

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION'S VIEWS TO THE CMA6 AND CMA7 PRESIDENCIES ON THE BAKU TO BELÉM ROADMAP TO 1.3T

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IOM welcomes the opportunity to provide views to the Presidencies of CMA6 and CMA7 on the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T, as instructed by letter MOI/MTP/BtB Roadmap from the UNFCCC Secretary General of 21 February 2025. The preparation of a dedicated workplan, including engagement with Parties and non-Party stakeholders, appears as a crucial opportunity to scale up available climate finance from all public and private sources to USD 1.3 trillion by 2035 as foreseen by [Decision -/CMA.6](#) on the new collective quantifiable goal on climate finance of 2024.

The Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T shall integrate both traditional and innovative sources of funding that can help advance robust climate action in developing countries, including mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage dimensions, addressing the situation of the most vulnerable populations, migrants and refugees (as indicated in the NCQG decision), human mobility considerations in climate adaptation planning and implementation, and the migration and planned relocation implications of loss and damage (as noted in the 2023 Loss and Damage Fund decision). Funding instruments addressing the impacts of climate change on human mobility can be leveraged to contribute to the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T as they support the resilience of vulnerable populations to the impacts of climate change and can help foster the positive contributions of migrants and displaced persons to an ambitious just transition.

(a) What are your overall expectations for the “Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T”?

IOM expects the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T to spell out a clear, ambitious and realistic path towards achieving the objective set up in the NCQG decision - scaling up of financing to developing country Parties for climate action from all public and private sources to at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035.

The Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T should design a path forward for climate finance mechanisms – GCF, AF, GEF, FRLD – to address gap areas that have not been supported, like human mobility. At the same time, the Roadmap should proactively identify other existing sources of funding (such as bilateral donors, IFIs, private sector, philanthropy, companies, remittances) and innovative mechanisms (blended finance and others) that can help bring the overall figure as close to USD 1.3 trillion as possible, while defining clear areas of priority for each source, including gap areas, like human mobility.

(b) Which topics and thematic issues should be explored to inform the Roadmap, within the scope of its mandate?

Despite the strong integration of human mobility in multiple UNFCCC decisions and in NDCs and NAPs, little, if any, climate finance has been disbursed to climate mobility programming so far. **The Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T should address gap areas, such as climate mobility, in its Roadmap on scaling up climate finance.** From IOM's perspective, the topics that should be explored to inform the roadmap include the issues surrounding human mobility – migration, displacement and planned relocation – based on the needs of affected communities and national priorities expressed in NDCs and NAPs.

1. Human mobility is integrated in UNFCCC decisions and in NDCs and NAPs

There is a suite of UNFCCC COP decisions by Parties that justify the strong need for human mobility – migration, displacement and planned relocation – and migrants to be included as a topic of interest in the work of the Roadmap. The scope of the mandate of the Roadmap would fully justify this inclusion based on previous references and the need to consider populations that are particularly affected by the impacts of climate change.

Global climate change discussions have highlighted since the **Paris Agreement** the need to protect the rights of migrants in climate action. The establishment of the **Task Force on Displacement** under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM) further highlighted Parties agreement to address human mobility in contexts of climate change as a priority issue. This was recalled in the **Global Stocktake** decision [1/CMA.5](#) made at COP28 in Dubai, which called on “Parties and relevant institutions to improve coherence and synergies between efforts pertaining to disaster risk reduction, humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction, and displacement, planned relocation and migration, in the context of climate change impacts”. The **NCQG** decision further urged “Parties and other relevant actors to promote the inclusion and extension of benefits to vulnerable communities and groups in **climate finance efforts**, including women and girls, children and youth, persons with disabilities, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, **migrants and refugees**, climate-vulnerable communities and people in vulnerable situations”.

Secondly, it is important to signal that human mobility has increasingly become a topic of action in both NDCs and NAPs. 39% of submitted NDCs and 85% of NAPs to date include human mobility in some form. The integration of human mobility in NDCs has included commitments by Parties to advance action on climate mobility – for instance in Ecuador, Chile, Mexico or Uruguay. Efforts are underway to make sure that the new generation of NDCs that are being produced by Parties in the lead to COP30 also include human mobility as an area of action, as it is already the case in the NDCs 3.0 from [Uruguay](#), [Ecuador](#) and [Cuba](#).

Under the leadership of IOM, the Task Force on Displacement published during COP29 a [Technical guide](#) on integrating human mobility and climate change linkages into relevant national climate change planning processes, focused on NAPs. Accompanying this process, multiple NAPs have included references and action items on human mobility, including among others Argentina, Ecuador, Guatemala. New NAPs under preparation will also include the topic as an important area of work, with examples already coming from Grenada and Brazil. The Roadmap's commitment to identifying financing resources to assist developing Parties in implementing their NAPs and NDCs provides a strong justification for including human mobility considerations as a distinct area of work.

2. Climate finance flows to climate mobility programmes are limited

Current funding falls significantly short of what is needed for robust climate action, including addressing the impacts of climate change on migration, displacement, and planned relocation. Notably, with [limited exceptions](#), major existing UNFCCC-related climate funding instruments – such as the GCF, AF, GEF – rarely include provisions in their programming documents and projects to address human mobility in the context of climate change. For instance, a [review](#) carried out by the WIM in November 2024 on case studies of several projects funded by GCF in relation to its strategic workstreams on loss and damage found that *“none of the selected projects address the workstream on migration, displacement and human mobility in a significant way”*.

The scale of needs remains immense. The **economic impact of internal displacement** worldwide was estimated at more than [USD 21 billion](#) in 2021 by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC),

counting both disaster and conflict displacement. With an estimated [20.3 million new displacements](#) due to weather hazards in 2023 alone, the costs to both governments and communities remain overwhelming and understudied.

The **financial needs for planned relocation** are largely unknown. As communities *find themselves compelled* to move out of harm's way – such as in coastal areas due to sea level rise – relocation costs rise. However, these processes are extremely costly from the little evidence available:

- The planned relocation of 35 families from [Isle de Jean Charles](#) in 2022 had a cost of USD 48 million.
- The relocation of 300 families from the [island of Gardi Sugdub](#) reportedly cost around USD 12 million only in terms of transportation and infrastructure.
- In Fiji, the relocation of [Narikoso](#) cost over EUR 800,000, with the Government spending around three times more than initially foreseen.

Yet, this is only the tip of the iceberg, as reliable estimates on the number of communities that will need relocation in the coming decades are not available and economic calculations cannot always account for the non-economic implications of these movements.

Climate migration in its more regular forms also has costs that need to be accounted for, including the need to [rebuild lives and livelihoods, accessing health and education and services in destination areas](#). Responding to all these needs will certainly require tapping into existing and innovative sources of funding that could be identified through the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T.

Furthermore, **preventing displacement** through adaptation and disaster risk reduction financing may also have important financing implications. Since [projections](#) vary greatly across scenarios and methodologies, including in terms of populations at risk, estimating the funding requirements to prevent displacement is highly challenging but very considerable.

As underlined by [multiple experts](#), with most resources to address climate mobility originating from outside the climate financing landscape, different sources of funding [have been brought forward](#) to respond to this challenge. This includes domestic funding (state level domestic budgets used for adaptation, social protection programmes), and bilateral and multilateral sources (humanitarian funding, Multi-Partner Trust Funds). Yet the overall funding landscape remains unclear and the availability of different sources of funding does not match the scale and scope of needs.

3. (c) What country experiences, best practices and lessons learned can be shared related to barriers and enabling environments; innovative sources of finance; grants, concessional and non-debt creating instruments, and measures to create fiscal space?

As the attention of the international community has increasingly turned to human mobility in contexts of climate change, analyses on barriers and opportunities to access funding have emerged. When assessing the potential role of Multilateral Development Banks in financing climate migration, the [Migration Policy Institute](#) identifies a set of challenges that could be extrapolated to other sources of funding: a need for more context-specific data and knowledge, limited national policy frameworks and client demand, a dearth of concessional financing and grant funding, and underdeveloped internal coordination and capacity. An [IOM report](#) noted other challenges for public access to climate finance, such as debt burden, and for the private sector contributions could be “obstructed by risk perceptions, regulatory barriers and high interest rates”.

1. Planning and Data Good Practices on Climate Mobility

To address the existing challenges, IOM has launched the development of **Climate Mobility Investment Framework** to provide an integrated approach to addressing human mobility needs and risk of displacements in the context of climate change. The Climate Mobility Investment Framework will include a set of technical tools, including Climate Mobility Needs Assessment and guidance for investment planning that will enable countries to develop National Climate Mobility Investment Plans and access varied and fit-for-purpose financing, including from both public and private sectors.

One of the key challenges IOM is addressing is the limited access to granular data on climate displacement risks, particularly those linked to slow-onset hazards. This data gap hampers efforts to understand and inform policies on the nexus between human mobility and climate change. In response, IOM, under its Climate Mobility Innovation Labs (CMIL) has developed the [Risk Index for Climate Displacement \(RICD\)](#), which integrates macro-level hazard, exposure, and vulnerability analysis with granular, micro-level data that focuses on the immediate triggers of displacement in identified hotspot areas. By providing a nuanced and actionable understanding of displacement risks and “tipping points”, the RICD enables policymakers, practitioners, and researchers to identify climate hotspot areas where displacement is most likely to occur and develop more targeted, effective responses.

Building on this data-driven approach, IOM leverages advanced analytics and research to bridge knowledge gaps and strengthen climate mobility planning. In collaboration with GeoAct, an earth observation consultancy specialized in the adoption of geoinformation and innovative intelligent technologies, a **Climate Mobility Assessment** report was developed. The assessment leveraged diverse data sources – including climate models, migration tracking, and socioeconomic indicator – to assess climate-induced mobility. A key aspect of this approach is the use of multi-layered data analysis to assess climate-induced mobility. By integrating Earth Observation data, satellite imagery, and AI-driven analytics, the report maps the relationship between climate stressors and migration patterns, providing policymakers with actionable insights.

[IOM’s partnership with Microsoft’s AI for Good Lab](#) has enhanced evidence-based climate mobility assessments, integrating AI-powered climate analytics, risk modelling, and geospatial assessment. In the Maldives, this approach identified at-risk populations and five safe islands, guiding relocation strategies and strengthening the National Adaptation Plan (NAP). In Ethiopia, flood risk mapping has supported early warning systems and flood preparedness planning for at-risk communities, while in Libya, extreme heat assessments along migration routes inform climate adaptation for migrants and host communities.

2. Finance Good Practices Related to Climate Mobility

Among the enabling environments to improve funding for climate mobility, an [assessment](#) of the Eastern Caribbean States by GIZ noted the importance of **including human mobility in adaptation and resilience building** initiatives across the region. This is critically important in regions where climate change projects are being implemented in contexts with a high prevalence of human mobility, including migration, displacement and planned relocation. In sum, when tailored to the local context, climate adaptation interventions cannot disregard the social dimensions of human mobility.

Another good practice can be found in the reliance on **collaboration between migration and climate finance entities to fund innovative solutions to climate mobility**. In this context, IOM has successfully mobilized resources from Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada and Global Affairs Canada’s climate envelope for the implementation of an [initiative](#) with the objective of strengthening climate adaptation to address the adverse environmental drivers of migration in agriculture and resource dependent communities in Southern Mexico.

Another area of opportunity identified in the framework of the IOM [study](#) relates to the **investment in regional public goods to address climate mobility**. As the New Global Financing Pact urges investment in public goods, it offers a potential new stream of finance that can be aligned with climate mobility, complementing more traditional sources of funding. A possible opportunity under this approach could include the Regional Operations Envelope, a special financing window established within the African Development Bank's concessional African Development Fund.

Trust funds designed to meet climate change challenges can be mobilized as well in the context of climate mobility. This includes for instance the [development of public funds](#) to support the relocation of communities at risk. Fiji pioneered this approach through the Climate Relocation of Communities Trust Fund [Act of 2019](#), supporting the country's [Planned Relocation Guidelines](#).

Blended finance has not yet been significantly leveraged to fund solutions to climate mobility. Yet it represents an important area of opportunity, registering [important growth](#) in recent years. Blended finance requires buy-in and contributions from the private sector, which are not yet well developed. An interesting example in this regard relates to the funding received by [IOM](#) to provide humanitarian assistance to people displaced by the floods in Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, in 2024 largely provided by the private sector. Other potential sources of funding from the private sector that can support action on climate mobility include [insurance processes](#) at multiple scales. The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility ([CCRIF](#)), designed as a regional catastrophe fund for Caribbean governments to limit the financial impact of hurricanes and earthquakes, has often been noted as a promising initiative.

IOM has taken steps to **enhance blended finance for climate mobility** in Asia and the Pacific, especially through [the Climate Catalytic Fund \(CCF\)](#). The CCF is the first fund in the region dedicated explicitly to climate mobility that employs a blended finance model. It leverages matching funds from local governments, civil society organizations, and the private sector through a 1:1 co-financing requirement. This approach fosters shared commitment, mobilizes additional resources to support and scale up locally led, bankable adaptation actions and innovations, and de-risks private sector investments in adaptation and risk reduction. Furthermore, the Fund's allocation and priorities will be guided by the IOM Risk Index for Climate Displacement (RICD), which provides granular, local-level risk data to identify potential hotspots necessary to maximize the Fund's impact. The CCF will be piloted in three countries: the Philippines, Indonesia, and Fiji.

IOM has also highlighted the historical opportunity represented by the loss and damage architecture, and notably the **Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD)**, as a key new source of funding to address climate mobility. Migration, displacement and planned relocation are quoted as belonging to the scope of the FRLD in COP28 [decision 1/CP.28](#), meaning countries and communities could receive funding from FRLD to respond to climate mobility. Moreover, [the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage](#), of which IOM is an inaugural member, provides a significant pathway to accessing new forms of finance. This network plays a vital role in catalyzing financing for climate-vulnerable states by supporting the development of robust loss and damage frameworks and proposals for the FRLD. The new approach embodied by the FRLD, coupled with the Santiago Network's capacity-building efforts and the expected participation of migrants in consultative processes, as well as IOM's involvement in the Annual High-Level Dialogue on Loss and Damage, creates a unique opportunity and responsibility to unlock and scale up funding for climate mobility solutions.

3. (d) Which multilateral initiatives do you see as most relevant to take into account in the Roadmap and why?

From IOM's perspective, and based on the above issues, it would be important for the Roadmap to 1.3T to consider a wide range of funding sources and initiatives that target multiple dimensions of

climate action, including the impacts of climate change on human mobility. This raises both opportunities and challenges that can be considered when developing and implementing the Roadmap when looking at multilateral initiatives.

From an opportunity standpoint, a focus on human mobility, that could be extrapolated to other areas, opens a wide array of multilateral initiatives that can be considered to respond to climate mobility. This includes, for instance, the **Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MMPTF)**, which has addressed the adverse climate drivers of migration, and regular pathways for people on the move in the context of climate change. Projects directly addressing climate mobility have been funded in countries like **Brazil, India, Iraq and the the IGAD region**. **IOM's internal Development Fund** has continued to implement relevant projects that include, among many other topics, research and evidence generation on the impacts of climate change on human mobility, capacity building and training for national and local counterparts, integration of human mobility in National Adaptation Plans and climate adaptation interventions.

Furthermore, disaster displacement work, generally funded by bilateral and multilateral humanitarian assistance, can also provide resources to address displacement when these movements occur due to climate change impacts. Climate financing has been mobilized to prevent and address displacement risk, yet reactive solutions – instead of preventive one – are still prevalent. Forecast-based financing can provide an opportunity to improve the timeliness of this funding to achieve better results for affected populations. Forecast-based financing was used in the context of typhoon responses in the Philippines to strengthen and protect shelters and housing. In addition, the Internal Displacement Solutions Fund (IDSF) supports the implementation of the UN Secretary General's Action Agenda on Solutions to Internal Displacement. The Fund supported 10 joint programmes for a total of USD13.8 million, including in disaster displacement situations, like in **Vanuatu**.

Under the umbrella of the **Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage**, a new Technical guide on accessing finance for averting, minimizing, and addressing the impacts of displacement associated with climate change impacts will provide clear indications and pathways to support the work of the Roadmap in this thematic area.

When looking at multilateral initiatives that can inform the work of the Roadmap, it should be mentioned that the scale of needs that derives from situations of migration, displacement and planned relocation and involve the situation of migrants is still way beyond the availability of resources from existing sources. Therefore, **while it is important to involve the mentioned initiatives as contributors to the climate finance goal, it is as important to point out that further support is required and will be increasingly required to meet evolving needs**. The Roadmap has, therefore, the responsibility to take stock of the multiple initiatives that already exist, but also to identify reliable and viable approaches to achieve the 1.3T goal that would help mitigate the adverse impacts of climate change, including on human mobility.

Readings

<https://www.fmreview.org/financing-displacement-response/puscas-guadagno/>

https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/WIM_TEASER_5.pdf

https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/climate-finance-provided-and-mobilised-by-developed-countries-in-2013-2022_19150727-en.html

https://weadapt.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/giz_landscape-of-financing-options-hmccc_final_web.pdf

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https://www.adaptationcommunity.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/FinancingHMCCCPublication_FINAL.pdf

<https://eastandhornofafrica.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1701/files/documents/2024-04/planning-climate-mobility-digital-5.3.2024-1.pdf>

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/mpi_climate-mobility-donors-2025_final.pdf