

**Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action**  
**(ADP)**  
**Second Session (ADP 2)**

Views on implementation of all the elements of decision 1/CP.17, (a) Matters related to paragraphs 2 to 6

**Submission of the Republic of Korea**

The Republic of Korea (hereafter “Korea”) welcomes the opportunity to submit its views on the implementation of all the elements of decision 1/CP.17, (a) Matters related to paragraphs 2 to 6. Korea is pleased that throughout the last year it has constructively engaged in the roundtable discussions with other Parties under Workstream I of the ADP through submissions by the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) and interventions in its own capacity.

This submission is related to paragraph 13 of the “Planning of Work” of the ADP<sup>1</sup> agreed on at the COP 18, which exemplifies four aspects such as:

- (a) Application of the principles of the Convention;
- (b) Building on the experiences and lessons learned from other processes under the Convention and from other multilateral processes, as appropriate;
- (c) The scope, structure and design of the 2015 agreement;
- (d) Ways of defining and reflecting enhanced action.

**Application of the principles of the Convention: item (a)**

As reaffirmed in the preamble of decision 2/CP.18 “Advancing the Durban Platform”, the work of the ADP shall be guided by the principles of the Convention. Among those principles, “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective

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<sup>1</sup>Final version of FCCC/ADP/2012/L.4

capabilities (CBDR &RC)” is of great relevance in the context of ADP discussions on the post-2020 climate regime.

CBDR, the first part of the CBDR & RC, could be understood as it represents two different kinds of responsibilities of the Parties, which are “common responsibilities” and “differentiated responsibilities”. The former is properly reflected in decision 1/CP.17, which clearly states that a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention (hereafter “2015 agreement”) will be applicable to all Parties. The latter should also hold in the 2015 agreement, as the Convention calls on the developed countries to take the lead in combating climate change and recognizes the specific needs and special circumstances of developing countries. In this sense, full consideration must be given to the historical responsibilities of greenhouse gas accumulation and relevant national circumstances of Parties, particularly developing countries as long as the 2015 agreement is intended for universal application.

However, a Party’s differentiated responsibilities would not be fully understood without taking into consideration its capabilities to mitigate and adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. Faced with the growing urgency to address climate change, Parties are already exerting efforts in a manner reflecting their ever-changing capacities in a differentiated manner. In order to rapidly close the significant gap between what has been pledged and what is required to achieve the 2°C goal, each Party’s contribution commensurate to its respective capabilities will be needed more than ever.

The principles of the Convention should apply to the 2015 agreement in an integrated fashion. Their application to the new climate regime may also need to be accompanied by a modern interpretation of them which, as described above, are firmly based on the CBDR and, at the same time, accommodates the status quo regarding RC effectively. Korea believes that the principles will remain in effect beyond 2020 with such interpretation corresponding to the urgent need to increase the level of global ambition.

**Widest possible cooperation and participation by all Parties: item (c) and (d)**

Decision 1/CP.17 reiterated a preambular paragraph of the Convention that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response. Parties agreed to do so in Durban, for they envisaged that the broader and more effective participation of all Parties in the post-2020 regime would be indispensable for attaining the ultimate objectives of the Convention, in particular given the urgency to cope with climate change.

Korea consistently argued during the course of the previous roundtable discussions that three points should be taken into account, so that broader participation might be realized through the 2015 agreement. They are national circumstances, balance between stringency and participation, and incentivizing more ambitious action.

**National Circumstances:** for the 2015 agreement to be effective and applicable to all, differing national circumstances have to be properly reflected in it with respect to mitigation as well as adaptation and needs for means of implementation. We have seen a consensus emerging from our fruitful exchange of views that any ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach or single simple formula can hardly be an option to address the enhanced action required by decision 1/CP.17, if we are to complete the work of the ADP which should be applicable to all Parties in time. It should be noted as well that national circumstances be incorporated, as appropriate, not as an excuse for inaction, but as a way of understanding Parties’ enhanced action to mitigate climate change up to and beyond 2020. For instance, a Party’s mitigation efforts could be understood based on, among others, renewable energy sources endowment, industrial and trade structures, marginal abatement costs, etc.

**Balance between stringency and participation:** for the sake of the climate-effectiveness of the post-2020 regime, a balance should be established between stringency with regard to Parties’ enhanced action and flexibility for broader participation. Stringency will be a necessity, to a degree, for “mutual assurance” for other Parties’ action as well as for the environmental integrity of the 2015 agreement.

However, we need to be aware of the possibility that Parties could be hesitant to have ambitious goals or even reluctant to fully participate when faced with more stringent rules than they would be politically ready for. Enhanced stringency and universal participation must work together for the climate-effectiveness of the post-2020 regime. In this context, It is conceivable to harmonize these two possibly countervailing factors in a long-term perspective – the level of stringency may be differentiated among Parties, while there is a robust mechanism that strongly encourages Parties to move to a higher level of stringency.

**Incentivizing more ambitious action**: such an effective mechanism would be tied with facilitative instruments which incentivize Parties, particularly developing countries, to increase their mitigation ambition. This aspect requires the 2015 agreement to be as clear and specific as possible concerning the provision of means of implementation. Predictable, consistent and scaled-up support for enhanced action should be an essential part of it. In addition we have to take the following into account: special consideration given to least developed countries (LDC) and small island developing states (SIDS); no precondition for support ignorant of national circumstances; the effective operation of related institutions such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). On top of financial support and technology transfer, evidence that enhanced action goes in tandem with sustainable development could reinforce mitigation actions by developing countries.

**Scope, structure and design based on the Convention: item (c)**

Korea, as a member of the EIG, envisages that the 2015 agreement will assume a form of legally binding instrument to overcome uncertainty working against enhanced action on a global scale. The scope of the 2015 agreement will be derived from the Convention and decision 1/CP.17. More specifically, the 2015 agreement should articulate its aim to fulfill the ultimate objective of the Convention and ways to realize the climate-effective, widest possible cooperation and participation among Parties. With mitigation put at the core, it will also address adaptation and means of implementation in balance with mitigation. Korea is of the view that paragraph 5 of decision 1/CP.17

could serve as the basis of discussions on the scope.

It should be designed so that it respects the principles of the Convention and fully accommodates national circumstances of Parties. Even though we will keep striving, up to and beyond 2015, to increase aggregate mitigation ambition as needed, enhanced action on the part of Parties which it will address should be predicated on what they would pledge to do, which shall be reflected in the structure of the 2015 agreement.

### **Strengthening of the multilateral, rules-based regime: item (b)**

Korea supports the concept that the post-2020 regime be rooted in strong, internationally-agreed rules applicable to all Parties. Fortunately, we have very rich assets which have been developed under the Kyoto Protocol (KP) for more than a decade, especially those related to rules for accounting, reporting and review and flexible mechanisms. They will be carried on, as appropriate, in the new regime and be sure to contribute to its success.

On the other hand, we have to note what elements have possibly *not* added to the effectiveness of KP. We believe that the non-participation of some developed countries undermines trust in the validity of multilateral climate regimes as well as the KP's efficacy. Leading efforts of developed countries will remain crucial, for they are key to reciprocal actions by developing countries and will, in turn, prevent the post-2020 regime from suffering a similar fate to its predecessor.

In addition, it would be desirable to assess the role of enforcement and facilitative compliance rules in a regime applicable to all Parties. Under the KP, Most developed country Parties comply with it out of good faith as responsible members of the international community rather than in fear of the compliance mechanism. This aspect is in line with the balance between stringency and participation described above.

Together with institutions established through the Cancún Agreements, another achievement of the multilateral climate regime, experiences and lessons learned from the first commitment period of Kyoto Protocol would be a keystone in measuring our

aggregate progress, and enhancing our ambition in moving further toward the ultimate objective of the Convention.