18 November 1997
ENGLISH ONLY
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
AD HOC GROUP ON THE BERLIN MANDATE
Eighth session, second part
Kyoto, 30 November 1997
Agenda item 3
1. At the first part of its eighth session, the Ad Hoc Group on
the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) considered the issue of greenhouse gas
sinks in the context of quantified emission limitation and reduction
objectives (QELROs) (FCCC/AGBM/1997/8).
2. At the same part of the session, Parties were invited to submit views on this topic by
12 November 1997. The secretariat was requested to compile these
submissions into a miscellaneous document.
3. Eight such submissions(1) have
been received. In accordance with the procedure for miscellaneous
documents, these submissions are attached and are reproduced in the
language in which they were received and without formal
editing.
FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.4
GE.97-
Submission No. Page
Denmark 3
(Submission dated 12 November 1997)
2. Japan 11
(Submission dated 12 November 1997)
3. Marshall Islands 16
(Submission dated 12 November 1997)
Nauru 26
(Submission dated 10 November 1997)
5. New Zealand 33
(Submission dated 12 November 1997)
Norway 45
(Submission dated 12 November 1997)
7. Peru 48
(Submission dated 12 November 1997)
United States of America 50
(Submission dated 12 November 1997)
Denmark supports the submission by the UK on behalf of the EU and
its members states, responding to the questionnaire on
sinks.
The following is thus to be considered a supplementary explanation
of the Danish views and the thoughts behind them.
1. Should anthropogenic sinks be included or excluded
in a QELRO? Why or why not (in responding you may wish to consider a
budget period or year)
Include or not? answer: yes, if properly designed.
a) It is not necessary to include sinks
now.
The inclusion of sinks in QELRO's of the Kyoto protocol, in a
so-called net approach, is being advocated by some parties, as
necessary to achieve action in the field of sink protection and
enhancement.
The Danish position is that this view is only justified if QELROs
is considered the only mean to achieve results . All Parties are
however already committed to protecting and enhancing sinks, and a
large repertoire of policies exist, that may be used towards this
end.
b) inclusion of sinks will not remove the necessity to
achieve emission reductions
The enhancement of sinks, although an important contribution to
overall GHG abatement, will not change the basic fact, that large
reductions in emissions will be needed urgently, if stabilisation of
the GHG-concentrations at safe levels shall be achieved. Considering
the very big inertia in the political, sociological and technological
processes that are typical for such emission reductions, and the very
short time available to achieve such reductions, the inclusion of
sinks in QELRO's should only be accepted contingent on safeguards to
secure that it would not result in delays in the implementation of
emission mitigation efforts.
A major concern in this connection is thus, that the inclusion of
sinks in QELROs can only be accepted, when the likely impact on
emission limitation efforts have been thoroughly analysed. Many of
the proposed approaches to sink-inclusion in QELRO's have the risk of
creating new quantities of hot air, that would lower overall emission
reductions if such sink-hot air could be freely traded off against
emission reductions.
We believe, that the lack of sufficient analysis so far, and the
lack of consensus on definitions and technical details, would exclude
any decision in Kyoto to accept a net approach already
now.
We might however be prepared to include in the protocol,
provisions and processes that might lead to a later agreement on
sinks.
We believe the most important doubts are related to CO2-sinks from
the land-use change and forestry (LUCF), and will hence concentrate
on these sinks in the following.
The following is an attempt to highlight the problems we see in
relation to LUCF-sinks, and some thoughts on how to circumvent
them.
c) Include only anthropogenic sinks, and avoid "hot
air"
There seem to be general acceptance, that only anthropogenic sinks
should be included in an eventual net approach. The IPCC inventory
guidelines offers a first methodology for defining this concept.
However, the precision, and the ability of the methodologies to
capture dynamic effects are still rather rudimentary. We believe the
only acceptable methodology would be a methodology based on detailed
forestry statistics on areas, and age classes. We note that severe
problems exist in certain areas, in relation to finding a robust
discrimination between natural and anthropogenic sinks.
Simultaneously, the IPCC is looking into the related questions. This
is a strong argument to await this work, before inclusion of
LUCF-sinks in QELRO's is even considered.
Present IPCC-methodologies tend to define the anthropogenic part
of the CO2-sink as more or less the total sink, in the case of
managed forests. As more and more forests become managed, the total
"anthropogenic" sinks of inventories could grow, as monitoring
methods become more developed. Potentially this could lead to an
anthropogenic sink in the inventories of about 6 bio ton of CO2 (the
size of the unidentified northern continental sink according to SAR).
Today, annex1 countries have identified about 1/4 of this sink in
their inventories. As the total sink is believed to result from
factors largely beyond control, except by global policies, (such as
CO2-fertilisation, Nitrogen deposition, or warming-induced growth),
gradual inclusion under a scheme where sinks could be credited
against emission-reductions, poses the danger of a considerable
amount of hot air, which would hardly be useful, especially, if
emission-trading were to be allowed.
Hence any scheme would need to contain provisions for guarding
against gradual inclusion in the inventories of this "hot
air".
d) Avoid perverse incentives
Many sink-crediting schemes could lead to credit being giving for
having stopped unsustainable behaviour, such as going from a
situation with deforestation, to a more sustainable forestry policy.
Giving credit for this, in a situation where not all Parties to the
convention have QELROs, may create the incentive to continue such
practices, in order to have a favourable starting position, when
negotiating eventual future QELROs.
e) For Carbon, sinks should be defined as changes in
Carbon stocks
Further we believe, it is absolutely essential that any definition
of net LUCF-sinks should be restricted to represent anthropogenic
changes in domestic carbon-stocks. This may be extended to include
changes in domestic pools of wood products rather easily, if
sufficient statistics are available.
Denmark would however not be in favour of accepting schemes, that
necessitate detailed bookkeeping of carbon in products traded. The
responsibility for securing that wood-products are sustainably grown
and harvested, and hence CO2-neutral, when used, should rest with the
producers.
f) To define a scheme for the inclusion of sinks,
definitions of sinks is not enough
The complete scheme will only be defined when it is settled both
how compliance to the QELRO is defined, and how the QELRO itself is
calculated. This will also involve the base year question (or maybe
the baseline question).
As much confusion may arise from different interpretations of the
same language, the discussion may benefit if the question of sinks is
first approach in a pragmatic (and transparent) way, by simply trying
to operationalize how QELROs should be set and compliance calculated.
We restrict in the following the discussion to
CO2-emissions.
g) Definition of gross approach
As some doubts has been cast even on the definition of the gross
approach, lets first make clear, that we assume, that a gross
approach, to be used in the EU's proposed flat rate targets, would
not involve any contributions (neither sources nor sinks) from LUCF,
neither in 1990 nor in any future target years.
Hence in our view LUCF contributions should always be considered
sinks (even when negative in 1990, and hence actually a net source!)
and be excluded from a gross approach.
For CO2 this means that 1990 emissions in the gross approach would be only emissions from fuel combustion + fugitive emissions (e.g. venting, solvents) + industrial emissions (e.g. cement, tiles).
Denoting these emissions with EG, the compliance to a 15%
reduction target would be formulated:
EG20150 < redfacgross * EG1990 =
QELROGROSS2010
where redfacgross = 0.85 for a 15% reduction target.
Similar equations would apply to other target years or budget
periods.
h) Definition of net approach
We then have a number of alternatives for extending this to a net
approach. Defining the net sink from LUCF as SN = LUCFsinks -
LUCFsources, we could define a net approach as
alt A: EG2010-SN2010 <
redfacA * (EG1990-SN1990) =
QELROA2010 ("net-net" approach)
This alternative A is an approach where percentage reductions are
directly prescribed for the net emissions (a "net/net" approach). As
this would necessitate a recalculation of the QELROs in going from a
gross to a net approach, it is not so easy to implement later, on top
of a Kyoto agreement (assuming that we will not in Kyoto go for a net
approach right away). Alternatively one could therefor opt for a
credit option, enabling any sink enhancement achieved after an
eventual agreement on sinks, to be subtracted from emissions, in
comparing with the QELRO:
alt B: EG2010 -
(SN2010-SN1990) < redfacB *
EG1990 = QELROB2010 ("credit"
approach)
Note that the redfac is related to a percentage reduction target
(redfac= 1-relative emission reduction), to be distinguished from the
question of "capping" (or reducing) credits, which should not be
discussed before a clear understanding of the net approach as such
has been achieved.
We note that QELROA is different from QELROGROSS (if redfacA =
redfacgross), whereas QELROB may be equal to QUELROGROSS (if redfacB
= redfacgross).
We note as a site-effect, that by alternative A, the meaning of a
percent reduction is influenced by the magnitude of SN. If fx SN =
1/2 *EG a 10% reduction of EG-SN can be achieved with a 5% reduction
in EG, keeping SN unchanged. This points to the necessity of
considering differentiation of percentage reductions, dependent of
the size of SN, if fair distribution of commitments are to be
achieved. This is avoided by approach B.
One should also note for alternative A the rather peculiar
situation that may arise for a country for which sinks are greater
than emissions in the base year. Here alternative A prescribes that
the country should continue to be a net sink, with a net sink size in
the target year at lest redfacA * the net sink size in the basis
year. This would enable the country to expand emissions with
(1-redfac)*base year sink, if the sink were held constant. In 1990,
no annex 1 country among the 27 for which the secretariat was able to
report sink data was in this situation. However in 1995 (or last
reported year) Latvia reported a net CO2 sink of 141% of emissions.
Hence this special situation need to be considered if a different
base year is chosen (or in connection with future non annex 1
countries that may be in a similar situation).
Depending on how QELROs for individual countries were eventually
set, both A) and B) may create winners and loosers. Potential loosers
would be countries that already expect declining sinks over time, due
to age distribution effects. A somewhat attractive option, that would
make it easy to build upon a gross Kyoto result, would be to redefine
the QELRO for each country (in each target year or budget period) so
as to make the shift to a net approach neutral for all countries.
This would involve estimating the future expected sink value in the
target years in the case of no transition to a net approach. Such a
procedure is described below as alternative D.
We could also use variants of A and B where SN1990 was
replaced by, say SN1997. This could be motivated by a
desire not to make an advantage out of the fact, that a country might
have had a numerically large, but negative net sink in 1990 (such as
is the case of Australia) - we should not give future credit for
having had an unsustainable behaviour in 1990!
It is to be noted, that all Annex 1 countries have SN > 0 in
1995, according to the compilation of the secretariat, with the
possible exception of Canada and some other countries, for which no
information is given, whereas negative SN's occur in 1990. This may
motivate a base year for SN different from 1990.
The New Zealand approach, we believe is
alt C: EG2010 - SN2010 <
redfacC * EG1990 = QELROC2010 ("gross-net"
approach)
with the result that most countries would find themselves in an
easier situation after introduction of the net approach, unless the
QELROs were adjusted downwards. The total reduction in QELROs for
aggregate annex 1 would need to be around 1.3 bio t of CO2 (or about
6% of 1990 emissions) to keep the ambition level unchanged (if the
1995 sink level were assumed to apply also for a future
situation).
Finally, we could take the "Icelandic" approach, which we believe
to be, that LUCF contributions should be restricted to effects
attributable to anthropogenic actions to enhance sinks, taken after
1990. This would involve measuring against a baseline scenario
(SNbaseline) for the magnitude of SN in the absence of such
actions:
alt D: EG2010 -
(SN2010-SNbaseline2010) < redfacD *
EG1990 = QELROD2010 ("base-line"
approach)
or
alt E: EG2010 - SN2010 <
redfacD * EG1990 = QELROD2010 ("policy"
approach)
where SN2010 is the documented results of
sink-enhancing actions after 1990 (such as Carbon accumulated in
areas, that are aforested after 1990).
Here we have excluded SN from appearing on the right hand side of the inequality in alt D, as
SN1990 = SNbaseline1990 by definition. Also
here, a later base year than 1990 could be used for SN and
SNbaseline. It is not clear, whether SN < SNbaseline should be
allowed, or whether SNbaseline<0 could be accepted.
An approach could be to demand that SNbaseline were to be chosen
as the evolution to be expected in the absence of any net change in
forest area, and with harvesting levels that approach long-term
sustainability (i.e. SNbaseline approaching 0 in the long term). Such
a baseline would include the effects of actions before the base year.
This would give SNbaseline = 0 in all years when using the default
IPCC approach, but certainly not when using a more realistic approach
based on age distributions of the standing stock of
trees.
With this definition of the baseline, aforestation and sustainable
harvest policies would be an advantage, whereas deforestation or
unsustainable harvesting would be punished. The definition would need
further detailing, as evidently the dynamic approach to sustainable
harvest levels, even with fixed forest area, is not uniquely
defined.
The important thing would be to avoid baselines consisting of
continuation of unsustainable practises, such as deforestation, or
unsustainable harvest policies.
Alternative E would make the book-keeping much simpler. Guidelines
would be set up on how to calculate the credits for each kind of
action, much in analogy with the situation in the case of
AIJ-projects. As methodologies are developed, more and more kinds of
actions could be included.
There might be some "honourable free riders" in both approach D
and E, namely countries, that would anyway, even without a net QELRO,
undertake a policy of aforestation (as the Convention already ask
for!). The effect on global emissions of such honourable free riders
is equivalent to the existence of a new type of hot air, that would
necessitate QELRO-redefinition to guaranty a benefit for global
warming. Such QELRO redefinition should not necessarily hit the
countries with ambitious programs even without the net approach, but
may be distributed on all countries. The latter approach would in
fact be preferable in order not to punish countries that already have
taken action or giving a credit to countries that play a game of no
action, with the intent to negotiate a larger benefit in a future
negotiation on sinks (if such countries exist!).
In fact, there is no reason why any country's baseline (except for
countries with very large forest cover in the start position) should
not involve some aforestation policies, considering the commitments
of the convention.
Hence a necessary condition for accepting a net approach might
be the acceptance by each country of a certain baseline of sink
enhancement, such that only efforts above this baseline may be
substituted for emission reductions, whereas efforts below this
baseline would necessitate increased emission
abatement.
For all alternatives, we can define "the effective sink credit" to
be the amount EG can be expanded, compared to the gross approach
(which could be the one negotiated in Kyoto):
EG2010 < redfacgross * EG1990 +
Credit
For the various alternatives we find the following effective sink
credits:
A) Credit = SN2010 - redfacA * SN1990 + (redfacA-redfacgross)*EG1990
B) Credit = SN2010 - SN1990+ (redfacB-redfacgross)*EG1990
C) Credit = SN2010+ (redfacC-redfacgross)*EG1990
D) Credit = SN2010 - SNbaseline2010 + (redfacD-redfacgross)*EG1990
E) Credit = DSN2010 +
(redfacD-redfacgross)*EG1990
The notion of an effective sink credit is seen to be a little
complicated, if redfacA,...redfacD is different from redfacgross
above.
It is a most likely possibility, however, that one might want to
adjust the reduction percentages (redfac) in going from a gross to a
net approach, ia to secure a given ambition level in terms of
aggregate reductions of the total net emissions to the
atmosphere. This would in particular be necessary under the New
Zealand approach (alt C) as aggregate sinks over annex 1 (excluding
Canada) were already about 1.3 bio t of CO2 in 1995, equal to about
5-6 % of annex 1 gross emissions.
The degree to which it would be necessary to reduce the redfac's
is determined by the size of the aggregate credit, summed over
countries, and calculated in the situation where a gross approach
is chosen, as any aggregate positive credit calculated for this
situation constitutes "hot air" (net emission reductions that would
occur anyway even without taking the net approach).
For all alternatives, it should be considered how the scheme would work if commitments were eventually extended to one or more non-annex 1 countries. Alternative A and B may give some problems for countries such as Brazil, for which SNbaseyear might be negative and numerically large. Would it be fair to give a perpetual credit based on a large source in the base year? To stress what the implications of this is, you may imagine that a sufficiently large source might give future credits (depending on the size of redfac in future years/periods) that might enable the country to completely destroy its forests, and still be better of than under a gross approach. The total size of the credits accruing from baselevel emissions (SN1990) in alt A and alt B, could be as high as the total source term estimated for the tropics (of about
8 bio t CO2 annually), as this source term (mainly forest
clearing) is evidently "anthropogenic". As forest clearings in the
IPCC scenarios are assumed to stop (due to lack of remaining
forests?) after clearing about 83 Gt C, a credit of 8 bio t from
SN1990 in alt A would allow the forests to be cleared in
about 40 years without penalty (or a similar emission expansion to be
made in gross emissions) and would allow emissions to be expanded
thereafter. The absence of the 1990 levels of SN from the net credits
(as in alt C and D) is in this context a virtue, that should be
considered.
If the transition from a gross approach to a net approach were to
be taken in such a way as to leave any country neither worse nor
better off (except by having a greater flexibility!) country specific
reduction factors redfacA,, redfacD should be negotiated for each
country so as to render zero the net sink credit defined above for
the various alternatives. The difficulty of this, of course, is that
it involves estimating the future value of SN, that would be achieved
without taking a net approach (i.e. under a gross
approach).
In any case, even if redA,,redD were chosen equal across countries (= flat rate net approach), such an exercise of adjusting reduction factors (or QELROs) would be needed based on a projection of the aggregate future SN of parties, to secure that the transition from a given gross + flat rate approach would not result in an overall lowering of the reductions of net emissions to the atmosphere.
i) Implications for inter country monetary
payments
The choice of scheme for defining the net approach to QELROs will
also, under the assumption of the introduction of a future emission
trading system, have a major impact on the net monetary flows arising
from trading between countries. Schemes that would result in major
transfers to some or all major forestry countries even without
explicit action taken by these countries after 1990, would result in
an unnecessary burden on the remaining countries, on top of expenses
for domestic mitigation. This would represent a reinterpretation of
the convention, from being a commitment to preserve reservoirs and
enhance sinks domestically, to being a collective responsibility to
finance such actions in other annex 1 countries as well. This would
be especially doubtful, if such "preservation efforts" were actually
just a reduced destruction rate (as could be the case in alternative
A or B).
j) The question of substitutability of sink enhancement
and emission reduction
Enhancement of LUCF-sinks, which increase the carbon-pools in
forests, will not provide full certainty, that the carbon sequestered
would not later be emitted to the atmosphere. Even if countries would
be held strictly responsible for any future decreases in such Carbon
pools, it is not certain, that unforeseen events (forest die-back,
forest fires etc.) may not create carbon losses, that could not be
compensated by other measures.
This may motivate that a certain discounting (such as allowing
only a certain percentage of extra Carbon sequestered) to be offset
against emissions.
Similar concerns would apply to other Carbon sequestration
techniques, such as deposition in the oceans.
Other sinks (such as deposition in depleted gas wells, or
reinjection for enhanced oil-recovery) may be more
certain.
The different nature of various sinks may thus warrant an
individual negotiation on setting of a discount factor for each sink
type to be used in any net approach.
1. Should anthropogenic sinks be included or excluded in a QELRO ?
Why or why not ? (In responding you may wish to consider which budget
period or target year)
In the long run, anthropogenic sinks should be included in a QELRO
for the following reasons:
(i) Effects on climate change is dependent on atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs), which is affected by both GHG emissions and GHG sinks.
(ii) In order to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system, the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) requests the Parties to take measures for
mitigating climate change by addressing anthropogenic emissions by
sources and removals by sinks.
On the other hand, we also recognize the very different nature of
sinks, compared with emissions by sources. The following issues
should be taken into account in a comprehensive manner when we
consider the inclusion of sinks in the legally binding
QELRO.
(i) how to deal with significant uncertainties related to global carbon cycle;
(ii) how to deal with significant technical uncertainties regarding methods for measurements/estimates and verification;
(iii) how to define "anthropogenic" sinks, including the problem of forest fire;
(iv) how to handle the reference year problems, as pointed out by New Zealand;
(v) how to handle the issues related to forests and other woody biomass stocks, and harvested wood.
These are very unique problems in sinks, requiring comprehensive
consideration for all these issues together. Otherwise, we may have
significant other environmental problems. For instance, one of such
problems could be to provide potential incentives to clear presently
matured forests and plant single species of trees, neglecting
importance of biodiversity. The Government of Japan (GOJ), therefore,
believes that it is still premature now to include sinks in a legally
binding QELRO. Some solutions should be provided on the above issues
before we include sinks.
2. What would be the impact of including or excluding sinks on the
QELRO levels, national plans or policies of your country ? (Please
try to provide a qualitative answer.)
By including sinks in a legally binding QELRO on the basis of the
present level of scientific knowledge, we may encounter significant
problems in estimating and verifying "net" anthropogenic emissions.
We are afraid that inclusion of sinks may cause a significant
loophole in assessing compliance with a legally binding
QELRO.
By excluding (not including) sinks, it may be argued that
incentives for enhancement of sinks and protection of reservoirs be
less. However, the UNFCCC requests the Parties to promote sustainable
management, and promote and cooperate in the conservation and
enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs (Article 4.1
(d)). The Government of Japan (GOJ) has been promoting these
activities and will continue to do so, regardless sinks be included
in a legally binding QELRO or not. GOJ is of the view that the
exclusion of sinks should not be used as an excuse for inactions in
this field.
3. What criteria governed your answer to question number 1
?
The major criteria may include:
(i) scientific level of uncertainty in understanding global carbon cycle;
(ii) state-of-art technologies to measure and estimate anthropogenic sinks;
(iii) present level of national systems of the Parties in estimating and verifying anthropogenic sinks;
(iv) clear, shared and common understanding on the definition of "anthropogenic sinks"; and
(v) resolution of other remaining issues, including the problem of
reference year and appropriate methods to deal with the concern
expressed by New Zealand.
4. How would you define "anthropogenic" sinks in the context of a
QELRO ?
In the context of a legally binding QELRO, "anthropogenic" sinks
should be clearly defined to provide no confusion nor conflict in
their interpretations during the implementation stage of the
protocol. From this viewpoint, the following issues should be taken
into account when we define "anthropogenic" sinks:
(i) anthropogenic sinks should be able to be measured/estimated and verified in a sufficiently accurate manner, based on the available scientific and technical knowledge.
(ii) they should be defined as specific as possible, hopefully by source/sink categories or sectors (forests, grasslands/shrublands, mineral soils, organic soils etc.);
(iii) they should not be defined to threaten the long-term objective of the UNFCCC;
(iv) from administrative viewpoint, they should not be defined to cause significant annual fluctuations;
(v) they should not create loopholes, for instance, by inadequate
handling of changes from unmanaged forests to managed.
GOJ believes that it is difficult to appropriately define
"anthropogenic" sinks within a short time before COP3, taking into
account all the above mentioned issues.
5. Do you agree or disagree with the following proposition; if so,
why or why not ? "Any QELRO that would include sinks should be based
on the 1996 IPCC guidelines. Any new IPCC methods would only apply to
a second budget period or subsequent target."
We presume that the question means "If a QELRO will include sinks
for the first budget period, the methods to be used for the first
period should be decided at COP3. In this case, the methods should be
based on the 1996 IPCC guidelines."
Based on this presumption, our answer is "Yes". GOJ agrees with
the proposition mentioned above, because:
(i) the legally binding QELRO that could be agreed on at Kyoto should be defined in a quantitative manner; and
(ii) the only presently available authoritative methods are those
included in the 1996 IPCC guidelines. We have no time by the Kyoto
Conference to further develop/elaborate other methods in this
field.
It should be, however, noted that we agree to use the 1996 IPCC
guidelines as a whole, including its philosophy. In other words, the
IPCC guidelines recommend to use country specific methods rather than
defaults mentioned in the guidelines, if such country specific
methods are considered more accurate and adequate. It should also be
noted that in some source/sink categories such as land use change and
forestry, particularly regarding agricultural soils, the 1996 IPCC
guidelines have not been well developed to estimate GHG
emissions/absorption by agricultural as well as forest soils. Further
studies are ongoing to adopt adequate methods for such categories. In
such cases, we should not use the methods presently described in the
1996 IPCC guidelines.
Regarding the second question in para 5, GOJ agrees that any new
IPCC methods (adopted after COP3) should only apply to commitments
that are adopted for a second budget period or subsequent periods. It
should, however, be noted that this does not mean GOJ agrees with
inclusion of sinks in a legally binding QELRO.
6. a) Which IPCC land use change and forestry (LUCF) categories
should be included or excluded in a QELRO ? Why ? Examples: all LUCF/
changes in forest and other woody biomass stocks/other.
GOJ does not believe that we have sufficient scientific and
technical knowledge on LUCF, and therefore, it is premature to decide
which LUCF categories should be included in a legally binding QELRO
(Please see paragraph 4 above).
b) If some categories are excluded, how should they be dealt with
?
We should work out appropriate and comprehensive methods to
measure/ estimate anthropogenic LUCF emissions by sources and removal
by sinks, taking into account the various aspects related to LUCF,
together with IPCC, SBSTA and other relevant authorities. GOJ
considers that the criteria in paragraph 4 above should be used in
selecting LUCF categories to be included in a legally binding
QELRO.
7. What reference year should be used as the basis for any QELRO
that would include sinks ? 1990/2000/none/other
Since UNFCCC determined to use 1990 as the reference year for
anthropogenic GHG emissions, we should use the same reference year
for sinks. On the other hand, GOJ recognizes that the present methods
have a problem, as addressed by New Zealand. Adequate methods should
be developed to address this issue (with only one reference
year).
8. a) How much uncertainty do you associate with the GHG
inventories provided by your country for the specific IPCC reporting
categories ?
Quantitative evaluation of uncertainties has been one of the most
difficult tasks related to GHG inventory in Japan. Generally
speaking, in some areas the numbers are relatively certain and in
other areas not. Specifically, it is significantly uncertain to
measure/estimate carbon sinks through soils, including both forest
and agricultural soils.
b) What uncertainty levels would be appropriate for sinks in a QELRO,
bearing in mind the uncertainties associated with sources
?
First of all, we should be careful on what methods should be used
to discuss the uncertainties. If the methods used are different, the
numbers on uncertainties differ. In this paragraph, we should use the
methods prescribed in the IPCC guidelines (Volume I, Annex I
(Managing Uncertainties)), to define uncertainties.
We believe that there are different types of uncertainties to be
discussed. In the context of sinks, the following issues need to be
considered:
(i) scientific uncertainties regarding global carbon cycle;
(ii) technical uncertainties in data (both emission factors and activity data) relating to measurements, estimation and verification;
(iii) uncertainties arising from ambiguous definitions and their
interpretations;
When we generally discuss uncertainty issues, we bear in mind the
uncertainties mentioned sub-para (ii) above. Even in this case, GOJ
believes that uncertainties in activity data relating to sinks are
significantly uncertain in some Annex I Parties. GOJ further believes
that at present, uncertainties associated with sub-para (i) and (iii)
above are much more significant, and therefore, cannot be ignored.
GOJ proposes that adequate level should be determined by the
Conference of the Parties, possibly through the SBSTA, from
scientific, technical as well as political and administrative
viewpoints.
c) How should uncertainties be dealt with ?
Uncertainty levels of various different source categories should
be regularly reviewed and updated from scientific and technical
viewpoints. When uncertain level of a source category reaches
satisfactory level, such category should be included in the legally
binding QELRO, unless we have other substantial
problems.
9. Should there be a limit on the amount of sinks in a QELRO ? If
so, how should it be determined ?
GOJ does not have sufficient information to answer the
question.
10. Is the data provided in national communications
adequate/inadequate for assessing compliance with a QELRO ? Why or
why not ?
Yes, in some areas such as CO2 emissions by fuel combustion, but
no in other areas such as CO2 sinks and N2O emissions by agricultural
soils because of significant lack of scientific and technical
knowledge (Please see paragraph 8 (a) above).
11. Should any "national system" established under Article 4 give
special consideration to sinks ?
Any national system should pay due attention to sinks, if a
legally binding QELRO includes sinks.
12. In order to achieve compliance with a QELRO (with/without
sinks), what activities should be credited or not credited and what
base year should be used ?
Please see paragraphs 7, 8 (b) and 10 above.
13. What definition should be included; in which article of the
protocol ?
Either now or later, when sinks be included in a legally binding
QELRO, the definition of "net" anthropogenic emissions should be
defined in Article 1 (definitions). Categories of LUCF to be included
in a legally binding QELRO should also be well defined, either in the
protocol (through its amendment) or by COP decision or other means
related to methodologies.
14. Do you have any other approach to propose ?
The Conference of the Parties should request IPCC to further
develop and elaborate methods for LUCF categories, with the policy
guidance from SBSTA.
15. Do you have specific protocol language ?
No special proposal.
Question 1. Should anthropogenic sinks be included or excluded in
a QELRO? Why or/why not? (In responding you may wish to consider
which budget period or target year.)
Anthropogenic sinks should not be included in a legally binding
QELRO for the first budget period. Decisions on sinks for subsequent
budget periods should be made when QELROs for such periods are being
established. Such decisions should be based on further advice from
the IPCC on sinks.
There are four major reasons which speak for the exclusion of
sinks from the first budget period:
(1) methodological weaknesses and scientific uncertainties;
(2) gaps in data relating to sinks;
(3) lack of comparability of sinks data; and
(4) creation of possible perverse incentives.
Individually and collectively, these problems would render
rigorous assessment of compliance with QELRO commitments, including
the operation of related mechanisms such as trading and joint
implementation, impossible. For these reasons, each reason is
discussed in detail below under Question 3.
Question 2. What would be the impact of including or excluding
sinks on the QELRO levels, national plans or policies of your
country? (Please try to provide a qualitative answer.)
QELROs are being negotiated only for Annex I Parties. Their inclusion or exclusion is of critical concern to the Marshall Islands because the achievement of QELROs has direct and immediate implications for countries vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. Marshall Islands shares a strong interest in ensuring that the strongest possible QELROs are adopted in Kyoto but also that these are fully implemented.
Question 3. What criteria governed your answer to question
1?
The Marshall Islands seeks to ensure QELRO commitments for the
first budget period stimulate early action to tackle the dominant
causes of climate change: fossil fuel emissions. Furthermore, in our
view, legally binding QELRO should be subject to the highest degree
of certainty and they must be transparently achieved. Strict
compliance with QELROs will be necessary to penalize free-riders, to
ensure fairness among Parties and to promote confidence in the
regime. QELRO implementation should promote early action in the
critical sectors of economic activity and not lead to or exasperate
other environmental problems. Including sinks in QELROs would not
meet these criteria for the reasons described below in more
detail.
(a) Methodological problems and scientific
uncertainties
Volume 2 of the IPCC Second Assessment Report clearly sets out the
methodological problems and scientific uncertainties surrounding the
measurement of emission uptake by sinks. The 1996 Revised Guideline
recognize that major uncertainties exist relating to the emissions
factors and activity data for sinks. Table A1 from the revised 1996
Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories listing the range
of uncertainties, appended herewith, provides the range of
uncertainties associated with CO2, CH4 and
N20.
In his report to the seventh session of SBSTA (October 1997),
Professor Bolin, on behalf of the IPCC, reiterated the problems
relating to sinks. He specifically pointed out in relation to
terrestrial ecosystems "the error margin for the determination of
sources and sinks are quite large" and that "[b]ecause of our limited
understanding and lack of observations simplified methods have been
proposed by the IPCC and been adopted by the FCCC for the assessment
of sources and sinks by countries". As these are "very approximate",
Professor Bolin highlighted the importance of analyzing "their
possible shortcomings" in the context of the IPCC's
work.
Uncertainties also exist as regards CH4 and
N2O. These uncertainties speak for excluding these sector
categories (or dealing with them in a special way) and not for
including sinks. Removals by sinks accounted for about 6 or 7% of
total reported emissions by Annex 1 Parties. For Annex I Parties as a
whole the removal effects of sinks are small but bigger than
emissions of N2O and trace gases. Furthermore, Parties'
emissions projections and mitigation plans indicate that
uncertainties from sinks are or are likely to be more significant in
relative terms than uncertainties relating to CH4 or
N2O. This is because the short and long term projections
from Parties second national communications anticipate declining
CH4 emissions by 2000 and 2020. Secondly, although some
Parties anticipate increases, in overall terms, N2O
emissions will probably fall for Annex I Parties. If continued, these
trends will magnify the importance of sinks vis-à-vis the
uncertainties associated with some CH4 and NOx source
categories. Thus the treatment of sinks must be undertaken in a sound
manner.
If accepted as part of the Kyoto Protocol, achievement of QELROs
through the use of joint implementation sinks projects in developing
countries or trading regimes involving non-Annex I Parties will also
magnify the importance of sinks. Hence the cumulative effect of
methodological problems and scientific uncertainties relating to
sinks are likely be more significant over time.
(b) Data gap problems
Some Annex I Parties simply do not have adequate data for sinks or
have failed to supply such data (however uncertain it might be) in
their national communication despite the fact that the current
reporting guidelines for Annex I Parties require the provision of
such information.
The compilation and syntheses of national communications show the
current quality of reporting of the land use change and forestry
sector (LUCF) is highly inadequate. For example, in the initial
compilation and synthesis of first national
communications:
out of all 33 reporting Parties, only 14 countries broke the LUCF
sector down in emissions and removals for their base year as required
by the reporting guidelines;
USA failed to present emissions and removals separately as
required by the reporting guidelines;
Projections of the LUCF sector were equally deficient: only 16 out
of the 33 reporting countries provided figures for 2000;
and
Among the economies in transition, only the Czech Republic and
Latvia submitted emission projections for LUCF sector for
2000.
The level and quality of information has not improved markedly since the submission of first national communications. Between July 1996 and July 1997, a range of countries submitted updates on LUCF emissions and removals . The updates resulted in major changes in the value of sinks removals from the original value submitted. The percentage change of values is as follows:
Australia 7%
Bulgaria 65%
Czech Rep. 156%
Denmark 12%
Finland 21%
France 3%
Germany 50%
Japan 7%
Latvia 90%
New Zealand 16%
Norway 200%
Russia 33%
Slovakia 4%
UK 430%
On average, these fluctuations actually exceed the uncertainty of
60% for this type of data as given by the IPCC. The magnitude of
these changes highlight Parties' present difficulties concerning
reporting of the LUCF sector, and underscore the need for additional
methodological and scientific work to remove these
difficulties.
The compilation and synthesis of second national communications
does not quell concerns about lack of data or the failure to provide
this to Convention bodies. The LUCF data included in this compilation
is significantly incomplete because not all Annex I Parties submitted
their reports and those that have, have failed to do so in a
comprehensive manner. The compilation document notes, for example,
that:
None of the 18 reporting Parties submitting second national
communications provided the worksheets or equivalent information on
LUCF requested by the FCCC guidelines.
Whether it is due to lack of technical capacity, unwillingness or
the nature of the guidelines themselves, it is clear that the current
FCCC reporting requirements have not significantly improved sinks
data for Annex I Parties as a whole.
The difficulties presented by this lack of information will only
be compounded if the Kyoto Protocol allows QELRO to be achieved
through joint implementation sink projects with developing countries.
The availability and accessibility of data from developing country
Parties is much more acute.
Likewise, if the Kyoto Protocol allows achievement of QELROs through trading, data from all Parties must be accurate and made available in a timely manner. Thus it is not enough that some Parties have accurate data on sinks. Flexibility mechanisms such as joint implementation and trading require a high standard of reporting from all Annex I Parties (and those non-Annex I Parties that might play a role in QELRO achievement should the Kyoto instrument so permit).
(c) Comparability problems
Uncertain and incomplete information problems are compounded by
the use of differing definitions and methodologies used by Parties
with regards to sinks.
The compilation and synthesis of second national communications
states:
"None of the problems with comparability of
CO2 emission estimates from this sector identified in the
compilation and synthesis of first national communications appear to
be resolved. The information provided did not shed additional light
on various assumptions related to the definitions of anthropogenic
activities and their treatment for emissions reporting purposes. In
general, Parties did not specify whether their forests are totally
managed or not."
And:
"Comparison and aggregation of emissions and removals from land
use change and forestry was complicated by scientific uncertainties,
difficulties in data collection and differing coverage. Further
research and methodological work is needed to ensure that estimation
and reporting is done in a consistent, transparent and comparable
manner."(emphasis in original). FCCC/SBI/1997/19, Annex,
para29.
Due in part to these problems, the confidence levels expressed by
Parties in categories relating to sinks was at best "medium", and for
the most part "low." This degree of confidence levels cannot be the
basis of undertaking or discharging legally binding QELRO
obligations. The present FCCC guidelines, including the 1996 Revised
Reporting Guidelines do not provide agreed definitions for sinks. And
these need to be resolved to improve comparability of
data.
(d) Perverse incentives problem
Inclusion of sinks in QELROs may create perverse incentives and
cause or exasperate other environmental problems.
All forests (temperate, tropical or boreal) serve multiple
functions: they are important centers of biodiversity, a source of
recreation and amenity globally and locally and are often home to
indigenous peoples. They also serve invaluable ecological functions
such as preventing soil erosion. Including sinks in QELROs will
provide a powerful regulatory incentive to maximize one function
above others: carbon sequestration. If unchecked, this might create
an incentive for Parties to begin or accelerate felling of old growth
forest (which are relatively stable carbon reservoirs) to ensure they
can take credit for planting fast growing mono-culture forests to fix
carbon. The inclusions of sinks in QELRO thus may run counter to the
objectives and efforts of other international treaties and programs
to promote conservation, sustainable development and sustainable
forestry practices.
Including sinks in the QELRO would also run counter to the
Polluter Pays Principle which requires the polluting industry or
sector to internalize the cost of pollution. The largest source of
total GHG emissions and of CO2 emissions for Annex I
Parties is fuel combustion. The inclusion of sinks in QELRO would
tend to delay early action to tackle emissions at source. It would in
effect shift the burden of pollution control to a sector which is not
the major contributing sector. This has major social and equity
implications which need to be fully considered.
Finally, to have the same environmental effect as avoiding fossil
fuel emissions, carbon stored by sink conservation and enhancement
would have to remain locked out of the atmosphere over geological
time scales.
There does not appear to be any scientific basis on which the
integrity of forests as carbon stores can be guaranteed for
centuries, let alone millennia. The political and institutional
mechanisms for ensuring this is the case are also lacking. At this
stage, carbon storage is a high risk strategy, which could result in
significant releases of additional carbon in the future (if as
expected, climate change itself leads to increased forest fires). The
significant scientific and methodological uncertainties concerning
the long term safety of sequestered carbon speak against including
these in the QELRO for the first budget period.
Question 4. How would you define anthropogenic sinks in the
context of a QELRO?
The Convention's definition of sinks covers all removals of
greenhouse gases from the atmosphere anthropogenic or otherwise. The
purpose of defining "anthropogenic" is to ensure that Parties do not
take credit for what nature is already doing on the carbon
sequestration front.
Yet an application of a "but for human intervention" test is
problematic as all sinks today are subject to direct or indirect
anthropogenic interference, including "natural forests". The latter
because humans decide not to cut these down. The 1996 IPCC Guidelines
provide that "natural forests" should not counted as these are in a
state of equilibrium whether or not these are managed. But this begs,
rather than answers, the question of what is "managed" and "natural."
To be useful, a definition of "anthropogenic sinks" should determine
what counts as significant, human intervention. Criteria to establish
which sinks actually meet these requirements also need to be
elaborated. This should be done as soon as practicable by the first
Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol, based on technical advice
provided by SBSTA and the IPCC.
Question 5. Do you agree or disagree with the following
proposition; if so why and why not? Any QELRO that would include
sinks should be based on the 1996 guidelines. Any new method would
apply only to the second budget period or subsequent
target.
Any QELRO including sinks should not be based on the 1996 IPCC
Guidelines. This is because the Guidelines do not provide conclusive
answers to a number of issues that are relevant to providing legal
certainty concerning what sinks should be counted in QELROs. The
Guidelines, for example, do not define what is "anthropogenic,"
"natural" or "management." They are also not conclusive on other
issues such as the determination of "anthropogenic fires" or how
emissions from long life wood products should be treated. The issue
of soil carbon is also not addressed.
These issues must be better understood by the IPCC and then agreed
by Parties. They cannot be left solely for a scientific and technical
assessment body such as the IPCC or for each Party to determine.
Doing so would compromise transparency, consistency and comparability
of sinks data.
Once agreed, the methodology and guidelines for determining what
counts as sinks should not be changed during a budget period. Any
such changes should not apply retrospectively unless there is
agreement to the contrary by all Parties.
6.a) Which IPCC LUCF categories should be included or excluded in
a QELRO? Why? Examples: all land use change and forestry/Changes in
forest and other woody biomass stocks/other.
b) If some categories are excluded, how should they de dealt
with?
All LUCF categories should be excluded from QELROs for the first
budget period. If sinks are to be included in QELRO, no IPCC LUCF
should be excluded per se. However, modalities for how different
sinks could be included in QELROs should be discussed by Parties on
the basis of advice from the IPCC on sinks (see also response to
question 14 below).
Question 7. What reference year should be used as the basis for
any QELRO that would include sinks? 1990/2000/none/other
1990 reference year should be used for QELROs. The
inclusion/exclusion of sinks should not alter the base year. Base
year choices, and other conditions for including sinks in the second
budget period should be addressed when these QELROs are being
negotiated.
Question 8. How much uncertainty do you associate with the GHG
inventories provided by your country for the specific IPCC reporting
categories?
The Marshall Islands has not completed the preparation of the
national inventories. It is not clear at this stage whether
uncertainties will exceed or be less than the IPCC default figures
contained in Table A1-1 of the revised 1996 IPCC Guidelines for
National Greenhouse Gas Inventories.
Question 8 (b) What uncertainty levels would be appropriate for
sinks in a QELRO, bearing in mind the uncertainties associated with
sources?
In general terms, for legally binding QELROs of modest proportion,
only sources commanding "high" confidence levels should be included
in the first budget period. In the compilation and synthesis of
second national communications, "high" confidence levels were
associated with an error range of less than 10 per cent and were
reported only for CO2 from fuel combustion and industrial
processes. As these emissions are the primary cause of climate
change, a QELRO focusing on them would send a powerful signal to the
right sector.
Questions 8 (c) How should uncertainty be dealt with?
For the first budget period, Marshall Islands considers that Annex
I Parties' achievement of QELROs should focus on the biggest and most
certain cause of climate change: the emissions of
CO2 by fossil fuel combustion.
This first signal should not get lost in the noise of measures to
tackle smaller and highly uncertain sectors. These sectors could, for
example, be addressed through non-QELRO related commitments in the
first budget period. And they should be considered for inclusion in
QELRO commitments for subsequent budget periods based on advice from
the IPCC.
Question 9. Should there be a limit on the amount of sinks in a
QELRO; if so how should it be determined?
Removals by sinks account for about 6 or 7% of total reported
emissions. The limit on the amount of sinks in a QELRO should not be
greater than this amount. It should, in fact, be much smaller than
this to take into account the methodological problems and scientific
uncertainties associated with sinks.
Dividing this cap between Parties is likely to create problems
because one cap might not fit all. Differentiated caps or limits for
each Party would increase complex negotiations. Future options to
deal with the issues might include the establishment of a discounting
system (see question 14 below).
Question 10. Is the data provided in national communications
adequate/inadequate for assessing compliance with a QELRO? Why or why
not?
For detailed reasons see answer to question 3. The data currently
provided to assess implementation of Article 4.2 (a) and (b) is
inadequate. Unless improved by all Parties, such data would be wholly
deficient for assessing compliance with legally binding
QELROs.
Question 11. Should any "national system" established under
Article 4 give special consideration to sinks?
All Parties should improve their sinks reporting. If sinks are
included in QELROs, Parties should be obliged to improve their
capacity to supply and monitor sinks data and the counting of any
sinks related credits towards their QELRO should be contingent on the
provision of such information.
Question 12. In order to achieve compliance with a QELRO
(with/without sinks) what activities should be credited or not
credited and what base year should be used?
It is not clear what is meant by the term "credit." Does it refer
to some kind of points system operating in parallel or in conjunction
with QELROs? Does it refer to joint implementation? Or is it an
allusion to action taken under the Convention being "credited" to the
QELRO commitment elaborated by the Protocol?
The latter would amount to shifting the base year forward from
1990. Such a move would have the perverse effect of rewarding Parties
whose emissions have increased since 1990 and penalizing those whose
emissions had declined or stabilized since then!
Question 13. What definitions should be included; in which article
of the protocol?
No definitions relating to "net" or "sinks" should be included in
the Protocol. The treatment of sinks should be handled through COP
and/or MOP decisions as these are a more flexible tool capable of
evolving in a dynamic fashion in response to new scientific knowledge
and evolving methodologies. These decisions should be made on the
basis of further work and advice from the IPCC.
Question 14. Do you have any other approach to
propose?
All Parties to the Convention ultimately wish to see QELROs cover
as comprehensive a range of actions as feasible. The question is when
and how.
Our present knowledge of sinks, and how to account for them, is
subject to very serious levels of uncertainty and methodological
dispute. The first step to including sinks would be for the Parties
to address these. To assist this process, the COP should request the
IPCC to prepare a special report on the scientific and technical
issues surrounding sinks for the attainment of a QELRO. The IPCC
should address the issues that are unresolved from a scientific and
technical perspective as well as those that cannot be resolved by the
IPCC without further guidance from the FCCC. The report should
suggest improved methodological tools to deal with the uncertainties.
The IPCC should examine various methodological tools and approaches
for the treatment of sinks, including those being suggested by
Parties in the AGBM with a view to providing an analysis of short and
long term consequences that could be expected from each approach, in
particular the impact on emissions during the first budget period.
This report should provide a basis for Parties to the Protocol to
agree when and how to include sinks in QELROs.
Without prejudice to the question of sink inclusion in QELRO in
the first or subsequent budget periods, one approach that could be
considered by the IPCC is that of "discounting" which would specify a
discount for each sink category that would be applied to any credits
generated by that category towards QELROs.
Under this scheme all IPCC source and sink categories would be
listed in an annex (essentially draft Annex B) together with a
default uncertainty values for each category. Parties would be
allowed to count in to the QELRO all sources and sinks subject to
discounting each sector according to the uncertainties, and other
policy relevant factors, associated with it. Where Parties could
demonstrate that they had a lower uncertainty than the default
values, they might be permitted to use these instead. The removals
credits generated by sinks could be subject to an appropriate
discount to reflect their uncertain character. In the energy sector
the IPCC default uncertainty on emission estimates is currently 10%.
All Parties could thus claim 90% of their energy sector emission in
the QELRO. Those that had lower uncertainties for the energy sector
might be permitted to claim more. The IPCC default uncertainty for
LUCF is 60%. So Parties could claim say, 60% of this sector, unless
their data justified smaller discounts.
The discounting approach has several advantages over a blanket inclusion of all sinks because:
it avoids the need to agree one uncertainty level applicable to
QELROs;
it could apply equally well to emissions from uncertain sources
(some CH4 and N2O sources have uncertainty
ranges comparable to some sinks);
it rewards Parties with sound sinks data and at the same time
provides a powerful incentive to others to generate such data and
make it available to the Convention or protocol bodies.
The discount values, and modalities for gaining credits in excess
of the default values would however have to be agreed by Parties.
These could be established as part of the modalities for the
accounting of emission budgets to be agreed by the first Meeting of
the Parties, on the basis of expert advise from the SBSTA, responding
in particular to the specific report from the IPCC on the sinks
described above.
Question 15. Do you have specific protocol language.
This can be elaborated quickly should other Parties consider it
useful.
Table A1-1 of the "Revised 1996 IPCC Guidelines for National
Greenhouse Gas Inventories: Reporting instructions", page A
1.4
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Note: Individual uncertainties that appear to be greater that +/- 60% are not shown. Instead judgement as to the relative importance of emission factor and activity data uncertainties are shown as fractions which sum to one. |
1. Should anthropogenic sinks be included or excluded
in a QELRO? Why or why not? (In responding you may wish to consider
which budget period or target year.)
Anthropogenic sinks should be excluded from a QELRO at the present
time because: 1) the term is not sufficiently
well-defined; 2) the uncertainties associated with
sinks will make compliance with targets difficult or impossible to
confirm; 3) the lack of definition and the
uncertainties in assessing sinks will facilitate mis-use of sinks in
subverting the aims of reduction targets; 4) removal
by sinks of greenhouse gases is generally small (< 10%) in
comparison with emissions by sources and hence inclusion of sinks
will not make such a large difference.
It can be argued that such regulation of sinks is already required
under the terms of Article 4 of the Convention, although specific
regulatory policies, measures, targets and timetables are not
presently specified.
On the other hand, sinks are important and creating specific
incentives to manage them responsibly is a meritorious goal.
Therefore, sinks should be included in QELROs when an adequate
definition has been agreed and when uncertainties have been reduced
significantly.
We favor establishing specific procedures to define anthropogenic
sinks and reduce uncertainties in their assessment through the good
offices of the IPCC. As soon as the definition is agreed and
uncertainties reduced by appropriate methodologies and reporting
procedures, sinks should be included in QELROs. This will provide
incentive to prepare for the management of sinks while at the same
time reducing problems that would be involved in including
them.
2. What would be the impact of including or excluding
sinks on the QELRO levels, national plans or policies of your
country? (Please try to provide a qualitative
answer.
My country has not reported. It is a developing small island country and would not be bound by QELROs.
3. What criteria governed your answer to question
number 1?
1) lack of definition; 2)
uncertainties; 3) possibility of mis-use making
compliance difficult or impossible to assess.
4. How would you define "anthropogenic" sinks in the
context of a QELRO?
This is of course a major undertaking which should be tackled by
an expert group of independent scientists and policy professionals,
i. e., the IPCC. A tentative definition, based upon very limited
thinking and consultation, is as follows:
Anthropogenic sinks are those that are created or
significantly enhanced exclusively through significant human
intervention and/or management efforts, and whose creation or
enhancement yields net benefit within the contexts of climate, the
larger environment, and the broader arena of socio-economic concerns.
The critical elements of this definition are as
follows:
a) sinks "that are created or significantly
enhanced.through significant human intervention and/or management
efforts;"
The term "created" is relatively straight-forward. If a forest is
re-planted, or if specific management efforts and policies enable the
reforestation of a previously deforested area, then a sink has been
created under this definition.
On the other hand, the essential task of defining "significantly
enhanced" and also "significant human intervention and/or management
efforts" is challenging. What constitutes significant enhancement,
and how can it be measured? This question intersects importantly with
the issue of measurement uncertainty, discussed in detail
below.
And what constitutes "significant human intervention and/or
management efforts?" If one re-plants portions of a forest, has the
entire forest been managed? Can a country fence off a forest, declare
it a climate preserve, and claim credit for all greenhouse gases it
absorbs? If one assesses the forest cover by satellite
reconnaissance, is that "management? If a coral reef is fertilized by
runoff from agricultural lands, is this "management?" If the forest
is studied by a scientific team for purposes of sink activity, is
that "management?" If part of a forest is sprayed once a year does
this qualify the whole forest for inclusion as a sink for QELRO
purposes? How much effort must be invested before management can be
said to be significant?
These questions embrace real policy and definition dilemmas that
will have to be confronted directly if we are to draw the line
between legitimate sink enhancement and bogus efforts to avoid
significant actions to benefit the climate.
Determining what is a "significant" human intervention and/or
management effort is also difficult. The significance will of course
depend on how much effort is invested, but also on how successful
that effort is. Definition of the term "significant" should therefore
establish some kind of proportionality between managerial effort, the
success of that effort, and credit obtained, in order to incentivize
and properly reward managerial effort. This is obviously a complex
undertaking, but I do not see how it can be avoided if benefit to the
climate system is to be achieved and assured in workable operational
compliance regimes. This issue demands calibrating the relationship
between investment energy and QELROs credit, which is a matter both
for science and also for policy and negotiation.
b) sinks whose enhancement creates net benefit
within the context of climate;
If management efforts emit more greenhouse gases than are absorbed
by the consequent removal of gases by sinks, then the management has
had negative net benefit within the context of climate. This
obviously is to be avoided. It can be argued that the market would
itself ensure this outcome. However, market distortion from the
QELROs process may require more systematic attention and
mitigation.
c) creation of net benefit within the broader
context of environmental issues;
If management of a sink creates net benefit within the context of climate, this does not mean that it creates overall net benefit to the environment. For example, silviculture frequently entails monocropping and associated heavy application of fertilizer and pesticides. These practices are widely acknowledged to be highly destructive of natural biodiversity. Therefore, silviculture can be beneficial in the narrow context of climate, by enhancing removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere; but simultaneously disadvantageous to the environment at large, through the consequent loss of biodiversity. In such cases, net benefit to the environment may not result.
Similarly, fertilization of the oceans with elements that normally
constitute limiting factors, such as iron, could enhance
phytoplankton growth, but such blooms could interfere negatively with
ocean ecosystems by, for example, loss of biodiversity through
reducing light penetration to mid-waters and hence disrupting life
cycles of species there.
Likewise, planting the African savannas with fast growing scrub bush could alter ecosystems irreparably and accelerate the loss of megafaunal biodiversity. Converting rangeland, grassland or wetland to agricultural land might have the same adverse effects on biodiversity. And so on.
Clearly, measures taken to benefit the climate must not do greater harm to the environment at large. To extend credit to environmentally harmful activities would provide incentives to do harm, which would be clearly counterproductive. Therefore, unless net environmental benefit results from sink creation or enhancement, credit must not be extended under QELROs.
Quantifying this provision of the definition of anthropogenic sinks will be difficult; how much is biodiversity worth in comparison with possible impacts on climate? How can we compare the rights of indigenous people with prospective climate change? Neither will it be simple to identify all harms associated with specific management activities. The effort is essential, however, if we are to avoid creation of inadvertent negative externalities.
d) creation of net benefit within the still
broader context of policy (including socio-economic
factors).
In the same way that climate-related activities can cause
unintended negative impacts on other components of the environment,
they can also have negative impacts on social or economic issues. For
example, displacing island people by rising sea level may actually
enhance sinks by enhancing coral reef growth. This does not mean that
we should encourage sea level rise by extending credit under
QELROs.
Less obvious, and therefore more difficult to handle, sink credits
that cause displacement of indigenous peoples from grasslands in
order to plant forests may well not serve the broader social
good.
Equally difficult, climate related activities that adversely impact the economy may not be of value overall. Again, one could argue that the market will take care of itself; but again, extension of QELROs credit could provide exactly the market distortion that encourages counterproductive sink management activities. This must be guarded against in the definition of sink management.
5. Do you agree or disagree with the following
proposition; if so, why or why not? "Any QELRO that would include
sinks should be based on the 1996 IPCC guidelines. Any new IPCC
methods would only apply to a second budget period or subsequent
target."
The 1996 IPCC guidelines are certainly a good beginning. They indeed provide methodologies, and general guidance. They do not, however, address adequately the issue of uncertainty, nor do they attempt to define anthropogenic sinks. Until these difficult tasks are completed to the satisfaction of all Parties, credit should not be extended for sinks. If credit for sinks is applied prior to answering these difficult questions, the incentive to find answers will be lost. Sending the right market signals regarding sinks is possible without removing the incentives to do the job right.
6. a) Which IPCC LUCF categories should be included or
excluded in a QELRO? Why? Examples: all land use change and
forestry/Changes in forest and other woody biomass stocks/other.
The answer to this question is strongly related to 1 above.
Categories of LUCF and other sinks should be included on the basis
of: 1) adequate definition; 2) adequate measurement and assessment
methodology; 3) adequate reporting data; and, above all, 4)
sufficient certainty in assessment measures. As a general rule,
uncertainties that are no greater than +10% might be considered
acceptable.
b) If some categories are excluded, how should they be dealt with?
Their exclusion should signal the need to devote urgent attention
to the four criteria listed in a) above in order to ensure their
early inclusion.
7. What reference year should be used as the basis for
any QELRO that would include sinks?
1990/2000/none/other
1990 seems adequate, but I would wish the issue of the baseline
year to be evaluated by the IPCC in order to reveal possible
complications or unintended implications from choosing different
years.
8. a) How much uncertainty do you associate with the GHG inventories provided by
your country for the specific IPCC reporting categories?
Not Applicable (Nauru does not currently report)
b) What uncertainty levels would be appropriate for sinks in a QELRO,
bearing in mind the uncertainties associated with sources?
Uncertainties in sources is no excuse for permitting uncertainties in sinks. The proper response is to develop methodology to reduce both. The acceptable level of uncertainty is strongly dependent upon the magnitude of the QELROs targets. It is the ratio of uncertainties in the reduction targets (signal) to the uncertainty (noise) that matters (signal-to-noise ratio). Generally speaking, the signal to noise ratio must be sufficiently low to enable confident assessment of compliance and/or benefits of assessment measures. Unfortunately, this is possible at present mainly with carbon dioxide emissions from energy-related activities. This is why dealing with uncertainties should be a priority of the IPCC.
Error analysis and signal-to-noise ratios may appear at first sight to belong to the esoteric realm of statisticians. However, it is absolutely essential to deal with these issues if compliance under the Convention is to be assessed confidently. It would obviously be a curious policy decision to create a Convention or a Protocol for which compliance could not be confidently assessed.
In the meantime, a practical level of uncertainty is necessary for developing reasonable provisions. A value of + 5 - 10%, while entirely arbitrary, may be provisionally acceptable in that it strikes a balance between the ideal and the possible.
c) How should uncertainty be dealt
with?
1) by requesting the IPCC to examine on an urgent basis the implications of uncertainties in assessing compliance and benefits of measures;
2) by requesting the IPCC to work consistently over the long term to reduce uncertainties in methodologies and reporting;
3) by creating appropriate incentives to eliminate or reduce
uncertainties, for example, discounting or by inverse proportionality
between credit and uncertainty.
9. Should there be a limit on the amount of sinks in a
QELRO; if so, how should it be determined?
If uncertainty were not an issue, there would be no reason to
limit sinks at all. On the contrary, the more they are included, the
greater the protection will be in the long run, and hence the greater
the benefit to the climate.
Given uncertainties in reporting and methodologies, however, there
should be a limit on the amount of sinks in a
QERLO and it should be determined on the basis of uncertainty levels.
For any particular target QERLO, the greater the uncertainty in
measuring a sink, the less it should be credited in QERLOs. And the
more ambitious the target, the greater uncertainty can be permitted
to achieve the same level of confidence in compliance assessment. The
exact proportionality between uncertainty, target levels and credit
is a matter of scientific advice and negotiation.
10. Is the data provided in national communications
adequate/inadequate for assessing compliance with a QELRO? Why or why
not?
No. The data provided in national communications allow little more
than an intelligent estimate of sources and sinks, although there is
substantial variation across gases, sectors and sinks. In part this
is because data are not available, and in part it is due to the issue
of uncertainty. If, for example, the uncertainty level is 10% and the
QERLOs target is 0% (stabilization), then compliance can be assessed
only within a statistical probability range of perhaps 50%. This is
far from the 5% confidence limits that are normally considered
acceptable.
11. Should any "national system" established under
Article 4 give special consideration to sinks?
Yes. It is important to prioritize sinks from the early stages of
policy actions, in order to send the proper signals to governments,
institutions and markets. On the other hand, it would be
inappropriate to incorporate sinks quantitatively in contexts that
could permit non-compliance or make compliance impossible to
assess.
12. In order to achieve compliance with a QELRO (with/without sinks), what activities should be credited or not credited and what base year should be used?
The most rational approach is to credit activities in proportion to uncertainty levels (discounting). This would minimize the risk of non-compliance, minimize the risk of inability to measure compliance, and at the same time provide a powerful incentive to eliminate uncertainties by appropriate studies and development of methodologies. At the same time, a signal to include sinks could be sent by assigning a threshold uncertainty
(e. g., 5 - 10%), below which the sink or activity could be
credited.
In respect to base year, please see the answer to question # 7
above. This question appears redundant with that.
13. What definitions should be included; in which article of the protocol?
As usual, the need for definitions will follow directly from the terms that are agreed through negotiation. There is no need to specify terms in advance, and indeed, it is not possible nor appropriate to pre-judge the negotiations by such specification.
14. Do you have any other approach to propose?
The basic approach favored by Nauru is
discounting. This includes: 1) inclusion of sinks
from the beginning, in order to send the right signals to
governments, institutions and markets; 2) assigning credit for sinks
in direct proportion to the ambition of QERLOs targets, in order to
maximize compliance assessment; 3) assigning credit for sinks in
indirect proportion to measurement and reporting
uncertainties.
The rationale for discounting is that it will: 1) enable sinks to
be included from the outset, thereby maximizing the benefit to the
climate; 2) limit credit for uncertain sinks in order to minimize the
impact of uncertainties on compliance assessment; 3) create a
powerful incentive to reduce measurement and reporting uncertainties
in order to remove these, to the long-term benefit of the climate
system.
15. Do you have specific protocol
language?
Like definitions, protocol language is a matter for detailed
negotiations following agreement on principle. Agreement on basic
principles will lead quickly to acceptable negotiating
text.
Q1 Should anthropogenic sinks be included in or
excluded from a QELRO?
Yes, they should be included, based on a proportionate sharing of
overall Annex I removals by anthropogenic sinks in 1990. (A Party's
QELRO for a future budget period would be set on the basis of its
emissions in 1990 less a proportionate share of total Annex I
removals in 1990.)
Our reasons are as follows:
(i) The FCCC and, in particular, the Berlin Mandate, are
unequivocally clear that sinks must be taken into
account;
(ii) Not to do so would represent a substantial emissions
'loophole';
(iii) To not include sinks would foreclose the opportunity for an
important mitigation option that may provide additional least cost
options;
(iv) Sharing 1990 removals across Annex I Parties based on 1990
emissions would be equitable. Including sinks in this manner would
ease the difficulty faced by some Parties and may assist in Parties
converging to an agreeable outcome in Kyoto.
Further comment on points (i) and (ii)
It is important to ensure targets for Annex I as a whole are not
set at such a level that net emissions could rise above 1990 levels.
This could occur if 1990 removals are ignored. At
AGBM8(2) we noted the
following:
This picture can be further elaborated as follows
Figure 2: ANNEX I ANTHROPOGENIC CO2 EMISSIONS AND
REMOVALS IN 1990
What this elaboration points out is that there are two elements to the 'net' removals noted in Figure 1 (earlier). These two elements can 'coexist' in a single activity, e.g. commercial forestry, which has harvesting emissions, and removals during forest growth. For a sustainably managed forest with an even distribution of age classes, these emissions and removals can net out to zero, i.e. the forest is in overall carbon equilibrium.
In other cases, the emissions and removals are more separate - for
example, land clearance emissions, emissions from loss of soil carbon
from land use change, and deforestation emissions, on the one hand;
and land reversion removals, gain in soil carbon from land use
change, and afforestation removals, on the other.
There are two key points to be made regarding these two Figures:
The total anthropogenic removals by sinks are more than the net LUCF 1.1 billion tonnes.
The total anthropogenic emissions by sources are more than the
13.8 billion tonnes of 'gross' emissions.
How does a potential 'emissions loophole' arise? In the long term,
the level of removals by the 1990 sinks cannot be sustained.
Eventually, all sinks must 'grow up' to become reservoirs, which no
longer remove CO2 from the atmosphere. As the
removals diminish to zero, the atmosphere will see correspondingly
greater net emissions.
If the Protocol were to establish a constraint (e.g.
stabilisation) based on the large 'anthropogenic emissions by
sources' pie in Figure 2, for example, the atmosphere would
eventually see an increase in emissions
equivalent to the amount of removals by sinks in 1990. Clearly, this
would not be consistent with constraining the impact on the
atmosphere(3) .
How soon would this occur? If changes were left to nature, the
length of time would depend on the age and growth rate of sinks in
the regions of the world where the sinks exist. For New Zealand's
pine forests, for example, with relatively fast growth rates the
length of time would be relatively
short(4) .
However, if the Protocol were established with the larger
'gross' or total emission 'pies' of Figure 2 and then credit was
allowed for some, or all, of the anthropogenic removals in future
budget periods, the emission increase would be immediate. This is
because the credits would allow 'gross' emission reductions to be
deferred(5).
Either way, the point is that, if sinks are excluded from
QELROs, i.e. if QELROs are established on either a 'gross' basis or
an 'emissions by sources' basis, without a 'net contraction factor',
the atmosphere will see an
increase in net
emissions.
Comment on point (iii)
Point (iii) above is that to not include sinks would
foreclose the opportunity for an important mitigation option that may
provide additional least cost options.
This could only have the following
effects:
the overall costs of adjustment to a less fossil fuel intensive future would be higher than otherwise; and
for a given level of acceptable cost, the Parties would
negotiate less ambitious targets.
In other words, including sinks on an appropriate basis will
mean that a more ambitious target emerges from
Kyoto.
Comment on point (iv)
Point (iv) is that sharing 1990 removals across Annex I
Parties in proportion to 1990 emissions would be equitable and, in
our assessment, including sinks in this manner would ease the
difficulty faced by some Parties. Rather than creating volatility, we
believe our approach could have a smoothing
effect.
Without doubt, including sinks at all will have a disparate
effect on Parties' circumstances. Parties with relatively more
forestry activity (active CO2 removers), will fare
comparatively better. This is directionally consistent with the
intent of the Convention. Bearing in mind that the EU bubble itself
has an internally smoothing effect on member States which is helpful
when sinks are included, consider the circumstances of those Parties
outside that bubble. In our view, including sinks in the way proposed
here would change these circumstances in such a way as to improve the
chances for negotiating an outcome, even a uniform target
outcome.
Summary
In summary, inclusion of sinks is essential for conformity with
the intent of the FCCC and the Berlin Mandate. By appropriately
including sinks, it is possible to ensure that the collective Annex I
target constrains future emissions in line with what the atmosphere
'saw' in 1990 - not some higher level. Including sinks provides a
broader set of least cost mitigation options which serve to reduce
Parties' costs to meet targets and allow more ambitious targets to be
accepted.
Question 2: What would be the impact of including or
excluding sinks on QELRO levels, national plans or policies of your
country?
New Zealand has undertaken deliberate agricultural subsidy removal
and forestry encouragement policies which today are having a
substantial effect on New Zealand's net emissions of greenhouse gases
to the atmosphere. In 1990,CO2 removals from New Zealand's
plantation forests mitigated over 85% of all anthropogenic
CO2 emissions, including those from forest harvest and
land use change.
Excluding sinks from the Protocol would have a clear adverse
effect on New Zealand's ability to accept an ambitious target.
Because of our already high usage of renewable energy, New Zealand
faces one of the highest marginal abatement costs of OECD countries.
In terms of emissions per capita and emissions per GDP, New Zealand
is broadly comparable to Ireland, a country which, under the proposed
EU burden sharing arrangement, would be allowed a substantial growth
in emissions. Differentiation proposals, such as that developed by
Iceland for example, have also indicated that New Zealand should have
a comparatively easier target.
Including sinks will change New Zealand's circumstance only if
inclusion is handled appropriately, i.e. in the way suggested in the
response to Question 1 above. If, however, a Party's rate of removal
in a future budget period were referenced against the Party's rate of
removal in 1990, New Zealand would be penalised by the inclusion of
sinks.
Using an 'individual Party net 1990' approach (one option in
Protocol draft text) would not be a problem for New Zealand alone. It
is true of all Parties who had substantial sinks in 1990. If targets
were set for individual Parties on the basis of their 'net 1990'
emissions, the greater the amount of removals a Party had in 1990,
the smaller its budget would be. This would penalise those Parties
with significant removals in 1990.
As explained above, New Zealand proposes that Annex I Parties
proportionately share the total CO2 removal by
sinks occurring in 1990. This is achieved by setting a Party's QELRO
on the basis of its anthropogenic emissions in 1990 less a
proportionate share of total Annex I anthropogenic removals in 1990.
This approach is exactly equivalent to basing emission budgets on a
Party's emissions by sources in 1990, adjusted by a uniform
contraction factor.
This contraction factor is the ratio of total Annex I removals by
sinks in 1990 divided by total Annex I emissions by sources in 1990.
Based on reported and estimated data this factor is around 12% to
15%. The contraction factor simply ensures that the sum of Annex I
Parties' emission budgets is based on the net emissions to the
atmosphere by Annex I Parties in 1990, ie the same total budget that
would be derived from summing budgets based on the 'individual net in
1990'.
In the budget period, each Annex I Party's anthropogenic emissions
to the atmosphere can then be measured on a net basis, i.e. emissions
by sources less removals by sinks(6)
.
If the Protocol includes sinks on this basis, even given the high
marginal abatement cost faced by New Zealand's energy sector, New
Zealand will be better placed to accept a more ambitious
target.
An important point to note is that New Zealand is a strong
advocate of emissions trading. CO2 removal
credits derived from our sinks would be part of the international
emissions trading regime. This means New Zealand's energy sector
emitters would face the international market price of
CO2.
Question 3: What criteria governed your answer to
question 1
Fully detailed in our answer to question 1.
Question 4: How would you define "anthropogenic" sinks
in the context of a QELRO
New Zealand proposes that the text of the Protocol explicity refer
to anthropogenic emissions by sources and anthropogenic removals by
sinks.
New Zealand is an active participant in the work of the IPCC
inventory group for land use change and forestry and supports and
will fully abide with the definition of anthropogenic that is
recommended to SBSTA and agreed by the COP.
New Zealand's reported CO2 removals are without
question anthropogenic as they result from planted forests and
afforestation.
Question 5: Do you agree or disagree that any QELRO
that would include sinks should be based on the 1996 IPCC guidelines
(for the first budget period)
New Zealand agrees but however notes that the 1996 IPCC guidelines
need to be finalised with respect to the treatment of harvested wood
products and biomass burning.
Any COP decision on inventory methodologies and any article in the
protocol related to inventory methodologies should be mindful of this
fact. In addition, a COP decision should urge the IPCC to place a
high priority on the completion of the 1996 guidelines as they relate
to land use change and forestry and additionally request the SBSTA to
provide any assistance necessary to facilitate the work of the IPCC
in this regard.
Question 6a: Which IPCC LUCF categories should be
included or excluded in a QELRO?
New Zealand supports the principle that all anthropogenic
emissions by sources and removals by sinks covered by the 1996
Guidelines should be included.
We also support the fact that the 1996 Guidelines endorse, and
recommend to Parties, the use of the most accurate national inventory
methods.
This said, we are mindful that some Parties have concerns about
some inventory activities and that in accomodating such concerns
Annex I Parties may choose, for the first budget period, to include a
less than complete list of activities covered under the IPCC 1996
Guidelines.
It was to allow for this possible outcome that New Zealand earlier
proposed a separate Annex for anthropogenic land use change and
forestry activities. We believe this option may yet prove to be found
agreeable to Parties.
Question 6b: If some categories are excluded, how
should they be dealt with?
Methodological work should be completed as soon as possible and
they should be included in the second budget period.
The protocol should include a provision for the review of changes
in inventory methodologies including GWPs with a view to a process to
revise QELROs in the second budget period if changes in methodologies
have sufficiently substantive effects.
(Such a provision is also likely to accommodate changes in our
understanding of climate change science. QELROs for the second period
budget and any subsequent periods should therefore be established at
this time on a provisional basis.)
Question 7: What reference year should be used as the
basis for any QELRO that would include sinks?
1990/2000/none/other
As noted in our answers to questions 1 and 2 it will be necessary,
under our proposal, to assess an individual Party's anthropogenic
emissions by sources in 1990, and assess the aggregate of Annex I
Parties' anthropogenic removals by sinks.
This latter assessment might be estimated at an aggregate level
rather than building it up from the individual Party level which may
prove difficult if some Parties do not have 1990 data.
During a future budget period net emissions or removals of
CO2 from land use change and forests can be assessed
from the change in carbon stock during the period. For this
measurement the reference stock would be that at the beginning of the
budget period.
Should Parties not have 1990 or subsequent data for the level of
carbon stock associated with the LUCF activities included in the
Protocol, they should be urged to begin reporting this data in their
annual inventories as soon as possible and, certainly, prior to the
beginning of the first budget period.
Question 8: Uncertainty
questions
The estimated uncertainty surrounding CO2
net removals by plantation forest sinks is in the order of
25%.
The estimated uncertainty surrounding CO2
emissions from on-site burning of biomass (scrub and indigenous
forest) and on-site decay of scrub cleared for forestry is in the
order of 35%.
(See NZ Second National Communication Pg 188-189 and Annex 5 for
further detail)
On the general question of uncertainty we would note that the
above uncertainty levels for LUCF emissions and removals are no
greater than, and in some cases far less than, the uncertainties for
some sources of methane and nitrous oxide.
In New Zealand's view, uncertainty for sinks should be treated in
the Protocol in a manner consistent with that for other greenhouse
gases. The focus should be continuing emphasis by IPCC/SBSTA on
improving inventory methodologies and ensuring that methodologies do
not contain systematic bias, i.e. there should be a generally equal
likelihood that the true value lies on the + side of the central
value as the - side. This, plus the fact that one is looking at
differences over time of emissions and removals where uncertainties
will tend to cancel themselves, means that uncertainty can be less of
a concern than some perceive.
It is also important to realise that strengthening Parties'
commitments will create incentives to improve national emission
monitoring and inventory techniques. This should lead to a reduction
in current levels of uncertainty.
We would also note that in addition to the uncertainty of
measurement, some Parties may be concerned about how the inclusion of
sinks affects their ability to predict their emissions in a future
budget period. This concern may then translate to their acceptance of
targets for this future period.
In our view this element of uncertainty needs to be put in the
context of all emissions, including those from energy. While energy
emissions may have relatively lower measurement uncertainties, future
emissions depend on factors such as future economic growth which are
relatively quite uncertain.
Again it is not appropriate to single out sinks as a particularly
uncertain element with the view to exclude them from the
Protocol.
Question 9: Should there be a limit on the amount of
sinks in a QELRO?
With the New Zealand proposal, which is that Annex I Parties
should proportionately share the aggregate 1990 level of removal by
anthropogenic sinks, it is not necessary that a limit be placed on
the amount of sinks in a QELRO.
In a budget period Annex I Parties should be assessed on a 'net to
the atmosphere' basis. There is no rational reason to place limits on
sinks in this calculation.
Placing a limit on sinks can, at the margin, remove all incentive
to take additional actions to increase CO2 removals. This
runs counter to the objectives of the Protocol and the Convention
itself. It also has the potential to unnecessarily increase the
overall cost of attaining a target.
Question 10: Is national communication data
adequate/inadequate for assessing compliance with a
QELRO?
By the time the first budget period begins there is no reason to
believe this should be a significant problem. Parties not following
the 1996 guidelines by then should have their data duly adjusted
(penalised). This is provided for in the current proposed Protocol
text (in Article 5.2)
Question 11: Should any "national system" established
under Article 4 give special consideration to sinks?
National inventory systems need to be established under the
general principle that the most accurate possible methods should be
established to estimate all anthropogenic emissions by sources and
removals by sinks. Removals by sinks are no more or less important
than emissions by sources.
Question 12: In order to achieve compliance with a
QELRO what activities should be credited and what base year should be
used?
As noted in our answer to question 2, during a budget period each
Annex I Party should be assessed on the basis of their net effect on
the atmosphere. All activities leading to anthropogenic emissions by
sources and removals by sinks for which IPCC inventory guidelines
exist and have been accepted by the COP should be included in this
assessment.
As noted in our answer to question 7, LUCF emissions and removals
can be assessed from the change in carbon stock over the period, The
'base year' for this assessment would be the beginning of the budget
period.
Question 13: What definitions should be included?
Net = emissions by sources less removals by sinks
(We will provide others at a later time following a fuller review
of the draft articles)
Question 14: Do you have any other approach to
propose?
The approach generally proposed in answers to previous questions
and articulated in text in response to question 15 is the approach
New Zealand is putting forward for consideration at this time in an
effort to have Parties converge on a solution to the sinks issue. It
should be noted that this approach is a little different to that
articulated in the 27 October position New Zealand circulated at
AGBM8.
In the 27 October proposal, the distinction was drawn for
CO2 emissions between energy and industrial processes
(often termed 'gross' emissions) on the one hand and land use change
and forestry (LUCF) on the other. LUCF includes both emissions and
removals.
This, for example, is a distinction also drawn by the Secretariat
in how it synthesizes inventory data. There are a number of arguments
that Parties including New Zealand have made about why such a
separation is logical, both deriving from the Convention and from the
nature of the emissions themselves (eg fossil fuel based compared
with recycled atmospheric carbon).
However such a separation is not universally accepted and may lead
to it being difficult to reach convergence on the sinks
issue.
A more practical problem arises when one attempts to construct
protocol text with such a separation. For example, sinks other than
for CO2 from LUCF exist which may be construed as
anthropogenic, even if inventory methodologies have yet to be
developed for Parties to report them. Also emissions from LUCF are
not restricted to just CO2.
In our view, on reflection, to create understandable and agreeable
text to cater to these practical complexities appears unlikely at
this late hour. It now seems to us that the appropriate distinction
to draw is simply anthropogenic emissions by sources and
anthropogenic removals by sinks.
This is the basis of the text proposed in our answer to question
15.
Question 15: Do you have specific Protocol language?
Yes:
New Zealand textual proposal - Article
3
1. Each Party [Parties] included in Annex I
shall [individually or jointly] ensure that [its/their] net aggregate
anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of [the] greenhouse
gases [listed in Annex A] [not controlled by the Montreal Protocol]
do not exceed [its/their] commitment[s], expressed in terms of [an]
emission[s] budget[s], calculated in accordance with this
article.
Comment: Paragraph 1 combines
through the use of [ ] the elements of the current Alternatives 1 and
2 in FCCC/CP/1997/2. We suggest that the intent behind Alternative 3
is catered to in out proposed paragraphs 6 bis and 6 ter which
establish defined aggregate Annex I Party targets on a net basis for
the first and second budget periods.
Paragraph 1 essentially says that Annex I Parties' net
emissions to the atmosphere during a budget period shall not exceed
the emissions budget for that period established under the various
paragraphs in Article 3 by which the emissions budgets are finally
calculated. Paragraph 1 caters to the inclusion or exclusion of an
Annex A and the inclusion or exclusion of Parties acting jointly
(i.e. the EU Bubble).
6 bis. For the first budget period, the total of
all Annex I Parties' net emissions of [the] greenhouse gases [listed
in Annex A] [not controlled by the Montreal Protocol] shall be [_]
per cent of the total of all Annex I Parties' net emissions of
greenhouse gases [listed in Annex A] [not controlled by the Montreal
Protocol] in 1990.
6 ter. For the second budget period, the total of
all Annex I Parties' net emissions of [the] greenhouse gases [listed
in Annex A] [not controlled by the Montreal Protocol] shall be [_]
per cent of the total of all Annex I Parties' net emissions of
greenhouse gases [listed in Annex A] [not controlled by the Montreal
Protocol] in 1990.
Comment: As noted above, paragraphs
6 bis and 6 ter establish the aggregate Annex I targets on a net
basis relative to 1990 for the first and second budget periods. (The
combination of these paragraphs and emissions trading under the
provisions of Article 6 essentially establish an 'Annex I
Bubble').
7. For the first budget period, from 200[x] to
200[x+5], the starting budget for each Annex I Party shall be [__per
cent / the percentage inscribed for that Party in Attachment 1] of
that Party's aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent
emissions(7) of [the] greenhouse gases
[listed in Annex A] [not controlled by the Montreal Protocol] in 1990
or in the base year or period determined in accordance with paragraph
3 above, multiplied by 5.
Comment: Paragraph 7 provides that
the starting budgets of Annex I Parties are individually established
on the basis of their anthropogenic CO2 equivalent
emissions by sources. The text contemplates various [ ] options.
First, these could be all anthropogenic emissions by sources or only
those from gases/sources listed in Annex A. Second, the targets could
be uniform for Parties or as differentiated and inscribed in
Attachment 1. Paragraph 8 duplicates paragraph 7 for the second
budget period.
8. For the second budget period, from 200[x] to
20[x+5], the starting budget for each Annex I Party shall be [__per
cent / the percentage inscribed for that Party in Attachment 1] of
that Party's aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent
emissions of [the] greenhouse gases [listed in Annex A] [not
controlled by the Montreal Protocol] in 1990 or in the base year or
period determined in accordance with paragraph 3 above, multiplied by
5.
8 bis. To ensure that the total amount of all
Annex I Parties' net emissions to the atmosphere of [the] greenhouse
gases [listed in Annex A] [not controlled by the Montreal Protocol]
established under paragraph 6 bis and 6 ter is not exceeded, the
budget for each Annex I Party established in paragraphs 7 and 8 shall
be reduced by the ratio of total Annex I anthropogenic removals by
sinks in 1990 divided by total Annex I anthropogenic emissions in
1990.
Comment: Paragraph 8 bis is the
means by which the individual starting budgets for Annex I Parties
established under paragraphs 7 and 8 are contracted (or shrunk) to
proportionately share the aggregate removals by sinks of Annex I
Parties in 1990. This ensures that the total of Annex I Parties'
emissions budgets are in accord with the limits established in
paragraphs 6 bis and 6 ter.
It should be noted that because this contraction of Parties'
individual budgets occurs after any equity decisions that may be
taken which lead to differentiating the emissions baseline ( ie in
paragraphs 7 and 8 if this happens), these would be taken into
account in the uniform sharing of removals.
(Note that text relating to Article 10 Parties needs to be
similarly reviewed for modification in accord with the
above!)
The Norwegian response to questions for parties regarding
sinks
Question 1
Norway wants a protocol with incentives to direct policies and measures both towards sinks and sources. This necessitates an inclusion of sinks in the QELROs in the protocol or other instrument to be agreed in Kyoto. Otherwise we are afraid the protocol will hamper the Parties in stimulating the most effective balance of policies and measures in order to fulfil the goal of the Climate Convention. An inclusion is consistent with the Convention and the Berlin Mandate. Both a traditional net approach and a so-called stock change approach (here the term stock change approach is used for an approach in line with what New Zealand has advocated in recent AGBMs) could provide incentives to increase the sinks. We can see technical and scientific advantages with a stock change approach. Practically all Norwegian forests are managed and thus subject to various policies and measures which will constantly affect the uptake of carbon. We realise technical difficulties in an approach that would try to single out and count effects of specific climate related policies and measures only.
Question 2
Inclusion of removals by sinks seems to make it possible for many
Parties to accept more ambitious QELROs. The alternatives a)
exclusion of sinks, b) inclusion on a net basis or c) inclusion on a
stock change basis will imply three different levels for the QELROs
in order to express equivalent levels of ambitions regarding
emissions of GHGs. In countries where the sinks are large compared to
the emissions, these levels can be significantly different. (This is
illustrated in the secretariat's paper FCCC/SBSTA/1996/9/Add.1 table
3, based on the first communications under the Convention.) For
Norway, inclusion of sinks in a QELRO may make it possible to accept
a more ambitious QELRO than without.
Regarding national plans or policies in Norway, inclusion of sinks
in the QELROs will definitely put more emphasis on efforts in the
forestry sector, which would most likely lead to a higher net uptake
of GHG (CO2).
Question 3
The main reasons for our answer to question 1 are the commitments
of the UNFCCC and the Berlin Mandate, addressing all sectors, sources
and sinks of GHGs. From an environmental point of view, it is
important to give the right incentives for actions, including sources
as well as sinks, in the protocol or other instrument to be agreed in
Kyoto. Inclusion of removals by sinks will also make it possible for
many Parties to accept more ambitious QELROs.
Question 4
For Norway it seems reasonable to include antrophogenic emissions
and sinks from land use change and forestry (LUCF) in accordance with
the IPCC guidelines. For Norway reporting on such sources has been
extensively undertaken in our second national
communication.
In principle all areas within the jurisdiction of a party which
have been affected by management, and all categories, should be
included in the basic calculations in accordance with the IPCC
guidelines. Inclusion of sinks in a QELRO should be based on the
assumption that the calculated sink is real in terms of removing
CO2 from the atmosphere, and thus comparable to reductions
of emissions by sources.
Question 5
The reporting scheme should be compatible with the reporting of
emissions included in QELROs. The other important principle is to be
able to utilise the best information at a certain point in time. When
we define QELROs in Kyoto, these will most probably be related to
present data based on IPCC 1996 guidelines and presented in the
national communications.
If Parties make improvements in their methodology within the
guidance of the IPCC guidelines the same changes should apply
to all relevant years, both base years and target years. The changes
should be reported in a transparent way. The questions arising from
future revisions of the guidelines that may lead to changes in
the figures have many similarities with other types of questions
related to future methodological issues connected to the
implementation of the protocol. The approach to such changes
should therefore reflect the more general approach in the protocol to
such methodological issues. The same problem of uncertainty and
possible revision applies for any gas or sector included in the
QELROs, and not only to sinks. The uncertainty and possibility for
revisions in this sector is not considered greater than for emissions
of methane and nitrous oxide.
Question 6
In principle all IPCC LUCF categories should be
included.
Question 7
1990 should preferably be used as base year, but differentiated
QELROs or lack of reliable data may make it possible to use other
years.
Question 8
a)
The level of uncertainty varies between different chemical
compounds and different reporting categories. We find most of the
data of CO2 emission from fossil fuels rather accurate.
The uncertainty in the emission data for biotic CO2 sinks
are in general at the same order of magnitude as the data for some of
the methane and nitrous oxide categories, e.g. CH4 from landfills and
N2O from agriculture.
The trend from one year to another is less uncertain than the
level of the emission in one year. Further the uncertainty is
generally higher for single categories than for the aggregated figure
for a chemical compound.
b)
We will have to live with uncertainties related to many sources
and sinks in the QELROs. Compared to other uncertainties, we find the
uncertainties in the LUCF sector in Norway acceptable, and it is thus
appropriate to have sinks included in our QELROs. We believe the
situation is similar in many Annex I countries. In principle the
level of uncertainty for sinks in the QELROs should not be
significantly higher than for other single reporting categories.
Inclusion of sinks (LUCF) in a QELRO will not necessarily increase
the uncertainty and inclusion is not more problematic than inclusion
of i.a. methane from landfills and N2O from
agriculture.
c)
Transparent reporting according to agreed guidelines.
Question 9
No limitation.
Question 10
Yes it is adequate - if the communications are in line with the
guidelines.
Question 11
The national system for estimation of emissions and removals
referred to in article 5 in the FCCC/CP/1997/2 should take into
consideration anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals
by sinks of all GHGs as proposed in the document.
Question 12
Base year: Preferably 1990. The development in all antrophogenic
emissions by sources and removals by sinks should be credited against
properly differentiated QELROs.
Question 13, 14 and 15
At the moment we have no further comments to these questions
beyond the information given above.
ANSWERS TO THE PROPOSED QUESTIONS FOR PARTIES REGARDING
SINKS
1. Yes. Because it is a reduction that can be accomplished within
those that offer economic advantages. However, there is a need for a
special global effort from the scientific community to achieve a
reliable methodology on land use change and forestry.
2. The impact of including sinks on QELRO levels should mean
higher levels of commitments that if they are not accounted. Peru is
aware of the need to initiate a short term progressive reduction of
emissions for the next century. This is a cornerstone of the
Protocol.
3. The answer to question 1 is governed by scientific, economic, environmental and political criteria.
Scientific: sink function of woods and soil is evident
Economic: higher resource valuation, cost efficiency and efficacy in mitigation options
Environmental: additional environmental benefits as land use capacity restoration, water balance, microclimate and biological diversity
Political: Higher forest valuation leads to better national
policies on sustainable development. Specially ifs developing
countries, this will help to initiate or reinforce the long term
process to reduce deforestation due to poverty.
4. "Anthropogenic" sinks should be defined as a product of a
process in which clear action and decision making processes were
involved and that can not be attributed to chance or circumstances.
In fact, anthropogenic sinks are produced by activities of
afforestation, reforestation and forest management.
5. Disagree. 1996 IPCC guidelines recommends the use of available
national methodologies or default values in tile land use change and
forestry categories. This has meant the use by developed countries of
their own expertise and the use of default values from developing
countries. New IPCC methods should be developed to reduce uncertainty
and achieve comparable methodologies according to Art. 4.1 a). These
new methodologies should be based on field work research, systematic
observation and development of data archives.
6. A. The category that shall be included is
changes in forest and other woody biomass stocks. The reason is that
human action is more evident and quantifiable methodologies are
easier to achieve in a short term period.
B. The categories that shall be excluded are expected to be
addressed with specific policies and measures to enhance their role
as greenhouse gases sinks
7. The base year should be 2000 to which clear methods should be
developed.
8. a. For sinks high uncertainty is assumed.
b. A maximum of what is allowed to me highest source considered
c. Uncertainty should be addressed through enhancing the knowledge
of biogeochemical cycles particularly in tropical counties.
Additional funds should be provided for that reason
9. Yes. It should be determined according to the overall capacity,
of greenhouse gases removal by sinks in comparison with the global
emissions level.
10. Inadequate. Maximums and minimums according to uncertainties
are expected to be provided as well as evidence that the enhancement
is due to anthropogenic sinkes.
11. Not clear which article 4.
12. Afforestation, reforestation and forest
management.
13. The categories of anthropogenic enhancement of sinks should be
included
14. No.
15. No.
Class |
Source |
Quality of National Emission Estimate |
Quality of Project- Level Reduction |
US Emissions Share (percent) |
US Emissions Trend | |
IPCC Current |
Post-Kyoto |