19 February 1997
ENGLISH ONLY
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
SUBSIDIARY BODY FOR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVICE
Fifth session
Bonn, 25-28 February 1997
Item 3 of the provisional agenda
The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
(SBSTA), at its fourth session, invited Parties to submit their
views, by 15 January 1997, on the implications of different emission
limitation proposals in terms of projected increases in global mean
temperatures, sea-level rise and other changes in climate
(FCCC/SBSTA/1996/20, para. 26).
The secretariat has received seven such submissions from Parties.
In accordance with the procedures for miscellaneous documents, these
submissions (1)are attached and
reproduced in the language in which they were received without formal
editing. Any further submissions from Parties will be issued in an
addendum to the present document.
FCCC/SBSTA/1997/MISC.2
BNJ.97- 70003
Paper No. Page
1. Canada 3
(Submission received 17 January 1997)
LONG-TERM GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION
PROFILES
2. Kuwait 5
(Submission received 13 January 1997)
COMMENTS ON AGENDA ITEM 3 (EMISSION PROFILES)
PURSUANT TO THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE FOURTH
SESSION OF THE SUBSIDIARY BODY FOR SCIENTIFIC
AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVICE
3. Netherlands 11
(on behalf of the European Community and its member States)
(Submission received 17 January 1997)
EMISSION PROFILES
4. Nigeria 12
(Submission received 14 January 1997)
COMMENTS ON AGENDA ITEM 3 (EMISSION PROFILES)
PURSUANT TO THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE FOURTH
SESSION OF THE SUBSIDIARY BODY FOR SCIENTIFIC
AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVICE
5. Switzerland 18
(Submission received 16 January 1997)
LONG-TERM EMISSION PROFILES
6. United States of America 19
(Submission received 17 January 1997)
EMISSION PROFILES
7. Uzbekistan 21
(Submission received 23 January 1997)
COMMENTS ON POINT (a) - INTERACTION WITH
IPCC
Introduction:
As a signatory to the UNFCCC, Canada is committed to the ultimate
UNFCCC objective of avoiding dangerous human interference with the
global climate system. Canada also believes that actions to achieve
this objective should recognize that the pursuit of sustainable
economic development is the appropriate context for adopting measures
to address climate change. Canada also accepts the responsibility of
developed countries under Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC to take the lead
in combating climate change and its adverse effects. However, Canada
also believes that, to achieve an effective and equitable response to
the risks of climate change, such response must be based on sound
science and carefully designed strategies that ultimately involve all
Parties to the Convention.
Canada believes there is a need to improve understanding of to
what extent a range of emissions profiles would address the
convention objective. Such analysis should also consider the risks of
both absolute changes and the rate of changes in atmospheric
greenhouse gases, and hence of global and regional climates. Given
this context, Canada believes it is useful to examine a range of
possible greenhouse gas emissions profiles to examine the overall
sensitivity of the global climate system, and hence the welfare of
human society, to these different profiles. Canada also believes it
important to improve understanding of the potential economic
implications of a range of possible emissions profiles, and suggests
the IPCC work on economic implications consider the profiles that are
being put forward.
Therefore, further to the conclusions of the fourth session of the
SBSTA (FCCC/SBSTA/1996/20), Canada offers the following illustrative
profiles for further work:
Baseline Emission Scenarios
Canada recognizes that the IS92 emission scenarios presented by
the IPCC for UNFCCC consideration provide a very useful reference for
assessing the implications of alternative action strategies. However,
these scenarios need to be updated to reflect current knowledge, and
need to be broadened to address some of the issues identified in the
IPCC's 1994 Special Report on the Evaluation of the IPCC IS92
Emission Scenarios.
Suggested Profiles for Annex I Action
Strategies
Profile A.1. Annex I Parties only stabilize emissions at 1990 level by 2005 (to reflect likelihood that year 2000 emission levels may be 5-10% above 1990 levels).
This profile reflects the initial aim under the UNFCCC. It is,
however, noted that the Berlin Mandate recognizes that this emission
profile will not achieve the objective of the UNFCCC, and hence is
suggested primarily for comparison purposes.
Two variants of this option are suggested:
Option A.1a Annex I Parties stabilize emissions at 1990 levels by 2005 and remain
stabilized at 1990 levels thereafter.
Option A.1b Annex I Parties continue efforts under initial aim (stabilize emissions at
1990 levels), but are not successful such that emissions continue to increase through
2005 and continue to increase thereafter.
Profile A.2. Annex I Parties initially stabilize emissions, then decrease emissions at a constant rate for an extended period of time. Non-Annex I Parties do not take deliberate action.
Two specific variants of this general option are suggested to
assess the implications of delayed action (offset by more intensive
and an extended period of action), as follows:
Option A.2a. Annex I Parties stabilize at 1990 levels by 2005, then reduce emissions
by 0.5% / year to 2050 and stabilize at 2050 levels there
after.
Option A.2b. Annex I parties delays additional action until 2020, then decrease
emissions from 2020 levels at 1.0% / year through to 2050, and 0.5% / year from
2050 to 2100.
Suggested Profiles for all Parties
Profile B.1. Annex I Parties undertake action as
in Profile A.2a. Non-Annex I UNFCCC Parties with per capita GDP in
excess of a specified threshold stabilize emissions at 2020 levels by
2030. All other Parties take no specified action until they reach the
specified threshold.
Profile B.2. As in B.1, but Non-Annex I Parties
with per capita GDP above the specified threshold reduce "business as
usual" emissions growth by 50% per year from 2020 to 2050, and
stabilize thereafter. Remainder of the Parties continue on a business
as usual path (until threshold reached, after which above assumptions
are followed).
Comments on agenda item 3 (emission profiles) pursuant to the conclusions of the
fourth session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific
and Technological Advice.
1. Any IPCC analysis of the temperature sea level or other
climate implications of proposed emissions limitations for of any
other emission profiles or scenarios should be prepared only as an
IPCC Special Report and should not be prepared as a Technical
Paper.
The Conclusions of the fourth session of the Subsidiary Body for
Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) did not specify that the
analysis should be undertaken as a Technical paper. Since the issue
of whether the analysis should be prepared as a Special Report or as
a Technical Paper was intensively debated at the session, but the
Conclusions failed to request a Technical Paper, there is no
justification to interpret the Conclusions as implying SBSTA's desire
for a Technical Paper. The Conclusions merely requested the IPCC to
complete the work "as soon as possible on the basis of these
submissions in consultation with the Joint Working Group". The quoted
phrase is entirely consistent with preparation of the analysis as a
Special Report.
The principle procedural difference between a Special Report and a
Technical Paper is that the Bureau of the IPCC possesses the final
authority for approval of the content of a Technical Paper, whereas
the IPCC participating governments exercise final approval (called
"acceptance") of a Special Report. The sole justification for
granting the IPCC Bureau such authority over Technical Papers is that
Technical Papers are to be based on the material already in existing
IPCC reports, such as the Second Assessment Report. However, the
analysis in question will be based on new material that has not been
contained in any existing IPCC report, i.e. analysis of the
temperature, sea level and other climatic implications of alternative
emission profiles or scenarios that never have been constructed or
analyzed by the IPCC before now. Thus, the subject matter of the
analysis in question is exactly the type of material that was agreed
by IPCC-XII (Rome, December 1995) that would not be
appropriate for a Technical Paper.
Construction of the new emissions profiles or scenarios that will
be analyzed will involve many controversial assumptions. These will
include:
- Whether the analysis will make assumptions concerning CO2 emissions of
Annex I Parties after the dates specified proposals that have been made in the AGBM
to limit such emissions of Annex I Parties, and, if so, whether those emissions will
remain constant or increase or decrease (and, in either of the later two events,
at what rate).
- The assumptions concerning each of the non-CO2 gases, or at least the
"major" non-CO2 gases (such as methane nitrous oxide, and the CFC substitutes),
including the assumptions concerning those gases after 1990 and after the dates
specified in proposals that have been made in the AGBM to limit emissions of
Annex I Parties.
- The assumptions concerning greenhouse gas emissions by non-Annex I
Parties.
- The assumptions concerning global sulfate aerosols related to each of the
different profiles of scenarios of CO2
emissions.
- The assumptions concerning changes in CO2 sinks, taking into account
proposals for commitments of Annex I Parties to preserve or
enhance sinks.
During the fourth session of the SBSTA, the informal contact group
was not able to reach agreement on the first three of these issues,
and it did not address the last two. Resolution of all of these
issues will have direct bearing on the results of the proposed IPCC
analysis. The fact that these issues are controversial emphasizes why
the governments participating in the IPCC, and not merely the Bureau,
should exercise find approval of the analysis, including how the
analytical results are expressed.
2. Any IPCC analysis of the temperature sea level or other
climatic implications of proposed emissions limitations for of any
other emission profiles or scenarios must be accompanied by IPCC
analysis of the economic impacts of the same proposals, emission
profiles or scenarios.
The second session of SBSTA identified the IPCC studies that it
desired in Annex III to the report of that session. Annex III placed
in the same "box" studies to "assess the economic impacts on
all Parties, including non-Annex I Parties, of any proposed new
commitments to be undertaken by Annex I Parties "and to" assess the
implications of different emission limitation proposals including any
proposal new commitments to be undertaken by Annex I Parties on
projected temperature increases, sea level rise and other change in
climate". This was clear statement of subset's desire that the IPCC
studies on climate change impacts and economic impacts should be
companion studies.
Policymakers cannot make informed judgments about proposed
protocols, or about the implications of alternative emission profiles
or scenarios, unless they are informed about both the climate and
economic implications. Even if some proposals, profiles, or scenarios
offered the prospect of averting some temperature increase or sea
level rise, those potential benefits would have to be considered in
light of the projected economic costs of the same proposals,
profiles, or scenarios. Otherwise, the analysis would be incomplete
and unbalanced.
3. In accordance with the decision at the second session of SBSTA, any IPCC analysis of temperature, sea level, or other climatic implications of alternative emission profiles or scenarios must be confined to proposals that have been made in the AGBM.
This means that such analysis: (a) must avoid speculation about emissions of Annex I Parties after the dates specified in such proposals, (b) must not be confined to emissions of CO2,
(c) must reflect all proposals, including proposals for differentiation of commitments by Annex I Parties, and (d) must not assume limitations of emissions of non-Annex I Parties.
To enable informed analysis, it should be deferred until all
Parties have had opportunity to submit proposals during the sixth
session of the AGBM.
It is clear that the purpose of the SBSTA's request for the study
in question was, if possible, to inform policymakers of the
climate implications of proposals for a protocol or another legal
instrument that would be considered during the AGBM negotiations. The
decision of the second session of SBSTA as set forth in Appendix III
of the report of that session, called for the IPCC to "assess the
implications of different emissions limitation proposals
including any proposed new commitments to the undertaken by Annex
I Parties on projected temperature increases, sea level rise and
other change in climate". This was not a request for the IPCC to
exercise its own judgment about what emission profiles or scenarios
should be analyzed or to create "extended", or "hypothetical", or
"idealized" profiles or scenarios.
There are important reasons why the IPCC's analysis should be confined to proposals that actually are made by Parties during the AGBM negotiations.
First: the purpose of the analysis is to inform
policymakers, if possible, of the climate consequences of what they
might agree to during the AGBM negotiations. Therefore, any emission
profiles or scenarios invented by the IPCC for purpose of the
analysis necessarily will have policy implications. The IPCC should
not become involved in such matters and instead should analyze those
scenarios that are indicated by what the Parties themselves have
proposed.
It is noteworthy that, according to the 17 December 1996 (8:24 PM)
draft prepared by the distinguished Chairman of the informal contact
group dealing with these issues, the predominant view of the contact
group was: "The SBSTA requested the IPCC to develop emission profiles
based on all emission limitation proposals submitted to the
secretariat by all Parties by 15 January 1997, including the
differentiation of commitments among Annex I Parties. No profile
developed from a proposal should be extended beyond a timeframe
developed in that proposal; the IPCC should not introduce additional
proposals outside the range of parties submissions".
Second: Any departure of an emissions profile or scenario
from what would result as a consequence of proposals by Parties in
the AGBM would be arbitrary and wholly speculative. For example, any
profile or scenarios that assume emissions levels for those Parties
after the latest date specified in a proposal ignores the fact that
such emissions could increase or decrease in amounts that cannot be
foreseen. Many factors, including economic and technology
developments, national policies that are unrelated to climate change,
and, most importantly, the outcome of future negotiations under the
UNFCCC, will determine future emissions levels of Annex I Parties.
Cumulative net emissions throughout the time period that is analyzed
will determine temperature and sea level rise. This means that, since
no current proposal specifies what happens to emissions after 2010,
it is the wholly unknown cumulative emissions after that date (or
others specified in a Party's proposal made in the AGBM) which
largely will determine temperature and sea level rise at the end of
the next century. Therefore, emissions profiles or scenarios that
make arbitrary assumptions for the period following the one that is
the subject of proposals actually made by Parties in the AGBM will
tell us nothing about the climate implications of those
proposals.
It is worth repeating that according to the 17 December 1996 (8:24
PM) draft prepared by the Chairman of the informal contact group
dealing with these issues, the predominant view of the contact group
was: "No profile developed from a proposal should be extended beyond
a timeframe developed in that proposal, the IPCC should not introduce
additional proposals outside the range of Parties'
submissions."
Third: An IPCC analysis that reflects limitations only on
CO2 emissions of Annex I Parties would be contrary to the
Berlin Mandate, which states that the AGBM process "shall be guided
by a coverage of all greenhouse gases, their emissions by sources and
removals by sinks and all relevant sectors" and also would be
contrary to every QELROs proposal made to date in the AGBM, none of
which is confined to CO2 emissions limitations. It would
be highly unrealistic and, therefore, uninformative to confine the
analysis to CO2 limitations, as was proposed by the
original draft of Technical Paper 3 of IPCC Working Group I. Again,
it is noteworthy that the 17 December draft proposed by the Chairman
of the contact group on this issue stated the predominant view of the
group: "Such analysis must be based on all major greenhouse gases and
aerosols".
There are many combinations of commitments that might be
undertaken by Annex I Parties concerning all greenhouse gases and
sinks. Speculation by the IPCC as to what the resultant profiles or
scenarios might be performed no useful task. Instead, the IPCC should
analyze what the Parties will have before them as their negotiations
progress.
Fourth: Several Parties (including Australia, France, Iceland, Japan, Norway,
Republic of Korea, and the Russian Federation) have proposed that the new commitments of Annex I Parties should not be the same for all Annex I Parties. It is unfair to ignore those positions. Therefore, any analysis should reflect the differentiation of commitments of
Annex I Parties that may be proposed in the AGBM. As noted
earlier, that was the predominant view in the informal contact group
on this issue.
Fifth and most importantly: It would be totally improper
for the analysis to make any assumptions concerning future
limitations on greenhouse gas emissions of non-Annex I Parties. The
purpose of the analysis is to inform policymakers, if possible, of
the climate implications of proposals to be considered by the AGBM,
but it is well known that the Berlin Mandate forbids consideration of
new commitments by non-Annex I Parties. The IPCC should not make
assumptions concerning future global emissions that are contrary to
the clear provisions of the Berlin Mandate.
It is recognized that most of the formal proposals made in the
AGBM currently lack sufficient detail to analyze their temperature,
sea level rise, or other climate implications. That does not mean
that the IPCC should not have the license to "fill in the blanks". By
the end of the sixth session of the AGBM in the first week of March
1997, the Parties will have submitted a large number of proposals in
the form of text for a protocol or another legal instrument. Rather
than having the IPCC speculate about future levels of CO2
and other greenhouse gas emissions of Annex I Parties, how such
levels will vary in light of proposals for differentiation among
Annex I Parties, how such levels will vary in light of proposals for
differentiation among Annex I Parties, and the effects of commitments
of Annex I Parties to preserve and enhance sinks, it would be vastly
preferable to commence the analysis in question only after the
Parties' proposals are known. If, in fact, the IPCC undertakes the
analytical effort, deferring its commencement until conclusion of
AGBM-6 is a small price to pay in exchange for being faithful to what
the various parties actually have proposed to their
colleagues.
4. Great care must be taken in assumptions concerning sulfate
aerosols to be sure they reflect not only proposals to limit
CO2 emissions of Annex I Parties, but also increased
sulfate aerosols of non-Annex I Parties.
The IPCC's Second Assessment Report recognized the important role
played by sulfate aerosols in projecting future temperature and sea
level changes. This suggests that any reductions of future
CO2 emissions by Annex I Parties that would occur as a
result of proposals for new commitments by Annex I Parties would be
accompanied by some, not a proportional, decline in
anthropogenic sulfate aerosols of those Parties. At the same time, as
recognized in the preamble of the UNFCCC, "the share of global
emissions (of greenhouse gases) originating in developing countries
will grow to meet their social and development needs". This suggests
that that anthropogenic sulfate aerosols of non-Annex I Parties will
increase. The Second Assessment Report does not suggest otherwise.
The Analysis of temperature, sea level, and other climate change
implications of proposals for new commitments by Annex I Parties must
not ignore the increases in anthropogenic sulfate aerosols of
non-Annex I Parties.
5. The analysis must compare temperature and sea level change
implications of proposed new commitments of Annex I Parties against
the temperature and sea level change implications of all of the IPCC
IS92 emission scenarios.
The IPCC has developed six emissions scenarios, IS92 "a" through
"f". However, the IPCC sometimes has chosen to present analysis of
only some of those scenarios, IS92 "a", "c", and "e". Although the
IS92 "c" and "e" scenarios "bracket" the range of the six IS92
scenarios, some policymakers will discount either or both of them,
because they reflect what some people regard as "extreme" assumptions
they make. Examples are the low population assumptions of the IS92c
scenario and the eventual elimination of all nuclear power in the
IS92e scenario. As a result, the attention of those policymakers who
wish to disregard scenarios "c" and/or "e" is focused on the IS92a
scenario.
This is unfortunate, since, in its Special Report entitled "Climate Change 1994"
(at page 297), the IPCC stated that "at this time there is no
objective basis for assessing that one scenario is more likely to
occur than another". Therefore, comparison of the climate
implications of proposed new commitments of Annex I Parties should be
made against the climate implications of all of the IS92 emissions
scenarios.
6. If the analysis will compare temperature and sea level (or cumulative emissions) implications of proposed new commitments of Annex I Parties against the temperature and sea level (or cumulative emission) implications of alternative levels and dates at which greenhouse gas concentrations might be stabilized the analysis should make such comparisons against the full range of stabilization levels and dates that have been considered by the IPCC.
In the Second assessment Report, the IPCC presented information
about emissions profiles and cumulative emissions that would be
associated with atmospheric of from 350 to 1000 ppmv. The COP has not
determined the concentration levels or dates at which concentrations
of greenhouse gases should be stabilized to meet the ultimate
objective of Article 2 of the UNFCCC. Therefore, any comparisons of
the temperature and sea level (or cumulative emissions) implications
of proposed new commitments of Annex I Parties against the
temperature and sea level (or cumulative emissions) implications of
alternative concentrations levels and dates must involve the full
range of stabilization levels and dates that have been considered by
the IPCC.
With respect to the IPCC's request for guidance on greenhouse gas
emission profiles, beyond 2010, the EU notes that in paragraph 23 of
FCCC/AGBM/1996/10 a number of proposals for emission reductions for
Annex I Parties is presented. The EU supports the principle of using
extended and illustrative profiles to represent the range of
proposals. This principle has been applied in the draft IPCC
technical paper to enable the full range of different emission
reduction proposals to be assessed. The EU suggests that emission
profiles should at least range from a profile with a 0.5% reduction
per annum after 2000 to a profile with a 20% reduction by 2005
followed by a 2% reduction per annum thereafter. In addition to these
cases the EU suggests that the cases of constant emissions after 2000
at the 1990 level and constant emissions at the 1990 level by 2000
followed by a 1% and a 2% reduction per annum subsequently also be
studied. There is ambiguity regarding the intentions to reduce
CO2 emissions or all greenhouse gas emissions in the
proposal already published. The EU suggests that both options be
investigated.
For each of these cases the IPCC IS92 scenarios should be used for
non-Annex-I Parties.