



United Nations

FCCC/KP/CMP/2014/3



Framework Convention on
Climate Change

Distr.: General
4 September 2014

Original: English

**Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting
of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol**

Tenth session

Lima, 1–12 December 2014

Item X of the provisional agenda

**Report on the high-level ministerial round table on increased
ambition of Kyoto Protocol commitments**

Note by the secretariat

Summary

This document contains a summary of the high-level ministerial round table on increased ambition of Kyoto Protocol commitments, which took place on 5 June 2014 in Bonn, Germany, in conjunction with the sessions of the subsidiary bodies held in June 2014. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, at its eighth session, decided to convene this high-level ministerial round table to consider information submitted by Parties included in Annex I taking on quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments in the second commitment period. The discussion focused on Parties' intention to increase the ambition of their commitments, the potential for increasing ambition, progress made towards achieving their mitigation commitments, and the latest projections for greenhouse gas emissions until the end of the second commitment period. Parties also discussed the urgency of action and the need for higher ambition, lessons learned from the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol that can guide future international action on climate change, and national actions and efforts being undertaken to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention.

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Contents

	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Page</i>
I. Introduction	1–5	3
A. Background	1–3	3
B. Mandate	4	3
C. Possible action by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol	5	3
II. Proceedings of the high-level ministerial round table	6–13	4
III. Key issues highlighted during the discussion	14–75	5
A. Opening remarks	14–17	5
B. Update on the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and its Doha Amendment	18–31	5
C. General discussion	32–75	7

I. Introduction

A. Background

1. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), at its eighth session, adopted the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol,¹ which established the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. In accordance with the Doha Amendment, Parties included in Annex I taking on commitments for the second commitment period shall aim to reduce their emissions collectively by at least 18 per cent below 1990 levels.

2. Noting the urgent need to increase the level of mitigation ambition, the CMP requested² each Party included in Annex I taking on quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments in the second commitment period to submit information on the following by 30 April 2014:

(a) Its intention to increase the ambition of its commitment, including progress made towards achieving its quantified emission limitation and reduction commitment;

(b) The most recently updated projections for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions until the end of the second commitment period;

(c) The potential for increasing ambition.

3. Four submissions³ were received by the secretariat: from the European Union (EU) and its member States and Iceland, Australia, Liechtenstein and Norway. The information in these submissions was to be considered at a high-level ministerial round table to be held during the first sessional period in 2014.⁴ The high-level ministerial round table took place on 5 June 2014 in Bonn, Germany, in conjunction with the sessions of the subsidiary bodies held in June 2014.

B. Mandate

4. The CMP requested the secretariat to prepare a report on the high-level ministerial round table referred to in paragraph 3 above for consideration at CMP 10.⁵

C. Possible action by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol

5. The CMP may wish to take note of the information contained in this report and to consider any relevant action, as needed.

¹ Decision 1/CMP.8.

² Decision 1/CMP.8, paragraph 9.

³ Available at <<http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/SitePages/sessions.aspx?showOnlyCurrentCalls=1&populateData=1&expectedsubmissionfrom=Parties&focalBodies=CMP>>.

⁴ Decision 1/CMP.8, paragraph 10.

⁵ As footnote 4 above.

II. Proceedings of the high-level ministerial round table

6. The high-level event was co-chaired by the President of the nineteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) and CMP 9, Mr. Marcin Korolec (Poland), and the President Designate of COP 20 and CMP 10, Mr. Manuel Pulgar-Vidal Otálora, Minister of Environment of Peru. The two co-chairs also presided over the high-level ministerial dialogue on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action⁶ held on 6 June 2014 in Bonn.

7. Welcoming remarks for the two ministerial events were provided by the co-chairs, by Ms. Rita Schwarzelühr-Sutter, Parliamentary State Secretary to Germany's Federal Minister for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety, and by Ms. Christiana Figueres, Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC.

8. On the request of Mr. Korolec, a presentation on the status of implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and its Doha Amendment was made by a representative of the secretariat. The presentation sought to provide context for the round-table discussion by summarizing the submissions received and providing the status of ratification of the Doha Amendment.

9. In preparation for the high-level round table, Mr. Korolec issued a related information note⁷ and proposed the following questions to assist Parties in preparing for the event and focusing the discussion:

(a) What is the status of implementation of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol? How can the ambition of mitigation commitments for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol be increased? What policies and measures have been deployed or are planned in this regard?

(b) What is the status of ratification of the Doha Amendment? How can the entry into force of the Amendment be expedited?

(c) What lessons can be learned from the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol in order to increase the level of mitigation ambition?

(d) Based on lessons learned, how can domestic mitigation action and mitigation through international market-based mechanisms be combined to best facilitate future reductions in global emissions?

10. Statements were first made by ministers, then by heads of delegation and finally by representatives of observer organizations.

11. The co-chairs encouraged the participation of civil society during the round table. The different constituencies were invited to address the following question in their interventions: what actions can civil society take to help governments to increase mitigation ambition under the Kyoto Protocol?

12. Forty Parties represented at the ministerial or senior official level took the floor during the round table, including on behalf of three negotiating groups. In addition, statements were delivered on behalf of six observer organization constituencies.

13. The co-chairs concluded the round table by thanking all participants for their constructive contributions and active participation. They summarized the key points from the discussion and requested the secretariat to make their summary conclusions available on

⁶ The summary conclusions by the co-chairs of the dialogue are available at <http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_jun_2014/in-session/application/pdf/140610_dp_ministerial_summary_final.pdf>. Webcasts of both high-level ministerial events are available at <http://unfccc.int/meetings/bonn_jun_2014/items/8186.php>.

⁷ Available at <http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_jun_2014/application/pdf/140514_kp_ministerial_infnote.pdf>.

the UNFCCC website.⁸ Participants were informed that a more detailed report would be prepared by the secretariat for consideration at CMP 10.

III. Key issues highlighted during the discussion

A. Opening remarks

14. Mr. Korolec highlighted the recent scientific findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). He noted that there is evidence that the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol achieved substantial reductions in emissions and that lessons learned from the implementation of the Protocol can inform the process of building a new and even more effective agreement for the future.

15. Mr. Pulgar-Vidal Otálora noted that fulfilment of the Kyoto Protocol goals is a central requirement for any future climate agreement. By fulfilling their obligations, Parties will demonstrate leadership and political will. He also noted that the implementation of the Protocol provides lessons that can enhance collective action towards the future regime. He reiterated the commitment of the Government of Peru to the process.

16. Ms. Schwarzelühr-Sutter noted that the ministerial presence during the sessions of the subsidiary bodies illustrated that decision makers are committed to addressing the challenge of climate change. Further, she stated that the high-level events were an opportunity for ministers and senior officials to provide guidance and to build trust and confidence in the process.

17. Ms. Figueres acknowledged the leadership and commitment demonstrated by the ministers participating in the events and urged them to inject critical political vision and focus into the work of the negotiators. She highlighted the need for urgent and accelerated action and encouraged Parties to ratify the Doha Amendment. At that time, only 10 instruments of acceptance of the 144 required for its entry into force had been received by the Depositary.

B. Update on the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and its Doha Amendment

1. Introduction

18. The secretariat provided an update on the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and its Doha Amendment. The update included an overview of the four submissions received, from the EU and its member States and Iceland, Australia, Liechtenstein and Norway, a brief analysis of the emission data received by the secretariat and an update on the status of ratification of the Doha Amendment. The update provided in paragraphs 19–31 below, which is based on information drawn from those four submissions, was summarized in the presentation made by the secretariat.⁹

⁸ The summary conclusions by the co-chairs are available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_jun_2014/in-session/application/pdf/140610_kp_ministerial_summary_final.pdf.

⁹ Available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_jun_2014/application/pdf/4_june_kp_round_table_final.pdf.

2. Progress towards achieving quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments

19. The EU, according to its submission on behalf of its member States and Iceland, will overachieve its emission reduction target for the first commitment period and is projected to overachieve its target for the second commitment period. Preliminary data show that its average annual emissions over the period 2008–2012 are 18.8 per cent below 1990 levels.

20. Australia is making progress towards decarbonizing its economy, with the emission intensity of the economy falling by approximately 50 per cent since 1990. Domestic policies have been important in helping to achieve this outcome, including through the facilitation of abatement opportunities in the land sector, the regulation of appliance and building standards, and subnational energy efficiency schemes.

21. From 1990 to 2012, Liechtenstein's gross domestic product grew by about 140 per cent and its population by approximately 25 per cent. At the same time, Liechtenstein decoupled its economic growth from its GHG emissions. Despite the growth of its economy and the increase in its population, Liechtenstein's emissions today are below 1990 levels.

22. Norway voluntarily chose to overachieve its target for the first commitment period by 10 per cent, which is equivalent to 5 million tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO₂) per year. Norway will not use removal units pertaining to forest management under Article 3, paragraph 4, of the Kyoto Protocol for compliance in the first commitment period, leading to additional overachievement. Norway will meet its target for the first commitment period without government purchases of Kyoto Protocol units, while the planned procurement of such units is expected to contribute to a 10 per cent overachievement in the second commitment period.

3. Most recently updated projections

23. The EU, according to its submission on behalf of its member States and Iceland, projects its total emissions to be 24.5 per cent below base year levels in 2020. This suggests that the total potential overachievement for the first and second commitment periods, compared with the targets set under the Kyoto Protocol, will be about 5.5 Gt CO₂ eq, approximately 4.2 Gt CO₂ eq of which are expected to be accrued between 2008 and 2012, with a further 1.3 Gt CO₂ eq to be added between 2013 and 2020.

24. Projections made in 2013 indicate that Australia's emissions will reach 685 Mt CO₂ eq in 2020 in the absence of policy measures such as the Emissions Reduction Fund, but taking into account pre-existing measures such as energy efficiency programmes and the renewable energy target legislation. Australia's 'business as usual' emissions are expected to grow by 2 per cent per year on average until 2020, driven by population and economic growth. This underscores the size of the effort Australia will have to make to meet its target to reduce emissions by 5 per cent below 2000 levels by 2020.

25. For Liechtenstein, the 'with measures' scenario, which takes into account measures such as stabilization of energy consumption, enhancement of renewable energy sources and reduction of CO₂ emissions, leads to projected emissions of around 194 Gg CO₂ eq in 2020. This corresponds to a 15 per cent reduction in emissions from 1990 levels.

26. Total GHG emissions excluding land use, land-use change and forestry for Norway are projected to remain relatively stable in the period up to 2020, before declining somewhat by 2030. This projection takes into account that emissions from the petroleum industry are expected to rise for some years, before declining around 2030. The emission intensity of the Norwegian economy has fallen by 40 per cent since 1990. In the mainland economy the decline has been 50 per cent. This trend is projected to continue: the emission

intensity of the mainland economy is projected to decline by a further 40 per cent from 2011 to 2030.

4. Potential for increasing ambition

27. The EU, according to its submission on behalf of its member States and Iceland, continues to be committed to the implementation of policies that would help to significantly overachieve its emission reduction commitment for the second commitment period and thereby contribute to closing the ambition gap. The EU, its member States and Iceland underlined their continued interest in exploring options for raising the pre-2020 ambition of all Parties under the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP). The EU, its member States and Iceland reiterated their conditional offer to move to a 30 per cent emission reduction by 2020 compared with 1990 levels provided that other developed countries commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and developing countries contribute adequately according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities.

28. Australia has committed to reviewing its international targets in 2015. The review will consider Australia's international emission reduction targets in the context of negotiations on a new global climate change agreement that would apply to all countries from 2020. It will focus on the extent to which other nations, including major economies and Australia's major trading partners, are taking real and comparable actions to reduce emissions.

29. Between 2012 and 2020, Liechtenstein plans to implement further measures, estimated to deliver the reduction of 183 Gg CO₂ eq needed to comply with its commitment.

30. In 2012, a broad agreement on climate policy, strengthening Norway's climate goals, was reached between the majority of the political parties in the Norwegian Parliament, with the objective of cutting emissions by 40 per cent by 2020 compared with 1990 levels, if this could contribute to achieving consensus on an ambitious climate agreement that would see the countries with the highest levels of emissions agree to specific emission reduction commitments.

5. Status of ratification of the Doha Amendment

31. In the overview presentation made by the secretariat it was noted that, at the time of the round table, only 10 instruments of acceptance of the Doha Amendment had been received by the Depositary, meaning that 134 more were still required for the Doha Amendment to enter into force.

C. General discussion

1. Urgency of action and need for higher ambition

32. Several participants cited the recent findings of the IPCC as confirmation that current emission reduction efforts are inadequate and will not keep the global temperature increase below 2 °C.

33. Highlighting an increase in extreme weather events in recent years, speakers, especially those from Parties particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, provided examples of how their social and economic development is already being adversely affected by the effects of climate change.

34. Ministers and senior officials acknowledged that the level of emission reduction needed to stabilize the global temperature cannot be achieved through the Kyoto Protocol alone. Several interventions encouraged Parties included in Annex I not participating in the second commitment period to take on comparable emission reduction targets and Parties not included in Annex I to undertake actions in line with their capabilities. Ministers and senior officials also highlighted the clear link between the issues under discussion and the negotiations under the ADP.

35. The importance of strong and clear political will was reiterated. Ministers were called upon to increase political momentum to achieve a robust and effective 2015 agreement. In this regard, the Secretary-General's Climate Summit in September was seen as another opportunity for stronger political engagement and a place where Heads of State and Government can announce their intention to take on more ambitious commitments.

2. Ratification of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol

36. Participants acknowledged that the adoption of the Doha Amendment was a fundamental step in addressing climate change, and agreed that ratification is now urgently needed to ensure its entry into force.

37. Several ministers and senior officials informed the meeting that national preparations were under way to allow their countries to ratify the Amendment as soon as possible. Some participants stated that they would be submitting their instruments of acceptance early in 2015, once the implementing rules for the second commitment period have been formally adopted at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Lima, Peru, while others noted that their ratifications were dependent upon the extent to which developed countries show leadership by implementing their commitments and targets.

3. Progress made towards achieving quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments

38. Parties to the Kyoto Protocol with commitments in the second commitment period that made statements during the round table confirmed that they remain firmly committed to their reduction targets in the second commitment period. They also noted that they have been implementing measures to achieve the required reductions even before formal ratification. They indicated that they are broadly on track to reduce their emissions in line with their commitments. Several ministers and senior officials reported that current emissions are below, or in some cases well below, targeted reductions for the first commitment period. It was further noted that, even though current projections indicate overachievement of commitments, additional measures are already being planned or implemented, which may add to the projected overachievement.

39. Speakers from Parties not included in Annex I acknowledged the efforts of Parties included in Annex I participating in the second commitment period, but encouraged them to increase the ambition of their commitments, especially in the light of the projections that suggest overachievement. In their view, the projections of significant overachievement imply that the ambition of the current commitments is low. Further, they queried why such Parties would not officially take on more ambitious commitments if it were already clear that they will overachieve the current commitments.

40. Some Parties included in Annex I however maintained that achieving and possibly overachieving commitments had not been easy and required stringent measures even in the face of a global economic crisis. In this regard, several speakers explained that the emission reductions already achieved had been derived through the successful decoupling of emissions from economic growth.

41. Several participants highlighted how it had been possible to reduce emissions while their economies continued to grow, illustrating that sustainable development, growth and poverty eradication are all possible without increasing emissions and that economic growth and prosperity can be supported and stimulated by ambitious emission reduction efforts.

42. There was a suggestion for the secretariat to compile the information submitted by Parties in accordance with paragraph 9 of decision 1/CMP.8, and an invitation was made to those that have not provided information to do so for that purpose. It was suggested that such a compilation would be a helpful tool in determining the remaining ambition gap.

4. Most recently updated projections for greenhouse gas emissions until the end of the second commitment period

43. Some participants reported that their projected emissions for 2020 are lower than required, implying an overachievement. Reasons cited for this reduction in their projected emissions included implementing policies that have reduced the energy intensity of industries, promoting the energy efficiency of buildings and promoting more environmentally sound practices and technologies.

44. Speakers did not go into specific technical details regarding emission projections during the discussion, but referred to the information available in the four submissions made by Parties included in Annex I in accordance with decision 1/CMP.8.

5. Potential for increasing ambition

45. The ambition mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol launched at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Doha, Qatar, was recognized as a critical element of the political compromise achieved there. In the light of the recent IPCC reports, participants acknowledged that decisions to raise ambition cannot be delayed beyond 2020.

46. Speakers from Parties not included in Annex I expressed their disappointment that Parties included in Annex I with commitments in the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol did not explicitly indicate their intention to raise their level of ambition in the second commitment period. Some speakers from Parties not included in Annex I stated that increasing ambition under the Protocol would be instrumental in building trust and confidence, which is important for facilitating collective global action.

47. Suggestions as to how to achieve an increase in ambition included enabling domestic mitigation action through international market-based mechanisms in order to facilitate future reductions in global emissions, and creating international cooperative initiatives to increase pre-2020 ambition.

48. Some participants noted that international market-based mechanisms should not be seen as the only option and that there should be a limit to their use. It was also noted that further discussion on the use of international cooperative initiatives could be useful.

49. Some participants noted that Parties included in Annex I have offered to increase their level of ambition subject to certain conditions. The conditions stated include other Parties included in Annex I committing to comparable emission reductions and developing countries making adequate contributions in accordance with their responsibilities and respective capabilities. Some speakers called for the removal of such conditions.

50. Many participants highlighted that one of the major weaknesses of the Kyoto Protocol is the lack of broad participation. It was suggested that, in order to tackle climate change effectively, broader participation is crucial. In this regard, it was noted that the focus should be on increasing collective action. Some speakers stated that it is more efficient to address the issue of increasing mitigation ambition under the ongoing negotiations of the ADP, where all Parties are involved.

51. It was also noted that many Parties had not yet come forward with mitigation pledges for the period up to 2020 and that clarity was still lacking on the basic conditions for the pledges under the Cancun Agreements.

52. Collective action to enable an effective response to the global challenge of climate change was strongly encouraged. Some ministers and senior officials reminded participants that contributions to the global effort to reduce emissions should be consistent with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. In this regard, Parties with the ability to assist were encouraged to help less developed and poorer Parties through the provision of finance, technology and capacity-building to facilitate both mitigation and adaptation actions.

6. Lessons learned from the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol

53. Ministers and senior officials acknowledged that the Kyoto Protocol marked a significant step for the climate regime at the time that it was adopted. They stated that the Protocol rules and mechanisms set a standard for international efforts to measure and account for emissions, created the world's first carbon markets, which showed that economic opportunities could go hand in hand with the effort to reduce emissions, spurred early action in developing countries through the clean development mechanism (CDM) and stimulated a wide array of national policies.

54. Some speakers noted that the Kyoto Protocol, despite its pioneering character, had shown that insufficient political will coupled with weak compliance mechanisms results in a weak legally binding system. Participants therefore see an opportunity to ensure that the new agreement, currently being developed, includes the positive aspects of the Protocol and improves on its weaknesses.

55. Participants acknowledged that the legally binding nature of the Protocol was crucial, as it laid a solid international foundation on which national actions could be built. In addition, they highlighted the useful and environmentally solid systems created by the Protocol, including systems relating to the measurement, reporting and verification of emissions and the flexibility mechanisms.

56. Several speakers recognized the flexibility mechanisms as one of the achievements of the Protocol. Several ministers and senior officials representing Parties included in Annex I noted that these mechanisms had enabled them to undertake more ambitious action. A key advantage of these mechanisms was seen to be their ability to engage the private sector and private finance in innovative results-oriented practices in a way that other policy mechanisms sometimes cannot. In this regard, particular mention was made of the CDM, which was seen as an example of how cooperation can promote greater ambition.

57. Several speakers representing Parties not included in Annex I voiced concerns about the future of the CDM in the absence of strong targets for the second commitment period, which reduces support for future mitigation action in developing countries. A concern was also raised by participants from Parties particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change that the replenishment of the Adaptation Fund would be jeopardized without the CDM, currently its primary source of replenishment.

58. Although the CDM was identified as one of the strengths of the Kyoto Protocol, several speakers also highlighted challenges in terms of the length of time required to prepare and register projects. It was felt that moving forward on such issues should be taken into consideration and addressed.

59. Another strength of the Kyoto Protocol was seen to be in creating procedures for the measurement, reporting and verification of emissions and removals, and in establishing compliance rules aimed at safeguarding environmental integrity.

60. The value of the Kyoto Protocol accounting system was acknowledged. It was stated that the system allows Parties to better understand their share of emissions and trends in emissions in different sectors. This facilitates better forecasting of emissions and can therefore increase the capacity to prepare realistic pledges.

61. Experience with the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol accounting rules has shown the importance and complexity of the rules related to emissions and removals from land use and land-use change. Participants noted that it will therefore be essential to determine, by the Lima Conference, how such rules should be built into the processes relating to intended nationally determined contributions.

62. Several speakers noted that, when the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in the 1990s, developed countries were responsible for the majority of global GHG emissions, but that the situation has since changed. In this regard, the need for a meaningful process in the new climate agreement to review overall progress, which can propose action based on changing circumstances and adjust the level of ambition as needed, was mentioned.

63. Some speakers stated that not all review processes are effective and pointed to the example of the ongoing process to review ambition in the second commitment period, where increases of commitments are not forthcoming. In their view, it would be better to have short commitment periods in conjunction with a legally robust review to prevent the locking-in of low levels of ambition.

64. Several participants noted that the limited participation in the Kyoto Protocol, and even more limited number of Parties included in Annex I that have decided to take on commitments in the second commitment period, reduces the impact that the Kyoto Protocol can have on global emission levels. Those participants therefore noted that broad participation is essential if the emission reductions required to appropriately address the challenge of climate change are to be achieved.

7. Applying the lessons learned

65. Ministers and senior officials acknowledged that the lessons learned from implementing the Kyoto Protocol are highly relevant to the current negotiation process under the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action. The value of the legal framework of the Protocol in providing the necessary certainty and clear accountability was noted.

66. This includes market-based mechanisms, which can help to increase the level of ambition while increasing the cost-effectiveness of reduction measures. There was broad support for building on this experience and exploring a design mechanism for the new global agreement that can provide incentives for high ambition. In this regard, the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms, the framework for various approaches, the new market-based mechanism and non-market-based approaches were identified by some as important issues in relation to the 2015 agreement.

67. It was recommended that the CDM should be reformed to include a focus on the net mitigation benefits to be realized from CDM activities instead of the current focus on providing only opportunities for emission offsets. It was therefore suggested that the emergence of a reformed CDM, designed to fit seamlessly into the 2015 agreement alongside the new mechanisms, could enable increased private-sector investment that could facilitate pre-2020 emission reductions.

68. Although market mechanisms were seen as important components of the Protocol, some speakers noted that markets are only viable when there is certainty on policy direction and clear targets are identified. It was stated that, in order to enhance the effectiveness of domestic mitigation actions and market-based mechanisms, Parties should adhere to rules

and guidelines developed and agreed through the UNFCCC process, as this will enhance coordination, collaboration and comparability within that process.

69. Experience has shown that international market-based mechanisms can play a significant role in achieving legally binding emission reduction targets. However, it has also become clear that environmental integrity has to be ensured when using such mechanisms. Some participants emphasized that, if environmental integrity can be ensured, market mechanisms will undoubtedly remain an important component of the future agreement.

8. Actions and efforts to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention

70. Participants highlighted the efforts made in their countries to support the ultimate objective of the Convention, and listed actions taken nationally towards achieving that objective. Some speakers representing developed countries not only highlighted their national efforts but also efforts taken to assist developing countries in undertaking ambitious national actions. In this regard, actions undertaken through climate finance for both mitigation and adaptation were highlighted.

71. Among the economic, social and environmental benefits derived from increases in energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy and low-carbon technologies, many ministers and senior officials highlighted the creation of new jobs, improved air quality, reduced climate-related deaths and diseases, and increased economic growth.

72. In this context, activities and initiatives to support the ultimate objective of the Convention were underlined by participants, including but not limited to the following:

- (a) GHG emission trading systems;
- (b) Legislation facilitating renewable energy and energy efficiency objectives, eco-design, eco-labelling and reductions in fluorinated gas emissions;
- (c) Regulation of CO₂ emissions from vehicles;
- (d) Standards for energy efficiency in buildings;
- (e) Mainstreaming of climate actions into economic, fiscal and employment policies;
- (f) Establishment of agencies to address renewable energy and energy efficiency;
- (g) National green economy strategies;
- (h) Low-carbon development strategies;
- (i) Decommissioning of old power plants;
- (j) Fuel switching and fossil fuel divestment;
- (k) Economic policies such as carbon taxes and emission reduction funds;
- (l) Internationally complimentary initiatives;
- (m) Land-use and forest management plans;
- (n) Cancelling of surplus Kyoto Protocol units.

73. Speakers from civil society constituencies stated that they can play an important role in promoting ambitious climate action by enhancing engagement with relevant non-governmental actors, including cities, businesses, youth and farmers.

74. Engaging in carbon markets was identified as a good opportunity for stakeholder participation. Another avenue could be the establishment of long-term regional and national energy and climate objectives and targets and of strategies for meeting them. This would give businesses predictability to plan investments and hence stimulate early action in the pre-2020 period, which could lead to further emission reductions during that period. It could also encourage early deployment of existing and new technologies.

75. There was a suggestion to conduct a more intensive exchange of information among Parties on measures taken, so that Parties can benefit from the experience of other Parties.
