

# Mobilizing Resources for Climate Finance

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# The equity case

- To have a 50–50 chance of holding to a 2 deg C, GHG emissions need to decrease by a **factor of 2.5 in 40 years** and emissions per unit of output **by a factor of 7 or 8**
- Need for an **energy–industrial transformation** in the next few decades to manage the risks of climate change
- Rich countries are wealthier, better equipped technologically and have emitted around 75% of cumulative global GHG emissions since the mid–19th century
- Without a **reduction in emissions from developing countries**, there is no way or reducing global emissions sufficiently
- A climate change agreement will need to involve **substantial support by the rich countries for the mitigation and adaptation** investment necessary in poorer countries


# The politics

- Bali, Copenhagen, Cancun and Durban indicate that action on reducing emissions will need to be taken globally, but poorer countries need to be assured, through financial support, of **equal access to sustainable development** (preferable to common but differentiated responsibilities)
- This is the logic behind the Copenhagen **\$100bn a year commitment** and of the establishment of the GCF
- The commitment is for **public and private**. The equity case sketched above provides a strong argument for **significant part of the funds being grants** (or grant equivalent) and public, since private flows require repayment and come with other obligations
- This was the background to the **AGF** work, commissioned by the UN SG to identify sources of finance to meet the Copenhagen commitments
- **Rio increased the pressure** on developed countries on the back of little delivery on climate finance
- **Sensible ideas, such as green growth, risk to be the lost** due to this pressure, the proverbial ‘baby thrown away with the bath water’

# The current economic crisis

- Makes it harder to deliver, but...
  - Even clearer that **more effective ways of deploying the world's savings** are required, given the enormous needs for investments to promote development
  - Finance for low-carbon technologies in the context of the COP process, should thus be seen not only as part of an equitable agreement, but also as:
    - more **sound and efficient global allocation of investment**
    - Step towards a **more stable long-run macroeconomic framework**
  - Investment in low-carbon technologies has recovered quickly

GLOBAL TOTAL NEW INVESTMENT IN CLEAN ENERGY,  
2004–11 (\$BN)



Note: Includes corporate and government R&D, and small distributed capacity. Adjusted for re-invested equity. Does not include proceeds from acquisition transactions

Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance

# Funding the Fund: little has been done after AGF/G20-WB-OECD efforts

- The AGF report, together with the G20-WB-OECD report, remain the most relevant framework for principles and for potential sources. What emerges is that:
  - It is **feasible to raise \$100bn** a year by 2020
  - What's needed is a **reliable and principle-based bundle of sources of finance**
  - It makes sense for it to involve **public and private instruments**
  - Funds should be **scalable to the adaptation and mitigation financing needs**
  - Sources should provide **incentives for production and consumption consistent with the overall move to the low-carbon economy.**
  - It will take time to build the crucial elements of taxation based on economic principles, in particular in relation to the GHG externalities: **we need to start now to fill in the Fund by 2020.**
  - We should recognize that in the interim there will need to be initial financial flows **based on existing sources.**

# What are current financial flows

- CPI estimates that climate funds are about \$100bn a year
- ~\$50bn are public
- ~\$20bn are actual grants, the rest are loans by multilateral banks
- Only \$2bn are carbon markets related
- \$50bn are private

So, are we done with the Copenhagen pledge?


- No!
  - Copenhagen commitments are for **additional** funds
  - These flows represent total investment, not **incremental** investment
  - **Gross** flows, i.e. including the full amount of loans that carry obligations for repayment; they are not in this sense net contributions.
- However, the figures indicate that there are already significant flows of climate finance to developing countries

# Sources of finance: the principles

1. Taxing the bad
2. Additionality as new-ness or innovative finance
3. Incidence on rich countries
4. Public sources needed for adaptation and market failures
5. Scalability, robustness and credibility
6. Raising domestic revenues in developed countries

# Sources of finance: individual sources

\$bn, 2020, per year



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\* Estimates in parenthesis are from World Bank (2011). *Mobilizing Climate Finance*. Washington DC  
 Note: The figures in this table refer to the flows available for international climate finance using AGF and World Bank assumptions. A substantial amount of revenues, not accounted for in this table, would be retained in national budgets. For example, the AGF assumes that 90% of auction revenues and 50-75% of travel would be retained domestically

# Sources of finance: the bundles


- ‘Bundles’ of mutually supportive and consistent financial sources is particularly attractive:
  - Provides source countries with flexibility in choosing domestic sources according to countries’ preferences.
  - Allows for the spreading of the risks associated with individual sources not delivering the expected flows increasing reliability
  - Different sources can reinforce each other, strengthening arguments for their joint inclusion in any package or bundle.
- Some sources will overlap with each other, the overall revenue potential of a bundle, therefore, is not necessarily the sum of its parts. |
- The dynamic relationship between the sources, and the potential for mutual reinforcement in the wider context of a move towards a low-carbon economy, that matters here.
- The portfolio approach pursued by the AGF Report attempts to move the debate on sources from picking individual sources in isolation, “a menu approach” to reliable, self-reinforcing bundles of sources.

# Illustration of potential combinations

\$ Billions

- A: Carbon market public revenues
- B: International transport
- C: Carbon related revenues
- D: IFIs
- E: Financial transactions tax
- F: Direct budget contributions

Flows in 2020



Source Romani and Stern (2011)

# A 'carbon efficiency' bundle

- Particularly attractive: bundle of sources built around the principle of carbon efficiency + strong international cooperation

Such a bundle could deliver:

- ~\$30 billion p.a. in net public funds from the emissions trading/taxing, depending on the level of ambition and commitment of developed countries
- ~\$30 billion p.a. in net public funds from taxing international transport and removing fossil fuel subsidies
- ~\$20 billion p.a. in gross flows in the form of loans from IFIs, by investing an additional \$5 billion p.a. to their capital base
- ~\$250–300 billion p.a. in gross private flows generated by using the leverage potential of public funds
- ~ \$150–200 billion p.a. in national treasuries of developed countries as additional non-hypothecated revenues

All bundles are dependent on the political willingness of individual countries to have a carbon price and emission reduction commitments in line with pledges

# Conclusions: challenges ahead

- Overall lack of momentum in developed countries, mostly due to US politics and Euro crisis. But the list of priorities is clear:
  - Removal of fossil energy subsidies in developed countries, particularly phasing out production subsidies – G20 could be the right vehicle
  - International transport taxes
  - Revenues from emission trading schemes through auctions is a short-term opportunity. *Get it done now when the prices are low!*
  - The reforms of carbon markets to expand scope and depth is a critical ongoing task
- The IFIs have a key role to play in financing climate actions and in crowding in other finance. Potential space for a new institution focused on sustainable infrastructure
- The GCF must demonstrate it can deliver quickly. Funding the fund and starting operations with some early success examples is crucial

# A political question?

- **Rio rejected the concept on green growth on the back of concerns about shifting responsibilities**
- **At the same time many countries are pursuing inclusive green growth strategies and attracting finance, both public and private**
- **Are the public funds from developed countries going to green growth part of the 100bn commitment? Or are they 'normal' ODA?**
- **This really challenges the whole concept of additionally in the context of sustainable development**

# Back up




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# Approximately \$50bn could be raised from public sources


\$bn, 2020, per year



1 Not counted towards financing needs as carbon finance increases needs proportionally  
 2 International private finance, excludes domestic private finance  
 SOURCE: AGF report

# However, total flows will depend on carbon prices and international coordination

\$bn, 2020, per year



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
SOURCE: AGF report, Project Catalyst analysis

# Defining the interim financing period will be crucial

## 2013-2015 period overview

### Rationale for interim climate finance period

- Goal for policy makers to work towards a more relevant time frame and reach consensus on meaningful, short-term objectives.
- Scale-up financing sources while establishing investment pipeline and delivering concrete mitigation and adaptation measures



### Potential sources

- Majority of the AGF sources can be used to meet short-term objectives:
  - Carbon pricing related revenues (ETS auctions, carbon tax)
  - Domestic tax on transport
  - Other public sources e.g., royalties, subsidies

### Uses

- Governments will need to establish short term objectives e.g. 50% of avoided deforestation by 2015
- Projects need to be kicked-off to meet these short term targets

# Overview on major estimates - ETS for the maritime Sector

## Imposing a carbon price on the international maritime sector through a sectoral emission cap

### High level description of methodology

- Estimate of total emissions from international maritime transport based on:
  - IMO estimates of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from *base estimates* (based on the IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios , SRES)
- Calculation of revenues by multiplication of estimated emissions under the IMO SRES base case scenarios with carbon prices for three defined scenarios (assumes ETS is linked to global carbon markets and therefore global carbon prices, here approximated by offset prices).

### Resulting revenue estimates (\$bn)

- Scenario 1: 2.4 – 5.6
- Scenario 2: 4.1 – 9.3
- Scenario 3: 8.1 – 18.5

### Tax base assumptions

Driver	Value	Information source
International maritime emission projections	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Estimates range from 925 – 1058 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> in 2020</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>IMO</li> </ul>

#### Caveats:

The maximum potential revenue from the measure ranges from \$9.3 - \$52.9 bn. These have been discounted by an indicative figure of 30% as compensation for developing countries (assuming that developing countries are compensated based on their share of global imports).

These estimates would an assumption that 25-50% of remaining revenues are made available for climate finance.

Revenue estimates could be further reduced depending if less than 100% of permits are auctioned and if there are strong emission reductions in the sector due to technical and operational measures to reduce sector emissions.

### Tax-rate/price assumptions

Driver	Value	Information source
Price for carbon (assumed or equivalent)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Scenario price (\$15-50)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>AGF scenario paper</li> </ul>
Compensation for developing countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Indicative 30%</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Assumption by authors that developing countries are compensated based on their share of global imports</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>25-50%</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Assumption by authors</li> </ul>




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Share of revenues earmarked for climate finance

# Detailed calculation tree - ETS for maritime, low scenario



# Overview on major estimates - Carbon levy for maritime

Imposing a carbon price on the international maritime sector through a sectoral carbon levy.

## High level description of methodology

- Estimate of total emissions from international maritime transport based on:
  - IMO estimates of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from *base estimates* (based on the IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios , SRES)
  
- Calculation of revenues by multiplication of estimated emissions under the IMO SRES base case scenarios with carbon prices for three defined scenarios (assumes ETS is linked to global carbon markets and therefore global carbon prices, here approximated by offset prices).

## Resulting revenue estimates (\$bn)

- Scenario 1: 2.4 – 5.6
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## Tax base assumptions

Driver	Value	Information source
International maritime emission projections	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Estimates range from 925 – 1058 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> in 2020</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ IMO</li> </ul>
<p><b>Caveats:</b>                      The maximum potential revenue from the measure ranges from \$9.3 - \$52.9 bn. These have been discounted by an indicative figure of 30% reflecting the provision of compensation for developing countries (based on the developing countries share of global imports).                       These estimates would an assumption that 25-50% of remaining revenues are made available for climate finance.                       Revenue estimates could be further reduced if the carbon levy is applied to less than 100% of emissions in the sector and if there are strong emission reductions in the sector due to technical and operational measures to reduce sector emissions.</p>		

## Tax-rate/price assumptions


Driver	Value	Information source
Price for carbon (assumed or equivalent)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Scenario price (\$15-50)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ AGF scenario paper</li> </ul>
Reimbursement of developing countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Indicative 30%</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Assumption by authors that developing countries are compensated based on their share of global imports</li> </ul>
Share of revenues earmarked for climate finance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 25-50%</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Assumption by authors</li> </ul>



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# Detailed calculation tree - Carbon Levy for maritime, low scenario



# Overview on major estimates - ETS for aviation

Creation of a global sectoral cap on emissions for international air travel and auctioning of resulting permits to raise revenue.

## High level description of methodology

- Estimate of total emissions from international air travel and air transport based, using
  - Detailed routing information to estimate passenger-kilometers flown and tonne-kilometers transported
  - Assumptions on average fuel emissions by kilometer
- Emissions from domestic flights, flights between developing countries and intra-EU flights excluded (covered by EU ETS)
- Calculation revenues by multiplication of estimated emissions with carbon prices for three defined scenarios (assumes ETS is linked to global carbon markets and therefore global carbon prices, here approximated by offset prices)

## Resulting revenue estimates (\$bn)

- Scenario 1: 0.9 – 1.9 bn
- Scenario 2: 1.6 – 3.1 bn
- Scenario 3: 3.1 - 6.3 bn

## Tax base assumptions

Driver	Value	Information source
<b>Passenger air travel</b>		
▪ Passenger capacity by route 2009 <sup>2</sup>	▪ 3.3 tr (total)	▪ OAG
▪ Load factor	▪ 77%	▪ IATA
▪ Distance by route	▪ Actual route km	▪ OAG
▪ Emissions per passenger-kilometer	▪ 0.12-0.15 kg <sup>3</sup>	▪ Defra, EEA, Atmosfair
▪ Annual passenger growth rate	▪ 4.1%	▪ ACI, Boeing
▪ Annual efficiency increase	▪ 1.7%	▪ GHG emissions outlook
<b>Air freight transport</b>		
▪ Freight volume by route 2013 <sup>2</sup>	▪ 190 bn TKM (total)	▪ IATA industry forecast
▪ Distance by route	▪ Actual route km	▪ OAG
▪ Emissions per tonne-kilometer	▪ 0.6-1.3 kg <sup>3</sup>	▪ Defra
▪ Annual freight growth rate	▪ 5.4%	▪ ACI
▪ Annual efficiency increase	▪ 1.7%	▪ GHG emissions outlook

### Caveats:

Actual revenues would be reduced:

- i) Depending on the actual compensation percentage for developing countries
- ii) If less than 100% of permits were auctioned,
- iii) Depending on the design and the extent of market-based instrument that is applied to aviation emissions
- iv) If emissions are reduced in the sector due to technical and operational measures to reach mitigation goals

## Tax-rate/price assumptions

Driver	Value	Information source
▪ Price for carbon (assumed or equivalent)	▪ Scenario price (\$15-50 <sup>1</sup> )	▪ AGF scenario paper
▪ Percent of revenues earmarked for climate financing	▪ 25-50%	▪ Assumption by authors



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


1 Depending on scenario

2 excluding domestic and intra-EU flights

3 depends on flight distance

# Detailed calculation tree - ETS for aviation, low scenario



1 Emissions for domestic flights, intra-EU flights, and flights between developing countries

2 Linked to carbon scenario, value shown for low

# Overview on major estimates - Fuel Levy on Aviation

## Implementation of a global tax on jet fuel.

### High level description of methodology

- Estimate of total fuel consumed from international passenger air travel and air freight transport, using
  - Detailed routing information to estimate passenger-kilometers flown and tonne-kilometers transported
  - Assumptions on average fuel consumption by kilometer
- Emissions from domestic flights, flights between developing countries and intra-EU flights excluded (covered by EU ETS)
- Fuel tax per ton of jet fuel estimated to capture the carbon externality and therefore set equal to carbon prices for three defined scenarios
- Calculation of revenues by multiplication of estimated fuel consumption with fuel tax

### Resulting revenue estimates (\$bn)

- Scenario 1: 0.9 – 1.9 bn
- Scenario 2: 1.6 – 3.1 bn
- Scenario 3: 3.1 - 6.3 bn

### Tax base assumptions

Driver	Value	Information source
▪ Passenger air travel		
– Passenger capacity by route 2009 <sup>1</sup>	– 3.3 tr (total)	– OAG
– Load factor	– 77%	– IATA
– Distance by route	– Actual route km	– OAG
– Fuel consumption per passenger-kilometer	– 38-48 g <sup>2</sup>	– Defra, EEA, ATAG, Atmosfair
– Annual passenger growth rate		– ACI, Boeing
– Annual efficiency increase	– 4.1%	– GHG emissions outlook
▪ Air freight transport		
– Freight volume by route 2013 <sup>1</sup>	– 1.7%	– IATA industry forecast
– Distance by route	– 190 bn TKM (total)	– OAG
– Fuel consumption per tonne-kilometer	– Actual route km	– Defra, ATAG, EEA
– Annual freight growth rate	– 0.2-0.4 kg <sup>2</sup>	
– Annual efficiency increase		– ACI
▪ Carbon content of jet fuel	– 5.4%	– GHG emissions outlook
	– 1.7%	▪ ATAG , EEA
	▪ 3.2 tonnes CO2e/ton	

#### Caveats:

#### Actual revenues would be reduced:

- i) depending on the actual compensation percentage for developing countries
- ii) if the levy applied to less than 100% of emissions.
- iii) If emissions are reduced in the sector due to technical and operational measures to reach mitigation goals


### Tax-rate/price assumptions

Driver	Value	Information source
▪ Price for carbon	▪ Scenario price (\$15-50 <sup>3</sup> )	▪ AGF methodology paper
▪ Percent of revenues earmarked for climate financing	▪ 25-50%	▪ Assumption by authors



1 excluding domestic and intra-EU flights; not including charter flights which account for ~5% of passenger air transport  
 2 depends on flight distance  
 3 Depending on scenario

# Detailed calculation tree - Fuel Levy for Aviation, low scenario



# Overview on major estimates - Ticket Tax

Implementation of a tax on every international airline ticket.

## High level description of methodology

- A ticket tax can potentially raise any amount of revenue – only dependant on political will
- Approach taken here: ticket tax should cover carbon externality and is therefore equal to the revenue raised under a sector ETS or fuel levy (passenger travel only)
- The revenue was broken down to measure the results on individual tickets, based on the number of passengers traveled and the average fuel consumption per short, medium and long haul flight

## Resulting revenue estimates (\$bn)

- Scenario 1: 0.7 – 1.4
- Scenario 2: 1.2 – 2.4
- Scenario 3: 2.4 - 4.7

## Resulting ticket surcharges (\$)²

- Scenario 1: 1 – 7
- Scenario 2: 1 – 12
- Scenario 3: 2 - 24

## Tax base assumptions

Driver	Value	Information source
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Estimates from WS2 ETS/fuel levy calculations                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Revenue estimates – \$1.9 bn – \$9.5 bn</li> <li>– Relevant emissions<sup>1</sup> 2020 (passenger only)                                     <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▫ Short haul (&lt;500 km) ▫ 1 Mt</li> <li>▫ Medium haul (500 – 1.600 km) ▫ 13 Mt</li> <li>▫ Long haul (&gt; 1,600 km) ▫ 175 Mt</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ Total number of relevant passengers 2009<sup>1</sup> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Short haul – 18 m</li> <li>– Medium haul – 76 m</li> <li>– Long haul – 236 m</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ Annual passenger growth rate                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 4.1%</li> </ul> </li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– WS 2 calculations</li> <li>– WS 2 calculations</li> <li>▪ OAG</li> <li>▪ ACI, Boeing</li> </ul>

## Tax-rate/price assumptions

Driver	Value	Information source
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ - (see aviation ETS/fuel tax calculations)</li> </ul>	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ WS 2 calculations</li> </ul>

**Caveats:**


The calculations represent the maximum potential revenue from a ticket tax. These have NOT been discounted. The revenue estimates will be lower than presented:

- i) Depending on the actual compensation percentage for developing countries
- ii) If the ticket tax is applied to less than all eligible tickets,



1 Excluding inter-developing country, domestic and intra-EU flights  
 2 Depends on flight type (short-, medium-, long-haul)

# Detailed calculation tree - Ticket Tax, low scenario




<sup>1</sup> Linked to carbon scenario, value shown for low

<sup>2</sup> Only for passenger air travel between Annex-I countries and 50% of travel between Annex-I countries and other countries



# Overview of sources analysed by AGF

\$bn, 2020, per year



SOURCE: AGF report

# The funds raised by the AGF could make a significant contribution towards financing needs

\$bn, 2020, per year

