Distr.
GENERAL
FCCC/SB/1998/2
15 May 1998
Original: ENGLISH
SUBSIDIARY BODY FOR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVICE
Eighth session
Bonn, 2-12 June 1998
Item 8 of the provisional agenda
SUBSIDIARY BODY FOR IMPLEMENTATION
Eighth session
Bonn, 2-12 June 1998
Item 8 of the provisional agenda
MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATIVE IMPLEMENTATION
Note by the secretariat
CONTENTS
Paragraphs Page
I. INTRODUCTION 1 - 8 3
A. Mandates 1 - 5 3
B. Scope of the note 6 - 7 4
C. Possible action by the SBI and the SBSTA 8 4
II. ISSUES CONCERNING MANDATES 9 - 11 5
III. ISSUES CONCERNING INDIVIDUAL MECHANISMS 12 - 47 6
A. Project-based mechanisms 17 - 37 6
1. General issues 17 - 19 6
GE.98-
Paragraphs Page
2. Joint implementation 20 - 21 8
3. Clean development mechanism 22 - 36 8
4. The AIJ pilot phase 37 12
B. Inventory-related mechanism: international emissions trading 38
- 47 12
IV. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES 48 - 49 14
V. PROPOSED ACTIVITIES 50 - 56 14
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Mandates
- The Kyoto Protocol(1) provides
for the establishment of three new mechanisms of cooperative
implementation which may be used by Annex I Parties to supplement
domestic actions to fulfil their emission limitation and reduction
commitments under Article 3.(2)
Article 6 on joint implementation
(JI)(3) provides for transactions
among Annex I Parties whilst Article 17 on international emissions
trading (IET)(4) provides for such
cooperation among those Parties, whose quantitative commitments
are inscribed in Annex B to the Protocol. Article 12 on a clean
development mechanism (CDM) extends the scope of cooperation to
non-Annex I Parties, thereby contributing to their sustainable
development and to the ultimate objective of the Convention.
Through the CDM, particularly vulnerable developing country
Parties should also be assisted in meeting the costs of adaptation
to the adverse effects of climate
change.(5) The term cooperative
implementation is used in this note as a collective heading for
the three new mechanisms established under the Kyoto Protocol as
well as for activities implemented jointly (AIJ) which, under a
pilot phase, have been undertaken since 1995 according to the
mandate contained in decision 5/CP.1 (FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1).
- The Protocol provisions regarding the three mechanisms vary in
the detail of their content and in procedures for taking decisions
on implementation. Article 6 on JI and Article 12 on the CDM
establish frameworks to be filled out by the Conference of the
Parties to the Convention serving as the meeting of the Parties to
the Protocol (COP/MOP) at its first session
(COP/MOP 1) or later. Article 17 is a general enabling clause
that provides for the Conference of the Parties to the
Convention (emphasis added) (COP) to define the arrangements for
IET, though it may be presumed that these will be confirmed by
COP/MOP.
- In adopting the Kyoto Protocol, the Conference of the Parties
at its third session (COP 3) set in motion a process of
preparatory work for a "prompt start" to the work of
COP/MOP 1 (decision 1/CP.3, paragraph 6). This process
encompasses the work required to give effect to the three new
cooperative mechanisms. It enables the COP, supported by the
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)
and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), to prepare
decisions on these mechanisms for adoption by COP/MOP 1 or, as in
the case of emissions trading, decide on the matter itself. The
allocation of work arising from this mandate is the subject of a
proposal by the Chairmen of the SBSTA and the SBI to the eighth
sessions of these subsidiary bodies (FCCC/SB/1998/1).
- By the same decision, COP 3 also identified a number of tasks
related to the three mechanisms to be undertaken by COP 4, on the
basis of preparatory work by the SBSTA and the SBI, as well as by
the secretariat with the guidance of the Chairmen (decision
1/CP.3,
paragraphs 5 (b), (c) and (e)).
- These two related actions by COP 3 constitute the mandates for
the eighth sessions of the SBSTA and the SBI to carry forward the
work of implementing the three mechanisms for cooperative
implementation envisaged by the Kyoto Protocol.
B. Scope of the note
- This note by the secretariat seeks to focus discussions on
some key issues regarding the design and functioning of the three
new mechanisms. They concern mandates and matters related to
individual mechanisms, as well as cross-cutting issues. The note
addresses each mechanism separately in view of their different
origins, approaches, participants and possible applications.
Reference is, however, made to similarities between the
mechanisms, in particular where coordination of work on
methodological and institutional issues and inter-institutional
collaboration are concerned. The note suggests, in its concluding
part, elements of a work programme up to and, to some extent,
beyond COP 4. It draws upon the views submitted by Parties
(FCCC/SB/1998/MISC.1), contains reflections by the secretariat and
builds on its consultations with other organizations having
activities, under way or planned, that could contribute to the
design or operation of the mechanisms.
- As a further input to the discussions, the secretariat will
make available to Parties information on activities of
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations in areas of
cooperative implementation (FCCC/SB/1998/MISC.2) and report orally
on inter-institutional consultations aimed at facilitating the
exchange of views on concepts and on work programmes. This
information, apart from providing Parties with an overview of
relevant activities, should provide the subsidiary bodies with a
basis for inviting external contributions to their work on the
three mechanisms.
C. Possible action by the SBI and the
SBSTA
- In addition to expressing their views on the issues and
questions raised below, the SBSTA and the SBI may give guidance on
the organization and sequencing of work on the three mechanisms as
well as in the area of AIJ, taking into consideration chapter V
below.
II. ISSUES CONCERNING MANDATES
- Three assumptions regarding the mandates referred in section
I.A. above require confirmation:
(a) While paragraphs 5 (b) and (c) of decision 1/CP.3 provide
broad mandates for the design of emissions trading and JI
(respectively "definition of relevant principles, modalities, rules
and guidelines" and "elaboration of guidelines"), the explicit
mandate in paragraph 5 (e) is limited to the implications of
paragraph 10 of the article on the CDM (the provision for use of
certified emission reductions obtained in the period 2000-2007 during
the first commitment period). Nevertheless, it is assumed that the
Parties will consider it prudent to undertake a comprehensive design
exercise for the CDM, so that its operating procedures would be clear
by the year 2000, i.e. by COP 5 in 1999;
(b) While the Kyoto Protocol does not make any reference to AIJ
under the pilot phase (decision 5/CP.1), it is assumed that the
technical work carried out under this mandate will be drawn upon, as
appropriate, in designing the two project-based mechanisms, JI and
CDM. This relates primarily to methodological issues such as
determination of baselines, monitoring and reporting functions, but
also to capacity-building in host and investor countries;
(c) Notwithstanding the differences in the provisions for taking
formal decisions on the three mechanisms, it is assumed that the
Parties to the Convention will seek to reach consensus on the design
and operation of each of the three and that any consensus achieved
before the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol will be confirmed
by the Parties to the Protocol at COP/MOP 1.
- These assumptions affect the work programme on the design of
the three mechanisms. The last also has to do with the confidence
of Governments, organizations and corporations in the utility of
their participation in early action to put the mechanisms into
effect.
- In addition to the core articles on cooperative
implementation, several other articles in the Protocol are of
relevance, if not explicitly linked, to the three new mechanisms.
Any existing or future mandates related to these articles
influence the scope and pace at which work on cooperative
implementation proceeds. Among them are Article 18
(non-compliance), Article 4 (joint fulfilment of
commitments), and Articles 5, 7 and 8 (in the context of JI as
defined in Article 6) as well as Articles 21, 24 and 25 (on entry
into force of the Protocol). Among the methodological issues to be
considered in the context of project-based activities is the
question of sinks (Article 3.3 as well as 3.4). Parties may wish
to consider the requirements for synchronization of work in the
context of the various mandates.
III. ISSUES CONCERNING INDIVIDUAL
MECHANISMS
- Joint implementation and IET provide Annex I Parties with the
possibility to effect transfers/acquisitions of emission reduction
units (ERUs), or any part of an assigned amount, among themselves
and subtract/add these to their assigned amount of greenhouse-gas
(GHG) emissions. Both mechanisms contain qualifications that such
acquisitions shall be supplemental to domestic actions.
- The CDM foresees that an Annex I Party investing in a
sustainable development project in a non-Annex I Party may add
resulting certified emission reductions (CERs) to its assigned
amount. It may thus use them to contribute to compliance with part
of its quantified emission limitation and reduction commitment
under Article 3. As an additional function, the CDM will also
assist particularly vulnerable developing country Parties in
meeting the costs of adaptation to the adverse effects of climate
change.
- While recognizing the genesis and specific purpose of the CDM,
it is useful to organize practical work on JI and the CDM in a
manner which reflects that they are both project-based mechanisms
with similarities related in particular to methodological issues
(such as project baselines) as well as to institutional and
capacity-building requirements. There are, however, differences
concerning their starting dates, the specified character and type
of project activities, certification procedures and their explicit
linkage to funding adaptation measures. The extent and
implications of these differences may need to be considered.
- IET is an inventory-related mechanism. Its methodological
requirements are largely distinct from those of the other two
mechanisms, and linked to those needed for the assessment of
compliance by Annex I Parties with their commitments (accounting,
monitoring and verification).
- This chapter addresses issues related to the design of each of
the three new mechanisms under the Protocol and points at areas of
relevance to more than one mechanism. Parties are invited to react
to the issues presented. The mechanisms will be taken up in the
sequence project-based mechanisms (JI, CDM) followed by the
inventory-related mechanism (IET).
A. Project-based mechanisms (JI and
CDM)
1. General issues
- The secretariat's approach to the two project-based mechanisms
is based on the following understandings, to which reactions are
sought:
(a) Projects under JI and the CDM are subject to approval by each
Party involved; in the case of the CDM, this would include approval
that projects assist non-Annex I Parties in achieving sustainable
development;
(b) JI and the CDM are intended to be financed mainly by new
private investment, attracted by the prospect of access to emission
reductions "offshore" ('emission reduction units' and 'certified
emission reductions', respectively) at lower cost than those
available domestically. Public finance may also be engaged through
these mechanisms, as appropriate;
(This presumes that domestic arrangements in Annex I Parties for
meeting Article 3 commitments would provide incentives to firms,
or sectors, to seek emission reductions at least cost. It also
presumes that private as well as public entities would be authorized
to participate in the mechanisms.)
(c) Public finance, including that of publicly-funded
international and regional institutions, will be needed to facilitate
the flow of private funds through the mechanisms; this role can be
exercised in different forms and through diverse channels;
(Facilitating functions could include project development,
financial mediation and risk management.)
(d) The credibility of the two mechanisms will depend on the
quality and consistency of the measurement of emission reductions
from projects.
(It is presumed that the Parties will wish to pay particular
attention to the methodologies and arrangements for such measurement.
It will be important to ensure the integrity of the
monitoring/reporting/auditing functions by separating them from those
of arranging and providing finance.)
- As regards the work programme on JI and the CDM, the
secretariat assumes that the Parties will see merit in integrating
technical work on common methodological, procedural and
institutional issues, as well as on capacity-building. As
indicated above, this work will draw upon the results of technical
work under way in the pilot phase of AIJ as appropriate (see also
chapter V below).
- There are provisions in Article 6 as well as in Article 12
which can be found in one article, but not in the other. Parties
may wish to express their views on these differences and their
implications, so as to clarify their interpretation. Among these
provisions are the following:
(a) Starting dates: JI does not contain a
provision similar to the one under the CDM concerning the utilization
during the first commitment period of CERs obtained from the year
2000 up to the beginning of the first commitment period;
(b) Sequestration projects: JI provisions refer
to projects aimed at reducing emissions by sources or enhancing
anthropogenic removals of GHGs by sinks. The CDM provisions refer to
projects that provide reductions in emissions. In addressing this
issue, consideration may be given to the fact that the reduction of
deforestation is a means of reducing emissions. (On the issue of land
use change and forestry, see FCCC/SBSTA/1998/INF.1);
(c) Adaptation: Article 12 provides for the CDM
to channel some funding to assist with the costs of adapting to the
adverse effects of climate change. No such provision occurs in
Article 6 on JI; (The same issue may be raised in the context of
international emissions trading.)
(d) Certification: Article 12 explicitly provides
for the certification of emission reductions from CDM projects.
Article 6 is silent on certification. Parties may wish to consider
modalities for certifying emission reductions from JI projects (such
as monitoring the adherence to guidelines on baselines).
2. Joint implementation
- Article 6 and Article 3.10 and 3.11 set out the mechanism for
which the short term 'joint implementation' (JI) is suggested.
Through this mechanism, projects which provide a reduction in
emissions by sources, or an enhancement of removals by sinks, can
be carried out among Annex I Parties and result in emission
reduction units which can be used in meeting the commitments under
Article 3 in a manner which is supplemental to domestic actions.
- Decision 1/CP.3 calls for preparatory work on the elaboration
of guidelines as provided for under Article 6 of the Protocol.
Article 6 does indeed already spell out several provisions and
contains the provision, in paragraph 2, that COP/MOP at its first
session or as soon as practicable thereafter, may further
elaborate guidelines, including for verification and reporting.
The six elements in Article 6 guiding the design of the JI
mechanism are as follows: (i) approval of project by Parties
involved; (ii) additionality; (iii) compliance for acquiring Party
with obligations under Articles 5 and 7 as a prerequisite for ERU
acquisition; (iv) supplementarity of acquisition of ERUs to
domestic actions; (v) participation of legal entities in
generation, transfer and acquisition of ERUs subject to
authorization by responsible Annex I Party; and (vi) crediting
limitation during resolution of Article 8 issues.
3. Clean development mechanism
- A CDM is defined in Article 12 of the Protocol and referred to
in Article 3.12. It provides for an Annex I Party investing in a
sustainable development project in a non-Annex I country to add
CERs to its assigned amount of GHG emissions.
- Whereas paragraphs 1-9 of Article 12 contain provisions to be
further determined by COP/MOP (at its first session or
unspecified), Article 12.10 is referred to in paragraph 5 (e) of
decision 1/CP.3. It calls for preparatory work by the secretariat
so that COP 4 can consider the analysis of the implications of
Article 12, paragraph 10, of the Protocol whereby CERs obtained
during the period 2000-2007 can be used to achieve compliance in
the first commitment period. As the request does not delineate the
extent of work required for the analysis of the implications of
paragraph 10, it is prudent to consider design options for the CDM
in a comprehensive manner at an early stage.
- Design objectives: Principal functions which need to be
accommodated in designing the CDM include its governance,
operational functions/certification processes, potential marketing
of CERs, arranging for funding of mitigation projects and
providing finance for adaptation projects. Differentiation between
the CDM's function of facilitating mitigation projects and that of
assisting in funding adaptation as specified in paragraph 8 needs
to be borne in mind.
- Governance: The organs which are to fulfil the governance
functions of the CDM and which are named in the Protocol are, in
hierarchical order, the COP/MOP, the Executive Board (EB), and the
operational entities. Actors in the CDM process can be host and
investor governments (which have to approve projects in which they
are involved) as well as private and/or public entities whose
involvement is subject to guidance by the EB as stated in
paragraph 9.
- The following functions to be fulfilled by COP/MOP, the
supreme organ governing the CDM, are spelled out in Article 12:
(a) Exercising overall authority and providing overall guidance to
the CDM;
(b) Playing a role in setting the scope of CDM activities through
the provision that Annex I Parties may use the CERs accruing from
such project activities to contribute to compliance with part of
their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under
Article 3, as determined by COP/MOP;
(c) Designating the operational entities that certify emission
reductions;
(d) Ensuring that a share of the proceeds from certified project
activities is used
- To cover administrative expenses, as well as
- To assist particularly vulnerable countries in meeting costs
of adaptation;
(e) Elaborating - at its first session (COP/MOP 1) - modalities
and procedures to ensure transparency, efficiency and accountability
through independent auditing and verification of project activities.
- In particular the last-mentioned function which is
specifically assigned to COP/MOP 1, i.e. the elaboration of
modalities and procedures, will inform the design process through
the criteria and objectives stated therein.
- The CDM is supervised by the Executive Board (EB). It provides
guidance on the involvement of private and/or public entities.
Design aspects to be considered include the characteristics of the
EB, for example its institutional locus and methods of work, the
relationship between COP/MOP and the EB and any administrative
support that may be required.
- Operational functions/certification: The operational functions
and those related to certification span the entire project cycle
of mitigation projects under the CDM. The respective functions for
the organs and actors of the CDM - the EB, operational entities
and private and/or public entities - need to be determined and
modalities/options spelled out. In doing so, it is important to
clearly distinguish and separate finance and auditing functions.
- Functions to be fulfilled by the EB in this context require
further definition, in particular in response to the following
questions:
(a) To what extent is the EB involved in the project cycle? How
would CDM criteria such as sustainability and additionality be
addressed in an operationally feasible manner? What are the
implications of paragraph 6, which mentions 'certified project
activities' (who certifies?), i.e. how active will be the role of the
EB in project identification (who identifies through which means,
such as a project 'bazaar' on a Web site?), in the determination of
project eligibility and, finally, a priori project certification?
(b) What is the process and what are the criteria (rules) for
identifying and monitoring operational entities - to be designated by
the COP/MOP - which are to certify emission reductions from each
project (in the light of 'modalities and procedures' established by
COP/MOP1)?
(c) What are the elements of the 'guidance on the involvement of
private and/or public entities' (link to operational functions)?
- Issues to be addressed concerning operational entities include
the definition of appropriate eligibility criteria for their
participation, the extent and procedures of their certifying
operations and, importantly, the provisions built into the system
for assuring the adherence to standards.
- In defining the role of private and/or public entities (host
and investor Party(ies)), the following issues need to be
addressed:
(a) What are the procedural and functional requirements for the
entities to participate in project activities resulting in certified
emission reductions and acquisition of such reductions?
(b) How is ownership - public or private - of CERs defined? Could
host countries or their legal entities be owners and for which
purpose?
(c) What is the relationship between private entities and the
State in the host country of the project and in the investor country
(impact on pursuit of policies and programmes in the light of
national priorities; accountability)?
(d) Are any capacity-building activities required to facilitate
participation in the CDM by public and private entities? If so, which
institutions could carry out such activities?
- According to Article 12.6, the CDM is to assist in arranging
funding for certified project activities resulting in emission
reductions (mitigation projects). The following design questions
need to be addressed with respect to this function:
(a) What are the implications of Article 12.6, e.g. in relation to
the importance of institutional separation of certification and
arranging of funding?
(b) How is assistance for mitigation projects to be effected
(grants, technical assistance, project development) and who would
carry out this function?
(c) What could be the respective roles of private and public
finance?
- An additional function of the CDM could be the marketing of
CERs generated by such certified project activities.
- A further issue relates to the possible ownership of CERs by
host countries of CDM projects. What would be the modalities for a
host country to own CERs and what options would there be for their
use (including the determination of the price per unit)?
- Another aspect of the CDM concerns the share of the proceeds
from certified project activities which are to be used for
covering administrative costs and for funding adaptation measures
(Article 12.8). Questions in this context include:
(a) What is the relationship between the provisions in Article
12.8 on assistance to 'meet the costs of adaptation' and Article 4.4
of the Convention?
(b) How can developing country Parties that are 'particularly
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change' be defined and
eligibility for assistance determined (role of IPCC)?
(c) What is the nature of the assistance to be provided (e.g.
grants, technical assistance, project development) and what
institutional arrangements are required for this?
(d) What is the scope of administrative expenses to be covered?
(e) What are 'the proceeds from certified project activities' and
what is an appropriate 'share' of such proceeds to be used for the
above purposes?
4. The AIJ pilot phase
- COP 1 established AIJ under the pilot phase through decision
5/CP.1. Since its inception in 1995, this has given rise to 75
projects in 17 host countries and by 5 investor countries (as of
March 1998). While the pilot phase has allowed for valuable
experience to be built up in host and investor countries alike -
ranging from the approval process (ensuring that national
development and environment priorities are met), methodological
questions such as the determination of baselines to
capacity-building and related research activities - the core issue
of crediting was, however, absent. The range of features which are
common to AIJ, JI and CDM and experience from the AIJ under the
pilot phase could be usefully employed in the design process of
the project-based activities for which credits can be obtained.
B. Inventory-related mechanism: international
emissions trading
- A framework for IET among Annex I Parties is contained in
Article 17, and Article 3.10 and 3.11. Article 17 further calls on
the COP to define the relevant principles, modalities, rules and
guidelines, in particular for verification, reporting and
accountability. Decision 1/CP.3, paragraph 5, assigns this task to
COP 4 for consideration.
- In its most basic form, IET could consist of the exchange of
parts of assigned amounts between eligible Parties, through a
system of "double-entry book-keeping" as envisaged in Article 3.10
and 3.11. This could be supplemented by domestic emissions trading
schemes where a Party allocates part of its assigned amount to
legal entities under its jurisdiction/within its territory, for
example to industrial sectors, directly to private companies,
and/or to brokers. More sophisticated, market-based, trading
arrangements would be required if Parties wish to explore
arrangements whereby such legal entities would be able to engage
in cross-border IET.
- An adequate national monitoring and reporting system would
need to ensure that the international reporting obligations of a
Party are met, in accordance with Article 5 and Article 7. Also,
if IET is to be possible at an early date and under uncertainty
concerning eventual compliance on the part of the transferring
Party (seller), a trading scheme may need to be backed through
provisions to be defined, such as insurance. Parties would thus
need to determine the prerequisites for engaging in IET, as well
as eligibility criteria.
- In the period towards and during the first commitment period,
knowledge will emerge on several issues which may have a bearing
on the scope and credibility of the IET mechanism. On the one
hand, the impact of policies and measures of Annex I Parties on
their GHG emissions will become increasingly apparent, and, by the
year 2005, demonstrable progress will be assessed. On the other
hand, provisions may be devised which affect the costs of
non-compliance - and thus of measures to achieve compliance, such
as IET - to these Parties.
- Article 17 calls for the definition of 'principles' for IET.
Since the Protocol is guided by the principles set out in Article
3 of the Convention, it is assumed that any discussion of
principles will be grounded in that article, including issues
concerning equity and competitiveness.
- A key issue is the qualification in Article 17 that 'any such
trading system shall be supplemental to domestic actions'. How
should this provision be interpreted and put into practice (see
also paragraph 49 (a) below)?
- A further key issue in the elaboration of IET concerns
participation. Article 17, referring to Article 3, defines
participation in IET as including Annex I Parties which have
agreed to limit their GHG emissions to the assigned amount as
specified in Annex B for the purposes of fulfilling their
commitment under Article 3. The participation of actors other than
Parties, such as private companies and legal entities, has not
been mentioned in Articles 17 and 3.10 and 3.11. While domestic
emissions trading rules could be set by sovereign States, the
relationship between such domestic systems and international
emissions trading will need to be determined. Also, no Parties
other than Annex I Parties are included. Questions in this context
are:
(a) What would be the modalities for the participation of private
or public legal entities in IET, taking into account the need to
maintain Party accountability?
(b) Is there a need for a certain compatibility of rules between
domestic emissions trading systems and international emissions
trading? If so, how could this be accomplished?
(c) How could issues of market power in IET be addressed?
- Parties may wish to pronounce themselves on the linkages in
work schedules between the design process of IET and
methodological work aimed at improving accounting and national
systems (Article 5) as well as work on determining and addressing
non-compliance (Article 18). Parties may further wish to indicate
how the balance between allowing for a flexible market mechanism
and the need for rules and regulations is to be struck in the
design of a credible IET. In this context, the issue of
transaction costs could be addressed. If an IET market is to
function with as much information, transparency and a calculable
risk concerning compliance as possible, confidence in accounting
systems will be essential. The desired sophistication of such
systems may imply additional direct and indirect transaction
costs.
- An additional question relates to the concern that transfers
of assigned amounts under the IET may not correspond to genuine
reductions in emissions. How could such concerns be addressed?
- A Party which had transferred parts of assigned amounts to
another Party through IET could find itself in non-compliance at
the end of a commitment period. How should this potential
situation be addressed? Issues to be considered include:
(a) Should the non-compliance of the transferring Party impact on
the validity of its past emissions transfers? If so, how? For
instance, what would be the liability consequences of such a
situation on the transferring and/or acquiring Party?
(b) How could uncertainty concerning compliance best be minimized
and potential problems of compliance identified before its assessment
at the end of the first commitment period?
(c) What risk management approaches (e.g. insurance) could be
employed to deal with uncertainty concerning compliance?
IV. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES
- Ultimately, the three new cooperative implementation
mechanisms provide for transactions in units of GHG. On the
assumption that these transactions will be market-based, there
will be a tendency for the unit value of reductions to be
equalized under the three schemes. It is envisaged that the
Parties may wish to anticipate such trends in their design of the
three mechanisms.
- Guidance is particularly required where provisions may or may
not apply to more than one mechanism and an indication should be
given whether differentiation should be maintained or an effort be
made at harmonization. Certain specific assumptions and questions
to be addressed are as follows:
(a) Supplementarity: Transactions under JI and
IET are to supplement domestic actions by Annex I Parties to meet
their commitments under Article 3 of the Protocol. How would the
provision 'supplemental to domestic actions' be operationalized
(basis of calculation)? Under the CDM, Annex I Parties may use the
CERs to 'contribute to compliance with part of their quantified
emission limitation and reduction commitments' as determined by
COP/MOP (Article 12.3). Will there be a determination of the overall
extent of supplementarity? Will shares be attributed to each
mechanism?
(b) Participation of private entities: What
arrangements will be needed to ensure the accountability of
individual Parties for transactions undertaken by private entities,
including transnational corporations, under their authority?
V. PROPOSED ACTIVITIES
- Parties may wish to review the proposed work to be undertaken
before COP 4. Elements of work on each mechanism are outlined
below. In each case, the subsidiary bodies are invited to indicate
the timing and sequencing of work, the priorities to be observed
in preparation for COP 4 and what work may need to continue beyond
that. They are also invited to determine which elements of work
they will undertake themselves, in formal sessions or informal
frameworks, and on which they seek inputs and/or support
activities from the secretariat or from other organizations. In
the last-mentioned case, they may also indicate whether, in
certain instances, information and proposals should be submitted
directly or compiled and synthesized.
- The Chairmen of the two subsidiary bodies have expressed
interest in receiving information on activities and plans of
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations with
particular expertise and/or interest in relation to the three
mechanisms. The secretariat has convened an inter-organization
meeting for the purpose of collecting such information; it will
provide Parties with a document compiling the information
(FCCC/SB/1998/MISC.2), together with an oral report at the eighth
sessions. Collaboration and exchange of experience will be further
strengthened with relevant United Nations bodies and
inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations through
participation in workshops, the organization of forums on
cooperative implementation mechanisms, and the ongoing improvement
of the Web site.
- Some of this work may be undertaken within the existing
resources of the secretariat and other organizations. The
secretariat has given priority to this area of work in its
proposal for deploying "post-Kyoto" resources (FCCC/SBI/1998/3).
However, given the scale of the work and the need to undertake it
expeditiously, supplementary funding needs are likely to arise,
for the secretariat and for other organizations.
- Work related to joint implementation
(a) Implications of decision 1/CP.3, paragraph 5 (c) need to be
determined and the scope of work on further guidelines, including a
timetable reflecting options for the implementation of Article 6
provisions, should be delineated. Linkages with work schedules on
Articles 5, 7 and 8 need to be borne in mind;
(b) Methodological issues: In the design of guidelines, practical
options on several issues need to be developed. The following is
proposed:
- Concerning the determining of baselines (such as the
development of a list of feasible technologies, e.g. in a regional
context) and on topics such as monitoring and reporting, work
undertaken during the AIJ pilot phase could be drawn upon and
suitably expanded;
- Concerning issues related to the certification/crediting of
ERUs obtained through JI projects, this new area of work needs to
be developed and experience gained in collaboration with other
institutions which are anticipating to undertake efforts;
- Work on sinks (Article 3.3) and on Articles 5, 7 and 8 needs
to be reflected upon as it evolves;
(c) Institutional and related issues: Capacity-building experience
gained during the ongoing AIJ pilot phase needs to be further
monitored and evaluated. This could provide a basis for designing
relevant provisions in the guidelines on JI. Additional work is
needed to identify new and expanded institutional, technical, legal
and human resource requirements arising from monitoring, verification
and the certification process. Parallels to similar work carried out
in the context of the CDM may be explored. Activities which are
useful in this context include the exchange of experience and
national/regional specificities through workshops which elaborate on
practical options (leading to the identification of 'best practices')
which are found to be most suitable to the needs of both host and
investor countries. Of particular interest are the definition of and
guidelines for the operation of legal entities.
- Work related to the clean development
mechanism
(a) Implications of decision 1/CP.3, paragraph 5 (e) need to be
determined and the scope of work on the CDM, including a timetable
reflecting options for its implementation by the year 2000, should be
delineated;
(b) Methodological issues: In the design of the CDM, practical
options on several issues need to be developed. The following is
proposed:
- Concerning the determining of baselines (such as the
development of a list of feasible technologies, e.g. in a regional
context) - in particular in view of the sustainable development
provision - and on topics such as monitoring and reporting, work
undertaken during the AIJ pilot phase could be drawn upon and
suitably expanded;
- Concerning issues related to certification/crediting of CERs
obtained through CDM projects, approaches need to be developed and
experience gained in collaboration with other institutions which
are anticipating to undertake related efforts;
(c) Institutional and related issues: Modalities for
capacity-building for successfully carrying out CDM projects need to
be worked out (also the linkages to conceptual work under AIJ and
JI), bearing in mind the experience gathered through the AIJ pilot
phase. In addition, new needs as they emerge from intensified
monitoring, reporting and verification as well as from the various
certification requirements would need to be reflected in a
capacity-building strategy related to CDM. The list of issues and
questions in chapter III.A above would guide the detailed work.
- Work related to the AIJ pilot phase
(a) Continuation of work begun under the AIJ pilot phase, such as
the monitoring of projects, and the provision of a document to the
eighth and ninth sessions of the subsidiary bodies with updates on
activities by Parties;
(b) Preparation of the second synthesis report on the AIJ pilot
phase (in accordance with decision 5/CP.1); given the larger number
of projects now reported upon in accordance with the uniform
reporting format (URF) and the longer duration of projects, the
second synthesis report is likely to generate a significant body of
knowledge and experience with AIJ. Based on more empirical data and
improved reporting by Parties, valuable information can be derived,
for example on the refinement of descriptors, and other URF elements;
(c) Work on at least four substantive areas which commenced during
the pilot phase but which will remain of continued relevance for JI
and CDM under the Protocol will be advanced before COP 4 (through
technical papers and workshops):
- Capacity-building for cooperative implementation;
- Definition of terminology (such as verification, reporting
etc);
- Determination of GHG reductions attributable to a project;
- Monitoring and verification of projects.
- Work related to international emissions
trading
(a) Determining the implications of decision 1/CP.3, paragraph 5
(b) and identifying related work;
(b) Methodological issues:
- Application of principles of Article 3 of the
Convention in the context of IET; identification of additional
principles if so required;
- Linked to the modality of IET contained in Article
3.10 and 3.11, there are several issues which require
consideration, such as the timing of trade and liability as
highlighted above;
- Concerning rules: Article 17 calls for verification,
reporting and accountability provisions to be defined. In the
light of the modalities established in Article 3.10 and 3.11,
issues concerning the validity of trades will need to be
established in the context of determining the process leading to
assessing compliance;
- Concerning guidelines for verification and
accounting, links to work by the secretariat on monitoring and
assessing of compliance, and on the provisions contained in
Articles 5, 7 and 8 as well as in Article 18 need to be borne in
mind and elaborated upon.
- - - - -
1. For the full text of the Kyoto
Protocol, see decision 1/CP.3 in document FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1.
2. "Article" means, unless otherwise
indicated, an article in the Kyoto Protocol.
3. "Joint implementation" is suggested
as a short term for the mechanism defined in Article 6.
4. Owing to possible confusion with
domestic emissions trading schemes, trading under Article 17 will be
referred to as "international" emissions trading (IET).
5. Articles 6 and 17 are to be
considered in conjunction with Article 3.10 and 3.11; Article 12 is
linked to
Article 3.12.