10 June 1998
ENGLISH ONLY
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
SUBSIDIARY BODY FOR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVICE
Eighth session
Bonn, 2-12 June 1998
Agenda items 6 (b) and (c) and 8 (b) to (d)
SUBSIDIARY BODY FOR IMPLEMENTATION
Eighth session
Bonn, 2-12 June 1998
Agenda item 8 (b) to (d)
1. In addition to the submissions already received and contained in documents
FCCC/SB/1998/MISC.1 and Add. 1, 2 and 3, one further submission has been received.
2. In accordance with the procedure for miscellaneous documents, this submission is
attached and reproduced in the language in which it was received and without formal editing.
FCCC/SB/1998/MISC.1/Add.4
BNJ.98-
Paper No. Page
1. Iceland 3
(Submission received 4 June 1998)
1. The impact of single projects on emissions is item 6 (c) on the agenda of SBSTA. This issue originates from paragraph 5 (d) in Decision 1/CP.3, which acknowledged the problems associated with the impact of single projects on emissions in small economies. This decision calls for the Fourth Conference of the Parties to consider and, as appropriate, take action on suitable methodologies to address the situation of Parties listed in Annex B of the Protocol, for whom single projects would have a significant proportional impact on emissions in the commitment period.
2. Iceland has presented a discussion paper on the issue (FCCC/SB/1998/MISC.1/Add.2). Under agenda item 6 (c) Iceland made a statement.
3. Five Parties took part in the initial deliberation of SBSTA on this agenda item following the statement by Iceland: Belize (on behalf of AOSIS), Australia, USA, United Kingdom (on behalf of the EU and its Member States) and Switzerland. The chair of SBSTA asked Iceland to provide answers to the questions raised by Parties.
4. Belize stated that AOSIS was concerned that single project exceptions could create loopholes unless narrowly defined and that they would need time to evaluate the proposal made by Iceland. This concern of AOSIS is fully shared by Iceland and has guided its efforts to narrow the suggested provision as much as possible without making it unduly complicated. Effective narrowing criteria are included in the proposal by Iceland. This can be supplemented by adding an explicit definition of small economies and limit the provision to Parties for which total emissions were less that 0.05% of total Annex I emissions in 1990.
5. Australia pointed out that opportunities on a project-by-project basis to reduce global emissions need to be taken seriously. They pointed out that investment in greenhouse-friendly projects could be discouraged or precluded by an emissions cap on a country, resulting in continued production in high emissions plants located elsewhere. Australia called for debate on the proposal from Iceland to allow for a decision to be taken at COP-4. The problem identified by Australia is very real and can be substantiated by examples from Iceland.
6. The US called for additional information on the particular situation of Iceland to facilitate understanding of their concern and asked for the text of Iceland's statement to be made available. Key statistics on the emissions of Iceland and the impacts of foreseeable projects are to be found in Appendix 1 to this document.
7. The US suggested that a possible provision to address the problem would only apply to the extent that the projects would cause the Party to exceed its assigned amount. Iceland considers this a useful additional feature in the design of the provision and an effective way of preventing a Party, making use of this provision, from transferring any of its assigned amount to other Parties.
8. The EU recalled the existence of flexibility mechanisms and AOSIS asked why Iceland could not solve its problem through flexibility mechanisms such as the CDM. Iceland responded by stating that it was committed to developing and using flexibility mechanisms but that the scale of the problem was such that it seriously limits the possibility of solving the problem through the flexibility mechanisms. As pointed out by the EU and the US, COP-3 decided that COP-4 should look at the problem of single projects after the assigned amount for Iceland had been set in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol and the provisions for flexibility mechanisms defined in the Protocol.
9. The EU pointed out that the meaning of "single projects" and "significant proportional impact" would need careful definition to avoid the creation of loopholes. Iceland agrees with this and has suggested ways to make these terms operational (see discussion paper). EU stated they would study this and other proposals.
10. Switzerland stated that it would not accept a separate process of assessment for unforeseeable events. Iceland fully agrees with Switzerland in this regard but maintains that the problems of the impact of single projects on emissions are entirely foreseeable. In the particular case of Iceland, this problem has been identified from the beginning and addressed in national communications and the in-depth review of the first national communication. The treatment of single projects needs to be transparent and information on projects to be reported separately should be made a priori.
I. Basic Statistics on Emissions from Iceland
Total greenhouse gas emissions in 1990:
(in million tonnes of CO2 equivalents)
- CO2 2.147
- CH4 0.294
- N2O 0.127
- HFC 0
- PFC 0.296
- SF6 0.005
Total emissions 2.869 million tonnes
CO2 source categories (1990):
(in million tonnes of CO2)
- Transport 0.721 (33.6%)
- Fishing vessels 0.655 (30.5%)
- Industry 0.243 (11.3%)
- Industrial processes 0.390 (18.2%)
- Other 0.137 ( 6.4%)
Total CO2 emissions 2.147 million tonnes
II. Population
1990 254,788
1995 267,3802010 (projected) 297,593
Projected increase from 1990 to 2010: 16.8%
III. Projects in power intensive industries in Iceland after 1990
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Enlargement of an aluminium smelter |
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Enlargement of a ferrosilicium plant |
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An almumium smelter |
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An aluminium smelter |
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A magnesium plant |
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