AFRICAN GROUP OF NEGOTIATORS (AGN)
STATEMENT
Roundtable 1 – Mitigation & Response Measures
Technical Dialogue 1.3
7 June 2023

Zimbabwe on behalf of the African Group.

These remarks represent the African Group's reflection on Section IIB: mitigation and response measures cluster Summary Report of TD 1.3 on (31 March 2023). Our Intervention consists of two parts: a general reflection on the summary report, and some substantive comments.

General Reflections:
In terms of the **structure** of the report, as a group we understand the combination of the mitigation & response measures topics as a pragmatic step to facilitate the logistical arrangements of the technical dialogues. We however strongly encourage the co-facilitators to advance the work such that, in the Factual Synthesis Report, these two topics are afforded the full priority they deserve, and be presented separately;

On how the two topics are addressed, we would like to bring your attention to paragraph 32 of decision 19/CMA.1 and your view on the consideration of how you are addressing or planning to address the input from the forum on the impact of response measures in line with the elements identified in paragraph 34 of decision 1/CP.21

In terms of **process** we are cognisant that the technical dialogue outputs will inform the political phase, which is tasked with making recommendations for enhancing the two aspects of Article 14.3, viz. *enhancing commitments* across all aspects of climate action including the provision of means of implementation, AND *international cooperation* on climate action. We encourage you, co-facilitators, to strongly reflect the options for enhancing ambition in line with Article 3 of the Paris Agreement on progression in the Factual Synthesis Report (FSR).

Substantive inputs:
We note the four emerging messages on the mitigation and response measures cluster, and we would like to make the following comments. In our view, the messages in the FSR following TD 1.3 should cover as a minimum four aspects of mitigation challenges we now face as follows:

- The required global mitigation effort in the short, medium and long term, to ensure that we collectively meet the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement;
- A comparison of this requirement to current levels of ambition expressed in both NDCs and long-term low emissions development pathways, and the identification of the global mitigation "gap";
- Consideration of the gap in the light of equity, including consideration of common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities in relation to the use of historical emissions space up to this point (pre-2020 ambition) and equity principles for considering options for closing the gap;
- What opportunities there are for further mitigation options to assist in closing the gap, and what resources will need to be mobilized to implement these, including support requirements for developing countries.

Our comments on the emerging messages are as follows:

1. We note the **first and third emerging messages**, that
    - *'Emissions are not in line with modelled global mitigation pathways consistent with the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement, and there is a rapidly narrowing window to raise ambition and implement existing commitments to limit warming to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels.'* (i)
    - *'Achieving net zero CO2 and GHG emissions requires systemic transformations across all sectors taking into account needs and context in developing countries, phasing out high-emission systems and technologies while scaling up low- and zero-emission alternatives, and implementing both supply- and demand-side measures' (iii)*

    Enhancing these emerging messages would involve **quantification of the required reductions and timeframes in line with the findings of IPCC AR6**, as well as noting that mitigation pathways will be different for different groups of Parties, in line with provision of the Convention and the Paris Agreement.

    We propose an **additional message**, that addresses the pre-2020 implementation gap. Annex I mitigation commitments for 2020 under both the Convention and Kyoto Protocol did not meet the required benchmark contained in the IPCC's 4th Assessment Report for Annex I countries (in a range from 25-40% reduction in relation to 1990 levels), and a decision in Doha to revisit these levels with the aim of increasing 2020 mitigation ambition, did not result in any change in the aggregate target level. Developed countries did not take the lead and did not mobilize the 100 Billion USD for developing countries to mitigate and adapt, thereby requiring more mitigation by all going forward, more climate impacts, and inadequate provision of support to developing countries. It is therefore crucial that as part of the first stocktake, we take stock of pre-2020 progress. In our view, this is consistent with equity dimensions of the collective assessment of the GST, and constitutes a practical step towards equity and enhancement of commitments and international cooperation. We refer to the **2017 Emissions Gap Report** amongst others which quantified performance against the 25-40% imperative for developed countries.

2. In respect of the **second emerging message**, *'Much more ambition is needed in domestic mitigation measures in NDCs to realize existing and emerging opportunities, in order to halve global emissions by 2030, reach net zero CO_2 emissions by 2050 globally, based on equitable sharing of efforts across countries.'* We welcome the equity contextualisation and propose that it be further elaborated, noting:

    (i) The developmental context and needs of developing countries, such as the right to development, as such policy space to address basic needs such as access to clean energy. Six hundred (600) million people in Africa are without access to electricity, while 900 million people are without access to cleaner energy for cooking (IPCC, AR6). This can be addressed through international cooperation to accelerate energy access in Africa with an energy mix that drives low-carbon development and enhances access; and this requires the policy space to sustainably exploit available natural resources, including sun, wind and natural gas as required, and to raise the required finance to achieve this in a way which does not result in unsustainable levels of debt.

    (ii) The promotion of equity and fairness in allocation of policy space for developing countries to achieve sustainable development, noting that Africa's cumulative historical emissions are 3% of the cumulative total, and that the transition towards a low carbon world should not deepen global inequalities between the global North and South.

(iii) The IPCC's modelled global mitigation pathways to keep within 1.5 degrees Celsius without overshoot (as contained in the IPCC AR 6 report), are based on current global inequality trends worsening (Kanitkar, *et al*, 2022[1]):

- GDP increases across all regions at different rates by 2050, where, as of 2020 per capita GDP of the North American region at US$ 54,000 is approximately 17 times more than that of Sub-Saharan Africa, and 10 times more than that of the South Asian region; by 2050 the increase in per capita GDP for developing countries - excl. China- is expected to increase from US$17, 000 to US$47,000 - ranges from US$9,000 - US$28,000 in 2010 PPP dollars, with Sub-Saharan Africa being the bottom of the range at US$9,000, which is even below the 2020 bottom range for developed countries of US$16,000
- In respect of consumption of goods and services, as of 2020 consumption per capita in developing countries ranged from $1,000 to $17,000, whereas developed countries, excluding economies in transition, ranged from $28,000 to $52,000, and by 2050; also, developing countries will increase their consumption of goods and services by with a range of US$3,000 - US$17,00; with the lowest consumption being in Sub Saharan Africa and South Asia where the consumption will grow from US$1,000 to US$3,000 and US$4,000 respectively; whereas developed country consumption - excluding economies in transition - would increase to a range of $22,000 to $58,000 with North America increasing per capita consumption from US$37,00-US$58,000

This suggests a transition that will perpetuate global inequality and maintain the relative underdevelopment of developing countries. The effect of this would be to degrade the ability of developing countries to respond effectively to climate impacts, which will most likely deepen these inequalities.

3. In respect of the **fourth emerging message**, *'Increasing the consideration of equity can enable greater ambition in mitigation, with tailored approaches addressing different contexts and the impacts of response measures'* we would like to iterate the importance of having a separate section to adequately address this topic, focusing on the negative impacts of unilateral response measures, without the international cooperation that was agreed to in the Paris Agreement; and the consideration of the establishment of a system for reporting and addressing these negative impacts, and the provision of support to countries affected by it.

Further, we are of the view that that the energy transition must be just. This applies particularly to the production of fossil fuels, and the development of new fossil fuel production capacity. Any agreement concerning the phasing out of fossil fuels, and any moratorium on new investments in fossil fuel production, must be applied equitably. While we are very aware of the urgent need to mitigate fossil fuel use, there must be an equitable solution to the problem of phasing out fossil fuel production and consumption globally. A blanket ban on investment in new fossil fuel projects is NOT equitable or just, and cannot be the basis for a just transition.

4. Still on the fourth emerging message, we also note that, the OECD 2022 report identifies climate finance mobilised towards the $100 billion comprised of $48.6 billion in loans (71% of the $68.1billion public finance), and $17.9 billions in grants (26% of the $68.1 billion of public finance). Bloomberg's Sovereign Debt Vulnerability Ranking 2022 identifies countries at risk of debt default, with developing countries at the highest risk of defaulting in the repayment of their debt obligations in 2023, with African countries with the highest mitigation potential being in the top ten countries at risk.

[1] Kanitkar, T., Mythri, A., Jayaraman, T. 2022. *Equity Assessment of Global Mitigation Pathways in the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report.* https://tinyurl.com/3zreu3cn

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This suggests that financing of the transition requires financing models first take into account the fiscal constraints of developing countries in their ability to facilitate and invest in the transition, and furthermore consider the type of financing available for the transition such that it does not lead to further indebtedness of developing countries.