

DRAFT TEXT

on

SBSTA 59 agenda item 5 / SBI 59 agenda item 8
Matters relating to the global stocktake under the Paris Agreement

Version 5/12/2023 5:00

Updated textual building blocks by the co-chairs

These updated building blocks have been produced by the co-chairs under their own authority and are intended to be used as a tool for the further development of a draft CMA decision on the first GST. They have attempted to reflect views expressed by Parties, including through options, where appropriate.

{Preambular}

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement,

Recalling Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement, which provides that the Agreement, in enhancing the implementation of the Convention, aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change,

Also recalling Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, which provides that the implementation of the Paris Agreement will reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances,

Further recalling, as provided in Article 14, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement, that the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall periodically take stock of the implementation of the Paris Agreement to assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of the Agreement and its long-term goals, and that it shall do so in a comprehensive and facilitative manner, considering mitigation, adaptation and the means of implementation and support, and in the light of equity and the best available science,

Recalling, as provided in Article 14, paragraph 3, of the Paris Agreement, that the outcome of the global stocktake shall inform Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their actions and support in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Agreement, as well as in enhancing international cooperation for climate action,

Also recalling decisions 19/CMA.1, 1/CMA.2, 1/CMA.3 and 1/CMA.4,

Underlining the critical role of multilateralism based on United Nations values and principles, including in the context of the implementation of the Convention and the Paris Agreement, and the importance of international cooperation for addressing global issues, including climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty,

Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind and that Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, the right to health, the rights of Indigenous Peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity,

Noting the importance of ensuring the integrity of all ecosystems, including in forests, the ocean and the cryosphere, and the protection of biodiversity, recognized by some cultures as Mother Earth, and also noting the importance of 'climate justice', when taking action to address climate change,

Underlining the urgent need to address, in a comprehensive and synergetic manner, the interlinked global crises of climate change and biodiversity loss in the broader context of achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, as well as the vital importance of protecting,

conserving, restoring and sustainably using nature and ecosystems for effective and sustainable climate action,

{Context and cross-cutting considerations}

1. *Welcomes* that the Paris Agreement has driven near-universal climate action by setting goals and sending signals to the world regarding the urgency of responding to the climate crisis;

2. *Underlines* that, despite overall progress on mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation and support, Parties are not collectively on track towards achieving the purpose of the Paris Agreement and its long-term goals;

3. *Expresses serious concern* that 2023 is set to be the warmest year on record and that impacts from climate change are rapidly accelerating, and *emphasizes* the need for urgent action and support to keep within reach the 1.5°C goal and address the climate crisis in this critical decade;

4. *Welcomes* the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and *expresses its appreciation and gratitude* to those involved in preparing the reports in the sixth assessment cycle for their excellent work and dedication to continuing their work during the extraordinary circumstances of the pandemic;

5. *Notes with serious concern* the findings of the Sixth Assessment Report that human activities, principally through emissions of greenhouse gases, have unequivocally caused global warming of about 1.2°C, that human-caused climate change is already affecting many weather and climate extremes in every region across the globe, and that if climate goals are to be achieved, both adaptation and mitigation financing would need to increase many-fold;

6. *Welcomes* the conclusion of the first global stocktake, *expresses appreciation and gratitude* to those involved in the technical dialogue thereunder, and *also expresses* appreciation and gratitude to the co-facilitators for preparing a factual synthesis report and other outputs of the technical assessment;

7.

Option 1: Recognizes that the consideration of equity can enable greater ambition in climate action and support and increase the likelihood of meeting the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, including just transitions, strengthening resilience, sustainable development, environmental protection, poverty eradication and human rights, and that historical, current and changing contexts within and across nations remain potent factors in the ability to make progress towards climate goals;

Option 2: Notes that equity is complex and multidimensional as Parties have different national circumstances and capabilities to contribute and that their contributions toward achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement are nationally determined and *also notes* that human rights-based, inclusive approaches can lead to better climate outcomes and enable more ambitious climate action and policies;

Option 3: Reiterates and respects the principles of equity and CBDR-RC under the Convention and its Paris Agreement, recognizing that they are at the very core of the global response to climate change and *reiterates* their continued importance in guiding global efforts to address climate change in the long-term to ensure fairness and leaving no one behind;

Option 4: no text

8.

Option 1: Recognizes that historical emissions and the use of the world's carbon space, is not equitably distributed as assessed by the IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report, with developed countries emitting historically more emissions relative to their share of the global population, and *recognizes* that equitable mitigation action is guided by historical responsibility, *also recognizes* that developed countries should take the lead on mitigation actions;

Option 2: Notes the challenges related to pre-2020 ambition and implementation and *further notes* that the achievement of the Paris Agreement is based on a forward-looking process,

fundamentally relying on all Parties bringing forward and implementing their highest possible ambition towards the realization of the goals of the Paris Agreement;

Option 3: no text

9. *Recognizes* the specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, as provided for in the Convention;

10. *Reaffirms* that sustainable and just solutions to the climate crisis must be founded on meaningful and effective social dialogue and participation of all stakeholders, including Indigenous Peoples, local communities and governments, women, youth and children, and *notes* that the global transition to low emissions and climate resilient development provides opportunities and challenges for sustainable economic development and poverty eradication;

11. *Emphasizes* the critical role of the full implementation of the enhanced transparency framework under the Paris Agreement;

12. *Also emphasizes* that finance, capacity-building and technology transfer are critical enablers of climate action;

13.

Option 1: Reaffirms Article 3, paragraph 5, of the Convention stating that Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to address the problems of climate change, and measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade;

Option 2: no text

14. Welcomes the high-level events and takes note of the summary;

{Collective progress towards achieving the purpose and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, including under Article 2, paragraph 1(a–c), in the light of equity and the best available science, and informing Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, action and support}

{Mitigation}

15. *Reaffirms* the Paris Agreement temperature goal of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels;

16. *Recognizes* that the impacts of climate change will be much lower at the temperature increase of 1.5 °C compared with 2 °C and *resolves* to pursue efforts to limit temperature increase to 1.5 °C;

17. *Expresses utmost concern* at the findings of IPCC AR6 that human activities have caused around 1.2 °C of warming to date and that impacts are already being felt in every region and will increase with every increment of warming;

18. *Acknowledges* that significant collective progress towards the Paris Agreement temperature goal has been made since the adoption of the Agreement with the expected global temperature increase in 2100 of 3.7–4.8 °C with the adoption of the Cancun Agreements in 2010, 3.0–3.2 °C with the adoption of the Paris Agreement and commitments made through intended nationally determined contributions in 2015, and 2.5–2.9 °C with the latest nationally determined contributions;

19. *Expresses appreciation* that all Parties have communicated nationally determined contributions that demonstrate progress towards achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal, most of which provided the information necessary to facilitate their clarity, transparency and understanding;

20. *Commends* Parties that have communicated long-term low GHG emission development strategies, and notes that 87 per cent of the global economy in terms of share of

GDP, is covered by climate neutrality, carbon neutrality, GHG neutrality or net zero emissions targets, which provides the possibility of reaching below 2 °C when taking into account their full implementation;

21. *Recognizes* the important role and active engagement of non-Party stakeholders, particularly civil society, business, financial institutions, cities and other subnational authorities, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, women, youth and children, in contributing to the significant collective progress towards the Paris Agreement temperature goal, including progress through other relevant intergovernmental processes;

22. *Notes* that over the past decade mitigation technologies have become increasingly more available, and that the unit costs of several low-emission technologies have fallen continuously since 2010, notably wind power, solar power, and storage, due to technological advancements, economies of scale, increased efficiency, and streamlined manufacturing processes;

23.

Option 1:

Notes with concern the pre-2020 gaps in both mitigation ambition and implementation under the Convention and Kyoto Protocol by developed country Parties;

Bis Also notes that the IPCC had earlier indicated that developed countries must reduce emissions by 25–40 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020. Also notes that the report on national greenhouse data for 1990-2020 prepared by the UNFCCC secretariat stated that GHG emissions of Annex I Parties that do not have economies in transition, decreased by 11.3 per cent and 13.4 per cent without and with LULUCF respectively, and those of Annex I Parties with economies in transition, decreased by 43.3 per cent and 53.2 per cent without and with LULUCF respectively. Also notes that the 2023 compilation and synthesis report on the fifth biennial reports prepared by the UNFCCC secretariat noted that two developed countries did not fulfil their targets for 2020 under the Convention;

Option 2: no text

24. *Notes with significant concern* that despite progress made, global greenhouse gas emissions trajectories are not in line with the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement, and there is a rapidly narrowing window to raise ambition and implement existing commitments in order to limit warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels;

25.

Option 1:

Recognizes that limiting global warming to 1.5 °C with no or limited overshoot requires peaking in global greenhouse gas emissions at the latest before 2025 and rapid, deep and sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions of 43 per cent by 2030 and 60 per cent by 2035 relative to the 2019 level and to reach net zero CO₂ emissions by 2050;

Option 2: no text

26. *Also notes with concern* the findings of the NDC synthesis report that current NDCs, would reduce emissions on average by 2 per cent on 2019 levels by 2030 and that there is a sizeable difference to the global greenhouse gas emissions trajectories in line with the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement;

27.

Option 1: Further notes the findings of the NDC synthesis report that, when all NDCs are fully implemented, including all conditional parts, GHG emission level in 2030 are projected to even be 5.3 per cent lower than in 2019. However, this depends mostly on access to enhanced financial resources, technology transfer and technical cooperation, and capacity-building support. When NDCs are implemented without any conditional element the emission level is estimated to result in a 1.4 per cent increase compared to 2019;

Option 2: no text

28. *Notes* with further concern the findings of the IPCC that policies implemented by the end of 2020 are projected to result in higher global GHG emissions than those implied by NDCs, indicating an implementation gap and *recognizes* the urgent need to address this gap;

29.

Option 1: Acknowledges that the carbon budgets consistent with achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal are now small and being rapidly depleted and *expresses concern* that historical cumulative net CO₂ emissions between 1850-2019 amount to about four fifths of the total carbon budget for a 50 per cent probability of limiting global warming to 1.5°C, and to about two thirds of the total carbon budget for a 67 per cent probability to limit global warming to 2°C;

Option 2: no text

30. *Emphasizes* the urgent need for immediate, deep, rapid and sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions by Parties across all sectors, including through accelerated implementation of domestic mitigation measures in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, use of voluntary cooperation approaches under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement and other cooperative actions;

31. *Notes* the findings of the Sixth Assessment Report that feasible, effective, and low-cost mitigation options are already available in all sectors to keep 1.5 °C within reach in this critical decade with the necessary cooperation on technologies and support, and *also notes* that significant barriers remain to achieve the scale and speed of implementing these mitigation options;

32. *Emphasizes* its resolve to accelerate action in this critical decade on the basis of the best available science and equity, reflecting common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of different national circumstances and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty;

33. *Recalls* the findings of AR6, that in all countries, mitigation efforts embedded within the wider development context can increase the pace, depth and breadth of emissions reductions, as well as that policies that shift development pathways towards sustainability can broaden the portfolio of available mitigation responses, and enable the pursuit of synergies with development objectives;

34. *Reiterates its call upon* Parties to accelerate the development, deployment and dissemination of technologies, and the adoption of policies, to transition towards low-emission energy systems, including by rapidly scaling up the deployment of clean power generation and energy efficiency measures, including accelerating efforts towards the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, while providing targeted support to the poorest and most vulnerable in line with national circumstances and recognizing the need for support towards a just transition;

35.

Option 1:

Calls upon Parties to take further action in this critical decade towards:

(a)

Option 1: Tripling renewable energy capacity globally by 2030 compared to the 2022 level to 11,000 GW and doubling the global average annual rate of energy-efficiency improvement compared to the 2022 level to 4.1 per cent by 2030;

Option 2: no text

(b)

Option 1: Substantially scaling up globally by 2030 zero and low-emission technologies, including abatement and removal technologies, including carbon capture, utilization and storage, and low-carbon hydrogen production;

Option 2: no text

(c)

Option 1: An orderly and just phase out of fossil fuels;

Option 2: Accelerating efforts towards phasing out unabated fossil fuels and to rapidly reducing their use so as to achieve net-zero CO₂ in energy systems by or around mid-century;

Option 3: no text

(d)

Option 1: A rapid phase out of unabated coal power this decade and an immediate cessation of the permitting of new unabated coal power generation, recognizing that the IPCC suggests a pathway involving a reduction of unabated coal use by 75 per cent from 2019 levels by 2030;

Option 2: no text;

(e)

Option 1: Phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies over the medium term;

Option 2: no text

(f)

Option 1: Rapidly increasing the deployment pace for zero-emission vehicles;

Option 2: no text

Option 2: no text

36. *Recognizes* the need for a just energy transition that takes into account different starting points and national circumstances as well as energy security, affordability and accessibility and the need for sustainable development;

37.

Option 1: *Invites* Parties to consider further actions to reduce by 2030 non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions, including by reducing methane emissions globally by at least 30 per cent by 2030 and 40 per cent by 2035;

Option 2: no text

38.

Option 1: *Emphasizes* the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring nature and ecosystems to achieve the Paris Agreement temperature goal, including through halting and reversing deforestation by 2030 and through other terrestrial and marine ecosystems acting as sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and by protecting biodiversity, while ensuring social and environmental safeguards;

Option 2: no text

39. *Invites* Parties to preserve and restore oceans and coastal ecosystem and scale up, as appropriate, ocean-based mitigation action;

40. *Notes* the importance of transitioning to sustainable lifestyles and sustainable patterns of consumption and production in efforts to address climate change and *encourages* efforts towards transitions to sustainable lifestyles, sustainable patterns of consumption and circularity approaches, including circular economy and circular carbon economy approaches;

41. *Recalls* Article 3 and Article 4, paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 11, of the Paris Agreement and *requests* Parties that have not yet done so to revisit and strengthen the 2030 targets in their nationally determined contributions as necessary to align with the Paris Agreement temperature goal by the end of 2024, taking into account different national circumstances;

42. *Recalls* Article 3 and Article 4, paragraph 3, of the Paris Agreement, and *reaffirms* that each Party's next nationally determined contribution will represent a progression beyond

the Party's current nationally determined contribution and reflect its highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances;

43. *Reaffirms* the nationally determined nature of nationally determined contributions;

44.

Option 1: Recalls Article 4, paragraphs 4 of the Paris Agreement, and *encourages* each Party to come forward in their next nationally determined contributions, referred to in paragraph X, with ambitious, absolute economy-wide emission reduction, covering all greenhouse gases sectors, and categories and aligned with limiting global warming to 1.5 °C, as informed by latest science;

Option 2: no text

45. *Notes* the importance of aligning nationally determined contributions with long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies, and *encourages* Parties to align their next nationally determined contributions with long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies;

46. *Notes* the capacity challenges of least developed countries and small island developing States related to the preparation and communication of new nationally determined contributions;

47.

Option 1: Urges Parties that have not yet done so and invites all other Parties to communicate or revise, by the sixth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, their long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies referred to in Article 4, paragraph 19, of the Paris Agreement towards just transitions to net zero emissions by or around mid-century, taking into account different national circumstances and stresses the urgency of aligning these strategies with emission trajectories needed to limit warming to 1.5 C;

Option 2: Urges Parties that have not yet done so and invites all other Parties to communicate or revise, by the sixth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, their long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies referred to in Article 4, paragraph 19, of the Paris Agreement towards just transitions to net zero emissions by or around mid-century, taking into account different national circumstances, and requests developed country Parties to include timeframes for reaching net-zero by 2040 and negative greenhouse gas emissions as early as possible;

48. *Emphasizes* Article 4, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement, which provides that support shall be provided to developing country Parties for the implementation of Article 4 of the Paris Agreement, in accordance with Articles 9–11, and *recognizes* that enhanced support for developing country Parties will allow for higher ambition in their actions;

49.

Option 1:

Recalls the obligation of developed country Parties to provide financial resources to developing country Parties for mitigation actions, and *recognizes* that mitigation action for developing countries depend on the provision and mobilization of means of implementation and support from developed countries, including for achieving universal access to energy;

Option 2: no text

{Adaptation}

50. *Emphasizes* the importance of the global goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a view to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate adaptation response in the context of the temperature goal referred to in Article 2 of the Paris Agreement;

51. *Acknowledges* that adaptation challenges exist, and risks are increasing with every increment of warming, and that greater levels of mitigation can reduce the need for additional adaptation efforts, and that greater adaptation needs can involve greater adaptation costs;
52. *Recognizes* the increasing adaptation planning and implementation efforts being undertaken by Parties, towards enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability, as set out in national adaptation plans and adaptation communications, and notes that 50 Parties have submitted their national adaptation plans and 62 Parties have submitted their adaptation communications;
53. *Also recognizes* the significant efforts of developing country Parties in developing and implementing their national adaptation plans and adaptation communications, including through their domestic expenditures, as well as their increased efforts to align their national adaptation development plans;
54. *Notes with appreciation* the contribution of relevant constituted bodies and institutional arrangements, including the Adaptation Committee, the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, and the Nairobi Work Programme, to these efforts;
55. *Recognizes* the contribution of non-Party stakeholders, and the importance of Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge for understanding, designing, evaluating and implementing climate adaptation processes and action to reduce risks from climate change;
56. *Notes with significant concern* the findings in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Sixth Assessment Report that most observed adaptation responses are fragmented, incremental, sector-specific and unequally distributed across regions, and that despite progress, significant adaptation gaps exist across sectors and regions, and will continue to grow under current levels of implementation, with the largest adaptation gaps among lower income groups;
57. *Notes* that there are gaps in the collective assessment of the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation, and that monitoring and evaluation of outcomes is critical for tracking the progress in adaptation actions;
58. *Notes with concern* that the current provision of climate finance, technology development and transfer and capacity-building for adaptation remains highly insufficient to respond to worsening climate change impacts in developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change; and *notes* that the estimated costs/needs of adaptation are now approximately 10–18 times as much as international public adaptation finance flows;
59. *Acknowledges* that establishing and improving national inventories of climate impacts over time and building accessible, user-driven climate services systems can strengthen the implementation of adaptation actions, and *recognizes* that one third of the world does not have access to early warning and climate information services, as well as the need to enhance coordination of activities by the systematic observation community;
60. *Emphasizes* the urgency of scaling up action and support, including finance, capacity building and technology development and transfer, to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change in line with the best available science, taking into account the priorities and needs of developing country Parties as referred to in Article 9, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement;
61. *Notes* the increasing intensity and frequency of impacts caused by climate change, in line with IPCC AR6 findings, and *calls for* urgent, transformational and locally led adaptation action;
62. *Recognizes* cross-border and transboundary risks that require knowledge-sharing and international cooperation for addressing them;
63. *Also recognizes* that adaptation integrated with sustainable development can reduce maladaptation and create co-benefits to many sectors and systems;
64. *Emphasizes* that the magnitude and rate of climate change and associated risks depend strongly on near-term mitigation and adaptation actions, that long-term planning for and accelerated implementation of adaptation, particularly in this decade, are critical to closing

adaptation gaps and create many opportunities, and that accelerated financial support for developing countries from developed countries and other sources is a critical enabler;

65. *Recognizes* the importance of the iterative adaptation cycle for building adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability and *notes* that it is an iterative process, consisting of risk and impact assessment; planning; implementation; and monitoring, evaluation and learning;

66. *Also recognizes* the importance of meaningful participation of Indigenous Peoples, local communities, migrants, women, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations in addition to Parties, in developing and implementing locally appropriate adaptation action;

67. *Notes* that integrated solutions, such as land-use management and nature conservation, not only reduce emissions but also offer economic, social and environmental benefits such as improved wellbeing, and that adaptation can mitigate impacts and losses, as part of a country-driven gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent approach, building on best available science as well as Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge;

68. *Calls upon* Parties that have not yet done so to have in place their national adaptation plans, policies and planning processes by 2025 and have progressed in implementing them by 2030;

69. *Also calls upon* Parties that have not yet done so to submit and update periodically an adaptation communication, including the consideration of including relevant information in the biennial transparency reports;

70. *Further requests* the secretariat to prepare an annual synthesis report on adaptation information provided by Parties in their biennial transparency reports, adaptation communications and nationally determined contributions;

71. *Calls for* the enhanced adaptation efforts that are needed to achieve the goal in Article 2, paragraph 1(b), of the Paris Agreement and the global goal on adaptation;

72. *Placeholder for GGA outcomes*

73.

Option 1: Invites the scientific community to continue enhancing knowledge on adaptation and *also invites* the IPCC to prepare a special report on adaptation, including metrics and indicators in advance of the second global stocktake;

Option 2: Invites the scientific community to continue enhancing knowledge on adaptation, including on metrics and indicators;

74. *Emphasizes* the critical importance of scaling up support for adaptation and *urges* developed country Parties to urgently and significantly scale up their provision of climate finance, technology transfer and capacity-building for adaptation so as to respond to the urgent needs of developing country Parties as part of a global effort, including for the formulation and implementation of national adaptation plans and adaptation communications;

75. *Encourages* further efforts, including by the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, to simplify access to adaptation finance;

76. *Requests* the Adaptation Fund Board and the Green Climate Fund Board to provide an update on their activities and scope of support in relation to assisting developing country Parties in their efforts to achieve the targets referred to in paragraph xx (on NAPs and AdCom);

77. *Urges* developed country Parties to at least double their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing country Parties from 2019 levels by 2025, in the context of achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation in the provision of scaled-up financial resources, recalling Article 9, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement;

78.

Option 1: Requests the Standing Committee on Finance to develop a roadmap on the doubling of adaptation finance, recognizing that doubling is an initial step toward rapidly increasing adaptation finance based on the needs of developing countries to achieve a balance between mitigation and adaptation;

Option 2: Requests developed country parties to provide transparency in progress on delivery of para xx;

Option 3: no text

{Alt 1C.3 Finance flows and means of implementation and support

Alt 2C.3 Means of implementation and support, including finance flows

Alt.3C.3 Means of implementation and support

Alt.4C.3 Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development

C.3bis Means of implementation and support}

79. *Emphasizes* the importance of finance as a critical enabler for climate action;

80. *Recalls* that developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention and that other Parties are encouraged to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily;

81. *Also recalls* that as part of a global effort, developed country Parties should continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance from a wide variety of sources, instruments and channels, noting the significant role of public funds, through a variety of actions, including supporting country-driven strategies, and taking into account the needs and priorities of developing country Parties. Such mobilization of climate finance should represent a progression beyond previous efforts;

82. *Further recalls* that the provision of scaled-up financial resources should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation, taking into account country-driven strategies, and the priorities and needs of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant capacity constraints, such as the least developed countries and small island developing States, considering the need for public and grant-based resources for adaptation;

83.

Option 1: Notes the continued efforts of developed country Parties towards reaching the goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020, in the context of meaningful mitigation action and transparency on implementation;

Option 2: Notes with serious concern the gap in relation to the fulfilment of the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020, in the context of meaningful mitigation action and transparency on implementation;

84. *Notes* the finding of the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that if climate goals are to be achieved, both adaptation and mitigation financing would need to increase many-fold, and that there is sufficient global capital to close the global investment gap but there are barriers to redirect capital to climate action. Governments through public funding and clear signals to investors are key in reducing these barrier and investors, central banks, and financial regulators can also play their part;

85. *Highlights* the growing gap between the needs of developing country Parties, in particular those due to the increasing impacts of climate change and their increased indebtedness, and the support provided and mobilized for their efforts to implement their nationally determined contributions, highlighting that such needs are currently estimated at USD 5.8–5.9 trillion for the pre-2030 period;

86.

Option 1: Acknowledges that the quality of finance provided is important and that too often concessional finance and grants have not been targeted where the needs are greatest, and recognizes that current instruments are mainly loans, which is leading to an increase in levels of indebtedness in a context of limited fiscal space, that in turn is leading to increasing risks and costs of finance. A transformative shift towards grants and non-debt instruments would ensure more sustainable financial support;

Option 2: Notes that scaling up new and additional grant-based and concessional finance remains critical to support developing countries, particularly as they transition in a just and equitable manner;

Option 3: Emphasizes the importance of scaling up access to quality finance, including grant based and concessional finance, and recognises that there is a positive connection between having adequate fiscal space, and climate action and advancing on a pathway towards low emissions and climate resilient development, building on existing institutions and mechanisms in particular the IMF and the Paris Club;

87. *Recognizes* the fact that there is no multilaterally agreed definition of climate finance, *notes* the submissions received in response to decisions 11/CP.25 and 5/CMA.2, which highlighted that some Parties noted how the lack of a common definition impacts the ability to track and assess climate finance, while other Parties mentioned that a single definition would not be useful, and also notes that the operational definitions in use generally reflect a common understanding of what is considered mitigation and adaptation finance;

88. *Emphasizes* the ongoing challenges faced by many developing country Parties in accessing climate finance and encourages further efforts, including by the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, to simplify access to such finance in particular for those that have significant capacity constraints, such as the least developed countries and small island developing States;

89.

Option 1:

Acknowledges that reaching the goal of making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development in Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement is an essential means to achieve the mitigation and adaptation goals of the Paris Agreement and stresses that this goal is complementary to, and no substitute for, Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, which remains essential for achieving mitigation and adaptation goals;

Recognizes that significant global progress has been made toward making finance flows consistent with the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement and *notes with concern* that progress toward achieving Article 2, paragraph 1(c) of the Paris Agreement has been uneven across sectors, regions, and actors, and that significant opportunities remain to accelerate and enhance efforts;

Option 2:

Recognizes that actors outside of the UNFCCC process have increasingly undertaken efforts in relation to climate finance since the adoption of the Paris Agreement and *also recognizes* that Parties have undertaken efforts to contribute to Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement through nationally determined contributions under Article 3 of Paris Agreement;

90. *Takes note of* the work of the Standing Committee on Finance related to Article 2, paragraph 1(c) and the conduct of the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue to exchange views and enhance understanding on the scope of Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement and its complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement;

91. *Notes* the report prepared by the secretariat under the guidance of the Presidency of the twenty-seventh session of the Conference of the Parties, on the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue on the scope of Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement and its complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement;

92. *Emphasises* the importance of scaled up public finance and urges developed country Parties to urgently and significantly scale up their provision of climate finance, technology transfer and capacity and to fully deliver on the goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year to address the needs of developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation through to 2025 emphasizing the importance of transparency in the implementation of their pledges;

93.

Option 1: Recognizes the gap that remains to reach the goal of USD 100 billion per year by 2020 and until 2025, and the critical need to close the cumulative gap if the goal is to be fully achieved by 2025, addressing the shortfall from previous years;

Option 2: Notes the recent findings of the OECD report on that matter including the expectation that the goal has been met in 2022, and encourages developed country Parties to further scale up the provision and mobilization of climate finance;

94. *Further urges* the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, multilateral development banks and other financial institutions to further scale up investments in climate action and calls for a continued increase in the scale and effectiveness of climate finance from all sources including grants and other highly concessional forms of finance;

95. *Strongly urges* the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism to make full use of their existing financial capitalization for the programming and implementation of projects for climate action in developing countries;

96. *Welcomes* the pledges made by xx contributors during the second replenishment of the Green Climate Fund, resulting in a nominal pledge of USD xx billion, and *encourages* further pledges and contributions towards the second replenishment period of the Green Climate Fund, welcoming the progression over the previous replenishment period;

97. *Recognizes* the centrality of the role of the Adaptation Fund in the climate finance architecture, *welcomes* the new pledges made at this session, *urges* all contributors to fulfil their pledges in a timely manner and *invites* the contributors to ensure the sustainability of the resources of the Fund including the share of proceeds;

98. *Highlights* the role of the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund in supporting actions by developing countries to address climate change, *welcomes* the pledges made to the two Funds and invites developed country Parties to further contribute to the two Funds;

99. *Invites* the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, United Nations agencies, multilateral and bilateral financial institutions, and other relevant institutions to provide enhanced support to developing country Parties in identifying and costing needs;

100. *Recalls* that the new collective quantified goal aims at contributing to accelerating the achievement of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change; increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emission development in a manner that does not threaten food production; and making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emission and climate-resilient development;

101. *Also recalls* that its deliberations on setting the new collective quantified goal on climate finance will conclude in 2024, and (placeholder to welcome NCQG decision);

102. *Reiterates* Articles 2, 4 and 9 of the Paris Agreement and *highlights* that about USD 4.3 trillion per year need to be invested in clean energy up until 2030 to be able to reach net zero emissions by 2050, and, furthermore, that the adaptation finance needs of developing countries are estimated at USD 215–387 billion annually up until 2030, which is 10-18 times higher than current adaptation finance flows;

103. *Highlights* that delivering the finance required to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement will require a transformation of the financial system and its governance,

structures and processes, engaging governments, central banks, commercial banks, institutional investors and other financial actors;

104. *Recognizes* that efforts must be pursued on all fronts, including public, private, domestic and international finance, towards meeting investment needs by scaling up financial flows consistent with a pathway towards low GHG emissions and climate resilient development, including mobilization of private finance through public interventions for mitigation and adaptation and scaling up public finance for adaptation, and scaling up investments in developing countries;

105.

Option 1: Recognizes the pivotal role of the private sector to complement the financial groundwork of the public sector, *resolves* to strengthen policy guidance, incentives, regulations and enabling conditions, to reach the necessary scale of investments to achieve a global transition towards low GHG emissions and climate resilient development and *encourages* Parties to continue enhancing their enabling environments and policy frameworks to facilitate the mobilization and effective deployment of climate finance;

Option 2: no text

106. *Reiterate* calls on the shareholders of multilateral development banks and international financial institutions to reform multilateral development bank practices and priorities, align and scale up funding, ensure simplified access and mobilize climate finance from various sources and encourages multilateral development banks to define a new vision and commensurate operational model, channels and instruments that are fit for the purpose of adequately addressing the global climate emergency, including deploying a full suite of instruments, from grants to guarantees and non-debt instruments, taking into account debt burdens, and to address risk appetite, with a view to substantially increasing climate finance;

107. *Also reiterates* calls on multilateral development banks to contribute to significantly increasing climate ambition using the breadth of their policy and financial instruments for greater results, including on private capital mobilization, and to ensure higher financial efficiency and maximize use of existing concessional and risk capital vehicles to drive innovation and accelerate impact;

108. *Underscores* the urgency of enhancing understanding and action to make finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emission and climate-resilient development in a transparent and inclusive manner in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication and in line with the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities in the light of different national circumstances;

109.

Option 1: Recognizes the need Parties to arrive at a common understanding on the implementation of Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement and in this context decides to establish a work programme on the implementation of Article 2, paragraph 1(c) of the Paris Agreement;

Option 2: no text

110. *Recognizes* the importance of providing support, including finance, to developing countries for taking action on achieving the goal of Article 2, paragraph 1(c) and urges climate finance providers, including the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, to provide support to developing countries for taking action on achieving Article 2, paragraph 1(c);

111.

Option 1: Urges Parties to scale-down finance flows inconsistent with climate action and achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement, such as finance flows towards emissions-intensive, maladapted or non-climate-resilient activities, through measures such as phasing out fossil fuel subsidies and putting a price on carbon, as well as putting in place regulations that create the conditions to guide the private and financial sectors and improve transparency

and accountability of the private sector by eliminating misleading environmental messaging across markets and address greenwashing;

Option 2: no text

112.

Option 1: Encourages Parties and non-Party stakeholders to improve the assessment and management of climate-related financial risks and to significantly scale-up domestic investments in climate action in line with the Paris Agreement and in this regard *encourages* Parties to increase the use and ambition of carbon pricing measures;

Option 2: no text

{Technology development and transfer}

113. *Underlines* the fundamental role of technology development and transfer, endogenous technologies and innovation in facilitating urgent adaptation and mitigation action aligned with achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement and sustainable development;

114. *Welcomes* the progress of the Technology Mechanism, which is comprised of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network, including through its first joint work programme, in supporting technology development and transfer through policy recommendations, knowledge-sharing, capacity-building and technical assistance;

115. *Highlights* continuing gaps and challenges in technology development and transfer and the uneven pace of adoption of climate technologies around the world and urges Parties to address barriers and strengthen cooperative action, including with non-Party stakeholders, in particular with the private sector to rapidly scale up the deployment of existing technologies, the fostering of innovation, and the development and transfer of new technologies;

116. *Also highlights* the importance of predictable, sustainable funding for implementing the mandates of the Technology Mechanism and for supporting national designated entities;

117. *Recognizes* the need to further enhance the linkages between the Financial Mechanism and the Technology Mechanism;

118. *Emphasizes* the importance of ensuring the availability of and access to enhanced financial and capacity-building support for developing countries, in particular the least developed countries and small island developing States, to implement and scale up prioritized technology measures, including those identified in their technology needs assessments, technology action plans, and long-term low-emission development strategies that align with their national circumstances;

119. *Encourages* inclusive, equitable international cooperation on research, development and demonstration as well as innovation, including in hard-to-abate sectors, with a view to strengthening endogenous capacities and technologies and fostering national systems of innovation in line with the IPCC findings;

120. *Recognizes* that achieving the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement requires the rapid and scaled-up deployment and adoption of existing clean technologies accelerated innovation, digital transformation and development of new technologies as well as increased access to those technologies, supported by appropriate enabling frameworks and international cooperation;

121. *Welcomes* the launch of the Technology Mechanism Initiative on Artificial Intelligence for Climate Action, which explores the role of artificial intelligence as potentially powerful tools for advancing and scaling up transformative adaptation and mitigation action in developing countries with a focus on least developed countries and small island developing States;

122.

Option 1: Decides to establish a technology implementation programme, led by the Technology Mechanism and supported by the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism,

loss and damage fund and Adaptation Fund to strengthen support for the implementation of priorities identified by developing countries, including, but not limited to, priorities identified in TNAs, TAPs, NAPs, NDCs, LT-LEDS, BTRs and adaptation communications and to address the challenges identified in the first periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism, and *invites* SBI 61 (November 2024) to take into account the technology implementation programme in its consideration of the Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer, with a view to recommending a draft decision on this matter for consideration and adoption at CMA 6 (November 2024);

Option 2: no text

123.

Option 1: *Invites* the Technology Executive Committee to regularly analyse the global status of the development and transfer of climate technologies to inform subsequent global stocktakes of the Paris Agreement;

Option 2: no text.

{Capacity-building}

124. *Underlines* the fundamental role of capacity building in taking urgent climate action aligned with the goals under the Paris Agreement and appreciates the contributions of institutional arrangements under the Paris Agreement, such as the Paris Committee on Capacity-Building;

125. *Welcomes* the progress made in capacity building at individual, institutional, and systemic levels, since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, including through the work of the Paris Committee on Capacity-Building, the Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency, the Action for Climate Empowerment agenda, the NDC Partnership and South-South and Triangular cooperation;

126. *Recognizes* best practices in capacity building, notably multi-stakeholder engagement, enhancing ownership by beneficiary countries, and the sharing of experiences and lessons learned particularly at the regional level;

127. *Acknowledges* that developing country Parties continue to have persisting capacity gaps and urgent needs to effectively implement the Paris Agreement, including related to skills development, institutional capacity for governance and coordination, technical assessment and modelling, strategic policy development and implementation;

128. *Encourages* enhanced coherence and cooperation in the provision of effective capacity-building support through diverse cooperation models, including, but not limited to, facilitating collaboration platforms and capitalizing on exchanging existing knowledge, country-led shared experiences and best practices;

129. *Recognizes* the role of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform, in strengthening the capacity of Indigenous Peoples and local communities to effectively engage in the UNFCCC process and for Parties to meaningfully engage Indigenous Peoples and local communities in their climate policies and action;

130.

Option 1: *Calls for* the establishment of a capacity-building programme on NDCs, including through workshops, to facilitate the sharing of knowledge and good practices for the preparation and implementation of NDCs;

Option 2: no text

131. *Encourages* developing country Parties to identify their capacity-building needs in their Biennial Transparency Reports;

132. *Requests* the Paris Committee on Capacity Building to consider new activities covering the topics of adaptation, Article 6, the Enhanced Transparency Framework in deciding on their future annual focus areas;

133.

Option 1: Decides to establish a capacity-building fund, and to establish institutional links with existing financial funds such as the Global Environment Facility, the Green Climate Fund, the Adaptation Fund to further enhance the capacity building for developing countries;

Option 2: No text

{Loss and damage}

134. *Recalls* Article 8 of the Paris Agreement, in which, Parties recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset events, and the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of loss and damage, and Parties should enhance understanding, action and support, including through the Warsaw International Mechanism, as appropriate, on a cooperative and facilitative basis with respect to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change;

135. *Also recalls* the recognition of the importance of particularly vulnerable developing countries and segments of the population that are already vulnerable owing to geography, socioeconomic status, livelihood, gender, age, indigenous or minority status, or disability, as well as the ecosystems they depend on, in responding to loss and damage associated with climate change impacts;

136. *Stresses* the importance of a human rights-based, gender-responsive and conflict-sensitive approaches to loss and damage;

137. *Also stresses* the importance of promoting coherence and complementarity in all aspects of action and support for averting, minimizing, and addressing loss and damage associated with climate change impacts;

138. *Recognizes* advancements in international efforts to avert, minimize and address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts, including extreme weather events and slow onset events, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, including: the progress made under the WIM Executive Committee and its thematic expert groups, through the establishment of the Santiago network and progress in its operationalization thereof; areas referred to in paragraph 4, Article 8, of the Paris Agreement; and as a result of ongoing efforts on enhancing understanding, action and support with respect to loss and damage associated with climate change impacts;

139. *Recognizes* national efforts to respond to loss and damage associated with climate change impacts, such as comprehensive risk management, anticipatory efforts and plans, and mechanisms to channel funding, including to the local level and those who are at the frontline of climate change, to support activities relevant to averting, minimizing, and addressing loss and damage associated with climate change impacts;

140. *Notes with serious concern* the findings of the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which project the adverse impacts and related loss and damage from climate change to escalate with every increment of global warming and which highlight that climate change has already impacted human and natural systems around the world, with those who have contributed the least to climate change being most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change;

141. *Acknowledges* that climate change has already caused and will increasingly cause loss and damage and that, as temperatures rise, impacts from climate and weather extremes, as well as slow onset events, will pose an ever-greater social, economic and environmental threat;

142. *Emphasizes* that keeping the global average temperature rise to below 1.5 °C will be essential to limiting future loss and damage and recognizes that immediate, deep, rapid and sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions would reduce future adaptation costs and loss and damage, enhance sustainable development co-benefits, and that urgent mitigation and adaptation actions are crucial to averting minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with climate change impacts, to the extent possible;

143. *Recognizes* greater understanding of how to avoid and respond to tipping points and more knowledge, understanding, support, policy and action are needed to comprehensively manage risks and avert, minimize and address loss and damage;
144. *Acknowledges* the significant gaps that remain in responding to the increased scale and frequency of loss and damage, and the associated economic and non-economic losses;
145. *Expresses deep concern* regarding the significant economic and non-economic loss and damage for developing countries in reducing fiscal space and impairing the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals;
146. *Reiterates* the United Nations Secretary-General's call made on World Meteorological Day 2022 to protect everyone on Earth through universal coverage of early warning systems against extreme weather and climate change by 2027 and *invites* development partners, international financial institutions and the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism to provide support for implementation of the Early Warnings for All initiative;
147. *Recognizes* the need for urgent and enhanced action and support for averting, minimizing and, particularly, addressing loss and damage, including through the WIM, the Santiago network and other relevant cooperation efforts, such as early warning systems and systematic observations;
148. *Calls on Parties* to explore synergies with disaster risk reduction, humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction in the context of climate change impacts, in order to make progress in averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in a coherent, effective manner;
149. *Taking note with appreciation* of the work of the Transitional Committee in responding to its mandate, *welcomes* the adoption of the decisions operationalizing the new funding arrangements, including a fund, for responding to loss and damage referred to in paragraphs 2–3 of decisions 2/CP.27 and 2/CMA.4;
150. *Also welcomes* the pledges made to date for the operationalization of the new fund referred to in decisions -/CP.28 and -/CMA.5, and the offers of xx to contribute to the Fund;
151. *Urges* developed country Parties to continue to provide support and *encourages* other Parties to provide, or continue to provide support, on a voluntary basis, for activities to address loss and damage in line with decisions -/CP.28 and -/CMA.5;
152. *Invites* financial contributions with developed country Parties continuing to take the lead to provide financial resources for commencing the operationalization of the Fund;
153. *Notes* that the Board (of the Fund referred to in decisions -/CP.28 and -/CMA.5) will prepare a long-term fundraising and resource mobilization strategy and plan for the Fund to guide its mobilization of new, additional, predictable and adequate financial resources from all sources of funding;
154. *Recalls* that in the context of the enhanced transparency framework, each interested Party may provide, as appropriate, information related to enhancing understanding, action and support, on a cooperative and facilitative basis, to avert, minimize and address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts;
- 155.

Option 1:

Decides that in order to monitor progress in responding to loss and damage associated with climate change, common metrics are needed; with sufficient technical and capacity building support for countries to be able to establish inventories for loss and damage.

Bis Urges interested developing country Parties to consider making requests to the Santiago network or other relevant institution or institutions for the provision of technical assistance to enhance or establish inventories or registries for collecting information on loss and damage;

Ter *Requests* the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism to prepare guidelines for developing a data interface that will allow for the aggregation of and application of metrics to information on loss and damage, including the information provided on a voluntary basis in biennial transparency reports under the enhanced transparency framework;

Option 2: Recognizes the need for robust information, based on the workstreams of the Warsaw International Mechanism, for informing and enhancing national plans, and risk and vulnerability assessments relevant in the context of loss and damage associated with climate change impacts;

156.

Option 1: Recognizing the existing information gap on loss and damage, *requests* the secretariat to develop, regularly, a loss and damage gap report with a view to informing subsequent global stocktake and *decides* to establish a standing agenda item entitled “Matters relating to loss and damage associated with climate change impacts”;

Option 2: no text

{Response measures}

157. *Recognizes* the importance of maximizing the positive and minimizing the negative economic and social impacts of the implementation of response measures;

158.

Option 1: Recalls Article 4, paragraph 15, of the Paris Agreement, which states that Parties shall take into consideration in the implementation of the Paris Agreement the concerns of Parties with economies most affected by the impacts of response measures, particularly developing country Parties;

Option 2: Reaffirms Articles 3.4, 3.5, 4.2(a), 4.8 and 4.10 of the UNFCCC as well as Article 4, paragraph 15, of the Paris Agreement, which states that Parties shall take into consideration in the implementation of the Paris Agreement the concerns of Parties with economies most affected by the impacts of response measures, particularly developing country Parties;

159. *Recognizes* that Parties and non-Party stakeholders have taken significant efforts to assess and address the positive and negative socioeconomic impacts of response measures domestically and under the six-year workplan of the response measures forum and its Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures;

160. *Appreciates* the progress of the Katowice Committee on Impacts in supporting the work of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures;

161. *Notes* that just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality job and economic diversification are two key strategies for addressing the impacts of response measures and that they will be implemented taking into account different contexts and different national circumstances;

162.

Option 1: Underscores the significant employment and economic growth opportunities resulting from pursuing a 1.5C aligned trajectory and *urges* Parties to make efforts to maximize those opportunities;

Option 2: No text

163. *Notes* that further urgent efforts are needed to strengthen the progress of the forum and its KCI;

164. *Encourages* Parties to consider using existing methodologies and tools, including modelling tools, for the assessment and analysis of the impacts of the implementation of response measures in consultation with technical experts, practitioners and other relevant stakeholders, as appropriate, with a view to maximize the positive impacts of response measures, with a particular focus on creation of decent work, quality jobs and economic diversification;

165. *Also encourages* Parties to develop more national case studies involving the assessment and analysis of the impacts of the implementation of response measures, including sectoral, national, sub-national, domestic and unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral cross-border measures, to enable an exchange of experience among Parties;

166.

Option 1: Further encourages Parties to establish capacity-building partnerships and networks for increasing the representation of developing countries in the use and development of impact assessment tools and methods for assessing the impacts of the implementation of response measures;

Option 2: no text

167. *Encourages* Parties, in their efforts to diversify their economies, to pursue such policies in a manner that promotes sustainable development and eradication of poverty, taking into account national circumstances;

168.

Option 1: Urges Parties, acknowledging the importance of multilateralism to achieve socio-economic development in particular of LDCs, SIDs, developing countries, to counter climate related unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures;

Option 2: no text

169. *Strongly encourages* Parties to provide detailed information, to the extent possible, on the assessment of economic and social impacts of response measures;

170. *Requests* the forum and its KCI to intensify their efforts in implementing the recommendations outlined in relevant decisions including by enhancing cooperation among Parties, stakeholders, external organizations, experts and institutions and by enabling the exchange of information, experience and best practices among Parties to raise their resilience to these impacts;

171.

Option 1:

Further requests the forum and its KCI to:

- integrate scientific findings from the latest IPCC reporting into intensifying efforts to facilitate a just transition of the workforce and economic diversification;
- assess the negative impacts of climate related unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures with a view to eliminating such measures;
- promote facilitation of development of tools and methodologies to assess and analyse the impacts of the implementation of response measures;

Option 2: no text

172. *Notes* that the global transition to low emissions provides opportunities and challenges for sustainable economic development and poverty eradication;

Placeholder for Just Transition Work Programme without prejudice to final placement

{International cooperation}

173. *Recognizes* the critical role that international cooperation has played in fostering ambitious climate action, including through the sharing of information, good practices, experiences, lessons learned, resources and solutions and welcomes current international cooperative efforts and voluntary initiatives for enhancing climate action and support by Parties and non-Party stakeholders;

174. *Reaffirms* a commitment to multilateralism, especially in the light of the progress made under the Paris Agreement and *resolves* to unite in the pursuit of efforts to achieve the purpose and long-term goals of the Agreement;

175. *Acknowledges* that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation and *notes* that the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change states that international cooperation is a critical enabler for achieving ambitious climate action and encouraging development and implementation of climate policies;

176. *Recognizes* the importance of international collaboration in enhancing climate action across all actors of society, sectors and regions, in contributing to progress towards the goals of the Paris Agreement; and *urges* Parties and non-Party stakeholders to join efforts to accelerate delivery through inclusive international collaboration;

177. *Recognizes* the important role and active engagement of non-Party stakeholders, particularly civil society, business, financial institutions, cities and subnational authorities, of Indigenous Peoples, local communities, women and youth, in contributing to the progress on addressing and responding to climate change and enhancing ambition and highlights the urgent need for further multilevel, gender-responsive and cooperative action in this regard;

178. *Welcomes* the leadership and efforts of the high-level champions to support the effective participation of non-Party stakeholders in the global stocktake;

179. *Encourages* Parties and non-Party stakeholders to engage actively in the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action for enhancing ambition;

180. *Invites* the secretariat to enhance the inventory and tracking of voluntary initiatives on the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action portal;

181. *Emphasizes* the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring forests to achieve the Paris Agreement temperature goal, including through Article 5, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement;

182. *Recalls* decisions 2/CMA.3 and 3/CMA.3 and *invites* Parties to continue making use of, as appropriate, voluntary cooperative approaches under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement in order to enhance their climate action in line with the purpose and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, and in doing so, avail themselves of the capacity-building initiatives referred to in paragraphs 12 and paragraph 14, respectively, of the same decisions;

183. *Welcomes* decision -/CMA.5 on voluntary cooperative approaches under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement;

184.

Option 1: Notes with appreciation current carbon pricing initiatives and *encourages* Parties to enhance and implement carbon pricing measures that align with the purpose and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement;

Option 2: no text

185.

Option 1: Expresses serious concern that measures imposed by some countries, including, inter alia, sanctions on low-carbon products, restrictions on technology investment and cooperation, green barriers, discriminatory legislation, plurilateral constraints, etc., which are not aligned with the principles of the Paris Agreement, in particular equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, as well as WTO rules;

Option 2: No text

186. *Encourages* Parties and non-Party stakeholders to enhance cooperation in the implementation of multilateral environmental conventions and agreements, particularly their work under the Rio Conventions, to facilitate the achievement of the purpose and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals in a synergistic and efficient manner;

187. *Also encourages* exchanges and international cooperation among non-Party stakeholders, including the private sector, research institutions and organizations, at local, sub-national, national and regional levels, including conducting joint research, personnel

training, practical projects, technical exchanges, project investment and standards cooperation;

{Guidance and way forward}

188.

Option 1:

Recalls decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 25, and *decides* that Parties shall submit to the secretariat their next nationally determined contributions at least 9 to 12 months in advance of the seventh session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (November–December 2025) with a view to facilitating the clarity, transparency and understanding of these contributions;

Bis Further recalling decision 6/CMA.3, paragraph 2, and *encourages* Parties to communicate in 2025 their nationally determined contributions with an end date of 2035;

Ter Reaffirms the nationally determined nature of nationally determined contributions;

Quat Recalls Article 3 and Article 4, paragraphs 3, of the Paris Agreement, and reaffirms that each Party's next nationally determined contribution will represent a progression beyond the Party's current nationally determined contribution and reflect its highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances;

Quin Recalling decision 4/CMA.1, paragraph 7, and paragraph 13, *notes* that Parties shall provide the information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding contained in annex I to decision 4/CMA.1, as applicable to their nationally determined contributions, and that Parties shall account for their nationally determined contributions in accordance with the guidance contained in annex II to decision 4/CMA.1;

Sex Recalling Article 4, paragraph 9, and Article 14, paragraph 3, of the Paris Agreement, and decision 4/CMA.1, paragraphs 7 and 13, *also notes* that Parties shall provide information on how its nationally determined contribution has been informed by the global stocktake in their next nationally determined contributions, in the context of providing information for paragraph 4(c) of annex I to decision 4/CMA.1;

Sept Invites Parties when preparing their subsequent NDCs to take into account the outcomes of the global stocktake;

Oct Also invites Parties to present their revised nationally determined contributions at a special event held under the auspices of the Secretary General of the United Nations in 2025;

Option 2:

Calls upon Parties, informed by the outcome of the global stocktake, to update and enhance, in a nationally determined manner, their actions and support in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Agreement, as well as to enhance international cooperation for climate action;

189. *Reaffirms* that Parties may update their adaptation communication at any time and submit it as a component of or in conjunction with other communications or documents, including a national adaptation plan, a nationally determined contribution, a national communication, or biennial transparency report and recalling that guidance for adaptation communications are to be reviewed in 2025;

190. *Recalls* that Parties shall submit their first biennial transparency report and national inventory report, if submitted as a stand-alone report, at the latest by 31 December 2024 and *urges* Parties to make the necessary preparations for ensuring timely submission thereof;

191. Recalling decision 18/CMA.1 paragraph 7 and decision 1/CMA.4, paragraph 73 *recognizes* the importance of the provision of increased support, in a timely, adequate and predictable manner, to developing country Parties for implementing the enhanced transparency framework under the Paris Agreement;

192. *Acknowledges* the importance of Action for Climate Empowerment - climate change education, training, public awareness, public participation, public access to information and international cooperation on these matters - to support Parties and non-Party stakeholders in the consideration of the outcomes of the first global stocktake;

193.

Option 1: Invites Parties and non-Party stakeholders to submit by 1 March 2024 information on their experience and lessons learned in conducting the first global stocktake and requests the secretariat to prepare a report on lessons learned from conducting the stocktake and areas for further work to be taken into account for the second global stocktake;

Option 2: no text

The below is a listing of ideas of Parties that need further refining

Encourages Parties to:

- Take into account the global stocktake decision while making financial pledges in doubling of adaptation finance, subsequent GCF replenishment, finance contributions to the Loss and Damage Fund, and in ongoing deliberations of the NCQG;
- Consider and adopt best practices from the Technical Dialogue of the first global stocktake;
- Support national, regional and thematic global stocktakes to inform NDCs and inform upcoming global stocktakes;
- Establish a dialogue to inform enhanced international cooperation by UNFCCC and non-UNFCCC towards effective international cooperation starting in 2024;
- Empower youth and children as agents of change in addressing and responding to climate change and support the consideration of the outcomes of the first global stocktake;
- Consider gender-responsive and rights-based approaches in the consideration of the global stocktake outcomes;
- Adopt the Enhanced Lima Work Programme on Gender and its Gender Action Plan for application mutatis mutandis to the implementation of gender-related decisions and mandates under the Paris Agreement;
- Avoid unilateral measures that are impacting national revenues of developing countries as such reducing their mitigation and adaptive potential;

Invites the IPCC to:

- Continue providing relevant and timely information and scientific knowledge for the next global stocktake;
- Prepare a special report in its Seventh Assessment Cycle on respective social-economic costs, conditions, needs and implications of limiting global warming to well below 2 °C and pursuing efforts to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, including those of the relevant modelled pathways;
- Develop guidelines to allow Parties to provide simplified estimates of their historical emissions since 1850;
- Develop a simplified methodology that could allow the exercise of reaching the relative historical contribution to global temperature increase, for all Kyoto gases and all sectors;

Invites the scientific community to:

- Generate information relevant for NDCs and aligning them with 1.5 degrees, cross cutting considerations such as tipping points, guidance on risks and impacts, vulnerability, cryosphere and closing observation gaps;
- Address the knowledge needs identified in the first global stocktake;
- Invites relevant constituted bodies, including the Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work programme, work programme on just transition pathways, ad-hoc programme on the new and new collective quantified goal and global goal on adaptation work programme to advancing and following up on the outcomes of the global stocktake;
- Invites existing workstreams and Constituted Bodies under the Paris Agreement to develop and provide qualitative and quantitative indicators for tracking progress towards climate goals drawing upon existing frameworks within the Paris Agreement;
- Requests relevant constituted bodies, to strengthen the mainstreaming of a gender perspective and inclusiveness in their work, with a view to ensure a more efficient, gender-responsive and human-rights based climate action, and to provide input to the GST 2;
- Requests relevant constituted bodies, to consider further elements related to Art.2.1c through a work programme on enhancing the understanding and implementation of Article 2, paragraph 1 from CMA.6;
- Invites the co-chairs of the MWP to consider the outcomes of the global stocktake and determine which elements are most clearly relevant to the work of the MWP and support a practically oriented exchange on related challenges and opportunities;
- Invites the SB chairs to consider follow up on the mitigation elements of the GST in every session within the Mitigation ambition and implementation work programme, for instance in the form of technical papers or workshops, including on energy transition, the next NDCs, updates or publications of LT-LEDS, and Parties' implementation of mitigation action concerning topics of the MWP;

Requests the UNFCCC secretariat to:

- Compile data on and develop a data explorer for emissions and projections including aggregated global data and that disaggregated by country, sector and gas on the basis of the Parties' reporting under the enhanced transparency framework to enable Parties to collectively assess mitigation opportunities and data gaps;
- Add a standing item on gender and climate change as part of the sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;
- Establish the Paris-Alignment Work Programme to provide information on Parties' respective efforts related to the achievement of Article 2.1(c), to present clear plans to further accelerate implementation, and to exchange views on experiences and best practice;
- Prepare, as part of the NDC synthesis report, an update on progress towards the implementation of the global stocktake outcomes, ensuring ongoing assessment and improvement of the GST process;
- Prepare regular update reports starting at COP29 in 2024 outlining overall progress on implementation of the GST recommendations, for monitoring progress on raising ambition;
- Convene thematic round-tables, high level events and workshops at national, regional and international level to advance implementation of outcomes of the global stocktake, reflect on development, exchange lessons learnt and best practices on NDCs, and enhancing international cooperation;

- Hold national, regional and thematic global stocktakes to inform NDCs and inform upcoming global stocktake;
 - Organize a series of workshops to facilitate the preparation of new NDCs;
 - Establish a GST forum, after the first global stocktake, which could be organized in the margins of the meetings of the Subsidiary Bodies in June 2024 and June 2025, which will be a voluntary platform for Parties to share their plans for new NDCs, expressing their needs, barriers and opportunities, open to observers and separated and distinct from any agenda item;
-