Closing the ambition gap: A workplan for survival

Bonn Climate Change Conference

21 May 2012

CO_2 concentration still rising



Measurements taken from CO2 record from Mauna Loa, Hawaii 1958-2011 and South Pole Ice Core CO2 Record

Climate change impacts are worsening

- Hotter temperatures
- Sea level rise and permanent land loss
- Coastal erosion
- Food security challenges
- Ocean acidification and coral bleaching
- Loss of biodiversity
- More intense extreme weather events

Bridging the Emissions Gap
A UNEP Synthesis Report

UNEP

The ambition gap is not closing



- High end of pledges not sufficient to close the gap
- Increasing ambition beyond the high end of the pledges is essential.

Enhancing mitigation ambition under decision 1/CP.17

"Noting with grave concern the significant gap between the aggregate effect of Parties' mitigation pledges in terms of global annual emissions of greenhouse gases by 2020 and aggregate emission pathways consistent with having a likely chance of holding the increase in global average temperature below 2 ° C or 1.5 ° C above pre-industrial levels,"

"7. *Decides* to launch a workplan on enhancing mitigation ambition to identify and to explore options for a range of actions that can close the ambition gap with a view to ensuring the highest possible mitigation efforts by all Parties;"

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Greatest mitigation potential lies in stronger accounting rules and domestic measures

- Minimizing the use of “lenient” LULUCF credits and surplus emission credits (2-3 $GtCO_2e$).
- Avoiding double counting and non-additionality (.7-2.8 $GtCO_2e$).
- Implementing the more ambitious “conditional” pledges (2-3 $GtCO_2e$).
- Increasing the global share of renewables in energy supply from roughly 10% at present to 15% by 2020 (4 $GtCO_2e$), or to 20% by 2020 (close the ‘ambition gap’).
- Significantly reducing subsidies for fossil fuels (1.7 $GtCO_2e$).
- Intensifying energy efficiency improvements offers further potential to close the gap.

Additional measures are important, but no substitute for more ambitious targets and NAMAs

- Reducing emissions from aviation and shipping provides some potential to close the gap (0.3 to 0.5 GtCO2e), but greater cooperation is required at the ICAO and IMO.
- Persuading countries to take pledges that have not done so is also important, but provides limited mitigation potential.
- Reducing “short-lived climate pollutants” is important. The present gap already reflects an expectation that substantial reductions will occur. Therefore, not reducing these pollutants would make the gap larger, but taking action will not make the gap smaller.

Workplan format and expected outcome

- Activities should commence immediately and include a series of in-session workshops, submissions, and negotiations.
- The workplan should culminate at COP18 with:
  - more ambitious economy-wide emission reduction targets by developed countries, including locking in **QELROs** for Annex I Kyoto Protocol Parties
  - more ambitious NAMAs by developing countries
  - clarity that the appropriate scope and scale of financial resources, technology transfer and capacity building will be available for developing country NAMAs.

The Workplan should facilitate higher ambition under the KP and LCA

The workplan for enhancing mitigation ambition should lead to the adoption of more ambitious QELROs for Annex I Parties that are:

- Single numbers;
- Based on a **five-year** commitment period;
- Minimize the use of surplus carryover units; and
- Become legally binding at the earliest possible time.

Annex I Non-Kyoto Protocol Parties should adopt new, economy-wide commitments of comparable ambition.

Developed Country Mitigation

Information to be provided by developed countries:

1. Domestic policies and measures that would enable them to raise the level of ambition of their current economy-wide emission reduction targets
2. The emission reduction potential of such policies and measures (in GtCO2e), including their contribution toward closing the ambition gap
3. Constraints preventing the adoption of such policies and measures

In Doha, A1 Kyoto Parties should lock in more ambitious QELROs and A1 non-Kyoto Parties should adopt comparable commitments.

Developing Country Mitigation

Information to be provided by developing countries:

1. The means of implementation required that would enable Parties to develop and implement more ambitious NAMAs
2. Domestic policies and measures that would comprise such NAMAs
3. The emissions reduction potential of such NAMAs (in GtCO2e), including their aggregate contribution toward closing the ambition gap
4. Any other constraints preventing the adoption of such NAMAs

Provision of the means of implementation

Information to be provided by developed countries:

1. Means of implementation developed countries are prepared to provide to enable pre-2020 NAMAs, including scale and nature of:
   - financial resources,
   - technology, and
   - capacity building.

Schedule of activities for 2012

Party and Observer submissions	Jul
Workshop (Bangkok)	Aug-Sep
Leaders meeting (New York)	Sep
Pre-COP ministerial (Seoul)	Nov
COP18 (Doha)	Nov-Dec

The ambition gap must be closed at COP18 in Doha.

Failing to close the gap *immediately* would lead to significant risk of crossing multiple tipping points and temperature rise exceeding 3.5° C. In that event, we would be negotiating a very different type of legally binding agreement under the Durban Platform, which would need to address the massive adaptation, forced migration, and loss and damage that would be brought on by dangerous climate change.

Barbados Declaration on Sustainable Energy

7-8 May 2012

Country	Economy-wide goals	Timing
Cape Verde	35% reduction in GHGs	2020
Grenada	20% reduction in GHGs below BAU	2020
Marshall Is.	40% reduction in GHGs below 2009	2020
Country	**Renewable Energy goals**	**Timing**
Barbados	29% of energy consumption from RE (indicative)	2029
Cape Verde	50% of energy consumption from RE	2030
Cook islands	50% of energy from RE (inhabited islands)	2015
Cook islands	100% of energy from RE (inhabited islands)	2020
Dominica	Increase RE (hydro) generation from 30% to 100%	
Guyana	90% of electricity from RE (hydro)	
Marshall Is.	20% of energy from RE	2020

Barbados Declaration on Sustainable Energy

7-8 May 2012

Country	Renewable Energy goals	Timing
Mauritius	35% share of RE	2025
Nauru	50% energy demand met by alternative sources	2015
St Lucia	20% increase in share of RE in energy supply	2020
St Vincent and the Grenadines	30% of electricity from RE	2015
St Vincent and the Grenadines	60% of electricity from RE	2020
Samoa	20% of energy from RE	2030
Seychelles	15% of power from RE	2030
Timor Leste	50% of power from RE	2020
Tonga	50% of electricity from RE	2020
Tuvalu	100% power from RE	2020

Thank you.