



# Climate Action Network International

## Submission to ADP Chairs on Workstream 2: Pre-2020 Ambition

March 1, 2013

*Climate Action Network International (CAN-I) is the world's largest network of civil society organizations working together to promote government action to address the climate crisis, with more than 700 members in over 90 countries. [www.climatenetwork.org](http://www.climatenetwork.org)*

### 1. Overview: continued complacency will send the world to 4°C

***“Sea levels in the central-west Pacific will rise by 2 meters before 2100. My people will be forced to abandon their homes [...]. My country will be destroyed by climate change. It will be removed from the map by rising seas. Because it is happening inch by inch does not make the situation any less desperate, or any less urgent. This is an emergency.”***

*Tony deBrum, Minister in Assistance to the President of the Marshall Islands, at the UN Security Council Arria Formula Meeting, 15 Februar 2013*

At successive UNFCCC meetings, Parties have acknowledged the existence of a multi-gigatonnes gap between the current level of ambition to mitigate emissions until 2020 (expressed in QELROs, pledges, targets and NAMAs) for the period until 2020 and what is required in that period to allow the world to stay below the critical 1.5/2°C threshold. According to the Climate Action Tracker<sup>1</sup>, current pre-2020 ambition (expressed by countries in QELROs, pledges and NAMAs) puts the world onto a path of 2.7-4.2°C warming. There is a consensus within the scientific community that we are fast approaching a devastating tipping point. In this context it is alarming that governments have not taken any steps yet to close the gap but allow it to grow. According to UNEP, the estimated emissions gap in 2020 for a “likely” chance of being on track to stay below the 2°C target is 8 to 13 GtCO<sub>2</sub>e, while it was 6 to 11 GtCO<sub>2</sub>e in the 2011 report. Global emissions are currently 14 per cent above where they should be to have a likely chance to limit global warming to no more than 2°C.

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<sup>1</sup> Climate Action Tracker, Warning of Climate Science – Again – Written in Doha Sand, 8 December 2012. [http://climateactiontracker.org/assets/publications/briefing\\_papers/2012-12-08\\_Briefing\\_paper\\_Doha.pdf](http://climateactiontracker.org/assets/publications/briefing_papers/2012-12-08_Briefing_paper_Doha.pdf)

Some Parties seem to hope to get away with misinterpreting “enhancing ambition” to mean to continue to mitigate after 2020, and to leave the current pre-2020 ambition gap untouched – at least as far as own action is concerned. This is a highly irresponsible assumption. Raising the ambition level of *action before 2020* is a prerequisite to stay below the 1.5/2°C threshold.

With sufficient political will, that is lacking for instance in the US, China, EU, Canada, Japan, Australia and Russia, emissions can be brought to a level by 2020 consistent with staying below the critical 1.5/2°C threshold. UNEP’s “Bridging the Emissions Gap 2012” report asserts that this is possible and economically feasible, using existing, mature technologies. In fact it should be common knowledge by now that if nothing more is done to increase the current unconditional pledges, costs would be much higher to reach deeper reductions in later years and/or the adaptation needs would be far greater.

***“This is why the transformation of our economies into low-carbon economies is so important. This is why we cannot and must not continue to fuel our economies with fossil resources. This is why it is time now to move towards a green economy and truly sustainable development, in order to create the future we want – and to avoid a future we should all fear.”***

*Miguel Berger, Deputy Permanent Representative of Germany<sup>2</sup> to the United Nations, at the UN Security Council Arria Formula Meeting, 15 February 2013*

## 2. Key areas for increasing pre-2020 ambition

Raising the ambition level before 2020 requires: (a) increasing current 2020 mitigation pledges/targets of developed countries’; (b) enabling new or enhanced 2020 pledges/NAMAs by developing countries; and (c) action through complementary measures. The ADP Work Stream 2 should address all three areas on an equal footing during 2013. Attempts to lower attention on only one or two areas should be resisted.

### 2.1 Increase current 2020 pledges/targets of developed countries

Most developed countries have demonstrated a frightening lack of political will to avoid dangerous climate change by increasing their current 2020 pledges. Developed countries’ collective pledged

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<sup>2</sup> As of 25 February 2013 and despite these encouraging words made in New York at the *UN Security Council Arria Formula Meeting*, Germany has not yet decided to support the European Commission’s modest proposals to save the dysfunctional European Emissions Trading Scheme from complete collapse and take steps so it regains the role as the EU’s central legal instrument to incentivise climate-friendly investments and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

effort falls short of the agreed 25 to 40% range,<sup>3</sup> not one pledge is adequate,<sup>4</sup> and in some cases individual pledges are a disgrace.

In Doha, it was decided that Parties in Annex 1 will revisit their QELRCs for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol no later than 2014 and inform the secretariat on the Party's intention to increase the ambition of its commitment, to be considered by a high level ministerial roundtable at the first sessional period in 2014.

While no such decision was taken by the COP with regard to the pledges by Parties in Annex 1 that (continue to) refuse to join the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, CAN maintains that ALL developed countries must revisit their pledges. It does not help closing the gap if Parties continue to deflect this challenge by pointing to developing countries or the opportunities of complementary measures alone.

There is no need to wait until 2014 either. **Annex 1 Parties – Kyoto or non-Kyoto – should go beyond merely *informing* the secretariat (by April 2014) about their intentions to increase their ambition but instead use 2013 to prepare for the actual increase.** Developed countries should increase their 2020 pledges so that their collective effort moves into the 25-40% range as a first step towards increasing their targets to more than 40%<sup>5</sup> below 1990 levels by 2020. This also means developed country Parties with pledges in the form of ranges should move to at least the upper end of those ranges, replacing conditions to do so for instance with responsibility for current and future generations.

Pushing the decision back until 2014 constitutes an unacceptable delay – e.g. for the European Union or the US. The EU's 20% target for 2020 has been achieved already, almost eight years in advance,<sup>6</sup> and the EU is already on course to reach 25% emissions reductions by 2020, with the final number being closer to 27% if proposed further reductions from various EU initiatives are fully implemented. If the EU does not increase its 2020 target now to at least a 30% emissions reduction domestically, and repair its collapsed Emission Trading Scheme, fatal investment signals will be sent to the EU economy, leading to new lock-in of high emissions.

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<sup>3</sup> Noting that a reasonable chance to stay below 2°C while keeping staying below 1.5°C within reach requires more than 40% reductions by 2020 from developed countries. After the KP rules for LULUCF accounting and the treatment of surplus AAUs have been agreed in Durban and Doha, the collective effort of developed countries can be estimated to be considerably lower than the 12-19% combined pledges suggest at face value.

<sup>4</sup> As shown by Climate Action Tracker: <http://climateactiontracker.org/countries.html>. Some (few, though) upper ends of pledged ranges might deserve the attribute "sufficient." But Kyoto Parties have inscribed their lower ends into Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol for the second commitment period.

<sup>5</sup> Environmental Defense Fund, Natural Resources Defense Council and The Nature Conservancy do not endorse this position.

<sup>6</sup> The European Commission projects that EU-27 greenhouse gas emissions will be about 18.2% below base-year levels for the period 2008-2012. When taking into account the use of carbon sinks and flexible mechanisms by Member States under the Kyoto Protocol, the emission reductions in 2011 were already 20% below 1990 levels. If existing policies and measures are implemented fully by EU Member states, projected 2020 emissions could be 27% below 1990 levels. If the EU would make full use of the opportunities identified by research groups and NGOs, it could reduce domestic emissions beyond 30%. CAN Europe, Closing the Ambition Gap, What Europe Can Do, 2012: [http://www.climnet.org/resources/publications/position-papers/doc\\_download/2127-closing-the-ambition-gap-what-europe-can-do-dec-2012-](http://www.climnet.org/resources/publications/position-papers/doc_download/2127-closing-the-ambition-gap-what-europe-can-do-dec-2012-)

The US should also revisit its clearly inadequate target. As it is responsible for about half of A1 emissions the US target needs to be at least in the range of 25 to 40% below 1990 levels by 2020. In addition, the US is not doing enough to attaining even its weak 17% below 2005 level (i.e. 3% below 1990 level) reduction target, despite new and strengthened Clean Air Act regulations reducing greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles and stationary sources<sup>7</sup>. The Administration has not yet matched its low commitment with adequate action and key opportunities, such as reductions from power plants, remain untapped.

There is no reason for Australia to stay at its current weak and highly inadequate pledge of merely 5% reductions below 2000 levels except perhaps a general unwillingness to take on Australia's fair share in the globally needed mitigation effort. Likewise, Japan must not reduce its current 25% target. Countries whose pledges are above expected BAU emissions must urgently revisit their level of ambition. For all developed countries not operating under the second commitment phase of the Kyoto Protocol, their pledges/targets must be converted into a trajectory until 2020. Knowledge of the trajectory and thus the country's carbon budget for the period is essential for the agreement to have environmental integrity. A point target for 2020 is not adequate.

Despite the setbacks from Doha, Parties should develop a rigorous common accounting framework to ensure transparency on domestic emissions in developed countries, allowing comparability of efforts between Kyoto and non-Kyoto developed country Parties.

*Our suggestions for action by individual developed countries can be found in the Annex of this submission.*

## **2.2 Enable new or enhance 2020 pledges/NAMAs of developing countries**

Closing the ambition gap will also require adequate additional efforts from the group of developing countries while respecting the principles of the UNFCCC. 2013 should be the year to identify what additional efforts are possible and what additional support would be required to enable developing countries to step up their efforts. In 2013, Parties should also make progress on better and more transparently linking scaling up mitigation finance with enhancing ambition in developing countries.

Not all developing countries that are in the position to do so have already made pledges or announced NAMAs. This includes countries with relatively high capabilities such as Qatar, Argentina, Nigeria, Iran, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Thailand and others. These countries should use 2013 to prepare for their pledges and announce them no later than at the COP19 in Warsaw, complemented by information on what support would be needed to implement such pledges/NAMAs, including information on what additional support would be needed to enhance ambition even further.

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<sup>7</sup> WRI, Can the U.S. Get There from Here? Using Existing Federal Laws and State Action to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, February 2013. [http://pdf.wri.org/can\\_us\\_get\\_there\\_from\\_here\\_full\\_report.pdf](http://pdf.wri.org/can_us_get_there_from_here_full_report.pdf)

For those developing countries with relatively high capabilities and/or high responsibilities that have already made pledges or announced NAMAs, it can be assumed that at least in some of those countries there could be additional mitigation potential that is not yet covered by NAMAs or pledges. COP19 should encourage those countries to undertake in-country assessments on additional potentials that are not yet covered by current pledges, including information on how those potentials could be captured in new or enhanced pledges and what external support would be required to unlock those potentials.

Parties should also use the ADP WS2 work to explore options to improve the interplay between the provision of means of implementation and the level of ambition in developing countries made possible by such means of implementation. There is a danger that the lack of e.g. financial support for specific actions might lead to lower-than-possible ambition through those actions, locking-in high-emission pathways in developing countries. The aim of this work should be to simultaneously increase ambition and support to the highest possible levels. Parties should explore the potential role the registry could play here, or alternative mechanisms.

Some countries with low capacity will not be in the position to develop (and subsequently announce) pledges or NAMAs, due to their low capabilities. For those countries the ADP discussion on Work Stream 2 should decide to establish at COP19 a NAMA readiness process capable of adequately enabling those developing countries that wish to do so to build their capacity to develop and implement ambitious NAMAs in line with their national sustainable development priorities.

*Further suggestions for action by individual developing countries can be found in the Annex of this submission.*

### 2.3 Action through complementary measures

Doha made clear that with the current low level of ambition shown by so many countries, revisiting targets, pledges and NAMAs under the current UNFCCC architecture may not be sufficient to close the gap. There exists additional mitigation potential in various areas that could be discussed, agreed and implemented outside the UNFCCC negotiations, using other existing multilateral bodies and agreements. Ticking off separate, well-defined mitigation actions and, where useful, entrusting them to non-UNFCCC bodies means that, at the COPs, Parties can focus more time on the task of getting a global agreement by 2015. This constitutes an efficient use of available institutional capacity but requires enhanced coordination between UNFCCC and other bodies (such as the Montreal Protocol, the CCAC or perhaps the G20, among others). The UNFCCC should have a catalytic role here, but progress on, or results of, those measures should be captured within the UNFCCC process – and be helped by guidance from it (including on levels of ambition expected from those complementary measures). This will be necessary to ensure a co-ordinated overview over options to close the gap as well as ensuring that, and monitoring whether, overall ambition reaches sufficient levels. It also follows that complementary measures will need to be subject to comparable MRV arrangements so as to ensure transparency and consistency in the overall effort.

All complementary measures need to be clearly analysed in how far they are truly additional to current (and new or enhanced) pledges by countries rather than means to fulfilling them. Discussing

complementary measures must not be used as a smokescreen or create the illusion that countries do not need to also increase their 2020 pledges or commitments, as e.g. expressed in QELRCs or country-wide reduction targets.

Complementary measures will have to respect the UNFCCC core principles. In many cases, the principles of one body are not to take precedence over another, however arrangements can be found that reflect the principles and customary practices of both. For instance there may be innovative ways how UNFCCC principles can be implemented, for instance through provisions on the use of revenues of market based mechanisms in the shipping or the aviation sector; see also below.

There are a number of complementary measures that can be accomplished relatively straightforwardly because “institutional homes” for agreeing such measures have already been identified. Those complementary measures include:

- **Addressing emissions from international aviation and shipping:** The ADP must consider the role that international shipping and aviation can make to closing the mitigation gap. Emissions from international aviation and shipping are large and growing fast, yet there is great potential to reduce those emissions - about 0.3–0.5 Gt of CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent in 2020 according to the UNEP 2010 Bridging the Gap report. Work is underway in both IMO and ICAO to agree mechanisms to address emissions in these sectors with **ICAO offering a unique opportunity to agree at least the cornerstones of an MBM in 2013**, while taking into account equity, national circumstances of various countries and the principles of the UNFCCC through the use of revenues. The ADP must closely monitor progress under IMO and ICAO, and provide guidance to these bodies on mitigation ambition levels, and any other matters as needed, including indications of how to reconcile the principles and customary practices of the various bodies, matters related to use of finance generated by market based measures for these sectors, etc. Additional financing generated should be channelled to developing countries for mitigation and adaptation actions through the Green Climate Fund, as well as for in-sector actions.
- **Phasing out HFCs:** COP19 should request that the Montreal Protocol agree to phase out production and consumption of these gases as a matter of urgency at MOP26. All Annex 1 Parties should also commit to an immediate ban on the use of HFC-23 offsets for compliance with Kyoto Protocol targets. Up to 2.2 GtCO<sub>2</sub>e by 2020 and 85 GtCO<sub>2</sub>e by 2050 could be saved globally, with an additional 11.3 GtCO<sub>2</sub>e from HFC-23 by-product control.
- **Removal of fossil fuel subsidies:** Fossil fuel subsidies distort markets and impede the transition to sustainable development. The ADP could develop ambitious pathways for phasing out fossil fuel subsidies in developed countries and identify options to shift those subsidies to additional mitigation activities (allowing higher pledges by developed countries), and to use savings from phasing out subsidies as international climate finance. For developing countries, the ADP could support work to carefully switch fossil fuel subsidies into supporting clean energy access fostering sustainable development. This should also include identification of ways for some developing countries to pursue fossil fuel subsidy phase-out as supported NAMAs. Levels of subsidies and actions towards phase-out should be reported as part of the National Communications and/or Biennial Reporting.

- **Short lived climate forcers:** In addition to (and not substituting) enhanced actions on CO<sub>2</sub>, CAN recommends strong and early actions on Black Carbon which is not listed as a greenhouse gas but according to recent science contributes significantly to global warming. A recent UNEP report concludes that ambitious actions to cut Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone could reduce global warming by about 0.5°C by 2050 and even 0.7°C in the Arctic compared to a reference case; there are additional benefits related to health and food security, avoiding more than 2 million premature deaths and the loss of more than 50 million tons of cereal and soybean production. Parties should agree text that requests appropriate fora for these emissions to take appropriate action. Methane emissions from fossil fuel production reinforce the need for a rapid transition to efficient energy use from renewable sources of energy, whereas some of the black carbon sources might be best treated through fora addressing access to clean and sustainable sources of energy for all.
  
- **Other complementary measures:** In addition there will be more complementary measures in several areas – such as **energy efficiency, renewable energies or REDD+** – where collective action could be identified and captured. For those measures institutional homes will have to be found.<sup>8</sup>

In 2013 the ADP should quickly agree concrete steps to take on the above ideas – including ensuring that the COP19 sends strong signals to the relevant bodies or institutions to progress work and request report-backs for COP20 on progress achieved.

### 3. Finance, Technology and Capacity Building

#### 3.1 Climate finance

That international financial support is a critical driver of developing country mitigation action is a basic principle of the Framework Convention,<sup>9</sup> and has been reiterated in the Kyoto Protocol,<sup>10</sup> the Bali Action Plan,<sup>11</sup> the Copenhagen Accord,<sup>12</sup> the Cancun Agreement<sup>13</sup> and the Durban AWG-LCA decision.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Examples of such cooperative initiatives or “climate clubs” are listed in Lutz Weischer, Jennifer Morgan and Milap Patel (2012), *Climate Clubs: Can Small Groups of Countries make a Big Difference in Addressing Climate Change?*, RECIEL 21 (3). They include:

- A Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement (as proposed by the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable development (ICTSD) - “home” to be defined;
- A technology specific club around renewable energy, promoting feed-in tariffs (FIT), with a potential link with IRENA (German Advisory Council on Global Change – WBGU).

<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/reel.12007/asset/reel12007.pdf>

<sup>9</sup> UNFCCC, Art 4(7), (“The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology...”).

<sup>10</sup> Kyoto Protocol, Art. 11.

<sup>11</sup> Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/CP.13, paras. 1(b)(ii), 1(e).

There is a critical need for clarity and predictability of both the financial flows that will be available to support NAMAs and the nature and cost of NAMAs themselves. Non-Annex 1 countries must populate the registry with detailed NAMAs, supported by clear budgetary assessments. This would help developed countries mobilise the adequate funding for specific NAMAs. On the other hand, developed countries must make clear the kinds and volumes of financial flows they intend to mobilise for NAMAs. In order to facilitate coherence between supported NAMAs and available resources, NAMAs could be designed in a flexible way to indicate a scale of mitigation ambition that would depend on the financial support actually provided.

The ADP could establish a working group or framework for international financial institutions, bilateral donors and their partner countries to develop NAMAs and assess the cost and required support. This kind of partnership would provide capacity to design NAMAs and assess costs and required support, and facilitate knowledge transfer, and thus help develop more ambitious and dedicated mitigation projects.

Although mitigation action in developing countries would be accelerated by increasing new and additional climate finance, there is still no plan for how to scale up finance commitments towards the commitment by developed countries to mobilise further resources to reach \$100bn per year by 2020. A climate finance roadmap 2013-2020 is a key precondition to increase mitigation pledges and NAMAs in developing countries. Towards this end, the Doha decision calls on developed country Parties to submit, by COP 19, their strategies and approaches for mobilising these resources.<sup>15</sup> These submissions should include a clear trajectory for scaling up finance.

Most assessments show that the shift to low carbon emission pathways in developing countries will require overall financing several times larger than the \$100bn commitment made by developed countries. Assuming that much of the total financing needed will come from the private sector, most of the \$100bn commitment by developed countries will need to be met from public finance – to leverage and incentivise the much larger shifts in additional private sector investments, and to support the actions that cannot attract private sector investments.

It is crucial that the results of the extended work programme on long-term financing are turned into recommendations for decisions at COP19, leading to a rapid scale-up of climate finance towards the 2020 target and sufficient to meet the needs of developing countries to realise proposed pledges and NAMAs and further increase their levels of ambition.

The Green Climate Fund can play a critical role in this regard. The governing instrument of the GCF sets a proper objective here, by directing the Fund to focus on promoting a “paradigm shift”. Such a paradigm shift involves a strategic, long-term, and fundamental re-orientation towards low-carbon,

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<sup>12</sup> Copenhagen Accord, paras. 5, 8.

<sup>13</sup> Cancun Agreements, Decision 1/CP.16, §III(B) (“Recognizing that developing country Parties are already contributing and will continue to contribute to a global mitigation effort in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Convention, and could enhance their mitigation actions, depending on the provision of finance, technology and capacity-building support provided by developed country Parties,”), see also paras. 52, 53.

<sup>14</sup> Draft Decision -/CP.17, §II(B).

<sup>15</sup> Draft decision -/CP.18, para. 67.



climate-friendly, climate-resilient, gender-equitable, pro-poor and country-driven development. Such a transformation must be undertaken on the basis of country-owned strategies, plans and programmes that are developed and implemented through participatory and inclusive processes and that are integrated into developing countries' core development plans.

Under the Durban decisions and Article 11 of the Convention, the COP is to provide guidance to the Board of the Green Climate Fund on matters related to policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria. Accordingly, an important outcome of the Durban Platform's work-plan on enhancing mitigation ambition should be **to provide guidance to the GCF on the policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria that would be most effective in catalysing the necessary paradigm shift.**

Two categories of actions should be prioritised.

- First, the GCF should focus on economy-wide or sector-wide actions that would rapidly and significantly lower emissions trajectories of a country (or regions within a country). The GCF should assess programmatic interventions with high mitigation potential, taking into account development objectives and environmental and social safeguards. To achieve a real paradigm shift, the GCF should only finance clean, safe, sustainable and efficient and non-fossil fuel-based energy technologies.
- Second, paradigm-shifting actions should also include initiatives that may deliver smaller immediate reductions, but can contribute towards transforming markets and patterns of private-sector investment over the medium to long term.

In addition, while there is broad agreement that the GCF should have the capacity to "leverage private-sector investment," encouraging private-sector co-financing of GCF supported actions will not necessarily spark a paradigm shift. The GCF should focus on supporting initiatives that reduce costs and eliminate barriers and perceived risks, so that low- and zero- carbon technologies and approaches can more quickly out-compete high-emitting technologies. Feed-in tariffs are an example of an approach that can catalyse the diffusion of near market technologies, and thus accelerate learning and the achievement of economies of scale.

## 3.2 Technology

The diffusion of environmentally sound technologies (ESTs) that places developing countries on low carbon development pathways is key to increasing pre-2020 ambition to narrow the emissions gap. Experience with renewable energy sources makes clear that harnessing key technologies can reduce emissions and change emissions trajectories.

To leverage technology to make the low carbon development pathways truly available to developing countries, the Technology Mechanism should be tasked to set a plan to determine how technology can address the 2°C/1.5°C challenge, adopt criteria to help guide Parties in evaluating the environmental soundness of technologies, facilitate innovation of key ESTs, and optimise the integration of these actions with the NAMA process. For the discussion under Work Stream 2 of the

ADP we suggest consideration of the following ideas to optimise the availability of ESTs relevant to enhancing overall ambition.

- The Technology Executive Committee (TEC) could be asked to bring together their technology roadmap work into a **technology needs mapping** across developing countries, taking into account, inter alia, existing Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs), and additional surveys of Parties, research initiatives, and civil society as well as the private sector.
- The TEC could also be asked to lead the development of a **strategic Technology Action Plan (TAP)** to address the 2°C/1.5°C challenge based, inter alia, on relevant science and experience with the emissions reduction capacity of key technologies, together with the technology needs mapping. It should address, inter alia, sectorial priorities (order in which to address sectors, possibly overlapping), timing relative to a country's stage of development, and regional, terrain or climate related best practices. This plan could be adapted to the national level (e.g. to identify how availability/provision of various technologies can help exploit mitigation potentials through NAMAs with the highest possible levels of ambition), and the regional level (e.g. in a co-operative effort by countries facing similar challenges). On the global level, the TAP could strategically guide national level processes, create the overarching framework around the 2°C/1.5°C challenge, and also address specific sectors that have similarities across countries (e.g. the power sector). For greatest effect, the strategic TAP would be implemented as a rolling, timeline-linked, action plan with targets for the diffusion of ESTs. It could be established by the Technology Executive Committee in co-operation with the Climate Technology Centre and Network and would include assessment of opportunities to close the pre-2020 gap.
- **Co-ordinated Research, Development and Diffusion (RD&D)**, can reduce costs by expanding markets and maximising the applicability of technologies. This co-ordination could be done, inter alia, through sponsored research and development pools and supporting regional or other country groupings to customize technologies. For example, under its mandate to promote and facilitate collaboration on the development and transfer of technologies, the TEC might invite relevant researchers and developers to work together on the development of identified key mitigation technologies. Or, the TEC might identify existing technologies that are reducing emissions in some countries but require specific modifications for others, such as least developed countries. Such development might be supported by funding from the Green Climate Fund, making technologies available to developing countries at very affordable prices.

It is vital that technologies are implemented in a manner that ensures social and environmental integrity and sustainability. The TEC should adopt clear **technology assessment** criteria to help Parties establish which technologies are indeed ESTs in that regard. This is a strategic consideration since ESTs, as a concept, have not been concretely defined in the UNFCCC. Relevant criteria and associated methodologies would help to guide the Technology Mechanism and Parties in identifying technologies for diffusion that are environmentally and socially sound and actually help to close the ambition gap while contributing to sustainable development.

**Efficiency of on-the-ground processes** that support the developing countries' technology needs and their link to the preparation of NAMAs is key to enhancing ambition. The low-hanging fruit in this regard is to carefully coordinate how the various processes interface on the ground. The secretariat could be asked to commission studies relating to how the mitigation-relevant processes, such as NAMA development and implementation, or sector-wide or economy-wide pledges, are linked to, or conditional on, the diffusion of technologies. This would be done with a view to removing obstacles and optimizing the use of TEC and CTCN resources and lessons learned. This study should address, inter alia, Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs), Technology Action Plans (TAPs), Low Emissions Development Strategies (LEDS), and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs). Based on the study, action should be taken to modify or create linkages that best leverage effort among the processes. It should also establish a review process that will keep the linkages current and functioning optimally.

### 3.3 Capacity Building

As already identified in section 2.2, developing country capacity to formulate, design and implement ambitious NAMA's in line with their sustainable development priorities is an essential element at the very front end of mitigation ambition.

Consistent with the principle of equitable access to sustainable development, CAN believes the ADP needs to create a specific topic and, optimally, a specific sub-workstream, capable of delivering the missing institutional arrangements required to ensure that all developing countries which request capacity support for either the design or the operationalisation of their low carbon development plans and NAMA's are fully and adequately supported within a clear, transparent, coherent and predictable framework for capacity building and capability enhancement.

## 4. Process

The ADP was launched in 2012, however time is of the essence and we need to move fast in 2013 to ensure momentum is not lost. There is a risk that Parties use the fixation on the 2015 agreement to the detriment of actions that can happen in the here and now/over the next years. 2013 is the year things have to happen - we need to take it up a gear. Work under ADP WS2 should be an iterative process where concrete steps must be agreed at each COP, regular assessments of the remaining gap, building political will at domestic level, etc. High-level engagement from Ministers and leaders will be vital as political will is seriously lacking today. The planned UN Secretary-General's leaders' summit in 2014 will be a crucial moment in this context.

Some ideas on a critical pathway for raising ambition:

- **Technical Paper and process:** UNFCCC Secretariat to produce a technical paper by SB38 (June 2013), based on submissions, identifying and quantifying concrete pre-2020 mitigation actions. Establishment of a process to translate technical report into concrete action (including identification of actions which can be taken with immediate effect, elaboration of

a strategy with milestones up to 2020 specifying projected emissions savings at each stage of the process).

- **Workshops throughout 2013:** Series of in-session roundtable discussions and workshops<sup>16</sup> throughout 2013 and beyond. The second ADP session in April-May could focus on additional complementary measures in some areas.
- **The finance ministerial in-session meeting at the end of 2013:** this meeting should focus on specific finance needs (levels, channels, instruments) to enable enhanced ambition in pre-2020 mitigation in developing countries. A special focus of work should be on the link between the provision of finance and the level of ambition made possible from it. The meeting should also discuss concrete steps on the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies as a way to shift existing finance from dirty to clean.
- **The COP19 in Warsaw** should be used for stocktaking of necessary actions, including individual country actions, on what it takes to close the 2020 gigatonnes gap and to move back onto a 1.5/2°C pathway. Warsaw should give political direction on the revisiting of 2020 pledges and actions as well as on complementary measures until 2020.
- **2013-2015 review:** Work undertaken in the 2013-2015 Review must be taken into account in establishing overall mitigation ambition. It is crucial that this is provided in a timely basis – with initial findings in 2013. How do we link the review to pre-2020 ambition? Some clear steps would be good. The 2013-2015 review must be a crucial input into the ADP negotiations in 2015 and form the basis for post-2020 emission reduction commitments but also to increase pre-2020 ambition. In order to play this role, the Review must provide initial findings in 2013 and report at COP20, and these should be established as milestones in the ADP work plan. Initial findings of Review to feed into ADP WS2 work – but how? From CAN Doha Paper: COP20 in 2014 should decide that draft text on action based on the review would be formulated by the mid-term sessions in 2015. This would enable COP21 in 2015 to decide on ambitious pre-2020 action as result of the first periodical review.
- **Ministerial roundtable to be held in the first sessional period in 2014:** This high level ministerial roundtable, agreed by Kyoto Parties, should be broader and encompass ALL countries' targets. The ADP should engage in the roundtable and provide an opportunity for non KP parties, especially developed country parties, to also increase their ambition in line with KP parties.
- **Ban Ki-moon's 2014 leaders' summit:** This event vital to ensuring that the process does not become mired in technical detail and endless debates. The proposal for a 2014 leaders' summit is extremely welcome, we expect personal commitment to this process by Heads of States and Governments. However, we also need a forum promoting frank exchanges between heads of State/Ministers, not just diplomatic grandstanding. The planned UN

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<sup>16</sup> Co-Chairs' draft conclusions state that these workshops "may, inter alia, identify, and catalyse the implementation of, initiatives and actions to rapidly, cost-effectively, urgently, and equitably reduce greenhouse gas emissions."

Secretary-General's leaders' summit in 2014 must be the time when ALL countries – both Kyoto and non-Kyoto developed country Parties as well as developing country Parties – revisit and increase their current level of ambition for the period up to 2020. At this summit, developed countries must announce the increase of their 2020 pledges/targets; advanced developing economies must increase their pledges and/or announce new or enhanced NAMAs, enabled up by scaled-up support from developed countries.

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## Annex – Country by Country Mitigation Ambition

**Table 1: Developed country 2020 mitigation ambition**

The following table offers CAN’s current view on what developed-country Parties should do to increase their individual level of ambition – as a first step. This would bring developed countries within the 25-40% range, but require still further action for them to increase their targets to the more than 40% below 1990 levels by 2020 necessary to keep the possibility of staying below 1.5°C alive.

Developed Country	Upper pledge	Lower pledge	The least that is required as an adequate contribution	Rationale
<b>Australia</b>	Reduce emissions by 5% below 2000 level by 2020.	Reduce emissions by 25% below 2000 level by 2020.	This year: a KP QELRO consistent with cuts of at least 25% below 2000 levels by 2020. And a commitment to work in the DPA process to raise ambition further (toward 40% by 2020).	Australia has set conditions for moving its target from 5% to 15% to 25%. The conditions for the 15% target have been met, according to government briefings.
<b>Belarus</b>	Reduce emissions by 8% below 1990 level by 2020	10% below 1990 levels by 2020	35% below 1990 levels by 2020	10% reductions by 2020 would hardly be an achievement, but rather the result of increasing emissions in the country without any really significant actions towards reductions. It’s time for Belarus to stop deceiving themselves and others, putting unrealistic GDP growth in emissions forecasts and exploiting the “economy in transition” status.
<b>Canada</b>	No unconditional pledge, BaU emissions growth assumed.	Reduce emissions by 17% below 2005 level by 2020.	25% below 1990 by 2020	Canada was the only party to leave Copenhagen and weaken their GHG reductions target. Worse, in December 2011 Canada set another negative precedent by withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol before the end of the first commitment period.  -25% below 1990 is the minimum amount that Canada needs to do and still be within the IPCC’s indicative range, however, there is no sign that the current federal government (likely in power until fall 2015) has any intention to even deliver on its own very weak target. Furthermore, economic modelling by the Toronto Dominion Bank has shown that Canada can reach a 25% target while maintaining a healthy economy and strong job creation.
<b>EU27</b>	Reduce emissions by 20% below 1990 level by 2020.	Reduce emissions by 30% below 1990 level by 2020.	40% below 1990 levels by 2020 (of which 30% domestic).	Emission reductions in the EU in 2011 were already 17.6% below 1990 level. Taking into account purchase of international credits the EU has reduced its emissions by at least 20%.

				As if this wasn't easy enough, simply by implementing the EU's existing renewable energy and energy efficiency targets would result in domestic emission reductions of 25% in 2020 as has been acknowledged by the European Commission in the 2050 Low Carbon Roadmap published in March 2011.
<b>Japan</b>	No unconditional pledge, BAU emissions growth assumed.	Reduce emissions by 25% below 1990 level by 2020.  Reduce emissions by -60 to -80% relative to 2005 by 2050	Confirm and keep the 25% GHG below 1990 levels by 2020 and 80% by 2050 Process for Low Carbon Development Strategy.	Japan has not confirmed its mid-term conditional pledges.  After the earthquake and nuclear accident, the government has reviewed climate policy including the unconditional national target. The innovative energy and environment strategy, decided in September, shows the range of GHG emissions in 2020 is only 5 to 9% reduction from 1990, far lower than the pledged 25% target.
<b>Kazakhstan</b>	7% below 1990 level.	10% below 1990 level	The 2020 target should be below current emissions levels (27% below 1990 emissions).	Kazakhstan changed its target from 10 to 7% emissions reductions below 1990 level over the course of the Doha negotiations.  The country's current emissions are around 27% below 1990 emissions levels. The target thus represents a substantial increase of emissions above current levels and remains inadequate.
<b>Liechtenstein</b>	Mirrors the EU pledge.	Mirrors the EU pledge.		
<b>Monaco</b>	Reduce emissions by 30% below 1990 level by 2020.			
<b>New Zealand</b>	None.  New Zealand has made a pledge of 10% below 1990 levels by 2020 conditional upon international accounting rules changing to suit New Zealand.	Reduce emissions by 20% below 1990 level by 2020.	Unconditional 40% reduction in net emissions below 1990 net levels by 2020.	New Zealand remains a Party to the Kyoto Protocol. It will be taking a quantified economy-wide emission reduction target under the UNFCCC in the period 2013 to 2020.  Listen to nearly a quarter of a million New Zealanders who have called on the Government to adopt a 40% target and match Denmark.  Convert your emissions trading scheme into a credible tool for cutting emissions rather than a covert means of corporate welfare.
<b>Norway</b>	Reduce emissions by 30% below 1990 level by 2020	Reduce emissions by 40% below 1990 level by 2020	40% by 2020 with at least two thirds of the target to be achieved through domestic mitigation	Norway has pledged to move to a target of -40% if this will contribute to achieving an ambitious global agreement. Increased mitigation ambition from rich countries such as Norway is probably the most important thing that can contribute

				to increasing overall ambition at the moment, so Norway should make good on this promise right away. Secondly, Norway needs to make clear that it intends to meet its target mainly through domestic action rather than offsetting. This is important for Norway's credibility in the UNFCCC negotiations.
<b>Russian Federation</b>	Reduce emissions by 15% below 1990 level by 2020	Reduce emissions by 25% below 1990 level by 2020	-40% by 2020 with LULUCF (but without any AAU carry over from Kyoto-1)	In 2009, Russian greenhouse gas emissions without LULUCF were -35%, with LULUCF Russia was at -59% from 1990 levels!  Excluding contributions from LULUCF and AAU carry over, Russian government scenarios vary from -14% by 2020 (based on unrealistically fast economic growth with old technologies), to a more reasonable scenario with greenhouse gas emissions at -28% at 2020, that could be achieved through concerted energy savings and energy efficiency.
<b>Switzerland</b>	Mirrors the EU pledge	Mirrors the EU pledge	40% below 1990 levels by 2020 (of which 25% domestic)	The new CO <sub>2</sub> law entered into force in January 2013 gives the federal council the confidence to set this 40% reduction target.
<b>Ukraine</b>	Reduce emissions by 20% below 1990 level by 2020	20% below 1990 levels by 2020. Full AAUs carry over.	57% below 1990 levels by 2020 no AAUs carry over to 2nd and subsequent commitment periods or post-Kyoto agreement.	The official position of Ukraine in fact means doubled emission growth from now until 2020. In addition the unconditional pledge on the table includes a huge amount of new hot air into the system. Ukraine's business as usual scenario for 2020 will be as much as 54% below 1990 levels.
<b>United States of America</b>	No unconditional pledge, BaU emissions growth assumed	Reduce emissions by 17% below 2005 level by 2020	25-40% range below 1990 levels by 2020	As the US is about half of A1 emissions, to achieve overall A1 reductions of 25-40%, the US target needs to be at least in the range. The US pledge is incredibly weak.  Despite new and strengthened Clean Air Act regulations reducing greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles and stationary sources, the US is not doing enough to attaining even the 17% reduction target, which will require new and ambitious action from the U.S. Administration. The Administration has not yet matched its low commitment with adequate action and key opportunities, such as reductions from power plants, remain untapped.  President Obama has raised expectations that he will act on climate change – through his Administration and also that he will champion action through Congress. He needs to immediately start to enact this action at home. The US new Secretary of State John Kerry needs to send clear signals that he will take a more positive and proactive stance toward the international negotiations.



				New staff will help here – but they must quickly differentiate themselves from the previous ‘do nothing’ approach.
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**Table 2. Developing country 2020 mitigation ambition**

The following table offers CAN’s current view on what developing-country Parties should do to increase their individual level of ambition.

<b>Developing Country</b>	<b>Existing action on the table</b>	<b>Additional actions each country should agree as their 2020 contribution as a minimum</b>	<b>Rationale</b>
<b>China</b>	<p>Endeavour to lower emissions intensity by 40-45% by 2020 compared with 2005.</p> <p>Intends to increase non-fossil energy consumption to 15% by 2020.</p> <p>Intends to increase forest coverage by 40 million ha and forest stock volume by 1.3bn m3 by 2020, compared with 2005</p>	<p>Domestic actions should include the introduction of a cap on coal; energy price reform and fossil fuel subsidy removal; a carbon tax and (/or) Emission Trading System by 2020.</p> <p>CAN welcomes announcements from the Chinese government for a tax on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and possibly energy-intensive products. They need to be followed through on and implemented rapidly.</p> <p>The government should also work with civil society to monitor the implementation of policies and plans for the 12th Five Year Plan (2011-2015) and promotion of higher 13rd Five Year Plan reduction target (17-20%) and its implementation.</p>	
<b>India</b>	<p>Endeavour to reduce emissions intensity by 23-25% by 2020 compared with 2005 (excl agriculture).</p>	<p>33-35% emission intensity reduction by 2020 compared with 2005, with additional finance and technology support.</p>	<p>Based on the Interim Report, Expert Group on Low Carbon Strategies for Inclusive Growth, Planning Commission Government of India:  <a href="http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/Inter_Exp.pdf">http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/Inter_Exp.pdf</a></p>
<b>South Africa</b>	<p>Emissions Peak between 2020 and 2025, plateau for up to a decade and then decline; Bring emissions below business-as-usual trajectory (BAU) by 34% by 2020 and</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Total national emissions to peak by 2020 and as far as possible below 550 Mt/annum;</li> <li>15% of electricity from new renewable energy</li> </ul>	

	<p>42% by 2025; 9% of electricity supply from new renewables (excl. hydro) by 2030.</p>	<p>technologies by 2020;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Targets for electrification of transport, including a minimum 15% of government fleets to be electric vehicles by 2020;</li> <li>• Safe and affordable public transport networks servicing all high population density areas;</li> <li>• Over 25 million square metres of solar water heating collection deployed;</li> <li>• Enforcement of comprehensive energy efficiency labelling regulations, with phase out of low efficiency rated equipment, and mandatory efficiency standards for production processes, increasing over time.</li> <li>• Implementation of the carbon tax (escalating from R150/ tCO<sub>2</sub>e) through February 2013 Budget Speech, without blanket or unqualified exemptions;</li> <li>• Adopt a process, with timeline, to establish a national carbon budget, or at least sectoral budgets covering at least 80% of national emissions, by mid October 2013 (as per White Paper).</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Brazil</b></p>	<p>Expected reduction of 36.1 – 38.9% below projected emissions by 2020 through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deforestation reduction</li> <li>• Grazing land restoration</li> <li>• Farming practice changes</li> <li>• Energy efficiency</li> <li>• Biofuel increase</li> <li>• Alternative energy, including Hydro</li> <li>• Iron &amp; steel bioenergy.</li> </ul>	<p>Reform the Forest Law without negative loop- holes.</p> <p>Complete and finish the revision of the National Climate Plan with the Sectorial plans and include how they will be financed.</p> <p>In COP19 Brazil should provide a long-term vision/plan, and clear list of NAMAs, indicating which ones require support.</p>	<p>Sector plans have to be delivered by Governmental departments detailing actions to undertake in order to fulfil their respective share of the national-wide emission reduction target. 2020 level of ambition is good but based exclusively on avoided deforestation. After 2020, energy emissions could peak again.</p>

<b>South Korea</b>	Aims to reduce national GHG emissions by 30% below BAU by 2020 (4% below 2005 by 2020).	20% below 2005 by 2020	
<b>Mexico</b>	Aims to reduce GHG emissions by up to 30% compared with BAU by 2020 with adequate financial support via programs identified in 2009 Special Climate Change Program.	<p>Create a Low Emission Growth Strategy to officialise the reduction of the 30% in 2020. Establish a peak of emissions in 2015.</p> <p>Adopt a target to produce clean and renewable energy to 2020, at least 15% without hydroelectric and nuclear. Create sustainable and efficient transportation programs in all the cities that have more than 100,000 habitants, and approve a vehicle efficiency standard to reduce at least 60% of the emissions that come from the transportation sector in 2020.</p>	<p>The 2009 Special Climate Change Program finishes in 2012. The key areas for the Mexican Government to consider in its next program are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Approve the General Law of Climate change to establish reduction goals in key sectors;</li> <li>• Work in the elaboration of LEDS including ambition goals in energy and transportation sectors;</li> <li>• Increased in at least 15% the participation of renewable energy in 2020;</li> <li>• Increased the budget allocation in renewable energy, sustainable transport and sustainable forest management.</li> </ul>
<b>Argentina</b>	No national-wide target has been communicated to the UNFCCC, only pre-existing climate policies (energy efficiency, renewables, biofuels, forest and solid waste management)	<p>Strengthen existing climate policies and ensure that the set of rules that will guide the implementation of the policies is enacted.</p> <p>Develop and communicate a comprehensive mitigation plan covering the pre-2020 and post- 2020 period. Provide detailed information about new unilateral and potential supported NAMAs.</p>	
<b>Malaysia</b>	No mitigation action has been communicated to the UNFCCC. Malaysia should register their existing domestic pledge of 40% reduction in carbon intensity below 2005 levels by 2020.	Adopt a target to reduce emissions by 20% below 2007 levels by 2020 and develop and communicate NAMAs that will meet this overall target and form part of an overall sustainable development plan, as well as identify what assumptions are included in calculations.	Malaysia has made a domestic pledge of 40% reduction of carbon intensity below 2005 levels by 2020. Malaysia has the institutional capacity to turn this pledge into MRV-able NAMAs. Malaysia has the ability to reduce emissions 20% below 2007 levels by 2020 by reducing areas including forestry, energy, transport, solid waste, industrial processes.

<b>Lebanon</b>	Reach 12% renewable energy in the energy mix by 2020.	This target was first mentioned at the Copenhagen summit in 2009. Its implementation will require a substantial effort.	
<b>Dominican Republic</b>	Reduce emissions by 25% below the 2010 level in 2030.		This pledge made in Doha is substantial, as it requires a reversal of the trend.
<b>Qatar</b>	<p>No specific mitigation action has been communicated to the UNFCCC, but a submission in Doha has opened the door to actions towards “economic diversification” in the region.</p> <p>Qatar, UAEs, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain will submit in 2013 specific actions, though not under the UNFCCC but “under a broader umbrella.” Actions will be subject to MRV.</p>	<p>Develop and communicate a comprehensive low carbon development strategy.</p> <p>Submit under the UNFCCC national mitigation pledges for 2020 by COP19 that will reduce their absolute emissions from current high levels.</p> <p>In addition as a wealthy Gulf Arab country, Qatar should contribute to global finance for climate action.</p>	As a high per capita emitter and a wealthy per capita country, Qatar can afford to develop a comprehensive mitigation plan that will demonstrate how they will reduce their absolute emissions from current high levels.
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	<p>No specific mitigation action has been communicated to the UNFCCC, but a submission in Doha has opened the door to actions towards “economic diversification” in the region.</p> <p>Qatar, UAEs, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain will submit in 2013 specific actions, though not under the UNFCCC but “under a broader umbrella.” Actions will be subject to MRV.</p>	<p>Develop and communicate a comprehensive low carbon development strategy.</p> <p>Submit under the UNFCCC national mitigation pledges for 2020 by COP19 that will reduce their absolute emissions from current high levels.</p> <p>In addition as a wealthy Gulf Arab country, Saudi Arabia should contribute to global finance for climate action.</p>	<p>Saudi Arabia should realize that climate change threatens its existence and should stop playing an obstructionist role in the international climate negotiations.</p> <p>Saudi Arabia is one of the highest per capita emitters, with high levels of per capita wealth. Saudi Arabia has long fought for a permanent forum on response measures, and at Durban this forum was established. If Saudi Arabia is serious about wanting to stop dangerous climate change, they need to show what they are willing to contribute.</p>
<b>Iran</b>	<p>30% emission reduction by 2025 in comparison to BAU.</p> <p>Financed by the government.</p> <p>Conditional pledge of 34% reductions conditional on international technical/financial support under the UNFCCC (emissions in BAU scenario for 2025:</p>	<p>64% emission reduction by 2025 in comparison to BAU (conditional on international technical/ financial assistance under the UNFCCC) (emissions in BaU scenario for 2025: 2,248.5 million tonne CO<sub>2</sub>)</p>	<p>Iran has no official NAMA and did not associate with the Copenhagen accord. The mitigation targets are extracted from Iran’s second communication to UNFCCC that was published in Durban COP17.</p> <p>Iran takes the BAU scenario for 2025 for its mitigation plan and does not refer to any historical</p>

	2,248.5 million tonne CO2).  Iran supports keeping warming below 2°C.		reference year.
<b>Kuwait</b>	No mitigation action has been communicated to the UNFCCC	Develop and communicate a comprehensive low carbon development strategy. Submit national mitigation pledges for 2020 by COP19.  In addition as a wealthy Gulf Arab country, Kuwait should contribute to global finance for climate action.	
<b>Oman</b>	No mitigation action has been communicated to the UNFCCC	Develop and communicate a comprehensive low carbon development strategy. Submit national mitigation pledges for 2020 by COP19.  In addition as a wealthy Gulf Arab country, Oman should contribute to global finance for climate action.	
<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	No specific mitigation action has been communicated to the UNFCCC, but a submission in Doha has opened the door to actions towards “economic diversification” in the region.  Qatar, UAEs, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain will submit in 2013 specific actions, though not under the UNFCCC but “under a broader umbrella.” Actions will be subject to MRV.	Develop and communicate a comprehensive low carbon development strategy.  Submit national mitigation pledges for 2020 by COP19 under the UNFCCC.  In addition as a wealthy Gulf Arab country, UAE should contribute to global finance for climate action.	
<b>All other Arab countries</b>		Develop and communicate a comprehensive low carbon development strategy. Submit national mitigation pledges for 2020 by COP19.	