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OFFICIAL YOUTH CONSTITUENCY OF THE UNFCCC

SBI 65 · Antalya · 9 November 2026

Article 6.2 Ambition Dialogue on Authorization

Young people's perspectives on what it means to authorize a mitigation outcome, and what that decision will mean for the generations who inherit it.

Theme: Authorization | **3 Priorities · Evidence-Based** | **CARP · BTRs · TERRs**

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Priority 1: Cross-NDC Period Authorizations

The vintage problem: when does mitigation count?

Imagine a child born today in Antalya. When that child is almost 10, will we still be using the same ITMO generated today, banked across NDC periods, to offset emissions in 2035? The atmosphere does not discount for timing.

TERR finding, Guyana & Switzerland: Reviewers found reporting insufficient to demonstrate no net increase in global emissions within and between NDC implementation periods.

CAs on CARP

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CA0001 to CA0066

Clean TERRs

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Every finalized review: inconsistencies

2026

ITMO authorized & generated today

Vintage established. Real mitigation occurs now.

2030

NDC period ends. ITMO not yet used.

No-banking rule: should expire with the period.

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2035

Same ITMO used to offset 2035 emission

Only redistributes accounting. No new climate action.

Our question: *When authorizing ITMOs today, what concrete measures do you apply to ensure vintages and cross-period transfers do not result in a net increase in global emissions between NDC periods?*

What exactly is being authorized?

Many Parties have both unconditional and conditional NDC targets. Current Article 6.2 guidance does not specify which part of the NDC should define the scope of authorizations, leaving an additionality gap at the heart of the system.

The gap: If a Party authorizes ITMOs from actions it was going to implement anyway under its unconditional target, those transfers may not represent genuine additional climate action. They simply redistribute existing commitments.

Our question: *How do you determine which part of your NDC informs your authorization decisions? And how do you ensure what you authorize goes beyond what national policies already require?*

Understanding the NDC structure

UNCONDITIONAL TARGET

What a Party commits to with domestic resources alone. No external support required. This is the baseline.

CONDITIONAL TARGET

More ambitious level, contingent on international finance, technology transfer, or capacity building, including Article 6 cooperation.

THE ADDITIONALITY GAP

Art. 6.2 guidance (Dec. 2/CMA.3) does not specify that authorizations must exceed the unconditional NDC target. Without this guardrail, Parties may authorize mitigation already counted in domestic baselines, producing no net global benefit.

Source: Decision 2/CMA.3 paras. 1 to 3 · Carbon Market Watch April 2026

Every single finalized review found inconsistencies. What is being done?

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CARP

Cooperative approaches registered (CA0001 to CA0066)

UNFCCC CARP, Nov 2026

23+

BTR TRANSPARENCY

of 44+ Parties with initial reports; only 8 submitted annual info (AEF)

UNFCCC Secretariat, Jun 2026

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CLEAN TERRS

Zero finalized technical expert reviews without inconsistencies

Decision 4/CMA.6

Selected TERR and IRTERR Findings

GY	**Guyana** Insufficient reporting to demonstrate no net increase in global emissions across NDC periods; cross-period vintage concerns identified.	Inconsistency
CH	**Switzerland** Reporting insufficient to demonstrate no net increase within and between NDC implementation periods.	Inconsistency
VU	**Vanuatu** Transparency elements incomplete; initial report and annual information gaps identified by reviewers.	Inconsistency
MN	**Mongolia** Corresponding adjustments and authorization scope insufficiently documented.	Inconsistency

Decision 4/CMA.6 asks Parties not to use ITMOs with inconsistencies, but does not stop trading. No example yet of an inconsistency pausing a transaction.

Authorization must mean something for the generations who will live with it

Today's authorization decisions will shape the climate we inherit. The evidence from CARP, TERRs, and BTRs shows the system is not yet delivering on its promises. We raise these concerns not to criticize individual Parties, but because they point to structural gaps the whole system needs to address together.

YOUNGO warmly urges Parties to bring the ambition and safeguards that young people need into every authorization decision and to protect those safeguards ahead of the 2028 Article 6 revision.

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YOUNGO's Three Asks

1 Address cross-NDC period vintages

Require authorization decisions to include safeguards ensuring ITMOs cannot be used across NDC periods in ways that redistribute accounting without additional climate action.

2 Protect the no-banking rule at 2028 revision

The no-banking provision prevents the market from becoming a vehicle for deferred promises. Weakening it would create liabilities future generations must reconcile.

3 Close the conditionality and additionality gap

Clarify that authorizations must exceed unconditional NDC targets. Strengthen requirements so every authorization is backed by an initial report, annual information (AEF), and BTR.

Looking to 2028: Article 6 Revision — YOUNGO urges Parties to begin that conversation now, grounded in what CARP, TERRs and BTRs already show.