

## SUBMISSION BY LUXEMBOURG AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES


This submission is supported by Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia.

Luxembourg, 31 August 2015

**Subject: The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP): Workstream 2 – Enhancing pre-2020 mitigation ambition**

### I. Introduction and summary


1. Enhancing pre-2020 mitigation ambition is an essential and integral part of the Durban Platform and the *“workplan on enhancing mitigation ambition to identify and to explore options for a range of actions that can close the ambition gap with a view to ensuring the highest possible mitigation efforts by all Parties”* must remain a high priority for Parties in the coming years.
2. The EU wishes to thank the ADP co-chairs for the July 24 Informal Note with possible elements for a COP21 decision on workstream 2 (WS2) and stands ready to engage on this as the basis of our work. The EU supports the call made by many Parties during ADP 2.9 to accelerate the implementation of near term climate action and to move from exploration of options to enhancing their implementation. **With this submission, the EU would like to clarify how WS2 can most effectively promote action. In light of this, we will also provide some initial reflections on the elements provided in the draft decision on WS2 as presented in the InformalNote. For clarity, sections reflecting directly on the draft decision are in italics throughout the submission.** The EU is looking forward to engage further on the draft decision during ADP 2.10.
3. In summary, the EU with this submission would like to convey the following **main messages:**
  - a. **The EU attaches great importance to the implementation of pre-2020 mitigation commitments and pledges and does not view the technical examination of opportunities with high mitigation potential as an alternative to Parties' commitments or pledges or to following up on them, but rather as a supplement that can help Parties implement their commitments or pledges and that may inspire them to increase these over time.**



- b. The EU believes there is a need for a clear mandate for regular high-level dialogues with input from the technical examination process and involving non-state actors, that will provide a recurring political space for announcing concrete action and collaboration on policy options and taking stock of progress on initiatives previously launched building on the Lima Paris Action Agenda. While recognizing that there are elements in the draft decision text going in this direction, the EU finds that these need to be combined and strengthened.**
- c. The EU believes there is a need for a clear link between the technical examination of opportunities with high mitigation potential to actors and stakeholders that can facilitate implementation on the ground and that the elements for a draft decision can be strengthened further in this regard.**
- d. While the EU wishes to recall that the mandate for WS2 is to enhance mitigation ambition, the EU is open to further explore with other Parties the merits and added value of a technical examination for adaptation under existing arrangements on adaptation under the Convention, taking into consideration their ongoing work.**
- e. The EU recognizes suggestions by others for addressing issues of broader pre-2020 implementation under WS2 and wishes to reiterate that pre-2020 implementation is of high priority to the EU. But the EU wishes to avoid duplications and finds that most issues of pre-2020 implementation are already being taken forward under existing agenda items and work that is mandated to advance further in Paris and beyond.**

## **II. Pre-2020 mitigation commitments and pledges**


- 4. The EU would like to emphasize the importance it attaches to the implementation of pre-2020 mitigation commitments and pledges and would like to reiterate its call to those countries that have not yet pledged to do so and for increased ambition of existing pledges. *The EU welcomes the invitation in the draft decision on WS2 to Parties that have not already done so to ratify the Doha Amendment and make a pre-2020 mitigation pledge. We also welcome the invitation to those Parties with existing mitigation commitments/pledges to consider opportunities for enhancing their efforts as identified through the TEP, but believe that this invitation should also apply to Parties without existing mitigation pledges. The EU furthermore would like the decision to encourage all Parties to demonstrate progress in implementing in full their commitments or pledges under the Cancun Agreement and to participate fully and in a timely manner in agreed MRV processes.*




5. The EU in this context wishes to stress that it does *not* view the technical examination of opportunities with high mitigation potential as an alternative to formal commitments or pledges from Parties or to following up on the implementation of pledges. Rather, the TEP under WS2 along with high-level engagement and a clearer link to the implementation level is a supplement that can help countries identify concrete actions and partners that will support the implementation of commitments or pledges. These concrete actions may also enable countries to overachieve on the pledges, and over time this is likely to create familiarity with low-carbon solutions and confidence with the low-carbon transition, which may inspire countries to increase their pre-2020 commitments or pledges over time, as well as to formulate more ambitious commitments under the Paris Agreement.

### **III. A multilateral focus on concrete actionable solutions with high mitigation potential**

6. The EU's vision is that the effectiveness of the TEP in catalyzing action and incubating solutions can be increased by establishing a clearer link to enhanced political high-level engagement and to stakeholders facilitating implementation on the ground, both state and non-state. The purpose of the process will be to:
  - identify concrete actionable solutions and options to support those solutions;
  - help mobilize all relevant actors within a specific "solutions area" to move in the same direction, including through collaborative action, and
  - create a continuous political push for implementing these concrete actionable solutions.
7. The focus on concrete policies or technologies in a multilateral setting carries a number of important advantages, including:
  - a. Providing the basis for much more direct and targeted involvement of relevant stakeholders in the global dialogue on each of the specific mitigation solutions.
  - b. Allowing the identification of specific (co)benefits and economic opportunities associated with each mitigation solution, which will also help to identify and mobilize stakeholders, including women.
  - c. Allowing the identification of specific sources of finance and other forms of support for implementation and the highlighting of successful projects and programs that could be scalable and replicable.
  - d. Contribute to strengthening international cooperation around concrete solutions.




8. Many fora outside the UNFCCC already bring together various actors on issues of climate and energy. WS2 should involve and build on the work of these. But the EU sees a clear value added in also addressing concrete solutions within the UNFCCC. This is because the convening power of the UNFCCC on climate issues is unmatched by any other organization. The gathering of the 196 Parties to the Convention makes the UNFCCC:
  - a. an unprecedented forum for continuous political attention of a global reach; gathering all ministers responsible for climate at the COP regularly.
  - b. an attractive forum for the private sector to engage with.
  - c. a potentially important player in contributing to coordination and coherence in the global 'implementation landscape', making use of Convention bodies.
9. The Technical Expert Meetings (TEMs) held under WS2 have already helped incubate new initiatives for accelerated mitigation action. One example is the initiative on renewable energy in Africa from the African Group, which is now growing outside of the Convention. The purpose was reflected in the recent Leaders' Declaration from the G7 Summit on 7–8 June 2015 declaring to "accelerate the access to renewable energy in Africa and developing countries in other regions with a view to reducing energy poverty and mobilizing substantial financial resources from private investors, development finance institutions and multilateral development banks by 2020 building on existing work and initiatives, including by the Global Innovation Lab for Climate Finance". Another example growing out of the discussions under TEMs is the Global Alliance for Buildings and Construction on which UNEP is working with the close involvement of France.
10. The EU is convinced there are prospects for scaling-up the international collaboration in many areas of high mitigation: There are opportunities for all Parties to engage in sharing experiences and developing new measures in relation to the UN-Sustainable Energy for All initiative, the UNEP-Risoe Energy efficiency Hub, the Climate and Clean Air Coalition, and the Covenant of Mayors Initiative, to mention a few. In the Climate and Clean Air Coalition initiative on alternative technologies and standards for HFCs, government, industries, and stakeholders are enabling the market transformation through cooperative activities that promote the development and deployment of climate-friendly, energy efficient alternatives and technologies. Collaboration on REDD+ activities is happening through e.g. the World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, as well as several private sector initiatives for combatting deforestation as reflected in the 2014 New York declaration on forests and climate change.




11. The EU views the TEP along with high-level engagement and the link to the implementation level as a *facilitative* process. WS2 should not be developing and deciding on specific projects, programs or measures or prescribe what Parties or other actors should do. We do not think it is feasible or desirable that decision on specific projects, programs or measures should be subjected to political negotiation at a multilateral level. This would be a very ineffective way of deciding on programs or projects and we would also expect that such decision making would significantly reduce the interest from non-state actors in participating in programs or projects. It is for exactly these reasons that we have created the Green Climate Fund as a separate body with an independent board deciding on projects. Because of the facilitative nature of WS2, it will remain difficult to measure the concrete mitigation outcomes of WS2. But it will be possible to assess progress in those various international initiatives that WS2 is helping catalyze and take stock of.
12. WS2 should catalyze action by ensuring learning, collaboration and political attention and by consistently involving relevant stakeholders in both Technical Expert Meetings (TEMs) and high-level dialogues. For this to happen, the EU believes that we need: A) a clear link from the technical examination of opportunities to the political level and; B) a clearer link from the technical examination of opportunities to actors facilitating implementation on the ground, including UNFCCC bodies. *While the draft decision on WS2 has elements going in this direction, the EU believes there is a need to strengthen these elements in order to ensure these clear links.*

***A) Link from technical examination to the political level***

13. The TEP has started the work of identifying options, benefits, barriers to implementation, support options and of engaging stakeholders. In Lima we decided to continue this process until 2020 and make recommendations to COP21 in relation to further advancing the process. At the same time, the Lima Call for Climate Action encouraged COP presidencies to organize annual high-level events on climate action. The Peruvian and French Presidencies are leading the way with the 'Lima Paris Action Agenda' (LPAA) and together with the UNSG's office and the UNFCCC Secretariat have made an essential contribution to creating international political attention around concrete solutions. *The EU welcomes the acknowledgement and appreciation in the draft decision on WS2 of the results of the LPAA.*




14. Going ahead, we need to connect the TEP and the political attention around concrete initiatives, and to ensure **continuity** so that these initiatives are followed up. We should maintain the focus on concrete high mitigation solutions and initiatives over time by providing certainty on the arrangements for continued political attention. Building on the events mandated 1/CP.20, paragraph 21, the EU therefore suggests: ***A clearer mandate for regular high-level dialogues with input from the TEP and involving non-state actors, that will provide a recurring political space for announcing concrete action and collaboration on policy options and taking stock of progress on initiatives previously launched building on the LPAA. The EU recognizes there are elements in the draft text going in this direction, but believes these need to be combined and strengthened, including by adding the purpose of taking stock of progress and that it should build on the LPAA.***
15. The EU does not see the regular high-level events suggested as separate from the events mandated in 1/CP.20, paragraph 21. Rather this is a way of enhancing these events, ensuring they take place regularly and are not solely dependent on shifting COP presidencies, and that there is a link with the TEP. This would not mean that the agenda of the high-level dialogues would be limited to input from the TEP. In addition to the output of the TEP, the high-level dialogues can focus on a broader set of action areas, and the COP presidencies could give special attention to ‘timely issues’ of their choice.
16. Further, with the purpose of securing the clear link between the TEP and the high-level events, the EU suggests that the ‘summaries for policymakers’ mandated in 1/CP.20 paragraph 19.c should a) help frame the high-level events; b) become available at least three months in advance of the high-level events allowing governments and non-state actors to prepare; c) clearly present scalable and replicable mitigation options and initiatives that actors can consider adopting or joining. *The EU believes that the draft decision on WS2 should also be strengthened to reflect these purposes.*
17. The EU is open to further explore the benefits of identifying a dedicated leadership role of the process (TEP and high-level dialogues) in terms of convening power and coherence of message and action and with the aim to ensure continuity in the process. Therefore the EU would like to explore various options for what could be the forms and responsibility of such leadership, including e.g. identifying TEMs topics, involving/appointing lead organizations on specific topics, reaching out to non-state actors and preparing the summary for policymakers, bearing in mind the budgetary implications.



18. To ensure consistency across the elements of the architecture, the EU supports the establishment of a dedicated agenda item under the COP to encompass both the TEP and the high-level dialogues.
19. With the purpose of acknowledging and tracking collaborative action, including under the LPAA, the NAZCA web tool, as far as funding allows, could be further developed, drawing on outside resources like the 'Climate Initiatives Database', and could be used as inputs to inform preparation of the TEMs, the summary for policymakers and the high-level events.

***B) Linking the technical examination with actors facilitating implementation on the ground***

20. While we do not believe that the TEP or high-level dialogue should take actual decisions on programs, projects or measures as referred above, we believe there are a number of important ways the technical examination process should link with the implementation level in order to facilitate action:
21. Firstly, we see an important role for the Technology Mechanism of the Convention. The Technology Executive Committee (TEC) should continue to engage with stakeholders to analyze the policy options in the area of technology, including the high potential areas identified in the TEP. The Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) should continue to bring together expertise for the development of economically, environmentally and socially viable projects, including in the high potential areas identified in the TEP. *The EU seeks a COP21 decision that requests the TEC and the CTCN to enhance their efforts to facilitate and support Parties in scaling up mitigation action through the implementation of the policy options identified in the TEP and to include their recommendations (TEC) and lessons learned (CTCN) in their future joint annual report to the COP. The decision could also encourage countries to make effective use of the CTCN to support the development of economically, environmentally and socially viable project proposals in the high potential areas as identified in the TEP.*
22. Secondly, while we would not want to see the board of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) taking explicit direction from the TEP for the reasons mentioned above, we do believe that the TEP can inspire the formulation of high-quality funding proposals for the GCF. This can contribute to a more ambitious and effective fund. It would still be up to the GCF board to select which proposals will be funded in line with the GCF's program priorities, policies and eligibility criteria.




23. Thirdly, we should provide for both involvement and feedback into the TEP from all relevant stakeholders. For each policy or technology area, there are a vast number of actors working with implementation of mitigation measures at different levels. The EU believes an important purpose of the TEP should be to bring into the same room a variety of key stakeholders and organizations involved in a particular solutions area, including the Financial and Technology Mechanisms of the Convention. This can facilitate contacts and communities of learning, help identify options/programs of support, potential project partners and international cooperative initiatives to join. *The EU strongly supports the encouragement in the co-chairs draft decision text to Parties, Convention bodies, international institutions, and non-state actors to cooperate in facilitating the implementation of policy options and actions identified through the TEP. Moreover, the EU finds that it would be useful if the COP21 decision:*

- a. Requests that TEMs are organized in cooperation with relevant Convention bodies and international institutions, who could possibly also be involved in updating the technical paper.*
- b. Request that each TEM focuses only on one or a few specific policy options representing best or good practice and with the potential to be scalable and replicable. Narrowing down could be an important way of ensuring relevant participation in TEMs.*
- c. Invites relevant outside actors, including international organisations, to engage effectively in TEMs and to submit their experience and recommendations, including from regional events, into the TEP.*

24. The EU recognizes the call by some Parties for holding TEMs at the regional level. While the EU is strongly supportive of regional activities to facilitate implementation on the ground, it recognizes that many regional meetings, activities and technical trainings in various areas of high mitigation potential are already taking place, including under other UN organizations (UNEP, UNDP, UNIDO, FAO, IRENA etc.) and MDBs. Many of the organizers are accredited entities to the UNFCCC or part of the UN umbrella and it will be important to look into possibilities for more effective synergies, cooperation and exchange of information between these many regional activities. It is important not to create another layer of regional events. The lessons and recommendations from the existing regional activities should feed into the TEP. We see the added value of WS2 is to also have such conversations at a global level, including on regional action and initiatives, in order to profit from the international political leverage to accelerate action.





### ***Continuation after 2020***

25. The focus on high mitigation options will continue being relevant in the post-2020 phase and the EU supports a process beyond 2020 that focuses on concrete and actionable solutions that can help raise the mitigation ambition of all Parties, based on the experience of the pre-2020 process if successful. In that context there should be a review of the effectiveness of the pre-2020 process which could serve as a basis to inform a process beyond 2020.

### **IV. Technical examination of adaptation**

26. The EU would like to recall decision 1/CP.17 and its mandate for WS2 *“to launch a workplan on enhancing mitigation ambition.”* However, the EU is open to further explore with other Parties the merits and added value of a technical examination for adaptation under existing arrangements on adaptation under the Convention, inter alia the Adaptation Committee, the Least developed countries Expert Group and the Nairobi Work programme, and taking into consideration their ongoing work, including the mandated reviews of such relevant adaptation institutions, processes and their work programmes.

### **V. Other matters related to implementation of pre-2020 ambition**

27. The EU agrees with the need to accelerate implementation and recognizes suggestions by others for addressing issues of broader pre-2020 implementation under WS2. We want to reiterate that broader pre-2020 work on implementation is of high priority to the EU. However, our work must be guided by avoiding duplications and ensuring value added and we find that most of these issues are already being taken forward under existing agenda items and work that is mandated to advance further in Paris and beyond.