been established and has started work quickly. It is vital that the momentum on this critical issue does not drop. Ensuring the adequate capitalization for the Fund is vital for delivering justice for those on the frontlines, but also for demonstrating that this process can work for the most vulnerable. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should set a specific FRLD replenishment target to at least triple current capitalization by 2027, and set a goal (beyond 2027) which recognizes that the cost of disasters in a climate-changed world exceed over \$2.3 trillion annually, according to UNDRR.

## **6. Closing the adaptation finance gap**

**Accept the nature of adaptation finance and default to grant-based and highly concessional finance.** Adaptation is at odds with the logic of classic investment: its returns are long-term, often invisible, and accrue to whole communities and ecosystems rather than to a balance sheet. This is why the ceiling for private finance's contribution to adaptation especially in the most exposed economies is low. The priority adaptation needs are resilience actions that generate no revenue and cannot service debt, yet an increasing share of adaptation finance arrives as loans, deepening the debt of the very States it should help, with over half of global climate finance now debt-based. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should acknowledge that adaptation finance, particularly for NAP implementation, should be made up, in the vast majority, of grants, or highly concessional finance. Climate-resilient debt clauses that suspend payments when a disaster strikes should also be a standard, automatic feature of

lending. Blended finance, guarantees, and similar instruments have a role to play, but this is limited and they must not be treated as a substitute for the public, grant-based finance that adaptation requires. COP 31 outcomes should provide the assurance that grant-based and highly concessional finance for adaptation will increase at the needed rate.

**Set out a path to closing the adaptation finance gap.** Developed countries were urged to at least double their provision of annual adaptation finance from 2019 levels by 2025, and that has not been demonstrably met. The at least tripling by 2035 target, which amounts to the provision of USD 120 billion a year, is a floor, not a ceiling, set against UNEP's estimate of USD 310 to 365 billion in annual adaptation needs to 2035. Most of the adaptation finance from the tripling should come through grants, and through the operating entities of the financial mechanism. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should set those targets at COP 31, reaffirm the tripling goal to be at least 120 billion USD by 2035, propose interim milestones for the tripling goal, and urge developed country Parties to report transparently on their adaptation finance provision this year and every year. Adaptation finance is needed urgently, and must be front-loaded, rising year on year rather than deferred to the end of the commitment period.

**Mobilize new public sources, including levies.** Closing a gap of this scale requires predictable, public revenue at scale. Solidarity levies on highly polluting and undertaxed activities, such as fossil fuel extraction, shipping, and aviation, can provide grant-based finance that does not add to debt. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should advance these options to complement budgetary contributions in line with Article 9 responsibilities.

**Establish a NAP implementation support package, anchored by seed funding.** Closing the gap between submission and implementation takes more than money alone. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should advance an integrated package combining grant based finance, project preparation, technology transfer, capacity-building, and direct access support for NAPs for SIDS, to be adopted at COP 31. At its core should be NAP seed funding: USD 3 million in grant based, low conditionality support for every developing country that submits a NAP, disbursed within three to six months, with the NAP itself as the application. The seed funding would give governments the flexibility to act immediately, while the surrounding package builds the pipelines, capacity, and access routes to sustain delivery, turning submitted NAPs into implemented NAPs and help elevate these plans as the political instruments of resilience.

## **7. Accelerating uptake and implementation of technological solutions**

**Develop and scale solutions designed for the most exposed conditions.** Technologies built for continental grids and large markets rarely fit small, dispersed settings like those of atolls, while local solutions that already work are too often overlooked in favor of imports. RMI's hybrid low carbon vessel, the Juren Ae, launched alongside the revival of traditional Marshallese boatbuilding, shows that solutions led by the most affected are deployable. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should support the development, testing and certification of fit-for-purpose solutions, from microgrids and storage, and focus funds to scale proven models across regions, turning pilots into pipelines. The Belem Technology Implementation Programme should be used to accelerate the uptake of adaptation technologies for the most vulnerable, including in climate resilient agriculture and fisheries.

**Make holistic support a condition of climate technology finance.** Climate finance for technology should be a full package from the outset: spare parts, maintenance financing, a

local operations plan, and the training, certification and employment of local technicians, with knowledge transfer to domestic institutions as a deliverable in its own right. This is a priority for RMI. Such training and certifications should advance gender-responsive approaches by recruiting, training, and certifying women technicians, ensuring equitable access to technical roles, and tailoring programs to overcome barriers to women's involvement. This coupling of the delivery of technological solutions with local maintenance, operations planning, and training should become a standing feature of climate finance across all finance providers. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should set out best practice from financial providers, and the next steps so that capacity-building and sustainability is ensured through all climate projects, especially for SIDS. The Paris Committee on Capacity-building or the Technology Executive Committee could provide this information.

**Accelerate early warning systems as a top priority with universal coverage, with the capacity to run them.** Meeting the 2027 early warning target demands urgent scale up of monitoring and observation systems. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should treat early warning as a frontline, time bound priority, accelerating deployment while pairing every system with the local capacity to operate it, so that science delivers protection at the speed the crisis demands. It should also commit to a political stocktake at UNGA81 to understand the progress towards the early warning target from the UAE Framework on Global Climate Resilience.

**Connect the ocean and climate regimes to drive action across them.** Ocean-climate action is currently fragmented across separate processes, the UNFCCC, the law of the sea and the new High Seas Treaty, regional fisheries bodies, the IMO, and biodiversity frameworks, each governing a piece of an indivisible system. For ocean States this incoherence is costly: warming, acidification, shifting fish stocks and sea level rise cut across all of them at once. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should promote alignment, so that the common good that is the ocean is protected and can continue delivering its services to the people that depend on them.

## Summary points:

### 1. *Agreeing a global response to overshoot*

- **Treat overshoot as a temporary breach to be reversed as soon as possible, not a planning horizon.** Reaffirm that the task is to strictly limit the magnitude and duration of overshoot and anchor this in the COP 31 outcome.
- **Uphold the best available science as the basis for the UNFCCC process.** The most immediate test is delivering AR7 in time to inform the second Global Stocktake.
- **Limit carbon dioxide removal (CDR) to what it can actually do.** It is a supplement to deep emission cuts, not a substitute for them.
- **Close the ambition gap with NDCs that keep 1.5°C within reach.** The COP 30 and COP 31 Presidencies, supported by the UN Secretary-General, should lead direct engagement with the Parties concerned this year so COP 31 can respond to the gap rather than note it.

### 2. *Delivering the rapid transition away from fossil fuels*

- **Keep a focus on delivery of the energy goals in the first global stocktake outcome that deliver real emission reductions.** Propose a process for regular and consistent tracking of the energy goals agreed under the first global stocktake, so as to inform timely responses ahead of their 2030 deadlines.
- **Encourage the development of national, regional and sectoral TAFF roadmaps.**
- **Promote the reduction and elimination of fossil fuel subsidies.** Urge Parties to commit to the transparent mapping of fossil fuel subsidies at the national level, to inform the second global stocktake and to promote their removal, reduction, restriction and redirection.
- **Commit to not building new oil, coal, or gas infrastructure.**
- **Encourage the safe decommissioning and repurposing of fossil fuel infrastructure.** Bring together producer countries and first movers in dialogue on shared decommissioning protocols.
- **Ensure limitations to fossil fuel use by new demand drivers, including data centers.** Recommend commitments to ensure that new demand is met by clean capacity and curbed through efficiency measures, and not used to justify new fossil fuel exploration and generation.
- **Reject nuclear energy, or carbon capture and storage (CCS) or other CDR technologies, as a justification for delay in ending dependence on fossil fuels within NDCs, LT-LEDS, TAFF roadmaps or in any other domestic energy plans.**
- **Propose global clean electrification targets for 2030 and 2035:** a shared global goal as part of the negotiated COP31 outcomes to raise the share of electricity from clean generation in final energy consumption to at least 30% by 2030 and at least 35% by 2035. This should be accompanied by complementary milestones

for high-impact end uses such as electric vehicles, industrial production, and building heating.

- **Recommend targets to cut methane and other non-CO<sub>2</sub> gases fast, including via the UN Secretary-General's Call to Action on Methane.**
- **Drive the decarbonization of international shipping and aviation**, building political commitment for adoption of the International Maritime Organization's Net Zero Framework and full compliance with the first round of the International Civil Aviation Organization's Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation and putting in place targeted levies on frequent fliers and private jets.
- **Champion the diversification of clean energy supply chains and investment in circular approaches.** Incorporate the insights of the UN Secretary-General's Initiative on Critical Energy Transition Minerals, recognize the importance of Free Prior and Informed Consent for mineral supply chains associated with Indigenous Peoples territories, support diversified supply chains, recycling and circular economy approaches, and local value addition.

### **3. *Taking a cross-sectoral approach beyond energy***

- **Halt and reverse deforestation and protect carbon sinks.** Advance action to halt and reverse deforestation and forest degradation by 2030, by drawing on the COP 30 Presidency's Deforestation Roadmap, connecting it to NDC and national plan implementation, and supporting the finance and forest-country partnerships, including mechanisms that reward standing forests, needed to deliver it.
- **Cut emissions from waste**, and urge parties to commit to reduce methane emissions from the waste sector by 30-35% below 2020 levels by 2030 and nearly 55% by 2050 in line with IPCC 1.5-aligned pathways.
- **Transform agriculture and food systems.** Support the scaling and transfer of climate resilient and agroecological practices, with the finance and capacity-building needed to operate them locally, and channel dedicated grant finance to smallholders and the most vulnerable. Redirect harmful agricultural subsidies to climate-resilient, sustainable and regenerative agriculture.

### **4. *Elevating adaptation and delivering the GGA on time***

- **Reaffirm adaptation as a shared global responsibility rooted in justice.** The means to adapt are the responsibility of those who created the problem. The GGA anchors that responsibility and the COP 31 outcome should affirm it.
- **Address the transboundary dimensions of adaptation.** Risks to oceans, fisheries, water, food security, health and migration cross borders. Dedicated dialogues between Parties, industries and financial sectors, organized around major transboundary risks, should be convened and carried to the second Global Stocktake.
- **Recognize NAPs as an opportunity to build security.** Climate change is a threat multiplier, and the aggregation of NAPs gives a global direction for human safety that should be recognized as part of the security agenda, mobilizing resources urgently.

- **Recognize that adaptation is needed on two tracks: incremental and transformational.** Project-level measures remain essential but whole communities now need large-scale, multi-sectoral protection, requiring finance beyond readiness and fragmented projects. Finance providers should adopt programmatic windows.
- **Make NAP delivery the route to GGA achievement by 2030.** Implementation, not planning, will make or break the GGA targets, and dedicated, Party-led spaces per thematic target with the right institutions in the room, should be convened before the second Global Stocktake as part of a standing process launched at COP31.

## 5. *Delivering what was promised on climate finance*

- **Implement Article 9 of the Paris Agreement and the NCQG, and demonstrate measurable progress.** Commit to an annual report which includes updates on climate finance from all finance providers, and incorporates updates on the delivery of the Baku to Belem Roadmap to \$1.3 trillion.
- **Make finance predictable.** All finance providers should publish forward looking, multi-year projections of their climate finance. Minimum allocation floors or funding envelopes for SIDS should be established at the climate funds and the MDBs. The Belem Mission to 1.5 should commit to increase the GEF Special Climate Change Fund envelope for SIDS to \$10 million.
- **Push access reforms to the finish line:** implement the access provisions of the NCQG, scale direct access, harmonize application and reporting requirements across the MDBs and bilateral providers, recognize accreditation mutually across the funds to end duplicative processes, adopt multi-year programmatic windows approved in a single decision, and reduce administration fees while allowing realistic implementation timelines. Prioritize regional and national funds and direct access entities.
- **Capitalize the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD).** Set a specific FRLD replenishment target to at least triple current capitalization by 2027, and set a goal beyond 2027 which recognizes that the cost of disasters in a climate-changed world exceeds over \$2.3 trillion annually, according to UNDRR.

## 8. *Closing the adaptation finance gap*

- **Accept the nature of adaptation finance and default to grant-based and highly concessional finance for the vast majority of NAP implementation.** Climate-resilient debt clauses should also be a standard feature of lending. COP 31 outcomes should provide the assurance that grant-based and highly concessional finance for adaptation will increase at the needed rate.
- **Set out a path to closing the adaptation finance gap.** The tripling adaptation target should be reaffirmed at COP31 as the provision of at least \$120 billion per year by 2035. Interim milestones and quality targets should also be set. Most of the adaptation finance from the tripling should come through grants, and through the operating entities of the financial mechanism. Developed country Parties should report transparently on their adaptation finance provision this year and every year.
- **Mobilize new public sources, including levies.** Advance solidarity levies on highly polluting and undertaxed activities, such as fossil fuel extraction, shipping

and aviation, to complement budgetary contributions in line with Article 9 responsibilities.

- **Establish a NAP implementation support package**, combining grant based finance, project preparation, technology transfer, capacity-building, and direct access support for NAPs for SIDS, to be adopted at COP 31. At its core should be NAP seed funding: \$3 million in grant based, low conditionality support for every developing country that submits a NAP.

#### **9. *Accelerating uptake and implementation of technological solutions***

- **Develop and scale solutions designed for the most exposed conditions.** Support the development, testing and certification of fit-for-purpose solutions, from microgrids and storage, and focus funds to scale proven models across regions. The Belem Technology Implementation Programme should be used to accelerate the uptake of adaptation technologies for the most vulnerable, including in climate resilient agriculture and fisheries.
- **Make holistic support a condition of climate technology finance.** Climate finance for technology should be a full package from the outset: spare parts, maintenance financing, a local operations plan, and the training, certification and employment of local technicians, with knowledge transfer to domestic institutions as a deliverable in its own right, as part of a gender-responsive approach. Best practice from financial providers should be captured, and the next steps to mainstream capacity-building and sustainability in all climate projects set out.
- **Accelerate early warning systems as a top priority with universal coverage, with the capacity to run them.** Treat early warning as a frontline, time bound priority, accelerating deployment while pairing every system with the local capacity to operate it.
- **Connect the ocean and climate regimes to drive action across them.** Promote alignment between ocean-related processes and frameworks.