27 June 1997
ENGLISH ONLY
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
AD HOC GROUP ON THE BERLIN MANDATE
Seventh session
Bonn, 31 July - 7 August 1997
Item 3 of the provisional agenda
In addition to the submissions already received (see
FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.2), a further submission has been received from
the Netherlands (on behalf of the European Community and its member
States).
In accordance with the procedure for miscellaneous documents, this
submission is attached and is reproduced in the language in which it
was received and without formal editing.
FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.2/Add.1
GE.97-
Paper No. Page
1. Netherlands 3
(on behalf of the European Community and its member States)
(Submission dated 18 June 1997)
I. INTRODUCTORY ELEMENTS' (para
10-26)
Preamble (para. 10 - 14)
With respect to the section on the preamble the EU notes that
several Parties have made suggestions with respect to the language to
be used in the preamble, like references to the IPCC SAR, adverse
impacts on developing countries and special positions of countries
with economies in transition. Also it has been suggested to cross
refer to selected provisions from the Convention.
The EU feels that a general reference to the Convention as a whole
and the Berlin Mandate would be the best way to introduce the
Protocol. However, in practice a preamble text should be pieced
together only after the main body of the legal instrument has been
discussed and - where already possible agreed upon. Therefore, the EU
suggests to defer the consideration of the section to a later
stage.
Definitions (para 15 - 19)
With respect to the definitions the EU wishes to state that at
this stage of our discussions it is premature to finalize the section
on definitions, since the main body of the text has not been
discussed and agreed upon. The EU agrees that many of the texts in
para 15.1. - 15.10, 17.1 - 17. 3, 18. 1 18.10, 19.1 - 19.2 may in the
end have to be included in the future section on
definitions.
The EU feels that the definitions in para 16.1-16.6 are directly
related to the substance of a specific QELRO proposal of a Party and
therefore will need to be discussed in the context of these specific
proposals before being addressed by the group which has been set up
to deal with Part I. The same applies to the un-elaborated proposals
in para 17.4 and 17.5. Definitions 19.4 and 19.5 are also of a
technical nature, and might also better be discussed elsewhere in the
first instance.
Objectives (para 20 - 23)
The EU likes to emphasize that article 2 of the Convention refers
to 'the ultimate objective of this Convention and any related
instruments' . Therefore according to the EU there should be no need
to discuss new language with respect to the objective of the
protocol. The EU suggests to delete para 20 23 and instead simply
cross refer to article 2 of the Convention.
Principles (para 24 - 26)
With respect to the section on principles the EU has the same
position as on the section on objectives. The Convention contains in
para. 3 the principles to guide Parties achieving the objective. No
need exists to come up with new principles. In this respect the EU is
inclined to agree with the position of the Russian Federation in para
26, although further clarification from the Russian Federation on
what is meant in such para 26 by 'statements of the Convention' would
be helpful.
Considering the present principles in the Convention the EU
suggests to delete para 24 and 25 - which also deal with topics which
might also be better discussed elsewhere in the first instance - and
instead simply to cross refer to the principles in article 3 of the
Convention.
II. STRENGTHENING THE COMMITMENTS IN ARTICLE 4.2(a) and
(b)
A. Policies and measures (para 27-50 and
Annexes)
Guiding commitments and guiding objectives (para 27 -
37)
The Berlin Mandate and the Geneva Ministerial declaration clearly
indicate that the outcome of the negotiations on a legally-binding
protocol or another legal instrument should contain commitments
regarding policies and measures including appropriate sectors and
areas.
The EU attaches considerable importance to the inclusion of
legally binding and other policies and measures in the protocol. To
this end it has indicated in its submission (para 33.1 to 33.4) that
Annex X Parties (countries that are members of the OECD including
recent new entrants and countries with economies in transition) shall
adopt and implement policies within national and regional programmes
in key areas. These policies and measures can be characterised as
belonging to either Annex A (common policies and measures) or Annex B
(coordinated policies and measures) with those marked with an
asterisk having priority. The remaining policies and measures
submitted previously would be considered as belonging to Annex C
(inclusion in national programmes).
The submissions presented by France in (para 29) follows the
approach taken by the EU and in the interest of simplifying the draft
protocol that should emerge from the Chairman's compilation document
the submission of France could be dropped.
The submission of Switzerland expresses support for the EU
position. The submission of New Zealand contained in para 34 also
states that common action in certain areas may be appropriate. The
AOSIS countries proposal also calls for certain measures to be
co-ordinated in a co-ordination mechanism in which we will comment in
more detail under Section VI on institutions and
processes.
Other submissions in particular those from Poland and the Russian
Federation either call for menu approach or the establishment of
general objectives. While we want to emphasize again that we prefer
the concept of common and coordinated measures for all Annex X
Parties to the menu approach we recognize elements in these
submissions which are close to our thinking.
Para 30(a) replicates just the Berlin Mandate while para 30(b) and
32 address issues which are dealt with in a separate chapter under
Section II.C. Similarly we think that the idea expressed in para 31
should be dealt with more appropriately under Section III, review of
commitments.
The proposal from Australia contained in para 28 does not add to
what is already laid down in Article 4.1(b) of the Convention, but
might rather weaken this provision. However we think that the idea of
performance indicators is an interesting one and we want to draw your
attention to the fact that a similar concept is expressed in the EU
submission on Section IV on Article 4.1.
Before commenting on the para dealing with specific policies and
measures let me conclude by saying that we are of the opinion that
there is no need for the inclusion of special guiding objectives for
policies and measures.
Regarding specific policies and measures contained in (para 38-47)
the EU notes that unfortunately two policies and measures have not
been marked with an asterisk (*) in the framework compilation, while
they should have been indicated as such (para 38.3a (Energy
efficiency standards, labelling and other product-related measures
for common household appliances etc.) and para 38.10c (Fluorocarbons
and SF6: international cooperation in the development of
policies and measures with sector organizations).
The EU proposal contained in para 38 is the most elaborated of the
submissions in the documents in front of us. It has submitted at
AGBM5 a shortened priority list of policies and measures, based on
the eleven papers identifying over 200 policies and measures it
previously presented for consideration. These policies and measures
are categorised according to the Annex structure it has elaborated in
the Protocol structure. The EU text provides a sound and flexible
basis for meeting the objectives of the Berlin Mandate and the focus
in the negotiation should now be on the common and co-ordinated
polices and measures to be contained in Annexes A and B. The
submissions of France and Germany could be accommodated in the EU
position.
In this context, the options proposed by the Chairman as regards
the Annexes -para 250.1 to 250.4 do not correspond to the framework
proposed by the EU. However, the EU warmly welcomes the fact that the
Chairman endorses the EU view that the Protocol should contain a
mandatory element in relation to policies and measures.
A number of Parties, Iceland (para 41), New Zealand (para 44),
Norway (para 45) and Switzerland have submitted proposals that could
integrate into the format provided by the EU submission. The position
tabled by Japan (para 43.1-43.5) lists a number of policy areas. As
the EU understands it, Annex I countries would be required to adopt
at least one policy and measure for each policy area. Progress in
achieving these objectives will be based on agreed indicators and
each Party will adopt voluntary goals measured on the basis of these
indicators as mentioned above the EU prefers common and coordinated
action on voluntary goals.
It must be recognised that some developed-country Parties, notably
the USA, have not included binding commitments to policies and
measures in their submissions. The EU, while defining more clearly
its priority list of policies and measures is convinced that
inclusion of policies and measures is essential to ensure that the
Protocol fully encompasses the remit of the Berlin Mandate, as called
for by the Geneva Ministerial Declaration.
Differentiation (Policies and Measures)
(para 48-51)
The main submission on this issue is from the group of countries
with economies in transition who wish to have a separate annex to the
protocol or another legal instrument. While the EU recognises the
specific problems of the countries in transition it believes that
their circumstances can be taken into account in the Protocol
structure it has advanced and not in a separate annex.
B. QELROs (para 51-117)
Guiding objectives (para 51-55)
The EU believes that Parties should develop a common recognition
of the GHGs concentration levels thought likely to result in
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system as
defined in Article 2 of the Framework Convention on Climate Change.
In this context, the EU recalls that, according to the IPCC SAR,
stabilisation of atmospheric concentrations of CO2 at twice the
pre-industrial level, i.e. 550 ppm, will eventually require global
emissions to be less than 50% of current levels of emissions; such a
concentration level is likely to lead to an increase of the global
average temperature of around 2 degrees C above the pre-industrial
level. The EU believes that global average temperatures should not
exceed 2 degrees above pre-industrial level and that therefore
concentration levels lower than 550 ppm CO2 should guide global
limitation and reduction efforts.
The EU cannot accept para 53.
The EU believes furthermore that para 54.2 does not belong in
Guiding Objectives but is rather a part of level and timing/emissions
budgets and should be moved to this section.
Legal character (para 56-61)
The EU reiterates its support for the language of the Geneva Ministerial Declaration calling for quantified legally-binding objectives for emission limitations and significant overall reductions within specified time frames for Annex I Parties.
In this context, the EU notes that this would not be the only
legally binding provision in the Protocol and refers in this regard
to its proposal on policies and measures. Language along the lines of
para 61 could in our view be included in a future preamble to the
Protocol.
Level & timing/emission budgets (para
75-91)
The EU continues to support the principles outlined in present para 80 but would like to emphasize a few points. The EU supports the need for QELROs within the time frames 2005 and 2010 as a preferable shorter time process, and 2020 as a possible longer term perspective. The short and medium term objectives will affect the levels of reduction required to be achieved over the longer term also, significantly affecting the scope for investment decisions made at any time in the future. Stabilisation as defined by Article 2 of the Framework Convention on Climate Change could be achieved by various emission paths within clear limits if overall objectives are to be met. It must be clearly understood that insufficiently ambitious short-and medium-term QELROs will require much greater reductions later in order
to meet the ultimate objective of the Framework Convention on
Climate Change and could jeopardize the attainment of that objective.
To follow the precautionary principle, early action must be
applied.
Emission budgets (para 85 - 91)
The EU has studied with interest para 85.2-85.6 and 90.1-90.6, but
wants to emphasize that it cannot consider them in detail until their
timing and reduction objectives have been clarified.
Regarding 90.1, the EU finds the idea of emission budgets
interesting, but wants to underline that such budget periods should
not postpone the time when commitments become legally binding and can
be monitored. We clearly oppose the idea of borrowing mentioned in
90.2 of this section and we do not wish to see this concept included
in the Protocol. In a Convention where the focus is on reducing the
environmental burdens for next generations, the idea of borrowing
emissions from those generations leans towards both unfairness and
un-sustainability.
Base years (para 86)
While the EU maintains 1990 as a base year, it notes the idea of
giving flexibility to Parties with Economies in Transition as
reflected in para 86. Base years other than 1990 for these Parties
should be stipulated in Annex Y. We intend to return to this point
later.
Flexibility (para 103 - 107)
Firstly regarding trading, whilst the EU is open to further
consideration and development of an emissions trading mechanism to
increase flexibility in meeting post-2000 commitments, there are a
large number of key issues which would need to be addressed and
resolved satisfactorily before agreement could be reached, and very
little time in which to do so. In particular the EU considers that
the issue of monitoring and verification, whilst not solely an issue
for trading, is a crucial one.
The EU is also concerned that emissions trading should not be used
as a means of avoiding action domestically to mitigate climate change
as required under Article 4.1 of the Convention. Neither should
trading be used as an excuse to delay action indefinitely, by
allowing borrowing (as proposed by the US). Trading should not be
seen as an alternative to the development of policies and measures as
set out in the EU's protocol proposal.
In light of the above the EU feels it is highly improbable that an
acceptable trading system could be elaborated and agreed upon in time
for CoP3.
Regarding joint implementation, the EU believes that JI between
Annex X Parties, as set out in the EU' s proposal (in para 109.1) and
subject to appropriate rules being part of the Protocol, could be a
valuable means of meeting a proportion of those Parties' commitments.
It could also be a useful step towards the involvement of all Parties
and possibly the development of a trading scheme. However the EU does
not believe that it would be appropriate to agree at COP3 upon joint
implementation between all Parties , before a decision has been taken
on the pilot phase of activities implemented jointly.
On this point the EU wants to draw the attention to the fact that
the text contained in paragraph 109.2 of document FCCC/AGBM/1997/2 is
not in accordance with the text of the EU's original submission of 15
January and should read: "The Conference of the Parties shall take
decisions regarding criteria for joint implementation with
other Parties at a future session".
C Possible impacts on developing countries of new
commitments in the new instrument/economic injuries sustained by
developing countries (para 118-123 and para 31-32 of
the Addendum).
The EU has taken good notice of all the proposals on this
important subject in para 118-123 and para 31-32 of the addendum,
made by Non-Annex I Parties. The EU takes the subject of impacts on
developing countries, that might arise from the adverse effects of
climate change and/or the impact of the implementation of response
measures very serious. It also recognises the situation of Parties
whose economies are highly dependant on income generated from the
production, processing and consumption of fossil fuels and associated
energy-intensive products. Art.4.8 and 4.10 of the Convention deal
with these issues and the Berlin Mandate makes specific reference to
these articles.
The approach chosen to deal with these issues in most of the
proposals made, namely to establish a form of financial liability
towards Parties that may see changes in their revenues from fossil
fuels exports and to establish a compensation mechanism to compensate
possible losses, is however not acceptable to us.
The EU would recommend to follow a different approach, that may
include the following elements:
a) Increase the transparency of the process that will lead to
decisions on the actions to be included in the protocol and their
implementation by making available information through the national
communications under the Convention and the protocol. In that context
information such as the nature of policies and measures undertaken,
changes in energy balances over time, but also the expected impact of
climate change itself would be useful. Furthermore, analysis of such
impacts will need to be pursued in the context of decision making at
international and national level. The IPCC workshop on this issue
planned for August in Oslo will be a useful contribution, as has been
the case for the round table discussions held at previous AGBM
sessions.
b) Explore how mitigation options and internationally agreed or
coordinated policies and measures can create opportunities for
countries that may face impacts of the implementation of response
measures to play a constructive role in the joint effort of all
Parties to combat climate change, while strengthening their economic
resource base. The EU is aware of some initiatives to do such
exploratory studies and welcomes an opportunity to hear more about
their results.
D MEASUREMENT, REPORTING AND COMMUNICATION OF INFORMATION
(para 124-133)
General observations
The draft text in para 126 tabled by the EU in relation to
measurements, reporting and communication of information is designed
to integrate with the requirements under Article 12 of the Convention
relating to national communications. The EU text, together with
additions to the "Guidelines for the preparation of National
Communications" to take account of commitments under the Protocol or
another legal instrument, provides a sound basis for reporting
obligations.
Allowing for the fact that the Japanese and USA proposals reflect
their different approaches to QELROs there are substantial
similarities between the EU and other proposals. Below we will now
comment on these proposals more in detail.
AOSIS (para 124)
In para 124 the AOSIS text is similar in substance to the EU text
except for the requirement in the AOSIS proposal (124.2) to indicate
how a Party's policies and measures form part of a low cost
implementation strategy. As the benefit of such a requirement is not
apparent, the EU, subject to further arguments that may be advanced
by AOSIS, does not favour it.
The EU would prefer its own approach, but if the AOSIS proposal is
to be developed, the EU considers that the provision of full costs
and benefits should be "as appropriate". As regards agreement on
methodologies, the EU understands the point being made by AOSIS;
however, the EU considers the revised Guidelines for Annex I
Communications provide sufficient guidance for the present and that
further work will be needed to develop them further after the first
meeting of the Parties to the Protocol or another legal
instrument.
Australia (para 125)
The EU considers that the Australian proposal in para 125 is more
appropriate for discussion under Section 2A of the Framework
Compilation in the section dealing with policies and measures and
refers to the EU proposals in para 33.1.
G77 and China (para 127) and Iran (para
128)
The EU would be concerned that the proposals that the proposals of
G77 and China in para 127 and Iran in para 128 do not provide for the
advancement of the implementation of the commitments in Article 4.1
of the Convention. In particular the proposals would prohibit the
development of In-Depth Reviews for developing country Parties and
could not provide a sufficient basis for strengthening the In-Depth
Review process for Annex X Parties. In this regard, the EU recalls
its proposals in para 151.2 as amended.
Japan (para 129)
The Japanese text in para 129 reflects its different approach to
QELROs and as such it differs from the EU in matters which it
requires information to be provided on. The basis on which
projections of future emissions should be provided (to the middle of
the 21st century is suggested in para 129 (e)), and the purpose for
which these projections would be used will need to be elaborated
before detailed consideration can be given to the inclusion of such a
provision.
The EU reaffirms its preferences for time frames such as 2005,
2010, and possibly 2020 in the Protocol or another legal instrument.
It acknowledges that an understanding of the longer horizons would be
interesting, if available, but considers that the determination of
requirements for the period after 2020 is a matter for review at an
appropriate time in the future. In the meantime, the EU considers
this proposal is not a matter for inclusion in the text of a legal
instrument.
Kuwait and Nigeria (para 130.1 -
130.5)
While para 130.1 (a) and (b) are similar in substance to the EU
text, para 130.2 et sequitur impose unnecessary additional
requirements in terms of frequency and detail of reporting on
developed country Parties. The main objective of this reporting
requirement is to identify the effect on fossil fuel and associated
product imports from developing countries. The information would be
subject to review by the secretariat assisted by a review team drawn
from Parties. Failure by a Party or Parties accounting for 10% or
more of GHG emissions to submit information sought would result in
lapsing of QELROs. In the EU view, this is a compliance issue and not
related to the reporting and communication of
information.
The submission of the information sought is in our view not
necessary and impracticable. National communications already require
the submission of detailed information to allow Parties to estimate
the effects of policies and measures. Accordingly EU cannot accept
the inclusion of para 130.2 to 130.4 of the Kuwaiti and Nigerian
text. However, the EU recognises that there might be elements worthy
of further consideration but which then could be discussed within the
framework of the present Guidelines for national communications of
Annex I Parties and possible revision of the Guidelines. In
recognising this, no concession can be implied in relation to the
proposals for compensation for economics injuries that may be
sustained by developing country Parties contained in Section II.C of
the Framework Compilation, including the proposals for compensation
for loss of income from exports of fossil fuels and fossil fuel
products outlined in para 120.
The provisions for the expiration of the Articles relating to
QELROs and policies and measures for all Parties arising out of a
failure of Parties representing 10% of developed countries' emissions
to submit a communication in any year, or implement policies and
measures arising out of the in-depth review process that appear
reasonably necessary to achieve the QERLO, are unacceptable to the
EU. It should not be possible for the essential provisions of the
Protocol or another legal instrument for all developed country
Parties to be negated by the acts of omission of a small number of
these Parties. It is legally unacceptable and contrary to any
provisions of international law that obligations may lapse in the
manner proposed. In any event, adequate provisions can be made in the
compliance and in the dispute resolution mechanisms to ensure timely
presentation of national communications and review and assist, if
necessary, any Party in the intensification of the necessary policies
and measures.
Switzerland (para 132)
The Swiss proposal in para 132 is in essence the same as the EU
proposal.
USA (para 133)
The USA proposal in para 133 reflects its approach to QELROs and
large elements of the reporting requirements would only be required
for consideration if provision is made for banking and borrowing
within and between budgetary periods for emissions. This proposal is
relevant to trading and should be discussed in that
context.
E. Voluntary application of commitments by non-Annex I
Parties (para 134-138)
As indicated in para 135, the EU believes that it is necessary to
allow for some or all commitments for Annex I Parties regarding
QELROs and policies and measures under the Protocol to be extended to
other Parties on the basis of voluntary acceptance, as also proposed
on the AOSIS Protocol text (para 134). They would do so in their
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or at
any time thereafter, notify the Depositary that it intends to be
bound by those commitments. The Depository shall then inform the
other signatories and Parties of any such notification,
The US proposal (para 138.1-138.2) includes the voluntary
acceptance of obligations as well. However, its approach does not
allow the flexibility included in the EU approach which allows
Parties to choose to adopt the full QELRO and/or various policies and
measures.
Regarding para 136.1 proposing the voluntary submission of
information by Parties not included in Annex I, the EU Draft Protocol
(para 135) states that once countries voluntary decide to be bound by
policies and measures and/or QELROs, they shall submit an initial
communication within 3 years of the entry into force of the Protocol
for that Party. This approach is still preferable to that in
136.1.
We do not believe that the proposition in para 136.2 is in line
with Article 11 and the Memorandum of Understanding on Modalities for
the functioning of operational linkages between the Conference of the
Parties and the operating entity or entities of the financial
mechanism, agreed at previous sessions. According to Article 11 and
the MoU, the COP is not responsible for funding decisions on
individual projects but for the overall policy guidance to the
financial mechanism. This proposition would foresee individual
funding decisions by the COP. It is the task of the financial
mechanism to take decisions as described in para 136.2. It goes
without saying that the financial mechanism has to ensure that funded
projects related to the Convention are in conformity with the
policies, eligibility criteria and programme priorities established
by the Conference of the Parties.
III. REVIEW OF COMMITMENTS' (para
139-148)
The EU would like to recall that the Geneva Ministerial
Declaration requested that: "The instrument should include a
mechanism to allow the regular review and strengthening of the
commitments embodied in a protocol or another legal instrument". The
EU strongly endorses this request as indeed do many other countries
and most of the proposals put forward reflect this basic
idea.
The EU strongly endorses the request for a review of the adequacy
of commitments on the basis of Art. 2 of the Convention, as indeed is
reflected in many of her proposals put forward.
The EU has inter alia proposed that the first general review
should take place no later than 31 December 2002. In the view of the
EU such a date will be appropriate as by that time achievements with
respect to current commitments can better be judged. Furthermore the
IPCC will issue its 3. Assessment Report at the latest in the
beginning of 2001 so this report could be used as a basis for the
review.
IV. CONTINUING TO ADVANCE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXISTING
COMMITMENTS IN ARTICLE 4.1.F (paragraphs
149-164)
A. General elements
The EU agrees with the general thrust of the proposal in
para 149 and wants to draw the attention to the fact
that the elements have been further elaborated in the EU
proposal.
The EU has revised its proposal in paras 150 - 151.4
by incorporating some views contained in the proposals from
France and the United Kingdom which are now superseded by the new EU
proposal. The EU would therefore like to add the following to its
previous proposal: - at the end of para 151.2 add
the following: "(g) in respect of national communications
(4.1j):
(i) arrangements for in-depth reviews of Annex 1 Parties
communications should be strengthened along the lines of the OECD
Countries Environmental Performance Reviews (that is including a
formal opportunity for ether Parties to ask questions about the
review findings);
(ii) in-depth reviews of non-Annex Parties' communications should
be introduced along the lines of existing arrangements for Annex
I."
- in para 151.3: add at the end of indent (ii)
the following:
"as well as of measures in sectors largely open to international
competition II.
Para 152.1- 152.3
With regard to these paragraphs the EU would like to highlight the
following considerations:
- the EU recognizes that continuing to advance existing
commitments by developing country Parties is dependant upon developed
country Parties meeting their commitments under Articles 4.3, 4.4 and
4.5;
- the EU notes that continuing to advance the implementation of
commitments by developing country Parties under Article 4. 1 also
depends upon these Parties adopting national strategies and policies
to mitigate and adapt to climate change;
- the EU also notes that para 152.1 contains
additional elements to these contained in Article 4.1 and would
therefore be beyond the scope of the existing commitments in Article
4.1. The EU refers to its proposals in paragraph 183 that the
financial mechanism of the CoP should also be the financial mechanism
for the purposes of the Protocol. Consequently the issues raised in
para 152.2 should be dealt with by the existing
arrangements of the SBI and SBSTA.
The EU agrees on the content of para 154.1 which
is also contained in para 151.2 of the Framework Compilation. With
regard to para 154.2 the EU believes that it should
be considered in the part related to financing.
The EU note with interest the proposal by Switzerland in
para 155 but would prefer to consider such
mechanisms in the context of Section II.E of the
Compilation.
The EU supports the inclusion of policies and measures in the
Protocol but cannot support the US proposal in para 157.6
as it is limited to countries outside Annexes A and B
only.
The same line of thinking applies to para 157.7
in sofar it is restricted only to non-Annex A and non-Annex
B.
With regard to para 157.8 the EU believes that
this para is unbalanced: in fact it introduces a review process for
non-Annex I Parties which is even stronger than the review process
envisaged for Annex I Parties. The EU believes that this point is
better considered in the proposed new para 151.2 (g).
The EU believes that the concepts expressed in para 158
are already covered in paras 150 and 183 of the Framework
Compilation.
B. Technology Transfer
The EU believes that there is no need in having two separate
chapters in the issue "Continuing to advance the implementation of
existing commitments in art. 4.1.
Para 159
The EU believes that the content of this para 159
is also treated in para 151.3 of the Framework
Compilation.
After an internal EU discussion para 160 is now
superseded and has to be removed from the Framework
Compilation.
The EU believes that the content of paras 161 to
164 is also treated in para 151.3 of the Framework
Compilation.
V. EVOLUTION (para 165)
The EU recognizes that in the long term emissions of greenhouse
gases from countries not included in Annex I must also be regulated
if the long term objective of the Convention is to be
met.
The EU is of the view that this should be considered as one
element in the first review of the Protocol.
VI. INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES (para
166-196)
With regard to the headings A, B, C and D the EU strongly supports
the notion of applying a high degree of institutional
economy.
A. CoP/MoP, para 166.1 -170.5
All proposals made under this heading generally seem feasible, as
they stay in line with traditional law-making. The proposal by the
EU, however, by relying on the same CoP for the Protocol as for the
Convention, complies with the terms of the chapeau to Art. 7.2 of the
Convention. For legal reasons, however, participation in
decision-making under the Protocol as well as bureau representation
will need to be limited to the Parties to the Protocol.
B. Secretariat, para 171. -175.2
We note with appreciation that all proposals go in the same
direction. we believe, however, that the formulation of the proposal
submitted by the EU is the most advanced one, as it is written in the
legal language necessary when drawing up a multilateral environmental
agreement.
C. Subsidiary Bodies, para 176.
-180.
Again, the general thrust of ail submissions points towards the two subsidiary bodies serving as the subsidiary bodies to the Protocol. For legal reasons, again, participation in decision-making as well as bureau representation will have to be limited to the Parties to the Protocol.
The model proposed by Australia in para 172, according to which
the question of participation would be considered in the light of the
precise role these bodies were to be given in the instrument, is not
acceptable to us.
D. Coordination Mechanism, para 181.1 -
181.4
The EU draft Protocol includes in its Annexes A, B and C
comprehensive lists of policies and measures. As stated in para 33.2
of doc. FCCC/AGBM/1997/2, Annex A refers to common measures for
industrialized countries, which are mandatory for all Annex X
Parties. Moreover, as stated in para 33.3, Parties listed in Annex X
shall give high priority to the adoption and implementation of the
policies and measures set out in Annex B, and shall work towards
early coordination, by applying the guidance set out in that Annex. A
process needs to be established to develop such guidance. In that
context suggestions for a coordination mechanism seem to go in the
right direction. At this stage, however, we doubt whether
establishing a coordination mechanism that took the form of a new
institution could be reconciled with our strong belief in the need
for institutional economy.
E. Financial Mechanism, para 182. -
183.
The proposals both opt for the financial mechanism established
under the Convention to serve also the Protocol. The language offered
by the EU in para 183, according to which "the financial mechanism
defined for the purposes of the Convention as well as the entity or
entities entrusted with its operation shall serve as the financial
mechanism and entity or entities for the purpose of the Protocol" is
in our view a more precise and a more appropriate one to include in a
Protocol. We do not believe that approval by the CoP of the
Convention would be necessary as such approval would be inherent in
the decision to be taken by the Cop when adopting the
Protocol.
F-G. Review of Information/Review of Implementation and
Compliance and Multilateral Consultative Process, para
184.-190.
First of all, the EU asks that a clear distinction be drawn
between "Review of information" and "Review of Implementation and
Compliance". To that end, para 184, which obviously has been taken
from an earlier EU submission, ought to be deleted as its content is
fully reflected in our later proposal as set out in para 189.
Furthermore para 186 to 190 should be dealt with under a single
heading to be called either "Multilateral Consultative Process" or
(to use language of the convention) "Matters with regard to
implementation".
Before addressing the issue of implementation and compliance, we
would like to comment on para 185.1 and 2 regarding the review of
information: a system for reviewing information has been established
by the CoP of the Convention by means of Decision 2/CP.l. In order to
incorporate such a system into the Protocol regime, CoP I of the
Protocol would have to take the stop of expressively endorsing
Decision 2/CP.l.
Turning to substance, the EU welcomes the importance attributed
and the wide support given to review of implementation and compliance
as such. We believe that the creation of a process for the resolution
of questions regarding implementation and compliance will be
indispensable taking into account the highly regulatory character of
the Protocol. This being the case, we would not wish to create any
substantive conditionality to Article 13 of the convention, as is
suggested under para 188.1. In order not to overload AGBM's agenda,
the EU has proposed to leave the detailed design of such a process to
the first CoP of the Protocol. The enabling provision of the Protocol
should, however, contain a clear and strong mandate to the COP, as
formulated by the EU in para. 189.
H. Dispute settlement, para 191. -
196.3
The EU wishes to reiterate that there is no need for a Protocol to
contain a separate provision on dispute settlement, as Art. 14 of the
Convention applies automatically to any Protocol.
VII. FINAL ELEMENTS' (para 197-241)
A. Decision making, para 197. - 201.
The interpretation given to Art. 17.5 of the Convention by para
200 is unacceptable, as in such case non-Parties to the Protocol
would be vested with authority to amend its provisions.
B. Amendments, para 202.1 - 206.
We noted the difference between the numbers necessary to adopt an
amendment in the AOSIS and the EU proposals. A higher number however
would guarantee a greater degree of acceptance.
For the reasons already stated with regard to the proposal in
para. 200, the EU cannot accept the interpretation given to Art. 17.5
of the Convention (para 205.1).
When a Party which has not joined in the adoption of an amendment
wishes to ratify it at a later stage, it would be helpful if that
Party, prior to depositing its instrument of ratification notified
the Secretariat of its intention to ratify. The Secretariat could
then inform the Parties of such notification.
C. Relationship with the Convention, para 207.1 -
208.
The EU interprets Art. 7.2 of the Convention as meaning that the
CoP of the Convention would also serve as the CoP of the Protocol
under the conditions set out in para 168. Moreover the EU proposal
outlines very clearly all the cases in which institutions established
by the Convention shall serve for the purposes of the Protocol as
well. Beyond these institutional linkages there is no need for
further guidance as stipulated in para 207.2. to para
208.
D. Adoption and Amendment of Annexes, para 209.1 -
213.
There is not much difference between the proposals of the AOSIS
and the EU; the EU proposal however is more explicit than the AOSIS
proposal and hence seems to us to be more suitable. For the reasons
already stated by us with regard to para. 200, the EU cannot accept
the interpretation given to Art. 17.5 of the Convention in para
212.1-3.
E. Right to vote, para 214.1 - 215.3
The issue of adjustments (para 215.3) requires further
discussion.
F. Relationship to other Agreements, para
217.
The EU is continuing to consider the implications of this proposal
but, as matters stand at present it does not consider that it will be
necessary to include a para of this type in the
Protocol.
G-H. Depositary and Signature, para 218. -
224.
No comments.
I. Provisional Application, para
225.
It would be open to Parties, whether or not such a provision
exists, to apply the instrument provisionally prior of its entry into
force and to notify the Depository accordingly, This being so we do
not consider that the provision proposed in para 225 is
necessary.
J.-K. Ratification, Acceptance,Approval or Accession
and Entry into Force, para 226.1 -
234.
A provision like the one included in para 230 cannot be
implemented in a legally sound manner; it should therefore not be
pursued.
With reference to para 232 we note that the number of
ratifications of an international environmental instrument
traditionally is among the last items to be decided. The EU therefore
would wish to reserve judgement on that matter for a later stage. At
the appropriate time we shall be happy to consider any variation on
the modalities of entry into force other than by mere numbers, as
suggested under para 234.
L.-M. Reservations and withdrawal, para
235. - 239.
The EU believes that the issue addressed in para 238.2 is in any
event covered by the rules of international law and notes that such
provisions are never included in international environmental
agreements.
N Authentic texts
No comments.