



Subsidiary Body for Implementation

c/o secretariat@unfccc.int

27 February 2017

RE: Opportunities to further enhance the effective engagement of non-Party stakeholders (NPS)

Dear Sir/Madam,

I am writing to you as Manager, Europe of the Global CCS Institute (Institute). The Institute is a fact-based advocacy and knowledge sharing organisation, which has as its mission to accelerate the development and deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS) globally in order to help to tackle climate change and provide energy security. The Institute is an accredited observer to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the Green Climate Fund (GCF); and member to the UNFCCC's Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) and to the UN Global Compact (UNGC).

At the 44th meeting of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) held in Bonn from 16 to 26 May 2016, the SBI invited observer organisations to submit by 28 February 2017 their views on the opportunities to further enhance the effective engagement of non-Party stakeholders (NPS) in the implementation of the Paris Agreement.¹

In offering these views to the SBI on this important matter (see **Appendix 1** for details), the Institute hopes its contribution further enhances this long-lived discussion within the UNFCCC. The Institute is also generally supportive of the views contained in the BINGO submission on behalf of that broad constituency.

CCS mitigation is institutionally recognised within the UNFCCC as an environmentally sound and sustainable development friendly technology. It is explicitly recognised in the Kyoto Protocol (Article 2.a.iv), and is eligible in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the GCF. Ensuring its eligibility in all future UNFCCC arrangements, both market and non-market, will clearly help empower Parties dependent on fossil-based economies to not only meet their current emissions reduction pledges, but provide for enhanced mitigation ambitions into the future in an economically and socially responsible manner.

The Institute believes that the modalities and procedures (M&Ps) for the implementation of the Paris Agreement (especially Article 6 'various approaches' and Article 10 'technology') can only be meaningfully developed by optimising the engagement of NPS' in the process. A deeper engagement of NPS' in UNFCCC processes can help increase the legitimacy of global governance arrangements without compromising member state sovereignty. This can ensure that the collective power of NPS' – especially the private sector – can be harnessed and leveraged to provide for continuous innovation of technologies and allow for commercial mitigation outcomes at a scale that can deliver the necessary emissions reductions.

Leaving the development of the M&Ps to government officials alone presents a risk of isolating meaningful NPS engagement which could serve to create additional barriers to private sector climate actions. A recent example of this is the 2011 Party-led proposal to tax CCS-CDM projects with a General Reserve requirement for 'unforeseen circumstances' (the option has since been rejected). The adoption of such a procedure could have presented CCS with not only an unsaleable business case in developing nations, but effectively taken off the global mitigation table an essential high-mitigation technology while simultaneously increasing overall mitigation costs. Clearly such a decision could have jeopardised the delivery of a 'well below 2°C' climate goal.

The Institute would be pleased to engage in any subsequent discussion or submission process organised by the UNFCCC to further discuss this issue. For more information, please contact Mr. Mark Bonner, Program Lead – International Climate Change (mark.bonner@globalccsinstitute.com).

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "John A. Sear".

¹ FCCC/SBI/2016/8, paragraph 164

NPS landscape in the UNFCCC

The legal texts of the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreements have little to say about the engagement of non-Party stakeholders (NPS).² The notion of NPS, which is also sometimes referred to as non-state actors (NSA), covers several constituencies that are in no way homogenous. All are likely however to have complementary interests even though engaging in very different vocations. For example, all constituencies fundamentally believe in the need to address and mitigate the potentially catastrophic impacts of climate change in an efficient, equitable and dependable manner (acknowledging that these may mean different things to different constituencies).

While the UNFCCC originally recognised just two constituencies (i.e. the business and industry nongovernmental organizations (BINGO) and the environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGO)); seven others have since been established including: the local government and municipal authorities (LGMA); the indigenous peoples organizations (IPO); the research and independent nongovernmental organizations (RINGO); the trade union non-governmental organizations (TUNGO); farmers and agricultural nongovernmental organizations (Farmers), women and gender non-governmental organizations (Women and Gender) and youth non-governmental organizations (YOUNGO). None of these constituencies explicitly include groups of faith or political parties. Another group of observer organisation is that of intergovernmental organisations (IGOs).

Once accredited to the UNFCCC, the participation by a NPS in a particular constituency is entirely by its own choosing. Such membership is considered by the UNFCCC as neither official nor binding and does not preclude an accredited organisation from communicating directly with Parties and/or the secretariat. Nor does it imply that the constituency focal points (note that typically – but not always – two focal points per constituency are allocated by the UNFCCC secretariat) have any inherent authority over its members behaviour, actions or views.

The benefits of an NPS belonging to a constituency are:

- Access to a Plenary floor in the form of an intervention;
- Allocation of secondary badges when a site access limit is planned by the secretariat;
- Receipt of informal advance information from the secretariat;
- Timely updates on progress and other matters through constituency daily meetings;
- Occasional delegation reception by Parties; and
- Access to bilateral meetings with officials and the secretariat.

The above constituent functions are considered important by accredited observers within the current context of limited opportunity to engage more formally in the UNFCCC processes. Constituencies value highly the safeguarding of historical gains of increased representation that have been hard fought for over the past two decades. But the propensity of the prevailing institutional arrangements to provide greater influence to NPS' within the UNFCCC remains weak in terms of providing for effective expression of views and ideas that can demonstrably improve the implementation of the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.

While the government-led nature of the UNFCCC negotiations is fully acknowledged by observers (given sovereign responsibility for compliance), it remains critically important for NPS' to be fully engaged at both the national level (in the formulation of domestic interest positions on issues) as well as at the treaty level in the implementation of the Paris Agreement. The former engagement is almost certainly at the behest of the respective sovereign governments; but engagement in the latter should ideally be managed within a broader global public interest – one that in principle represents the implementation of aggregate national interests as embedded in the Agreement itself.

For example, even if it were possible for focal points to represent the collective interests of their large and heterogeneous constituent members on matters affecting the implementation and operationalisation of the Paris Agreement, there remains a poor track record of the Plenary sessions actually affording such formal spaces for statements (i.e. many sessions have simply closed without hearing any NPS statements). The reality of plenary interventions is that they tend (i) not to be wholly representative of the broader views within each constituency, and (ii) the 2 minute time allocation on constituency statements severely constrains their usefulness and risks rendering them void of much meaningful and/or useful detail.

NPS statements are uploaded onto a UNFCCC digital portal, however this remains a very passive approach to communicating the rich ideas of NPS' on how the Paris Agreement can be given effect. After all, it is largely the NPS' that must undertake the climate actions to deliver on the government commitments contained in the

² The Convention states that “Any body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by the Convention, and which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the Conference of the Parties as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present object.” This is very similar to the text included in the Kyoto Protocol.

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Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC's) and/or will be impacted on by those actions. It seems logical that the validity of the climate treaty process can only benefit from paving the way for NPS' to operate with a higher degree of influence and accountability.


Current NPS architecture in the UNFCCC

The UNFCCC provides a number of opportunities for NPS' to convene to discuss ideas, as well as platforms to showcase climate actions. The main initiatives today include (see Table 1 for brief descriptions of each):

- UN Secretary General's Climate Summit (2014, lapsed);
- Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action portal (NAZCA, 2014);
- Lima Paris Action Agenda (LPAA, 2014);
- Technical Examination Process and associated Technical Expert Meetings (2014);
- Momentum for Change (2013);
- International Co-operative Initiative;
- High-level Climate Action Day (2015)
- Thematic days (2016);
- Interaction with Climate Champions (2015);
- Plenary interventions;
- Digital submission portals;
- Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action (2016);
- Informal Facilitative Dialogue (2018);
- Global Stocktake (2023 and every 5 years); and
- Direct engagement in UNFCCC institutional business (2010, i.e. TEC, CTCN, GCF).

The following diagram attempts to link these initiatives to illustrate their relationships and hierarchy in the UNFCCC negotiation process.

Diagram 1 NPS arrangements



Source: GCCSI

The traditional role of accredited NPS' in the UNFCCC is to observe proceedings, and to represent desired positions on issues at the national level of government. The Climate Champions (i.e. two appointed government ministers) oversee the Global Climate Change Agenda, and in 2016 published a roadmap to encourage NPS actions. They identify as their responsibilities the execution of existing efforts (the annual high-level event, voluntary initiatives of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA), and the organisation of Technical Expert Meetings (TEMs)) as well as the scaling-up and introduction of new or strengthened voluntary efforts, initiatives and coalitions.

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In practice, it seems a comparatively small number of NPS' (that are mostly well known to the Climate Champion's, the secretariat and/or constituency focal points) are either requested directly to express their views on the coordination of these initiatives (i.e. TEMs, annual high-level event) or encouraged to retrospectively report their climate actions and/or commitments into the voluntary domains of the Non-state Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA). Most related processes are subject to the governance of the UNFCCC, which ultimately implies the Parties themselves. The Institute's general impression is that such processes tend not to lend themselves to generating a depth and diversity of views that (a) is available, and (b) could be considered 'representative' on the various issues being considered.

There are few formal opportunities afforded to NPS' to liaise directly at the UNFCCC organisational level, which are mostly limited to COP/CMP/CMA decisions that call for submissions from observers (noting that many submissions are restricted to Parties only). NPS' can either feed their views into the written or oral products of the nine constituencies (which itself is subject to an exogenous review and edit process); or independently submit their expert views directly (formally and informally) to the UNFCCC secretariat.

While the drafting and submission of views remains a critically important information channel for the negotiations, the extent to which NPS submissions are substantively embedded in subsequent synthesis reports drafted by the UNFCCC secretariat is generally unclear (mainly due to the complexity, volume and diversity of NPS positions on the many of the issues being discussed). Also unclear is the extent to which these UNFCCC secretariat reports (no matter how high a quality they are) are read, understood and/or embraced by the Parties and/or influence their negotiating positions. Finally, the extent to which informal submissions are formally considered by the UNFCCC decision making process is unknown. The Institute's general impression is that the effectiveness of the submission process to raise Party awareness on implementation issues is moderate.

The direct participation of NPS' in the work programs (and the development of those programs) of the bodies of the Technology Mechanism (Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN)) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF) is viewed by many NPS' as being critically important. The TEC was the first UNFCCC body to embrace a model of active NPS engagement to the demonstrable benefit of its deliberations; and NPS contributions to the Climate Technology Centre's Network remains integral to the CTCN delivering on its mandate to assist the technology requests of developing countries. Furthermore, the ability of NPS' to apply for and access GCF resources to support projects remains an innovative and productive approach to catalysing NPS climate actions.

Accredited observers and Parties alike have also rallied recently to preserve the right to host free side-events and exhibits at both the mid-year intersessional and end of year conferences. This has been the case since 2015 when the secretariat publically proposed to impose a charge on them. A tremendous amount of expert knowledge and innovation is disseminated and showcased through these initiatives, as well as public advocacy for mitigation approaches, climate and energy policies, and visions for a clean energy future. While many Party delegates are engaged in these activities (either directly or indirectly), they do seem to have a limited impact on negotiation outcomes.

Table 1 NPS scope of influence in the UNFCCC

Channels for NPS engagement	Description	Opportunity for NPS Engagement	Potential Impact on UNFCCC Negotiations	Additional Observations
UN Secretary General's Climate Summit	In 2014 (prior to COP 21), UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon invited world leaders, from government, finance, business, and civil society in an effort to galvanize and catalyse climate action.	Low	High	Was hosted to rally global political support so that an agreement could be reached at COP 21 (2015)
Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action portal (NAZCA)	A platform that brings together the commitments to action by companies, cities, subnational regions, investors and civil society organizations to address climate change.	Moderate	Low-moderate	Provides for NPS' undertaking emissions control efforts; not suited for expert and non-emitting organisations advocating knowledge and ideas on how to implement the Paris Agreement.
Lima Paris Action Agenda (LPAA)	This was described at COP 21 as the "fourth pillar" of the Paris outcomes, together with the Paris Agreement, Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), and "finance and technology". The idea behind it was to mobilise the climate actions of the private sector, local governments, investors, NGOs, and citizens. The LPAA included 12 thematic areas including: resilience, less polluting transportation, renewable energy development, increasing energy efficiency, forest protection, sub national local action, business and innovation, agriculture, financial mobilisation, climate friendly building, and short term pollutants.	Limited (For mitigation technologies addressing fossil energy emissions such as CCS)	Low-moderate	It is also unclear to what extent to which

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Momentum for Change	This is a UN Climate Change secretariat initiative to showcase climate activities already underway. It recognizes (rewards) innovative and transformative solutions that address climate change and wider economic, social and environmental challenges (called Lighthouse Activities).	Moderate	Low-moderate	these initiatives have mobilised the current suite of initiatives or whether they would have happened anyway.
Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action	This is complementary to (not a substitute for) formal negotiations by Parties. It aims to accelerate cooperative climate action among Parties and non-Party stakeholders, consistent with the achievement of the NDCs. It also aims to foster greater mitigation ambition over time. It gives effect: convening of Party and non-Party stakeholders to enhance collaboration; showcasing successes and providing a platform for new initiatives; tracking of progress through NAZCA in support of the delivery of NDCs and the SDGs; and reporting of achievements and options to enhance action to the COP.	Low	Low-moderate	The fact that the LPAA designated 12 thematic areas and omitted any opportunity for cleaner fossil energy mitigation technologies to be included continues to constrain engagement.
International Co-operative Initiative	This is a digital portal managed by the UNFCCC secretariat that presents information on cooperative climate actions undertaken around the world at various levels by governments, international organizations, civil society, and business that contribute to reducing greenhouse gas emissions.	Moderate	Low-moderate	
High-level Climate Action Day	This is organized under the leadership of the Climate Champion's, in association with Parties and Intergovernmental organisations. A thematic day is decided on and features high-level political leaders, heads of international agencies, NGOs, technical/policy experts, and private sector representatives. For example. "Oceans Action Day" featured at COP 22.	Low	Low-moderate	
Thematic days	A number of side events are clustered around thematic days, including BINGO Day, Gender Day, Farmers' Day and Young and Future Generations Day.	Moderate	Low-moderate	
Technical Examination Process (TEP) and associated Technical Expert Meetings (TEM)	The TEP explores high-potential mitigation policies, practices and technologies with significant sustainable development co-benefits that could increase the mitigation ambition of pre-2020 climate action. It consists of regular in-session thematic TEMs and focused follow up work to be conducted by Parties, international organizations and partnerships throughout the year.	Moderate	Moderate	It is unclear (a) how the TEM topics are selected, and (b) how the secretariat decides who participates in the planning and delivery of the TEMs.
Interaction with Climate Champions	The two appointed climate champions aim to boost cooperative global action between governments, cities, business, investors and citizens in the wake of the Paris Climate Change Agreement, with an emphasis on cohesive, innovative and practical solutions to cut global emissions rapidly and also help the most vulnerable adapt to climate impacts and build their own clean energy futures.	Low	Low-moderate	It is unclear how the Climate Champions influence the outcomes of initiatives including how the TEM topics are selected, and how decisions are made on who participates in them.
Plenary interventions	Typically NPS constituencies can access the Plenary floor in the form of a 2 minute intervention at the end of the formal agenda.	Low	Low-moderate	
Digital submission portals	Accredited observers can submit their views on any issue at any time by requesting the secretariat upload their written submission onto the portal (http://unfccc.int/documentation/submissions_from_non-party_stakeholders/items/7478.php).	High	Unclear	

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Direct engagement in UNFCCC institutional business (ie. TEC, CTCN, GCF)	NPS' are engaging in the meetings of the TEC (and taskforces) and CTCN Advisory Board. NPS can also apply for and access the resources of the GCF for project level activity.	High	Moderate	The mandate for these bodies arise from COP/CMP/CMA and are heavily influenced by government led priorities (such as Technical Needs Assessments and Nationally Designated Entities)
Informal Facilitative Dialogue	In 2018 (COP 24), Parties will take stock of the collective efforts in relation to progress towards the goal set in the Paris Agreement and to inform the preparation of NDCs.	Unknown	Unknown	Modalities and procedures are yet to be developed.
Global Stocktake (2022 and every 5 years).	There will be a global stocktake every 5 years to assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of the Agreement and to inform further individual actions by Parties. The first is to be in 2023 (COP 29).	Unknown	Unknown	Modalities and procedures are yet to be developed.

Source: GCCSI

Survey results on the perception of NPS' in UNFCCC

The International Negotiations Survey (INS) has been collecting questionnaire data (random samples) from the climate negotiations since 2007 (i.e. started at COP 13, Bali); all surveys have been undertaken with the agreement of the UNFCCC secretariat. Analysis of this data provides a valuable insight on the role of NPS' within the UNFCCC.

Table 2 COP 17 and 18 side-event participants' perceptions of NPS roles

	COP 17	COP 18	COP 19	COP 20	ALL COPs		Not important to include NPS	Provide information and expertise	Represent important stakes in the decision	Represent marginalised views
Not important to include NPS	5%	4%	1%	3%	3%	NEGOTIATORS (n=210)	4%	40%	40%	16%
Provide information and expertise	31%	34%	28%	34%	32%	PARTIES (n=239)	3%	38%	44%	15%
Represent important stakes in the decision	49%	49%	54%	50%	50%	LOCAL GOVERNMENT (n=42)	7%	31%	55%	7%
Represent marginalised views	15%	15%	17%	13%	15%	BINGO (n=126)	6%	37%	52%	5%
Sample size	306	734	437	366	1843	RINGO (n=264)	3%	36%	48%	13%
	AVG					IGO (n=114)	1%	32%	53%	14%
						ENGO (n=390)	1%	29%	55%	15%
						OTHER (n=340)	2%	26%	51%	21%
						TOTAL (n=1725)	3%	34%	50%	13%


Source: INS Nasiritousi, Hjerpe and Linnér (2014): The roles of non-state actors in climate change governance: understanding agency through governance profiles, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics

Respondents articulated arguments as to why NPS' should be included in the international climate change agenda, with the two strongest and most consistent arguments being to (i) represent important stakes in the decision making processes and (ii) provide information and expertise. These overarching findings seem strongly consistent for all constituents over time.

The survey further identifies 10 core areas of interest as to why NPS' wish to engage in the business of the UNFCCC, and these are shown in Diagram 2.³

³ <http://www.internationalnegotiationssurvey.se/survey-items/non-state-actors-in-climate-change-governance-2/>

Diagram 2 (COP 17 and 18 side-event participants' perceptions of NPS roles)



Source: INS⁴

The more the data is disaggregated (as in Diagram 2), the clearer it is that the more varied are NPS expectations for engagement outcomes depending on their constituencies. For BINGO and IGOs, the main engagement outcomes sought are influencing agendas and policy makers as well as proposing climate solutions. The engagement priorities for RINGOs on the other hand seem to focus on proposing solutions, providing expertise and evaluating consequences (presume mostly of a scientific nature); and important to ENGOs appears to be the raising of awareness on climate issues and representing public (including marginalised groups) opinion.

As there appears to be no homogenous expectation of engagement outcomes across all of the constituent groups, a major challenge for the SBI will likely be that no universal engagement approach can be adopted to meet all the needs of the individual constituencies.

Suggestions for alternate channels of NPS engagement

The SBI continues to formally reaffirm "... the fundamental value of effective participation by observers and the value of contributions from observer organizations to deliberations on substantive issues".⁵ There is a clear need to afford NPS' a greater scope of influence in the formal negotiation processes; especially when it comes to shaping issues affecting the implementation modalities and procedures (M&P) for the Paris Agreement, as well as showcasing the prospects of high-mitigation potential technologies in the TEP.

An important consequence of this is that NPS' also have to recognise that with any enhanced opportunity to more deeply engage in the UNFCCC processes will necessarily bestow a greater degree of accountability (including a fairness of representation), transparency, and access to NPS deliberation processes.

For example, enhanced NPS engagement in the TEP should secure a level playing field for all high mitigation technologies so that Parties can be objectively informed of recent developments and applications. This has not been the experience to date in the clean energy agenda. Renewable energy and energy efficiency have been afforded three substantive TEMs (March 2014, June 2015, and May 2016) compared to just one for CCS (October 2014). This inherent bias can be addressed by allowing for greater participation by NPS' in the decision making processes of the TEP. Suggestions on how this might be done are offered below.

In regards to current UNFCCC practices for engaging NPS', the Institute:

- Applauds formal opportunities to discuss further how the UNFCCC can enhance the effective engagement of NPS', including the upcoming SBI 'in-session workshop' at SB46 (May 2017) as well as previous workshops (such as SB34 in 2011).
 - The Institute notes however that the observation cited on page 4 of the secretariat's 'in-session report' for the SB34 workshop – that "ideas be made without substantial financial requirements" – is too restrictive a condition to impose at this time if the UNFCCC is serious about deepening and enhancing the value of NPS engagement;

⁴ <http://www.internationalnegotiationssurvey.se/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/COPsideeventv3.jpg>

⁵ FCCC/SBI/2004/10, paragraph 98, FCCC/SBI/2010/27, paragraph 140, and FCCC/SBI/2011/7, paragraph 171.

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- Applauds the UNFCCC secretariat in making available the audio/video connections from the plenary halls to additional meeting rooms so that NPS access/viewing of the proceedings can be facilitated when numbers in the plenaries exceed available seating;
- Supports the continuation of the:
 - The Observer Organization Liaison Unit's (overseen by the Conference Affairs Services programme) secretarial and administrative functions as they relate to the participation of observer organizations (side-events, exhibits, Climate Change Studio etc);
 - Timely notifications to observers being posted to the UNFCCC notifications web page (http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/notifications/items/3153.php);
 - 'web on demand' function where Plenary sessions, press conferences and high level events can be viewed real time (and reviewed) by NPS';
 - Free of charge hosting of NPS' side-events and exhibits during the intersessional and end of year conferences;
 - Free of charge use of the UNFCCC Press facilities to make substantive announcements;
 - Administration of the Non-Party submission portal;
 - The TT:Clear web page outlining the business of the Technology Mechanism and its bodies;
 - Use of webcasts to cover the meetings of the TEC, CTCN Advisory Board and GCF Board, and the practice of encouraging NPS questions via social media (Twitter) in the TEC (which could be employed by other UNFCCC bodies);
 - The practice of allowing NPS' attend as observers [at least] the first and last meetings of the informal consultations – noting a future preference for NPS' to also attend all Contact Groups and informal consultations as observers;
 - Initiatives such as the Climate Change Studio;
 - Use of Twitter and other social media channels to announce the release and/or recent changes to formal documents;
 - Practice of holding no more than two meetings of plenary and/or Contact Groups concurrently (Decision FCCC/SBI/2011/7);
 - SBI's request (carried over from SBI 34) to the secretariat to provide a report every two years on the progress made on NPS engagement (FCCC/SBI/2016/2 paragraph 36) – and notes with appreciation the latest update for the period 2014–2015 (FCCC/SBI/2016/2 table 2); and
 - Opportunities for regular briefings by the Chairs of the UNFCCC bodies (and other dignitaries) at the intersessional and end of year conference.

In regards to future practices, the Institute would like to see (no order of priority):

- Extension of time between the start and close for the confirmation of registration badges; as well as for the application period for side-events and exhibits (which is essentially a week);
- A more transparent allocation approach to the registration quotas of participating observers to attend the intersessional and end of year meetings;
- Greater flexibility for NPS' contact persons to either change and/or share a confirmed delegate over the two weeks (allowing for a greater diversity of NPS' to be engaged in the process); related to the above point is an ability of the NPS' contact persons to transfer a limited number of confirmed week 1 badges to week 2 should week 1 badges not be utilised (and vice versa);
- NPS should have open access to the "Informal Informal's" or drafting groups or spin-off groups – at least on M&P type matters and certainly in the 1st week of the conference (prior to ministerial level negotiations); the reason for this is that the efficiency of implementing COP/CMP/CMA decisions should be done transparently and in the "public interest" – the SBI noted in [FCCC/SBI/2011/INF.7](#) that increased access to meetings is not just about enhanced transparency, but also about playing a constructive role in building the capacity of some Parties;
- NPS' should be afforded regular opportunities to address contact groups if time permits (and if the point above is observed, informal consultations and informal informals as well);
- Revise downwards the number of informal meetings held concurrently (Decision FCCC/SBI/2011/7 states no more than 6 Informal Consultations will be scheduled concurrently), as NPS engagement in all concurrent meetings is impossible, as it is for small Party delegations;

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- Where side-events are hosted in small room sizes, the connection of audio/video signals to web based 'channels' accessible in the overflow rooms should be sought (and the cost should be minimal);
- Constituencies should be invited by the Climate Champions, in close collaboration with the TEC, to submit suggestions in a timely manner (that allows for planning and organisation) on future TEM themes, agendas and expert participants; this requires a much more transparent decision making process than is currently being observed for the TEP;
- Some sort of conduit (digital or otherwise) should be established to directly connect NPS' (via their constituencies) with Party negotiators and the Climate Champions on a confidential basis – there is much interest in encouraging two-way exchanges on various issues as they arise before and during the negotiations (note: any request sent to a constituency focal point would need to be disseminated in a timely manner amongst all of its members and not quarantined by the focal point/s to a few favoured members);
- Consideration be given to substituting the short statements made by constituencies at the end of the closing plenary agendas for a more meaningful formal space in which constituencies can consolidate and communicate their ideas and positions on substantive matters; a fora or mechanism could be created for a limited but diverse number of C-level executive representatives from each constituency to meet at least once (preference would be twice) with all of the decision making machinery of the negotiations at the same time (chairs of the subsidiary bodies, UNFCCC Executive Secretary, Climate Champions, heads of delegations, ministers) and at a relevant moment in time (i.e. could be at the start of week 2 after all salient issues have been canvased and aired), and/or at a Climate Champion moderated annual pre-COP meeting with all constituencies providing input to the end of year high-level event/s;
- There should be no UNFCCC filter applied to accredited NPS' that restrict their interest in or rights to engage and/or participate in UNFCCC meetings. The UNFCCC's architecture orchestrates (rather than compels) all emitting NPS' to undertake climate action, and it is widely acknowledged that all NPS' have different vocations and positions on climate change matters; the reality is that to exclude any NPS from participating in the UNFCCC processes on the basis of a 'perceived conflict of interest' (and such perceptions cannot be uniformly interpreted) is to isolate an important constituency from either voluntarily committing to and delivering emissions reductions and/or hampering their comparative understanding and facilitation of national government commitments. This can serve no positive outcome in either the implementation of the Paris Agreement or the timely preservation of the global carbon budget;
- Create a virtual digital space for democratic NPS editorial narratives on any climate issue to be uploaded (with un-vetted substantive content) and allow such insights to be responded to by both Parties and NPS' alike on a voluntary basis; and
- Encourage the Climate Champions to host a 'Climate Action Summit' in the period of June to September of 2018 to showcase NPS actions and initiatives in preparation of the Informal Facilitative Dialogue at COP 24.

Concluding observations

The positive contributions of NPS' in UNFCCC processes have been long recognised by both the Parties and the subsidiary bodies. This groundswell support for NPS' engagement has never been stronger since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, which launched the LPAA, the NAZCA platform, and supported the emergence of NDCs. It is clear that stronger links between the UNFCCC's processes and NPS' engagement can be mutually beneficial (if managed well) in the following ways:

- The development of superior suites of M&Ps to implement the Paris Agreement that can help deliver national commitments in a least cost manner; M&Ps will better reflect the latest global best practices (technical, financial, projects, programs), the latest technological innovations (mostly residing in the private sector domain), and be informed by a level of operational pragmatism and specialised skill set that is often lacking within government delegations responsible for negotiating issues;
- Parties may be able to implement their NDCs faster while increasing domestic political momentum for them amongst their voting constituents by demonstrating a very broad level of acceptance from international NPS' experts as well as additional opportunities for international non-government collaboration; and
- NPS' can help streamline the implementation of international and national governance arrangements (thereby increasing the efficiency of their mitigation efforts), while showcasing their comparative expertise and climate actions on the international arena, and this could help secure additional support for such efforts.

The rules of the Paris Agreement are currently being developed and so it is very timely for the SBI to re-consider and review how the UNFCCC can strengthen its engagement with NPS' to further support the implementation of the Paris Agreement and to further facilitate voluntary NPS climate actions.