# OVERVIEW OF INPUTS TO THE TALANOA DIALOGUE

23/04/2018

> This note presents an overview of inputs submitted by Parties and non-Party stakeholders to the Talanoa Dialogue. Its objective is to describe in general terms the trends and main contents of those inputs, categorized according to the three questions of the Talanoa Dialogue. The analysis applies to those inputs received before the deadline of 2 April 2018.

## 1.      Introduction

### 1.1.     Background and purpose

1.       The Conference of the Parties (COP), by decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 20, decided to convene a facilitative dialogue among Parties in 2018 to take stock of the collective efforts of Parties in relation to progress towards the long-term goal referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement and to inform the preparation of Parties' nationally determined contributions (NDCs) pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement.

2.       The Talanoa Dialogue was launched at COP 23[1] as a process comprised of a preparatory and a political phase. Parties, non-Party stakeholders and expert institutions were encouraged to prepare analytical and policy-relevant inputs to inform the dialogue and submit these to the process.

3.       This note has been prepared by the secretariat in response to a request by the Presidency of COP 23 and the incoming Presidency of COP 24. It provides an overview of the inputs from Parties, non-Party stakeholders and expert institutions that were submitted by 2 April 2018 and address one or more of the three Talanoa Dialogue questions:

- Where are we?

- Where do we want to go?

- How do we get there?

All the inputs have been published on the Talanoa Dialogue platform.[2]

4.       This note provides a mapping of the inputs submitted by different stakeholders and a high-level overview of their content. It is intended to facilitate the Talanoa Dialogue discussions to be held in conjunction with the Bonn Climate Change Conference taking place from 30 April to 10 May 2018.  It does not intend to summarize the content of inputs received; rather, it provides a general view of 'what the conversation has been about'.

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[1] The approach to the Talanoa Dialogue is described in decision 1/CP.23, annex II.
[2] https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/2018-talanoa-dialogue-platform.

5.		This overview will be updated before COP 24 to capture all inputs to the Talanoa Dialogue submitted by 29 October 2018.

**1.2		Approach**

6.		When submitting an input, all stakeholders were requested to provide the following information:

- Identification of the stakeholder;

- Objectives pursued for submitting the input;

- Summary of the input;

- The input itself (file).

7.		This note presents, first, general statistics of participation and an overview of cross-cutting issues such as the objectives of submitting an input and expectations of the Talanoa Dialogue. Second, it provides an overview of the substance contained in the inputs, categorized into the three questions of the Talanoa Dialogue, as identified by the stakeholder at the time of submitting an input, as well as by topic and recurrent themes, as illustrated in figure 1.

**Figure 1**. Levels for analysing inputs



8.		The information is presented in accordance with the following qualifiers referring to the percentage of inputs that are relevant for a particular discussion: a few (up to 10 per cent), some (11–40 per cent), about half (41–60 per cent), about two thirds (61–70 per cent) and most (71 per cent or more).

9.		Information specific to different stakeholders has been classified in accordance with the categories described in table 1.

**Table 1**. Stakeholder categories used in this overview

| Party stakeholder | |
|---|---|
| Party | A country that is a Party to the Convention |
| Group of Parties | Group of Parties, whether formally established under the Convention[a] or ad-hoc associations for the sole purpose of jointly submitting an input to the Talanoa Dialogue |
| Non-Party stakeholders and expert institutions | |
| Academia and research | Stakeholders whose main activity is research or academic in nature |

| Civil society | Non-governmental organizations and institutions that represent the interests of citizens |
|---|---|
| International organizations | All non-United Nations intergovernmental organizations and all international associations of national government departments, agencies and institutions, as long as all members of the organization are of the same kind |
| Private sector | Stakeholders whose main activity is for profit |
| Subnational governments | Government institutions at the subnational level |
| United Nations | All and any United Nations funds, programmes, specialized agencies and others |
| UNFCCC constituted bodies | Bodies constituted under the Convention[b] |
| Mixed partnerships and coalitions | Partnerships and coalitions involving organizations and institutions from two or more of the different stakeholder categories referred to above |

[a] https://unfccc.int/process/parties-non-party-stakeholders/parties/party-groupings

[b] https://unfccc.int/

### 1.3    Overall statistics and trends

*Sample of inputs*

10.    A total of 220 inputs were uploaded into the Talanoa Dialogue platform by 2 April 2018. This overview applies to these 220 inputs.

11.    Civil society and academia, and research organizations jointly account for half of the inputs received. Inputs by mixed partnerships and coalitions, and the private sector account each for about 15 per cent of the total inputs. The remaining 20 per cent is spread evenly across subnational governments, international organizations, Parties and groups of Parties, and United Nations and UNFCCC constituted bodies (see figure 2).

12.    In total, 49 Parties submitted 15 inputs to the Talanoa dialogue: 7 Parties submitted individual inputs, while 8 groups of Parties representing a total of 42 Parties submitted joint inputs.

**Figure 2.** Distribution of inputs to the Talanoa Dialogue by stakeholder category

13.      Inputs varied in the extent to which they addressed in a direct manner the questions of the Talanoa Dialogue as well as in the extent to which they contain information that is actionable or replicable or holds potential to achieve impact on a large scale:

- Over two thirds of inputs present this clear link;

- Some inputs consisted of existing material (reports, publications, slides and other material) which is relevant to climate debates but not necessarily tailored to the Talanoa Dialogue;

- A few inputs were considered to marginally address the questions of the Talanoa Dialogue.

14.      Regarding which Talanoa Dialogue questions an input addresses, this overview relies on the stakeholder's own declaration at the time of submission. Almost half of the inputs (107) addressed question 1 (Where are we?); over half (114) addressed question 2 (Where do we want to go?) and two thirds (148) addressed question 3 (How do we get there?).

15.      About 70 inputs addressed all three questions either as a whole or by providing specific information to each. These inputs typically build a narrative from the present situation (Where are we?) to the future destination (Where do we want to go?), and propose ways to reach objectives (How do we get there?).

16.      Figure 3 shows the profile of inputs to different Talanoa Dialogue questions.

**Figure 3**. Inputs by Talanoa Dialogue question



17.      It should be noted that stakeholders did not necessarily draw strict boundaries between the questions. For instance, stakeholders addressed 'Where are we?' in terms of the gaps they perceive today and which relate to aspirations and expectations that would fit under 'Where do we want to go?'. A similar situation was found for the second and third questions as some inputs articulated a vision not only in terms of a destination (Where do we want to be?) but also in terms of the conditions needed to reach that destination (How do we get there?).

*Stakeholder objectives in submitting inputs*

18.     Stakeholders appear to have interpreted the request to explain the objective of submitting an input in at least three different ways:

- The vast majority understood this request in terms of the objectives of their input (e.g. to show the merit of particular technologies or policy options or to give visibility to their climate action);

- Some understood it in terms of what they expect to get out of their involvement in the process (e.g. influencing future climate policy, securing participation in Talanoa Dialogue events);

- Others understood it in terms of their vision for the Talanoa Dialogue process.

Table 2 summarizes the main trends observed in stated objectives by stakeholder type.

**Table 2.** Objectives by stakeholder

| Stakeholder | Objectives |
|---|---|
| Parties | Put forward their views on how to enhance the Talanoa Dialogue, sharing their take on each of the Talanoa Dialogue questions and sharing experiences that may be good practice for ambitious climate policy |
| Group of Parties | Submit their shared view on one or more of the Talanoa Dialogue questions, to bring scientific information to the attention of the Talanoa Dialogue, to comply with the obligations set out in previous decisions of the Conference of the Parties and to advocate for particular policy options |
| Academia and research | Share expert knowledge about climate change and climate action; advocate for particular policy options, most often policies and instruments to address opportunities and barriers to a just transition towards a low-carbon, climate-resilient world; and influence the design of mechanisms and tools under the Paris Agreement so that it serves integrity and ambition (e.g. design of nationally determined contributions; design of the global stocktake) |
| Civil society | Influence the design and mechanisms of international climate policy; provide information about the situation on the ground and get the voices of affected communities heard; secure a place on the international agenda for certain aspects of the climate challenge and encourage a wider debate; and call for bolder action |
| International organizations | Share expert knowledge on particular aspects of climate change/climate action and advocate for their own role in addressing the climate challenge |
| Private sector | Showcase their climate action and leadership; precipitate action from government to create the conditions necessary for business to increase climate action; request to be seen as key actors in meeting the climate challenge, and accordingly seek more integral involvement for themselves in national and international climate policymaking |
| Subnational governments | Showcase their climate action and leadership; precipitate action from national government to create the conditions necessary for subnational actors to increase climate action; request to be seen as |

Overview of inputs to the Talanoa Dialogue

| Stakeholder | Objectives |
| --- | --- |
|  | key actors in meeting the climate challenge, and accordingly seek more integral involvement for themselves in national and international climate policymaking |
| United Nations | Inform the debate by sharing expert knowledge and opinions on climate issues falling under their remit |
| UNFCCC constituted bodies | Inform the debate by sharing expert knowledge and opinions on climate issues falling under their remit |
| Mixed partnerships and coalitions | Showcase and demonstrate the merits of the climate action they have undertaken; provide information about options for more ambitious climate action in particular sectors; and persuade governments and the international community to act (in particular ways) to realize such potential |

*Expectations of the Talanoa Dialogue*

19.     Some inputs included stakeholders' expectations of the Talanoa Dialogue process, including that the dialogue:

- Is conducted in line with the principles enshrined in the Convention and the Paris Agreement, including equity, common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, historical responsibility, respect for human rights and others;

- Is safeguarded against conflict of interest;

- Reflects the voices of women and youth, and favours the perspectives of affected communities;

- Takes account of the best available science;

- Addresses the substance in a comprehensive way, including mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation;

- Is facilitative, constructive and cooperative;

- Brings concrete outcomes and, more specifically, sets more ambitious for the pre-2020 period and NDCs by 2020.

20.     Many non-Party stakeholders explicitly welcome the opportunity to feed into the international process, and contend that their participation makes for a more open, transparent and accountable process.

21.     Several non-Party stakeholders see their input as the first step in what they hope will become more substantial and ongoing participation in the international process. Quite a few of these stakeholders expect their engagement to span the rest of the year, with some explicitly stating that they expect it to go well beyond.

22.      A few explicitly state their interest in participating in Talanoa Dialogue debates (events) (during the April–May session) and indicate their availability to brief Parties on particular subjects face to face. Others indicate that they expect their involvement to be focused on the ground (e.g., organizations active in awareness-raising).

*General trends*

23.     One recurrent, cross-cutting theme was that the scale and pace of climate action must increase dramatically, and immediately so, if the world is to avert dangerous anthropogenic climate

change. Present initiatives and actions are understood to be not only insufficient to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement, but also insufficient to deliver on current NDCs.

24.     At the international level, inputs call for bolder and accelerated action at all levels of planning and implementation, and for mobilizing all societal actors by creating appropriate conditions and deploying wider collaboration and partnerships. For some, this would mean securing significantly more ambitious and robust NDCs by 2020, delivering on pre-2020 actions, putting in place a strong rule book for the Paris Agreement and creating the frameworks to harness the full benefits of international cooperation across the board.

25.     At the national and subnational levels, this would mean creating the conditions that enable all actors – subnational governments, private sector, civil society, private citizens – to contribute individually and collectively to delivering action conducive to a low-emission and climate-resilient future. This would require the establishment of the legal, policy, regulatory, fiscal, governance and investments frameworks to remove barriers, create incentives and mobilize broad action.

26.     A large amount of inputs referred to the moral dimension of the climate challenge. There were repeated calls to ensure that the way forward is for transitions and development paths that are just and inclusive, and consistent with human rights and equity.

27.     Many stakeholders elaborate on the ramifications of failing fully to apply the 'polluter pays principle' to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions released to the atmosphere. Such considerations underpin discussions relating to historical responsibility, appropriate climate finance for developing countries, in particular least developed ones, and the merits of certain policy options such as carbon pricing and the phasing out of distortive subsidies.

28.     Many inputs point to the synergies between climate action and sustainable development in respect of meeting the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. On resilience and adaptation, the links between the Paris goals and those of the Sendai Framework are also often highlighted. There is a clear call for a more holistic approach that ensures that climate action is well rooted in those other agendas, and draws from and contributes to meeting their goals.

29.     In this respect, a sizeable set of inputs focuses on the complex links on the ground between climate vulnerability, poverty and lack of development. While inputs contribute to sketching out ways forward to simultaneously promote climate resilience, poverty eradication and sustainable development, ideally in accord with human rights and other principles central to climate action and sustainable development, there is a general sense in the inputs that the task is enormous and action far from being commensurate with the level of need.

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**Box 1: Collaboration models**

The call for wider and deeper collaboration is a recurrent theme throughout inputs, appearing across all three Talanoa questions.

Some inputs showcase examples of new collaboration that is leading to better results, and that hold potential for replication and scale up. Others contend that in certain areas better collaboration could make a significant difference, and put forward their ideas on how this might be achieved.

Calls for closer cooperation also appear in relation to fostering the policy, regulatory, legal, investment and international and national governance framework to raise ambition.

Collaboration models are not only viewed as a means to an end by certain stakeholders, but as an integral part of their vision for a future.

At international level this means, a closer integration between the United Nations agendas for climate, disaster risk reduction and sustainable development, through closer cooperation among the actors concerned, and a closer cooperation between UN climate change and other UN programmes, funds and agencies.

At the national level this means, a closer cooperation among public and private actors with a view to creating conditions for climate finance and investment to increase, to foster technological innovation, and to pursue certain climate policy options (e.g., moderation of energy demand, addressing fossil fuel supply and subsidies and innovation) that require a level-playing field.

At the sub-national level, better vertically integrated governance is identified as a key factor to deliver more climate action. This involves a much more integral participation of sub-national actors in climate policy making and implementation.

The scope for wider and more effective collaboration at the sector level (e.g. transport) is a recurrent theme. It calls for comprehensive involvement of stakeholders in the design and delivery of plans to achieve low emissions and climate resilience across the relevant sector, including through public-private partnerships, closer cooperation among actors on the ground and closer links between donor and partner countries. There is also a sense that affected communities would need to be more closely involved.

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## 2. Overview per Talanoa Dialogue question

### 2.1 Where are we?

30.     A total of 107 inputs addressed this question. It should be noted that some of the substance contained in the inputs might fit under other questions. A fair amount of inputs addressed this question in terms of gaps and shortfalls compared with current goals and objectives. In doing so, certain inputs articulated their vision and ambition for the future, which relates to 'where do we want to be?' or the means to get there. In this section, none of the contents of inputs addressing the second and third questions of the Talanoa Dialogue were considered.

31.     Figure 4 shows the distribution of inputs to Talanoa Dialogue question 1 by stakeholder category.

**Figure 4**. Distribution of inputs to 'Where are we?' by stakeholder category



32.      Most inputs to the first Talanoa Dialogue question were submitted by non-Party stakeholders, with civil society, academia and research, and the private sector together accounting for more than two thirds of contributions. The remainder was evenly spread across Parties, Party groupings, international organizations, subnational governments and United Nations bodies other than the secretariat.

33.      In total, 40 Parties submitted 10 inputs to this question: 4 Parties submitted individual inputs, while 6 groups of Parties representing a total of 36 Parties submitted joint inputs.

34.      Inputs to this Talanoa Dialogue question tend to acknowledge and subscribe to the objective of the Paris Agreement. Several highlight with concern the current emissions and effort gaps (for mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation) and point out that the systemic transformational change necessary to deliver the Paris Agreement goals is not taking place at the necessary scale or pace.

35.      Several inputs consider the Paris Agreement goals to be insufficient to address the climate challenge. They argue that the Paris Agreement temperature goals entail too high a risk of unacceptable climate impacts, and that the provisions in the Paris Agreement on means of implementation, in particular finance, are insufficient to facilitate action on the necessary scale.

36.      The inputs to this Talanoa Dialogue question typically do one or more of the following:

   a.   Set out the **findings on GHGs** on the global, national or sectoral scale;

   b.   Set out the **state of play on climate impacts and vulnerability**;

   c.   Showcase **initiatives and actions**;

   d.   Analyse existing **institutional arrangements**.

37.      Figure 5 illustrates the frequency of these topics within the inputs to the first question of the Talanoa Dialogue.

**Figure 5.** Frequency of topics in inputs to 'Where are we?'



Frequency of topics appearing in 'Where are we?'

| | |
|---|---|
| Initiatives and actions taken | 93 |
| Cimate impacts and vulnerability | 39 |
| Findings on GHG | 31 |
| Institutional arrangements | 30 |

38.     The specific interest of different stakeholders as regards this question is as follows:

- Academia and research organizations predominantly share findings on GHGs, and climate impacts and vulnerability in certain parts of the world;

- The largest share of civil society inputs showcase initiatives and actions taken;

- International organizations centre primarily on initiatives and actions taken;

- Mixed partnerships and coalitions primarily showcase initiatives and actions taken, and share findings on GHGs;

- Parties' inputs share findings on GHGs and the initiatives and actions that they have taken for climate action (strategies, plans and policies for climate action);

- Private sector and subnational governments primarily showcase their own initiatives and actions.

*Findings on greenhouse gases*

39.     About a third of inputs to the first Talanoa question address findings on greenhouse gases. These referred to emission sources, their levels and trends; the effort gap as compared with mitigation pathways compatible with reaching the 2/1.5° C targets at least cost; and expected warming and other global changes.

40.     Some of the inputs outline GHG emission trends at the global and national levels. Several of them raise concerns that the emission levels are too high, and draw attention to the substantial gap between current emission levels and trends from what is required to stay on track to meet the 2/1.5° C target. The general appreciation is that, at this stage, it seems implausible that global emissions would peak by 2020.

41.     Certain inputs set out trends in specific economic sectors, notably transport (with aviation, shipping and freight emissions featuring repeatedly), agriculture and the global food system and, to a lesser extent, the heating and cooling sector. A handful draw attention to non-carbon dioxide climate forcers, including hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and black carbon.

42.     Several inputs discuss the mitigation potential of forests and of a variety of negative emission technologies for the purposes of closing the emissions gap.

43.     Other inputs present online tools for monitoring emission reductions. Examples include the monitoring tools available to networks (e.g. cities and regions, businesses) to report individual and collective emission reductions.

44.     Finally, a few inputs set out the links between emissions in the atmosphere and other changes in the Earth's system, such as ocean acidification, biodiversity losses and tipping points.

*Climate impacts and vulnerability: State of play*

45.     About a third of inputs into the first Talanoa question discuss climate impacts and vulnerability.

46.     Of these, about half discuss the challenges faced by vulnerable communities and habitats/ecosystems in different parts of the world. Coastal ecosystems, island communities in the Caribbean and Pacific regions and communities in extreme climatic zones such as semi-arid lands are some of communities and habitats that are mentioned in multiple inputs.

47.     A further quarter look at resilience building and explore the synergies/links between climate resilience on the one hand, and disaster risk reduction, sustainable development and poverty eradication on the other. At times, these inputs raise fundamental questions about the vision of development, particularly with regard to the justice and sustainability of development paths. Certain inputs address the human rights questions raised by climate vulnerability and climate action, and yet others focus on the issues raised by climate-driven migration.

48.     Several inputs addressing climate resilience discuss finance. This includes current financing models, flows and effort gap as compared with what is needed pre-2020 and post-2020, under the Paris Agreement. A handful of inputs address the issue from the investors' perspectives.

49.     Finally, in the context of resilience building, inputs call for collaboration models which more substantially involve and empower affected local and indigenous communities, and which effectively incorporate their knowledge.

*Initiatives and actions*

50.     Most of the inputs that address the first Talanoa Dialogue question do so by discussing a particular initiative or action deployed on the ground. This includes Parties' inputs outlining their strategies, plans and policies to combat climate change. Figure 6 shows the distribution of the different aspects of initiatives and actions as discussed by the inputs.

**Figure 6.** Distribution of initiatives and actions

51.    The majority of inputs under this topic centre on progress achieved by the initiative or action in question against existing targets and other commitments, including for the pre-2020 period.

52.    In many instances, these inputs also identify opportunities and/or challenges for increased impact. Opportunities, for example, include enabling factors and game changers, including for behavioural and lifestyle change. Challenges, on the other hand, include barriers, gaps and unmet needs. Some inputs go even further and articulate demands for specific policy action to create a more conducive environment. For instance, a shift away from cars in urban transport is considered by some to rest on phasing out fossil fuels subsidies (removing barrier) and putting in place better public transport schemes (incentives).

53.    The range of initiatives and actions spans the full spectrum of climate action. Opportunities and challenges, as well as calls for policy action, are specific to each.

54.    Inputs outlining initiatives and actions by non-Party stakeholders to reduce emissions often adopt a sectoral perspective. Sectors that appear repeatedly in inputs include transport (aviation, shipping, electric mobility, urban transport, rail), energy (energy efficiency across the board, renewable energy and clean energy technologies), buildings and land use (wetlands and forests).

55.    Inputs outlining initiatives and actions specifically seeking to enhance resilience are more broad ranging. Recurrent themes can still be found, such as community-based projects (including those sponsored by faith-based organizations), management of water resources including sanitation and, especially in developing countries, initiatives and actions to address the links between climate change, farming and food (in)security (sometimes includes stemming outward migration).

56.    Several initiatives and actions transcend individual economic sectors, and cut across mitigation and adaptation. Examples of these include coalitions of businesses, industry, investors, and subnational governments (e.g. cities and regions) taking action in a variety of sectors, and nature-based and ecosystem-based solutions that serve both mitigation and adaptation objectives in rural communities.

57.    Inputs highlighting initiatives and actions by Parties mostly address mitigation and adaptation at the national level. They comprise participation in international treaties and commitments taken; national plans and strategies to achieve the climate goals; concrete examples of domestic-driven climate finance mechanisms; and tangible and successful mitigation and adaptation initiatives.

*Institutional arrangements*

58.    Almost a third of inputs to the first Talanoa Dialogue question assess current institutional arrangements. They discuss action under the pre-2020 period, the current design of NDCs and other aspects of the Paris Agreement rule book (e.g. global stocktake, transparency framework). Some also address features and shortcomings in the international climate process, such as the limited participation of non-Party stakeholders, the role of interest groups and others. Issues at the national/international interface also appear multiple times, for example alignment of national policies and targets with international commitments.

59.    As far as NDC design is concerned, inputs primarily point out on weaknesses which require the attention of the international community. Some of these include limitations in scope and content (e.g. adaptation not systematically included, sectoral perspectives and plans lacking, plans for financing implementation lacking), transparency, and rushed preparation at the national level without proper involvement of subnational governments and other key stakeholders. Inputs also

touch on how the high degree of freedom accorded to Parties in their NDCs hampers comparability and effective monitoring and review.[3]

60.	A few inputs discuss the assessment of NDCs against specific benchmarks. Attention is called to historical responsibility and equity, and to the need to define 'ambitious' and 'fair' in relation to NDCs. Several inputs see the Talanoa Dialogue as paving the way for the robust global stocktake mechanism to be put in place under the Paris Agreement.

61.	References to shortcomings in the international climate process highlight insufficient participation from non-Party stakeholders and the public, and argue that without these the governance and transparency of the Paris Agreement is in jeopardy. Underrepresentation of women, youth, affected communities' voices and potential conflicts of interest are other issues mentioned in this regard.

## 2.2	Where do we want to go?

62.	A total of 114 inputs addressed this question. It should be noted that some of the substance contained in these inputs might better fit under the question 'how do we get there?' as some stakeholders also included information on the means and factors required to achieve a stated vision or goal. In this section, all the contents of inputs addressing the third question of the Talanoa Dialogue were not considered.

63.	Figure 7 shows the distribution of inputs to Talanoa Dialogue question 2 by stakeholder category.

**Figure 7.** Distribution of inputs to 'Where do we want to go?' by stakeholder category



64.	Civil society and academia and research account for about half of the inputs to this Talanoa Dialogue question. The private sector and mixed partnerships and coalitions account for a further third. The rest is spread evenly across Parties and Party groupings, subnational governments,

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[3] See section under 'How do we get there?' on recommendations for the secretariat and the bodies of the Convention.

international organizations and the United Nations. No inputs from UNFCCC constituted bodies address this Talanoa Dialogue question.

65.      In total, 40 Parties submitted 10 inputs to this question: 4 Parties submitted individual inputs, while 6 groups of Parties representing a total of 36 Parties submitted joint inputs.

66.      Inputs to this question for the most part articulate expectations of how the future should unfold to address climate change.

67.      There is a large variety in the way that different actors addressed this question. Contents included visions that range from global aspirations to goals and efforts that different stakeholders set for themselves. There is also significant variation in the extent to which the vision is cast in actionable terms. Some are abstract (e.g. those dealing with respect of certain rights and principles) while others are concrete and practical, with actionable targets and plans on a scale that is commensurate with the actor's power to influence outcomes.

68.      The inputs to this Talanoa Dialogue question typically do one or more of the following:

   e.   Identify aspirations in terms of **global goals and principles for climate action**;

   f.   Outline **emissions scenarios and trajectories** compatible with stated goals;

   g.   Describe a **future vision towards a zero (net) emissions world**;

   h.   Describe a **future vision towards climate resilience**;

   i.   Explain the stakeholder's **future vision and ambition for themselves**;

   j.   Outline expectations about future **institutional arrangements**.

69.      Figure 8 illustrates the frequency of these topics within the inputs to the second question of the Talanoa Dialogue.

**Figure 8.** Frequency of topics in inputs to 'Where do we want to go?'



Frequency of topics appearing in 'Where do we want to go?'

| Topic | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Future vision towards a zero emissions world | 98 |
| Global goals and principles | 47 |
| Vision and ambition for self | 40 |
| Future vision towards climate resilience | 31 |
| Institutional arrangements | 29 |
| Emissions scenarios/trajectories | 20 |

70.      The specific interest of different stakeholders as regards this question is as follows:

   ▪   Academia and research organizations predominantly set out a future global vision towards zero net emissions and climate resilience;

   ▪   Civil society also emphasize a future vision of zero net emissions and climate resilience as well as their own vision;

   ▪   International organizations centre primarily on their vision towards a zero (net) emissions future, as do those from mixed partnerships and coalitions;

- Parties focus on emissions trajectories, their vision towards a low-emission and climate-resilient future, and on a functioning international regime to achieve the objective of the Convention and the Paris Agreement goals.

- Private sector and subnational governments set out their vision and ambition for themselves, frequently in the context of a broader global vision towards a low-emission world.

*Global goals and principles*

71.     The majority of inputs to Talanoa question 2 make an explicit reference to the Paris Agreement goals and principles; many affirm the Paris Agreement temperature goals.

72.     Stakeholders also express concern with the scale and speed of climate action being insufficient to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement and also in relation to the pre-2020 period. They call for more rapid, larger-scale climate action, including that which concerns closing the effort gap in emission reductions and climate finance for adaptation.

73.     About half of all inputs to the second Talanoa question discuss goals and principles. Many of these inputs indicate the need for limiting temperature rise to the more ambitious temperature goal in the Paris Agreement (i.e. 1.5°C). For several, this does not seem enough to meet the objective of the Convention of averting dangerous anthropogenic climate change, and they envision limiting global temperature rise to well below this level (i.e. 0.5–1.5° C).

74.     Certain inputs note the synergies between the Paris Agreement goals and those of other international regimes/processes (e.g. Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, SDGs). These tend to call for more holistic approaches that more effectively exploit the synergies among the different, yet related international agendas. The links between the Paris Agreement and the SDGs under the 2030 Agenda is a frequently recurring theme in the inputs.

75.     Finally, some inputs devote their attention in part or in full to the principles enshrined in the Convention and the Paris Agreement, and call for them to continue to be upheld.

*Emissions scenarios and trajectories*

76.     About a fifth of inputs addressing this question centre on emissions scenarios and trajectories, with several focusing on the implications of staying away from the 2/1.5° C emissions trajectories.

77.     These inputs primarily focus on assessing and closing the emissions gap between current emission trends and emission pathways compatible with least cost trajectories to limit warming to 2/1.5° C above pre-industrial levels.

78.     Many inputs stress that to be compatible with the Paris Agreement goals global emissions are required to peak no later than 2020, and to considerably be reduced towards emissions neutrality /zero net emissions by mid-century (preferably earlier).

79.     Inputs emphasize that closing the current emissions gap can only be achieved with substantially renewed, immediately more ambitious NDCs; suitable near- and long-term strategies toward net zero emissions by mid- century; appropriate carbon pricing mechanisms; and appropriate finance to acquire and deploy technology that is tailored to local conditions.

80.     Some inputs take on a sectoral perspective on emissions scenarios and trajectories. Recurrent themes include transport, energy, and certain ecosystems in relation to land use. In some instances, the focus is even narrower, at sub-sector level. For instance, within the transport sector inputs consider comprehensive transport plans, aviation and shipping. A handful of inputs discuss

emissions scenarios and trajectories for natural ecosystems (e.g. coastal and inland wetlands, forests).

*Future vision towards a zero (net) emissions world*

81.     Most inputs into the second Talanoa Dialogue question articulate a vision towards a low or zero net emissions future. About half of these inputs set out a vision at a broad level (i.e. global or national), while the other half do it through the lens of a specific high-emitting sector or within a specific locality.

82.     Inputs setting out a vision on a broad scale tend to discuss system-wide aspirations such as striving for less resource-intensive economies; climate-friendly lifestyle choices; full application of the polluter pays principle; adequate governance frameworks; investment frameworks that mobilise low carbon and sustainable finance; and efficient climate policies that address multiple objectives.

83.     Inputs that centre on a particular high-emitting sector include estimates of emission reduction potential in the sector in question and the targets that these sectors could aim for within particular time frames.

84.     In addition to targets, these inputs often also outline the transformational and systemic changes that need to happen for the sector to be able to deliver the transition to a low-emission future at the necessary scale and speed to meet the Paris Agreement goals. On this point, the recurrent themes include the future legal, policy, regulatory, investment and fiscal frameworks to realize opportunities and overcome challenges; availability and accessibility of finance (private and public); international cooperation; and new cooperation models to involve and mobilize a wider range of sectoral stakeholders.

85.     Key sectors frequently referred to within the inputs include transport (urban transport, low-emissions transport plans); energy (curbing demand, energy efficiency demand and supply measures, renewable energy, phasing out fossil fuels); agriculture and food production systems (low-emission agriculture, dietary choices); forests (deforestation and forest degradation); buildings (building codes and urban planning); and cities and regions.

86.     Low-carbon technologies and practices relevant to one or more of these sectors are often discussed too. For instance, concerning agriculture and food production systems, several inputs call for a rethink of meat production and consumption on account of resource intensity. Stakeholders' visions for this sector is to see subsidies to meat production removed, and consumers consciously favouring plant-based diets. Carbon removal/sequestration options also appear repeatedly (forests carbon sinks, soils, negative emissions technologies).

*Future vision towards a climate-resilient world*

87.     Over half of inputs to this Talanoa question include references to visions for a climate-resilient future.

88.     The majority take as a starting point the plight of particularly vulnerable communities and habitats, such as those located in low-lying islands and semi-arid lands.

89.     The way forward for many involves a holistic approach that exploits synergies between climate resilience, disaster preparedness and sustainable development, in line with the respective United Nations agendas for climate, disaster risk reduction and sustainable development (Paris Agreement, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, 2030 Agenda).

90.     For some, a climate-resilient future intrinsically rests on limiting climate risks through effective GHG emission reductions.

91.     Visions for a climate-resilient future also elaborate on the transformations needed to achieve climate resilience and adaptation. Chief among them are: poverty reduction and economic growth; a transformation to increased availability, accessibility and predictability of finance; and increased means of implementation (technology, capacity-building).

92.     Other critical aspects of a climate-resilient future mentioned multiple times include empowered local communities and indigenous peoples that are able to fully participate in decision-making that affects them; more inclusive partnerships of actors on the ground; and the deployment of adequate adaptation strategies, including those with mitigation co-benefits.

*Vision and ambition for self*

93.     Over a third of the inputs to the second Talanoa question include a vision or ambition that the stakeholder has for itself. These inputs also elaborate on the leadership and influence that the stakeholder aspires to exert, notably among its peers and other actors in its immediate environment. For Parties, this is notably about exerting leadership and influence on the international community and process; for non-Party stakeholders this tends to be about building a critical mass to motivate more rapid and substantial transitions within their sector/area of work (and beyond).

94.     Regarding future vision and ambition, Parties often refer to national plans and strategies to deliver their NDCs. They also highlight the need for support to implement them. One Party explicitly stated that it is striving to enhance the ambition of its NDC before 2020.

95.     Future visions put forward by non-Party stakeholders include concrete targets within set time frames. Examples are found at the level of individual organizations as well as at the level of wider partnerships and coalitions. The latter typically also seek to motivate large-scale change, including through their supply chains and other interactions with the rest of the economy. Examples include large businesses coming together in different networks and alliances to use their purchasing power to facilitate the switch to renewable energy and electric vehicles, and investors coming together to set new standards for climate risks reporting.

96.     Some non-Party stakeholders put forward their vision and ambition in less concrete terms but are equally bold in their aspirations. Recurrent examples in this area are found in associations of grass-roots leaders (including faith leaders), who see themselves as catalysts and multipliers of climate action within their communities, particularly with regard to behavioural and lifestyle change.

*International institutional arrangements*

97.     Almost a third of inputs focus on future international institutional arrangements. These inputs centre primarily on the arrangements under the Paris Agreement. In some instances their attention is on the links between the climate agenda and other related international agendas.

98.     Inputs on the Paris Agreement put most of their emphasis on NDCs as a key component of 'where do we want to go?'. In particular, they express expectations of robust and ambitious NDCs in the shortest possible time frames.

99.     Many refer to a strong Paris Agreement rule book more generally as a key objective to be aimed for. Recurring themes in the inputs are the features that the specific NDCs should have in order to be effective (e.g. scope, level of detail, fit for monitoring and review[4]), the definition and operationalization of concepts linked to NDCs (e.g. ambition or fairness) and the need for effective

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[4] See also recommendations for the secretariat and the bodies of the Convention under 'How do we get there?'.

monitoring frameworks, that is, effective modalities for the transparency framework and the global stock take.

100.    Some inputs concern themselves with who gets to participate in international climate policymaking and to what extent they do so. Non-Party stakeholders generally acknowledge the opportunities afforded to them by the Global Climate Action Agenda and the Talanoa Dialogue in terms of linking up with national governments and other non-Party stakeholders, and of influencing the process. In this regard, the vision for the future is an even more inclusive process that would increase the participation and involvement of non-Party stakeholders, of the general public and of less well-represented constituencies (e.g. future generations).

101.    A handful of inputs express their expectations for a more holistic international institutional arrangement. Specifically, they call for better links to exploit synergies among the 2015 international agendas (Paris Agreement, SDGs and Sendai Framework), and between the Convention and other related international conventions and agreements (e.g. Kigali Amendment, Convention on Biological Diversity, United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification).

## 2.3    How do we get there?

102.    A total of 148 inputs addressed this question.

103.    It should be noted that some of the substance contained in these inputs might better fit under the other two questions. For example, some inputs focused on gaps that they would like to see filled or stated a vision that they would like to achieve. In this section, all the contents of inputs addressing the first and second questions of the Talanoa Dialogue were not considered.

104.    Figure 9 shows the distribution of inputs to Talanoa Dialogue question 3 by stakeholder category.

**Figure 9.** Distribution of inputs to 'How do we get there?' by stakeholder category



105.    Most inputs addressing the third Talanoa Dialogue question were submitted by non-Party stakeholders, with civil society, research and academia, and mixed partnerships and coalitions accounting for the majority of inputs.

106. In total, 47 Parties submitted 11 inputs to this question: 5 Parties submitted individual inputs, while 6 groups of Parties representing a total of 42 Parties submitted joint inputs.

107. Parties and non-Party stakeholders address this question from a variety of angles and perspectives. While the intention for some is to give visibility to certain initiatives and actions on the ground, others elaborate on ideas for potential solutions to scale up and accelerate climate action, call for others to take action or put forward fairly detailed and actionable plans to move forward.

108. There is also substantial variation in the scale and scope at which inputs address this question. They range from very general, addressing the global geographical scale or abstract principles, to very concrete, with specific suggestions for action in niche sectors.

109. Collectively, inputs addressing this Talanoa Dialogue question identify a number of aspects that can prove valuable for establishing a road map towards the destination identified under the second Talanoa Dialogue question. Often, inputs clearly point to what needs to be done to reach a particular objective, by whom and, in some cases, even by when.

110. Most inputs address this Talanoa Dialogue question by doing one or more of the following:

   a. Showcase **existing action on the ground** that is achieving results and may hold potential for others through replication and/or scale-up;

   b. Share knowledge, analyses and opinions on **high-potential solutions, including on technologies and collaboration models** that may help to broaden the scope of and accelerate climate action;

   c. Make **recommendations for the secretariat and the bodies of the Convention** on issues to be addressed in the international climate negotiations;

   d. Make **recommendations for actions that national governments** must take to ensure progress towards realizing the global vision and ambition (outlined in Talanoa Dialogue question 2);

   e. Make **recommendations for the private sector, including financial actors**;

   f. Make **recommendations for intergovernmental organizations**.

111. Figure 10 illustrates the frequency of these topics within the inputs to the third question of the Talanoa Dialogue.

**Figure 10.** Frequency of topics in inputs to 'How do we get there?'



112. The specific interest of different stakeholders as regards this question is as follows:

   ▪ Academia and research organizations predominantly make recommendations for the secretariat and the bodies of the Convention and national governments. They also discuss high-potential solutions, particularly on the land use sector;

- Civil society centres primarily on cross-cutting actions on the ground and on making recommendations for the secretariat and the bodies of the Convention;

- International organizations mostly identify actions and recommendations for national governments;

- Mixed partnerships and coalitions primarily produce recommendations for national governments and the secretariat and the bodies of the Convention. They also showcase specific action on the ground (notably in the transport and oceans and coastal zones sectors);

- Parties' inputs mostly set out their action on the ground (i.e. their national climate plans and strategies). They also issue recommendations for their peers and the secretariat and the bodies of the Convention;

- The private sector inputs mostly focus on showcasing existing action on the ground by businesses and investors, and call for governments and the secretariat and the bodies of the Convention to act;

- Inputs from subnational governments primarily showcase their action on the ground and high-potential solutions (with several inputs touching on collaboration models, human settlements, transport and energy), and issue recommendations for national governments and the secretariat and the bodies of the Convention.

- The inputs from the United Nations for the most part issue recommendations for national governments.

*Existing action on the ground (good practices)*

113.     Over half of inputs to the third Talanoa question showcase actions on the ground which can be replicated to meet future climate goals. These inputs typically fall into one or more of the sectors shown in figure 11.

**Figure 11.** Sectoral distribution of existing action on the ground

114.    About half of inputs touching on this topic describe initiatives and actions that refer to cross cutting issues or concern multiple sectors. The rest of inputs are more or less evenly spread across individual economic sectors.

115.    About a quarter of inputs outlining actions on the ground highlight cross-cutting issues such as finance, gender, health, education, less well-represented constituencies and decent work. Actions and initiatives involving finance, especially for resilience, account for a substantial share of citations under cross-cutting issues. Other recurrent themes include actions to foster grass-roots education and capacity-building (especially including youth and/or targeting lifestyle changes), actions and initiatives that foster the respect of human rights and just transition, community-led initiatives involving nature-based solutions and participatory planning.

116.    A further 20 per cent of inputs present good practices that transcend individual sectors. These include plans and strategies outlined by national governments as well as certain initiatives and actions by non-Party stakeholders.

117.    Parties elaborate on their existing or planned strategies and climate policies. They showcase results where these are visible, show good practices that may hold potential for others, and articulate how and why their choices are well suited to meeting their goals. Some of the areas covered by Parties are: proper application of the polluter pays principle; increased international cooperation in climate finance, aid and technology; transformations sought in particular economic sectors; and specific policy options such as the phasing out of fossil fuels.

118.    Some Non-Party Stakeholders also discuss initiatives and actions that transcend any one economic sector. Examples include certain initiatives and actions to advance early warning systems, and others to precipitate behavioural change at individual and societal level.

119.    The rest of initiatives and actions that can serve as good practices are evenly spread across the different economic sectors. Energy, transport, human settlements and agriculture and forestry each feature in about 10 per cent of the inputs; while industry, oceans and coastal zones, and the water sectors appear less frequently (< 10 per cent).

120.    Recurrent examples in the energy sector include energy plans at sub-national level, i.e. cities and regions, and plans to ensure a just and sustainable transition away from coal. In the transport sector, several examples on urban mobility, e.g. promotion of sustainable public transport and electrical vehicles, and rail can be found.

121.    Recurring themes pertaining to human settlements include cities and regions plans to address mitigation and adaptation, best practices on coordination at city level, city leadership in climate action, and capacity building. In addition, some inputs illustrate how vulnerable human settlements can be made more resilient, e.g. by early warning systems or enhancing communities' resilience opportunity through better economic opportunities.

122.    Prominent examples in the land use sector include ecosystems based adaptation, community-led projects to restore forests and wetlands and examples of changes to food production and consumption patterns, e.g. climate proof agriculture for smallholders, mainstreaming climate into development programmes for farmers, promoting more climate friendly dietary choices.

123.    Examples in industry elaborate on investors' initiatives to create frameworks that foster low carbon and climate resilient investments and businesses striving to make new technologies more accessible, e.g. corporations switching to renewable electricity and electric cars. For oceans and coastal zones, the Global Climate Action Agenda is generally understood to have provided a framework for action, with some actors showing how they are already addressing the links between climate and sustainable development in oceans and coastal zones. Finally, actions and initiatives in the water sector show a variety of collaboration models that allow for more effective water

management, e.g. better integrated and better able to operate at basin levels despite jurisdictional boundaries.

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**Box 2: Finance**

Finance is another recurrent issue that appears in inputs across all three Talanoa questions. Relevant input on this topic includes assessments of current finance levels, or as estimates of what is needed to meet climate policy goals, in terms of finance levels, the quality and other features of finance.

Most inputs assess current finance as being largely insufficient to meet climate change goals, in both developed and developing countries, and both in the pre- and post-2020 period.

These inputs often identify the creation of innovative financial instruments and programmes, e.g. green finance, and of incentives for climate friendly investments as critical to improve the availability, accessibility, and predictability of financing.

They also see a major role for the bodies of the Convention, national governments and the private sector, in setting up a conducive finance and investment framework.

The most prominent areas identified, where more or better finance is needed are:

- Adaptation, particularly finance for climate proofing investments and climate-resilient infrastructure, and finance to generate knowledge, systems and economic opportunity to increase resilience;

- Technology and innovation, particularly finance to fund innovation clusters, finance for developing countries to acquire technology for mitigation and adaptation, finance for developing countries to adapt technology to local conditions;

- Sub-national actors, particularly pointing out the insufficient finance sources accessible to sub-national actors for all sorts of climate action;

- Private finance needs and the insufficient use of public funds to leverage this.

Specific solutions for financing that are showcased include innovative financing in cities and urban contexts for climate proofing investments, and financial services adapted to local communities in vulnerable parts of the world.

The finance generating capacity of certain policy options is featured, particularly of those that seek to create a price signal for mitigation. In this regard, certain inputs consider the finance that more extensive carbon pricing mechanisms could generate (for those wishing to undertake emissions abatement and beyond); and others look at the finance that could be freed up for climate action by reforming the tax and subsidies to emission intensive technologies and sectors.

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*High-potential solutions, including technologies and collaboration models*

124.    More than two thirds of inputs elaborate on high-potential solutions, including technologies and collaboration models. These inputs discuss the merits and potential of different solutions for more rapid and wide-ranging climate action.

125.    The inputs under this topic fall under different economic sectors as set out in figure 12.

**Figure 12.** Sectoral distribution of existing action on the ground



126.     About a third of inputs on high-potential solutions target cross-cutting aspects, and a further 20 per cent touch on issues pertaining to the national economy as a whole. About 10–15 per cent of inputs on high-potential solutions, technologies and collaboration models target the land use or energy sectors. The remaining inputs present high-potential solutions, technologies and collaboration models for human settlements, transport, industry, water, and oceans and coastal zones.

127.     Promising high potential solutions on cross cutting issues include ways of considering the voices of future generations, ways of achieving a more effective communication of the climate challenge, ways of ensuring just and sustainable transition towards a low carbon, climate resilient world, e.g. investment in job creation for communities adversely affected by response measures to climate change. Inputs addressing the economy as a whole include plans under development by Parties, and studies and assessments presented by international organisations, academia and the United Nations.

128.     Among individual economic sectors, land use and energy are the ones featuring most often. Many examples of solutions for the land use sector turn on how to increase the mitigation and adaptation gains from soils and forests (e.g. carbon sink, resilience co-benefits), extending REDD, improving emissions reporting for the land use sector, and low carbon agricultural practices and technologies. For the energy sector, they include solutions for increased energy efficiency and financing for a scale up of energy technologies, notably renewables and other low emissions technologies like carbon capture and storage (CCS), fossil fuel subsidy reform and moderating energy demand.

129.     Less frequently addressed sectors include human settlements, transport, industry and oceans and coastal zones. Examples in human settlements are primarily solutions for a transition to low emissions development, such as vertically integrated governance and city networks. Examples for transport elaborate on achieving zero emissions through comprehensive plans, specific policy options, increased political will, and cooperation involving a wider variety of stakeholders. Solutions put forward for the industry seek to ensure investment frameworks conducive to more widespread low emissions and climate resilient investment, particularly in technology, and to exploit the leadership of businesses and investors to generate appropriate shifts. Examples for oceans and

coastal zones emphasize the need to improve the relationship between people and oceans, the preservation of coastal ecosystems as buffers against climate impacts and highlight the benefits of strong outreach, capacity building and knowledge creation and management.

130.    Another recurrent theme across promising solutions is the potential held by new and more extensive collaboration models in a wide range of areas of climate action. Moving to climate action on a larger scale seems to be for many to be contingent on making these wider collaborations work (see Box 1).

*Recommendations for the secretariat, the COP and the bodies of the Convention*

131.    More than half of the inputs to the third Talanoa question put forward actions and recommendations for the secretariat, the COP and the other bodies of the Convention.

132.    A first group of inputs elaborates on the general goals of the Convention. Specifically, these inputs suggest a strong call for accelerating the systemic transformations needed towards a low-carbon and climate-resilient world within the time frames required, (pre- and post-2020 action) and for increased international cooperation.

133.    Many inputs refer to the work of the secretariat and the bodies of the Convention in relation to the Paris Agreement. They typically call for a robust and fit for purpose rule book and put forward recommendations for:

- The design of NDCs (e.g. include adaptation, comprehensively cover all/different economic sectors, especially transport and land use/forests, be comparable, fit for monitoring and review);

- The design of the global stocktake to ensure an effective cycle of increased ambition;

- An effective transparency framework.

134.    Many of the inputs call for immediate national, long-term, deep decarbonization strategies, and some also call for more attention to be placed on near-term pathways.

135.    The attention of the secretariat and the bodies of the Convention is also solicited on specific policy issues that require international coordinated policy action. Recurrent themes include carbon pricing (including the provisions under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement); policies on non-carbon dioxide GHGs (e.g. HFCs, short-lived climate pollutants); managing fossil fuel production and phasing out fossil fuel subsidies; institutional reforms to spur investment and steps to improve the availability, adequacy, predictability, accessibility and sustainability of means of implementation.

136.    In addition, the secretariat and the bodies of the Convention are also called upon to ensure that all climate action, including negotiations, uphold the fundamental principles embodied in the Convention and the Paris Agreement.

137.    Some of the recommendations for the secretariat and the bodies of the Convention target process. They variously call for a more open and transparent process, closer involvement of non-Party stakeholders (including youth) and better information for citizens.

138.    Many non-Party stakeholders acknowledge the value of the Global Climate Action Agenda and point to a robust rule book for the Paris Agreement as something that will enhance integrity and foster more private sector involvement. Others state that they would like to see the Global Climate Action Agenda and the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action develop further and become more influential in negotiations and in implementation.

139.    Some inputs also call for closer multilateral coordination (e.g. United Nations coherence, links between different international instruments and agreements, including the Paris Agreement

and the Montreal Protocol, processes under the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Maritime Organizations and others).

*Recommendations for governments*

140.     More than half of all inputs identify actions and recommendations for national governments. These touch mostly on creating the legal, policy, regulatory, fiscal and governance frameworks to create enabling conditions for climate action within their territories.

141.     In relation to the implementation of the Paris Agreement and NDCs, many of these inputs call for increased national ambition backed by clear plans; for all Parties to follow the example set by those already working to better align their national targets and policies with international commitments; and for more attention to be paid to the systemic transformations needed to meet the Paris Agreement goals.

142.     Several inputs point out the scope for more comprehensive national-level consultation on NDC preparation, the consideration of co-benefits, ways to enhance the subnational governance framework to enable subnational actors to make their due contribution to national climate objectives, and the need for better integration of climate change in national visions for economic development. Others focus on the principles that they would like to see governments uphold and address more convincingly, for example just transition, equity and human rights.

143.     Inputs calling on government action at the national level often call for a more comprehensive coverage of sectors and GHGs in mitigation policies (HFCs, short-lived climate pollutants); incentives to reduce energy demand throughout the economy; mainstreaming climate action into (all) sectoral policies; building resilience in conjunction with sustainable development, disaster risk preparedness and poverty eradication while ensuring sufficient financial resources; upping education and awareness-raising for increased citizen involvement and mobilization; and more attention to, including financial support for, carbon removal research and technologies (including natural sinks).

144.     Inputs calling on governments to take action at the sectoral level refer to conditions required for the deployment and dissemination of low-emission technology. As far as specific sectors are concerned, accelerating low-emission technology in the energy sector and more decisive action in the transport and agriculture sectors (especially on forests and food production systems) are highlighted by several stakeholders.

145.     Certain inputs focus on aspects of the financial system, for example increasing and guiding climate finance, mainstreaming climate aspects into investments and others.

146.     Finally, others call on governments to get involved and foster deeper and more extensive collaboration at sub-national level to ensure that all relevant actors are engaged and mobilised for climate action. At the international level, governments are urged to cooperate more and better with their peers to achieve climate goals across the board.

*Recommendations for the private sector*

147.     A few inputs to Talanoa question 3 identify actions and recommendations for the private sector, particularly businesses and investors. Recurrent recommendations for the private sector include shifting to low-carbon and climate-resilient investment and creating new financial mechanisms that facilitate large-scale investments in climate-related initiatives, technologies and processes.

148.    Businesses are further requested to continue to harness their purchasing power to generate market signals and are urged to exploit their ability to lead by example and propagate climate ambition across their peers and supply chains to achieve greater impact.

*Recommendations for intergovernmental organizations*

149.    Finally, a few inputs set out actions and recommendations for intergovernmental organizations whose activities have synergies with climate action, and could lead to more ambition. This concerns better links with other United Nations agencies and programmes (United Nations Development System reforms, United Nations coherence, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Maritime Organizations), relevant international agreements (Kigali Amendment, Convention on Biological Diversity, United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification), and closer integration with the 2030 Agenda to simultaneously achieve climate and sustainable development goals.