7 June 1999
ENGLISH ONLY
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
SUBSIDIARY BODY FOR SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVICE
Tenth session
Bonn, 31 May - 11 June
1999
Agenda item 10
SUBSIDIARY BODY FOR
IMPLEMENTATION
Tenth session
Bonn, 31 May - 11 June
1999
Agenda item 6
Procedures and
mechanisms relating to compliance under
the Kyoto
Protocol
Submissions from
Parties
Note by the
secretariat
Addendum
1. In addition to the submissions
already received (see FCCC/SB/1999/MISC.4 and Add.1 and 2), a further
submission(1)
has been received from South Africa
on behalf of the Group of 77 and China.
2. In accordance with the procedure
for miscellaneous documents, this submission is attached and is
reproduced in the language in which it was received and without
formal editing.
INITIAL VIEWS OF THE G77
AND CHINA ON PROCEDURES AND
MECHANISMS RELATING TO
COMPLIANCE UNDER
THE KYOTO
PROTOCOL
The Group of G77 and China has
identified the following elements relevant to procedures and
mechanism relating to compliance under the Kyoto Protocol. These
represent the initial views of the Group on this matter and will be
developed further as discussions evolve. The list of questions
attached hereto, in addition to those compiled by the Secretariat,
will be a useful tool in the preparation of further submissions. It
is envisaged that such submissions made by members of the Group of
G77 and China on the basis hereof would aid the Group to further
develop it's position on procedures and mechanisms relating to
compliance.
ELEMENTS
Elements that need to be taken into
account in the development of a compliance regime are, inter
alia -
- The objective of the compliance
regime should be in line with the objective of the Convention and
should as a first priority aim at ensuring that the emission
reduction commitments are met by Annex B Parties.
- A comprehensive, strong,
efficient and effective compliance system is of vital importance
for the successful implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and is
therefore imperative for the credibility and integrity of the
processes to be developed under the Protocol.
- In line with the provisions of
the Convention and the Protocol the principle of common but
differentiated responsibility is regarded as a corner stone in the
design and implementation of the compliance regime.
- In the design of the compliance
regime due cognizance should be given to the principle of the need
for adequate and effective national compliance regimes and
enforcement measures in Annex B Parties and how these can support
and strengthen the international regime.
- The adoption of legally binding
and quantified commitments and the introduction of the Kyoto
Protocol mechanisms make the development of non-compliance
procedures imperative.
- The Protocol must be assessed in
its totality with a view to identify the essential elements and
tools for anticipating, preventing, identifying and responding to
non-compliance.
- Compliance rules, procedures and
institutions should be such that it would enable the climate
change regime to anticipate, prevent, identify and respond to
situations of non-compliance.
- The procedures and mechanisms
should be effective, fair and equitable and operate in a
transparent, timely and efficient manner.
- Aspects to be considered in the
development of the compliance regime are the need for,
inter alia -
- the elaboration of relevant
principles, modalities and guidelines for the verification,
reporting and accountability under the Protocol's
mechanisms;
- the potential application to
the Protocol of any MCP adopted under the
Convention;
- a critical evaluation of the
Convention and the Protocol's financial mechanism as a means of
assessing both the obligations of Annex I Parties, and the
adequacy of the mechanism in assisting non-Annex I Parties to
comply with the Protocol.
- Only Parties that are in
compliance with their obligations and are bound by a compliance
regime should be allowed to participate in the Kyoto Protocol
mechanisms.
- Binding consequences for
non-compliance are essential. This will enhance the Parties
collective ability to deter non-compliance.
- Consequences resulting from
non-compliance should be proportional and responsive to the case
at hand.
- In dealing with cases of
non-compliance, facilitative as well as enforcement measures
should be employed.
- It may be desirable to identify
cases and/or activities that may constitute
non-compliance.
- An indicative list of
non-compliance consequences, depending on the cause, type, degree
and frequency of non-compliance should be devised. These could
include inter alia -
- Appropriate assistance,
including technical and financial expertise and capacity
building;
- Issuing cautions;
- Suspension of rights,
including ability to participate in Article 6, 12 and
17;
- Penalties, including financial
penalties for Annex B Parties.
- Financial penalties resulting
from a non-compliance procedure should be made available to meet
the cost of adaptation.
- If necessary, an appropriate
institution or body may be required to consider each case of
non-compliance. Relevant procedures and the review process will
need to be determined. The application of the principle of due
process should be fully taken into account. The constitution of
such an institution or body shall be based on the principle of
equitable geographical representation.
- The benefits of establishing
procedures for imposing automatic consequences in certain
circumstances to cases of non-compliance should be
explored.
- The compliance regime will be
essential to strengthen the domestic and regional arrangements of
Annex B Parties.
LIST OF QUESTIONS
RELATED TO A COMPLIANCE SYSTEM
Note: These questions are submitted
to be used in addition to the list of questions in Annex III of
the Non-Paper by the Secretariat.
- What should be the principles
that guide the development of the procedures and mechanisms to
implement Article 18 of the Kyoto Protocol?
- What procedures and mechanisms
under Article 18 entail binding consequences? What are the
implications of "binding consequences" vis-à-vis
other consequences of non-compliance, and the amendment of the
Protocol?
- Should procedures and mechanisms
"entailing binding consequences" be adopted concerning
non-compliance with respect to:
a) "Guidelines" for the national systems for estimating emissions
of greenhouse gases and removals by sinks, which may be
established pursuant to Article 5.1; or "guidelines" for the
implementation of Article 6, as provided for in Article 6.2; or
"guidelines" for the reporting of certain information in national
communications, as provided for in Article 7.4?
b) "Modalities, rules and
guidelines" adopted pursuant to Article 3.4, concerning how, and
which, additional categories of sinks may be added to those
contained in Article 3.3?
c) "Modalities and
procedures" concerning the Clean Development Mechanisms, which may
be adopted pursuant to Article 12.7?
d) "Principles, modalities,
rules and guidelines" concerning emissions trading, which may be
adopted pursuant to Article 17?
- The expert review teams
contemplated by Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol review
"information submitted under Article 7 by each Party included in
Annex I." In this regard -
a) Should we integrate the requirements of Articles 8.3 and 8.5
with the procedures that may be developed to implement Articles
18, 16, and 19? If so, how?
b) Although the expert
review teams may provide information relevant to whether an Annex
I Party is at risk of non-compliance or may not be in compliance,
do the teams have authority to make any determination (initial,
provisional, or otherwise) that such Party is in
non-compliance?
c) If the report of the
review team (issued after the end of a commitment period of an
Annex I Party) does not indicate non-compliance by the Annex I
Party with its emissions limitation/reduction commitment under
Article 3 of the Protocol, does that preclude any Party from being
able to raise an issue of non-compliance?
d) Should a review team
possess authority to initiate, by its own determination, a
procedure adopted pursuant to Article 18 that could result in
binding consequences to a Party?
e) Should a review team
possess authority to initiate, by its own determination, a
procedure that may be developed to implement Article
16?
5. Should the idea of "automatic"
penalties be used? If so, in what cases?
6. Should financial penalties be
used? If so, in what cases? Elaborate, including a description of how
and for what purposes the proceeds of financial penalties should be
used.
- - - - -
1. In order to
make this submission available on electronic systems, including the
World Wide Web, this contribution has been reformatted. The
secretariat has made every effort to ensure the correct reproduction
of the text as submitted.
FCCC/SB/1999/MISC.4/Add.3
BNJ.99-95