30 May 1997
ENGLISH ONLY
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
AD HOC GROUP ON THE BERLIN MANDATE
Seventh session
Bonn, 31 July - 7 August 1997
Item 3 of the provisional agenda
In addition to the submissions already received (see
FCCC/AGBM/1996/MISC.2 and Add.1, 2, 3 and 4 and FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.1
and Add.1 and 2), further proposals have been received from Brazil,
the Netherlands (on behalf of the European Community and its member
States) and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland.
In accordance with the procedure for miscellaneous
documents, these submissions are attached and are reproduced in the
languages in which they were received and without formal
editing.
Any additional submissions will be issued as a further addendum.
FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.1/Add.3
GE.97-
CONTENTS
Paper No. Page
1. Brazil 3
(Submission dated 28 May 1997)
2. Netherlands 58
(on behalf of the European Community and its member States)
(Submission dated 21 April 1997)
3. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 60
(Submission dated 29 May 1997)
The First Conference of the Parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (Berlin, March-April 1995)
decided that a Protocol to the Convention should be negotiated and be
ready for approval by the Third Conference of the Parties (Kyoto,
December 1997). The guidelines for the negotiation of such a protocol
are contained in the resolution known as the Berlin Mandate, and the
negotiating body established for this purpose is the Ad-hoc Working
Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM).
This document contains proposals for the substantive elements
of the Protocol to the Convention, for consideration by the AGBM at
its seventh session (July 1997). The proposal is divided into three
parts.
Part I is an executive summary, containing some key elements
relevant to the negotiation of the Protocol.
Part II is the proposal itself, in the form of text for the
Protocol.
Part III, with technical appendices, contains an extended
explanation of the basic concepts and proposals, together with some
illustrative elements.
1. Objective
The Berlin Mandate and subsequent decisions by the AGBM provide
for the establishment of quantitative emission reduction and
limitation targets for Annex I Parties to the Convention, and the
advancement of existing commitments by non-Annex I
Parties.
It follows that the two central questions to be discussed by
the AGBM in preparing a Protocol to the Convention are:
a) the decision on the future level of Annex I Parties
emissions, in the time horizon of the Berlin Mandate (2000 to 2020);
and
b) the criterion for the sharing of the burden of mitigation
among those Annex I Parties.
In order to introduce objectivity in the treatment of both
questions, it is necessary to establish the relationship between the
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol (the cause
of climate change), and the quantitative resulting change of climate
(the effect of human action).
Whereas it is recognized that the change of climate is
predicted to have a complex geographical distribution, it is
important to have a single variable to measure climate change. It is
proposed here that the change in global mean surface temperature be
used as a measure of climate change.
This proposal addresses the central question of the
relationship between the emissions of greenhouse gases by Parties
over a period of time and the effect of such emissions in terms of
climate change, as measured by the increase in global mean surface
temperature.
The introduction of a measure of emissions over a given period
of time in terms of their effect upon the temperature increase allows
the choice of a reduction target for the ensemble of Annex I Parties
to be made with a clear view of the impact of the choice upon climate
change.
This target based upon the induced temperature increase allows
maximum flexibility in the choice of policies and measures by Annex I
Parties and therefore reduces the economic burden of mitigation
measures. At the same time, it is comprehensive in terms of inclusion
of different greenhouse gases, and it establishes the concept of a
"budget" in terms of the effect of emissions over a period of
time.
The criterion for the sharing of the burden among those Parties
becomes a natural consequence of the fact that, given the emissions
over a period for every and each Annex I Parties, it is possible to
assign relative responsibilities to individual Parties according to
their respective contributions to climate change, as measured by the
induced change in temperature.
It also establishes an objective differentiation criterion
among Annex I Parties, as most of the burden is to be borne by those
Parties that are most responsible for contributing to climate
change.
2. Common but differentiated responsibilities
The principle of the common but differentiated responsibilities
between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties arises from the
acknowledgment by the Convention that the largest share of historical
and current global emissions of greenhouse gas has originated in the
developed countries.
It is also acknowledged by the Convention that the per capita
emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and that
the share of global emissions originating in developing countries
will grow to meet their social and development needs.
It is possible to assign relative responsibilities to the
ensemble of Annex I countries and non-Annex I countries according to
their respective contributions to climate change, as measured by the
induced change in climate. It is shown that, whereas the annual
emissions of non-Annex I countries, according to the IPCC IS92a
scenario, are estimated to grow to be equal to those of Annex I
countries by 2037, the resulting induced change in temperature from
non-Annex I countries are estimated to equal that of Annex I
countries only in 2147.
3. Polluter pays principle
The effective implementation of the Protocol requires the
specification of a framework under which the departure by a Party
from its commitment results in an obligation to compensate such
departure by other means.
It is proposed that the departure from the temperature increase
ceiling allowed for an individual Party, measured in terms of the
induced change in climate, be used as a quantitative basis for
establishing a contribution to a non-Annex I clean development fund
to be managed by the financial mechanism of the Convention for the
promotion of precautionary measures in non-Annex I
Parties.
It is also proposed that Annex I Parties be allowed to use the
difference between the temperature increase ceiling allowed for the
Party and actual induced temperature increase as a measure in trading
among themselves. An Annex I Party that exceeds its temperature
ceiling, over an evaluation period, can compensate it by
"purchasing", at a market value, an equivalent "temperature credit"
from another Annex I Party that induced a temperature increase lower
than its committed temperature ceiling.
The financial resources of the clean development fund are to be
directed preferentially to the non-Annex I Parties that have a larger
relative contribution to climate change.
Each non-Annex I Party may, on a voluntary basis, apply for
funds to be used in climate change projects. Such applications are
subject to the appropriate regulations approved by the Conference of
the Parties for this purpose.
In the detailed specification of the criteria for the use of
the financial resources from the non-Annex I clean development fund,
it may be found appropriate to assign a small portion of such
resources to climate change adaptation programs.
This clean development fund will contribute to a global
objective, which is the ultimate objective of limiting the change in
climate itself, while allowing constructively the advancement of the
implementation of the Convention by non-Annex I Parties.
4. Objectivity of the discussion of a
protocol
In order to clarify the proposal, Part III of this document
contains numerical data intended exclusively for illustration
purposes. Whereas an effort has been made to use the best available
data for this purpose, their use does not in itself constitute an
acknowledgment of the appropriateness of such data.
It may be noted that the proposal is neutral to Brazil, as a
non-Annex I Party, and the assignment of Brazilian share in the clean
development fund distribution proposed is in accordance with its
relative contribution to climate change.
Definitions
1. For the purposes of this Protocol, the following definitions
shall apply:
"net anthropogenic emissions" of
a given greenhouse gas not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, in a
given year, means the difference between the
anthropogenic emissions by sources and the
anthropogenic removals by sinks of
that greenhouse gas, in that year.
"effective emissions", in a
given time period, means the increase in global mean surface
temperature at the end of the period, as determined by an agreed
climate change model, resulting from both the net
anthropogenic emissions of an agreed set of
greenhouse gases, in each year of that time period, and from the
initial concentrations of those greenhouse gases in the beginning of
the period.
Quantitative emission limitation and reduction
objectives
2. For the purposes of this Protocol, the following greenhouse
gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol shall be considered:
carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide.
3. Effective emissions
references are established for the totality of Annex
I Parties and for each Annex I Party, equal to the respective
effective emissions corresponding to a
constant level of net anthropogenic
emissions of each greenhouse gas in the period 1990
to 2020, equal to the level of net anthropogenic
emissions in 1990, and taking the initial
concentrations in 1990 to be equal to zero.
4. An effective emissions
ceiling is established for the totality of Annex I
Parties equal to the effective
emissions corresponding to a constant level
of net anthropogenic emissions in the
period 1990 to 2000, equal to the level of net
anthropogenic emissions in 1990, and decreasing
regularly from 2000 to 2020 to a value, in 2020, that is 30% lower
than the 1990 value, and taking the initial concentrations in 1990 to
be equal to zero.
5. Effective emissions reduction
targets are established for each of the periods
2001-2005, 2006-2010, 2011-2015 and 2016-2020, for the totality of
Annex I Parties, equal to the difference between the
effective emissions reference and the
effective emissions ceiling, both
computed as provided for in items 3 and 4 above, for each of the
above periods, and taking the initial concentrations in each period
to be equal to zero.
6. A relative responsibility of
each Annex I Party with respect to the totality of Annex I Parties is
established, for each of the periods 1990-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010,
and 2011-2015, equal to the relative fraction of the
effective emissions which is
attributable to that Party, with respect to the ensemble of Annex I
Parties, by considering, for each of the above periods, constant
net anthropogenic emissions equal to
its value in the initial year of the period, and the respective
concentrations in the initial year of the period. The Parties may
wish to adjust the individual relative responsibilities to take into
account special considerations provided for in the
UNFCCC.
7. An individual effective emissions reduction
target is established for each of the periods
2001-2005, 2006-2010, 2011-2015 and 2016-2020, for each Annex I
Party, equal to the share of the effective emissions
reduction target for the totality of Annex I Parties,
that represents a fraction of the total equal to their
relative responsibility for the
periods 1990-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010, and 2011-2015,
respectively. Such targets may be
achieved individually or jointly among Annex I Parties.
8. An individual effective emissions
ceiling is established for each of the periods
2001-2005, 2006-2010, 2011-2015 and 2016-2020, for each Annex I
Party, equal to the difference between the corresponding
effective emissions reference and
individual effective emissions reduction
target.
9. Each Annex I Party agrees to adopt the necessary policies
and measures to ensure that their net anthropogenic
emissions in the period 2000-2020 are such that the
corresponding effective emissions
remain below its individual effective
emissions ceiling for each period in item 8
above.
Contributions
10. There shall be a periodic
evaluation, for the periods 2001-2005, 2006-2010,
2011-2015 and 2016-2020, of the compliance by each Annex I Party with
the commitments to maintain its effective emissions
below the respective effective
emissions ceiling, including the
calculation of the difference between the
effective emissions based on reported
net anthropogenic emissions, and the
corresponding effective emissions
ceiling.
11. A contribution shall be made to the financial mechanism of
the Convention by each Annex I Party found to be in non-compliance in
accordance with item 10 above, on the basis of 3.33 US$ (three US
dollars and thirty-three cents) for each effective
emissions unit above the effective
emissions ceiling calculated as per item 10 above,
expressed in tCy equivalent.
12. The financial mechanism of the UNFCCC shall establish a
non-Annex I clean development fund to
receive the contributions made in accordance with item 11
above.
13. The financial resources of the non-Annex I
clean development fund shall be made available to
non-Annex I Parties for use in climate change mitigation and
adaptation projects according to guidelines to be established by the
Fourth Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC.
14. The financial resources of the non-Annex I
clean development fund allotted to climate change
adaptation projects shall not exceed 10% (ten percent) of the total
amount of this fund in any year.
15. The financial resources of the non-Annex I
clean development fund allotted to climate change
projects in each of the periods 2001-2005, 2006-2010, 2011-2015 and
2016-2020 shall be made available to non-Annex I Parties that wish to
implement such projects, in the same proportion as their fraction of
the overall non-Annex I Parties effective
emissions, determined for the periods 1990-2000,
2001-2005, 2006-2010, and 2011-2015, respectively, by considering ,
in each period, a constant level of net anthropogenic
emissions, equal to the arithmetic mean of the
reported net anthropogenic emissions,
and initial concentrations, for the period 1990-2000 equal to zero,
and for the periods 2001-2005, 2006-2010, and 2011-2015, equal to
that resulting from the net anthropogenic
emissions considered in the previous
periods.
1. Introduction
The UNFCCC process, from the point of view of the mitigation of
climate change, consists of a periodic reporting of emissions of
greenhouse gases by the Parties, a periodic review of the global
situation in terms of the likely change of climate in the future, a
decision on the future level of emissions to be tolerated, and a
decision on the sharing of the burden to be incurred by individual
Parties with a view to maintaining the emissions below the levels to
be tolerated. At the current stage of the process, the Berlin Mandate
established guidelines for the negotiation of a Protocol that, in
particular, calls for the inclusion of quantitative emission
limitation and reduction objectives for the Annex I
Parties.
It follows that the two central questions to be discussed by
the AGBM in preparing a Protocol to the Convention are:
a) the decision on the future level of emissions to be
tolerated from the Annex I Parties, taken together; and
b) the criterion for the sharing of the burden among those
Annex I Parties.
This proposal addresses the central question of the
relationship between the emissions of greenhouse gases by Parties
over a period of time and the effect of such emissions in terms of
climate change, as measured by the increase in global mean surface
temperature. It is demonstrated that a very simple calculation scheme
can be used in lieu of the complex climate
models, while still maintaining the correct functional dependence of
the increase in mean surface temperature upon the emissions over a
period of time.
As a result, the discussion on the overall quantitative
emissions to be tolerated can take place with immediate consideration
of the effect of different quantitative emissions scenarios upon the
temperature and mean sea level.
The discussion on the sharing of the burden of mitigation is
made more objective by the ready availability of quantitative
information on the effect upon climate change of the emissions of
individual Parties and consequently on their relative
responsibilities in inducing climate change.
In order to make the Protocol effective, it is not sufficient
to establish quantitative emission limitation and reduction targets
for individual Annex I Parties in the period leading to 2020. It is
necessary, in addition, to establish mechanisms by which the
compliance of individual Annex I Parties with their respective
commitments are periodically verified, and departures from compliance
at the end of the period imply the automatic assessment of the
obligation to contribute to a global clean development fund as a
compensatory measure. An objective criterion is further introduced
for the distribution of such fund among non-Annex I Parties, in
proportion to the effect of their emissions in producing climate
change.
Section 2 (of this Part III) contains an introduction to
differentiation of commitments.
Section 3 analyses the relationship between emissions and
climate change, developing a simple measure of the magnitude of
climate change in terms of net anthropogenic
emissions of all greenhouse gases.
Section 4 establishes an objective measure of reduction targets
for the ensemble of Annex I Parties in terms of climate
change.
Section 5 analyses the relative responsibilities of Annex I
Parties among themselves.
Section 6 contains a further elaboration of the relative
responsibilities concept, highlighting the relative responsibility of
Annex I group of countries compared to non-Annex I
group.
Section 7 analyses the sharing of the burden of mitigation
among Annex I Parties, and introduces the concept of reduction
targets and ceilings.
Section 8 establishes a compensation mechanism in case of
departure from achievement of ceiling objectives by Annex I
Parties.
Section 9 proposes criteria for the distribution of the
financial resources of the non-Annex I clean development
fund.
2. Differentiation of
commitments
There is a growing consensus within the AGBM that the Kyoto
Protocol is to contain a requirement for the reduction of emissions
from Annex I Parties by 2010 with respect to those in 1990 of the
order of 20%. This percentage of reduction originated with the
protocol proposed by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), and
may be changed in the final stages of the negotiations.
One question being discussed in the AGBM is that of the
criteria that should be used for the differentiation among Annex I
Parties of their quantitative commitments for emission
reductions.
Some countries have advanced the idea of a "flat rate", meaning
the application of the same percentage to each Annex I Party, with
the argument that it would be very difficult to do otherwise. This
"flat rate", or more appropriately, this "flat percentage of
reduction rate with respect to a fixed baseline of 1990" is one of
the many possible criteria for the sharing of the burden of
mitigation among Annex I Parties.
It would be equally simple to propose that the reduction should
be the same in terms of the absolute emissions, or the same in terms
of emissions per unit of population or gross national
product.
In addition, the "flat rate" criterion for the sharing of the
burden of mitigation penalizes Parties that, for one reason or
another, have maintained relatively low emissions up to the baseline
year. This penalty is compounded by the fact that the cost of
avoiding emissions increases non-linearly as the energy matrix
becomes less carbon-intensive.
On the other hand, the "flat rate" approach fails to take into
account important factors that determine the baseline year starting
point in terms of initial level of emissions and concentrations, such
as:
a) the present and historical relative importance of fossil
versus renewable energy sources;
b) the efficiency of the technology in the generation and use
of energy;
c) the population and population growth;
d) the natural resources base;
e) the profile of socio-economic activities; and
f) the surface area of territory.
For the above reasons, the majority of the Annex I Parties
insist on the introduction of some criterion for the differentiation
of the commitments of these Parties. The present proposal takes this
concern into consideration.
The principle of the common but differentiated
responsibilities, between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties, arises
from the acknowledgment by the Convention that the largest share of
historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gas has
originated in the developed countries.
It is also acknowledged by the Convention that the per capita
emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and that
the share of global emissions originating in developing countries
will grow to meet their social and development needs.
A simple reading of this statement leads implicitly to the
interpretation of the relative share of current and projected future
emissions of the two groups of Parties as being a measure of the
relative responsibility between the groups of Parties.
It is often implied that, as the non-Annex I emissions in the
future will tend to grow more rapidly than Annex I emissions, most of
the responsibility for climate change in the future will tend to be
attributed to non-Annex I Parties, the year when the non-Annex I
emissions equals those of Annex I Parties being taken as the year
when the respective responsibilities become equal.
This approach for implicit differentiation of responsibilities
overestimates the non-Annex I Parties share of responsibility, as it
does not take into consideration the different historical emission
path resulting from very different industrialization process and
consumption patterns in time of both groups.
The definition of relative responsibilities in terms of the
relative resulting change in global mean temperature, taking into
account the initial concentrations due to Annex I and non-Annex I
Parties eliminates this difficulty.
In addition, non-Annex I Parties will likely be the most
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.
For the above reasons, it is important that the non-Annex I
Parties recognize that they have a stake in the discussion of the
issue of differentiation of quantitative commitments by Annex I
Parties within the AGBM.
3. The relationship between emissions and climate
change: a simple measure of the magnitude of climate change in terms
of net anthropogenic emissions of all greenhouse
gases
The UNFCCC recognizes, on one hand, that the mitigation of
climate change is to be done by limiting or reducing the difference
between the anthropogenic emissions and the removals by sinks of
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, and on the
other hand, that the ultimate objective is to limit the change in
climate itself.
For the sake of brevity, such difference between anthropogenic
emissions and anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not
controlled by the Montreal Protocol is to be conveniently defined as
net anthropogenic emissions. In this
text only, and unless stated otherwise, the word
emissions means the net
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases not
controlled by the Montreal Protocol as defined here.
It becomes therefore of central importance to establish the
relationship between the net anthropogenic
emissions and the resulting change of climate.
Whereas it is recognized that the change of climate is predicted to
have a complex geographical distribution, it is important to have a
unique measurement of the global climate change.
The obvious choice of a unique variable to measure climate
change is the change in global mean surface temperature, because
other global variables such as the time rate of change of the global
mean surface temperature and the rise in mean sea level are derived
from the change in global mean surface temperature. In this text
only, and unless stated otherwise, the word
temperature means such change in
global mean surface temperature.
The dependence of the temperature upon the emissions is a
complex one and is best treated with the help of coupled
atmospheric-oceanic global circulation models. As reported in the
IPCC Second Assessment Report, the simple climate models, which are
box-diffusion models, are today able to model with sufficient
accuracy the significant functional dependency between emissions and
temperature.
As a matter of fact, the IPCC Working Group I has produced the
IPCC Technical Paper II, at the request of the Convention bodies,
entitled "An Introduction to Simple Climate Models Used in the IPCC
Second Assessment Report" which summarizes the key aspects of such
models and thus makes an important contribution to bringing the best
scientific knowledge to the help of policy makers in the area of
climate change.
For the immediate purposes of assisting in the negotiation of
the Protocol mandated in Berlin, and given the relatively short time
period involved (at most 1990 to 2020), it is shown that all relevant
aspects of the functional dependence of the temperature upon the
emissions can be represented with sufficient accuracy by an even
simpler "policy maker" model as described in summary below and as
detailed in Appendix I.
In a first approximation, the dependence of the atmospheric
concentrations upon the emissions over a given period of time is
proportional to the accumulation of the emissions up to the year in
question, taking into account that the older the emission the smaller
its effect on the concentration, due to the exponential natural decay
of the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere with a different lifetime
for each gas.
As an example, a carbon dioxide emission occurring in 1990 will
produce a certain concentration in that year that will have decayed
to 80% of the original value by 2020. While the same is approximately
true for nitrous oxide (both with an atmospheric lifetime of about
140 years), a methane emission in 1990 will have decayed to 8% of the
original value by 2020, given its lifetime of 12 years.
The physics of the radiative forcing indicates that the rate of
deposition of energy on the surface, that is, the warming itself, is
proportional to the concentration of the greenhouse gas, with a
different constant of proportionality for each gas (1 for carbon
dioxide, 58 for methane and 206 for nitrous oxide, for the present
level of concentrations, with respect to carbon
dioxide).
The increase in global mean surface temperature is roughly
proportional to the accumulation over time of the radiative warming.
The radiative warming is, in turn, proportional to the atmospheric
concentration of the greenhouse gas. It follows that the temperature
increase itself is proportional to the accumulation of the
atmospheric concentration of the greenhouse gas.
In reality the above statement is only approximately true, in
view of the non-linearities of the system and the existence of other
mechanisms such as the delay introduced by the dissipation of heat
into the oceans through advective and diffusion
processes.
Such complete treatment of the climate system is included in
the atmosphere-ocean coupled general circulation models requiring the
highest available computing power. The simple box-diffusion models,
as demonstrated in the IPCC Second Assessment Report include such
processes to a sufficient accuracy and are therefore calibrated
against the supercomputer models.
The present document, in reality, contains a proposal of a very
simple policy maker model, calibrated against the simple
box-diffusion models by empirically determining constants of
proportionality by comparison with results from the IPCC MAGICC
box-diffusion model, when both are fed with the same emission
data.
The policy maker model contains, nevertheless, all of the
essential functional dependence between, on one hand, the increase in
global mean surface temperature and mean sea level rise and, on the
other hand, the net anthropogenic
emissions of greenhouse gases over a given period,
that induce such change in climate (see Appendix I).
In practice, therefore, the emissions of a greenhouse gas over
a given period of time, together with the consideration of the
additional concentration of anthropogenic origin in the initial year
of the period, can be directly expressed in terms of their
quantitative effect upon the increase in temperature. Such a measure
of the temperature is defined here as the effective
emissions over a given period.
Different greenhouse gases can be included, with their
respective constants of proportionality between temperature (or sea
level rise) and the accumulation of concentrations, and their
individual effects added in terms of the resulting change in
temperature or sea level rise over the period
considered.
It also follows that the temperature can be expressed,
alternatively to degrees Celsius, in terms of accumulated
concentrations of any greenhouse gas. For the sake of convenience,
carbon dioxide is chosen, and the temperature is expressed in units
of GtCy equivalent. For the period
from 1990 to 2020, the correspondence is 1 GtCy equivalent equals
0.0000164 degree Celsius.
It is to be noted that the uncertainties remaining in the
present knowledge of the absolute value of the predicted temperature
change as reflected, for instance, in the margin of uncertainty in
the climate sensitivity (the change of temperature resulting from a
doubling of the carbon dioxide concentration is known to be within
the range 1.5 to 4.5 degrees Celsius) does not affect the conclusions
about the relative contribution of countries.
Future improvements of the complex models, as the uncertainties
are progressively decreased, can be easily incorporated by updating
the calibration constants of proportionality in order to improve the
accuracy of the absolute results through the incorporation of the
best available scientific knowledge.
4. An overall effective emissions reduction target for
the ensemble of Annex I Parties - an objective measure of such
targets in terms of climate change
Whereas there is a consensus that the mitigation measures
should be decided in two steps: a decision on the overall target to
be achieved by a group of countries and then the sharing of the
burden among them, there has been a tendency to concentrate on the
establishment of a reduction target in terms of annual
emissions.
The introduction of the concept of effective
emissions (a measure of emissions over a given period
of time in terms of their effect upon the temperature increase)
allows the choice of a reduction target to be made with a clear view
of the impact of the choice upon climate change.
At the same time, it incorporates automatically two important
aspects of the problem, the comprehensiveness in terms of inclusion
of different greenhouse gases, and the concept of a "budget" of
emissions over a period of time. Those aspects are important for they
allow maximum flexibility in the choice of policies and measures by
Parties and therefore reduces the economic burden of mitigation
measures.
It is proposed that an upper limit be established for the
emissions of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide from the
ensemble of Annex I Parties for the period 1990-2020, such that the
effect of such emissions in the period upon the temperature increase
in 2020 is a value fixed in the Protocol as a goal, expressed in
terms of effective emissions as
defined above.
The definition of the goal is made by establishing an
effective emissions reference and an
effective emissions ceiling. The
effective emissions reference minus
the effective emissions ceiling is
defined here as the effective emissions reduction
target. All these are evaluated in terms of
effective emissions, which can be
expressed in units of degree Celsius or, alternatively, in units of
GtCy equivalent.
It is important that a quantitative reduction objective be
established with reference to a defined absolute reference, rather
than with reference to an abstract hypothetical reference. The exact
reference is irrelevant, provided that it is defined in absolute
terms. It is thus proposed that a reference be taken as the effective
emissions in the period 1990-2020 that correspond to a fixed level of
annual emissions of the three greenhouse gases equal to their
reported levels in 1990 for the ensemble of the Annex I
Parties.
This reference is denominated the effective
emission reference for the ensemble of Annex I
Parties for the period 1990-2020. Its value, in degree Celsius and in
GtCy equivalent, can be easily computed with the simple policy maker
model and the 1990 values for annual emissions of the three
greenhouse gases from Annex I Parties.
It is proposed that a ceiling be established for the collective
emissions of the three greenhouse gases for the ensemble of Annex I
Parties, expressed in terms of effective
emissions.
The value proposed for the ceiling is that corresponding to a
constant level of annual emissions in the period 1990-2000 and a
regular reduction of annual emissions from 2000 to 2020, to a level
in 2020 thirty (30) percent lower than the starting value. This
effective emission ceiling is also
expressed in units of degree Celsius or GtCy equivalent.
It follows that the difference between the
effective emission reference and
the effective emission ceiling
represents an effective emission reduction target
for the ensemble of the Annex I Parties in the period
1990-2020.
The effective emission reduction
target measures directly the magnitude of the
mitigation of climate change to be obtained, in degree Celsius. At
the same time, it provides the needed unique constraint to the
reductions in annual emissions of the different gases, while allowing
all possible flexibility in terms of the distribution in time of the
reductions, as well as the flexibility with respect to mitigation of
emissions of different gases.
For the sake of illustration of the magnitude of these values,
a calculation was made with the proposed simple policy maker model,
calibrated for the period 1990-2020 against the MAGICC box-diffusion
model and the emission data from the IPCC scenario IS92a. The
available data for carbon dioxide annual emissions in 1990 from
fossil fuels and cement production were used as well as the
atmospheric concentration in 1990 derived from consistent data set of
historical emissions (see Appendix II). Instead of the present
proposal, this illustrative calculation considered the AOSIS proposal
of a 20 percent reduction in annual emissions by 2010 for Annex I
Parties.
The use of the year 2010 in this illustration is only due to
the fact that the well known AOSIS proposal for a Protocol refers to
that year, and in order to put into evidence the implication of the
AOSIS proposal in terms of limitation of temperature increase. The
present proposal refers to the year 2020, in line with the Berlin
Mandate.
It is found that in the reference case of constant annual
emissions in 1990-2010, including 1990 concentration levels, the
effective emissions by Annex I Parties
will be equal to 7,597.21 GtCy, or 0.124650 degree Celsius. If
1990-2010 new emissions only are considered instead, the
effective emissions by Annex I Parties
will be equal to 866.867 GtCy, or 0.014223 degree
Celsius.
The AOSIS proposal represents a reduction in
effective emissions of 18.692 GtCy, or
0.000306 degree Celsius, corresponding to a ceiling of
effective emissions of 7,578.51 GtCy, or 0.124343
degree Celsius, or alternatively 848.175 GtCy, or 0.013916 degree
Celsius, if 1990-2010 new emissions only are considered
instead.
The corresponding values for the sea level rise are a reduction
from 2.123765 cm in 2010, by 0.005225 cm, to 2.11854 cm.
It is interesting also to notice that such reduction in annual
emissions represents a reduction of 0.246 percent in the expected
increase in temperature or sea level rise due to emissions from Annex
I Parties, or alternatively a reduction of 2.16 percent in the
expected increase in temperature or sea level rise corresponding to
the 1990-2010 new emissions only.
In Appendix III, an illustrative simulation of different
reduction targets for the ensemble of Annex I Parties, corresponding
to reducing CO2 emissions in 2010 from 0% to 100% of 1990 level, is
shown in Tables A3.1(GtCy) and A3.2(degree Celsius).
5. The relative responsibilities of Annex I Parties are
proportional to their respective effective
emissions
Parties are presumed somehow to have a control over their
annual emissions. This fact, together with the Convention requirement
that Parties report annual emissions, give rise to a natural tendency
to compare the annual emissions of Parties and thus implicitly to
associate the emissions to the relative responsibilities in inducing
climate change.
Annual emissions, however, are not an appropriate measure of
climate change. The increase in global mean surface temperature, on
the other hand, is a simple and effective global measure of climate
change.
The fact that it is also possible to measure such a change in
temperature in units of GtCy equivalent, and thus relate it directly
to annual emissions over a period through the concept of
effective emissions over a period,
makes it natural to assign relative responsibilities to individual
Parties according to their respective contributions to climate
change, as measured by the induced change in
temperature.
It is thus proposed that the relative responsibilities of
Parties within a group of Parties be defined to be in the same
proportion as their respective effective
emissions, including the initial concentration level
in the beginning of the period.
This proposal provides a means to measure objectively the
relative responsibility of each Party or each group of Parties in
producing climate change. Given the fact that the Convention contains
the all-important principle of a common but differentiated
responsibility, it provides an objective criterion for the
differentiation of responsibilities.
Furthermore, it provides a means to quantify the relative
responsibility of developed countries with respect to developing
countries as a result of their contribution to the atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases by the time the Convention was
negotiated.
In addition, during the initial work of AGBM, there have been
suggestions to define indices in terms of emissions per unit of
socio-economic or physical indicators of the same Parties or a
combination of these, or a convenient choice of such
indicators.
The following is an analysis of the proposed concept of using
the relative effective emissions
(which is also a measure of the resulting change in temperature) as a
measure of the relative responsibility, in comparison with other
suggestions.
a) Annual emissions
The actual emissions have been used as a measure of the
responsibility of polluters in cases of urban atmospheric pollution
or river contamination. Such procedure is justified by the fact that,
when the residence time of the pollutant is relatively short, the
concentration of the pollutant is proportional to the emission. Also,
in these cases, the detrimental effect is produced by the
concentration itself and therefore the emission is a valid measure of
the effect to be mitigated.
In the case of climate change, the long residence time of the
main greenhouse gases makes the concentration of these gases
proportional to the accumulation of the emissions rather than to the
emissions themselves, account taken of the different decay times of
the gases.
b) Atmospheric concentrations
The atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases is not a good
measure of the responsibility because the greenhouse gases are not
pollutants in themselves and therefore there is no proportionality
between the detrimental effects and the concentration.
c) Annual emissions relative to socio-economic or physical
indicators
It has been suggested that the relative responsibility of
Parties be associated with their annual emissions expressed per unit
of population, GNP, surface area, energy consumption (expressed in
tons of oil equivalent - toe), renewable energy production (in toe),
among others.
There is a difficulty in the choice of the reference unit to be
used, since Parties will naturally give preference to the choice of
indicator that results in a better performance for themselves, which
will also make it possible for them to reach a given target with less
effort or less burden on their economies.
In addition, all the indicators suggested are, in one way or
another, related to the causes of emissions, rather than with their
effect.
d) Effective
emissions
The proposed association of the relative responsibility of
Parties with their respective effective
emissions makes it unnecessary to resort to
expressing such effective emissions in terms of any socio-economic or
physical units.
The proposed use of the effective
emissions over a period of time, including the
initial concentration level in the beginning of the period, as a
measure of the relative responsibility of Annex I Parties, is closely
connected to the physical reality of the greenhouse warming, a
property not applicable to the absolute emissions, these being an
instantaneous "snapshot" of a situation over an arbitrary period of
one year.
Perhaps the most striking demonstration of this fact is a
reference to the Kuwait oil well fires, which produced for a very
short period of time very high daily or monthly emissions, with a
negligible effect upon climate change, as demonstrated by detailed
calculations at the time.
The change in temperature (or the effective
emissions) is an objective measure of climate change,
for it can be argued that the detrimental effects of climate change
guard some sort of proportionality to it. This is likely to be true,
in a first order, for all of the impacts that have been surveyed by
the IPCC Working Group II, including those associated with extreme
weather events, and is certainly true for the rise in mean sea
level.
The notable exception to this rule is the time rate of change
of temperature, which is significant for the impact upon the
adaptation of species, a case in which the time differential would
tend to cancel the cumulative effect of concentrations to produce a
temperature change with the result that the detrimental effects would
in the end be roughly proportional to the concentrations expressed in
GtC equivalent, rather than to the temperature expressed in GtCy
equivalent.
As an illustration of this point, the relative responsibility
of each Annex I Parties was estimated on the basis of several
indicators: the annual 1990 carbon dioxide emissions; the
effective emissions for the period
1990-2010 with and without (flat rate proposal) consideration of the
concentrations in 1990 due to previous emissions, assuming constant
annual emissions in the period and with individual reductions
according to the AOSIS proposal applied on a "flat rate" basis. The
data used, for illustration purposes, are those in Appendices I and
II. The estimations are presented in Appendix IV. It is to be noted
that the present proposal is that the relative responsibility of each
Annex I Party be evaluated taking into account the initial
concentrations in the beginning of the period.
It is interesting to notice that the evaluation of the relative
responsibility of Annex I Parties without consideration of their 1990
annual concentrations is, by construction, equivalent to the "flat
rate" approach for assignment of relative
responsibilities.
The relative responsibilities based on 1990 annual emissions
expressed in terms of the socio-economic and physical units have also
been estimated for illustration purposes for each Annex I country and
some non-Annex I countries. These results are presented in Appendix
V.
6. Relative responsibility of the group of Annex I
countries and non-Annex I countries
The consideration of the special case of the relative
responsibility of Annex I and non-Annex I countries deserves special
attention as a result of the differentiation made by the Convention
in noting that "the largest share of historical and current emissions
has originated in developed countries".
The use of countries rather than Parties in this section is due
only to the ready availability of estimated data for past and future
emissions, and should not represent a major obstacle to the
appreciation of the results since a vast majority of countries are
Parties to the Convention.
It is thus pertinent to evaluate the relative responsibility of
Annex I versus non-Annex I countries over the period considered for a
Protocol in the periods extending to 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2020, as
provided for in the Berlin Mandate, taking into account the
concentration in 1990 estimated to be attributable to those two
groups of countries.
Published historical data on CO2 energy and cement sector
emissions for every country for the period 1950-1990 have been used,
in conjunction with a backward extrapolation into the period
preceding 1950, to estimate the atmospheric concentrations in 1990
attributable to Annex I and non-Annex I countries.
The methodology, described in Appendix II, can be easily
extended to methane and nitrous oxide, and other sectors, such as
land-use change, can be easily incorporated into this
estimate.
The effect of the emissions from the other greenhouse gases,
however, is known to be small in comparison with that from carbon
dioxide, according to the IPCC Second Assessment Report. In addition,
the relatively short lifetime of methane in the atmosphere tends to
decrease the importance of historical emissions of this gas. For
these reasons, the carbon dioxide emissions from the energy and
cement sectors are likely to be a sufficiently good proxy for the
total effective emissions for the
purposes of evaluating the relative responsibility of Annex I and
non-Annex I countries.
Figures 1 to 3 show the change in climate as measured by the
increase in global mean surface temperature, expressed in GtCy, for
the period 1990-2020, resulting from the 1990 concentrations
attributable to the two groups of Parties, with IPCC IS92a emissions
after 1990 and without any emissions after 1990.
Figure 1 - Change in climate as measured by the increase in
global mean surface temperature, expressed in GtCy, for the period
1990-2020, resulting from the 1990 concentrations attributable to the
two groups of Parties, without any emissions after 1990.
Figure 2 - Change in climate as measured by the increase in
global mean surface temperature, expressed in GtCy, for the period
1990-2020, resulting from IPCC IS92a emissions after 1990,
disregarding the 1990 concentrations.
Figure 3 - Change in climate as measured by the increase in
global mean surface temperature, expressed in GtCy, for the period
1990-2020, resulting from the 1990 concentrations attributable to the
two groups of Parties plus IPCC IS92a emissions after
1990.
Figures 4 to 8 show the relative responsibility of the two
groups of Parties, as measured by the respective
effective emissions for the period
1990-2010 considering the 1990 concentrations and the IPCC IS92a
scenario for the period 1990-2010. For the sake of comparison, the
relative share of 1990 emissions and of 1990 concentrations
attributable to each group, are also indicated in the
figure.
Figure 4 - Relative responsibility attributable to each group
of Parties, according to 1990 CO2 emission levels.
Figure 5 - Relative responsibility attributable to each group
of Parties, according to 1990 CO2 concentration levels.
Figure 6 - Relative responsibility attributable to each group
of Parties, according to induced temperature increase in 1990 due to
CO2 emissions.
Figure 7 - Relative responsibility attributable to each group of Parties, according to induced temperature increase in 2010 due to CO2 emissions.
Figure 8 - Relative responsibility attributable to each group
of Parties, according to induced temperature increase in 2020 due to
CO2 emissions.
This exercise is further extended up to 2200 with the use of the IPCC IS92a scenario up to 2100 and the assumption that the rate of growth of emissions in 2100-2200 is the same as that in 2025-2100.
Figure 9 - Extended CO2 emissions IPCC scenario
IS92a
Figures 10 and 11 show the change in climate and relative responsibility of Annex I and non-Annex I countries in the period 1990-2100 measured by the respective effective emissions in the period with 1990 concentrations, expressed in degree Celsius.
Figure 10 - Change in climate attributable to Annex I and
non-Annex I countries in the period 1990-2200 measured by the
respective effective emissions in the
period with 1990 concentrations, expressed in degree
Celsius.
Figure 11 - Relative share of climate change, as measured by
the increase in global mean surface temperature, attributable to
Annex I and non-Annex I countries, with a separation of the effect of
pre- and post-1990 emissions for both groups of countries, in the
period 1850-2200, using the IPCC IS92a emissions scenario, extended
to 2200.
It is interesting to notice that, whereas the annual emissions
of non-Annex I countries are estimated to grow to be equal to those
of Annex I countries by 2037, according to the IPCC IS92a scenario,
the resulting change in temperature as measured by the
effective emissions from non-Annex I
countries are estimated to equal that of Annex I countries in
2147.
7. Sharing of the burden of mitigation among Annex I
Parties and consequent effective emission reduction targets and
ceilings
Once the overall effective emissions reduction
target for Annex I Parties is defined, as well as the
relative responsibility of individual Annex I Parties, this section
describes the proposed sharing of the burden of mitigation among
those Parties.
It is proposed that the division of the collective burden of
mitigation among the Annex I Parties in the group be made in
proportion to their respective relative responsibility including 1990
concentration, as defined in the previous Section.
It might be argued that the burden in mitigating climate change
should be measured, as it is often done in economics, in terms of the
cost of such mitigation. It is unlikely, however, that agreement
could be reached on how to evaluate such cost, given the very
considerable differences that exist in economic management techniques
among the Parties, and the foreseeable discussions about the indirect
factors that should be included in these evaluations.
It is further recognized that the Convention establishes a
number of special considerations in determining the measures to be
taken by each Party. As a consequence, it is proposed that the
reduction targets determined in accordance with the above criterion
be the starting point for negotiations in which the special
considerations will be taken into account in determining the
reduction to be made by each Party.
Once an effective emission reduction
target is established for the ensemble of Annex I
Parties, an individual effective emission reduction
target for each Party is established as a fraction of
the collective target that is proportional to the relative
responsibility of that Party vis-à-vis the ensemble of Annex I
Parties. This reduction target for each Party is then subject to
negotiation among the Parties in the group with a view to taking into
account the special considerations provided for in the Convention and
the result of negotiations.
Once the individual effective emissions
reduction target is established for each Annex I
Party, the corresponding effective emissions
ceiling is derived as the difference between the
effective emissions over the given
period that result from a path of constant emissions, taken as a
reference, and the respective effective emissions
reduction target.
For the sake of illustration, and using the same data base as
before, the individual effective emissions reduction
targets and effective emissions
ceilings have been estimated for all Annex I Parties,
expressed both in GtCy and in degree Celsius. Those results are
presented in Table A6.1 in Appendix VI.
Table A6.2 is an estimation for each Annex I Party of the
reduction in 2010 emission level as compared to 1990 level that
corresponds to the ceiling estimated in Table A6.1, assuming constant
1990 emission level in the period 1990-2000 and decreasing regularly
from 2000 to 2010. Figure A6.1, also in Appendix VI, shows a
comparison between percentages estimated in Table A6.2 and the 20%
"flat rate" for each Annex I Party.
In Appendix VI, an illustrative simulation of the different
targets for an arbitrarily chosen individual Annex I Party, in
accordance to its relative responsibility including 1990
concentration, corresponding to its respective fraction of different
reduction targets for the ensemble of Annex I Parties (see Appendix
III) reducing from 0% to 100% of 1990 CO2 emission level in 2010, is
shown in Table A6.3 (in GtCy) and Table A6.4 (in degree
Celsius).
8. Compensation mechanism in case of departure from the
achievement of ceiling objective by Annex I
Parties
The effective implementation of the protocol requires the
specification of a feedback mechanism by which the departure by a
Party from its commitment to maintain its emissions below a ceiling
results in an obligation to compensate such departure by other means,
such that the net effect will constitute a positive contribution to
the global mitigation of climate change.
It is proposed that a periodic evaluation be made of the actual
emissions by each Party by comparing, for every evaluation period of
n years (it is proposed that this periodicity be of five years), the
effective emissions derived from the
reported annual emissions, with the corresponding
effective emission ceiling.
It is proposed that the difference, which is a measure of the
departure from the objective of that Party, be used as a quantitative
basis for establishing, in the case of emissions above the ceiling, a
compulsory contribution to a non-Annex I clean development fund to be
managed by the financial mechanism of the Convention for the
promotion of mitigation measures in non-Annex I Parties. Such
contribution is to be made in accordance to a fixed scale of
20US$/(n+1) per tCy of effective
emissions above the ceiling.
The proposed scale is equivalent to 10US$ per ton of carbon
avoided which, according to some estimates, is a value likely to
promote the implementation of non-regret measures by non-Annex I
Parties.
It is also proposed that Annex I Parties be allowed to use this
difference as a measure in trading effective
emissions among themselves, that is, a Party that,
over an evaluation period, reports effective
emissions above its ceiling may compensate this by
"purchasing", at a market value, an equivalent number of
effective emissions, in GtCy, from
another Party that has reported effective
emissions below its ceiling.
It follows that there will only be a contribution to the
non-Annex I clean development fund if the effective
emissions in a given evaluation period, from the
ensemble of Annex I Parties, are above their collective
effective emission
ceiling.
For the sake of illustration, one Annex I Party for which
reported annual emissions are available for the period 1990-1994 has
been used as a hypothetical example to estimate the departure from
the commitment and resulting compensation.
The resulting hypothetical contribution due to CO2 emissions
was estimated for the period 1990-2010, as well as the relative
importance of the main greenhouse gases in terms of
effective emissions for the same
period and presented in Table A7.1.
9. Distribution of the financial resources of the
non-Annex I Clean Development Fund
It is proposed that the financial resources of the non-Annex I
clean development fund obtained in each evaluation period from the
contributions of Annex I Parties are to be distributed to non-Annex I
Parties subject to the two conditions described below.
Each non-Annex I Party may, on a voluntary basis, apply for
funds to be used in climate change projects. Such applications are
subject to the appropriate regulations approved by the Conference of
the Parties for this purpose.
An upper limit is established for the funds that may be
approved for each non-Annex I Party, which is equal to the fraction
of the total funds available corresponding to the relative
responsibility, measured in terms of their individual
effective emissions using available
reported data, without 1990 initial concentration for the first
period, and the concentration resulting from the previously reported
net anthropogenic emissions for the
subsequent periods, of that Party among the ensemble of non-Annex I
Parties.
It is recognized that this limitation may result in funds not
being used within an evaluation period. It is proposed that the
surplus is to be carried over into the next evaluation period and it
is expected that the availability of these funds will encourage
non-Annex I Parties to generate acceptable climate change projects
for their use.
The effect of this limit is to direct the financial resources
of the fund preferentially to the non-Annex I Parties that have a
larger relative contribution to climate change, thus promoting
mitigation where it matters most, hence contributing to a global
objective, while contributing constructively to the advancement of
the implementation of the Convention by non-Annex I
Parties.
Appendix VIII presents a simulation, based on available data,
of the relative distribution among non-Annex I Parties, with the
results shown in Table A8.1 and Figure A8.1.
A simple model for use by policy makers is presented for the
relationship between emissions of greenhouse gases and the resulting
increase in global mean surface temperature and mean sea level
rise.
The functional dependence of the atmospheric anthropogenic
concentration of a given greenhouse gas upon the emissions over a
given period of time is given by
r = C ò e(t') exp(-(t-t')/t) dt' (1)
where
r(t) is the atmospheric concentration at time t
e(t) is the annual rate of emission at time t
t is the atmospheric exponential decay time
C is a constant
and the integral is taken over the given period.
The constant C was determined by linear regression of the value
of the integral with the results of the MAGICC box-diffusion model
result for the period 1990-2020, computed with emissions in the
period from the IPCC IS92a scenario.
Table A1.1 contains the values of the constant C and of the
atmospheric exponential decay time t for carbon dioxide, methane and
nitrous oxide.
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Figures A1.1 through A1.3 show a comparison of the
anthropogenic concentrations computed with the MAGICC model and
formula (1).
Figure A1.1 - Concentration of carbon dioxide computed by the
MAGICC model for the period 1990-2020 with IPCC IS92a emission
scenario data, and by the simple decision maker model with the
constants of Table A1.1.
Figure A1.2 - Concentration of methane computed by the MAGICC
model for the period 1990-2020 with IPCC IS92a emission scenario
data, and by the simple decision maker model with the constants of
Table A1.1.
Figure A1.3 - Concentration of nitrous oxide computed by the
MAGICC model for the period 1990-2020 with IPCC IS92a emission
scenario data, and by the simple decision maker model with the
constants of Table A1.1.
The radiative forcing for each greenhouse gas is computed from
its atmospheric concentration as
DF(t) = k r(t) (2)
where
DF(t) is the rate of deposition of energy per unit area on the
surface of the Earth
k is a constant determined from the functional dependence of DF
upon the concentration by expanding it in series around the
concentration values actually observed in 1990 and taking only the
linear term.
In a first physical approximation, the increase in the surface
temperature is given by
DTf(t) = a ò DF(t') dt' (3)
where
DTf(t) is the temperature increase in the first
physical approximation
a is a lumped constant that takes into account all the relevant
physical factors.
It follows from (2) and (3) that the increase in mean surface
temperature can be written as
DTf(t) = b ò r(t') dt' (4)
where b is a constant.
The constant b was determined by linear regression of the value
of the integral with the results of the MAGICC box-diffusion model
result for the period 1990-2020, computed with emissions in the
period from the IPCC IS92a scenario.
Table A1.2 contains the values of the constant b for carbon
dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide, expressed in units of degree
Celsius per unit of volumetric concentration per unit of time in
years, and also in units of degree Celsius per unit of mass per unit
of time in years.
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The use of the constant for carbon dioxide allows the increase
in temperature to be expressed in units of carbon concentration
multiplied by time or, conveniently, the effective
emission of any gas can be expressed in degree
Celsius or in GtCy equivalent.
This procedure replaces completely the greenhouse warming
potential concept as a tool to provide for a common measure of
emissions of different greenhouse gases with the advantage that it
avoids the need to arbitrarily choose a time horizon but, instead,
relates the emissions of different greenhouse gases through their
effect in producing a change in temperature over a given
period.
Figure A1.4 shows a comparison of the increase in global mean
surface temperature computed with the MAGICC model and formula
(4).
Figure A1.4 - Increase in mean global surface temperature
computed by the MAGICC model for the period 1990-2020 with IPCC IS92a
emission scenario data, and by the simple decision maker model with
the constants of Table A1.2.
It is seen that the simple policy maker models can be used to
estimate with sufficient accuracy the temperature increase for a time
period of the order of 30 years.
The consideration of formulas (1) and (4) makes it evident that
there are two arbitrary constants that represent the lower limit of
the two definite integrals. In reality, it is assumed in the above
discussion that the lower limit of both the integrals are the same,
while this is not necessarily so.
In particular, it may be convenient to take the lower limit of
the first integral (formula 1) to be minus infinity and the lower
limit of the second integral (formula 4) to be 1990. This corresponds
to taking into account the atmospheric concentrations in 1990 of the
greenhouse gases due to emissions before 1990, which must be done to
evaluate quantitatively the Convention provisions on this
subject.
The rise in mean sea level is treated in a similar
fashion:
mslr = g ò r(t') dt' (5)
where
mslr is the increase in mean sea level
g is a similarly derived empirical constant.
The values of g and the comparison with MAGICC results are
presented in Table A1.3 and Figure A1.5.
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Figure A1.5 - Mean sea level rise computed by the MAGICC model
for the period 1990-2020 with IPCC IS92a emission scenario data, and
by the simple decision maker model with the constants of Table
A1.3.
In order to take into account the effect upon climate change of
the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases in 1990, and the
detailed attribution of such concentration to the pre-1990 emissions
of individual countries, the time series of emissions by individual
countries estimated by the U.S. Oak Ridge National Laboratory has
been processed to allow such estimate to be made.
The U.S. Oak Ridge National Laboratory has published and made
available, in digital form, a table of the annual emissions on an
yearly basis for every country, for the period 1950 to 1990, for
carbon dioxide from the energy sector and cement
production.
Such table has been recomputed to take into account that some
present-day countries are the result of the merging or disaggregation
of countries that have existed as independent entities in the past.
In the case of aggregation, such as for instance the consideration of
metropolitan France and French Guyana, the emission data have been
simply added and assigned to the country that is recognized as an
independent state. In the case of disaggregation such as, for the
division of Czechoslovakia in the Czech Republic and the Slovakian
Republic, the overall emission data have been attributed to each one
of the component parts in the same proportion as the reported 1990
emission. Some adaptations to this rule have been made whenever
relevant independent data are available. Data were not available for
Lesotho, Namibia and in the case of Eritrea where ORNL data is only
available for the former Ethiopia (now split into Ethiopia and
Eritrea). Also in the case of Italy, ORNL data includes San
Marino.
The modified ORNL data covers the period 1950 to 1990. Given
the relatively long decay time of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere,
over one hundred years, it became important to estimate the emissions
in the period preceding 1950.
This backward extrapolation of the annual emissions was done in
two steps. First, a period was chosen in the early part of 1950-1990,
when the aggregate global emissions (obtained by adding the ORNL
country emission data) were considered to be smooth and corresponding
to one exponential function, as seen in Figure A2.1 and A2.2, in both
linear and log form.
Figure A2.1 ORNL data (1950-1990) and best fit curve used to
extrapolate data for the period 1840-1949.
Figure A2.2 Log curves used to calculate extrapolation
data.
The period 1950-1973 was chosen and a linear least-square
function best-fitted to the log emission data for that period for
each country. Such linear best-fitted function was then used to
extrapolate the log emission data backward for the period before 1950
and inverted to produce the exponentially decreasing emission
estimate for each country. Figures A2.3 to A2.9 exemplify this
procedure for selected countries from both Annex I and non-Annex I
Parties.
Figure A2.3 - ORNL data and best fit curves for the USA.
Figure A2.4 - ORNL data and best fit curves for the Russian
Federation.
Figure A2.5 - ORNL data and best fit curves for
Germany.
Figure A2.6 - ORNL data and best fit curves for the United Kingdom.
Figure A2.7 - ORNL data and best fit curves for China.
Figure A2.8 - ORNL data and best fit curves for India
Figure A2.9 - ORNL data and best fit curves for
Brazil.
In summary, the emissions data effectively used were the
back-extrapolated data for the period 1840-1949, and the ORNL data
for the period 1950-1990.
The result of this processing of the ORNL data is available for
downloading from the Brazilian Government climate change INTERNET
site: http://www.mct.gov.br/gabin/clima.htm
The use of concentrations resulting from pre-1990 carbon
dioxide emissions from the energy (and cement) sectors only is done
as an illustration and because those are the only readily data
available on a country-by-country basis. Nevertheless, such a use is
also justified to the extent that the majority of the effect of the
overall pre-1990 emission effect is taken into account by this
procedure, as demonstrated by the use of the MAGICC model results.
The MAGICC model run includes, on a global basis, the effect of
land-use change carbon dioxide as well as the effect of methane and
nitrous oxide.
It can be seen in Figure A2.9 that the energy and cement carbon dioxide historical emissions account for the very large majority of the temperature change resulting from pre-1990 greenhouse gas emissions from all sectors. At last, it is important to remember that our interest here is only to estimate the importance of pre-1990 emissions on a relative basis and not in absolute terms.
Figure A2.10 - Relative radiative forcing of main greenhouse
for IS92a IPCC scenario.
Simulation of Different Targets for the Ensemble of
Annex I Parties
An illustrative simulation of different reduction targets that
result from a path of constant emissions from 1990 to 2000 and
regularly decreasing emissions from 2000 to 2010, for the ensemble of
Annex I Parties, corresponding to reducing CO2 emissions in 2010 from
0% to 100% of 1990 level, is shown in Tables A3.1(in GtCy) and
A3.2(in degree Celsius).
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Table A3.1 |
Annex I Parties |
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|
|
|
|
Percent |
|
EMISSIONS |
1990 concentration |
new emissions |
|
Reduction |
|
LEVEL IN 2010 |
plus new emission |
only |
reduction target |
new emissions |
|
(as % of 1990) |
GtCy |
GtCy |
GtCy |
% |
|
100% |
7597.21 |
866.8667 |
0.0000 |
Reference |
|
90% |
7587.86 |
857.5209 |
9.3458 |
1.08 |
|
80% |
7578.51 |
848.1751 |
18.6916 |
2.16 |
|
70% |
7569.17 |
838.8294 |
28.0373 |
3.23 |
|
60% |
7559.82 |
829.4836 |
37.3831 |
4.31 |
|
50% |
7550.48 |
820.1378 |
46.7289 |
5.39 |
|
40% |
7541.13 |
810.7920 |
56.0747 |
6.47 |
|
30% |
7531.79 |
801.4463 |
65.4204 |
7.55 |
|
20% |
7522.44 |
792.1005 |
74.7662 |
8.62 |
|
10% |
7513.09 |
782.7547 |
84.1120 |
9.70 |
|
0% |
7503.75 |
773.4089 |
93.4578 |
10.78 |
|
Table A3.2 |
Annex I Parties |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Percent |
|
EMISSIONS |
1990 concentration |
new emissions |
|
Reduction |
|
LEVEL IN 2010 |
plus new emission |
only |
reduction target |
new emissions |
|
(as % of 1990) |
C |
C |
C |
% |
|
100% |
0.124650 |
0.014223 |
0.000000 |
Reference |
|
90% |
0.124496 |
0.014070 |
0.000153 |
1.08 |
|
80% |
0.124343 |
0.013916 |
0.000307 |
2.16 |
|
70% |
0.124190 |
0.013763 |
0.000460 |
3.23 |
|
60% |
0.124036 |
0.013610 |
0.000613 |
4.31 |
|
50% |
0.123883 |
0.013456 |
0.000767 |
5.39 |
|
40% |
0.123730 |
0.013303 |
0.000920 |
6.47 |
|
30% |
0.123576 |
0.013150 |
0.001073 |
7.55 |
|
20% |
0.123423 |
0.012996 |
0.001227 |
8.62 |
|
10% |
0.123270 |
0.012843 |
0.001380 |
9.70 |
|
0% |
0.123116 |
0.012690 |
0.001533 |
10.78 |
Estimation of Relative Responsibility of Individual
Annex I Parties
As an illustration of this point, the relative responsibility
of Annex I Parties was estimated on the basis of several indicators:
the annual 1990 carbon dioxide emissions; the
effective emissions for the period
1990-2010 with (an illustration of the current proposal) and without
(flat rate proposal) consideration of the concentrations in 1990 due
to previous emissions, assuming constant annual emissions in the
period and with individual reductions according to the AOSIS proposal
applied on a "flat rate" basis. The data used, for illustration
purposes, are those in Appendix I and II.
For the sake of illustration, available data have been used to
estimate the relative responsibility and therefore the relative
burden of individual Annex I Parties for the different criteria, as
detailed in Tables A4.1, A4.2 and A4.3 and shown in Figures A4.1,
A4.2 and A4.3.
It is interesting to notice that the evaluation of the relative
responsibility of Annex I Parties without consideration of their 1990
annual concentrations is, by construction, equivalent to the "flat
rate" approach for assignment of relative
responsibilities.
a) Relative Responsibility with 1990 CO2 Emissions as Reported
by Inventories
|
Table A4.1 - Relative Responsibilities | |
|
1990 Inventories* |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
United States |
36.219 |
|
Russian Federation |
17.453 |
|
Japan |
8.439 |
|
Germany |
7.410 |
|
United Kingdom |
4.216 |
|
Canada |
3.380 |
|
Italy |
3.134 |
|
Poland |
3.032 |
|
France |
2.678 |
|
Australia |
2.111 |
|
Spain |
1.661 |
|
Romania |
1.250 |
|
Netherlands |
1.225 |
|
Czech Republic |
1.211 |
|
Belgium* |
0.757 |
|
Bulgaria |
0.606 |
|
Greece |
0.600 |
|
Hungary |
0.524 |
|
Sweden |
0.448 |
|
Austria |
0.433 |
|
Slovakia |
0.426 |
|
Finland |
0.394 |
|
Denmark |
0.380 |
|
Switzerland |
0.329 |
|
Portugal |
0.308 |
|
Estonia |
0.276 |
|
Norway |
0.259 |
|
Ireland |
0.224 |
|
New Zealand |
0.186 |
|
Latvia |
0.168 |
|
Lithuania* |
0.161 |
|
Luxembourg |
0.083 |
|
Iceland |
0.016 |
|
Liechtenstein |
0.002 |
|
Monaco |
0.001 |
|
|
|
|
*For Belgium and Lithuania: ORNL data |
|
Figure A4.1 Relative responsibility of Annex I Parties
according to 1990 emissions.
b) Relative Responsibility with Flat CO2 Emissions from 1990 to
2010, including 1990 Concentration
|
Table A4.2 - Relative Responsibility with Flat CO2 | ||
|
Emissions from 1990 to 2010, including | ||
|
1990 Concentration |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
United States |
|
41.9415 |
|
United Kingdom |
|
13.5447 |
|
Russian Federation |
|
10.3731 |
|
Germany |
|
10.0651 |
|
Japan |
|
3.8255 |
|
France |
|
3.3541 |
|
Canada |
|
2.5965 |
|
Poland |
|
2.3371 |
|
Italy |
|
1.5283 |
|
Belgium |
|
1.4769 |
|
Australia |
|
1.1537 |
|
Czech Republic |
|
1.0697 |
|
Netherlands |
|
0.9963 |
|
Spain |
|
0.8123 |
|
Romania |
|
0.7552 |
|
Sweden |
|
0.4710 |
|
Hungary |
|
0.4463 |
|
Bulgaria |
|
0.3774 |
|
Slovakia |
|
0.3760 |
|
Austria |
|
0.3640 |
|
Denmark |
|
0.3556 |
|
Switzerland |
|
0.2148 |
|
Finland |
|
0.2096 |
|
Greece |
|
0.1978 |
|
Norway |
|
0.1812 |
|
Ireland |
|
0.1646 |
|
Estonia |
|
0.1572 |
|
New Zealand |
|
0.1570 |
|
Luxembourg |
|
0.1545 |
|
Portugal |
|
0.1353 |
|
Lithuania |
|
0.0969 |
|
Latvia |
|
0.0955 |
|
Iceland |
|
0.0138 |
|
Liechtenstein |
|
0.0010 |
|
Monaco |
|
0.0006 |
Figure A4.2 Relative responsibility of Annex I Parties
according to the above illustration of the current
proposal.
c) Relative Responsibility with Flat CO2 Emissions from 1990 to
2010, not including 1990 Concentration
|
Table A4.3 - Relative Responsibility with Flat CO2 | ||
|
Emissions from 1990 to 2010, not including | ||
|
1990 Concentration |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
United States |
|
36.8631 |
|
Russian Federation |
|
18.0203 |
|
Japan |
|
8.0927 |
|
Germany |
|
7.3455 |
|
United Kingdom |
|
4.2815 |
|
Canada |
|
3.2243 |
|
Italy |
|
2.8995 |
|
Poland |
|
2.7986 |
|
France |
|
2.7535 |
|
Australia |
|
2.0397 |
|
Spain |
|
1.5505 |
|
Romania |
|
1.3813 |
|
Czech Republic |
|
1.1739 |
|
Netherlands |
|
1.0607 |
|
Belgium |
|
0.7900 |
|
Bulgaria |
|
0.6958 |
|
Greece |
|
0.5283 |
|
Hungary |
|
0.4405 |
|
Austria |
|
0.4146 |
|
Slovakia |
|
0.4127 |
|
Denmark |
|
0.3989 |
|
Finland |
|
0.3923 |
|
Sweden |
|
0.3773 |
|
Portugal |
|
0.3208 |
|
Switzerland |
|
0.3185 |
|
Norway |
|
0.2923 |
|
Estonia |
|
0.2730 |
|
Ireland |
|
0.2357 |
|
New Zealand |
|
0.1962 |
|
Lithuania |
|
0.1684 |
|
Latvia |
|
0.1660 |
|
Luxembourg |
|
0.0741 |
|
Iceland |
|
0.0172 |
|
Liechtenstein |
|
0.0015 |
|
Monaco |
|
0.0005 |
Figure A4.3 Relative responsibility of Annex I Parties
according to "flat rate" proposal.
The relative responsibilities based on 1990 annual emissions expressed in terms of the socio-economic and physical units have also been estimated for illustration purposes for each Annex I Party and some non-Annex I countries.
|
Table A5.1 |
Emissions/GDP |
|
|
Table A5.2 |
Emissions/capita |
|
|
Countries |
|
tC/US$ (PPP) |
|
Countries |
|
tC / inhab. |
|
Ukraine |
|
1.1537 |
|
Estonia |
|
6.688 |
|
Russian Federation |
0.8093 |
|
Luxembourg |
|
6.372 | |
|
Estonia |
|
0.7935 |
|
United States |
|
4.945 |
|
Belarus |
|
0.6219 |
|
Russian Federation |
4.347 | |
|
Bulgaria |
|
0.5757 |
|
Czech Republic |
|
4.066 |
|
Romania |
|
0.4672 |
|
Canada |
|
3.999 |
|
Lithuania |
|
0.4526 |
|
Australia |
|
3.993 |
|
Poland |
|
0.4413 |
|
Ukraine |
|
3.960 |
|
Latvia |
|
0.4036 |
|
Germany |
|
3.143 |
|
Czech Republic |
|
0.3951 |
|
Belarus |
|
2.938 |
|
Slovakia |
|
0.3782 |
|
Bulgaria |
|
2.888 |
|
Luxembourg |
|
0.2650 |
|
Belgium |
|
2.777 |
|
Zimbabwe |
|
0.2317 |
|
Finland |
|
2.747 |
|
Hungary |
|
0.2172 |
|
Slovakia |
|
2.745 |
|
China |
|
0.1958 |
|
Denmark |
|
2.664 |
|
Greece |
|
0.1857 |
|
United Kingdom |
|
2.617 |
|
United States |
|
0.1818 |
|
Poland |
|
2.589 |
|
Germany |
|
0.1808 |
|
Netherlands |
|
2.436 |
|
Australia |
|
0.1799 |
|
Latvia |
|
2.403 |
|
Canada |
|
0.1661 |
|
Norway |
|
2.384 |
|
Ireland |
|
0.1543 |
|
Ireland |
|
2.363 |
|
Finland |
|
0.1518 |
|
Japan |
|
2.306 |
|
Belgium |
|
0.1434 |
|
Romania |
|
2.280 |
|
United Kingdom |
|
0.1344 |
|
Iceland |
|
2.272 |
|
India |
|
0.1303 |
|
New Zealand |
|
1.976 |
|
Egypt |
|
0.1277 |
|
Austria |
|
1.847 |
|
Netherlands |
|
0.1256 |
|
Italy |
|
1.804 |
|
Denmark |
|
0.1246 |
|
Greece |
|
1.792 |
|
Mexico |
|
0.1239 |
|
Liechtenstein |
|
1.688 |
|
Iceland |
|
0.1228 |
|
France |
|
1.688 |
|
New Zealand |
|
0.1126 |
|
Lithuania |
|
1.651 |
|
Turkey |
|
0.1108 |
|
Switzerland |
|
1.580 |
|
Japan |
|
0.1080 |
|
Hungary |
|
1.574 |
|
Argentina |
|
0.1076 |
|
Sweden |
|
1.515 |
|
Norway |
|
0.0984 |
|
Spain |
|
1.415 |
|
Spain |
|
0.0981 |
|
Portugal |
|
1.107 |
|
Austria |
|
0.0975 |
|
Mexico |
|
0.933 |
|
Italy |
|
0.0952 |
|
Argentina |
|
0.864 |
|
Portugal |
|
0.0935 |
|
Turkey |
|
0.613 |
|
Cameroon |
|
0.0920 |
|
Monaco |
|
0.610 |
|
France |
|
0.0839 |
|
China |
|
0.566 |
|
Liechtenstein |
|
0.0834 |
|
Zimbabwe |
|
0.372 |
|
Sweden |
|
0.0761 |
|
Egypt |
|
0.344 |
|
Switzerland |
|
0.0718 |
|
Brazil |
|
0.334 |
|
Congo |
|
0.0704 |
|
Costa Rica |
|
0.259 |
|
Brazil |
|
0.0557 |
|
Congo |
|
0.214 |
|
Costa Rica |
|
0.0487 |
|
India |
|
0.193 |
|
Ethiopia |
|
0.0327 |
|
Cameroon |
|
0.106 |
|
Monaco |
|
0.0246 |
|
Central African Rep. |
0.016 | |
|
Central African Rep. |
0.0216 |
|
Ethiopia |
|
0.014 | |
|
Table A5.3 |
Emissions/Energy Consumption |
|
Table A5.4 |
Emission/Renewable Energy | ||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Countries |
|
tC / toe |
|
Countries |
|
tC / toe |
|
Estonia |
|
3.312 |
|
Belarus |
|
15299.40 |
|
Bulgaria |
|
2.128 |
|
Hungary |
|
1124.86 |
|
Romania |
|
1.908 |
|
Czech Republic |
|
333.05 |
|
Ukraine |
|
1.795 |
|
Ukraine |
|
107.09 |
|
Czech Republic |
|
1.697 |
|
United Kingdom |
|
95.66 |
|
Congo |
|
1.652 |
|
Netherlands |
|
92.48 |
|
Latvia |
|
1.550 |
|
Luxembourg |
|
88.33 |
|
Belarus |
|
1.519 |
|
Bulgaria |
|
84.89 |
|
Poland |
|
1.500 |
|
Belgium |
|
76.33 |
|
Zimbabwe |
|
1.387 |
|
Germany |
|
60.50 |
|
Russian Federation |
1.342 |
|
Ireland |
|
60.19 | |
|
India |
|
1.320 |
|
Slovakia |
|
37.25 |
|
Greece |
|
1.211 |
|
Estonia |
|
32.21 |
|
Cameroon |
|
1.200 |
|
Zimbabwe |
|
28.72 |
|
Lithuania |
|
1.135 |
|
Egypt |
|
26.25 |
|
Australia |
|
1.135 |
|
India |
|
25.85 |
|
Slovakia |
|
1.119 |
|
Japan |
|
23.18 |
|
Germany |
|
1.084 |
|
Greece |
|
23.03 |
|
Ireland |
|
1.018 |
|
Russian Federation |
21.82 | |
|
United Kingdom |
|
0.971 |
|
Romania |
|
21.74 |
|
Egypt |
|
0.969 |
|
Poland |
|
20.32 |
|
United States |
|
0.958 |
|
Lithuania |
|
19.42 |
|
China |
|
0.945 |
|
Spain |
|
17.16 |
|
Denmark |
|
0.941 |
|
France |
|
14.69 |
|
Hungary |
|
0.934 |
|
Congo |
|
14.65 |
|
Mexico |
|
0.899 |
|
Italy |
|
12.69 |
|
Italy |
|
0.863 |
|
United States |
|
12.65 |
|
Japan |
|
0.860 |
|
Australia |
|
12.15 |
|
Spain |
|
0.824 |
|
Denmark |
|
10.97 |
|
Portugal |
|
0.813 |
|
Latvia |
|
7.33 |
|
Ethiopia |
|
0.812 |
|
Argentina |
|
6.93 |
|
Argentina |
|
0.775 |
|
Cameroon |
|
6.66 |
|
Belgium |
|
0.751 |
|
Mexico |
|
6.34 |
|
Luxembourg |
|
0.738 |
|
Portugal |
|
5.62 |
|
Netherlands |
|
0.690 |
|
Ethiopia |
|
5.07 |
|
Canada |
|
0.667 |
|
China |
|
3.69 |
|
Austria |
|
0.642 |
|
Canada |
|
3.05 |
|
France |
|
0.621 |
|
Finland |
|
2.52 |
|
New Zealand |
|
0.611 |
|
Switzerland |
|
2.46 |
|
Finland |
|
0.590 |
|
Austria |
|
2.38 |
|
Switzerland |
|
0.579 |
|
Costa Rica |
|
1.51 |
|
Norway |
|
0.562 |
|
New Zealand |
|
1.40 |
|
Costa Rica |
|
0.526 |
|
Sweden |
|
1.15 |
|
Brazil |
|
0.443 |
|
Norway |
|
0.97 |
|
Sweden |
|
0.382 |
|
Brazil |
|
0.74 |
|
Iceland |
|
0.341 |
|
Iceland |
|
0.47 |
|
Table A5.5 |
Emissions/Surface Area | |
|
|
|
|
|
Countries |
|
tC / km2 |
|
Monaco |
|
10191.39 |
|
Netherlands |
|
1117.81 |
|
Luxembourg |
|
1024.75 |
|
Belgium |
|
934.20 |
|
Japan |
|
771.96 |
|
Germany |
|
751.25 |
|
United Kingdom |
|
633.52 |
|
Czech Republic |
|
533.59 |
|
Italy |
|
352.52 |
|
Ukraine |
|
333.68 |
|
Poland |
|
328.53 |
|
Liechtenstein |
|
328.43 |
|
Slovakia |
|
302.27 |
|
Switzerland |
|
286.31 |
|
Estonia |
|
225.93 |
|
Bulgaria |
|
224.98 |
|
Romania |
|
214.37 |
|
France |
|
180.40 |
|
Austria |
|
179.15 |
|
Hungary |
|
170.54 |
|
Belarus |
|
147.39 |
|
Greece |
|
144.39 |
|
United States |
|
143.75 |
|
Portugal |
|
125.13 |
|
Ireland |
|
122.33 |
|
Spain |
|
110.99 |
|
Latvia |
|
92.56 |
|
Lithuania |
|
92.32 |
|
China |
|
73.49 |
|
India |
|
61.73 |
|
Turkey |
|
49.69 |
|
Mexico |
|
46.49 |
|
Finland |
|
45.91 |
|
Russian Federation |
37.90 | |
|
Norway |
|
33.94 |
|
Denmark |
|
33.36 |
|
Sweden |
|
32.82 |
|
New Zealand |
|
26.10 |
|
Egypt |
|
21.94 |
|
Costa Rica |
|
17.69 |
|
Canada |
|
12.50 |
|
Argentina |
|
10.95 |
|
Zimbabwe |
|
10.84 |
|
Australia |
|
9.57 |
|
Brazil |
|
6.43 |
|
Iceland |
|
6.12 |
|
Cameroon |
|
3.23 |
|
Congo |
|
1.59 |
|
Ethiopia |
|
0.71 |
|
Central African Rep. |
0.09 | |
Sources:
The World Factbook, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/nsolo/factbook/global.htm, for GDP (purchasing power parity), population and surface area.
OECD, for energy balance data.
Once the emissions reduction target is established for each
Party in a group of Parties, an effective emissions
ceiling is derived as the difference between the
effective emissions that result from a
path of constant emissions minus the respective emissions reduction
target over a given period.
The same country emission data were also used to estimate the
individual effective emissions ceiling
for Annex I Parties, using the relative responsibility with flat CO2
emissions from 1990 to 2010, including 1990 concentration as
presented in Appendix IV and shown in Table A6.1.
|
Table A6.1 |
1990-2010 |
|
|
|
1990-2010 |
|
|
|
Constant Emissions |
Reduction Target |
Ceiling |
| ||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
United States of America |
319.554 |
0.00524302 |
7.8395 |
0.000128625 |
311.714 |
0.00511440 |
|
Russian Federation |
156.212 |
0.00256302 |
1.9389 |
0.000031812 |
154.273 |
0.00253121 |
|
Japan |
70.153 |
0.00115102 |
0.7151 |
0.000011732 |
69.438 |
0.00113929 |
|
Germany |
63.676 |
0.00104474 |
1.8813 |
0.000030868 |
61.794 |
0.00101388 |
|
United Kingdom |
37.115 |
0.00060896 |
2.5317 |
0.000041539 |
34.583 |
0.00056742 |
|
Canada |
27.951 |
0.00045860 |
0.4853 |
0.000007963 |
27.465 |
0.00045063 |
|
Italy (including San Marino) |
25.135 |
0.00041240 |
0.2857 |
0.000004687 |
24.849 |
0.00040771 |
|
Poland |
24.260 |
0.00039804 |
0.4368 |
0.000007167 |
23.823 |
0.00039087 |
|
France |
23.870 |
0.00039163 |
0.6269 |
0.000010286 |
23.243 |
0.00038135 |
|
Australia |
17.682 |
0.00029011 |
0.2156 |
0.000003538 |
17.466 |
0.00028657 |
|
Spain |
13.441 |
0.00022053 |
0.1518 |
0.000002491 |
13.289 |
0.00021804 |
|
Romania |
11.974 |
0.00019647 |
0.1412 |
0.000002316 |
11.833 |
0.00019415 |
|
Czech Republic |
10.176 |
0.00016697 |
0.1999 |
0.000003280 |
9.976 |
0.00016369 |
|
Netherlands |
9.195 |
0.00015086 |
0.1862 |
0.000003055 |
9.008 |
0.00014781 |
|
Belgium |
6.849 |
0.00011237 |
0.2760 |
0.000004529 |
6.572 |
0.00010784 |
|
Bulgaria |
6.032 |
0.00009896 |
0.0705 |
0.000001157 |
5.961 |
0.00009780 |
|
Greece |
4.580 |
0.00007514 |
0.0370 |
0.000000607 |
4.543 |
0.00007454 |
|
Hungary |
3.819 |
0.00006266 |
0.0834 |
0.000001369 |
3.736 |
0.00006129 |
|
Austria |
3.594 |
0.00005897 |
0.0680 |
0.000001116 |
3.526 |
0.00005785 |
|
Slovakia |
3.577 |
0.00005869 |
0.0703 |
0.000001153 |
3.507 |
0.00005754 |
|
Denmark |
3.458 |
0.00005673 |
0.0665 |
0.000001091 |
3.391 |
0.00005564 |
|
Finland |
3.401 |
0.00005579 |
0.0392 |
0.000000643 |
3.361 |
0.00005515 |
|
Sweden |
3.271 |
0.00005367 |
0.0880 |
0.000001444 |
3.183 |
0.00005222 |
|
Portugal |
2.781 |
0.00004563 |
0.0253 |
0.000000415 |
2.756 |
0.00004522 |
|
Switzerland |
2.761 |
0.00004530 |
0.0401 |
0.000000659 |
2.721 |
0.00004465 |
|
Norway |
2.534 |
0.00004157 |
0.0339 |
0.000000556 |
2.500 |
0.00004102 |
|
Estonia |
2.367 |
0.00003883 |
0.0294 |
0.000000482 |
2.337 |
0.00003835 |
|
Ireland |
2.044 |
0.00003353 |
0.0308 |
0.000000505 |
2.013 |
0.00003302 |
|
New Zealand |
1.700 |
0.00002790 |
0.0293 |
0.000000481 |
1.671 |
0.00002742 |
|
Lithuania |
1.460 |
0.00002395 |
0.0181 |
0.000000297 |
1.442 |
0.00002365 |
|
Latvia |
1.439 |
0.00002361 |
0.0179 |
0.000000293 |
1.421 |
0.00002331 |
|
Luxembourg |
0.643 |
0.00001054 |
0.0289 |
0.000000474 |
0.614 |
0.00001007 |
|
Iceland |
0.149 |
0.00000244 |
0.0026 |
0.000000042 |
0.146 |
0.00000240 |
|
Liechtenstein |
0.013 |
0.00000021 |
0.0002 |
0.000000003 |
0.013 |
0.00000021 |
|
Monaco |
0.005 |
0.00000008 |
0.0001 |
0.000000002 |
0.004 |
0.00000007 |
The same country emission data were also used to estimate the
reduction level in 2010 corresponding to the individual
effective emissions ceiling for each
Annex I Party, using a constant CO2 emissions from 1990 to 2000, and
decreasing regularly from 2000 to 2010. The percentage reduction in
CO2 emission level in 2010 as compared to 1990 CO2 emission level is
presented in Table A6.2 and Figure A6.1.
|
Table A6.2 |
Emission reduction in 2010 |
|
|
(as % of 1990 level) |
|
Country |
% |
|
United Kingdom |
63.27 |
|
Luxembourg |
41.69 |
|
Belgium |
37.39 |
|
Germany |
27.41 |
|
Sweden |
24.96 |
|
Monaco |
24.50 |
|
France |
24.36 |
|
United States of America |
22.76 |
|
Hungary |
20.26 |
|
Netherlands |
18.79 |
|
Slovakia |
18.22 |
|
Czech Republic |
18.22 |
|
Denmark |
17.83 |
|
Austria |
17.56 |
|
Poland |
16.70 |
|
Canada |
16.11 |
|
Iceland |
16.04 |
|
New Zealand |
16.00 |
|
Ireland |
13.96 |
|
Switzerland |
13.48 |
|
Liechtenstein |
13.48 |
|
Norway |
12.40 |
|
Lithuania |
11.51 |
|
Latvia |
11.51 |
|
Russian Federation |
11.51 |
|
Estonia |
11.51 |
|
Australia |
11.31 |
|
Romania |
10.93 |
|
Bulgaria |
10.85 |
|
Finland |
10.69 |
|
Italy (including San Marino) |
10.54 |
|
Spain |
10.48 |
|
Japan |
9.45 |
|
Portugal |
8.43 |
|
Greece |
7.49 |
An illustrative simulation of the different targets for an
arbitrarily chosen individual Annex I Party (United States of
America), in accordance to its relative responsibility including 1990
concentration, corresponding to its respective fraction of different
reduction targets for the ensemble of Annex I Parties (see Appendix
III) reducing from 0% to 100% of 1990 CO2 emission level in 2010, is
shown in Table A6.3 (in GtCy) and Table A6.4 (in degree Celsius).
|
Table A6.3 |
United States |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Percent |
Emission |
|
Emission |
1990 concent. |
new emissions |
reduction target |
new emissions |
Reduction |
Reduction |
|
Level in 2010 |
plus new emis. |
only |
|
ceiling |
new emissions |
Level in 2010 |
|
(as % of 1990) |
GtCy |
GtCy |
GtCy |
GtCy |
% |
(as % of 1990) |
|
100% |
3186.38 |
319.5539 |
0.0000 |
319.5539 |
Reference |
0.00 |
|
90% |
3182.93 |
316.1087 |
3.9198 |
315.6341 |
1.23 |
11.46 |
|
80% |
3179.49 |
312.6636 |
7.8395 |
311.7144 |
2.45 |
22.93 |
|
70% |
3176.04 |
309.2185 |
11.7593 |
307.7946 |
3.68 |
34.39 |
|
60% |
3172.60 |
305.7733 |
15.6790 |
303.8749 |
4.91 |
45.86 |
|
50% |
3169.15 |
302.3282 |
19.5988 |
299.9551 |
6.13 |
57.32 |
|
40% |
3165.71 |
298.8830 |
23.5185 |
296.0354 |
7.36 |
68.78 |
|
30% |
3162.26 |
295.4379 |
27.4383 |
292.1156 |
8.59 |
80.25 |
|
20% |
3158.82 |
291.9927 |
31.3580 |
288.1958 |
9.81 |
91.71 |
|
10% |
3155.37 |
288.5476 |
35.2778 |
284.2761 |
11.04 |
103.18 |
|
0% |
3151.93 |
285.1025 |
39.1976 |
280.3563 |
12.27 |
114.64 |
|
(*) Fraction of Annex I reduction target according to relative responsibility including 1990 concentration | ||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Table A6.4 |
United States |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Percent |
Emission |
|
Emission |
1990 concent. |
new emissions |
reduction target |
new emissions |
Reduction |
Reduction |
|
Level in 2010 |
plus new emis. |
only |
|
ceiling |
new emissions |
Level in 2010 |
|
(as % of 1990) |
C |
C |
C |
C |
% |
(as % of 1990) |
|
100% |
0.052280 |
0.005243 |
0.000000 |
0.005243 |
Reference |
0.00 |
|
90% |
0.052223 |
0.005186 |
0.000064 |
0.005179 |
1.23 |
11.46 |
|
80% |
0.052167 |
0.005130 |
0.000129 |
0.005114 |
2.45 |
22.93 |
|
70% |
0.052110 |
0.005073 |
0.000193 |
0.005050 |
3.68 |
34.39 |
|
60% |
0.052054 |
0.005017 |
0.000257 |
0.004986 |
4.91 |
45.86 |
|
50% |
0.051997 |
0.004960 |
0.000322 |
0.004921 |
6.13 |
57.32 |
|
40% |
0.051941 |
0.004904 |
0.000386 |
0.004857 |
7.36 |
68.78 |
|
30% |
0.051884 |
0.004847 |
0.000450 |
0.004793 |
8.59 |
80.25 |
|
20% |
0.051828 |
0.004791 |
0.000515 |
0.004729 |
9.81 |
91.71 |
|
10% |
0.051771 |
0.004734 |
0.000579 |
0.004664 |
11.04 |
103.18 |
|
0% |
0.051715 |
0.004678 |
0.000643 |
0.004600 |
12.27 |
114.64 |
|
(*) Fraction of Annex I reduction target according to relative responsibility including 1990 concentration | ||||||
For the sake of illustration one Annex I Party for which
reported annual emissions are available for the period 1990-1994 has
been used as an example to estimate the departure from the commitment
and resulting compensation.
The resulting hypothetical contribution due to CO2 emissions
was estimated for the period 1990-2010, as well as the relative
importance of the main greenhouse gases in terms of
effective emissions for the same
period and presented in Table A7.1.
|
Table A7.1 |
Clean development fund - Hypothetical United States Contribution Estimation for the 1990-2010 period |
|
|
|
|
|
|
mean surface |
| ||||||
|
|
Emissions |
|
|
Emissions |
|
|
Concentrations |
|
|
Effective Emissions |
|
|
temperature |
mean sea-level | |
|
year |
CO2 |
CH4 |
N2O |
CO2 |
CH4 |
N2O |
CO2 |
CH4 |
N2O |
CO2 |
CH4 |
N2O |
All Gases |
increase |
rise |
|
|
Gg |
Gg |
Gg |
PgC/y |
TgCH4/y |
TgN/y |
ppmv |
ppbv |
ppbv |
GtCy |
GtCyequiv |
GtCyequiv |
GtCyequiv |
C |
cm |
|
1990 |
4957022 |
27000 |
411.40 |
1.35192 |
27.00 |
0.2618 |
0.000000 |
0.000000 |
0.000000 |
0.000000 |
0.000000 |
0.000000 |
0.000000 |
0.00000000 |
0.00000000 |
|
1991 |
4907452 |
27270 |
399.06 |
1.33840 |
27.27 |
0.2539 |
0.626797 |
9.477551 |
0.054105 |
1.632439 |
0.377843 |
0.025087 |
2.035369 |
0.00003339 |
0.00000001 |
|
1992 |
4957022 |
27270 |
399.06 |
1.35192 |
27.27 |
0.2539 |
1.242865 |
18.304015 |
0.106139 |
4.869373 |
1.107573 |
0.074300 |
6.051246 |
0.00009928 |
0.00000003 |
|
1993 |
5105733 |
26730 |
399.06 |
1.39247 |
26.73 |
0.2539 |
1.860816 |
26.435855 |
0.157740 |
9.715707 |
2.161497 |
0.147438 |
12.024642 |
0.00019729 |
0.00000006 |
|
1994 |
5105733 |
28080 |
357.92 |
1.39247 |
28.08 |
0.2278 |
2.493173 |
33.738186 |
0.208913 |
16.208960 |
3.506543 |
0.244304 |
19.959807 |
0.00032749 |
0.00000009 |
|
1995 |
4957022 |
27000 |
411.40 |
1.35192 |
27.00 |
0.2618 |
3.121029 |
40.939717 |
0.254251 |
24.337410 |
5.138695 |
0.362191 |
29.838296 |
0.00048957 |
0.00000014 |
|
1996 |
4957022 |
27000 |
411.40 |
1.35192 |
27.00 |
0.2618 |
3.725612 |
47.195401 |
0.306246 |
34.040445 |
7.020243 |
0.504187 |
41.564875 |
0.00068197 |
0.00000019 |
|
1997 |
4957022 |
27000 |
411.40 |
1.35192 |
27.00 |
0.2618 |
4.325892 |
52.958776 |
0.357810 |
45.306858 |
9.131561 |
0.670091 |
55.108510 |
0.00090418 |
0.00000025 |
|
1998 |
4957022 |
27000 |
411.40 |
1.35192 |
27.00 |
0.2618 |
4.921900 |
58.268586 |
0.408946 |
58.125522 |
11.454566 |
0.859705 |
70.439793 |
0.00115573 |
0.00000032 |
|
1999 |
4957022 |
27000 |
411.40 |
1.35192 |
27.00 |
0.2618 |
5.513666 |
63.160525 |
0.459658 |
72.485389 |
13.972599 |
1.072833 |
87.530821 |
0.00143615 |
0.00000040 |
|
2000 |
4957022 |
27000 |
411.40 |
1.35192 |
27.00 |
0.2618 |
6.101220 |
67.667480 |
0.509949 |
88.375490 |
16.670312 |
1.309278 |
106.355080 |
0.00174500 |
0.00000049 |
|
2001 |
4957022 |
27000 |
411.40 |
1.35192 |
27.00 |
0.2618 |
6.684592 |
71.819747 |
0.559822 |
105.784933 |
19.533564 |
1.568848 |
126.887345 |
0.00208188 |
0.00000058 |
|
2002 |
4957022 |
27000 |
411.40 |
1.35192 |
27.00 |
0.2618 |
7.263812 |
75.645239 |
0.609281 |
124.702904 |
22.549328 |
1.851351 |
149.103583 |
0.00244639 |
0.00000068 |
|
2003 |
4957022 |
27000 |
411.40 |
1.35192 |
27.00 |
0.2618 |
7.838910 |
79.169674 |
0.658331 |
145.118668 |
25.705600 |
2.156596 |
172.980864 |
0.00283815 |
0.00000079 |
|
2004 |
4957022 |
27000 |
411.40 |
1.35192 |
27.00 |
0.2618 |
8.409914 |
82.416743 |
0.706973 |
167.021563 |
28.991325 |
2.484394 |
198.497282 |
0.00325681 |
0.00000091 |
|
2005 |
4957022 |
27000 |
411.40 |
1.35192 |
27.00 |
0.2618 |
8.976854 |
85.408274 |
0.755211 |
190.401005 |
32.396313 |
2.834560 |
225.631877 |
0.00370201 |
0.00000103 |
|
2006 |
4957022 |
27000 |
411.40 |
1.35192 |
27.00 |
0.2618 |
9.539759 |
88.164379 |
0.803049 |
215.246484 |
35.911180 |
3.206906 |
254.364569 |
0.00417344 |
0.00000117 |
|
2007 |
4957022 |
27000 |
411.40 |
1.35192 |
27.00 |
0.2618 |
10.098658 |
90.703584 |
0.850490 |
241.547567 |
39.527277 |
3.601248 |
284.676092 |
0.00467077 |
0.00000131 |
|
2008 |
4957022 |
27000 |
411.40 |
1.35192 |
27.00 |
0.2618 |
10.653578 |
93.042960 |
0.897537 |
269.293893 |
43.236639 |
4.017405 |
316.547937 |
0.00519370 |
0.00000145 |
|
2009 |
4957022 |
27000 |
411.40 |
1.35192 |
27.00 |
0.2618 |
11.204550 |
95.198231 |
0.944194 |
298.475175 |
47.031926 |
4.455196 |
349.962297 |
0.00574194 |
0.00000161 |
|
2010 |
4957022 |
27000 |
411.40 |
1.35192 |
27.00 |
0.2618 |
11.751599 |
97.183887 |
0.990464 |
329.081202 |
50.906375 |
4.914439 |
384.902016 |
0.00631521 |
0.00000177 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Effective CO2 Emissions |
329.0812 |
GtCy |
|
|
|
|
|
|
GHG relative importance in terms of effective |
|
|
| |||
|
CO2 Ceiling |
|
311.7144 |
GtCy |
|
|
|
|
|
|
emissions for the 1990-2010 period |
|
|
| ||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CO2 |
CH4 |
N2O |
|
|
|
|
Departure from CO2 Ceiling |
17.3668 |
GtCy |
|
|
|
|
|
|
85.50% |
13.23% |
1.28% |
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Emission hypothesis: |
1990/1994: actual emissions |
|
CO2 emission ceiling according to 20% reduction for the ensemble of Annex I Parties and | ||||||||||||
|
|
|
1995/2010: return to 1990 emission level |
|
relative responsibility for USA including 1990 concentration level. | |||||||||||
The financial resources of the clean development fund shall be
directed preferentially to the non-Annex I Parties that have a larger
relative contribution to climate change, thus promoting mitigation
where it matters most and contributing to a global objective, while
contributing constructively to the advancement of the implementation
of the Convention by non-Annex I Parties.
There is, in addition, an upper limit to the funds that may be
approved for each non-Annex I Party that is equal to the fraction of
the total funds available corresponding to the relative
responsibility, measured in terms of effective
emissions, of that Party among the ensemble of
non-Annex I Parties.
Table A8.1 and Figure A8.1 present a simulation, based on
available data, of the relative distribution of the financial
resources of the clean development fund among non-Annex I
Parties.
|
Table A8.1 - Fund distribution among non-Annex I Parties | |
|
according to relative contribution to climate change | |
|
with respect to 1990-2010 CO2 emissions |
|
|
(IS92a scenario, including 1990 concentration) |
|
|
|
|
|
Country |
|
|
|
|
|
China |
29.81469 |
|
India |
8.58896 |
|
Mexico |
4.45394 |
|
Kazakhstan |
3.97032 |
|
Venezuela |
3.94587 |
|
Brazil |
3.00593 |
|
Uzbekistan |
2.71396 |
|
Argentina |
2.52969 |
|
Iran |
2.36756 |
|
Republic of Korea |
2.30692 |
|
Democratic People's Republic of Korea |
2.01429 |
|
Saudi Arabia |
1.90234 |
|
Indonesia |
1.81287 |
|
Azerbaijan |
1.24004 |
|
Egypt |
1.13006 |
|
Nigeria |
0.93556 |
|
Colombia |
0.89389 |
|
Croatia |
0.82889 |
|
Thailand |
0.81652 |
|
Pakistan |
0.80643 |
|
Algeria |
0.77152 |
|
Turkmenistan |
0.73968 |
|
Chile |
0.69153 |
|
Malaysia |
0.64705 |
|
Cuba |
0.62881 |
|
Philippines |
0.62170 |
|
United Arab Emirates |
0.53947 |
|
Georgia |
0.51200 |
|
Israel |
0.46085 |
|
Kuwait |
0.45697 |
|
Moldova |
0.45120 |
|
Peru |
0.43154 |
|
Viet Nam |
0.38841 |
|
Slovenia |
0.36349 |
|
Zimbabwe |
0.33592 |
|
Morocco |
0.32423 |
|
Syrian Arab Republic |
0.32304 |
|
Zambia |
0.26921 |
|
Trinidad and Tobago |
0.26453 |
|
Armenia |
0.24443 |
|
Zaire |
0.20767 |
|
Ecuador |
0.20107 |
|
Uruguay |
0.19761 |
|
Qatar |
0.18863 |
|
Bahrain |
0.17899 |
|
Bangladesh |
0.17377 |
|
Tunisia |
0.17183 |
|
Lebanon |
0.14130 |
|
Kenya |
0.12075 |
|
Yemen |
0.11912 |
|
Albania |
0.11818 |
|
Mongolia |
0.11301 |
|
Sri Lanka |
0.11048 |
|
Oman |
0.10948 |
|
Myanmar |
0.10409 |
|
Jamaica |
0.10263 |
|
Jordan |
0.09881 |
|
Cote d'Ivoire |
0.09234 |
|
Bolívia |
0.07468 |
|
Sudan |
0.07330 |
|
Ghana |
0.07164 |
|
Guatemala |
0.07031 |
|
Panama |
0.06395 |
|
Mozambique |
0.06190 |
|
United Republic of Cameroon |
0.05750 |
|
Bahamas |
0.05362 |
|
Senegal |
0.04659 |
|
Costa Rica |
0.04369 |
|
United Republic of Tanzania |
0.04310 |
|
El Salvador |
0.04060 |
|
Nicaragua |
0.03522 |
|
Honduras |
0.03487 |
|
Ethiopia (including Eritrea) |
0.03408 |
|
Malawi |
0.02749 |
|
Papua New Guinea |
0.02744 |
|
Guyana |
0.02631 |
|
Malta |
0.02414 |
|
Paraguay |
0.02265 |
|
Congo |
0.02152 |
|
Mauritania |
0.02047 |
|
Guinea |
0.01887 |
|
Uganda |
0.01732 |
|
Mauritius |
0.01573 |
|
Botswana |
0.01560 |
|
Haiti |
0.01515 |
|
Sierra Leone |
0.01350 |
|
Fiji |
0.01323 |
|
Barbados |
0.01318 |
|
Benin |
0.01294 |
|
Niger |
0.01048 |
|
Nepal |
0.00858 |
|
Cambodia |
0.00830 |
|
Togo |
0.00787 |
|
Swaziland |
0.00640 |
|
Antigua & Barbuda |
0.00635 |
|
Mali |
0.00589 |
|
Burkina Faso |
0.00580 |
|
Lao People's Democratic Republic |
0.00466 |
|
Djibouti |
0.00454 |
|
Central African Republic |
0.00447 |
|
Cape Verde |
0.00436 |
|
Chad |
0.00388 |
|
Belize |
0.00352 |
|
Gambia |
0.00230 |
|
Guinea Bissau |
0.00225 |
|
Burundi |
0.00222 |
|
Micronesia |
0.00206 |
|
Saint Lucia |
0.00185 |
|
Solomon Islands |
0.00175 |
|
Nauru |
0.00166 |
|
Seychelles |
0.00162 |
|
Samoa |
0.00148 |
|
Grenada |
0.00135 |
|
Vanuatu |
0.00104 |
|
St. Kitts-Nevis |
0.00093 |
|
St. Vicent & the Grenadines |
0.00093 |
|
Marshall |
0.00087 |
|
Bhutan |
0.00085 |
|
Maldives |
0.00073 |
|
Comoros |
0.00070 |
|
Dominica |
0.00069 |
|
Kiribati |
0.00040 |
|
Cook Islands |
0.00031 |
|
Niue |
0.00005 |
|
Lesotho |
|
|
Namibia |
|
Figure A8.1 - Relative distribution of clean development fund
among non-Annex I Parties
Revised EU-proposal on AGBM negotiating text
On behalf of the European Community and its Member States, I
herewith send you, in addition to our submission of March 28th, the
revised EU proposal for Annex X; Monaco has been added to that
list.
ANNEX X(1)
Australia
Austria
Belarus
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Czech Republic
Denmark
European Community
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Mexico
Monaco
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Republic of Korea
Romania
Russian Federation
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Ukraine
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United States of America
243bis This Amendment shall enter into force on the ninetieth day
after the date of deposit of the [thirtieth] [twentieth] [fiftieth]
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
243.1bis For each State or regional economic integration
organization which ratifies, accepts or approves this Amendment or
accedes thereto after the [deposit of the instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession/fulfillment of the requirements of
paragraph 243bis] this Amendment shall enter into force on the
ninetieth day after the date of deposit by such State or regional
economic integration organization of its instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession.
243.2bis For the purposes of paragraphs 243bis and 243.1bis above,
any instrument deposited by a regional economic integration
organization shall not be counted as additional to those deposited by
States members of the organization.
- - - - -
1. 1 Additions of developed countries or countries with economies in transition could be made.