Distr.
GENERAL
FCCC/AG13/1996/1
5 June 1996
Original: ENGLISH
AD HOC GROUP ON ARTICLE 13
Second session
Geneva, 10 July 1996
Item 4 (b) of the provisional agenda
Third session
Geneva, 16-18 December 1996
Note by the secretariat
1. At its first session, the Ad Hoc Group on Article 13 decided to request Parties,
non-parties, and intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations to make written submissions in response to a
questionnaire relating to a multilateral consultative process
(FCCC/AG13/1995/2, para. 17). The submissions would be compiled and
synthesized by the secretariat.
2. Nineteen Parties and one non-party submitted responses:
Australia, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Czech
Republic, the European Community, France, Honduras, Japan, Kuwait,
Latvia, Mali, Mexico, Russian Federation, Senegal, Turkey, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Zambia. These
submissions were compiled in document
FCCC/AG13/1996/MISC.1.
3. Ten non-governmental organizations (NGOs) submitted responses: Development Alternatives (India), Foundation for International Environmental Law (United Kingdom), Global Climate Coalition (USA), International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria), Hamburg Institute for Economic Research (Germany), RainForest ReGeneration Institute (USA), Tata Energy Research Institute (India), University of Bradford
(United Kingdom), Verification Technology Information Centre
(United Kingdom) and Woods Hole Research Center (USA). These
submissions were compiled in document FCCC/AG13/1996/MISC.2. No
submissions were received from intergovernmental
organizations.
4. Both compilations were made available during the sessions of
the subsidiary bodies held in February and March 1996. Submissions
were received subsequently from Lebanon and from the Wuppertal
Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy, and can be found in
documents FCCC/AG13/1996/MISC.1/Add.1 and MISC.2/Add.1,
respectively.
5. The present document is a synthesis of the above-mentioned submissions.
It provides a spectrum of views on the multilateral consultative
process and identifies common areas of understanding that seem to be
emerging. For ease of reference, it combines submissions from
Parties, non-parties and non-governmental organizations in one
document. When the views expressed by non-governmental organizations
correspond to those of countries, they have been merged. However,
views expressed by non-governmental organizations that are not
supported by inputs from countries are clearly
distinguished.
Question 1(a). What should be understood by the term
"multilateral consultative process"?
6. Many submissions defined the term "multilateral consultative
process" by the functions it would fulfil. In this regard, four
central functions, inter alia, were described: to provide
assistance; to address concerns regarding implementation of the
Convention; to resolve potential disputes; and to interpret the
Convention.
(i) Assistance
The first central function is to assist Parties to implement their
commitments under the Convention. Several submissions envisaged the
process or a consultative service having access to legal, economic
and technical expertise, whereby Parties could obtain advice on
preparing national communications, developing climate change
mitigation policies, and fulfilling other obligations under the
Convention or future protocols.
(ii) Concerns regarding
implementation
The second central function is to deal with concerns regarding
implementation, for example, situations in which one or more Parties
are unwilling or unable to comply with their obligations under the
Convention or a future protocol. A Party concerned about its own
ability to implement commitments or concerned about the
non-compliance of another Party could invoke the process. In the case
of a Party experiencing implementation difficulties, that Party
could, on its own initiative or in response to the requests of
others, engage in consultative discussions with the main body
responsible for the multilateral consultative process. A few
submissions suggested that the process could be invoked not only by
Parties but by the secretariat, the existing subsidiary bodies,
and/or the Conference of the Parties (COP). Many submissions saw the
process as closely related to the in-depth review process, which
effectively reveals the progress towards climate change mitigation
achieved by those Parties that are subject to such reviews.
(iii) Potential disputes
The third central function is to resolve potential conflicts
between Parties in a facilitative and non-confrontational manner.
Many responses indicated that the type of conflict most anticipated
would be a situation wherein one or more Parties perceive themselves
to be injured by a Party that has not complied with the Convention or
a related legal instrument. Several submissions acknowledged that
traditional bilateral dispute resolution mechanisms are ill-suited
for global environmental treaties where the repercussions of
non-compliance affect many States. Some submissions commented that
they did not expect the dispute settlement procedure under Article 14
of the Convention ever to be invoked. They pointed out that Parties
to other multilateral environmental treaties have been reluctant to
invoke traditional dispute mechanisms even when such Parties have
identified the compliance of a given Party as
inadequate.
(iv) Interpretation of the
Convention
The fourth central function is to provide interpretation of the
Convention and to clarify the obligations of the Parties. Many
submissions found this to be an important function. One country
stated that the process could not "issue 'authoritative'
interpretations of the Convention, given the relevant provisions of
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties". It added that the
process could assist by providing advice to a Party individually or
Parties collectively on the interpretation or application of the
relevant provisions of the Convention. Some submissions suggested
that the various bodies and processes established under the climate
change regime, for example, the subsidiary bodies, the financial
mechanism, the dispute settlement procedures and annexes should be
subject to an Article 13 process. A few countries thought it
premature at this early stage in the development of a process to
define the range of questions that would be considered
appropriate.
Question 1(b). What "questions regarding the
implementation of the Convention" should be covered by such a
process?
7. Depending on which of the four central functions mentioned
above were advanced, a variety of views regarding the phrase
"questions regarding the implementation of the Convention" were
provided. Some submissions suggested that the questions should be of
a legal, economic, social, or technical nature in furtherance of the
inquiring Party's efforts to meet its national communications'
obligations and other commitments. However, one country and one NGO
indicated that purely technical and scientific issues were outside
the scope of the Article 13 process and should be taken up through
the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
(SBSTA).
8. In concordance with the second and third central functions,
several submissions stated that the Article 13 process should concern
issues regarding the extent to which an individual Party has been,
is, or will be fulfilling its commitments under the Convention or a
future protocol. One country stated that if a question directly
concerns all Parties, it should be discussed at an open-ended forum
such as the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) or the COP. One
NGO stated that for the process to apply to questions regarding the
implementation of the Convention, the questions must: be considered
important; be inappropriate for resolution through another article of
the Convention; and have an effect on more than one
Party.
Question 2. What is meant by the word "process" in Article
13? Should it be understood as a sequence of events or as a mechanism
or as an institution? Could it imply all of these?
9. Several submissions viewed the term "process" as inclusive of a
sequence of events, a mechanism and an institution. On the other
hand, many submissions favoured an institution as the structural
framework that would support the process. In this light, it was
suggested that a main institution be mandated to oversee the
multilateral consultative process, in addition to some
responsibilities being assigned to other institutions such as the
COP, the existing subsidiary bodies and the secretariat. One country
thought that, in order not to duplicate functions of other Convention
bodies, the process should be provided with "an additional subsidiary
body of the COP". This country suggested the establishment of an ad
hoc intergovernmental group of experts on legal and economic issues.
At least one NGO in favour of an institutional structure pointed out
that a permanent body develops an institutional memory and
credibility as it handles issues in a proper manner. The submissions
put forward a variety of institutional structures for the
multilateral consultative process, such as the establishment of a
subsidiary body of the SBI or a new subsidiary body of the COP.
Others preferred that the multilateral consultative process be
administered through the existing SBI without the creation of a new
institution or sub-institution. At least two countries were hesitant
to structure the process as an institution. One was particularly
concerned with the financial burden of establishing a new
body.
10. One NGO stated that, during the negotiations on the
Convention, the co-chairs of Working Group II of the
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee had suggested that the COP
establish an ad hoc panel responsible for resolving questions of
implementation. This NGO suggested, however, that such a structure
would not respond to questions in a timely fashion since it would be
necessary to convene sessions of the COP in order to initiate the
process. A few submissions recommended designing the Article 13
process on the basis of the Montreal Protocol and the 1994 Sulphur
Protocol implementation committees, which are permanent standing
bodies. One NGO suggested establishing a "clearing house panel" that
would be responsible for identifying questions to be put to various
expert groups.
Question 3. What principles should govern the process? Is
it sufficient that the process should be simple, transparent,
facilitative and non-confrontational in
character?
11. Numerous submissions affirmed that the process should be
simple, transparent, facilitative and non-confrontational. A few
countries stated that the process should not be judicial or
inquisitorial. Several countries envisaged the process as resolving
tensions between Parties in a similar way to the implementation
committees mentioned above.
12. A few NGOs offered qualifying considerations with regard to
the aforementioned principles. For example, one suggested that,
although the process should be simple at first, it should have the
flexibility to grow more complex if necessary. Another NGO urged that
a balance should be struck between public access to information
regarding Parties' compliance and the need for Parties to communicate
information that they perceive to be confidential. It pointed out
that Article 12.9 anticipates that the COP may establish criteria by
which Parties can designate information as confidential, thus
allowing the secretariat to aggregate such information before
disseminating it to Convention bodies involved in the communication
and review of information. However, it stated that the process could
nevertheless provide for negotiating with a Party involved in a
compliance review to gain access to sensitive information in exchange
for confidentiality.
13. With regard to structuring the process to be
non-confrontational, a few NGOs cautioned that "non-confrontational"
should not be interpreted as restricting the process from dealing
with situations in which Parties disagree or in which one or more
Parties perceive themselves to be injured by the non-compliance of
another Party. One NGO explained that at times the process may have
to be "formal, judgmental, and thus potentially confrontational". One
NGO stated that the process should provide for "carrots and sticks,"
including a genuine function to assist those Parties which are unable
to fulfil their obligations.
14. Some submissions suggested additional principles such as
timeliness, meaning that the process should be "expeditious in
seeking resolutions" as well as "mindful of the precautionary
principle", and due representation and due process, meaning in part
that all Parties involved should have the right to be
heard.
15. One country and an NGO stressed that the process should be
forward-looking: it should not dwell on past instances of
non-compliance with the Convention or protocol, but instead on how to
assist Parties achieve compliance in the future. One NGO stated that
the process should be voluntary in that no Party would be required to
participate.
Question 4. Is it necessary to establish such a
multilateral consultative process? If so, what measures should the
Conference of the Parties take for its adoption: decision of the COP?
Amendment? Protocol?
16. One country stated that the Convention "imposes an obligation
on Parties to consider the establishment of a multilateral
consultative process: it does not oblige them to establish one".
However, in this regard, many submissions supported the establishment
of such a process. Several NGOs thought that the process should be
established as soon as possible to help ensure that it becomes
credible by enabling it to develop, inter alia, competence,
legitimacy, expertise and precedents. One country conveyed its
uncertainty as to whether the process needed to be established in the
near future. Two countries expressed scepticism about the creation of
an additional institution to carry out the process. One stated that
the SBI and SBSTA have already been established in addition to the
IPCC process, "which represents an independent source of assessment
of, inter alia, the overall performance of the Parties." The
other indicated that the SBI is capable of reviewing and resolving
questions of implementation and cautioned that if the new process is
established at a time when existing mechanisms are not fully
operational, it could hinder the functioning of the COP and existing
subsidiary bodies and thus lead to confusion.
17. A large number of submissions suggested that if a multilateral
consultative process were to be established, it should be adopted by
decision of the COP. An NGO cited examples of agreements in which
decisions by the supreme body rather than a protocol and amendments
have proved effective: the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the Convention on
Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat
(Ramsar) and the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling (Whaling Convention). A few countries advised either adopting
the process by an amendment to the Convention or awaiting the
adoption of a protocol. Some submissions cautioned that a
disadvantage of the amendment or protocol approach was that the
process would be unavailable to Parties not having accepted the
amendment or ratified the protocol. One country stated that the
"mechanism should have appropriate rules and regulations which should
be contained in an annex ...".
Question 5. If a new mechanism or institution were to be
established under Article 13, should its membership be general or
restricted to specialists such as legal, economic, social or
technical experts? In this context, should a roster of experts to
provide advice be envisaged?
18. Most submissions suggested the establishment of either a
standing committee of legal, economic, and technical experts, or of
generalists having access to a roster of experts. One country stated
that any "mechanism" to be established should be as small as possible
to minimize costs associated with it. It also suggested the
nomination of a "rapporteur" who would be responsible for consulting
widely with Parties and others as appropriate on questions raised and
reporting back to the appropriate Convention body. It noted that this
option could prove less costly and be more responsive to Parties as
well as avoiding the potential complication of selecting members to
serve on a standing committee. Many submissions recommended that the
process draw upon expertise from some combination of the SBI, the
SBSTA, the IPCC and the Global Environment Facility, as well as other
relevant Convention bodies and related intergovernmental
institutions. One country suggested that the body be open-ended in
the interests of transparency, given that many developing countries
have limited resources for providing representatives to a committee
restricted to experts and consequently would be less able to monitor
its activities. One NGO suggested the establishment of small panels
of experts and/or Parties to hear and discuss particular issues in a
given case. These panels would "serve an advisory, not adjudicatory,
function".
19. In reference to a standing committee, many submissions advised
that members should be representatives from Parties, although some
suggested that members serve in their individual capacities. One NGO
noted that the implementation committee procedures of the Montreal
Protocol and the 1994 Sulphur Protocol provide for the election of
members in their capacity as Party representatives. However, another
NGO pointed out that the conciliation commission established under
Article 42 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights is composed of experts that serve in their individual
capacity.
20. Irrespective of whether members serve in their individual
capacity or as government representatives, many submissions advised
that members should be selected by Parties with due regard to
equitable geographical distribution. Many countries stressed that
Annex I and non-Annex I Parties should be given equal representation.
One country stated that membership should be limited to "at least 5
but no more than 10 members nominated by Parties". Another suggested
that in light of the "experience of the Implementation Committee of
the Montreal Protocol, it may be better to restrict the membership to
designated specialists and experts in order to make discussions
productive". One country proposed two levels of membership: a general
level to resolve "primary" questions, and "experts from different
sectors" to analyse questions of greater importance.
21. One NGO called for unlimited and non-restrictive participation
and another NGO commented that a Party that is the subject of the
consultative process should have the option of adding as well as
subtracting committee members. In addition, a few NGOs saw a role for
NGO representation within the process, although one NGO recognized
that such an arrangement would be politically infeasible. Another NGO
suggested that an NGO advisory group on implementation should be
established to support the process.
Question 6. What linkages would need to be established
with other Articles of the Convention, notably, Articles 7.2(c),
8.2(c), 10, 12 and 14? (For example, are the provisions on the review
process complete in themselves or is there scope for them to receive
support through the process envisaged under Article 13? What is the
relationship of Article 13 to Article 14? Would the process under
Article 13 automatically be halted if a Party invokes Article
14?)
22. Many submissions found linkages between the multilateral
consultative process and the existing institutional bodies,
procedures and processes. The following summarizes the various
suggested linkages between the Article 13 process and those articles
of the Convention listed in question 6 above.
(i) Article 7.2(c): COP shall facilitate, at the request
of two or more Parties, the coordination of measures adopted by them
to address climate change and its effects.
23. One country suggested that the multilateral consultative
process should interpret how the COP would facilitate, at the request
of two or more Parties, the coordination of measures to address
climate change and its effects. Many submissions assumed that the
Article 13 process, with functions that might include providing
technical assistance, interpretation of obligations, and
recommendations to achieve compliance, would effectively be a
coordination of measures between Parties to address climate change.
Thus, many countries and NGOs responded to this portion of question 6
by describing the role of the COP in the Article 13
process.
24. Several submissions stated that the committee, institution or
body that is established to implement the Article 13 process would
provide recommendations that would ultimately be presented to the COP
for adoption. Such recommendations could include actions to be
carried out by Parties that are called before the process; the COP;
or other institutions such as the financial mechanism. Other
submissions suggested that the committee's consultations should be
finalized without having to be adopted by the COP. In this case, the
COP would be presented with a report of the Committee's activities. A
few countries suggested that the COP should be able to pose questions
directly to the Article 13 mechanism.
(ii) Article 8.2(c): The secretariat shall facilitate
assistance to the Parties, particularly developing country Parties,
on request, in the compilation and communication of information
...
25. Many submissions stated that the compilation and communication
of information in promotion of the implementation of the Convention
could be considered as falling within the responsibility of the
Article 13 process, although one country found no such
correlation.
26. Many submissions envisaged the secretariat cooperating closely
with the multilateral consultative process by providing technical,
administrative and meeting support. One country voiced its concern
that such a relationship would be a financial burden on the
secretariat, whereas another country proposed that the Article 13
process would provide technical assistance to the secretariat. Some
submissions argued that the secretariat should be able to put
questions to the Article 13 mechanism and that the answers garnered
would provide useful information for all Parties.
27. One NGO envisaged the secretariat forming linkages with an
Article 13 process to carry out mutual responsibilities in resolving
problems relating to national communications. In this regard, both
the secretariat and the Article 13 process would be in a position to
identify those Parties requiring assistance to the COP, the financial
mechanism, and other bodies. A few NGOs suggested that, in the
context of the Article 13 process and the in-depth review process,
the secretariat, a Party and the COP should be able to invoke the
Article 13 process when a Party's communication reveals that it has
not met its obligations. In this context, one NGO indicated that the
secretariats under both the Montreal Protocol and the Second Sulphur
Protocol have the power to initiate non-compliance proceedings. This
NGO suggested that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change secretariat's "limited role" of compiling and transmitting
reports and facilitating assistance to those Parties preparing
communications, would need to be broadened.
(iii) Article 10: A subsidiary body for implementation is
hereby established to assist the COP in the assessment and review of
the effective implementation of the Convention.
28. Submissions enumerated a variety of potential linkages between
the Article 13 process and the SBI. First, many favoured the SBI as
the main body that would be responsible for the multilateral
consultative process. One country stated that the SBI would be the
"guardian" of the Article 13 process. One NGO noted, however, that
although such an arrangement would promote transparency, the
assessment of an individual Party's compliance is likely to prove
impossible in the political atmosphere of the SBI. Several
submissions recommended the establishment of a standing committee
under the SBI to give effect to Article 13. One NGO stated that in
this regard it would be necessary to decide whether such a standing
committee should report to the SBI or directly to the COP. One NGO
stated that a standing committee should probably report to the COP:
"alongside the SBI and independently of it".
29. One country suggested that members of an Article 13 body be appointed by the SBI. Alternatively, another country suggested that an Article 13 standing committee should serve as the executive institution of the SBI. In addition, a number of countries viewed the
Article 13 mechanism as assisting or providing support to the
SBI.
30. One NGO predicted that the main business of the multilateral consultative process would emerge from the national communications overseen by the SBI. Another NGO distinguished the roles of the Article 13 process and the SBI by explaining that the SBI would be responsible for assessing the overall implementation of the Convention, whereas the Article 13 process would be more concerned with the compliance record of individual Parties.
(iv) Article 12: Communication of information related to
implementation
31. Numerous inputs foresaw strong links between the multilateral
consultative process and the communication and review process. Some
endorsed Parties requesting guidance through the Article 13 machinery
on how to properly meet Article 12 obligations. A number of
submissions stressed that the Article 13 process should be available
to respond to questions of implementation generated by the in-depth
reviews of national communications. One country noted that, under
Article 12, paragraph 6, information communicated by Parties is to be
transmitted by the secretariat to any concerned subsidiary body.
Thus, a standing committee carrying out the functions of the
multilateral consultative process would already possess the
information necessary to determine whether a particular Party was in
compliance with the Convention.
32. Some countries identified linkages between the communication process and the
Article 13 process in slightly different ways. For example, one country foresaw the multilateral consultative process as providing interpretations or finding solutions to questions of general interest to Parties that arise as a result of the national communications. Another country perceived the Article 13 process as providing an opportunity for Parties to discuss their implementation of the Convention, thereby advancing the communication objectives of
Article 12. Moreover, one country recommended that the multilateral consultative process be requested to compile a database of legal and technical information derived from the inventories and descriptions of climate change mitigation efforts provided in national communications. On the other hand, one country saw Article 7.2(e), the SBI, and
decisions 2/CP.1 and 6/CP.1 as already providing a "mechanism for
reviewing and resolving questions relating to implementation under
the Convention". It advised that the existing mechanisms should
"accumulate the necessary experience" and that only subsequently
would it be "opportune to consider whether it is necessary to set up
any new procedure, or ... to improve and perfect the existing
mechanisms ..."
(v) Article 14: Settlement of
disputes
33. Several submissions expressed doubt that the traditional
dispute settlement procedures under Article 14 of the Convention
would ever be invoked. In this regard, they emphasized that in a
multilateral setting where non-compliance has consequences for the
entire constituency of States, there is often no one Party in a
position to initiate a traditional dispute settlement procedure. A
few submissions argued that given the above-mentioned drawbacks, the
establishment of a non-confrontational and facilitative multilateral
consultative process to foster implementation was
necessary.
34. Most submissions were divided on how the Article 13 and Article 14 processes might overlap and interact. Some ventured that, if a Party continued to fall short of compliance after Article 13 efforts to encourage implementation had been exhausted, Article 14 should be invoked. Once dispute settlement procedures have been invoked, many submissions recommended the automatic termination or suspension of the Article 13 process. One country stated that this would "recognize the primacy of Article 14 ..." Conversely, a few submissions supported the continuation of the consultative and facilitative services of
Article 13, arguing that this type of process was more likely to
generate agreement and to lead to a satisfactory solution for all
involved. One country mentioned that the negotiators of the
non-compliance procedures of the Montreal Protocol and the Second
Sulphur Protocol found it difficult to "identify what, if any,
priority ought to be attributed to the two regimes". This country
recommended that "the Montreal and Sulphur precedents" should, when
designing this aspect of the multilateral consultative process, be
given careful consideration.
35. In the view of one country, the Article 13 process may be considered as part of
Article 14, since Article 14, paragraph 1, requests that Parties
first seek to settle disputes "through negotiation or any other
peaceful means of their own choice." This country further stated that
as Article 14, paragraphs 6 and 7, refer to a conciliation commission
available to Parties within a dispute, such a commission, once its
procedures are defined by the COP in an annex to the Convention,
could be considered as falling within the purview of the multilateral
consultative process. One NGO stated that a conciliation commission
and an Article 13 process would not "appear to be mutually
exclusive".
36. Other inputs from countries described the differences between Article 13 and
Article 14 in the following ways:
(a) Article 13 is a process to avoid disputes whereas Article 14
is a process to settle disputes;
(b) The Article 13 process is forward-looking and the Article 14
process is backward-looking;
(c) The Article 13 process, unlike the Article 14 process, is
available to provide guidance and interpretation in situations that
do not necessarily presume a failure to comply or a
dispute;
(d) The Article 13 process could "serve as a waiting room to the
solution of the controversy by providing greater precision about the
scope of any particular norm or situation, thus avoiding a
controversy between Parties."
Question 7. Is there a gap between the processes on review
of implementation and on settlement of disputes? If so, what is the
extent of that gap and how could Article 13 contribute to narrowing
it?
37. Many submissions perceived a gap between the review process and the settlement of disputes procedures, and offered a variety of ways in which an Article 13 process could fill the gap. Firstly, some countries explained that the in-depth reviews of national communications will generate questions of an interpretive or technical nature. Currently, they stated, there is no mechanism from which to obtain definitive answers to questions relevant to implementation outside the dispute settlement procedures under
Article 14. This they found to be problematic since important
questions may not be confrontational or may pertain to all Parties to
the Convention. Furthermore, for those potentially confrontational
questions dealing with the non-compliance of a Party, a facilitative
and assistance-providing process would be better suited to the
climate change regime than a judicial proceeding. One NGO identified
the "obvious gap" as being the fact that the implementation review
does not deal with the individual implementation of Parties and lacks
a procedure to handle non-compliance.
38. One NGO described the multilateral consultative process as an
opportunity for focused discussions on questions relevant to
implementation outside a confrontational and bilateral setting.
Another NGO underlined the difficulty of examining implementation in
a routine and systematic manner in large, open-ended bodies such as
the COP, the SBI or the SBSTA. A third NGO stressed that some
concerns regarding the reliability of emissions estimates or the
efficiency of climate change mitigation policies can be answered
through the in-depth review process, and that as the Convention
develops and commitments become more "stringent and difficult to
meet", "potentially more contentious" issues such as the "efficacy of
certain policies and measures in achieving particular emission
stabilization or reduction objectives" could prove disruptive to the
review process.
39. Several submissions advised that Parties should be able to
turn to the Article 13 process for interpretation or guidance outside
the in-depth review context. In addition, they stressed that although
Article 14 is available, such questions were not suited to its
provisions.
40. One country and one NGO found no gap between the review
process and the settlement of disputes procedures. The NGO added that
both the COP and the SBI have the capacity to hold informal,
non-confrontational consultations on questions regarding
implementation, including disputes concerning the interpretation or
application of the Convention.
Question 8. Is there a relationship between the Article 13
process and the subsidiary bodies established under the Convention,
for example, the AGBM?
41. Many submissions envisaged various possible relationships between an
Article 13 process and the SBI, SBSTA and AGBM, as elaborated
below.
(i) The Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological
Advice
42. As in the case of responses to question 6, many submissions
saw the SBI as playing a central role in a multilateral consultative
process. Several proposed the establishment of a standing committee
under the SBI to give effect to Article 13. A few submissions
suggested that the SBI be given the mandate to respond to questions
of implementation falling within the purview of Article 13, while
others endorsed the creation of a new subsidiary body. One country
proposed that the Article 13 process function as a small and focused
"supreme body" of the SBI. Another commented that if a new subsidiary
body is created, its functions should be carefully designed so as not
to overlap with those of the existing subsidiary bodies.
43. Several NGOs allocated the responsibility for general matters
of implementation and the assessment of overall progress to the SBI,
and that of providing a forum for consideration of both technical
questions and non-compliance issues pertaining to individual Parties,
to the Article 13 process. In this context, one NGO thought it
unlikely that either the SBI or the SBSTA could consider issues of
individual Parties' implementation with the necessary detail and
attention. Accordingly, this NGO supported the establishment of a
separate subsidiary body for the Article 13 process. Conversely, some
countries and NGOs clearly disapproved of the creation of new
subsidiary bodies, with several citing budgetary constraints and one
country arguing that their creation would slow progress.
44. One country explained that the primary function of the SBI and
the SBSTA was to deal with questions posed by the COP, whereas the
Article 13 process should be designed to deal with questions posed by
Parties. Other countries, as well as several NGOs,
stressed that the process should be available for the purpose of
answering questions posed by the SBI and the SBSTA.
45. One NGO suggested that the Article 13 process be part of both
the SBI and the SBSTA. It proposed the creation of ad hoc committees
which would draw on experts in the SBI or the SBSTA, depending on the
issue to be considered. These ad hoc committees would handle
questions raised by Parties concerning the implementation of the
Convention or of a future protocol. They would investigate questions
and, following careful consideration, propose solutions that would
form the basis for further deliberations by either the SBI or the
SBSTA.
(ii) Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin
Mandate
46. Many submissions viewed the relationship between the
multilateral consultative process and the AGBM as indirect, albeit
important. Some acknowledged that if additional commitments were
adopted in a protocol, the implementation thereof would fall under
the purview of an Article 13 process. One country advised that the
Article 13 process should be designed concurrently or prior to the
AGBM negotiations on recommendations for climate change mitigation
policies and measures and quantified emissions limitations and
reductions. It was suggested that this could aid Parties in
formulating their positions, thus making these negotiations more
fruitful and target oriented.
47. A few countries mentioned that the AGBM is addressing issues
similar to those that would be considered by an Article 13 process,
including the strengthening of commitments in Article 4.2(a) and (b)
for Annex I Parties and the exchange of experience on national
activities, particularly those identified in Parties' communications.
Accordingly, one country suggested that a protocol should have
recourse to a multilateral consultative process. In this regard, one
NGO suggested that the text of a protocol make specific reference to
the multilateral consultative process for the resolution of questions
pertaining to new commitments. Another predicted that once a protocol
is adopted, the Article 13 process could be strengthened to respond
to more stringent obligations. In this regard, one NGO suggested
leaving the consideration of a "non-compliance procedure for a future
protocol to the legal experts of the Parties to this instrument".
However, one NGO found it preferable for provisions relating to an
Article 13 process and a protocol to be developed through the
Convention.
Question 9. What is the legal status of the
process?
48. Of those submissions that referred to the nature of the
process or institution, one country disapproved of the establishment
of a new institution and suggested that the legal status conferred
upon an Article 13 mechanism should be akin to one of "facilitator,
comprehensive observer, and solution provider". One NGO expressed the
view that the legal status of an Article 13 process would have parity
with other subsidiary bodies established under the
Convention.
49. Some submissions queried whether the Article 13 process would
be obligatory and whether its decisions would be binding on Parties.
Obligatory: Several submissions endorsed an optional process.
A few countries argued that if the COP adopts the Article 13 process,
it should be considered as compulsory. However, one country stated
that although "a decision of the Parties could establish the process
quickly by consensus ... , (it) is not considered legally binding on
Parties". This being the case, it felt that Parties would still be
expected to cooperate therewith. Binding decisions: Many
submissions stressed that the process would not be vested with formal
decision-making power. Instead, it would provide non-binding
recommendations to Parties or would make proposals for remittance to
the COP for consideration and possible adoption. One country argued
that, although it would not be mandatory to resort to "this
mechanism, once this is done its decisions must be
respected".
Question 10. What is meant by the Article 13 phrase:
"Parties on their request"? Who may trigger the process apart from
the Parties themselves? Is this process compulsory or
optional?
50. Responses offered a variety of interpretations of the phrase,
"Parties on their request." Many thought it clear that Parties could
invoke the multilateral consultative process. However, it was less
clear in what manner or via which bodies Parties could pose questions
relating to implementation. Numerous submissions proposed that
Parties could individually or collectively invoke the process when in
need of interpretation or assistance in meeting obligations under the
Convention. Some envisaged a Party possibly availing itself of the
process in order to signal its difficulty in fulfilling its
commitments under the Convention or a future protocol. One NGO stated
that the above-mentioned phrase should enable "Parties ... to
initiate the non-compliance procedure with or without the consent of
the Party or Parties concerned". One NGO stated that much of the
useful work done under an Article 13 process might occur without
formal triggering as is the case with the Montreal
Protocol.
51. Many submissions agreed that Parties could also invoke the
process when concerned about another Party's progress in implementing
the Convention. In this regard, one NGO indicated that Parties to the
Montreal Protocol and Second Sulphur Protocol have found it
appropriate to allow the triggering of the compliance procedures
therein by Parties concerned with another Party's implementation
progress. However, one NGO urged that to avoid confrontation, Parties
should only raise questions about their own compliance.
52. In addition to the direct triggering by Parties, the
submissions suggested a number of different avenues for invoking an
Article 13 process:
(a) Several thought that the COP, by consensus, should be able to
initiate the process during its sessions;
(b) One country suggested that if a problem appropriate for resolution by
Article 13 arises in the interim between COP sessions and it is
not possible to convene an extraordinary session of the COP, the COP
Bureau should be able to invoke the process;
(c) Several suggested that the Convention bodies, such as the SBI
and the SBSTA, should be able to invoke the process;
(d) Several ventured that the secretariat should be able to raise
questions of implementation, although others explicitly rejected this
option. One country stated that if the secretariat triggered the
process, a Party should be allowed "a right of objection ... at the
SBI level".
53. A few submissions proposed that the body assigned to oversee
the Article 13 process be empowered to trigger the process. Many
commented that the subsidiary bodies and the Parties would be able to
identify questions regarding implementation that would emerge from
the findings of the in-depth reviews of national
communications.
54. Several NGOs queried whether States or organizations not party to the Convention could trigger the Article 13 process, although almost all concluded that neither
non-governmental nor intergovernmental organizations would be permitted to do so. One NGO submission did point out, however, that non-party States, NGOs and IGOs may have access to information or expertise that could prove valuable in resolving questions regarding implementation. As a result, it recommended that interested non-party States and institutions should be allowed to observe the process and submit relevant information. It further added that, under the Montreal Protocol and Sulphur Protocol, NGOs, although not permitted to raise questions regarding implementation directly, may submit information to the respective secretariats about possible non-compliance which in turn may be forwarded to the implementation committees. One NGO pointed out that the secretariat would be in an advantageous "position to receive information from non-governmental sources ..."
It indicated, as an example, the European Community, stating that
the "European Commission receives most of its information from
concerned citizens".
55. Many submissions stressed that an Article 13 process should be
optional. Even so, one NGO commented that nearly all Parties invited
to appear before the Montreal Protocol Implementation Committee
regarding their compliance, do indeed attend the proceedings.
Question 11. Should the multilateral consultative process
be made to apply to related legal instruments in addition to the
Convention?
56. Most submissions supported establishing a process that would
apply to related legal instruments under the Convention (unless the
legal instrument provided for a separate procedure). One country
found it inefficient to establish a separate multilateral
consultative process in a future protocol. It expressed concern that
if the protocol was to be limited to Annex I countries, developing
country Parties could find themselves unable to participate in the
protocol's implementation mechanism. However, one country disagreed
that the Article 13 process should be applied to related legal
instruments.
57. Some submissions preferred to wait until the provisions of a
future protocol were specified before determining whether the Article
13 process would be appropriate. One NGO stressed that more precise
emission restrictions would require a more sophisticated and
demanding compliance system. This NGO acknowledged that Parties to
other international environmental agreements have been effective in
strengthening their compliance process as commitments
increased.
Question 12. Under this section Parties and contributors
are invited to make any additional inputs that they consider relevant
to the consideration of a multilateral consultative process and its
design.
58. One country indicated that the sessions of the Ad Hoc Group on
Article 13 and the AGBM should not overlap.
59. One country and an NGO stated that the multilateral
consultative process, if adopted, should be "a cooperative approach
to problem solving" and not a "non-compliance" or "enforcement
process". One NGO recommended that the process could be adopted after
several years of operation on an interim basis.
1. * The present document will be
available in all languages for the third session of the
AG13.
GE.96-