



Submission on the road map for global climate action

Introduction

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the road map for global climate action. After the historic Paris conference, it is of vital importance to find effective tools to accelerate climate action.

This submission is based on the report *Kokoaan suurempi Suomi*, released on July 1st and available in Finnish (<http://www.ym.fi/download/noname/%7BB754352F-F5E4-4283-9F29-AED9A079CABD%7D/119822>). The study looks at options to raise pre-2020 climate ambition especially using fora under and associated with the UNFCCC framework.

The report was written by Tyrsky Consulting for the Finnish Ministry of the Environment. Views expressed here are those of the authors and may not represent the official positions of the Finnish government or the Ministry of the Environment.

1) The current situation

Is this general presentation an accurate description of the current state of play? If not, what can we do more?

The presentation is generally an accurate description of the current situation. It is crucial to underline the importance of rapid implementation and pre-2020 action. Urgency and ambition should be key features of the Action Agenda.

Both pre- and post-2020 action should be strongly guided by the ultimate temperature goals under Paris Agreement Article 2. In essence they require drastically more ambitious emission commitments both post- and pre-2020. The need to update emission targets is highlighted in a recent study *What does the Paris climate agreement mean for Finland and the European Union?* (<http://www.sitra.fi/en/julkaisu/2016/what-does-paris-climate-agreement-mean-finland-and-european-union>).

Moreover the emerging Action Agenda needs to be enhanced and consolidated. This could include strengthening the synergies and reducing overlap between various existing pre-2020 fora, including LPAA, NAZCA, TEP and TEMs, Momentum for Change, high-level events and facilitative dialogues as well as the high-level champions. The Action Agenda also needs to have a solid institutional framework, including permanent staff and a reliable and sufficient budget.

2) The role of the high-level champions

Is this an accurate description of the role the high-level climate champions should play with regard to the mobilization of non-state actors? Is there anything else they should do, or are there things mentioned here that they should not do?

The description is broadly accurate and adequate. However, there are some additional issues that should be taken into account.

First, existing initiatives need to be also strengthened (not just “enhancing delivery”). For instance, the assessment of LPAA by Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions (http://www.climategroundswell.org/s/LPAA_Assessment_Report_7DEC15-mi34.pdf) showed that less than half of mitigation initiatives had a quantitative target. Moreover only half of the initiatives had a strong institutional base.

Second, new initiatives are needed also in other areas than adaptation. Specifically the world needs initiatives with high mitigation potential and immediate impacts on emissions.

Third, while various ICIs are essential to bridge the emissions gap, also countries need to do significantly more. Efforts so far to get parties to increase ambition in their pre-2020 pledges (either under KP2 or the Cancún outcome) have had very little success.

There are at least five different ways countries could strengthen their pre-2020 ambition:

- a) adopt new pledges: Cancún pledges cover about 4/5 of global emissions, but significant emitters (e.g. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and Malaysia) remain without NAMAs
- b) increase the coverage: many NAMAs only cover some sectors, emissions or measures
- c) implement conditional pledges: several countries both in the North and the South have conditional pledges and are currently implementing the unconditional ones
- d) update targets: countries can update their pledges officially to raise ambition
- e) overachieve pledges: if countries are not willing to update their existing pledges officially, they can aim at simply overachieving them

While decisions regarding national pledges clearly belong to sovereign Parties, high-level champions can also play a role. They can use their diplomatic skills and persuading power in a manner not unlike the work on non-state initiatives. The task could fall under the mandate of introducing “new or strengthened voluntary efforts, initiatives and coalitions” (Paris COP decision para 121) as a decision of a Party to increase ambition would naturally be voluntary. For instance, catalysing the emergence of a coalition of the willing with countries committing to accelerate their pre-2020 action could provide a powerful signal.

3) Transparency and tracking

How do we assess the initiatives? What would be the ideal set of criteria? Who would assess them? What should be the role of the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA)?

Increasing transparency and providing more and standardised data would be a welcome step. This would give an opportunity for the civil society and the research community to analyse the progress in implementing initiatives, including possibly naming and shaming (e.g. greenwashing).

However, there is a balancing act between assessing and scrutinising initiatives to ensure their integrity on the one hand and encouraging new initiatives and making it easy to announce them on the other. It is good to caution against introducing transaction costs both for participating institutions and the Action Agenda. For example the benefits of appointing a NAZCA ombudsperson should be weighed against the costs, including possibly making it less attractive for stakeholders to submit their actions.

The NAZCA platform provides a solid foundation for further work. Future efforts could focus on

- a) making sure more actors report their activities
- b) including Party measures that go beyond their existing pre-2020 pledges (KP2 or Cancún)

- c) engaging the research community in analysing the database and drawing lessons from it
- d) publicising and marketing climate action documented in NAZCA
- e) making the portal easier to use and more user-friendly
- f) increasing (optional) data coverage requested from submissions and standardising input

4) High-level event

What do Parties and non-Party stakeholders expect from the high-level event at COP 22? To have a real impact at COP 24 in 2018, the Climate Action Summit showcasing the results of non-state actor initiatives would need to take place sufficiently in advance. Should it be organized in the summer of 2018?

A successful high-level event will

- a) maintain and build momentum for climate action
- b) announce new, high-impact initiatives
- c) strengthen and broaden existing initiatives
- d) highlight progress and challenges
- e) strengthen linkages and synergies with other parts of the Action Agenda

The Climate Action Summit would benefit from building on the success of similar and comparable events previously, namely UN SG climate summits and Rio+20. Looking back at these cases, it would probably make sense to organise the Summit well in advance of COP24, in the summer, autumn or spring of 2018.

5) The role of the TEMs

Do you share the belief that the format of the TEMs should evolve in the light of the Global Climate Action Agenda? How could we ensure that the TEMs are more solution-oriented?

TEMs can and should play an important role as part of the Action Agenda. Some ways to develop them include:

- a) widen participation: include for instance more national leaders in charge of implementing policies and measures (e.g. sectoral ministers) and representatives of financing institutions
- b) focus: bring the discussions closer to implementation where they get more specific (e.g. scaling up solar PV in LDCs rather than overall discussion about promoting renewables)
- c) organise regional TEMs: one way to increase participation and engage local leaders would be to organise regional TEMs, together with e.g. regional economic organisations and UN Economic and Social Commissions
- d) ensure balance: effort needs to be made to ensure both Parties in the North and the South as well as non-Party stakeholders feel ownership of TEP
- e) remove overlap: TEMs could be held immediately prior to or after SB sessions or negotiations could have a break during TEMs to facilitate the participation of smaller Party delegations
- f) use electronic tools: various electronic tools can make it easier for participants both at the meeting and outside to provide their input and join the deliberations
- g) increase resources: even fairly small financial support could help in developing TEMs, including ensuring more participation from the South
- h) get closer to implementation: TEMs could get closer to implementation by e.g. focusing on success factors, barriers and ways to remove them as well as finance
- i) work together: various institutions within the UNFCCC framework and in the wider multilateral family can and should contribute to TEMs (e.g. TEC, CTCN, GCF, GEF and GGGI) more actively

- j) provide portfolios: TEMs together with various studies (e.g. <http://www.greentoscale.net>) show the abundance of solutions already available – these could be compiled in more implementation-oriented portfolios with clear links to tools to help implementation (MOI)

Looking forward to working with you to accelerate climate action.

In Brussels on July 5th, 2016

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Oras Tynkkynen', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Oras Tynkkynen
Tyrsky Consulting
oras.tynkkynen@tyrskyconsulting.fi