Draft decision -/CP.22

Report of the Standing Committee on Finance

The Conference of the Parties,

Recalling Articles 4 and 11 of the Convention,

Also recalling decisions 1/CP.16, paragraph 112, and 2/CP.17, paragraphs 120 and 121, as well as decisions 5/CP.18, 7/CP.19, 6/CP.20 and 6/CP.21,

1. Welcomes with appreciation the report of the Standing Committee on Finance to the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-second session, taking note of the recommendations contained therein;¹

2. Endorses the workplan of the Standing Committee on Finance for 2017;²

3. Notes the 2016 biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows while particularly welcoming the summary and recommendations by the Standing Committee on Finance as contained in the annex;³

4. Expresses its appreciation for the financial contributions provided by the Governments of Belgium, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland as well as the European Commission to support the work of the Standing Committee on Finance;

5. Requests the Standing Committee on Finance, in fulfilling its function on the measurement, reporting and verification of support, and in the context of its existing workplan, to cooperate with relevant stakeholders and experts and to consider ongoing work under the Convention and further action envisaged under the Paris Agreement;

6. Welcomes the 2016 forum of the Standing Committee on Finance on the topic of financial instruments that address the risks of loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change;

7. Takes note of the summary report on the 2016 forum, including the recommendations and follow-up activities of the Standing Committee on Finance and invites the Standing Committee on Finance to follow up on the recommendations in its 2017 workplan;⁴

8. Expresses its gratitude to the Government of the Philippines and the Asian Development Bank for their support in ensuring the success of the 2016 forum of the Standing Committee on Finance;

9. Invites the Standing Committee on Finance to continue its deliberations on the topic of its 2017 forum at its first meeting in 2017;

10. Reiterates that the Standing Committee on Finance will integrate financing for forests-related considerations into its 2017 workplan, where appropriate, and continue work on this matter in the context of the overall issue of improving coherence and coordination in the delivery of climate change financing, taking into account all relevant decisions on forests;

¹ FCCC/CP/2016/8.
² As contained in document FCCC/CP/2016/8, annex VIII.
³ See <http://unfccc.int/8034.php>.
⁴ See document FCCC/CP/2016/8, annex III, paragraphs 68 and 69.
11. *Requests* the Standing Committee on Finance to report to the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-third session (November 2017) on the progress made in the implementation of its workplan;

12. *Also requests* the Standing Committee on Finance to consider the guidance provided to it in other relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties.
Annex

Summary and recommendations by the Standing Committee on Finance on the 2016 biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows

[English only]

A. Context and mandates

1. The Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) assists the Conference of the Parties (COP) in exercising its functions with respect to the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, including, inter alia, in terms of measurement, reporting and verification of support provided to developing country Parties, through activities such as the biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows.\(^1\)

2. Subsequent to the 2014 biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows, the COP requested the SCF to consider: the relevant work of other bodies and entities on measurement, reporting and verification of support and the tracking of climate finance;\(^2\) ways of strengthening methodologies for reporting climate finance;\(^3\) and ongoing technical work on operational definitions of climate finance, including private finance mobilized by public interventions, to assess how adaptation and mitigation needs can most effectively be met by climate finance.\(^4\) It also requested the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement, when developing the modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework for action and support, to consider, inter alia, information in the biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows and other reports of the SCF and other relevant bodies under the Convention.

3. The 2016 biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows outlines improvements made and identifies areas for further improvements in the UNFCCC reporting guidelines and formats for developed and developing countries and for improvements in climate finance tracking and reporting of data producers and aggregators. The biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows presents estimates of flows from developed to developing countries, available information on domestic climate finance and South–South cooperation, as well as the other climate-related flows that constitute global total climate finance flows. It then considers the implications of these flows, including composition, purpose and emergent trends relevant to the UNFCCC objectives, including the new goals set out in the Paris Agreement.

4. The 2016 biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows comprises this summary and recommendations, and a technical report. The summary and recommendations was prepared by the SCF. The technical report was prepared by experts under the guidance of the SCF, and draws on information and data from a range of sources. It was subject to extensive stakeholder input and expert review, but remains a product of the external experts.

\(^1\) Decision 2/CP.17, paragraph 121(f).
\(^2\) Decision 1/CP.18, paragraph 71.
\(^3\) Decision 5/CP.18, paragraph 11.
\(^4\) Decision 3/CP.19, paragraph 11.
B. Challenges and limitations

5. The 2016 biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows presents a picture of climate finance to the extent possible. Due diligence has been undertaken to utilize the best information available from the most credible sources. Challenges were nevertheless encountered in collecting, aggregating and analysing information from diverse sources. The limited clarity with regard to the use of different definitions of climate finance limits comparability of data.

6. There are uncertainties associated with each source of data, and these have different underlying causes. Uncertainties are related to the data on domestic public investments, resulting from the lack of geographic coverage and differences in the way methods are applied, significant changes in the methods for estimating energy efficiency every few years and the lack of available data on sustainable private transport and other key sectors. Uncertainties also arise from the lack of procedures and data to determine private climate finance, methods for estimating adaptation finance, differences in the assumptions of underlying formulas to attribute finance from multilateral development banks (MDBs) to developed countries, the classification of data as ‘green finance’ and incomplete data on non-concessional flows.

7. The limitations outlined above need to be taken into consideration when deriving conclusions and policy implications from this biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows. The SCF will contribute, through its activities, to the progressive improvement of the measurement, reporting and verification of climate finance information in future biennial assessments and overviews of climate finance flows, to help address these challenges.

C. Key findings

1. Methodological issues relating to measurement, reporting and verification of public and private climate finance

*Improvements made in tracking and reporting of climate finance since the 2014 biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows*

8. Following the recommendations made by the SCF in the 2014 biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows, the 2016 biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows identifies the improvements listed below in the tracking and reporting of information on climate finance:

**Developed countries**

(a) Enabling Parties to provide additional information on their underlying definitions, methodologies and assumptions used, including on how they have identified finance as being “climate-specific”, as well as making these data more accessible to the public and recipient Parties, thereby enhancing consistency and transparency;

(b) Improving guidance on application of the Rio Markers for adaptation and mitigation and adjustments to the Rio Marker definitions for adaptation;

**International organizations**

(c) Making available MDB and multilateral climate fund activity-level data through the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD);
(d) Applying common principles for tracking mitigation and adaptation finance by MDBs and International Development Finance Club (IDFC) members;

(e) Making available data on climate co-financing flows through utilization of a joint methodology for tracking public and private climate co-finance by a consortium of seven MDBs.

Insights into reporting by developed countries and developing countries

9. The current biennial report (BR) guidelines\(^5\) were designed to accommodate reporting on a wide range of climate finance instruments and activities. This required a reporting architecture that was flexible enough to accommodate a diversity of reporting approaches. In some cases, limited clarity with regard to the diversity in reporting approaches limits comparability in climate finance reporting. Further improvements in reporting guidelines and formats are needed to enhance transparency on the approaches used by individual Parties and to enable greater comparability across reporting by Parties.

10. Current biennial update report (BUR) guidelines\(^6\) for reporting by developing countries on financial, technical and capacity-building needs and support received do not require information on the underlying assumptions, definitions and methodologies used in generating the information. Limited institutional capacity to track climate finance received, as well as the lack of data, can pose challenges in developing country reporting.

Insights into broader reporting aspects

11. Information on domestic climate-related finance is available including through a few BURs, Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Reviews (CPEIRs) and other independent studies. However, such information is difficult to compare.

12. There is a lack of systematic collection of data on climate-related private finance flows globally, due to difficulties in identifying climate-related finance, restrictions based on confidentiality, and conceptual and accounting issues. The primary sources cover mainly renewable energy and draw upon industry and sector databases, relying on voluntary disclosures. Efforts to develop methodologies for estimating mobilized private finance by public interventions are under way by the OECD DAC and the Research Collaborative on Tracking Private Climate Finance.

13. Ongoing efforts at the international and national levels aimed at improving climate-related financial risk disclosures are important for improving the transparency and promoting the alignment of finance and investment flows in accordance with Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement.

Insights related to review of climate finance information

14. Practices exist within the UNFCCC to review the information on support provided by Parties, including the international assessment and review of BRs and the international consultation and analysis of BURs. However, there are no internationally agreed methods for reconciling financial support provided against support received. Also, MDBs and IDFC do not have a standard procedure to review their climate finance data. In addition, BRs are not reviewed in time for aggregating data for the biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows.

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\(^5\) Decision 2/CP.17.

\(^6\) Decision 2/CP.17.

Flows from developed to developing countries as reported in biennial reports

15. USD 25.4 billion in 2013 and USD 26.6 billion in 2014 of climate-specific finance was reported in BRs, of which USD 23.1 billion in 2013 and USD 23.9 billion in 2014 was channelled through bilateral, regional and other channels (see figure 1). This represents an increase of about 50 per cent from public finance reported through the same channels in 2011–2012.

Multilateral climate funds

16. USD 1.9 billion in 2013 and USD 2.5 billion in 2014 was channelled through the UNFCCC funds and multilateral climate funds on the basis of their financial reports. Although this is a small share of the total climate finance, information on their activities is mostly complete.

Climate finance from multilateral development banks

17. Climate finance provided by MDBs to developing countries from their own resources was reported as USD 20.8 billion in 2013 and USD 25.7 billion in 2014. The methodology used in the 2014 biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows to attribute MDB finance from developed countries to developing countries suggests that USD 11.4 billion in 2013 and USD 12.7 billion in 2014 was delivered by developed countries. A more advanced methodology, which captures better the mobilization effect through the MDBs, suggests that USD 14.9 billion in 2013 and USD 16.6 billion in 2014 can be attributed to developed countries.

Private climate finance

18. The major source of uncertainty regarding flows to developing countries relates to the amount of private climate finance provided. Initial partial estimates of direct and mobilized private finance are available. Based on project-level data, renewable energy finance by developed country companies in developing countries is estimated at USD 1.8 billion in 2013 and USD 2.1 billion in 2014. Foreign direct investment in greenfield alternative and renewable energy in developing countries was estimated at USD 26.4 billion in 2013 and USD 21.6 billion in 2014. Both estimates are likely to be conservative. OECD and the Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) compiled an initial partial estimate of private finance mobilized by developed countries and identified USD 12.8 billion in 2013 and USD 16.7 billion in 2014 of private co-finance. These figures include private finance mobilized from international sources in addition to private finance mobilized domestically in developing countries. These partial estimates of direct private finance and mobilized finance are distinct, and cannot simply be aggregated.

Instruments

19. The mix of instruments used to channel support differs by funding source (see figure 2). About 35 per cent of the bilateral, regional and other finance reported to the UNFCCC in BRs is spent as grants, 20 per cent as concessional loans, 10 per cent as non-concessional loans, and the remainder through equity and other instruments. About 38 per cent of the reported finance is channelled through multilateral institutions, many of whom are MDBs that utilize capital contributions and commitments from member countries to raise low-cost capital from other sources of funding, including for donor contributions. This enables MDBs to offer a range of instruments and financial products, including grants (9 per cent), loans, including concessional loans, (83 per cent), equity (2 per cent) and other instruments (6 per cent). About 53 per cent of funding from multilateral climate funds is provided as grants, and
the remainder is largely concessional loans, which have increased as a share of approved funding over time. Forty-nine per cent of bilateral climate finance reported to the OECD is provided as grants, and 47 per cent as concessional loans.

**Recipients**

20. Climate finance goes to a wide range of governmental, private and non-governmental entities in recipient countries. However, reporting on recipient institutions is incomplete. For example, recipient data are available for about 50 per cent of the bilateral finance reported to the OECD DAC. For 2013–2014, developing country governments are specified as the recipients of about 40 per cent of the total flow. Climate finance channelled through other intermediaries may also reach national governments, but this is not captured in the data. Improving data on the recipients of climate finance could be an area for further work.

**Global finance flows**

21. On a comparable basis, global total climate finance has increased by almost 15 per cent since 2011–2012. In dollar terms estimated global total climate finance increased from a high bound estimate of USD 650 billion for 2011–2012 to USD 687 billion for 2013 and to 741 billion for 2014. Private investment in renewable energy and energy efficiency represents the largest share of the global total; however, the energy efficiency data are much less certain than the renewable energy data. Levels of finance have increased as the costs of clean technology have continued to fall. The coverage of data in the 2016 biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows has increased and improved since the 2014 biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows, but nevertheless the quality and completeness of data on global total flows are lower than those for flows to developing countries.

22. The estimate of global total climate finance in the 2016 biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows includes adjustments to the CPI estimate that were not part of the 2011–2012 estimate reported in the 2014 biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows. Partial data on domestic public finance expenditures of USD 192 billion per year were compiled. If these additional adjustments are included, they raise the upper end of the range to USD 880 billion in 2013 and USD 930 billion in 2014. However, the volume of the climate-related finance and investment flows globally may be higher, given that there are still significant data gaps in critical sectors such as sustainable transportation, agriculture, energy efficiency and resilient infrastructure.

23. Domestic climate finance: Comprehensive data on domestic climate expenditures are not available. Limited information is included in the BURs; estimates of climate-related finance included in national budgets, domestic climate finance provided by national development banks and commitments by developing country national climate funds. These indicative estimates suggest flows of USD 192 billion per year in developed and developing countries.

24. Some studies suggest that most climate finance in aggregate is mobilized and deployed domestically, both in developed and developing countries. In the limited number of developing countries for which information on domestic public climate finance is available, the data suggest that, in these countries, domestic public finance significantly exceeds the inflows of international public climate finance from bilateral and multilateral sources.

25. South–South cooperation: Data are limited, and mainly sourced from the OECD DAC, complemented with reports from a small number of other countries. On this basis, South–South cooperation was estimated to be in the range USD 5.9–9.1 billion for 2013 and USD
7.2–11.7 billion for 2014, of which about half was channelled through multilateral institutions.

Figure 1
Climate finance flows in 2013–2014 (USD billion and annualized)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flows to developing countries (USD billion)</th>
<th>Sources of data and relevant chapter in the technical report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNFCCC funds*</td>
<td>Chapter 2.2.1 Fund financial reports, climate funds update</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral climate funds (including UNFCCC funds)</td>
<td>Chapter 2.2.2 Fund financial reports, climate funds update</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate-specific finance through bilateral, regional and other channels</td>
<td>Chapter 2.2.3 CIF table 7(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which grants and concessional loans</td>
<td>Chapter 2.2.3 CIF table 7(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDB climate finance attributed to developed countries (own resources only)*</td>
<td>Chapter 2.2.5 MDB climate finance reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewable energy projects*</td>
<td>Chapter 2.2.9 CPI landscape of climate finance, BNEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI in greenfield alternative and renewable energy</td>
<td>Chapter 2.2.9 CPI landscape of climate finance, IES Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilized private finance*</td>
<td>Chapter 2.2.9 OECD CPI report 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global total flows (in inclusive of flows to developing countries above) (USD billion)</td>
<td>Chapter 2.4.1 CPI landscape of climate finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public and private investment excluding renewables (GBP)</td>
<td>Chapter 2.4.2 BNEF, CPI landscape of climate finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private energy efficiency</td>
<td>Chapter 2.4.3 IEA energy efficiency market report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sustainable transport</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private climate-relevant land use</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic climate-related public investment</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average total USD billion 2013–2014: 714 billion
**Note:** Figure is not to scale, but seeks to show the relative size of flows. Flows to developing countries are a subset of global total flows.


*a* Includes commitments approved during 2013 and 2014. Almost all contributions are contributed by Parties included in Annex II to the Convention (Annex II Parties). The values do not reflect pledges to the Green Climate Fund amounting to USD 10.2 billion by the end of 2014.

*b* From Annex II Parties to Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention (non-Annex I Parties). Values are derived by excluding climate finance to Parties included in Annex I to the Convention from the total climate finance provided by MDBs from their own resources to arrive at climate finance provided to non-Annex I Parties, and by attributing 85 per cent of this to Annex II Parties.

*c* From Annex II Parties to non-Annex I Parties.

*d* From Annex II Parties as well as Czechia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.

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**Figure 2**

**Characteristics of public finance in developing countries for 2013–2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average (2013 and 2014 in billion USD)</th>
<th>Purpose (%)</th>
<th>Implementing entities</th>
<th>Instrument (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adaptation</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
<td>Cross-cutting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFCCC funds*</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral climate funds (including UNFCCC funds listed above)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate-related bilateral¹</td>
<td>14.9–25.3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDB climate finance</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** All values are based on approvals.

**Abbreviations:** DFID = Department for International Development, GIZ = Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, MDB = multilateral development bank, NGO = non-governmental organization, NORAD = Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, USAID = United States Agency for International Development.

*a* Adaptation Fund, Global Environment Facility, Special Climate Change Fund and Least Developed Countries Fund. No Green Climate Fund projects were approved during 2013–2014.

*b* The values for bilateral finance are based on biennial report data for figure 1 in this document. The percentages for bilateral climate finance in this table are based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development data due to data availability.

*c* Not primarily development or concessional. One per cent of the equity reported is concessional equity.

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3. **Assessment of climate finance flows**

26. An assessment of the data underlying the overview of climate finance flows offers insights into key questions of interest in the context of the UNFCCC negotiations, including
support for adaptation and mitigation, levels of finance for different regions and how finance is delivered. Key features of different channels of climate finance for developing countries are summarized in figure 2.

27. Mitigation-focused finance represented more than 70 per cent of the public finance in developing countries reported in 2013 and 2014. Adaptation finance provided to developing countries accounted for about 25 per cent of the total finance. This is similar to 2011–2012, although there has been a slight increase in the proportion of adaptation finance from climate funds and bilateral concessional channels. More than 80 per cent of MDB investments focused on mitigation, and less than 20 per cent on adaptation.

28. There has been a significant role for grants in adaptation finance. Grants represent 88 per cent of adaptation finance approved climate funds and 56 per cent of the bilateral finance reported to the OECD DAC with adaptation as a principal objective. Some least developed countries and small island developing States in Africa and Asia have been among the largest recipients of adaptation finance.

29. About 33 per cent of funding from dedicated climate funds, 42 per cent of climate-related finance in the OECD DAC and 31 per cent of climate finance reported by MDBs is for Asia, often in countries with attractive investment climates. This funding has largely supported mitigation, including REDD-plus, reflecting the significant greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the region. About 21 per cent of finance from dedicated multilateral climate funds, 28 per cent of climate-related finance in the OECD DAC and 15 per cent of MDB climate finance is directed to African countries. There has been a growing emphasis on adaptation in this finance. About 23 per cent of funding from dedicated multilateral climate funds, 15 per cent of climate-related finance reported to the OECD DAC and 16 per cent of the climate finance reported by MDBs is directed to Latin America and the Caribbean.

30. There are costs associated with fund management, project development and implementation. These costs are recovered through mechanisms including administrative budgets and implementing agency fees, which vary across funds and institutions. Administrative costs range from less than 1 per cent to nearly 12 per cent of the approved funding. The actual costs are not necessarily proportional to the volumes of finance approved for projects.

31. A broad range of issues can present challenges in accessing climate finance, including: low levels of technical capacity to design and develop projects/programmes and to monitor and evaluate progress; difficulties in following the procedures of the funds to access finance; and low levels of awareness of the need for action and available sources of funding. Several efforts to strengthen “readiness” to access and make use of climate finance are now under way, and the Green Climate Fund (GCF) has recently stepped up its efforts in this regard. Investment in domestic capacity to structure and attract a range of sources of finance is also needed.

32. Ownership of climate finance and alignment of this finance with national climate change priorities and emerging policies and strategies is well recognized as an important element for ensuring effectiveness. Another important dimension is engagement of key stakeholders across government, particularly ministries of finance and planning, and across society, including civil society and the private sector. Most intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) submitted by developing country Parties outlined, in varying levels of detail, the estimated financial costs of the future emission reduction and climate adaptation

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7 In decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70, the COP encouraged developing country Parties to contribute to mitigation actions in the forest sector by undertaking the following activities: reducing emissions from deforestation; reducing emissions from forest degradation; conservation of forest carbon stocks; sustainable management of forests; and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.
scenarios they describe. In general, methodologies used to estimate financial needs or definitions of scope were not specified, and differed substantially. Beyond INDCs, few efforts to assess national or global climate finance needs have been completed since the 2014 biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows. INDCs may provide a framework for strengthening ownership in the future.

33. Impact monitoring systems are beginning to mature, although reporting of results remains nascent and relatively slow. GHG emission accounts are a primary metric of impact and effectiveness used for climate finance mitigation, often complemented with relevant output data such as the volume of installed clean energy or reductions in energy consumption. Consistency of methodologies for GHG accounting continues to be a challenge, though progress has been made by development finance institutions, which have adopted common principles.

34. Most adaptation interventions seek to identify the specific number of people that are likely to benefit from the proposed interventions, either directly or indirectly in terms of increased resilience. Ensuring the accuracy of estimates can be challenging, due to difficulties in identifying beneficiaries, establishing baselines and data collection, and defining and tracking resilience over time to what may be slow onset, or 1-in-100 or 1-in-500 year events.

35. Many funders use co-financing as best available evidence of private finance mobilization, and many climate funds use leverage ratios as one of their key results indicators. However, co-finance does not necessarily equate to mobilization, which is often used to imply a more causal relationship between public intervention and associated private finance, which is more complex to prove. High leverage ratios may not always indicate an effective use of public finance, as ratios can also be high in interventions that are the most commercially viable.

36. The 2016 biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows identified climate-related global climate finance flows of USD 714 billion on average in 2013–2014 (see figure 1); this is a significant amount, but is relatively small in the context of wider trends in global investment (see figure 3). For example, while investment in clean energy is rising, volumes of finance for high carbon energy in all countries remain considerably higher. Infrastructure and assets are at risk from the impacts of climate change, with serious potential consequences for the global economy.
Figure 3
Global climate finance in context

Note: This figure seeks to put the total volume of global finance flows in the context of wider trends in global investment. The flows featured on this diagram are not strictly comparable, and are presented for illustrative purposes only. Full details of the underlying studies are included in chapter 3 of the 2016 biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows.


D. Recommendations

37. The SCF invites the COP to consider the following recommendations:

(a) Invite Parties, the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and other relevant bodies under the Convention to consider the 2016 biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows, particularly its key findings, in order to improve guidelines for the preparation and reporting of financial information, as well as to develop the modalities, procedures and guidelines, as appropriate, for the transparency of support in accordance with Articles 9 and 13 of the Paris Agreement;

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8 This includes enhanced information on: sectors, financial instruments, the methodology used for reporting financial support through bilateral channels, the methodology used to identify climate-specific portions of public financial support through multilateral channels, and disaggregated data at the activity level.
(b) Request the SCF, in fulfilling its function on measurement, reporting and verification of support, and in the context of its workplan, to cooperate with relevant institutions and experts and to consider ongoing work under the Convention;

*Engaging with international organizations and the private sector*

(c) Encourage climate finance providers to enhance the availability of granular, country-level data and for the UNFCCC secretariat to make such information more accessible, including via enhanced web-based data platforms;

(d) Encourage relevant institutions and experts, including from the private sector, to devise practical options for estimating and collecting data on private climate finance, taking into consideration ongoing work by the OECD Research Collaborative on Tracking Private Climate Finance and by MDBs;

*Ownership, needs and impact*

(e) Encourage developing countries to take advantage of the resources available through the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism to strengthen their institutional capacity to programme their priority climate actions as well as to track and report climate finance;

(f) Request the SCF in preparing future biennial assessments and overviews of climate finance flows to assess available information on investment needs and plans related to Parties’ nationally determined contributions and national adaptation plans;

(g) Encourage Parties and relevant international institutions to enhance the availability of information that will be necessary for tracking global progress on the goals outlined in Article 2 of the Paris Agreement;

(h) Invite the Board of the GCF to consider information in the biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows in its annual dialogues with climate finance delivery channels in order to enhance complementarity and coherence between the GCF and other funds at the activity level;

(i) Invite multilateral climate funds, MDBs, other financial institutions and relevant international organizations to continue working to further harmonize methods for measuring climate finance and to advance comparable approaches for tracking and reporting on impacts.